Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 24 / Thursday, February 5, 2004 / Notices 5579

If additional information is required 

contact: Ms. Brenda E. Dyer, Deputy 

Clearance Officer, Information 

Management and Security Staff, Justice 

Management Division, Department of 

Justice, Patrick Henry Building Suite 

1600, 601 D Street NW., Washington, 

DC 20530.

Dated: January 30, 2004. 

Brenda E. Dyer, 

Deputy Clearance Officer, Department of 

Justice.

[FR Doc. 04–2322 Filed 2–4–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–FY–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 03–36] 

Annette Antonsson, M.D., Denial of 

Application 

On June 4, 2003, the Deputy Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Division 

Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), issued an Order 

to Show Cause to Annette Antonsson, 

M.D. (Respondent) of San Francisco, 

California, notifying her of an 

opportunity to show cause as to why 

DEA should not deny her application 

for a DEA certificate of registration as a 

practitioner pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a) 

and deny any pending applications for 

renewal or modification of Respondent’s 

expired DEA registration BA2457097. 

As a basis for revocation, the Order to 

Show Cause alleged that Respondent 

voluntarily surrendered her State 

license to practice medicine to the 

Medical Board of California effective 

May 24, 1999, and that, accordingly, she 

is not authorized to handle controlled 

substances in California, the State in 

which she applied to be registered. 

On July 5, 2003, Respondent, acting 

pro se, timely requested a hearing in 

this matter. In her request for a hearing, 

Respondent admitted she had 

surrendered her license and was 

‘‘currently not licensed in California.’’

On July 24, 2003, the Presiding 

Administrative Law Judge Mary Ellen 

Bittner (Judge Bittner) issued the 

Government, as well as Respondent, an 

Order for Prehearing Statements. 

In lieu of filing a prehearing 

statement, the Government filed 

Government’s request for Stay of 

Proceedings and Motion for Summary 

Disposition. The Government argued 

that the Respondent is without 

authorization to handle controlled 

substances in the State of California, 

and as a result, further proceedings in 

the matter were not required. Attached 

to the Government’s motion was a copy 

of the Medical Board of California’s 

Decision and Order, dated June 28, 

1999, adopting the Stipulation for 

Surrender of License which Respondent 

agreed to and signed on May 24, 1999. 

On July 31, 2003, Judge Bittner issued 

a Memorandum to Counsel providing 

Respondent until August 31, 2003, to 

respond to the Government’s motion. 

Respondent did not file any response. 

On September 23, 2003, Judge Bittner 

issued her Opinion and Recommended 

Decision of the Administrative Law 

Judge (Opinion and Recommended 

Decision). As part of her recommended 

ruling, Judge Bittner granted the 

Government’s Motion for Summary 

Disposition and found that the 

Respondent lacked authorization to 

handle controlled substances in 

California, the jurisdiction in which she 

was applying to be registered. Judge 

Bittner also recommended that the 

Respondent’s application for a DEA 

certificate of registration be denied. No 

exceptions were filed by either party to 

Judge Bittner’s Opinion and 

Recommended Decision and on 

November 13, 2003, the record of these 

proceedings was transmitted to the 

Office of the Acting DEA Deputy 

Administrator. 

The Acting Deputy Administrator has 

considered the record in its entirety and 

pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby 

issues her final order based upon 

findings of fact and conclusions of law 

as hereinafter set forth. The Acting 

Deputy Administrator adopts, in full, 

the Opinion and Recommended 

Decision of the Administrative Law 

Judge. 

The Acting Deputy Administrator 

finds that Respondent was previously 

issued DEA certificate of registration BA 

2457097, which expired in June 2002. 

Subsequently, Respondent filed an 

application for renewal on October 31, 

2002, which was appropriately treated 

by DEA as a request for a new 

registration. The Acting Deputy 

Administrator further finds that, 

effective May 24, 1999, Respondent 

voluntarily surrendered her State 

license to practice medicine to the 

California Medical Board and has also 

admitted that she is currently not 

licensed to practice in California. 

Therefore, the Acting Deputy 

Administrator finds Respondent is 

currently not licensed to practice 

medicine in California and as a result, 

it is reasonable to infer she is also 

without authorization to handle 

controlled substances in that State. 

DEA does not have statutory authority 

under the Controlled Substances Act to 

issue or maintain a registration if the 

applicant or registrant is without State 

authority to handle controlled 

substances in the State in which she 

conducts business. See 21 U.S.C. 

802(21), 823(f) and 824(a)(3). This 

prerequisite has been consistently 

upheld. See Karen Joe Smiley, M.D., 68 

FR 48944 (2003); Dominick A. Ricci, 

M.D., 58 FR 51104 (1993); Bobby Watts, 

M.D., 53 FR 11919 (1988). 

Here, it is clear that Respondent is not 

currently licensed to handle controlled 

substances in California, the jurisdiction 

in which she has applied for 

registration. Therefore, she is not 

entitled to a DEA registration in that 

State. 

Accordingly, the Acting Deputy 

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, pursuant to the 

authority vested in her by 21 U.S.C. 823 

and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, 

hereby orders that the application for a 

DEA certificate of registration submitted 

by Annette Antonsson, M.D., be, and it 

hereby is, denied. This order is effective 

March 8, 2004.

Dated: January 7, 2004. 

Michele M. Leonhart 

Acting Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 04–2341 Filed 2–4–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Thomas G. Easter II, M.D.; Denial of 

Registration 

On August 29, 2002, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), issued an Order 

to Show Cause to Thomas G. Easter II, 

M.D. (Dr. Easter) notifying him of an 

opportunity to show cause as to why 

DEA should not deny his pending 

application for a DEA Certificate of 

Registration pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

823(f). The order alleged in relevant part 

that: Dr. Easter had been convicted in 

Texas State court of eight felony counts 

of Possession of Controlled Substances 

by Fraud; that the court terms of his 

probation prohibited him from 

prescribing controlled substances and 

he was thus not authorized to handle 

controlled substances in the State in 

which he practices; and that his 

registration was inconsistent with the 

public interest based on Dr. Easter’s 

material false statements in his DEA 

Application for Registration and a false 

statement on his application for renewal 

of State registration under the Texas 

Controlled Substances Act. The order 

also notified Dr. Easter that should no 

5580 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 24 / Thursday, February 5, 2004 / Notices 

request for a hearing be filed within 30 

days, his hearing right would be deemed 

waived. 

The Order to Show Cause was sent by 

certified mail to Dr. Easter at his 

registered location in El Paso, Texas. On 

September 18, 2002, DEA received an 

undated signed receipt indicating the 

Order to Show Cause was received on 

his behalf. DEA has not received a 

request for hearing or any other reply 

from Dr. Easter or anyone purporting to 

represent him in this matter. 

Therefore, the Acting Deputy 

Administrator of DEA, finding that: (1) 

30 days having passed since the 

delivery of the Order to Show Cause at 

Dr. Easter’s registered address, and (2) 

no requests for hearing having been 

received, concludes that Dr. Easter is 

deemed to have waived his hearing 

right. See Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 67 

FR 65145 (2002); David W. Linder, 67 

FR 12579 (2002). After considering 

material from the investigative file in 

this matter, the Acting Deputy 

Administrator now enters her final 

order without a hearing pursuant to 21 

CFR 1301.43(d) and (e) and 1301.46. 

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1), the 

Acting Deputy Administrator may 

revoke a DEA Certificate of Registration 

and deny any pending applications for 

such a certificate upon a finding that the 

registrant has materially falsified any 

DEA application for registration. 

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2), the 

Deputy Administrator may revoke a 

DEA Certificate of Registration and deny 

any pending applications for such a 

certificate upon a finding that the 

registrant has been convicted of a felony 

related to controlled substances under 

State or Federal law. 

In addition, the Acting Deputy 

Administrator may revoke a DEA 

Certificate of Registration and deny any 

pending applications for such certificate 

if she determines that the issuance of 

such registration would be inconsistent 

with the public interest, as determined 

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(a)(4) and 

823(f). Section 823(f) requires the 

following factors be considered: 

(1) The recommendation of the 

appropriate State licensing board or 

professional disciplinary authority.

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing, or conducting research with 

respect to controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record 

under Federal or State laws relating to 

the manufacture, distribution, or 

dispensing of controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to 

controlled substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may 

threaten the public health or safety. 

As a threshold matter, it should be 

noted that the factors specified in 

section 823(f) are to be considered in the 

disjunctive: The Acting Deputy 

Administrator may properly rely on any 

one or a combination of the factors, and 

give each factor the weight she deems 

appropriate, in determining whether a 

registration should be revoked or 

denied. Henry J. Schwarz, Jr., M.D., 54 

FR 16422 (1989) 

The Acting Deputy Administrator’s 

review of the investigative file reveals 

that on April 23, 2001, in State of Texas

v. Thomas Easter, Cause No. 99D00731 

in the 243rd District Court of El Paso 

County, Texas, Dr. Easter pled guilty to 

an eight count indictment alleging 

violations of Texas Penal Code 

§ 481.129, Possession of Controlled 

Substance by Fraud, a Third Degree 

Felony. On May 24, 2001, the court 

deferred adjudication of guilt and 

placed Dr. Easter on 10 years 

Community Supervision, with Terms 

and Conditions. 

Among these Terms and Conditions 

was the prohibition that, without further 

order of the court, Dr. Easter was not to 

prescribe any medications, although he 

was permitted to make 

recommendations to a supervising 

physician. On February 22, 2002, the 

court modified the Terms and 

Conditions to generally allow Dr. Easter 

to prescribe medications, if done under 

the supervision of another physician. 

However, the court’s order specifically 

prohibited him from prescribing 

‘‘scheduled narcotics.’’

Pursuant to an August 22, 1998, 

Agreed Order of the Texas State Board 

of Medical Examiners, Dr. Easter’s 

license to practice medicine in Texas 

was restricted for a period of five years. 

That restricted license allowed him to 

prescribe, administer or dispense 

dangerous and controlled drugs with 

addictive potential, if he complied with 

certain enumerated conditions set forth 

in the Agreed Order. On June 6, 2003, 

the Texas State Board of Medical 

Examiners denied a request by Dr. 

Easter to terminate that Agreed Order. 

DEA does not have statutory authority 

under the Controlled Substances Act to 

issue a registration if the applicant is 

without State authority to handle 

controlled substances in the State in 

which he conducts business. See 21 

U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f) and 824(a)(3). The 

Acting Deputy Administrator and her 

predecessors have consistently so held. 

See Douglas L. Geiger, M.D., 67 FR 

64418 (2002); Theodore T. Ambadgis, 

M.D., 58 FR 5759 (1993); Ishan A. 

Karaagac, M.D., 51 FR 34695 (1986). 

While Dr. Easter may hold a Texas 

medical license allowing him to 

prescribe, administer and dispense 

scheduled drugs, as of the date of this 

final order, there is no evidence that the 

Order of the District Court dated 

February 14, 2002, has been modified, 

revoked or otherwise terminated. The 

State court’s order thus remains in full 

effect, prohibiting Dr. Easter from 

prescribing scheduled narcotic 

substances in Texas as a condition of his 

criminal probation.

Considering the foregoing, the Acting 

Deputy Administrator concludes, 

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f), that by 

virtue of that order, Dr. Easter currently 

lacks authority under the laws of the 

State of his applied-for registration and 

practice, to dispense controlled narcotic 

substances and his application should 

be denied on that, as well as the 

following grounds. See John P. Daniels, 

M.D., 51 FR 34694 (1986) (State criminal 

court’s probation order prohibiting 

defendant from possessing or 

prescribing dangerous drugs used as a 

basis for denying DEA application based 

on lack of State authorization). 

The Acting Deputy Administrator 

further finds that Dr. Easter has been 

convicted of eight State felonies relating 

to the distribution or dispensing of 

controlled substances and that denial of 

his application for registration is 

independently appropriate under 21 

U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(2). 

Dr. Easter also materially falsified his 

DEA Application for Registration 

(Control No. C07851408K). On February 

23, 2002, he signed and certified the 

information in that application as being 

true and correct. Among the 

misrepresentations in the application, 

Dr. Easter affirmatively responded to 

Question 4(a), which asked if he was 

‘‘currently authorized to prescribe’’

controlled substances ‘‘under the laws 

of the State or jurisdiction in which you 

are operating or propose to operate.’’

However, pursuant to the District 

Court’s Order of February 22, 2002, Dr. 

Easter was at the time he signed that 

application, and still is, prohibited from 

prescribing controlled narcotic 

substances in Texas, the State of 

intended registration and practice. 

Additionally, Dr. Easter replied in the 

negative to Question 4(c) of the 

application, which asked if he had ‘‘ever 

been convicted of a crime in connection 

with controlled substances under State 

or Federal law?’’ While entry of 

judgment in his criminal case was 

deferred, Respondent pled guilty to 

eight counts of Possession of Controlled 

Substance by Fraud, a Third Degree 

Felony under Texas law. DEA has 

consistently held that a deferred 

adjudication of guilt following a guilty 

plea, is a conviction within the meaning 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 24 / Thursday, February 5, 2004 / Notices 5581

of the Controlled Substances Act. See 

Vincent J. Scolero, D.O., 67 FR 42060, 

42065 (2002); Edson W. Redard, M.D.,

65 FR 30616, 30618 (2000); Yu-To Hsu, 

M.D., 62 FR 12840, 12842 (1997). 

The Application for Registration form 

includes a block for applicants to 

explain any ‘‘yes’’ answers to questions 

ion section 4 of the form. Dr. Easter left 

that block empty. The Acting Deputy 

Administrator finds that Dr. Easter 

should have revealed in his application 

that he had pled guilty to the drug 

related felony counts and that checking 

the block ‘‘no’’ to Question 4(c), coupled 

with omission of any mention of his 

criminal history in the application, was 

a material falsification. 

Dr. Easter also answered ‘‘no’’ to 

Question 4(e) which asked in relevant 

part, whether he ‘‘ever had a state 

professional license revoked, 

suspended, denied, restricted, or placed 

on probation?’’ (Emphasis added). 

However, a review of the record shows 

Dr. Easter’s Texas medical license was 

restricted at the time of his DEA 

application pursuant to the Texas State 

Board of Medical Examiners’ Agreed 

Order of August 22, 1998. 

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1), 

falsification of a DEA application 

constitutes independent grounds to 

revoke a registration. Past cases have 

established that the appropriate test for 

determining whether an applicant 

materially falsified an application is 

whether the applicant ‘‘knew or should 

have known’’ that the submitted 

application was false. See Barry H. 

Brooks, M.D., 66 FR 18305, 18307 

(2001); Terrance E. Murphy, M.D., 61 FR 

2841, 2844 (1996); Bobby Watts, M.D.,

58 FR 46995 (1993). The Acting Deputy 

Administrator finds that Dr. Easter knew 

or should have known that his answers 

to the above liability questions were 

false.

False answers to liability questions 

are always considered material, as DEA 

relies on the answers to those questions 

in determining whether it is necessary 

to conduct an investigation prior to 

granting an application. See Barry H. 

Brooks, M.D., supra, 66 FR at 18308; 

Theodore Neujahr, D.V.M., 64 FR 72362, 

72364 (1999). Prior DEA cases have held 

that ‘‘ ‘[s]ince [it] must rely on the 

truthfulness of information supplied by 

applicants in registering them to handle 

controlled substances, falsification 

cannot be tolerated.’ ’’ See Terrance E. 

Murphy, M.D., supra, 61 FR at 2845 

(quoting Bobby Watts, MD., supra, 58 FR 

at 46995. 

In prior DEA cases the Deputy 

Administrator has held that the totality 

of the circumstances is to be considered 

in determining whether a registration 

should be revoked because of a 

registrant’s material falsification of an 

application. See Barry H. Brooks, M.D., 

supra, 66 FR at 18308; Martha 

Hernandez, M.D., 62 FR 611435, 61147–

48. In this case, the Acting Deputy 

Administrator finds that Dr. Easter 

provided false information in 

responding to the liability questions on 

his application and after considering the 

totality of the circumstances, finds that 

these misrepresentations constitute a 

material falsification warranting denial 

of registration under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1). 

With regard to the public interest 

factors of 21 U.S.C. 823(f), as to factor 

one, recommendations of the State 

licensing board/disciplinary authority, 

it is noted that, except to the extent that 

Dr. Easter cannot treat himself or his 

family and must prescribe and 

administrator controlled drugs only 

when medically indicated and upon 

adequate examination, the Texas 

Medical Board has not currently 

restricted his ability to handle or 

prescribe controlled substances. 

Therefore, except for the order of the 

District Court, the Texas Medical Board 

would permit him to handle controlled 

substances in that State. However, 

‘‘ ‘inasmuch as State licensure is a 

necessary but not sufficient condition 

for a DEA registration * * * this factor 

is not dispositive.’ ’’ See Edson W. 

Redard, M.D., 65 FR 30616, 30619. 

It is noted the record reflects that on 

August 18, 1999, Dr. Easter surrendered 

his Colorado medical license and that 

his New Mexico medical license was 

revoked in September 2002, based on 

the Texas convictions and his failure to 

report those convictions to New Mexico 

licensing authorities in a timely manner. 

The Hearing Office in the New Mexico 

proceedings specifically noted that, 

despite his criminal convictions, Dr. 

Easter still saw nothing wrong in what 

he had done, asserted his acts were 

justified and showed no contrition or 

remorse. The Hearing Officer found Dr. 

Easter was not rehabilitated and, ‘‘if 

given the opportunity to do so, 

Respondent would write fraudulent 

prescriptions again if he believes he is 

justified.’’ This conclusion is considered 

by the Acting Deputy Administrator as 

adverse to Dr. Easter under factor one 

and, as discussed below, factor five, as 

well. 

Regarding factors two, three, four and 

five, the actions resulting in his 

conviction of the eight drug related 

felony counts discussed earlier, are 

relevant and adverse to Dr. Easter. With 

regard to factor five, such other conduct 

which may threaten the public health 

and safety, in Dr. Easter’s Application 

for Renewal of his Texas Controlled 

Substances Registration Certificate 

which he signed on March 29, 2002, he 

advised the Texas Department of Public 

Safety that, ‘‘initially I was ordered by 

the Court not to write prescriptions; 

however, on Valentine’s Day 2002 Judge 

Bonnie Rangel reinstated my ability to 

write prescriptions.’’ However, as the 

court’s order modifying the terms and 

conditions of Dr. Easter’s community 

supervision provides, while it generally 

authorized him to write prescriptions, 

the court specifically prohibited him 

from writing prescriptions for 

‘‘scheduled narcotics.’’ Dr. Easter’s 

omission of this critical fact from his 

State renewal application was a material 

misrepresentation, further indicating 

that his DEA registration would be 

inconsistent with the public interest. 

While recognizing the conduct 

forming the basis for Dr. Easter’s 

convictions occurred in 1997 and 1998, 

the Acting Deputy Administrator is 

particularly troubled by the attitude he 

has displayed as recently as July 2002. 

After his hearing before the New Mexico 

Medical Board, the hearing officer 

concluded Dr. Easter’s ‘‘lack of 

contrition or remorse and [his] apparent 

belief that he can write fraudulent 

prescriptions in violiation of the law if 

he believes he is justified to do so under 

certain circumstances shows [Dr. Easter] 

is not rehabilitated.’’

Couped with the series of omissions 

and misrepresentations in his DEA and 

Texas applications, it appears Dr. Easter 

still fails to appreciate the seriousness of 

his professional and personal 

misconduct and has a continuing 

penchant for not being candid when 

dealing with State and Federal licensing 

authorities. 

In light of the foregoing, the Acting 

Deputy Administrator finds that Dr. 

Easter’s registration would be 

inconsistent with the public interest, as 

that term is used in 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 

824(a)(4). 

According, the Acting Deputy 

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administrator, pursuant to the authority 

vested in her by 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824 

and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, hereby 

orders that the pending application for 

DEA Certificate of Registration, 

submitted by Thomas G. Easter II, M.D., 

be, and it hereby is, denied. This order 

is effective March 8, 2004.

Dated: January 7, 2004. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Acting Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 04–2338 Filed 2–4–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M