2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-4-2010

Verlin Alexander v. Orlando Fletcher

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-4288

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Recommended Citation

"Verlin Alexander v. Orlando Fletcher" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 1793.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1793
CLD-113 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-4288

 

VERLIN ALEXANDER,

 Appellant

v.

U.S. MARSHAL ORLANDO FLETCHER;

U.S. MARSHAL JOHN DOE 2; 

U.S. MARSHAL JOHN DOE 3;

ATF AGENT JOHN DOE 1;

ATF AGENT JOHN DOE 2; 

ATF AGENT JOHN DOE 3; 

FBI AGENT JOHN DOE 1;

FBI AGENT JOHN DOE 2; 

FBI AGENT JOHN DOE 3;

JOHN DOE 1, Delaware State Police Officer;

JOHN DOE 2, Delaware State Police Officer;

JOHN DOE 3, Delaware State Police Officer;

JOHN DOE 1, Delaware Probation and Parole Officer;

JOHN DOE 2, Delaware Probation and Parole Officer;

JOHN DOE 3, Delaware Probation and Parole Officer;

DELAWARE DEA AGENT JOHN DOE 1;

DELAWARE DEA AGENT JOHN DOE 2;

DELAWARE DEA AGENT JOHN DOE 3

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00436)

District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.

 

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 4, 2010
2

Before: BARRY, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

 

(Opinion filed: March 4, 2010)

_________

OPINION

 

PER CURIAM

Verlin Alexander appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil rights

action. We will summarily affirm. 

I.

On June 11, 2009, Alexander filed a pro se civil rights action in the United States

District Court for the District of Delaware against United States Marshal Orlando

Fletcher and seventeen John Doe defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that

the defendants violated his due process and equal protection rights in connection with his

allegedly unlawful arrest, search and seizure, and extradition on October 27, 2006. On

September 30, 2009, pursuant to its screening authority under 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), the District Court dismissed the complaint as barred

by the applicable limitation period for § 1983 claims. Alexander timely appealed. 

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review over a

District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary. 
 Alexander alleges that agents of the state of Delaware unlawfully arrested him in 1

Pennsylvania. The District Court applied the Delaware statute of limitations to these

claims; however, the result is the same as under Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations,

which is also two years for claims arising under § 1983. Compare 10 Del. Code Ann. §

8119, and 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524(7).

3

Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In determining whether a district

court properly dismissed a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we are required to “accept all

factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the

plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d

Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002));

see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-56 (2007). We may take

summary action if the appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.7;

I.O.P. 10.6. 

III.

The District Court correctly dismissed Alexander’s claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B),

as his claim lacked an arguable basis in law. Alexander’s § 1983 claims are governed by

the personal injury statute of limitations in Pennsylvania, the state in which his cause of

action accrued. See Lake v Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). The statute of 1

limitations for claims arising under § 1983 in Pennsylvania is two years. Id. Any claims

filed outside this period are untimely. 

A section 1983 cause of action accrues, and the applicable limitations period
 To the extent, if any, that Alexander’s claim can be characterized as one of false

2

imprisonment, this claim is also time barred. The statute of limitations begins to run

against an action for false imprisonment when the individual is released, or becomes held

pursuant to legal process. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). We take

judicial notice of the fact that Alexander was committed to the Department of Corrections

in default of bail on October 27, 2006, and was arraigned on November 6, 2006. (See

State of Delaware v. Verlin J. Alexander, Superior Court Criminal Docket). Alexander’s

false imprisonment claim thus accrued no later than November 6, 2008. See Wallace, 549

U.S. at 391. 

 The District Court found that the complaint was filed on the date it was signed, the 3

earliest date possible that it could have been delivered to prison officials for mailing. See

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir.

1998). 

 Because Alexander was proceeding in forma pauperis, the District Court was entitled 4

to reach the limitations question, which was obvious from the complaint and required no

factual development. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006).

4

begins to run, when the plaintiff “knew or should have known of the injury upon which

its action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d

Cir. 1989). Alexander’s claims stem from his allegedly unlawful arrest, which took place

on October 27, 2006. (Compl. 6.) On that date, Alexander knew or should have known

of the constitutional violations upon which his claims are based. Alexander did not file 2

his complaint until June 5, 2009, approximately seven months after the expiration of the

two-year limitations period. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that 3

Alexander’s complaint was barred on its face by the applicable statute of limitations.4

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm.