1 Filed 4/24/14 In re S.W. CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re S.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. F.M. et al., Defendant and Appellant. A139049, A139594

(San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. JD-123154)

This is an appeal from a decision by the juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of appellants F.M. (mother) and S.W. (a lleged father) to their daughter, also S.W. (minor), who was born in the fall of 2003. Mo ther challenges this decision on the ground that the court lacked subjec t matter jurisdiction over mino r. Alleged father, in turn, challenges the decision for lack of proper notice. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND On June 1, 2012, a petition was filed in San Francisco Juvenile Court pursuant to

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 , subdivisions (b), (c) and (g), based on allegations that parents had failed to protect minor, failed to offer adequate provision for her support, and caused or exposed her to sign ificant risk of serious emotional damage (section 300 petition). Accordi ng to the section 300 petition, mother was incarcerated in Texas and subject to a no-contact order with respect to minor for having physically and2 mentally abused her, and minor’s legal gua rdian, a maternal great aunt living in Tennessee, had relinquished th e guardianship and was unable to provide for her care. Specifically, it was alleged the legal guard ian had taken minor, who was depressed, suicidal and required psychotropic medi cines, from Tennessee to the home of her maternal grandmother in California. Th e maternal grandmother, however, was also unable to provide care for minor and, thus, ha d contacted the agency for assistance. The whereabouts of alleged father were unknow n, and both he and mo ther, who had never married, had substance abuse problems. The section 300 petition further alleged minor had been the subject of several prior referrals to child protective services, including one in Alameda County in 2007 for physical abuse, which was fo und inconclusive, and three in Texas between 2008 and 2010 for physical abuse and neglect, at least one of which wa s substantiated. The agency thereafter filed a report in anticipation of the June 4, 2012, detention/jurisdiction hearing that identified an Oakland telephone number for alleged father, but no address. The report also pr ovided additional info rmation about minor’s circumstances. In particular, the report noted that, several years ago, maternal grandmother had been given temporary custo dy of minor when mother was incarcerated in Texas for abusing her, but that maternal grandmother had sent minor to live with a relative in Georgia when she became unable to provide care. The Georgia relative then sent minor back to maternal grandmother afte r deciding she, too, was unable to care for minor, who at that time was depressed and su icidal. A few months later, in November 2011, maternal grandmother sent minor to live with her maternal grea t aunt in Tennessee, where she could attend public sc hool and enjoy a rural setting. Shortly thereafter, the maternal great aunt was appointed legal guardian of minor by the Tennessee juvenile court. However, as mentioned above, the maternal great aunt ultimately decided she could not care for minor and, thus, on Ma y 25, 2012, took her back to maternal grandmother in California without prior no tice to maternal grandmother, prompting

commencement of thes e proceedings.3 Following the detention hearing, the juve nile court found a prima facie case had been made pursuant to the identified subdivisions of Welfare and Institutions Code

section 300 and ordered that minor be detain ed. In doing so, the court first ordered minor’s temporary detention on an emergency basis and then, two days later following a continued hearing at which mother made he r first appearance, the court ordered her permanent detention, noting: “Given the hist ory of this case and given how much this

child has been shuttled around over the last however many months, I am most concerned about her stability at this point.” The agency prepared another report, file-stamped July 3, 2012, for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. This report indicated that alleged father’s whereabouts

remained unknown and that mother was in a Santa Clar a jail awaiting extradition to Texas on probation violations . The report recommended no reunification services for mother due to her impending incarceration, and declined to assess al leged father’s need

for services due to th e agency’s inability to locate him. This report was subsequently

amended to include information that mother had been sentenced to four years in Texas prison, and that alleged father’s whereabouts remained unknown de spite further efforts by the agency to locate him. 1 According to alleged father’s mother, he had not been in contact with minor for over five years and wa s reluctant to come forward due to child support concerns. At the conclusion of the July 11, 20 12, jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the alle gations in the section 300 petition, 2 declined to order

1 As we will discuss later in our discu ssion of the lack-of-notice issue raised on appeal by alleged father, the agency submitted severa l due diligence statements describing its efforts to locate alleged fathe r. (Pp. 13-15.) Also reserved for later is discussion of the juvenile court’s contacts with the Tennessee juvenile court that had established the maternal great aunt’s legal guardianship over minor, facts relevant to mother’s jurisdictional challenge. (Pp. 10.)

2 At a subsequent September 18, 2012 he aring, the agency amended the section 300 petition in certain respects, and added the following language to the subdivision (g) allegations: “[t]he legal gua rdian is no longer willing to pr ovide care for the child and has relinquished her legal guardianship.”4 reunification services for parents, declared minor a dependent, and set a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare a nd Institutions Code se ction 366.26. In anticipation of the permanency planning hearing, the agency submitted a report indicating that minor had been placed with a Bay Area foster family th at had indicated a desire to adopt her. Further, although continuing to exhibit emotional and behavioral shortcomings (including lying, stealing and disrupting her class at school), minor was making improvements in other respects. Am ong other things, mino r appeared bonded with her foster/prospective ad optive family, including a fost er sibling around the same age, and was being treated by a psychiatrist for several mental health concerns stemming from her past abuse, including ADHD and PTSD. While the adoptive home study had not yet been completed, the agency none theless recommended terminating parental rights. On June 26, 2013, following the permanen cy planning hearing at which argument was heard from counsel for both parents a nd minor, the juvenile court, among other things, found by clear and convincing evidence minor was likely to be adopted and adopted the agency’s r ecommendation to terminate parental rights. The court then set a six-month postpermanency revi ew hearing for October 7, 2013. Both parents timely appealed.

DISCUSSION Mother and alleged father challenge the order terminating their parental rights on distinct grounds. Mother contends the juveni le court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or emergency temporary jurisdiction to issue the challenged order. Alleged father, in turn, contends the agency failed to employ reasonable diligence in searching for him prior to disposition, such that he lacked proper notice of the dispositional/ jurisdictional proceedings, requiring remand fo r a new hearing. We addr ess each contention in turn

below. I. Did the juvenile court have jurisdiction over minor? The UCCJEA, formerly the UCCJA, was adopted in California effective January 1, 2000, and is now codified in Fa mily Code section 3400 et seq (the Act or5 UCCJEA). 3 “The Act is the exclusive method of determining the proper forum in custody disputes involving other jurisdictions and gove rns juvenile dependency proceedings. (§§ 3402, subd. (c), 3421, 3423, 3424, subd. (a); In re Nada R . (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1173 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].)” ( In re C.T . (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101, 106; In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1037, fn. 18.) “ ‘[S]ubject matter jurisdic tion [under the UCCJEA] either exists or does not exist at the time the action is commenced’ [citations], which is when the first pleading is filed. (§ 3402, subd. (e).) ‘There is no provision in the UCCJEA for jurisdiction by reason of the presence of the parties or by stipulation, consent, waiver, or estoppel.’ ([Citation]; see § 3421, subd. (c) [‘Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or su fficient to make a child cust ody determination.’].)” ( In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1040.) However, even when UCCJEA jurisdiction already rests with another state (here, Tennessee, where the legal gua rdianship had been ordered), the California juvenile court may exercise temporary jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and, as relevant here, “the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emer gency to protect the

child because the child . . . is subjected to, or threatened w ith, mistreatment or abuse.” (§ 3424, subd. (a).) “The courts have interp reted ‘emergency’ as a situation in which a child is in immediate risk of danger if returned to a parent’s care. (See In re Stephanie M

. [(1994)] 7 Cal.4th 295 [court asserted emer gency jurisdiction over an abused child diagnosed as suffering from battered child syndrome]; In re Joseph D. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 678 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 574] [eme rgency jurisdiction was proper based on reported incidents involving sexual abuse by ch ild’s stepbrother and father].) Aside from the necessity of protecting a ch ild from immediate harm, presence of the child in the state is the only prerequisite. (19 Ca l.App.4th at p. 688.) [¶] . . . In cases where the validity of the allegations are uncertain, th e very possibility the allegati ons of immediate harm might

3 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory c itations herein are to the Family Code.6 be true is sufficient for the court to assume emergency jurisdiction in the best interests of the children. ( In re Joseph D., supra , 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.)” ( In re Nada R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1174. See also In re Angel L. (2008) 159 Cal.Ap p.4th 1127, 1138 [recognizing the Legislature’s intent “to ‘a fford all children found in California the protection of California’s juvenile court[s] in exigent circumstance s’ ”], citing § 3424, subd. (e).) 4 “The finding of an emerge ncy ‘should not be made “i n a rush to judgment” but

rather “after a full and fair ev identiary hearing.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to invoke em ergency jurisdiction. [Citations.]” ( In re C.T.,

supra , 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 107- 108.) Under the Act, the jurisdictional finding is one

4 Section 3424, as rele vant here, provides: “(a) A court of this state has temporary emer gency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has b een abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to, or threaten ed with, mistreatment or abuse. [¶] . . . [¶] “(c) If there is a previous child custody determ ination that is entitled to be enforced under this part . . . any order issued by a court of this state under this section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequa te to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdicti on . . . . The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires. “(d) A court of this state that has been aske d to make a child custody determination under this section, upon being informed that a child custody proceedi ng has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 3421 to 3423, incl usive, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this state which is exercising jurisdicti on pursuant to Sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a ch ild custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protec t the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the dura tion of the temporary order. “(e) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting subdivision (a ) that the grounds on which a court may exercise temporary emergenc y jurisdiction be expanded. It is further the intent of the Legislature that these grou nds include those that existed under Section 3403 of the Family Code as that secti on read on December 31, 1999, particularly including cases involvi ng domestic violence.”7 of necessity in an emergency to protect a child who has been abandoned or faces the threat of mistreatment or abuse. (I n re Jorge G. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 125, 131-132; In re C.T., supra , 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 108-109.) Further, “[a]ssumption of emergency juri sdiction is an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only. [Citation.] Therefore, wh ile the court [may] properly exercise[] jurisdiction when . . . conduct[ing] a plenary hearing to determine whether an emergency existed, an emergency is not necessarily coextensive with the dependency.” ( In re Nada R., supra , 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175.) As expl ained by our appellate colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, “emergency jurisdicti on is short-term and limited.” ( Id .) However, by the same token, “an emergency can exist so long as the reasons underlying the dependency exist.” ( In re Nada R., supra , 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175. See also In re Angel L., supra , 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139 [“[e]ven though emergency jurisdiction ordinarily is intended to be short term and limited, [the court] may

continue to exercise its author ity as long as the risk of harm creating the emergency is ongoing”].) In this case, we conclude as an initial ma tter upon review of th e relevant record the juvenile court properly invoked temporary emergency jurisdiction at the commencement of the California proceedings because minor came within the statutory definition of “abandoned,” meaning she had been “left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.” (§ 3402, subd. (a).) Undisputedly, minor’s maternal great aunt effectively relinquished her Tennessee-ordere d legal guardianship over minor by taking minor to California and handing her off to mi nor’s maternal grandmother after deciding she could no longer care for minor. Minor’s grandmother, in turn, prompted the filing of the section 300 petition in this case by no tifying the agency th at minor had been abandoned to her care, but that she, too, was unable to take her in. Mother, for her part, admitted she was not a viable placement for minor. Among other issues, mother, at the time the proceedings commenced, was facing extradition to Texas as a result of her myriad probation violations. And, finally, alleged father ha d not had contact with minor in at least five years and coul d not even be located for purp oses of these proceedings until8 April 2013, approximately 10 months af ter their commencement. Under these circumstances, we have no doub t minor’s situation met the statutory requirements for the court’s exercise of emergency jurisdiction on abandonment grounds. Quite simply, had the juvenile court declined to assert tempor ary emergency jurisdiction, minor would have

been left in this Stat e without any readily-apparent source of protection and care, the very situation our Legislature sought to avoid when enacting section 3424. ( In re Jaheim B. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1351 [“Because the risk of harm creating the emergency was ongoing and [minor] could not immediatel y be returned to [m other], the court had subject matter jurisdiction un der section 3424 to conduct the dependency proceeding and issue its jurisdictional and dispositional orders”]; see al so § 3424, subd. (e).) However, as explained above, the juve nile court’s assumption of emergency jurisdiction is of limited duration and “doe s not confer upon the state exercising emergency jurisdiction the au thority to make a permanent custody disposition.” ( In re C.T., supra , 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 108.) As su ch, we now must determine whether the juvenile court had a valid basis for continui ng jurisdiction over mi nor, such that it was authorized to make the order challenged he rein to terminate parental rights, which effectively modified the Tennessee dependen cy order. We conclude for reasons that follow the juvenile court was warranted in exercising such jurisdiction. As stated above, when the juvenile c ourt took emergency jurisdiction over minor, she was already subject to juvenile court ju risdiction in Tennessee. Accordingly, the juvenile court was required under section 34 24, subdivision (d), to immediately contact the Tennessee court before continuing the pro ceedings. The juvenile court complied with this rule, thereby triggering additional jurisd ictional rules. Specifically, as all parties recognize, where, as here, a court of anothe r state has exercised jurisdiction over a child by making a child custody determination, a Ca lifornia court may not exercise jurisdiction to modify the other court’s determination un less it has first met the statutory requirements of section 3423. This statute provides in rele vant part that, except as otherwise provided in section 3424, a California court may not modify another State’s child custody

determination “ unless [the California court] has jurisdiction to make an initial9 determination under paragraph (1 ) or (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 3421 and either of the following determinations is made : (a) The court of the ot her state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction un der Section 3422 or that a court of this

state would be a more convenie nt forum under Section 3427. [¶] (b) A court of this state

or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presen tly reside in the other state.” 5 (§ 3423.) Here, the agency contends the California juven ile court had jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2), and al so made the required determination under section 3424, subdivision (a). We thus turn to these provisions to determine whether our court had authority to modify the Tennessee court order. Turning first to the statutory require ment that the California court possess jurisdiction to make an initia l determination under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2), the relevant language is as follows : “(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if any of the following are true: [¶ ] . . . [¶] (2) . . . a court of the home state of the child has

declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more appropriate

forum under Section 3427 or 34 28, and both of the following are true: [¶] (A) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at le ast one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this st ate other than mere physical presence. [¶] (B) Substantial evidence is ava ilable in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.” 6

5 “Initial child custody determination” is defined by the Family Code as the first child custody determination with respect to the minor. (§ 3402, subd. (h).)

6 Section 3421, subdivision (a)(1), in turn, requires that California “is the home state of the child on the date of th e commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of th e proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.” Here, there is no dispute that minor resided in Tennessee for much of the two-year period from 2010 to 2012, befo re commencement of the proceeding in California, making Tennessee, not California, her home state for purposes of this statutory scheme. (§ 3402, subd. (g).)10 Based upon our own review of this record , we agree with the agency the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over mi nor comported with the UCCJEA. (See In re Jaheim B., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 [re viewing court may independently reweigh the jurisdictional facts] .) Specifically, consistent w ith sections 3423 and 3421, subdivision (a)(2), the r ecord confirms that the court in minor’s home state of Tennessee

declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more appropriate

forum under Section 3427 or 34 28, and that both of the following are true: (A) minor and at least one parent have a “significant conn ection” with California beyond mere physical presence, and (B) substantial evidence is av ailable in California concerning minor’s need for dependency. We will explain. First, with respect to the Tennessee j uvenile court’s disinclination to continue jurisdiction, the record reflects that, upon receiving a message regarding this case from Judge Linda Colfax of the Sa n Francisco County Superior C ourt, Juvenile Division, a return call was placed by Judge Donna Davenp ort of the Rutherford County Superior Court in Tennessee. During this call, Judge Davenport spoke to Judge Colfax’s colleague, Judge Hitchens, advising the judge that the Tennessee court would step aside to permit the California court to exercise ju risdiction on forum n on conveniens grounds and, more specifically, “because moving th e child again at this point would be detrimental, particularly because there ar e no relatives in Tennessee available for placement.” This finding that California is the more convenie nt forum is amply supported by the relevant facts, including th e lack of persons in Tennessee capable or available to provide long-term care for minor, the agreement among counsel for all parties (including mother) that California juri sdiction is preferable, and the presence of key interested parties (including mothe r, grandmother, and minor) and of current information regarding this cas e in California and already be fore the California court. (See § 3427, subds. (b)(5), (6), (8).) 7

7 Section 3427, subdivision (b), sets forth the following eight factors for the court to consider in determining whic h forum is more co nvenient: (1) whet her domestic violence has occurred or likely will occu r and which state could best protect the parties and the11 Further, we agree with the ag ency that the fact that the parties were not present for the conversation between Judge Hitchens and Judge Davenport and that the conversation

was not recorded or transcribed are of no mo ment. The relevant provision, section 3410, subdivision (b), provides that the court “may” allow the parties to participate in

conversations or communications between the two courts; this provision does not require such participation. Moreover, case law holds th at the record must include “an account of

events” between the California and non-Calif ornia courts, but not necessarily “tape recordings or reporter’s transcript s” of specific conversations. ( In re C.T., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 111-112 [c oncluding the statutory requirements were met where the

conversations between the courts were descri bed in memoranda and/or described by the court on the record during the next hearing].) Here, the requisite account of events exists in the form of Judge Colfax ’s description on the record of the conversation between Judge Davenport of Tennessee an d Judge Hitchens of California shortly after the actual conversation took place. 8

child; (2) the length of time the child has re sided outside this st ate; (3) the distance between the two courts considering jurisdiction; (4) any financial hard ship to the parties due to litigating in one or th e other forum; (5) any agre ement regarding jurisdiction among the parties; (6) the nature and locati on of relevant evidence; (7) each court’s ability to fairly and expeditious ly decide issues and hear ev idence; and (8) each court’s familiarity with the particular matter. (§ 3427, subd. (b) .) As the agency notes, the statute requires the court to consider these fa ctors but does not require it to make factual findings on the record as to the applicability of specific factors. (See id . [“[b]efore determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of anothe r state to exercise ju risdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors”] [Italics added].)

8 In light of this record, we also reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court erred by failing to stay or dismiss thes e proceedings “pending investigation and consultation with Tennessee” re garding the more appropriate forum. In particular, the record reflects that, upon taking emergenc y jurisdiction over minor on abandonment grounds and upon learning of the ongoing Tennessee dependency, the California court first continued the matter to confirm the exis tence of the other state’s proceeding, and then stayed the proceeding for two weeks to actually co mmunicate with the Tennessee court regarding jurisdiction. As discussed above, that is exactly what the court was required to do: “A court of this state th at has been asked to make a child custody12 Second, with respect to the significant connections that minor and one or both parents have with California, the record re flects minor was born in California and did not move away until she was four years-old. In addition, a referral was received by the agency regarding minor in August 2007 allegi ng physical abuse by mother, although the allegations were unsubstantiated and the referra l was closed. While minor spent most of the next four or so years of her life elsewher e, she did return to California for two months

in 2010 to live with her ma ternal grandmother in the Bay Area, before returning for good in May 2012, just days before these proc eedings commenced, when her legal guardian flew with her from Tennessee and again left her in maternal grandmother’s care after deciding she was unable or unwilling to hersel f provide care. Since that time, minor has been placed in a California foster home, has been enrolled in a California school, and has received medical (including mental health and dental) treatment from California practitioners. Although still struggling at tim es with behavioral and emotional issues, minor is beginning to show signs of flour ishing in her Californi a environment and her foster mother has verbally committed to adopting her. These connections, we conclude, are indeed significant. (See In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal. App.4th 478, 510 [“assessment of a state’s ‘significant connec tions’ with a child is made at the time the jurisdictional determination is made, rather than at the time of commencement of the proceeding”].) Moreover, there is also evidence mother ha s returned to California from Texas after serving her sentence for probation violations, 9 and alleged father appears to live in Oakland or Berkeley. Maternal grandmother also continues to live in the Bay Area and has become an important and stable person in minor’s life, taki ng her on vacation and otherwise maintaining familial ties. Finally, a nother relative living in Palo Alto at some

determination under this section, upon bei ng informed that a ch ild custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a ch ild custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction unde r Sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, shall immediately communicate with the other co urt.” (§ 3424, subd. (d).)

9 Mother’s probation condition permits her to have superv ised visitation with minor, about which she is enthusiastic.13 point expressed interest in caring for minor, although, given her crim inal background, she does not appear to be a viable placement ca ndidate. Regardless, we have no doubt based on the record as a whole that the requisite “significant connection” for purposes of section 3421, subdivision (a)(2)(A), has been established. And finally, with respect to the remaini ng requirement that substantial evidence be available in California concerning the minor’s need for dependency, we have identified, at minimum, the following material facts: the presence of mi nor, mother, maternal grandmother and alleged father in California, all key witnesses with respect to minor’s need for dependency; th e additional presence in this Stat e of minor’s foster/prospective adoptive family, her doctors and therapist, and her child welfare representatives, among others; and the many up-to-da te reports and other docume nts prepared and submitted by the agency’s social wo rkers involved in this matter deta iling the circumstances of minor’s dependency, including her past abuse, mental health struggles, and frequent changes of residence and caregivers. On this record, we have no do ubt the substantial evidence standard under section 3421, subd ivision (a)(2)(B), has been met. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we ag ree with the agency the juvenile court’s exercise of subject matter jurisd iction over minor was appropriate. II. Did the agency exercise due diligence in attempting to loca te alleged father? Alleged father contends the agency failed to act with due diligence in its efforts to provide him with proper notic e of these proceedings. As such, he reasons, this matter must be remanded for a new hearing on juri sdiction and disposition. We disagree. The relevant law is not in dispute. “P arents are entitled to due process notice of juvenile court proceedings affecting the car e and custody of their children, and the absence of due process notice to a parent is a ‘fatal defect’ in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. [Citation.] Due process requires ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pr esent their objections.’ [Citation.] The means employed to give a party notice for due process purposes must be such as one, desirous of actually informing the party, might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. [Citations.]” ( In re Claudia S. (2005)14 131 Cal.App.4th 236, 247.) “If the whereabouts of a parent are unknown, the issue becomes whether due diligence was used to locate the parent. [Citations.] The term ‘reasonable or due diligence’ ‘ “ ‘denotes a thorough, systemat ic investigation and inquiry conducted in good faith.’ ” [Citation.]’ Due process notice requirements are deemed satisfied where a parent cannot be located despite a reasonable s earch effort and the failure to give actual notice will not render the proceedings invalid.” ( In re Claudia S., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 247.) Having considered the agency ’s efforts in this case to locate alleged father to provide him notice of the dependency procee dings, we conclude they meet the abovestated standard of due diligen ce. Specifically, the agency filed a due diligence report on June 28, 2012, indicating that, between June 7 and June 19, agency representatives

searched for information re garding alleged father’s wh ereabouts in public and governmental sources in Texas and California. In doing so, the agency relied on the only identifying information it had fo r alleged father, which consisted of his name and last known address in Texas. Shortly after this re port was filed, the agency was able to obtain from mother a new Bay Area phon e number for alleged fathe r, which the social worker

called without success on June 14, 15, 18, 20 and 22. On January 22, 2103, the ag ency executed a declaration of due diligence to inform

the court of its more recent efforts to locate alleged fa ther. Specifically, using two recently-discovered former addresses for allege d father, the agency had searched multiple California sources, and had also attempted unsuccessfully to contact him with two recently-obtained phone numbers. The court th en ordered the agency to publish a citation

and summons in the San Francisco Chronicle once weekly for four consecutive weeks, which order the agency complied with, albeit without success. In the report filed February 21, 2013 pu rsuant to Welfare a nd Institutions Code section 366.26, the social worker stated that she had been in contact with alleged father’s mother (aka, paternal grandmother), who told th e social worker alleged father “has never demonstrated interest in [minor’s] case. She last saw him approximately five years ago.15 According to an Email sent to [the social worker] by the paternal grandmother, [he] is

reluctant to come forward and to make his whereabouts known, as he does not want to have to pay child support.” Nonetheless, de spite this report and without making contact with the agency, alleged father appeared for the section 36 6.26 hearing on April 15, 2013, and was appointed counsel. The juvenile co urt also continued the section 366.26 hearing until June 14, 2013, and, in the meantime, set a presumed paternity hearing for May 9, 2013. However, the presumed paternity h earing was subsequently taken off calendar pursuant to an agreement betw een counsel for the agency and alleged father, at which

time counsel informed the court the hearin g would be added ba ck on calendar once alleged father and his counsel so decided. When alleged father’s counsel thereafte r appeared at the June 14 permanency planning hearing, she requested a continuan ce on the ground that “during the period from

the last court date to this date I have not ha d any contact with my client. And when I saw him in court today he informed me that he ne ver received the letter that I sent him, nor had he – he had lost my info rmation so he didn’t have any way of contacting me.” The court denied this request, noting alleged fath er’s choice to take the presumed paternity hearing off calendar and that he “has not even cooperated to the point of contacting the department or continu[ing] to locate his a ttorney. If he couldn’t find your information certainly people in the court could have assist ed him in that regard . There really is no good cause for a continuance.” On this record, we agree w ith the agency that its efforts to locate alleged father – including its numerous searches of public and governmental s ources, its four-week publication of his summons and citation in th e local newspaper, and its efforts to obtain

information as to his whereab outs from mother and other fa mily members – sufficed to meet the due diligence standard. The agency’s lack of succe ss in this regard does not undermine the consistency and meaningfulness of its efforts. Nothing more was required, and, even if it were, we can conceive of no harm that could ha ve resulted given the undeniable fact alleged father was informed of the permanen cy planning hearing, as both he and his counsel were present. In additi on, the juvenile court made efforts to set a16 presumed paternity hearing on his behalf before the selection and implementation hearing, which would have occurred but for his own choice to take it off calendar and not add it back. Under these circumstances, we reject his due process challenge. ( In re Kobe

A . (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1124 [affirmi ng order terminating parental rights where father suffered no prejudice from inadequate notice].) Finally, given our conclusion neither pare nt’s challenge on appeal withstands scrutiny, we need not consider their additional arguments that reversal of the judgment as to one parent requires reve rsal as to the other.

DISPOSITION The June 26, 2013, order to termin ate parental rights is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Jenkins, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ McGuiness, P. J.

_____________ ____________ Siggins, J.