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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 1:20-CV-23263

YULAIDA MANSO,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEIRDRE M. MARSHALL, P.A., and

DEIRDRE M. MARSHALL, M.D.,

Defendants.

______________________________/

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, sues Defendants, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A. and Deirdre M. 

Marshall, M.D., based on the following good cause:

Parties, Jurisdiction, and Venue

1. Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, is a sui juris resident of Miami-Dade County, 

Florida, who is over 18 years old. 

2. Plaintiff consents to participate in this lawsuit.

3. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., is a for-profit Florida corporation 

that is sui juris and operated its medical practice in Miami-Dade County, Florida, at all times 

material.

4. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, M.D., is over 18 years old, a resident of 

this Miami-Dade County, and is sui juris. Dr. Marshall was at all times material an 

officer/owner/director of the corporate Defendant for the time period relevant to this lawsuit. 

She ran its day-to-day operations, was responsible for all operational decisions, and was partially 

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or totally responsible for paying and/or deciding to pay Plaintiff’s wages as well as for the 

termination of her employment. 

5. This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal question claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 26 U.S.C. §201, et seq., and pendent/supplemental jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s related state law claims.

6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant because Defendants transact business in 

Miami-Dade County, they maintain their office and principal places of business and/or live in 

Miami-Dade County, and also because Defendants employed Plaintiff in Miami-Dade County, 

with most of the actions complained of occurring within this County.

7. Any/all conditions precedent to filing this lawsuit occurred and/or was satisfied 

by Plaintiff.

8. Plaintiff retained the undersigned counsel and agreed to pay a reasonable fee for 

all services rendered.

9. Plaintiff attempted to resolve this matter pre-suit, but Defendants failed and 

refused to respond.

COUNT I – VIOLATION OF EPSLA

(FAILURE TO PAY FOR LEAVE)

Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, reincorporates all preceding paragraphs as though set forth fully 

herein and further alleges as follows:

10. Plaintiff worked for Defendants from 2014 through April 7, 2020.

11. To the extent that records exist regarding the exact dates of Plaintiff’s 

employment exist, such records are believed to be in the exclusive custody of Defendants.

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12. The Florida Department of Education closed all public schools to onsite learning 

as of late afternoon on Tuesday, March 17, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

13. Miami-Dade County thereafter enacted Emergency Order 07-20 and required all 

non-essential businesses to close as of 9:00 p.m. on March 19, 2020.

14. The Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (“EPSLA”) went into effect on April 1, 2020, 

and it requires covered employers to provide paid sick leave to employees with one of six (6) 

qualifying conditions. FFCRA §5102, 5110(2).

15. One of the relevant provisions of the EPSLA is that the employee be required to 

care for a child whose school or place of care is closed, or for whom childcare is unavailable, 

because of COVID-19. FFCRA §5102(a).

16. Plaintiff was at all times material hereto an “employee” as the term is defined at 

29 U.S.C. §203(e), and incorporated into the EPSLA at 29 C.F.R. §826.10(a).

17. Plaintiff was at all times material hereto an “eligible employee” for purposes of the 

EPSLA, as the term is defined at 29 C.F.R. §826.10.

18. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., was at all times material hereto Plaintiff’s 

“employer” as the term is defined at 29 C.F.R. §826.10(a)(i). 

19. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., was at all times material hereto either 

engaged in commerce, or in an industry or activity affecting commerce that employed less than 

500 employees. 

20. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, M.D., was at all times material hereto Plaintiff’s 

“employer” as the term is defined at 29 C.F.R. §826.10(a)(i). 

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21. Defendants were Plaintiff’s direct employers, joint employers and co-employers, as 

that term “employer” is defined by 29 U.S.C. §203(d) and incorporated into the EPSLA at 29 

C.F.R. §826.10(a).

22. Plaintiff was at all times material hereto the primary caretaker for her child.

23. Plaintiff’s child’s school closed for a period of time commencing on or about 

March 17, 2020, and that closure lasted for the duration of the 2019-2020 school year.

24. Plaintiff was required to care for her child, whose school was closed by order of a 

State or local official or authority, for reasons related to COVID–19. See 29 C.F.R. 

§826.20(a)(1)(v).

25. Plaintiff’s spouse could not care for their child, due to his work as a “first 

responder”.

26. No other suitable person was available to care for Plaintiff’s child.

27. Plaintiff was taking her child to work with her as a result of the school closure, 

until Defendants instructed Plaintiff to cease bringing her child to work with her.

28. Plaintiff then requested that Defendants accommodate her by allowing her to 

telework from home, due to the closure of her child’s school, Defendants’ continued operation of 

their non-essential medical practice, and the lack of any other caretaker for her child.

29. Plaintiff advised Defendants of her child’s name, the name of the school (as part of 

the Miami-Dade County Public Schools), and represented that no other suitable person will be 

caring for her child.

30. Defendants responded by refusing to accommodate Plaintiff, by denying her 

request to telework from home, and by refusing to provide Plaintiff with paid leave, despite the 

requirements imposed by the EPSLA. 

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31. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation(s) of the EPSLA, as set 

forth above, Plaintiff is entitled to payment of her “average regular rate” of pay for the two-weeks

during which she was required to care for her child pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§826.25 and 826.25.

32. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §826.150, Plaintiff seeks recovery of the wages that she 

would have been entitled to pursuant to the EPSLA, plus an equal amount of liquidated 

damages, plus her attorneys’ fees and costs.

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, demands the entry of a judgment in her favor 

and against Defendants, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A. and Deirdre M. Marshall, M.D., jointly and 

severally after trial by jury and as follows:

a. That Plaintiff recover compensatory sick wage damages and benefits, plus 

an equal amount of liquidated damages as provided under the law, in 29 

C.F.R. §826.150 and in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) – or interest on the unpaid 

wages and benefits if no liquidated damages are awarded;

b. That Plaintiff recover pre-judgment interest on all unpaid emergency paid 

sick leave wages and benefits if the Court does not award liquidated 

damages;

c. That Plaintiff recover an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and 

expenses pursuant to the EPSLA and the FLSA;

d. That Plaintiff recover all interest allowed by law;

e. That Defendants be Ordered to make Plaintiff whole by providing 

appropriate minimum wage / sick leave pay and other benefits wrongly 

denied in an amount to be shown at trial and other affirmative relief; and 

f. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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COUNT II – VIOLATION OF EPSLA

(UNLAWFUL DISCHARGE)

Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, reincorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 9 as though 

set forth fully herein and further alleges as follows:

33. Plaintiff worked for Defendants from 2014 through April 7, 2020.

34. To the extent that records exist regarding the exact dates of Plaintiff’s 

employment exist, such records are believed to be in the exclusive custody of Defendants.

35. The Florida Department of Education closed all public schools to onsite learning 

as of late afternoon on Tuesday, March 17, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

36. Miami-Dade County thereafter enacted Emergency Order 07-20 and required all 

non-essential businesses to close as of 9:00 p.m. on March 19, 2020.

37. The Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (“EPSLA”) went into effect on April 1, 2020, 

and requires covered employers to provide paid sick leave to employees with one of six (6) 

qualifying conditions. FFCRA §5102, 5110(2).

38. One of the relevant provisions of the EPSLA is that the employee be required to 

care for a child whose school or place of care is closed, or for whom childcare is unavailable, 

because of COVID-19. FFCRA §5102(a).

39. Plaintiff was at all times material hereto an “employee” as the term is defined at 

29 U.S.C. §203(e), and incorporated into the EPSLA at 29 C.F.R. §826.10(a).

40. Plaintiff was at all times material hereto an “eligible employee” for purposes of the 

EPSLA, as the term is defined at 29 C.F.R. §826.10.

41. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., was at all times material hereto Plaintiff’s 

“employer” as the term is defined at 29 C.F.R. §826.10(a)(i). 

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42. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., was at all times material hereto either 

engaged in commerce, or in an industry or activity affecting commerce that employed less than 

500 employees. 

43. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, M.D., was at all times material hereto Plaintiff’s 

“employer” as the term is defined at 29 C.F.R. §826.10(a)(i). 

44. Defendants were Plaintiff’s direct employers, joint employers and co-employers, as 

that term “employer” is defined by 29 U.S.C. §203(d) and incorporated into the EPSLA at 29 

C.F.R. §826.10(a).

45. Plaintiff was at all times material hereto the primary caretaker for her child.

46. Plaintiff’s child’s school closed for a period of time commencing on or about 

March 17, 2020, and that closure lasted for the duration of the 2019-2020 school year.

47. Plaintiff was required to care for her child, whose school was closed by order of a 

State or local official or authority, for reasons related to COVID–19. See 29 C.F.R. 

§826.20(a)(1)(v).

48. Plaintiff’s spouse could not care for their child, due to his work as a “first 

responder”.

49. No other suitable person was available to care for Plaintiff’s child.

50. Plaintiff was taking her child to work with her as a result of the school closure, 

until Defendants instructed Plaintiff to cease bringing her child to work with her.

51. Plaintiff then requested that Defendants accommodate her by allowing her to 

telework from home, due to the closure of her child’s school, Defendants’ continued operation of 

their non-essential medical practice, and the lack of any other caretaker for her child.

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52. Plaintiff advised Defendants of her child’s name, the name of the school (as part of 

the Miami-Dade County Public Schools), and represented that no other suitable person will be 

caring for her child.

53. Defendants responded by refusing to accommodate Plaintiff, by denying her 

request to telework from home, and by refusing to provide Plaintiff with paid leave, despite the 

requirements imposed by the EPSLA. 

54. Plaintiff then objected and/or complained to Defendants about their failure to 

allow her to telework and their refusal to pay her the sick wages required by the EPSLA.

55. In response to Plaintiff’s objection and/or complaint(s) to Defendants about their 

refusal to allow her to telework and/or their refusal to pay her the sick wages required by the 

EPSLA, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

56. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation(s) of the EPSLA, as set 

forth above, Plaintiff suffered the loss of her job, her identity, and suffered emotional distress as a 

result of Defendants’ retaliatory conduct.

57. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §826.150, Plaintiff seeks recovery of the wages that she 

would have been entitled to pursuant to the EPSLA, the emotional distress and actual damages 

that she suffered, plus an equal amount of liquidated damages, plus her attorneys’ fees and costs.

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, demands the entry of a judgment in her favor 

and against Defendants, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A. and Deirdre M. Marshall, M.D., jointly and 

severally after trial by jury and as follows:

a. That Plaintiff recover compensatory damages for compensatory/actual 

damages including lost wages, lost opportunity to earn wages, lost benefits, 

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future lost wages and benefits, and an equal amount of liquidated damages 

as provided under the law and in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b);

b. That Plaintiff recover pre-judgment interest on all unpaid emergency paid 

sick leave wages if the Court does not award liquidated damages;

c. That Plaintiff recover for the mental anguish and distress caused by 

Defendants’ retaliatory conduct;

d. That Plaintiff recover an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and 

expenses pursuant to the EPSLA and the FLSA;

e. That Plaintiff recover all interest allowed by law; and 

f. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT III – VIOLATION OF THE FLORIDA WHISTLEBLOWER’S ACT

Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, reincorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 9 as though 

set forth fully herein and further alleges as follows:

58. Plaintiff worked for Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., from 2014 through 

April 7, 2020.

59. Plaintiff worked more than 1,250 hours during the 12 months before her 

employment was unlawfully terminated.

60. Plaintiff had an exemplary employment history with Defendant, Deirdre M. 

Marshall, P.A.

61. Plaintiff “perform[ed] services for and under the control and direction of an 

employer for wages or other remuneration,” for Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., and so 

Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., at all times material, as the 

term “employee” is defined by Fla. Stat. §448.101(2).

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62. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., was at all times material a “private 

individual, firm, partnership, institution, corporation, or association that employs ten or more 

persons,” and so it was Plaintiff’s employer, as the term “employer is defined by Fla. Stat. 

§448.101(3).

63. The Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (“EPSLA”) went into effect on April 1, 2020, 

and requires covered employers to provide paid sick leave to employees with one of six (6) 

qualifying conditions. FFCRA §5102, 5110(2).

64. One of the relevant provisions of the EPSLA is that the employee be required to 

care for a child whose school or place of care is closed, or for whom childcare is unavailable, 

because of COVID-19. FFCRA §5102(a).

65. The Emergency Family Medical Leave Expansion Act (“EFMLEA”) alsowent 

into effect on April 1, 2020, and it requires covered employers to provide paid sick leave to 

employees who are “unable to work due to a need to care for his or her Son or Daughter whose 

School or Place of Care has been closed, or whose Child Care Provider is unavailable, for 

reasons related to COVID-19.” 29 C.F.R. §826.20(b).

66. Plaintiff complained to Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., about her

reasonable and good faith belief that it was violating her EPSLA and EFMLEA rights by refusing 

to allow her to telework, by refusing to pay her the emergency sick leave wages to which she was 

entitled, and by refusing to pay her the wages required during the remainder of the 12 weeks for 

which she was entitled to take emergency leave due to the closure of her child’s school.

67. The EPSLA is a “law, rule, or regulation” as the term is defined by Fla. Stat. 

§448.101(4) (“includes any statute or ordinance or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant to any 

federal, state, or local statute or ordinance applicable to the employer and pertaining to the 

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business.”) The EPSLA is part of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act.

68. The EFMLEA is a “law, rule, or regulation” as the term is defined by Fla. Stat. 

§448.101(4) (“includes any statute or ordinance or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant to any 

federal, state, or local statute or ordinance applicable to the employer and pertaining to the 

business.”) The EFMLEA is part of the FFCRA.

69. On March 20, 2020, the Governor of the State of Florida issued Executive Order 

Number 20-27 directing all health care practitioners licensed in the State of Florida to 

“immediately cease performing” elective medical procedures.

70. Executive Order Number 20-27 vested the Agency for Healthcare Administration 

and the Department of Health with the authority to further implement and enforce its terms.

71. Section 252.36, Florida Statutes, provides that with regard to an executive order, 

“Such executive orders, proclamations, and rules shall have the force and effect of law.”

72. Despite Executive Order 20-27 and Fla. Stat. §252.36, Defendant, Deirdre M. 

Marshall, P.A., nonetheless continued to perform non-emergency and non-essential cosmetic 

procedures – such as cosmetic facial injections – despite the orders issued by the State of Florida 

and Miami-Dade County that precluded the performance of non-emergency and non-essential 

medical services.

73. Plaintiff complained to Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., that it was

violating Florida law by not only performing non-emergency and non-essential cosmetic 

procedures, but that it was violating the law by not wearing the required personal protective 

equipment (including masks) and by not requiring patients to the wear the required facial 

coverings (masks), despite the requirements (rules, laws, and/or regulations) requiring them to do 

so. 

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74. Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., disregarded the law and retaliated against 

Plaintiff shortly after she objected/complained about (a) not being able to telework in violation of 

the EPSLA, (b) not being offered the ability to receive emergency sick leave wages in violation of 

the EFMLA, (c) not being offered the ability to receive leave wages in violation of the EPSLA, (d) 

its continuing to perform non-essential elective medical procedures despite the prohibition on 

same, and (e) its failure to adhere to the requirements for wearing PPE and for requiring patients 

to wear facial coverings/masks in the office.

75. By initiating adverse employment actions against Plaintiff as aforesaid, Defendant, 

Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., violated the Florida Whistleblower Act.

76. Plaintiff was damaged and suffered a loss of her benefits, seniority rights, wages, 

and other remuneration as a direct and proximate result of Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, 

P.A.’s retaliatory conduct.

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, demands the entry of a judgment against 

Defendant, Deirdre M. Marshall, P.A., after trial by jury for compensatory damages including 

her lost benefits, lost seniority rights, lost wages past and future, lost benefits, and other 

remuneration (including paid time off), reinstatement to the same or equivalent position, 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. §448.103, costs, all interest allowed by law, and for such 

other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, Yulaida Manso, demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted this 5th day of August 2020.

Brian H. Pollock, Esq.

Brian H. Pollock, Esq. (174742)

brian@fairlawattorney.com

FAIRLAW FIRM

7300 N. Kendall Drive

Suite 450

Miami, FL 33156

Tel: 305.230.4884

Counsel for Plaintiff

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