Ronorabl,e George ,D. Mlnick 

County Attorney 

w00a County 

Quitman, Texas 

Dear Sir: Opinion No. O-6173 

Ret Authority of sheriff to 

sell unredeemed land 

acquired ~by the State at a 

tax sale when the original 

owner pays all taxes, penalties and interest after 

the expiration of the 

period of redemption. 

From youropinion request of October 19, 1944, and 

a letter from MF. 0. C. Parker, attorney for the Sells Petroleum Inc., we summarize the following ~facts: 

Prior to 1931, one Ellis owned and occupied 

45 acres of land in your county. In.February, 

1931, judgment was entered In a tax suit for all 

taxes delinquent on this land since 1919, and on 

March 31, 1931, execution issued upon this judgment and was executed by the sheriff, who. for 

failure of other bidders, bid the land In for the 

State,and executed his deed conveying the land to 

the State. For purposes of this opinion, we asi 

sume that all of the proceedings involved in this 

auitand sale were regulax and that there are no 

defects at any stage of these proceedings. 

Although this land was not redeemed during the 

period of redemption, the,sheriff has not yet made 

a second sale of the land, and no action has been 

taken to alienate to a third person whatever title 

.the State holds by virtue of Its tax deed. From 

the time of the sale to the present, Ellis has 

continued to occupy the land. 

At certain i,ndeterm?.nate times since the 

expiration of~the period of redempti.on--lncludFng, apparently, tlmesin 1937 and 1943:- 

certain payments have been made tithe tax col- 
lion. Qeorge D. Minick, page 2 (O-6173) 

lect6r?d+elative to this land and redemption 

certlflcates have been Issued therefor. Mr. 

Parker contends that these payments cover all 

taxes, penaltlea, Interest and coats due on 

this land. You express doubt aa to whether 

the costs have been paid, but state that all 

taxes, except for the current assessment, have 

been paid. 

Under the terms of Article 7328, V.A.C.S., your 

sheriff possessed the power to make a second sale of this 

land at public outcry to the highest bidder at any time after 

the expiration of the redemption period. This power he has 

not yet excroised. If you are correct in your belief that 

the costs have not been paid, and thus that all of the taxes, 

penalties, Interest and costs due on this land have not been 

paid, it Is our opinion that the land has not been redeemed 

and that it may now be sold by the sheriff In conformance with 

the applicable provisions of Article 7328. 

On the ot,her hand, if Mr. Parker Is correct in his 

belief that all of these items have been paid, with such payments being made subsequent to the expiration of the redemption period, the question arises as to whether the original 

owner may redeem from the State only during the redemptqon 

period or whether he may redeem by payment at any time while 

title to the land remains in the State. 

In conneotion with this question, it la to be remembered that our courts have adopted rules of construction whereby tax statutes are oonstrued strictly Insofar as they affect 

the rights and privileges of the taxing authority and liberally 

insofar as they affeotthe rights and privileges of a taxpayer. 

Texas Unemployment Compensation Commission, et al. v. Bass, 

151 S.W. (2d) 567. Moreover, the statutes relating to the 

foreclosure and sale of land for delinquent taxes have uniformly been held to be for the purpose of forcing collection of 

the taxes rather than for the purpose of enabling the State 

to obtain a profit upon the sale of such land. The law abhors 

forfeitures and favors redemption. Black on Tax Titles 

(2nd Ed.) p 348. Thus, as was said by the Court of Civil 

;Pgyal s of Texaa in the case of League v. State, 56 S.W. 

II . . .ft has always been the policy of the state to exten; the time for redemption of lands, and never to acquire 

them for itself." 

An apt illustration of these principles is to be 

found in the case of Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil 

co., et al., 52 S.W. (2d) 56. In this case, although the 

franchise tax statutes provide only that when the right to 
Ron. George D. Minick, page 3 (O-6173) 

do busFne,ss of a corporation has been forfeited f,or non-payment of franchise taxes, the taxpayer may revlveUsuch right by 

paying the taxes, Interest and penalties within six months 

from the date of such forfeiture, the Supreme Court held that 

the six months period is in no way a limitation and that a 

revival may also be effected by making the proper payment after 

the expiration of the statutory period, In so holding, the 

court saLa: 

“This statute is purely a revenue measure. 

Under It large sums are collected for the support 

of the state government. Statutes of this nature 

are always liberally construed so as to effectuate 

the chief object and purpose of thelr enactment. 

In making provision for the colleotion of public 

revenue, ordinarily time is not of the essence of 

the thing sought to be accomplished. . . 

“No sound reason can be advanced why the Legislature should desire to prevent a oorporatlon from 

reviving its right to do business by paying its 

delinquent tax with accumulated penalties after the 

time fixed in the statute if at the time payment is 

made the state has not availed itself of its right 

to bring a suit against said corporation for the 

purpose of forfeiting its charter. If corporations 

are permitted to pay their delinquent franchise 

taxes, with acoumulated penalties, at any time and 

thereby obtain a revival of their right to do business, and to use the courts, the chief object and 

purpose of the statute to obtain the payment of 

such taxes will be more readily acoompllshed.” 

In our opinion, the prlnclples and rules of oonstruction above set forth oontrol the instant question and establish 

the right of the taxpayer to,redeem his land upon making the 

ps;;iilents required by law, regardless of whether such payments 

are made before oraWkr the expiration of the redemption 

period. The statutes prescribing a two year redemption period 

nowhere provide that redemption may not be effecte.d after ,tie 

expiration of such period. on the contrary, these statutes 

merely provide--in the language of Article 7340--that the 

owner “shall have the right at any time within two years from 

the date of sale” to redeem the land. In our opinion, this 

establishment of a stated period was not for the purpose of 

setting a date beyond which redemption may not be had. Rather, 

we feel, this period was established to insure the original 

owner that he posaesses an absolute right of redem@tion during 

such period and that during such period the State will not 
Hon. George D. Minick, page 4 (O-6173) 

interfere with such right by selling the land to a third person. Stated differently, these statutes do not out off the 

right of the original owner to redeem after the expiration of 

the redemption period; rather they merely insure the original 

owner that his right of redemption may not be jeopardized 

during such period. 

Consequently, if Mr. Parker is correct in his 

contention and if proper payment of all taxes, costs, interest and penalties has been made, you are respectfully advised 

that the land in question has been redeemed and that the 

sheriff does not now possess the power to sell such land. In 

further support of this conclusion we call your attention to 

the holding and authorities in our Opinion No. O-423, a copy 

of which opinion Is enclosed herewith. 

Trusting that the foregoing fully answers your 

inquiry, we are 

APPROVED NOV. 4, 1944 Very truly yours 

/s/ Carlos C. Ashley 

FIRST ASSISTAHT ATTORNEY GENERAL RLTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

THIS OPINION CONSIDERED 

AND APPROVED IN LIMITED 

CONFERENCE 

RDM:ff-dhs 

Encl. 

By /s/R. Dean Moorhead 

R. Dean Moorhead 

Assistant