AFDD Template Guide 

20 September 2002

.

HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

OPERATIONS 

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-10 

25 April 2005 Draft

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-26, 

Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.

HOMELAND 

OPERATIONS 

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-10 

21 March 2006

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-26, 

Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-10 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 21 MARCH 2006 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Mr Bob Christensen) 

Certified by: AFDC/CC (Maj Gen Bentley B. Rayburn) 

Pages: 66 

Distribution: F 

Approved by: T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, General, USAF 

 Chief of Staff 
FOREWORD 

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are a stark example that some 

nations, organizations, groups, and individuals will implement extraordinary measures to 

further their cause and bring death and destruction to the United States. It is imperative 

that the Air Force prepare fully to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover 

from the full spectrum of threats to the homeland, to include natural emergencies, 

nation-state aggression, terrorist attacks, and other man-made events. 

Make no mistake about it: when the nation calls, the Air Force will respond – and 

we will respond quickly and effectively. We have much to contribute to the security of 

the homeland, regardless of the nature of the event. This includes the defense of the 

homeland through air and space operations, whether in air, space, or cyberspace. 

While civilian sector and federal agencies possess substantial assets and 

capabilities to respond to these domestic emergencies, the Air Force, with its inherent 

speed and through its distinctive capabilities, stands ready to provide full-spectrum 

support to these civil agencies. The Air Force brings specialized assets to support the 

Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the crisis portion 

of a terrorist event. We have capabilities that contribute to the Department of Homeland 

Security’s and their Federal Emergency Management Agency’s efforts at incident 

management, ranging from disaster relief to scenarios involving chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive devices. 

This document describes how our Air Force organizes and employs air and 

space power in operations in the homeland. We have superb air and space warfare 

doctrine addressing air and space expeditionary forces and combat operations. 

Homeland operations doctrine complements those documents. It focuses on how we 

support civilian agencies through the appropriate combatant commander in a variety of 

operations, such as neutralizing terrorist threats, responding to natural disasters, and 

supporting the traditional mission of homeland defense. Concepts such as centralized 

control/decentralized execution and unity of effort are just as relevant in the civil support 

arena as they are in warfighting. The complexities of the interagency process, the 

nexus between law enforcement and national security, and other issues raised when we 

conduct operations in the homeland create seams that we must address. This 

document represents a significant first step to codify our best practices in conducting 

operations in the homeland. 

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY 

General, USAF 

Chief of Staff 
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. v 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS...............................................................vii 

CHAPTER ONE—Introduction to Homeland Operations ................................................ 1 

Homeland Operations.................................................................................................. 1 

National Policy for Homeland Security......................................................................... 6 

Air Force Support to the National Strategy for Homeland Security .......................... 7 

Air Force Support for the Homeland Security Mission of the DOD........................... 9 

Organizations Established Since 11 September 2001............................................... 11 

CHAPTER TWO—Force Presentation and Organization of Forces.............................. 13 

Force Presentation for Defense Support of Civil Authorities...................................... 14 

Command Relationships............................................................................................ 15 

Geographic Combatant Commanders.................................................................... 16 

Functional Combatant Commanders...................................................................... 17 

North American Aerospace Defense Command .................................................... 17 

Air Force Components ........................................................................................... 18 

Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency.......................... 19 

Air National Guard.............................................................................................. 19 

Air Force Auxiliary/Civil Air Patrol ....................................................................... 20 

Joint Task Force..................................................................................................... 21 

CHAPTER THREE—Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities...... 23 

Homeland Defense.................................................................................................... 23 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities .......................................................................... 25 

Planning ................................................................................................................. 25 

Preparedness and Response................................................................................. 28 

National Response Plan......................................................................................... 30 

Immediate Response ............................................................................................. 31 

Initial Response...................................................................................................... 31 

Incident Management Actions................................................................................ 32 

Support to Civilian Law Enforcement ..................................................................... 32 

National Special Security Events ........................................................................... 34 

Critical Infrastructure.............................................................................................. 35 

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances............................................................... 35 

CHAPTER FOUR—Emergency Preparedness ............................................................. 36 

The Interagency Environment.................................................................................... 36 

Federal Agencies ................................................................................................... 36 

State Agencies....................................................................................................... 36 

Local Agencies....................................................................................................... 37 

Education and Training Requirements for Defense Support of Civil Authorities ........ 37 

Training Air Force Leaders and Responders.......................................................... 38 

Who Should Train for Defense Support of Civil Authorities.................................... 38 

What Needs to be Trained ..................................................................................... 39 
iv

Who are the Trainers ............................................................................................. 40 

Suggested Readings ..................................................................................................... 41 

Appendices 

A. National Policy and Law........................................................................................ 44 

Legal Sources for Homeland Operations ............................................................... 44 

B. Notional Sequence of Events for Defense Support of Civil Authorities.................. 48 

C. Emergency Preparedness..................................................................................... 50 

Glossary........................................................................................................................ 53 
v

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 This Air Force Doctrine Document establishes guidance for organizing and 

employing air and space forces at the operational level in the conduct of military 

operations within the homeland. This includes the full spectrum of potential military 

operations, to include civil support prior to a terrorist incident, civil support to contend 

with the consequences of an event, and extraordinary homeland defense or civil support 

operations. 

APPLICATION 

 This document applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian 

personnel, including regular, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard units 

and members. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this Air Force Doctrine Document and the 

particular situation when accomplishing the Air Force’s missions. Airmen should read it, 

discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

 Most Air Force assets (people, weapons, and support systems) may be 

employed in the conduct of operations within the homeland. This document discusses 

how we defend the homeland, support civil authorities, and prepare for domestic 

emergencies, as well as how the fundamentals of organization and employment of Air 

Force capabilities accomplish these responsibilities. 
vi

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology 

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force 

prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air 

Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and 

space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component 

commander while the term ”JFACC” refers to the joint component-level 

operational commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will 

normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are 

different, and should be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational 

control/administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through 

a Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air 

and space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a 

combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the 

air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in 

joint or combined operations is correctly known as a JAOC or CAOC. 
vii

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDDs) are built. Other information in the AFDDs 

expands on or supports these statements. 

 Homeland operations incorporate all applications of air and space power designed 

to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from the full spectrum of 

incidents and threats to the homeland, whether man-made or natural. (Page 1) 

 The Air Force stands ready to provide air and space capabilities to the geographic 

combatant commander, whether in support of a civil agency or in defense of the 

homeland. (Page 6) 

 The Air Force contributes to homeland security through its military missions 

overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. (Page 9) 

 Active duty Airmen are always under the command of military commanders up 

through the Secretary of Defense and the President. When Air Force capabilities 

are provided to civil authorities, the relationship is similar to the direct support role of 

one military force in support of another. (Page 10) 

 The complexity and basic premise of the interagency process for homeland 

operations, as well as the potential for a surprise terrorist event on American soil, 

differentiate homeland operations from traditional Air Force missions overseas. 

(Page 13) 

 An air and space expeditionary task force should be established and a commander, 

Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) identified for conducting homeland operations with 

operational control of Air Force forces given to the COMAFFOR. (Page 15) 

 In providing defense support for civil authorities, the Air Force supports federal, 

state, or local civil authorities in cases of natural or man-made domestic 

emergencies, civil disturbances, or authorized law enforcement activities. (Page 25) 

 Once a joint task force is established, Air Force forces deployed to a crisis should be 

organized like any other Air Force task force, that is, as an air and space 

expeditionary task force, and the COMAFFOR should be given operational control of 

Air Force forces. (Page 31) 
1

While September 11th was a call for the military to 

do more with regard to homeland defense, defending the 

United States, of course, has been the number one 

priority of the U.S. military since the founding of the 

republic. In fact, providing for the common defense was 

so basic an obligation of government that the founding 

fathers saw fit to place in that document, the Constitution, 

the very words, "providing for the common defense." 

 —Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld 

7 May 2002 

CHAPTER ONE 

INTRODUCTION TO HOMELAND OPERATIONS 

Homeland Operations 

Homeland operations incorporate all applications of air and space power 

designed to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from the full 

spectrum of incidents and threats to the homeland, whether man-made or natural. 

This includes homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and emergency 

preparedness. This construct for homeland operations establishes the Air Force’s 

responsibilities in direct support of homeland security. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) performs homeland defense, and contributes 

to emergency preparedness and defense support of civil authorities. The National 

Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) provides a federal framework for a concerted 

national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s 

vulnerability to terrorism, as well as minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 

do occur. The DOD, in its DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 

defines “homeland security” as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 

within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 

damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” For the Air Force, homeland 

operations are the means by which its support to homeland defense, defense support of 

civil authorities, and emergency preparedness is accomplished. Figure 1.1 shows the 

Air Force construct for homeland operations. 

Homeland Security (HS) 

Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within 

the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage 

and recover from attacks that do occur (from NSHS). HS includes domestic 

preparedness, critical infrastructure protection, and civil support in case of attacks on 
2

Homeland Operations

Homeland Defense

(HD)

Emergency 

Preparedness (EP)

Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities (DSCA)

Figure 1.1. Air Force Homeland Operations Construct 

Domestic relief 

operations 

Support to law 

enforcement 

Support to 

CBRNE 

incidents 

Support to 

civil 

disturbances 

civilians, continuity of government, continuity of operations, border and coastal defense, 

and national missile defense. By establishing its integrated response capability to 

support this effort, the Air Force is capable of responding to any sort of mission it is 

called upon to perform. 

Homeland Defense (HD) 

The DOD defines HD as the protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic 

population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other 

threats as directed by the President. United States Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM) describes HD as the protection of US territory, domestic population, 

and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United 

States. In understanding the difference between HS and HD, it is important to 

understand that USNORTHCOM is a military organization whose operations within the 

United States are governed by law, including the Posse Comitatus Act, that prohibits 

use of the Army or Air Force for law enforcement purposes, except as authorized by 

Congress and the United States Constitution. Thus, USNORTHCOM’s missions are 

military homeland defense and civil support to lead federal agencies. Air Force HD 

missions include force protection actions, counterair, counterintelligence, air and space 

warning and control, counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, air and missile 

defense, information security operations, and network defense. In all of these missions, 

the DOD either acts as the designated lead federal agency, or with a high level of 

autonomy within the national security structure. For the Air Force, HD operations 

involve a significant counterair emphasis and could involve preemptive operations 

through conduct of global strike operations against threats to the US homeland or US 

forces and installations throughout the world. In addition, special operations forces 
3

I will support and 

defend the Constitution 

of the United States 

against all enemies, 

foreign and domestic. 

—Excerpt from oath 

taken by all Airmen 

operating to locate, characterize, and secure weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

allows the DOD to defend and respond against WMD attacks or threats. 

Emergency Preparedness (EP) 

The Air Force includes emergency preparedness (EP) within the homeland 

operations umbrella. EP includes those planning activities undertaken to ensure DOD 

processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and the 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in a designated national security emergency. This 

includes continuity of operations (COOP), continuity of government (COG) functions, 

and the performance of threat assessments. 

 Homeland operations routinely involve a unique collection of federal, state, and 

local agencies, which present a number of challenges. First, homeland operations are 

distinguished by reliance on coordination rather than control. Second, the multiplicity of 

agencies and wide variety of potential types of homeland operations make a common 

operational picture (COP) very difficult. An agency’s COP is often dependent upon the 

type of scenario in which it is involved and its functions, roles, and responsibilities in 

relation to the scenario (e.g., North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] 

for air threats, the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] for natural 

disasters). Third, the processes used by civil agencies are complex and the number of 

different agencies involved adds to the complexity. Fourth, different agencies have 

different rules of engagement. These items are addressed in the national incident 

management system (NIMS), developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security at the 

request of the President, that integrates effective practices in emergency preparedness 

and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management. 

 The dynamic relationship between law 

enforcement and national security is illuminated 

by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 

(9/11). In the past, hijacked aircraft fell under 

the purview of either the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) or the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) because they were law 

enforcement concerns. On 9/11, a law 

enforcement concern rapidly became a national 

security issue when the aircraft were used as 

weapons. To counter the threat, the DOD 

quickly went from supporting civilian agencies to 

operating with a high degree of autonomy within 

the homeland under the direction of the 

President in his role as commander in chief. 

Computer attacks against critical DOD 

information systems are another example. 

Though computer hackers typically fall within the 

purview of civilian law enforcement, when 
4

Fig 1.2 Homeland Operations and Air Force Support 

Forest fire, tornado, 

flood 

Air Force Support: 

Airlift, medical, civil 

engineering, space 

support 

Recovery from 

CBRNE attack 

Air Force Support: 

Airlift, 

reconnaissance, 

medical, civil 

engineering, space 

support 

DOD supports civil agencies 

DOD is lead agency 

National special security 

event, presidential movement 

Air Force Support: combat air 

patrols, security forces, 

reconnaissance, medical, 

communications, air refueling, 

space support 

Attempted invasion, large scale 

attack 

Air Force operations: 

counterair, contersea, global 

strike, air refueling, 

reconnaissance, medical, civil 

engineering, space support 

Examples: Homeland Operations and Air Force Support 

Domestic relief 

operations 

Support to law 

enforcement 

Support 

to CBRNE 

incidents 

Support to civil 

disturbances 

Hijacked aircraft, 

CBRNE threats 

Air Force Support: 

Combat air patrols, air 

refueling, 

reconnaissance, space 

assets, antiterrorism, 

civil support 

directed against critical DOD assets such attacks constitute a national security threat 

that involves both civilian and military agencies. 

 The enforcement of civilian laws by Air Force personnel highlights another 

challenge. With exceptions, the Posse Comitatus Act and other legal and policy 

documents prohibit the use of military forces in supporting law enforcement agencies by 

enforcing civil law within the United States, such as performing surveillance, searches, 

seizures, and arrests. However, National Guard forces operating in state status (i.e., 

state active duty or Title 32, U.S. Code [U.S.C.]) are not affected by the Posse 

Comitatus Act. Under the jurisdiction of the state governor, they can enforce laws within 

the civilian population. 

 

 

 When the SecDef directs, the Air Force stands ready to defend the homeland. 

The Air Force makes available the full spectrum of air and space capabilities to meet 
5

To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, 

major disasters, and other emergencies, the US Government shall establish a 

single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management...In these 

efforts, with regard to domestic incidents, the US Government treats crisis 

management and consequence management as a single, integrated function, 

rather than two separate functions...The Secretary of Homeland Security is the 

principal Federal official for domestic incident management. 

—Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 

Management of Domestic Incidents 

the threat or hazard. Our Service has a long history of contributing forces and 

resources in support of civil authorities. From disaster relief and counter-drug support 

to military support in response to terrorist activities, the Air Force continues to play a 

role in homeland operations. 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) 

DSCA, often referred to as civil support, is DOD support provided during and in 

the aftermath of domestic emergencies—such as terrorist attacks or major disasters—

and for designated law enforcement and other activities. It includes military assistance 

for civil law enforcement operations in very limited circumstances. However, National 

Guard forces operating in state status (in state active duty and under Title 32, U.S.C.) 

can directly assist civil law enforcement operations. DSCA missions include, but are not 

limited to, supporting the Department of Justice (DOJ) in preventing or defeating 

terrorist attacks; response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield 

explosive (CBRNE) incidents; response to natural disasters such as earthquakes, 

floods, and fires; support to civilian law enforcement agencies, including counter-drug 

activities; and response to civil disturbances or insurrection. In all these missions, 

various federal, state, or local civilian agencies are primarily responsible for the 

management of the particular incident. For homeland operations, the Air Force’s 

involvement is supportive and dependent on a request to the DOD from the designated 

lead agency. Traditionally, DSCA operations were either considered crisis or 

consequence management. Crisis management activities were handled by the FBI and 

consequence management by FEMA. That distinction is now replaced with domestic 

incident management, a full-spectrum perspective that sees each event as a single 

incident requiring an integrated response. 

 Many of the same forces needed to support combat operations overseas and at 

home may be highly sought by the civil community when a crisis occurs. The SecDef, 

through his executive agent, determines the degree of DSCA that does not jeopardize 

the Air Force’s readiness. Current policy stipulates Air Force resources cannot be 

specifically allocated for the sole purpose of DSCA unless authorized by the SecDef, 

and are only made available when not required for other military operations (see DOD 

Directive [DODD] 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, for additional information). 
6

Combat operations remain the highest priority for the Air Force; these operations take 

precedence over noncombat operations unless directed by higher authority. Figure 1.2 

lists some of the types of operations Air Force forces could be involved in and the 

capabilities they can provide. Air Force organizations that provide support for domestic 

emergencies use the Air Force incident management system (IMS) structure to comply 

with Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, Management of Domestic 

Incidents. The IMS structure mirrors the national incident management system 

structure used by civil response agencies and outlined in the National Response Plan 

(NRP). For additional information, refer to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, Air Force 

Emergency Management Planning and Operations. 

NATIONAL POLICY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 

The Air Force stands ready to provide air and space capabilities to the 

geographic combatant commander (CCDR), whether in support of a civil agency 

or in defense of the homeland. The President provides national security policy in 

several documents, beginning with the National Security Strategy (NSS), and narrowing 

to a HS focus with the NSHS and HSPD 5. The NSS is very clear on the role of 

government: “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental 

commitment of the Federal Government.” In the fight against terrorism, potential Air 

Force operations include counterair missions; reconnaissance; global strike; and 

medical support, along with others. 

 At a broader level, HSPD-5 directed the establishment of the NRP. The NRP 

emphasizes a seamless, nationally integrated response, rather than fragmenting 

America’s response efforts. The NRP addresses the full range of domestic incidents. 

Ready to support this range, potential Air Force support includes medical personnel, 

civil engineers, and airlift capability. 

 The NRP is a dynamic document detailing how to integrate the incident response 

actions of federal, state, and local activities. HSPD-5 sets the guiding policy for 

domestic incident management and the NRP is the vehicle to unify this effort under the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. The NRP moves away from artificially dividing an 

event into crisis and consequence phases. Instead, the intent is to approach each 

event in a systematic and integrated manner, using the term domestic incident 

management. 

Dealing with the immediate consequences of a catastrophic event is a local 

responsibility. State or federal involvement is usually contingent on a request for 

support from the local authorities. Terrorist events, however, such as 9/11 or those 

preceded by substantial threat warning, involve the overlapping authorities of local, 

state, and federal agencies. Each of these agencies has a role in intelligence collection, 

analysis, threat response, and consequence management. While every attempt is 

made to maintain local and state control of domestic incidents, attacks and disasters 

deemed of significance to national security may be managed under federal jurisdiction. 

This creates a potential seam, with local authorities in the lead for managing the 
7

consequences of an event, while federal authorities lead the effort when national 

security is at stake. The numerous local, state, and federal agencies that may 

participate in homeland operations, each with its own differing chain of command, can 

complicate response efforts. The seams between agencies and the lack of a single 

command authority over the entire operation led to the NRP’s creation. It was designed 

to produce unity of effort for federal agencies, through the principal federal official 

(PFO), with the stated goal of approaching the operation in its entirety as management 

of a domestic incident. For more discussion of the NRP, see chapter 3. 

Air Force Support To The National Strategy For Homeland Security 

(NSHS) 

 The NSHS is designed to mobilize and organize the nation to secure the United 

States homeland from terrorist attacks. Air Force operating concepts and procedures 

continue to be developed to support the national strategy. The strategic objectives of 

HS and how the Air Force supports them are to: 

 Prevent attack. To prevent attacks against the United States, Air Force forces must 

deter, detect, predict, plan for, and preempt threats to the homeland. Air Force 

operations can prevent attack through early warning and military operations 

overseas, such as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). 

 Reduce vulnerability. Air Force operations can reduce America’s vulnerability to 

terrorist attacks by “show of force” air patrols, air patrols over specific locations or 

resources, and through military support to law enforcement (MSLE) during special 

events such as the Olympics, the Super Bowl, and Presidential movements. In 

addition, joint planning and mutual training exercises with civil authorities well before 

an incident occurs also reduce America’s vulnerability and provide force protection 

for Air Force forces. The military places special emphasis on securing and 

safeguarding stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons and associated facilities, 

whether operationally deployed, in storage, in transit, or awaiting disposal. 

 Minimize damage and recover from attack. Through DSCA, Air Force operations 

can respond promptly and decisively. Rapidly deployable medical capabilities and 

civil engineering expertise will be key contributors. The Air Force has the ability to 

provide logistics at all levels of operation, from bare base to main operating base 

support. 

 The NSHS provides a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of 

federal, state, local, and private organizations against a specific threat to national 

security—terrorism in the United States. In structuring its response to secure the 

homeland, the United States coordinates the resources of over 87,000 different local, 

state, and federal jurisdictions, focusing on six critical mission areas. The Air Force 

supports each area of the NSHS framework with its forces and capabilities: 
8

 Intelligence and warning 

  Potential Air Force support: air and space reconnaissance platforms; analysis 

expertise 

 Border and transportation security 

  Potential Air Force support: Position, navigation, and timing support; 

reconnaissance 

 Domestic counterterrorism 

  Potential Air Force support: Air Force Office of Special Investigations 

(AFOSI), Civil Air Patrol (CAP) 

 Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets 

  Potential Air Force support: Posted security forces, network defense, 

reconnaissance, airlift; counterspace, CAP 

 Defending against catastrophic terrorism 

  Potential Air Force support: Civil engineering, reconnaissance, posting 

security forces, airlift; counterair; countersea; counterspace, CAP 

 Emergency preparedness and response 

  Potential Air Force support: Emergency preparedness liaison officers 

(EPLOs), emergency medical treatment capabilities, civil engineering, airlift, 

support to DOD continuity of operations (COOP) capability, continuity of 

government (COG) execution support 

Principal Federal Official (PFO) 

 

 By presidential directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the PFO for 

domestic incident management. The Secretary of Homeland Security may appoint a 

subordinate to be his on-scene representative and that person will be considered the 

PFO for the particular incident. A key aspect of the federal response to a domestic 

incident is unity of effort to maximize the effectiveness of the forces of each federal 

agency. 

When portions of the federal government are called on to support a homeland 

event, there will be a lead agency identified. For most homeland events, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead agency at the federal level. For 

law enforcement-related events, the FBI is the lead agency at the federal level. DOD is 

the lead agency for HD. Historically, the lead agency has been referred to as the lead 

federal agent. 
9

Air Force Support For The Homeland Security Mission Of The DOD 

The highest priority of the United States military is the defense of the nation’s 

homeland against all enemies. The Air Force contributes to homeland security 

through its military missions overseas, HD, emergency preparedness, and 

support to civil authorities. The Air Force performs its missions to ensure air 

sovereignty, a nation's inherent right to exercise absolute control and authority over the 

airspace above its territory, for the United States. Within the United States, the NSHS 

envisions circumstances under which the DOD and therefore the Air Force would be 

involved in improving security at home: 

 Air surveillance, air sovereignty alert, and direct air defense operations to defend 

United States citizens and territory. Although the events of 9/11 have created 

NORAD-directed steady state air defense operations, normally only extraordinary 

circumstances require such measures. 

 Quick response in support of civilian agencies by providing unique capabilities during 

an emergency such as an attack or natural disaster. 

 Participation in “limited scope” missions where other agencies have primary 

responsibility for security such as at national special security events (NSSE) like the 

Olympics. 

 Support to a joint task force (JTF) or federal coordinating officer (FCO) under DSCA 

as a designated base support installation. Support may include use of the 

installation infrastructure, aircraft, personnel, equipment, and ancillary resources. 

 Air and space capabilities have been successfully applied in the homeland. 

Fighters have escorted suspicious aircraft, ensuring their safe landing. Air patrols 

patrolled high-threat and high-risk locations. Airlift moved civil agency personnel and 

cargo to the event scene. Specially configured mobility assets helped fight wild fires. 

Security Forces assisted in evacuation and cordon establishment after the bombing at 

the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta. The application of air and space power within the 

homeland has increased and the full spectrum of capabilities remains available. 

 

It is the policy of the Department [of Defense] to protect personnel on 

military installations and DOD-owned or leased facilities from CBRNE attacks, to 

respond to these attacks with trained and equipped emergency responders, and to 

ensure installations are able to continue critical operations during an attack, and to 

resume essential operations after an attack. 

 —Deputy SecDef Paul Wolfowitz memo, 

Preparedness of US Military Installation and Facilities Worldwide Against 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive 

(CBRNE) Attack, 5 Sep 02 
10

Active duty Airmen are always under the command of military commanders 

up through the SecDef and the President. When Air Force capabilities are 

provided to civil authorities, the relationship is similar to the direct support role 

of one military force in support of another. Air Force commanders’ priorities should 

be consistent with DOD guidance in these areas. The same is true when Air National 

Guard forces are federalized under Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.); if in Title 32, 

U.S.C., or state active duty status, they are under the command of the state’s Adjutant 

General, responsible to the state governor (for additional information, see Chapter 2). 

 DOD is the lead for HD missions and will be supported by other federal agencies 

for such missions. An agency other than DOD will be supported for civil support 

missions and DOD will play a role in providing that support, with the Air Force providing 

forces and resources from its capabilities. Figure 1.3 above describes this supported/ 

supporting relationship between the DOD and non-DOD agencies. The key agency to 

which the DOD provides support is FEMA. 

 The DOD will conduct homeland operations when directed by the President or 

requested by civil agencies and approved by the SecDef. The wide ranging capabilities, 

superior state of readiness, and detailed planning and risk management skills of the Air 

Force mean it will be ready to support homeland operations, where the Air Force will 

make significant, positive impacts in those operations. 

Figure 1.3. Support relationships between the DOD and non-DOD agencies 
11

We've undertaken the most sweeping 

reorganization of the federal government 

since the beginning of the Cold War. The 

FBI has transformed itself into an agency 

dedicated primarily to the prevention of 

future terrorist attacks. The Department of 

Defense has established a new top-level 

command whose priority is to protect the 

American homeland. We established the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge 

and analyze in a single place all vital 

intelligence on global terror. We created the 

Homeland Security Council within the White 

House...to help coordinate all homeland 

security activities across our government. 

—President George W. Bush, 

Commander-In-Chief 

 All requests from civilian agencies for DOD assistance, except those provided 

under mutual aid agreements or in response to imminently serious conditions, flow 

through the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS). JDOMS is the clearinghouse for 

accepting interagency mission assignments. JDOMS routes their recommendation to 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and DOD Executive Secretary 

(ExecSec) for SecDef approval. 

ORGANIZATIONS ESTABLISHED SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 

The Air Force established the Deputy for Homeland Operations (AF/A3S-H) and 

Air Forces, Northern, First Air Force (AFNORTH [1 AF]). Within the DOD, 

USNORTHCOM stood up as a geographic combatant command. The JDOMS was 

reorganized under the J-3 on the joint staff. In addition, the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense was established. Weapons of mass 

destruction civil support teams were established, supported by the Air National Guard, 

for the states, territories, and District of Columbia. 

 Among non-DOD organizations, the DHS was established and a number of 

previously disparate organizations were moved under it. The Homeland Security 

Council, similar to the National Security Council, was also initiated. A number of 

terrorist focused, information fusion organizations were established, including the 

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which consists of DOD (Air Force support 

coming from AFOSI and Air Force intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DHS, 

FBI, and representatives from other executive branch entities. The FBI further 

expanded their joint terrorism task forces at the national and local levels, which have a 

wide cross-section of experts, including AFOSI. Additional organizations supporting HS 
12

include the Joint Staff Deputy Directorate of Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense 

(DDAT/HD), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Joint Intelligence Task Force 

for Counterterrorism (JITF-CT), the Joint Force Headquarters, National Capital Region 

(JFHQ-NCR), the Joint Task Force, Civil Support (JTF-CS), and state quick reaction 

teams (QRT). 
13

On September 11th, our Air Force—our total 

force—was among the first to respond, launching 

interceptors and tankers from alert across the United 

States. Within hours we provided disaster assistance and 

began flying homeland defense missions that have 

continued around the clock since then—fighter, tanker, 

AWACS, and Air Control Squadrons all across America 

stood up overnight to prevent another airborne attack. 

Our Security Forces also responded magnificently when, 

for the first time ever, all our installations went to FPCON 

(Force Protection Condition) Charlie/Delta. We mobilized 

the ARC (air reserve components) in large numbers and 

they have met every challenge at home and abroad. 

—General John Jumper, 

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF), 

2001-2005 

CHAPTER TWO 

FORCE PRESENTATION AND ORGANIZATION OF FORCES 

The complexity and basic premise of the interagency process for homeland 

operations, as well as the potential for a surprise terrorist event on American soil, 

differentiate operations in the homeland from traditional Air Force missions 

overseas. These differences affect how we organize and present forces. 

 

An air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) provides the means for the Air 

Force to support homeland operations most efficiently. This is the case when Air Force 

forces are required to perform operations in the homeland away from their home station 

or in a larger joint force operation. It is especially important for the command element to 

include the A-staff functions and an air and space operations center (AOC). By having 

a pre-identified or standing command element, key relationships can be established 

with interagency participants prior to an event. In addition, the staff can be educated 

and trained on the interagency processes, the NRP, and other areas that add to the 

complexity of homeland operations. 

A standing command element and forces capable of response decrease 

response time. Terrorist attacks often come with minimal or no warning. This stands in 

opposition to the build-up phase typically available before initiation of traditional combat 

operations. As a result, homeland operations will often require immediate or nearimmediate response. For example, while the alert fighters scrambled during the 

response to 9/11 were assigned to continental United States (CONUS) Region, 

NORAD, rather than an AETF, the fact they were on alert and tied to a 24/7 chain of 
14

DCO 

PFO 

Functional Task 

Forces

COMAFFOR 

AF Forces 

Other 

Service 

USNORTHCOM 

OR 

USPACOM 

JTF/RTF 

OPCON 

TACON 

Support 

Figure 2.1. C2 Model: JTF with Service Components having 

OPCON of their forces. 

command allowed their response to be nearly instantaneous. In 2003, this rapid 

response was also demonstrated by First Air Force (1 AF), through their A-staff and 

standing AOC, as they prepared for potential support of Hurricane Odette recovery 

operations. Even though the hurricane did not have the impact predicted, Air Force 

forces were positioned to provide immediate support. This support became vital in 2005 

during the operations surrounding the preparations for and aftermath of Hurricane 

Katrina. Similarly, alert air forces assigned to the Alaskan NORAD Region are on 24/7 

tasking from the Eleventh Air Force (11 AF) combined AOC-Alaska (CAOC-A) to protect 

critical oil resources and the national missile defense sites in the geographically remote 

Alaskan homeland. These 1 AF and 11 AF AOCs, along with the Pacific AOC, provide 

the operational command and control support for other homeland security missions. 

FORCE PRESENTATION FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL 

AUTHORITIES 

In order to better enable the US military to conduct homeland security, President 

Bush and Congress established USNORTHCOM as a geographic combatant command. 

USNORTHCOM, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), and the functional 

combatant commands conduct 24/7 military operations in the homeland under the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) execution order, Operation NOBLE 

EAGLE. 

 When a domestic incident occurs and federal assistance is required, the 

Secretary of DHS will appoint a PFO as the on-scene coordinator. If DOD involvement 

is needed, the SecDef will direct the Commander, USNORTHCOM 
15

(CDRUSNORTHCOM) or Commander, USPACOM (CDRUSPACOM), as appropriate, 

to appoint a single voice for the DOD in the form of a Defense Coordinating Officer 

(DCO). For very small DOD involvement, the DCO’s role may be to coordinate the 

efforts of the Service components to USNORTHCOM/USPACOM that provide direct 

support. If DOD involvement becomes extensive, then CDRUSNORTHCOM/ 

CDRUSPACOM may establish a JTF or response task force (RTF) that would receive 

operational control (OPCON) of forces. In this case, the DCO becomes the JTF/RTF 

commander’s liaison to the federal agencies. The DCO assists the unity of effort to civil 

authorities by being DOD’s single face to the overall federal effort. Figure 2.1 above 

provides an example of command relationships for homeland operations. 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 

An AETF should be established and a commander, Air Force forces 

(COMAFFOR) identified for conducting homeland operations with OPCON of Air 

Force forces given to the COMAFFOR. This should occur when Air Force forces are 

required to perform operations in the homeland away from their home station or in a 

larger joint force operation. 

USNORTHCOM has many possible command and control options for use in 

homeland operations. For smaller events, forces may be placed under the OPCON of 

the DCO. As the response grows, task forces are used, as is the case with the standing 

joint task force for civil support. For large events, USNORTHCOM may rely on 

functional component commanders, as was done for Hurricane Katrina, where the 1 AF 

commander was designated the joint force air and space component commander 

(JFACC). 

Typically in operations outside the United States, a JTF will organize with both 

Service and functional component commanders. The Air Force component commander 

is the COMAFFOR. Though the JTF commander selects the functional component 

commanders, it should be noted the Air Force plans and trains for the COMAFFOR to 

be dual-hatted as the JFACC. While CDRUSNORTHCOM has appointed functional 

component commanders for his area of responsibility (AOR), it is unlikely that 

subordinate JTF organizational structures will include functional component 

commanders. As a result, it is expected that air assets will be provided in direct support 

through the theater-wide JFACC to the subordinate JTF commander. Other Air Force 

forces presented to the JTF, though, will be presented through the COMAFFOR, who 

will be under the OPCON of the joint force commander (JFC). If a homeland defense 

operation takes place, it is anticipated that the combatant commander will be the JTF 

commander and, thus will use his/her standing, theater-wide JFACC. Similar 

organizational structures are anticipated within the USPACOM AOR, too. When 

appropriate, the COMAFFOR should appoint an air component coordination element 

(ACCE) to support the joint force operations. For further discussion on the 

COMAFFOR, JFACC, ACCE, and command relationships, see AFDD 2, Operations and 

Organization. 
16

Geographic Combatant Commanders 

Both USNORTHCOM and USPACOM are geographic combatant commanders 

with responsibilities for conducting homeland operations. USNORTHCOM’s AOR is the 

48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, the Gulf of 

Mexico, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Bermuda, St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands, 

and waters out to 500 nautical miles (excluding Greenland). USPACOM’s AOR for 

homeland operations includes Hawaii and US territories and atolls. The AORs of both 

geographic combatant commanders extend 500 nautical miles from their respective 

land areas out into the surrounding waters. 

USPACOM is unique in that the forces in Alaska are under the combatant 

command (COCOM) of CDRUSPACOM, but Alaska is in the USNORTHCOM AOR. To 

facilitate operations in Alaska, CDRUSNORTHCOM has established JTF-Alaska (JTFAK), staffed by CDRUSPACOM’s Alaskan Command. 11 AF/CC, as JFACC, employs 

CAOC-A to support JTF-AK missions as well as Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR) 

missions. This arrangement allows for retention of unity of command and effort in 

presenting Air Force forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM. If additional forces are needed for 

a mission under USNORTHCOM control the SecDef may direct the attachment of 

forces from USPACOM or another combatant command. 

Incidents occurring in the homeland within the USPACOM AOR are normally 

organized around the JTF construct with forces attached from USPACOM’s assigned 

forces. But, as in any other operation, if USPACOM does not have the resident 

capability required to handle the situation then SecDef can attach forces from any other 

combatant commander as necessary. USNORTHCOM has very few assigned forces, 

so SecDef will attach forces from another combatant command in most cases. 

If a domestic incident occurs, CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM may 

establish a JTF to provide command and control for the DOD response force. In the 

NORTHCOM AOR, the air component to the JTF would normally be in the form of an 

AETF and 1 AF/CC, or his designee, would be the COMAFFOR. In some situations 

there may not be a need to attach Air Force forces to the JTF and 1 AF may assume a 

direct support role to the JTF. In the USPACOM AOR, the commander of Pacific Air 

Forces (PACAF/CC) designates the COMAFFOR. Command and control for Air Force 

forces within the USPACOM AOR will be executed through the PACAF Kenney 

Headquarters. In Alaska where NORTHCOM has responsibility for homeland security 

but forces are under the COCOM of CDRUSPACOM, PACAF/CC provides the 

commander, 11 AF, as the COMAFFOR supporting the USNORTHCOM JTF-Alaska. 

The single-Service task force is also used in the USNORTHCOM AOR. There 

are instances where the military capability for an incident resides in a single Service and 

it makes sense to create a task force for only that one Service’s forces. As in all other 

task forces, the combatant commander charters it. 
17

Functional Combatant Commanders 

 US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is a globally aligned functional 

combatant command with no assigned geographic AOR. In the area of HD, 

USSTRATCOM may expect to be the supported command for DOD space and 

information operations, especially computer network defense. USSTRATCOM is 

responsible for warning and, if necessary, assessing missile attack to the other 

combatant commanders. It is tasked as a supporting command to NORAD to provide 

missile warning and space surveillance in furtherance of NORAD’s mission of 

aerospace control of North America. In addition, USSTRATCOM would support 

USNORTHCOM and USPACOM in the event military operations are required to protect 

the homeland. 

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) serves as the DOD 

single manager for transportation, providing common-user air, land, and sea 

transportation and terminal services to meet national security objectives. These 

security objectives can occur in the homeland and USTRANSCOM will normally be in a 

supporting role. Air Mobility Command (AMC) is the Air Force component of 

USTRANSCOM. As the single manager for air mobility, AMC's mission is to provide 

airlift, air refueling, special air missions, and aeromedical evacuation for US forces. 

AMC also has the ability to support humanitarian, homeland defense, and other 

operations. 

 US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) serves as a supported or 

supporting commander for designated global strike operations and selected 

counterterrorism activities. The commander, USSOCOM serves as the supporting 

commander to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM within their respective AORs when 

requirements exceed conventional forces’ capabilities or special operations forces 

expertise is needed. When directed by the President or the SecDef, USSOCOM 

conducts special operations and provides special operations forces as required in 

support of civil authorities during DSCA operations, with Air Force Special Operations 

Command (AFSOC) providing the Air Force personnel and materiel. USSOCOM may 

also provide liaison officers and other assistance to the supported combatant 

commanders. 

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 

 NORAD has responsibility for providing air sovereignty, air warning, and air 

defense of the North American continent–specifically the CONUS, Alaska, Canada, 

Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. NORAD is a binational command, with two 

chains of command. One chain of command goes to the Canadian Prime Minister and 

the other to the President, but it does not go through the SecDef. Air Force air assets 

supporting NORAD fall under the OPCON of the NORAD commander in his role as 

commander, US Element NORAD, with OPCON delegated to the respective NORAD 

regional air defense commanders (i.e., Alaska and CONUS). Each region has a 

commander triple-hatted as JFACC, airspace control authority, and area air defense 
18

commander for executing defensive counterair (DCA) missions. The commanders of 

Alaska NORAD Region and CONUS NORAD Region do not have OPCON over entire 

Air Force units; rather they have OPCON over specific personnel and assets directly 

supporting the DCA mission. NORAD air defense sectors execute tactical control of 

DCA assets as designated in the region air tasking order published by the 1 AF AOC 

and CAOC-A. USSTRATCOM supports NORAD by providing the necessary missile 

warning and space surveillance. 

Air Force Components 

The air component to USNORTHCOM is designated Air Forces Northern (First 

Air Force) (AFNORTH [1 AF]) and the commander is dual-hatted as the commander of 

1 AF. The day-to-day air domain and civil support operations are conducted by 

AFNORTH (1 AF) from Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. The AFNORTH (1 AF) standing 

“tailored” AOC is particularly suited for all homeland operations taking place within the 

USNORTHCOM AOR (except Alaska where the 11 AF CAOC-A supports the ANR and 

USNORTHCOM’s JTF-AK). The AFNORTH (1 AF) AOC is always manned, providing 

the fastest possible response. In addition, its personnel are trained and exercised in 

homeland operations, and are familiar with the complexities of the interagency process 

and the legal considerations applicable to operations in the homeland. The 18 AF 

tanker airlift control center (18 AF/TACC) provides the 1 AF AOC with the majority of its 

airlift and aerial refueling expertise through direct support of AFNORTH (1 AF)’s air 

mobility division (AMD). 

When Air Force forces deploy or are employed in-place in support of 

USNORTHCOM inside the CONUS, Virgin Islands, or Puerto Rico, an Air Force single 

Service task force (SSTF) or the air component to a JTF is presented in the form of an 

AETF with administrative control (ADCON) back to 1 AF. The AETF forces will be 

OPCON to the SSTF commander or JTF/CC, who in turn reports to USNORTHCOM. If 

the AETF takes the form of an air expeditionary squadron (AES) or an air expeditionary 

detachment (AED), it will be attached to the AFNORTH (1 AF) standing headquarters. 

If the incident requires the establishment of an air expeditionary group or wing (AEG or 

AEW), they will also attach to the AFNORTH (1 AF) standing AETF headquarters, but 

two additional force presentation actions will occur if a JTF is formed. First, AFNORTH 

(1 AF) will deploy an air component coordination element (ACCE) to the JTF. At the 

same time, AFNORTH (1 AF) will establish an AEG or AEW. The AEW or AEG/CC will 

act as COMAFFOR for all Air Force forces supporting the JTF. 

Normally USTRANSCOM airlift aircraft will operate in a supporting relationship 

with USNORTHCOM. USTRANSCOM does not normally transfer OPCON of strategic 

airlift aircraft and crews that are capable of continuing to perform airlift missions in 

support of other USTRANSCOM requirements. For additional information, see AFDD 2-

6, Air Mobility Operations. 

 A standing COMAFFOR, AOC, and staff are essential for conducting homeland 

operations. The Air Force maximizes its contributions to homeland operations through 
19

rapid response and force integration. With a standing COMAFFOR, AOC, and staff, the 

Air Force dramatically decreases the response time and has the opportunity to educate 

and train pre-identified personnel on the processes and participants associated with 

homeland operations before an event occurs. 

Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency (AFNSEP) 

The Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency is a field 

operating agency that organizes, trains, equips, and deploys emergency preparedness 

liaison officers (EPLO) to the site of a disaster as quickly as possible. AFNSEP works 

directly with the COMAFFOR and JDOMS to coordinate the Air Force response in the 

initial stages of a homeland event. AFNSEP visits all homeland Air Force bases 

annually to brief them on defense support of civil authorities. 

The EPLO is a part of the defense coordination element located in the civil 

agency’s on-scene command post, acting as the Air Force’s representative to the 

defense coordinating officer. Traditionally, they are Air Force Reserve officers who 

deploy to assist in managing the consequences of an event. They have not historically 

been a part of the pre-incident, or crisis, phase of an event (e.g., a terrorist attack has 

not occurred, but intelligence indicates one is likely so a lead federal agent initiates 

actions). To advise civil agencies on air and space capabilities in an effective and 

timely manner, Air Force EPLOs must deploy as soon as possible. EPLOs are trained 

in emergency response and the coordination of follow-on Air Force assets in response 

to requests for Air Force support. They serve as the focal point within a joint field office 

for coordinating Air Force response to any incident. For incidents involving immediate 

response, a member of an Air Force installation emergency response element may be 

located in the civil agency’s on-scene command post until such time as the EPLO 

arrives. 

Air National Guard (ANG) 

 Special considerations exist in determining command relationships when dealing 

with the ANG. AFNORTH (1 AF)/CC and PACAF/CC (along with 11 AF/CC if 

designated as COMAFFOR) exercise OPCON of applicable ANG units and members 

when they are federalized and in Title 10, U.S.C., status for homeland operations. 

ADCON for discipline, personnel support, and administration for these federalized units 

is retained by the ANG Readiness Center, or if full mobilization has occurred, is given to 

the gaining command. With approval of the governor of a state and the President of the 

United States, federalized ANG officers may command ANG personnel who are still in 

Title 32, U.S.C., status. When ANG personnel are involved in training for federal 

missions (Title 32 status), the commander of the providing command may exercise 

training and readiness oversight, but not command. Command remains with the state 

authorities. Guard members in Title 32 status fall under the command authority of the 

adjutant general (TAG) of their state and therefore their governor. If Guard members 

operate in Title 32 status outside of their state but within the United States, command 

authority will remain with the TAG but be subject to any coordinating authority or state-
20

ANG assets can be classified into three categories within the law and, 

with the exception of one very limited situation under 32 U.S.C. §325 requiring 

approval of the President, can only be in one status at a time. The first is 

familiar: Title 10, where forces are under the authority of the President as 

commander in chief. The second category is “state active duty” for ANG forces 

under the authority of the state governor through the respective state's adjutant 

general and funded by the state. The third category is Title 32 status. They are 

under the authority of the state governor for training purposes but funding is from 

the federal government. The ANG and Air Force have agreed that the joint 

definition of ‘coordinating authority’ allows the state governor to direct ANG 

forces to respond to the direction of a Title 10 commander. The forces are still 

under the command authority of the governor, but for unity of effort the Title 10 

commander (i.e., active duty officer) can direct their actions. 

 —Information derived from Titles 10 and 32, U.S.C.

AFAux/CAP assets, much like the ANG, can be classified into two 

categories within the law and can only be in one status at a time. The first category 

is Title 10, where these Air Force Auxiliary forces are deemed an instrumentality of 

the United States when carrying out a non-combat mission assigned by the 

Secretary of the Air Force. The second category is where these same individuals 

and equipment are acting in the CAP Corporate category under title 36 as a 

federally sanctioned non-profit corporation. 

—Information derived from Titles 10 and 36, U.S.C.

to-state agreements. If no pre-negotiated agreement exists, responsibilities should be 

coordinated between applicable commanders. 

Air Force Auxiliary / Civil Air Patrol (AFAUX/CAP) 

The AFAux/CAP is authorized, when directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, 

to fulfill any non-combat mission of the Air Force. When CAP operates in AFAux status, 

it is an Air Force federal military activity and as such is required to comply with the 

Posse Comitatus Act and intelligence oversight restrictions. AFAux/CAP forces are 

presented through the Air Education and Training Command commander to AFNORTH 

(1 AF) or PACAF in response to requests for DSCA, consequence management 

operations, and other federal operations. 

 The AFAux/CAP is located in every state as well as Puerto Rico and provides 

low-cost platforms using light aircraft. The platforms support sensors like the satellite 

digital imaging system (SDIS), which can transmit real-time high quality photos to the 

customer via the worldwide web, and a new sensor called ARCHER, an emerging 

hyperspectral imaging capability. These sensors can be used for non-combat missions 
21

USNORTHCOM 

COMAFFOR

/JFACC 

Task Force - 

Medical 

Task Force - 

Troops 

Task Force - 

Logistics 

Figure 2.2. Notional organizational structure for Joint Task Force – 

Civil Support in USNORTHCOM 

JTF-CS 

such as search and rescue, critical infrastructure protection, low-level route survey or 

reconnaissance over high-value national infrastructure locations. 

Joint Task Force 

 The JFC determines appropriate objectives and sets priorities for the entire joint 

force. In combat operations, the JFC normally exercises command authority through 

designated subordinate component commanders. All joint forces include Service 

component commanders (e.g., a COMAFFOR) and may, at the discretion of the JFC, 

also include functional component commanders (e.g., a JFACC). The JFC may execute 

operations either through the Service component commanders, the functional 

component commanders, or some combination thereof. 

 The standing JTF for civil support (JTF-CS) is normally not organized around 

Service components but rather by function. The result is a JFC supported by a series of 

functional task forces such as Task Force (TF) Transportation, TF Medical, TF Troops, 

and TF Aviation. In these cases, Airmen should strive for unity of command through 

presentation of an appropriate AETF structure (see fig 2.2). 

 In some DSCA operations, the JFC may elect to attach expeditionary combat 

support (ECS) forces to subordinate functional task force commanders (TFCs) with a 

specification of OPCON to the TFC. This organizational scheme is not the most 

operationally effective for unity of command or unity of effort under a single Airman. Air 

Force best practice is that the JFC should allow the COMAFFOR to retain OPCON and 

TACON at his level. The COMAFFOR then provides direct support to the various 

functional TFCs. Another option, though less optimal, is having the COMAFFOR retain 

OPCON while the functional TFCs receive TACON of Air Force forces. 

 Because the DOD could have a supporting role in any federal emergency, close 

cooperation between the JTF and other federal agencies is required through the 

supported combatant commander’s DCO. The DCO has a staff in the form of a defense 

coordinating element (DCE) that provides the interface to the federal response effort for 
22

this coordination. The DCO and the DCE normally work for the JTF commander as part 

of the special staff. 
23

CHAPTER THREE 

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL 

AUTHORITIES 

HOMELAND DEFENSE 

 While all combatant commanders have a role in HD, USNORTHCOM and 

USPACOM have a primary role in the direct defense of the homeland. What we have 

learned about combat throughout our history as a separate Service applies to combat 

operations in the homeland. This is well documented in current doctrine (see AFDD 2, 

Operations and Organization, and AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations, for discussion of 

these capabilities). The defense of the homeland should primarily follow current 

warfighting doctrine. 

 One of our central air and space power tenets is centralized control, 

decentralized execution. This tenet remains relevant in homeland operations, but will 

very likely be stretched in the direction of “centralized execution” more so than in 

traditional combat operations. However, if execution is more centralized, the ability to 

engage fleeting targets decreases. One compensatory measure is to have well 

established and understood rules of engagement (ROE). To be effective, the ROE 

must be clearly understood and rapidly executable, with the shooter receiving approval 

in time to destroy the target. ROE should be defined when dealing with the full 

spectrum of response actions for homeland security. 

 NORAD and USNORTHCOM both have responsibilities within the same US air 

domain. NORAD is charged with air warning, air sovereignty, and air defense of the 

CONUS, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and Alaska, while USNORTHCOM has 

responsibility for all other air domain missions (other than those within USPACOM’s 

AOR) including responsibility for air domain missions in Mexico since NORAD’s charter 

Everyone knows that the Pentagon is not 

in the business of providing an armed force for 

[within] the United States, but when an event 

occurs we get the phone call and why do we get 

the phone call? Well, because the Department 

of Defense is considered the Department of 

Defense. They know that they've got troops. 

They've got people who respond. They're 

organized and they can be of assistance. 

—Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense 
24

If we lose freedom here [in America], there is no 

place to escape to. This is the last stand on Earth. 

—President Ronald Reagan

October 27, 1984 

does not include Mexico. Additionally, USNORTHCOM is a geographic combatant 

command, with a chain of command through the SecDef to the President. NORAD is a 

binational command, with two chains of command. One chain of command goes to the 

Canadian Prime Minister and the other to the President, but it does not go through the 

SecDef. As a result, command and control relationships need to be emphasized to 

ensure people understand their chain of command, and from whom they take orders 

during certain events. For more information, see the discussion on command 

relationships for these organizations in Chapter 2. 

The need for clarity in command relationships for HD is emphasized with the 

stand-up of the National Capitol Region command. Alaska also presents a need for 

command and control clarity, since Air Force forces in Alaska are under the combatant 

command of USPACOM, while the defense of Alaska is a USNORTHCOM 

responsibility. For Alaska, this clarity is provided through JTF-AK and CAOC-A. Lastly, 

while Hawaii, Guam, and other US territories and atolls are a part of the homeland, 

USPACOM is the geographic combatant command for those locations. 

 Airborne threat response will likely require more coordination when conducting 

combat missions in the homeland. This is partly driven by our country’s traditional 

treatment of hijacked aircraft and other terrorist threats as law enforcement concerns, 

rather than national security issues. Threat response procedures are well defined from 

the Cold War era, but the transition points should be clearly defined and aggressive 

coordination with civil authorities (e.g., DHS, FAA) is needed. This is relevant in the 

area of ballistic missile defense, as well. 

 In the targeting arena, additional coordination will also be necessary. While there 

are legal implications requiring thorough legal reviews before committing ISR assets, 

their employment need not be prohibited. A variety of organizations, such as the FBI, 

NCTC, Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau of DHS, and state and local law 

enforcement can provide much of the needed data. 

The Air Force can directly support the lead federal agency of the US Coast 

Guard for countersea operations. Air Force forces can be employed to support 

USNORTHCOM military operations for homeland defense by controlling use of the 

maritime environment along US coastal waters to prevent enemies from attacking 

civilian population centers, disrupting sea lines of communication, or committing 

terrorism on US sovereign soil. The Air Force performs comparable duties in the Pacific 

in support of USPACOM’s homeland defense missions. For further information on Air 

Force operations in the countersea role, see AFDD 2-1.4, Countersea Operations. 
25

 Lastly, added emphasis on the ROE can be anticipated. Senior decision makers 

continually balance the need for aggressive and effective combat operations with the 

need to minimize collateral damage and casualties. They most effectively accomplish 

this through applying risk management controls and processes. In the homeland, 

expect the balance to shift further towards protecting against collateral damage and 

casualties. 

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 

Planning 

 Many of the capabilities inherent in air and space forces can also provide for 

rapid response to support civil authorities in cases of domestic emergencies and 

disasters. In providing DSCA, the Air Force supports federal, state, or local civil 

authorities in cases of natural or man-made domestic emergencies, civil 

disturbances, or authorized law enforcement activities. Acts of terrorism, natural 

disasters, and accidents involving hazardous materials stretch local and state 

emergency response resources to the limit, and sometimes beyond. For acts or threats 

of terrorism in the United States, the Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, is 

the lead agency. When disasters or accidents occur, local authorities lead the effort 

and request assistance from state (e.g., “non-federalized” National Guard) and/or 

federal agencies as needed. In both instances, regular and reserve military units, 

including Air Force civilian personnel, may be tasked to assist in response and recovery 

efforts. In all cases, the Air Force is prepared to support homeland operations through 

intelligence and information sharing. 

Air and space operations centers (AOCs), in conjunction with the 18 AF/TACC, 

provide the full spectrum of planning for air and space operations in support of 

operations in the homeland. Specific regional AOCs provide support for homeland 

operations to CONUS NORAD Region and NORTHCOM for planning within the 

CONUS, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands; to ANR and JTF-Alaska for planning 

within Alaska; and to PACOM for planning within Hawaii, Guam and other US Pacific 

territories and atolls. The 18 AF/TACC supports homeland operations through effective 

application of air mobility capabilities to satisfy combatant commander requirements. 

 Regular and reserve installation commanders plan for situations that would 

require assigned units to assist local authorities. Installation commanders and planners 

should be aware of the various industries or other facilities in the surrounding 

communities. They should assess what potential hazard or threat these industries and 

facilities may pose to the installation. They should also determine what type of 

assistance each may require in the event of an emergency situation. The operational 

risk management process should be integral to any planning related to homeland 

operations. Installation commanders should be aware of critical dependencies on the 

surrounding community and work with involved agencies to ensure the installation is 

capable of continuing minimum essential functions in an emergency. Coordinated 
26

planning between the installation and the community is critical to a successful 

emergency response and must take into account the need to preserve the installation’s 

ability to project and protect its forces when and where needed. What occurs in the 

community may affect the installation’s ability to perform its mission. In addition to 

providing support, Air Force installations should have plans and procedures in place for 

receiving aid and assistance from DOD or civil agencies when needed. 

 Memoranda of agreement or understanding (MOA/MOU) with the surrounding 

communities can clarify such issues as response procedures and capabilities, and 

reimbursement of costs. MOA and MOU provide a means to answer numerous 

questions before a disaster or accident occurs, and allow for planning as to how military 

units will respond and what the local authorities expect of them. 

 Key agencies for planning include local fire, medical, and police forces. During 

off-base emergency situations, the Air Force may be able to provide assistance fighting 

fires, treating the injured, evacuating buildings, and establishing cordons. 

 The National Response Plan (NRP) contains detailed guidance and 

considerations and should be the primary reference in developing MOA/MOU (an 

extended discussion of the NRP is located later in this chapter). Refer to the NRP and 

take the following into consideration, whether or not MOA/MOU are in place: 

 Installation commanders may provide immediate response to save lives, prevent 

human suffering, or mitigate great property damage resulting from any civil 

emergency or attack. Otherwise, SecDef approval is required prior to providing Air 

Force support. Commanders acting under immediate response authority must 

expeditiously notify the JDOMS through command channels. 

 Circumstances for requesting assistance: Determine the circumstances under which 

mutual response will be requested and provided between the parties named in the 

memorandum. The circumstances will vary from installation to installation 

depending on available capabilities for both the off-base and on-base organizations, 

as well as what types of industries are located in the off-base communities. The 

most common example of requested assistance would be firefighting, explosive 

ordnance disposal, or hazardous materials units. 

 Procedures for requesting assistance (entry strategy): There should be a written set 

of instructions that civil authorities must follow when requesting assistance. This will 

standardize request procedures and clarify requirements for both the military and 

civilian organizations involved. 

 Procedures for responding to and communicating with the lead command element 

(integration strategy): Specific procedures should be provided for use by responding 

units when reporting to the scene of an emergency. Specify how the military 

organization will integrate with the civil authorities. A section within a MOA/MOU 

should also include frequencies for radios, radio procedures, equipment 

requirements, personnel requirements, force protection requirements, etc. 
27

- Animal Disease 

- Biological Incident 

- Chemical Incident 

- Civil Disturbance 

- Continuity of Operations 

- Counter Drug Operations 

- Counter Terrorism 

- Critical Infrastructure 

- Drought 

- Earthquake 

- Epidemic

- Explosion 

- Fire 

- Flood 

- Hurricane/Typhoon 

- Insurrection 

- Landslide 

- Mass Immigration 

- Medical Evacuation 

- Military Support for Civil 

 Disturbances 

- Military Support to 

Civilian Law Enforcement 

Agencies 

- National Special 

 Security Event 

- Oil Spill 

- Postal Work Stoppage 

- Radiological Incident 

- Snowstorm 

- Space Debris Impact 

- State Funerals 

- Terrorist Attack 

- Tornado 

- Tsunami/Tidal Wave 

- Volcanic Eruption 

Figure 3.1. Potential Defense Support of 

Civil Authority Missions 

 Procedures for cost accounting and potential reimbursement: A section within a 

MOA/MOU should contain instructions on how to track costs and request 

reimbursement. It applies to both the military and civilian agencies since most 

MOA/MOU are mutual response agreements. 

 Circumstances and procedures for withdrawing support (exit strategy): A MOA/MOU 

should specify such things as minimum notification time before assistance is 

withdrawn, maximum amount of time assistance can be provided, and procedures 

for transferring responsibilities to relieving units. 

 Procedures for scheduling and conducting training and exercises: Procedures for 

conducting joint exercises to familiarize all parties with the command structure and 

the scenarios in which assistance might be rendered should be incorporated into a 

MOA/MOU. 

 Installation coordination: A section in a MOA/MOU should describe efforts to bring all 

DOD installations clustered in one greater community together into an integrated, 

community-wide support plan (e.g., San Antonio, TX; Hampton Roads, VA; 

Washington, DC; etc.). 

 

 

 Most Air Force support to civil authorities will be in already familiar roles—

conducting airlift of supplies to affected areas or providing medical or engineering 

assistance to people in need. Examples of Air Force capabilities that may be requested 

in a domestic disaster or emergency include (but are not limited to): 

 Air mobility. AMC may provide airlift to support local, state, DOD, or other federal 

agencies (e.g., aeromedical evacuation). 

 Airbase opening and sustainment. The Air Force provides AETF force modules 

to open an airbase, provide command and control, establish an airbase, generate 

the mission, and operate an airbase. These modules can be used to establish 
28

remote, abandoned, or inactive airfields with capabilities to accomplish an assigned 

mission; the capabilities can also be used to augment existing airfield facilities to 

handle the demands of a homeland security incident. 

 Communications. Deployable Air Force communications systems can provide 

worldwide, single-channel, secure voice and record communications, and secure onsite communications at or away from home stations. 

 Reconnaissance. The Air Force can provide reconnaissance capabilities, both 

analysis/ assessment capabilities and assets (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles; 

AFAux, space reconnaissance assets), to monitor designated locations and provide 

airborne surveillance. They could, for example, be used to monitor floodwaters, 

assess hurricane or tornado damage, or assist in tracking terrorist activities. 

Reconnaissance assets could also be used to collect airborne nuclear debris 

following a domestic nuclear event. 

 Investigative support. AFOSI can provide investigative expertise to support 

criminal investigations and counterintelligence services. 

 Search and rescue. Air Force assets can provide rapid response capability for 

search, transportation, insertion, and extraction functions in support of rescue 

activities or law enforcement. 

 Civil engineering support. Air Force civil engineer forces are capable of rapidly 

responding to worldwide contingency operations. Capabilities include operation and 

maintenance of facilities and infrastructure, aircraft rescue and facility fire 

suppression, construction management of emergency repair activities, monitoring 

and protecting resources subject to CBRNE events, and explosive ordnance 

disposal (EOD). EOD provides assistance to federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies with EOD matters when determined to be in the interest of 

public safety. EOD supports specialized JTF operations and hazardous materials 

response for incidents involving explosives. 

 Health Services. Air Force Medical Service capabilities, while primarily designed to 

meet a wartime mission, are easily adaptable for civil disaster response. Small, 

incremental packages of tailored medical capability can be rapidly deployed to meet 

immediate and short-term civilian requirements. 

The illustrative list above is intended to provide examples of the breadth of 

capabilities the Air Force can bring to its DSCA role. It, along with the potential DSCA 

missions listed in Figure 3.1, are not all-inclusive, but convey the large variety of 

responses to DSCA needs the Air Force can perform. 

Preparedness And Response 

 Many events, from terrorist attacks to natural disasters, often occur with little or 

no warning. Terrorists attempt to hit quickly and decisively. A natural disaster, such as 
29

Two-and-a-half years ago, our nation 

saw war and grief arrive on a quiet September 

morning. From that day to this, we have 

pursued a clear strategy: We are taking the 

offensive against the terrorists abroad. 

—President George W. Bush 

a hurricane, can begin as an event believed to be controllable, but can rapidly spiral 

upward into one requiring greatly increased response needs. One of the best ways to 

mitigate against those realities is to lean forward within the existing legal and policy 

framework. There are a number of options available for the Air Force to be fully 

prepared. 

Implementation of standing execution orders (EXORDs) provides for 

preparedness by the Air Force. For instance, to counter terrorism in the homeland after 

9/11, there was developed a standing EXORD, the CJCS EXORD Operation NOBLE 

EAGLE. The EXORD can include prepare to deploy orders (PTDOs), and can establish 

direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) relationships, command relationships, and other 

responsibilities, all before an event occurs. PTDOs can include force modules with unit 

type codes (UTCs) identified, sourced, and alerted to be ready for deployment within a 

certain notification window. DIRLAUTH allows subordinate echelons to establish 

relationships within the interagency community, cross-flow information, and refine plans 

and potential support requests. Similar to standing EXORDs, concepts of operations 

(CONOPS) help the air component prepare to act by documenting various processes, 

policies, and plans well before the event takes place. Headquarters, Air Combat 

Command (ACC) is the lead agent for the Air Force’s homeland security CONOPS. 

Lastly, a pre-identified, standing command element enables the air component to lean 

forward. Once identified, the COMAFFOR and staff can become experts on the plans 

and policies affecting operations in the homeland, ones that are substantially different 

than those impacting traditional operations. Additionally, a standing command element 

facilitates reduced response times. 

In anticipation of being tasked during an actual emergency (under other than 

immediate response authority situations), commanders can recall personnel, run 

mobility lines, palletize equipment, and accomplish any other preparatory actions that 

will minimize the response timeline. Existing rules prohibit actual deployment of 

personnel until a formal request has been made, unless an immediate response 

resulting from a civil emergency or attack is required to save lives, prevent human 

suffering, or mitigate great property damage. 
30

National Response Plan (NRP) 

 The NRP recognizes the dynamic nature of emergency situations and identifies 

the best way to integrate local, state, and federal actions. Many incidents begin as local 

events and the first responders are normally local medical, law enforcement, and 

firefighting personnel. If the situation overwhelms local capabilities, it escalates to the 

state government level. Depending on the nature of the event, DOD agencies may be 

receiving information on the evolving crisis; planning begins if a request for assistance 

(RFA) is expected. Also at this stage the federal government may send a response 

team to assist the state and local agencies with the crisis. Because of legal 

considerations, federal assets are not normally used to help control the emergency until 

authorized by the President in the form of an emergency declaration. Once the 

President authorizes employment of assets to respond, federal agencies have explicit 

permission to expend funds. For example, the DOD in partnership with the Department 

of Veterans Affairs, DHS, and the Department of Health and Human Services comprise 

the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). Upon activation of the NDMS, the DOD 

will provide available resources for patient movement and reception, and definitive 

medical care. The NDMS will be used for the purpose of saving lives and minimizing 

human suffering. 

 The NRP outlines how the federal government implements the Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (usually referred to as the Stafford Act), 

as amended, to assist state, local, and tribal governments when a major disaster or 

emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively to save lives; protect public 

health, safety, and property; and restore their communities. 

 As a crisis unfolds it may become apparent that state and local civil capabilities 

will be exceeded and federal government involvement may be warranted. The PFO 

normally establishes a joint field office (JFO) to manage operations. From a military 

perspective, geographic combatant commanders continuously monitor their AORs and if 

they believe military forces may be needed they begin crisis action planning for 

response options. During the planning phase, the combatant commander may 

authorize military liaisons to deploy to the incident area. The combatant commander 

may also alert forces to prepare to deploy. The deployed liaisons advise the civil 

authorities on potential capabilities. Generally speaking, the intent of the Stafford Act is 

to restrict expenditure of federal funds until a declaration by the President and thus any 

costs incurred by DOD agencies prior to this declaration will not be reimbursed. The 

conduit for the PFO to do a formal RFA of DOD capabilities is the JDOMS who will staff 

the request through the DOD ExecSec for SecDef approval. 

The on-scene civil authorities in the JFO have available a single point of contact 

to the DOD, the DCO. Historically, the DCO and staff (defense coordinating element 

which includes Service EPLOs) are embedded in the JFO, which contends with the 

consequences of an event. Led by the FBI, the joint operations center (JOC) is the 

focal point for all federal investigative law enforcement activities during a terrorist or 

potential terrorist incident or any other significant criminal incident. Currently the only 
31

DOD representation at the JOC is in the consequence management cell. Every effort 

should be made to get Air Force representation in the operations cell of the JOC. If Air 

Force forces are likely to be needed, then an Air Force EPLO would be used. AFNSEP 

tracks the availability and expertise of the EPLOs and is the mechanism for activating 

and deploying them upon direction of the associated combatant command. For further 

information, see AFI 10-802, Military Support to Civil Authorities, and AFI 10-2501, Air 

Force Emergency Management Planning and Operations. 

Once a JTF is established, Air Force forces deployed to the crisis should 

be organized like any other Air Force task force, that is, as an AETF, and the 

COMAFFOR should be given OPCON of Air Force forces. 

Immediate Response 

 Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may 

require immediate action by military commanders or by responsible officials of other 

DOD agencies to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property 

damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from 

higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials of other DOD 

components are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil 

authorities, with follow-on reporting up the appropriate command chain as soon as 

practicable. 

 There are steps that installation commanders can take to minimize the timeline 

for responding when requested. During planning, key installation personnel should 

become familiar with the layout of the communities that surround the installation, the 

hazards to Air Force personnel, and the type of support that may be required. All 

homeland installations should have some kind of MOA with the local community to 

address the possibility of an incident. Major accident response exercises can be 

tailored to include local DSCA. See AFI 10-2501 for full spectrum threat response offbase exercise and coordination requirements with local communities. 

Initial Response 

 The formal request for assistance process takes time. From the moment the 

initial request is sent to the DOD until military forces are on scene, critical time elapses 

that may result in extensive human suffering and property damage. There are actions 

the component commanders can take in the interim. The commanders of AFNORTH (1 

AF) and PACAF are dual-hatted as component commanders and the Air Force regional 

planning agents for DSCA in their respective combatant commanders’ AORs. The 

respective AFNORTH (1 AF) and PACAF staff expertise and designated operations 

centers play a central role in providing component-level initial support to civil authorities. 

 In general, to execute a component-level initial response effort, the regional 

planning agents should: 
32

 Quickly establish lines of communication to facilitate requests for assistance, as well 

as coordinate with the respective combatant commander and civil authorities. 

 Determine appropriate Air Force support and response capabilities. 

 Perform risk management evaluation categorizing hazards and assigning risk 

controls to the appropriate level of leadership. 

 Source Air Force assets. 

 Establish lines of command and control for Air Force forces. 

 Plan for the efficient hand-off to follow-on forces. 

Incident Management Actions 

 When the SecDef approves use of military forces to aid in a domestic incident, 

the corresponding combatant command will establish a command structure to conduct 

the response, incorporating the appropriate Air Force response forces and capabilities. 

Air Force organizations use the IMS structure to organize response forces for 

compatibility and integration with domestic response organization incident management 

systems. As the operation progresses, military forces will get direction from civil 

authorities on how to respond; this will continue until the emergency subsides. Air 

Force forces should normally be used for what they are trained: civil engineering 

personnel can be used to help move rubble in a natural disaster, medical professionals 

can treat the sick and wounded, airlift forces can be used to transport humanitarian 

supplies, and other forces can provide support in their areas of expertise. 

 

Support To Civilian Law Enforcement 

 The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) restricts direct military involvement for law 

enforcement purposes, except as authorized by Congress and the United States 

Constitution (see Appendix A), called military support to civilian law enforcement 

agencies (MSCLEA). If Air Force forces are used in a law enforcement role they must 

be in compliance with public law. Normally Air Force force protection forces, such as 

Security Forces and AFOSI, will be called on for their expertise and the tactical level 

employment of these forces should be in accordance with their training. 
33

Oklahoma City Bombing 

 The bomb detonated outside the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in 

Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, resulted in 167 dead, 467 injured, and 2 missing. 

No warning preceded the attack. The event highlighted the ability to provide 

technical support on extremely short notice in support of civil authorities. Fort Sill 

dispatched two medical evacuation helicopters and Tinker Air Force Base 

deployed a 66-person rescue squad. Under his immediate response authority, the 

Secretary of the Army directed the director of military support (DOMS, now joint 

director of military support) to stand up the 24-hour crisis action team one hour 

after the explosion and sent a liaison officer to FEMA headquarters. DOD 

ultimately provided technical support and equipment to many agencies including 

the FBI and FEMA. 

DOMS received its first request for assistance three hours after the 

bombing, when FEMA requested transportation for an urban search and rescue 

team from Phoenix. An airborne C–141 from McChord Air Force Base was 

diverted to Luke Air Force Base to provide the airlift. After the presidential 

emergency declaration later in the day, DOMS staffed and issued an execute 

order tasking US Atlantic Command as the supported combatant commander. 

The DCO and the nucleus of the defense coordinating element were on scene 

eight hours after the blast and began coordinating all on-site requirements for 

support. Although the last formal request for support was received on April 29, 

DOD continued to assist in rescue and law enforcement efforts until the end of 

May. The peak strength reached 1,002 personnel and included a large amount of 

aviation and ground transport, specialized equipment with operators, and life 

support items. In addition to officially tasked military personnel, numerous 

volunteers of all professions and skills from Tinker, Altus, and Vance Air Force 

Bases also helped. In particular, firefighters, readiness troops, and readiness 

personnel helped organize support for search and recovery efforts. 

—Various Sources 
34

 In addition, law enforcement agencies may frequently request a variety of 

reconnaissance capabilities. For instance, the DOD supported the FBI with 

reconnaissance assets during the Washington, DC, sniper shootings in 2002. 

Reconnaissance is an area in which the DOD has a tremendous capability edge over 

civilian agencies. While there are legal implications requiring thorough legal reviews 

before committing reconnaissance assets, their employment need not be prohibited. 

Figure 3.2 outlines potential command relationships for a single Service task force 

oriented around reconnaissance capabilities. 

National Special Security Events (NSSE) 

 Terrorist attacks against highly visible, well-attended events can have a 

significant impact on our country because of the physical and psychological damage. 

When designated by the National Security Council, in accordance with Presidential 

Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62), Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the 

Homeland and Americans Overseas, these events are called national special security 

events (NSSE). Examples include the State of the Union Address and national political 

party conventions. PDD 62 reaffirms the domestic lead agencies and their 

responsibilities. It outlines the roles and responsibilities of other federal agencies, 

including the Public Health Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, the 

Department of Energy, the FBI, the US Secret Service, FEMA, and others. Air Force 

forces can provide a wide range of support, such as assisting in command and control, 

air patrols, medical support, military working dogs, logistical support, and response if a 

Single Service Task Force Supporting the 

FBI’s Counterterrorism Efforts 

Direct Support

OPCON

FBI

1 X Predator 

USNORTHCOM USJFCOM

COMAFFOR 

(1 AF/CC) 

ACCE

Fig 3.2. Single Service Task Force C2 Model 
35

crisis occurs. Many of the NSSE are vulnerable to air threats, so an air sovereignty 

mission is expected. NSSE are an example of where a JTF structure has proven 

successful within the NRP construct. 

Critical Infrastructure 

 Certain infrastructure within the United States is critical to the defense and 

normal function of the nation. If this infrastructure were disrupted by a man-made or 

natural disaster, it could cause grave damage. Examples include national missile 

defense sites, the National Capital Region, and electrical generation plants. DOD can 

be called on to help protect such installations from attack and to respond if a disaster 

occurs. An analysis of the nation’s vulnerabilities in this area is extremely sensitive and 

highly classified. The Air Force must be prepared in case it is called on to detect, 

preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from any potential threat to the nation’s 

critical infrastructure. 

Military Assistance For Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) 

 The Insurrection Act is an exception to the normal prohibition of military forces 

performing direct law enforcement duties in the civilian communities. Under certain 

conditions the President may invoke this act to send in DOD forces to help control a 

situation, referred to as MACDIS. If Air Force forces are sent in, they should normally 

be trained and equipped to handle civil disturbances and operate under very specific 

rules of engagement. Since National Guard forces in state status and under the control 

of a governor do not have the same restrictions (for Posse Comitatus Act purposes) as 

active duty forces, they could be the force of choice. 

 
36

Our great challenge is to protect 

the American people. The most basic 

commitment of our government will be 

the security of our country. We will win 

this war; we will protect our people. 

 —President George W. Bush 

CHAPTER FOUR 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT 

 When a domestic incident occurs many federal, state, and local agencies will be 

involved, and Air Force forces must be aware of the different agencies to facilitate an 

effective and efficient mission. With the exception of HD missions, a civilian agency will 

be in charge of the incident and military assistance will be similar to a direct support 

role. 

Federal Agencies 

 The primary agency involved in almost all domestic incidents is DHS and its 

Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R). Within this directorate 

resides one of the most widely known relief organizations in the United States, the 

FEMA. 

 There are various plans and annexes that outline which agency is in charge of 

which event, and how the leadership transition from one agency to the other takes 

place. It is important to understand the policy guidance, particularly because so much 

of it is evolving rapidly. Air Force advocacy for EPLO representation during the preincident phase can overcome this and provide effective Air Force support in the 

interagency environment during crisis management. 

 

State Agencies 

 A domestic incident routinely begins as a local level problem and elevates when 

it cannot be controlled. As such, the initial incident commander may be from the local 

law enforcement or fire department. 
37

We will eventually see a weapon of 

mass destruction used in a terrorist act...We 

had better start thinking about how we’re 

going to be prepared for that, because we’re 

woefully unprepared for that event. And that’s 

inevitable, as this asymmetry continues. 

—General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, Ret. 

Commander in Chief, US Central Command 

19 Oct 00, Senate Armed Services 

Committee, Testimony on USS Cole 

 

 When the problem cannot be controlled at the local level, the state government 

will get involved with its resources. Each state has a comparable emergency 

management agency to FEMA to direct a response. Other agencies that could be 

involved range from state law enforcement to the state agency responsible for natural 

resources. 

 A key organization at the state level is the ANG in state, non-federalized Title 32 

status. In these cases, the governor is in command of the ANG forces. This creates a 

seam between Air National Guard forces and active-duty Airmen. To resolve this seam, 

the governor can grant ‘coordinating authority’ to the active duty commander for unity of 

effort. Additionally, a state’s Adjutant General can be placed on active duty and 

simultaneously command active duty forces and their guard forces, if authorized by the 

President and the governor consents. 

Local Agencies 

 At the local level, first responders will include fire, police, and medical personnel. 

They will initiate the incident command system in accordance with their local 

procedures. If the situation escalates and requires state or federal support on scene, 

the respective local, state, and federal chains of command remain separate. Local 

efforts remain under the control of their local leadership. State efforts are under the 

control of the governor and federal efforts ultimately fall under the control of the 

President but they will all work together within the unified management system creating 

a joint action plan as directed by the national incident management system (NIMS) and 

the NRP. 

EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE 

SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 

 The threat to the United States from state and non-state terrorist groups 

intending to use weapons of mass destruction is quite real, yet difficult to predict. One 
38

of the best ways to prepare in the midst of the uncertainty is through education and 

training. The United States government is reorganizing federal agencies and 

departments to provide the most efficient command and control structure for response 

and mitigation to these events. Prior to the events of 9/11, defense support to civil 

authorities was predominantly focused and structured for response to natural disasters, 

such as forest fires, weather phenomena, and earthquakes. The federal, state, and 

local governments began preparing for large-scale response to weapons of mass 

destruction in the mid- to late-1990s while the DOD continued to focus on military 

operations outside the CONUS. Our nation is restructuring federal and military 

departments to rapidly respond to future attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. 

Training Air Force Leaders And Responders 

 The restructuring of the federal government for response to terrorist events and 

defense support of civil authorities has generated doctrinal concerns on potential 

missions and distinctive capabilities the Air Force is best organized and equipped to 

provide. The unique Air Force capabilities best suited to assist civilian authorities must 

be provided and managed in a way that merges these assets seamlessly with the 

civilian command structure. To enhance this transition, Air Force leaders and 

responders need a firm understanding of the civilian command and control structure and 

capabilities of local, state, and federal emergency management organizations. 

 Local, state, and federal emergency management agencies have standard 

protocols and structures to merge assets and control the response effort. The Air Force 

uses a command and control system similar to the NIMS, albeit from a military 

perspective. Air Force responders must understand how to merge into the federal, 

state, and local organizational structure. Also, staff officers at unified commands, major 

commands (MAJCOMs), and numbered Air Forces (NAFs) should be knowledgeable 

about the primary agency and other agencies involved in the federal response effort. 

This understanding will enhance military planning, command and control, and training 

functions. Personnel designated to perform, or whose positions may require them to 

perform, ACCE duties should obtain training commensurate with those responsibilities. 

 One key to effective training is exercising as comprehensively as possible. It is 

especially critical that local Air Force installation personnel exercise with the local 

communities. By exercising at the local level, a better working relationship results and 

both sides are able to understand capabilities and limitations brought by each. 

Who Should Train For Defense Support Of Civil Authorities 

 Installation first responders, command posts, dispatch centers, specialized 

teams, personnel assigned to disaster control groups, and installation leadership should 

receive training on when and how to respond, reporting requirements, and command 

and control relationships as they relate to the NRP and NIMS. Education and training 

should also be extended to the units representing those organizations likely to be 

tasked to support homeland operations. 
39

 MAJCOMs and NAFs are tasked with providing command and control assistance 

to a large Air Force response effort at the federal level. Staff officers performing the 

planning function, selecting units to deploy in support of AETF taskings, and advising 

senior commanders on response efforts must know the national response plans and 

taskings assigned. The Air Force’s EPLOs should be trained to facilitate recovering 

from a natural or man-made disaster. In addition, they should be familiar with all air and 

space capabilities relevant to homeland operations. 

 Headquarters Air Force personnel who formulate guidance and policy for 

defense support to civil authorities require a firm understanding of the federal strategy 

and those agencies tasked under federal plans. These staff officers are also 

responsible for educating the executive staff on appropriate actions and capabilities the 

Air Force can provide to the response effort. 

What Needs To Be Trained 

 Installation disaster response force personnel and commanders should receive 

training on the national and military response structure. This training is provided by the 

Civil Engineer under the full spectrum threat response program. See AFI 10-2501 for 

training requirements. Disaster control group members must understand the role of the 

FCO, state coordinating officer, DCO, the incident command system, and public affairs 

considerations. Installation responders must understand the circumstances under 

which military units provide support to civil authorities, when support should be 

withdrawn, the reporting requirements to higher headquarters, and validation 

procedures for requests from FCOs and state officials. Training must be provided on 

how DSCA taskings will be processed through the regional planning agents, Air and 

Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) Center, and the Air Force command and control 

structure for responding units. Installation planners require training in the NRP, regional 

disaster assistance plans, and city and county emergency response plans in the vicinity 

of the installation. 

 MAJCOM and NAF staffs require training on the national homeland security 

structure, agencies at Headquarters Air Force responsible for developing Air Force 

homeland security policy, the federal response system to include roles of federal 

agencies and key participants, legal aspects of providing military support in civilian 

jurisdictions, AETF deployment structure for DSCA, and military capabilities most likely 

to be requested. 

 Members of the Air Force operations center and appropriate Headquarters Air 

Force personnel require education on the NRP; Air Force, USNORTHCOM, and 

USPACOM plans outlining response taskings; federal response structure to include 

command and control; interagency processes for decision making; federal agency 

taskings; role of the Department of Homeland Security; and how to evaluate requests 

based on legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness of forces to 

accomplish the mission. 
40

Who Are The Trainers 

 City and state first responders and emergency managers receive training from a 

consortium of federal and state institutions (e.g., DOD, DOJ, DHS [FEMA], etc.) to 

prepare responders and decision-makers for dealing with the myriad of considerations 

involved in response to CBRNE events. These courses are also available to military 

personnel. 

 The Air Force education and training system is organized to provide training to 

five distinct groups: officer/enlisted accessions, developmental education, operational 

training (Air Force specialty training), special schools, and ancillary training to meet 

functional mission training. This Service education and training should take Air Force 

response capabilities for support of homeland operations into consideration when 

developing curricula. 

At the very Heart of Warfare lies Doctrine...
41

SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Doctrine Documents 

(Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the Air Force Doctrine Center 

web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil) 

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine 

AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power

AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations

AFDD 2-1.8, Counter-Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Conventional Operations 

AFDD 2-9, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations 

Air Force Publications 

AFPD 10-4, Operations Planning: Air and Space Expeditionary Force Presence Policy 

AFPD 10-8, Homeland Security 

AFPD 10-24, Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program

AFPD 10-25, Full Spectrum Threat Response

AFPD 10-27, Civil Air Patrol 

AFPD 90-9, Operational Risk Management 

AFI 10-208, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program 

AFI 10-245, Air Force Antiterrorism Standards 

AFI 10-401, Ai r Force Planning and Execution 

AFI 10-801, Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies

AFI 10-802, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) 

AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Planning and Operations

AFI 10-2701, Organization and Function of the Civil Air Patrol 

AFI 90-901, Operational Risk Management 

AFH 10-2502, USAF Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat Planning and 

Response Handbook

AFTTP(I) 3-2.34, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Risk 

Management

CONOPS for Air Force Homeland Security (available on the AF/XO website at 

https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xor/taskforce/hlsrefdocs.htm) 
42

The Air Force General Counsel Guidance Document, Posse Comitatus 

USAF Plan 55-2, DOD Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT) 

Joint Publications 

JP 3-01.1, Aerospace Defense of North America 

JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism

JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations 

JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 

Environments 

JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security 

JP 3-61, Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs

Department of Defense Publications 

DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Program 

DODD 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards 

DODD 2020.26, Defense Continuity Program (DCP) 

DODD 3020, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program

DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities 

DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)

DODD 3025.13, Employment of DOD Resources in Support of the US Secret Service

DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities

DODD 3150.5, DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents

DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents

DODD 4000.19, InterService, Interdepartmental, and Interagency Support

DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement

DODD 6010.22, National Disaster Medical System

DODI 2000.18, Department Of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines 

DODR 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components 

that Affect United States Persons 
43

Other Publications 

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 6 Feb 06 

Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz memorandum, Preparedness of US 

Military Installation and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack, 5 Sep 02 

EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities 

EO 13354, National Counterterrorism Center 

House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 

Katrina 

HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

National Response Plan 

PDD-39, United States Policy on Counter-Terrorism 

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States, (W.W. Norton and Company). 2004 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency website: http://www.fema.gov/ 

White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned

Chief of Staff of the Air Force Reading List 

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force Reading List is available for review at: 

http://www.af.mil/csafreading/ 
44

APPENDIX A 

NATIONAL POLICY AND LAW 

Whenever and wherever DOD forces are employed they will comply with the 

laws of the nation; this takes on added significance for operations in the homeland. 

This appendix discusses two general points regarding homeland operations and the 

law. In addition, a brief description of pertinent laws and policies is also included. 

 

 First is the overall legal framework affecting the application of air and space 

power in the homeland. There are restrictions on using the military to collect 

intelligence in the homeland. As a general rule, DOD assets cannot be used to collect 

intelligence on US citizens. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 

provides additional information. Exceptions to FISA are routed through the FBI to the 

FISA Court. In addition, there are restrictions on using the military for direct law 

enforcement duties in the civilian community, with exceptions. Some examples include 

the President’s ability to invoke the Insurrection Act if needed and legislation permitting 

some use of the military in direct law enforcement roles to counter the influx of illegal 

narcotics. 

 Second is the law and its impact on potential financial reimbursement to the 

DOD. When managing the consequences of an event, the states normally exercise 

primacy over domestic incidents and only when they ask for federal assistance, or in 

extraordinary circumstances does the federal government get involved. The request 

process is key for the military because a formal request by the state followed by 

Presidential approval is necessary for the military Services to get financially reimbursed. 

More information can be found in the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et seq.). 

Because of the legal and policy complexities, prompt and frequent consultations 

with military legal experts are among the most important considerations in planning for 

and employing military assets. The homeland legal environment is very complex and 

dynamic. Legal experts can help. 

Legal Sources for Homeland Operations 

Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42, 1511-19: The ADA generally 

prohibits the obligation or expenditure of appropriated funds in advance of, or in excess 

of, an appropriation by Congress. 

Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2301-

2367: Requires DOD coordination with WMD response agencies. Authorizes DOD 

support to DOJ when the SecDef and Attorney General jointly determine that a WMD 

threat exists and civil authorities lack sufficient capabilities. 

Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535: This act governs transfer of material between 

executive branch agencies within the federal government. The Economy Act does not 
45

apply to the transfer of material to non-federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs). 

Reimbursement to the DOD from non-federal agencies is authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 

377 to the extent such would be authorized under The Economy Act. 

Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness 

Responsibilities: The national security emergency preparedness policy of the United 

States is to have sufficient capabilities at all levels of government to meet essential 

defense and civilian needs during any national security emergency. A national security 

emergency is any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, terrorist attack, 

technological emergency, or other emergency that seriously degrades or seriously 

threatens the national security of the United States. 

Executive Order 13228, Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the 

Homeland Security Council: The Office of Homeland Security is headed by the 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Its mission is to develop and 

coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the 

United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The office coordinates the executive 

branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover 

from terrorist attack within the United States. 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 and Amendments, 50 U.S.C. 

§§ 1801 et seq.: FISA establishes a legal framework for foreign intelligence 

surveillance separate from ordinary law enforcement surveillance. It is aimed at 

regulating the collection of foreign intelligence information in furtherance of US 

counterintelligence, while protecting the privacy interests of United States citizens. 

Under FISA, surveillance is generally permitted based on a finding of probable cause 

that the surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; in these 

cases, specific procedural processes must be adhered to. 

Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.: HSA establishes the 

Department of Homeland Security by combining and consolidating previously existing 

agencies, such as the Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, Secret 

Service, Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, under one 

department. The DHS mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 

reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and minimize the damage, and 

assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that occur within the United States. DHS 

also has responsibility for investigating and prosecuting terrorism. 

Insurrection Statutes, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334: These statutes authorize the use of 

military forces, by presidential order in response to civil disturbances, including 

rebellion, insurgency, insurrection, or domestic violence such that the state authorities 

cannot or will not enforce state or federal law. The Insurrection Statutes permit the 

President to use federal forces in response to a request from a state or territory, to 

enforce federal authority, or to protect Constitutional rights. (See DODD 3025.12, 

Military Assistance with Civil Disturbances) 
46

Military Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-

382: These sections authorize support to civilian LEA and deal with the use of military 

information, equipment, facilities, and personnel. 

Military Information: Information collected during the normal course of military 

operations may be forwarded to federal, state, or local LEA if the information is 

relevant to a violation of criminal law. While the needs of the LEA may be 

considered when scheduling routine missions, missions may not be planned for the 

primary purpose of aiding LEA. (See DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian 

Law Enforcement Officials) 

Intelligence: The USA Patriot Act removed some of the legal obstacles to the sharing 

of information between law enforcement and intelligence components. Intelligence 

is a specialized activity that is governed by multiple Congressional statutes, 

Executive Orders (EO), and DOD Directives. (See EO 12333, United States 

Intelligence Activities; DODD 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities; DOD 5440.1-R, 

Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect 

United States Persons; and AFI 14-104, Oversight of Intelligence Activities) 

Military Equipment and Facilities: Military equipment and facilities may be made 

available to LEAs, subject to certain restrictions. (See DODD 5525.5, DOD 

Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials) Generally, military working 

dogs can be used to support civilian LEAs. (See AFI 31-202, Military Working Dog 

Program) 

Military Personnel: Except when authorized by statute or the Constitution, direct 

participation by military personnel in the execution or enforcement of the law is 

prohibited. Prohibited activities include interdiction, searches and seizures, arrests, 

and surveillance activities. Generally, the Air Force will not provide advanced 

military training to civilian law enforcement agencies. Permissible training includes 

basic marksmanship, patrolling, mission planning, medical, and survival skills. (See 

DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials) 

National Defense Authorization Acts: Since 1991, Congress has annually renewed 

military support for counterdrug operations. Under this, the SecDef may authorize 

support to federal, state, local, or foreign LEAs if requested. Types of support include 

maintenance and repair of DOD equipment, transportation of personnel and supplies for 

the purpose of facilitating counterdrug activities, counterdrug training activities, aerial 

and ground reconnaissance, and provision of support for command and control 

networks. 10 U.S.C. § 124 makes the DOD the lead federal agency for the detection 

and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. 32 

U.S.C. § 112 authorizes certain federal funding for the state counterdrug activities of the 

National Guard. 
47

National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651: This act establishes a process 

for presidential declarations of emergencies. These declarations must be published in 

the Federal Register and Congress must review declarations every six months. 

Congress is also able to terminate these declarations. This act does not impact the 

President’s Constitutional authority. 

Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1385: The PCA prohibits the use of the 

Army or the Air Force for law enforcement purposes, except as authorized by Congress 

and the United States Constitution. This prohibition applies to Navy and Marine Corps 

personnel as a matter of DOD policy. Prohibited direct support includes arrests, 

searches, and seizures as well as subjecting civilians to compulsory, prescriptive 

military service. The PCA does not apply to National Guard units in non-federal status. 

Military Purpose: The PCA does not prohibit direct support to law enforcement 

agencies if the primary purpose is to further a military or foreign affairs function of 

the United States. Actions that serve a primarily military purpose include 

investigations taken pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or 

other military administrative proceedings, and actions taken pursuant to a 

commander’s inherent authority to protect military personnel, property, or guests, or 

to maintain order on an installation. 

Emergency Authority: The PCA does not prohibit direct support in emergency 

situations when the action is taken under the inherent right of the United States to 

preserve order and carry out government operations. During sudden or unexpected 

emergencies, responsible DOD officials or commanders may approve the use of 

military forces in a law enforcement capacity in order to prevent the loss of life or the 

wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning or order. This 

“immediate response” authority should be used with great caution and in extremely 

unusual situations. 

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§

5121 et seq. [Stafford Act]: The statutory authority for federal disaster assistance. 

The Act provides procedures for declaring an emergency or major disaster, as well as 

the type and amount of federal assistance available. The Act authorizes the President 

to provide DOD assets for relief once a disaster is declared. After a presidential 

determination is made, DOD may use resources to “save lives, protect property,” and 

avert future threats (See DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civilian Authorities). 
48

APPENDIX B 

NOTIONAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF 

CIVIL AUTHORITIES 

 Ongoing emergency preparedness actions take place day-to-day (e.g., Air Force 

weather forces monitoring hurricane status) 

 Emergency event occurs—may be natural or man-made. 

 Local responders converge at disaster scene and take command of response. 

 DHS and DOD (JDOMS) become aware of the event and begin planning in case 

called upon to respond; AFNORTH and PACAF (as applicable), the Air Force 

Operations Center, and AFNSEP also become aware of the emergency. 

 If disaster is potentially man-made and a crime may have been committed, then DOJ 

may begin planning. 

 Local responders recognize scope of event is beyond their capability and the state 

government becomes involved. 

 DHS, DOD, and DOJ (if appropriate) may send liaison officers to the scene to advise 

the on-scene officers and prepare for federal response if needed. 

 AFNSEP sources Air Force EPLOs. 

 State authorities recognize scope of event is beyond their capability and request 

federal assistance through the President. 

 A presidential declaration is made, specific involvement of federal agencies is 

approved. 

 DHS designates a principal federal officer. 

 DOD through JDOMS and, in turn, through USNORTHCOM/USPACOM designates 

a DCO. 

 DOD forces identified to assist are approved through JDOMS. 

 The AEF Center identifies Air Force forces. 

  If Air Force forces are tasked to assist, every effort should be made to present 

these forces as an AETF through a COMAFFOR to the JTF commander. The 

COMAFFOR should be given OPCON of Air Force forces. 
49

 Upon declaration of completion of the civil support efforts by the JTF commander, 

DOD forces will redeploy to their home stations. 
50

SEC. 202. Continuity of Government. The head of each federal department and 

agency shall ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security 

emergency by providing for: succession to office and emergency delegation of 

authority in accordance with applicable law; safekeeping of essential resources, 

facilities, and records; and establishment of emergency operating capabilities. 

 —Executive Order 12656 Assignment of 

Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities 

COOP

COG

ECG

Figure C.1. Emergency Preparedness Structure 

APPENDIX C 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

The Air Force has a significant role in the process of preparing for national 

emergencies. One critical task is planning to assist in the continuity of government at 

the federal level. The Air Force currently has plans for continuity of operations, and the 

events of 9/11 demonstrated the necessity of those plans. The Air Force also has a 

significant input into the threat assessment process. The structure for this is illustrated 

in Figure C.1, from continuity of operations (COOP), to continuity of government (COG), 

supporting our enduring Constitutional government (ECG). 

 The SecDef Report to Congress cites several examples of emergency 

preparedness: “Examples of these emergency preparedness activities include: 

continuity of operations; continuity of government; conducting threat assessments; 

assisting federal, state, and local authorities in developing or enhancing their own 

strategic planning capabilities; and exporting the Department’s risk management 

approaches and methodologies to interested homeland security stakeholders. These 

activities also include, to the extent feasible and practicable, preparation for the 

provision of extraordinary civil support that may be required in the event of a 

devastating attack on the US. DOD is in support of a lead agency for all emergency 

preparedness activities other than those related to DOD continuity of operations.” 
51

 At the installation level, upgraded emergency preparedness planning and training 

is coupled with active force protection actions, including counterterrorism, antiterrorism, 

critical infrastructure protection, mission assurance, and information assurance, for Air 

Force infrastructure and personnel to both instill solid passive defense measures and 

allow a coordinated approach to installation and community protection. Combining these 

protection measures with the Air Force incident management system and continuity of 

operations planning will give local base offices the tools to maintain or seize the initiative 

after attack. For the longer term, networks of DOD installations will be integrated into 

the local community’s preparation and response scheme with rapid detection, response, 

and incident management capabilities. 

Life Cycle of Incident Management 

 Understanding the elements of incident management helps the Air Force to 

better prepare for contingencies and plan for integrating its capabilities with civilian 

capabilities: 

 Awareness is the continuous collection and analysis of intelligence, information, and 

knowledge. 

 Prevention refers to actions to avoid an incident through sound application of risk 

management methodologies. 

 Preparedness is a continuous process of improving performance. 

 Response refers to the actions needed to address the immediate and short-term 

effects. 

 Recovery refers to the actions needed to bring the community back to normal. 

 The Air Force full spectrum threat response program, outlined in AFI 10-2501, Air 

Force Emergency Management Planning and Operations, is the single integrated 

program used by the Air Force to address the full spectrum of physical risks, threats, 

mitigation strategies, crisis and consequence management activities, and passive 

defense activities and measures. 

CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) 

 DOD-level policies mandate COOP plans be developed and maintained to 

ensure essential functions continue unabated during national emergencies. These 

plans must integrate with, and are required to support, overarching and enduring 

constitutional government, continuity of the presidency, and continuity of government 

programs. Current guidelines require an “all hazards” approach to continuity planning 

covering any contingency, from natural or man-made disasters to a general nuclear war. 

COOP plans support COG and enduring Constitutional government programs. 
52

 Historical events indicate the disruption of Air Force operations is a distinct 

possibility. Survival of the Air Force is critical to the defense of the nation. As such it is 

crucial that each echelon of the Air Force understand its role in supporting Air Force 

mission essential functions. All Airmen should be prepared and know what actions to 

take when COOP is implemented. 

 AFI 10-208, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program, provides guidance for 

developing programs to ensure continuity of essential operations of the Air Force during 

an impending or actual national emergency. Headquarters Air Force, major commands, 

direct reporting units, and field operating agencies must possess a comprehensive and 

effective COOP program. All Air Force organizations must develop plans to ensure 

continuity of its essential functions, including alert and notification of personnel, 

movement of key people, and operational capability. COOP planning is best maintained 

by developing an integrated plan and solution among all efforts that ensure continuity of 

missions. These include force protection, information assurance, counterterrorism, 

antiterrorism, mission assurance, critical infrastructure protection, and others. 

CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT 

 Presidential Executive Order 12656, Section 202, Continuity of Government,

states: “The head of each federal department and agency shall ensure the continuity of 

essential functions in any national security emergency by providing for: succession to 

office and emergency delegation of authority.” The DOD develops plans and policies to 

support the continuity of government functions. Various Air Force organizations may be 

called upon to support COG planning and execution initiatives. The Air Force provides 

airlift support to the President and other senior government officials to support COG. 

These plans are tiered to support the overarching program of ECG. 

 
53

GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

ACC Air Combat Command 

ACCE air component coordination element 

ADA Anti-Deficiency Act 

ADCON administrative control 

AED air expeditionary detachment 

AEF air and space expeditionary force 

AEFC Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center 

AEG air expeditionary group 

AES air expeditionary squadron 

AEW air expeditionary wing 

AETF air and space expeditionary task force 

AFAUX Air Force Auxiliary 

AFI Air Force instruction 

AFNSEP Air Force National Security Emergency 

Preparedness Agency 

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations 

AFPD Air Force policy directive 

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command 

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 

AMC Air Mobility Command 

AMD air mobility division 

ANG Air National Guard 

ANR Alaska NORAD Region 

AOC air and space operations center 

AOR area of responsibility 

CAOC-A combined air and space operations center-Alaska 

C2 command and control 

CAP Civil Air Patrol 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high 

yield explosives 

CCDR combatant commander

CDRUSNORTHCOM commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM commander, United States Pacific Command 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CM consequence management 

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COG continuity of government 
54

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CONOPS concept of operations

CONR continental United States NORAD region 

CONUS continental United States 

COOP continuity of operations 

COP common operating picture 

DCA defensive counterair 

DCE defense coordinating element 

DCO defense coordinating officer 

DDAT/HD Joint Staff Deputy Directorate of Antiterrorism and 

Homeland Defense 

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOMS Director of Military Support 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

ECG enduring constitutional government 

ECS expeditionary combat support 

EO executive order 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EP emergency preparedness 

EP&R emergency preparedness and response 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EPLO emergency preparedness liaison officer 

ExecSec Executive Secretary 

EXORD execution order 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCO federal coordinating officer 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

FPCON force protection condition

GWOT global war on terrorism 

HD homeland defense 

HQ headquarters 
55

HS homeland security 

HSA Homeland Security Act 

HSPD homeland security presidential directive 

IMS incident management system 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JDOMS joint directorate of military support 

JFACC joint force air component commander (JP 1-02), 

joint force air and space component commander 

(USAF) 

JFC joint force commander 

JFHQ-NCR Joint Force Headquarters, National Capital Region 

JFO joint field office 

JIC joint information center 

JITF-CT Joint Intelligence Task Force for Counterterrorism 

JOC joint operations center 

JTF joint task force 

JTF-AK Joint Task Force-Alaska 

JTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support 

LE law enforcement 

LEA law enforcement agency 

LFA lead federal agency 

LNO liaison officer

 

MACDIS military assistance for civil disturbances 

MAJCOM major command 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

MSCLEA military support to civilian law enforcement 

agencies 

MSLE military support to law enforcement 

NAF numbered Air Force 

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical 

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 

NDMS National Disaster Medical System 

NIMS national incident management system 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

NORTHAF Northern Air Forces 

NRP National Response Plan 

NSHS National Strategy for Homeland Security 

NSS National Security Strategy 

NSSE national special security event 
56

OPCON operational control 

OPR office of primary responsibility 

ORM operational risk management 

PACAF Pacific Air Forces 

PCA Posse Comitatus Act 

PDD Presidential decision directive 

PFA primary federal agency 

PFO principal federal official 

PTDO prepare to deploy order 

QRT quick reaction team 

RFA request for assistance 

ROE rules of engagement 

RTF response task force 

SCO state coordinating officer 

SDIS satellite digital imaging system 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SSTF single Service task force 

TACC tanker airlift control center 

TACON tactical control 

TAG the adjutant general 

TF task force 

TFC task force commander 

TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice 

US United States 

USA United States of America 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe 

U.S.C. United States Code 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USS United States ship 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

UTC unit type code 

 
57

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

Definitions 

Airman. Any US Air Force member (officer or enlisted, active, reserve, or guard, 

along with Department of the Air Force civilians) who supports and defends the 

US Constitution and serves our country. Air Force Airmen are those people who 

formally belong to the US Air Force and employ or support some aspect of the 

US Air Force’s air and space power capabilities. The term Airman is often used 

in a very narrow sense to mean pilot. An Airman is any person who understands 

and appreciates the full range of air and space power capabilities and can 

employ or support some aspect of air and space power capabilities. (AFDD 1-1)

air sovereignty. A nation's inherent right to exercise absolute control and 

authority over the airspace above its territory. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant 

command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and 

conduct operations. (JP 1-02) 

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command 

authority established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 

164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands 

unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 

Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the 

authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command 

over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to 

accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command 

(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through 

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component 

commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority 

to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander 

considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is 

inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. 

See also combatant commander; operational control; tactical control. (JP 1-

02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified 

combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. See also 

combatant command. (JP 1-02)

consequence management. Those measures taken to protect public health 
58

and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief 

to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a 

chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic 

consequence management, the primary authority rests with the states to respond 

and the federal government to provide assistance as required. (JP 1-02) 

continuity of operations. The degree or state of being continuous in the 

conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or 

mission in carrying out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and 

duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties 

performed by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the 

commander. (JP 1-02) 

crisis management. Measures to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and 

prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management 

will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, 

special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the 

capability of the lead federal agency. (JP 1-02) 

full spectrum threat response program. The single, integrated Air Force 

program to address the full spectrum of physical risks, threats, mitigation 

strategies, and passive defense measures. The primary missions of the Air 

Force full spectrum threat response program are to 1) save lives, 2) minimize the 

loss or degradation of resources, and 3) continue, sustain, and restore combat 

and combat support operational capability in an “all hazards” physical threat 

environment at Air force installations worldwide. The ancillary missions of the full 

spectrum threat response program are to support Department of Defense 

homeland defense operations and to provide military support to civil and host 

nation authorities in accordance with Department of Defense directives and 

through the appropriate combatant command. The full spectrum threat response 

program is managed by the office of the Civil Engineer, HQ USAF/ILE. Also 

called FSTR. (AFI 10-2501)

homeland defense. The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic 

population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. 

Also called HD. (Definition will be incorporated into JP 3-26 upon its approval) 

homeland security. A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 

within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 

minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Also called HS. 

(National Strategy for Homeland Security) 

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. 

Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and 

may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between 
59

combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will 

exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be 

specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to 

perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving 

organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating 

objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the 

mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned 

to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the 

commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised 

through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional 

component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to 

organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in 

operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does 

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of 

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called 

OPCON. See also combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains 

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that 

helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, 

or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of 

destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers 

of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, 

biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of 

transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and 

divisible part of the weapon. (JP 1-02)