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Based on this conference, policymakers might consider the following steps:

© Expand multilateral programs to circumvent competition among PFP partners and to enhance
sub-regional cooperation.

© Craft PFP programs with three-to-five year time horizons to legitimize democratic political leaders
and programs in the region.

© Emphasize PFP political programs to offset military predominance in the region.

© Provide the resources to jump start PFP and avoid seeing the program stillborn.

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© To begin joint exercises. (Germany and the UK will carry out a joint exercise with Hungarian
forces in Hungary; the Dutch have requested that Hungarian forces participate in an exercise on
Dutch soil.)

© To bolster their staff in Belgium. (They have promoted their military representative to general
officer rank and expanded his staff by two at Evere; they will expand the staff at Mons as well).

SLOVAKIA

PFP clearly has an influence on Slovakia's transition. Slovakia's main objective is to gradually achieve
"full-fledged" NATO membership. Slovakia's PFP document describes the concrete steps they will take
to achieve military cooperation. They plan to implement PPBS in two-to-three years and to develop a
small but well-trained army to be inter-operable with NATO. They have allocated a specific portion (one
per cent) of their defense budget to PFP.

Slovakia feels that NATO's enlargement does not threaten anyone, but in fact expands the zone of
stability. They intend to send a liaison officer to NATO shortly. In addition, they will offer to make
training areas available to NATO for exercises up to battalion level, as well as an educational center in
Bratislava for PFP members. The Slovakians regard their 600-man UNPROFOR commit- ment as the
basis for future interoperability.

ROMANIA

The Romanians are discussing and developing their PFP presentation document. Though specifics of
Romania's PFP plan remain vague, the Romanians claim that PFP can lead to the expansion of security
to Central and even Easter Europe. They see NATO and PFP as the main power source to fill what they
see as a security vacuum in the region. They also seem to believe that PFP can assist Romania convert its
defense industry to produce military items to NATO standards and for NATO markets.

Romania's enthusiasm seems to be related more to the fact that PFP prevented NATO's early admission
of the Visegrad States; PFP represents a challenge for Romania, but also the "best chance" for the region.
The Romanians stress that they see PFP as the instru- ment for NATO's expansion, but argue that any
NATO expansion must include Romania.

BULGARIA

Bulgarians feel insecure as a result of the loss of international security guarantees. Bulgaria stresses the
primacy of the UN Charter and their past contributions to UN PKOs. They have made the political
commitment to join NATO, but they question whether NATO will really open its doors to Bulgaria. The
Bulgarians also seem resigned to the fact that they have little influence over the NATO process.

Though PFP creates an "equal" start to partners who are beginning the step-by-step process to NATO
guarantees, Bulgaria seems particularly sensitive to its financial constraints. Bulgarians stress the need
for new markets for their defense industry and for financial support. In this vein, the Bulgarian budget
meets only 30 per cent of the needs of the Defense Ministry. So Bulgaria faces cutting its military
forcespthe question is by how much. If Bulgaria's forces are cut, Bulgaria will be at risk.

Policy Recommendations

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INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM

A. Report Title: Central European Security, 1994: Partnership for Peace
(PFP)

B. DATE Report Downloaded From the Internet: 10/03/01

C. Report's Point of Contact: (Name, Organization, Address, Office
Symbol, & Ph #): National Defense University Press
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Washington, DC 20001

D. Currently Applicable Classification Level: Unclassified

E. Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release

F. The foregoing information was compiled and provided by:
DTIC-OCA, Initials: _ VM__ Preparation Date 10/03/01

The foregoing information should exactly correspond to the Title, Report Number, and the Date on
the accompanying report document. If there are mismatches, or other questions, contact the
above OCA Representative for resolution.



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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

STRATEGIC FoRUM

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Central European Security, 1994: Partnership
For Peace (PFP)

Dr. Jeffrey Simon

Conference Conclusions

© Most Central and East European states (the Czech Republic excepted) feel more insecure in 1994
than they did in 1989.

All Central and East European states agree that formal integration into Western institutions
generally and NATO specifically is the key to stability and security.

© All see PFP as the necessary step to NATO membership and security guarantee -- although they
are confused about the relationship of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to PFP
and how the Western European Union(WEU) will interact with NATO. They are also concerned
about whether Russia will establish a "special" relationship under PFP.

© The states fear that PFP has inadvertently undermined sub-regional cooperation and contributed to
competition, but they agree that this problem can be ameliorated by advancing sub-regional
programs and multilateral military activities.

© Resource scarcity is a universal problem; it has heightened insecurity and exaggerated competition
among Central and East Europeans. PFP's success or failure may rest on resource availability.

¢ All Central and Eastern European states regard peacekeeping operations as the instrument for

NATO integration. Because of that, it's possible NATO might receive more offers of
peace-keeping training sites, centers, and facilities than it could possibly accommodate.

Background

Despite a wide variety of problems, risks, threats, and opportunities, all presentations portrayed the real
basis of national security as depending on the following:

¢ Internal stability and development
© Good-neighbor relations

© Regional cooperation -- e.g., Visegrad Group, Carpatho-European Region, and Central European

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Initiative.

As a result, they portrayed their military restructuring more as an instrument for achieving the goal
of Western integration than as one for meeting immediate defense needs and re-quirements.

In the same vein, since all Central Europeans want to integrate into Western institutions such as
EU and NATO, they are frustrated because of confusion with their multiplicity, their shortage of
resources, and their lack of clear time-lines to demonstrate results to their constituencies.

© They express confusion about the relationship between NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation
Council and Partnership for Peace (PFP). Specifically, the Central and East Europeans want to
know the advantages or disadvantages of the WEU's Consultative Council and Associate
Membership.

* Since manpower and resources are so scarce, Central Europeans are uncertain as to the most
rational way to allocate those resources. They worry that the NATO-WEU institutions are really
competitive, not compatible.

¢ An important concern of the Central European states, one that they feel is little understood and
under- appreciated in the West, is that their social-psychological imperative requires short
time-frame goals -- three to five years. Ultimate Central European assessments of the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of WEU or NATO (NACC/PFP) may be driven by this
social-psychological need to fulfill goals quickly.

Despite NATO's efforts to the contrary, all Central European participants expressed concern about any
"special" relationship that Russia might develop with NATO under PFP. Any special relationship under
PFP raises Central European concerns about Russian influence over their security and potential
condominium. It also drives them toward the WEU, which excludes Russia.

Likewise -- NATO's efforts to the contrary --Central European participants expressed unanimity in one

judgment of NATO's PFP program. To wit, they perceive PFP as a necessary condition to future NATO
membership. As a result, PFP has turned them into competitors: As each state races to join NATO first,
it sees little reason to cooperate with the others. Competition may also be heightened by the fact that

NATO treats each bilateral PFP Presentation Plan as "confidential," which discourages and undermines
efforts to discuss and compare PFP plans and enhance transparency in the region.

Central and East European PFP Plans

POLAND

On 25 April 1994 Poland submitted its PFP presentation document to NATO. Poland sees PFP
participation as leading to full NATO membership. Poland's PFP priorities include:

¢ Political consultations
© Military exercises with stress on peacekeeping operations (PKOs)
* Broad exchange in defense and security informationbincluding plans to bolster their staffs at Mons

and Evere.

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Though the scarcity of resources to implement PFP remains a real problem, Polish political will and
determination exists. The Polish will seek to expand their NATO bilateral contacts under the PFP
umbrella because they want to establish a broad network of defense contacts. They are planning common
exercises with the Netherlands, Germany, and the US. They think that PFP should include other
countries in military exercises to enhance sub- regional cooperation. The Poles feel that the 16+1 PFP
formula does create competition, but expanding multilateral military exercises to enhance sub-regional
cooperation can reverse this situation. Poland has found its informal cooperation with France and
Germany to be useful.

CZECH REPUBLIC

The Czech Republic's strategic goal is to join NATO. They do not see PFP as a substitute for NATO
membership, but as a step toward membership. Prime Minister Klaus signed PFP in March 1994; the
Government signed the presentation document in early May and will present it to Brussels shortly.

The PFP document commits Czech forces to support UN peace- keeping operations and outlines the

means to achieve operational compatibility with NATO. The short-term goal is to support PKOs; the
mid-term goal is to achieve compatibility in combat operations; the long-term goal is to achieve full

compatibility.

The Czechs will offer their training ranges to NATO armies and intend to augment their staffs at Evere
and Mons. Though they need outside assistance, the Czechs have increased their defense budget, in part
to help achieve their PFP goals.

The Czechs made particular note of the fact that PFP has introduced an element of competition into the
region because NATO is evaluating each country. In addition, since PFP documents are "classified," PFP
tends to further "divide" the countries in the region. The Czechs, though, made note of their "special"
ties to Slovakia (specifically the Czech and Slovak military cooperation agreement of early May 1994).

HUNGARY:

The Hungarian PFP Presentation Document is now ready to be delivered. Hungary took its time because
it wanted a well-elaborated and well-developed document. The document was developed within the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) with the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and is
was coordinated with some NATO partners as well as Austria, which has assisted by exchanging
military planners and providing small-unit (company-battalion) training.

The Hungarians do not intend to publish the document, although they do not consider it confidential.
Hungary's PFP effort will seek:

© To develop a training and educational program with NATO and NATO members.
* To cooperate closely in peacekeeping monitoring and operations. They have already begun
cooperation with Nordic countries in PKO and monitoring activities. (The Hungarian Armed

Forces are not capable of meeting large requests.)

© To establish in Budapest a regional peacekeeping center for education and trainingpfor this center,
they will seek NATO's help.

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