COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 6, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP683-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF162

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

MICHELLE L. JENSEN,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Barron County: 

JAMES C. BABLER, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Michelle Jensen appeals from a judgment 

convicting her of possession of methamphetamine. Jensen contends that evidence 
No. 2021AP683-CR

2

seized during a traffic stop should have been suppressed because police unlawfully 

prolonged the stop. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Former Turtle Lake Police Officer Adam Steffen stopped Jensen’s 

vehicle because its exhaust system was loud, and Jensen appeared to be texting on 

her phone while driving. Steffen approached the vehicle, informed Jensen of the 

reason for the stop, and asked to see her proof of insurance. Jensen said that she 

would need to find her insurance information on her phone. Steffen decided to 

issue Jensen a written warning to have her exhaust system fixed within ten days. 

Issuing a written warning required Steffen to return to his squad car, open his 

TRAKS computer system, enter basic information about Jensen, her vehicle, and 

the relevant statute into the program, and then print a warning. Steffen estimated

the process to generate a written warning would take about two minutes on 

average, depending upon whether the form autopopulated or Steffen was required 

to manually enter all of the necessary information.

¶3 About four minutes after Steffen returned to his squad car to process 

the written warning, Polk County Sheriff’s Deputy Del Stone arrived at the scene 

with his police K9. Steffen did not call Stone to the scene and had no 

communication with him prior to his arrival. Rather, Stone had been traveling on 

the highway when he observed emergency lights from Steffen’s squad car and 

decided on his own to pull over and assist in the traffic stop. Steffen and Stone 

had a brief conversation about the nature of the stop and routine safety issues

before Steffen returned to processing the written warning. Steffen stated that the 

conversation was short because he did not like Stone and did not want to “deal 

with” him any more than necessary. 
No. 2021AP683-CR

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¶4 While Steffen was still in his squad car, Stone approached Jensen’s 

vehicle and made contact with her. Stone believed that Jensen exhibited “beyond 

normal nervousness” during the interaction. Stone then asked Jensen to exit her 

vehicle, escorted her to the front of Steffen’s squad car, patted her down for 

weapons, and told her to remain by Steffen’s squad car while he conducted a “K9 

sniff” of her vehicle. Stone retrieved his canine partner from his vehicle and 

walked the dog around Jensen’s vehicle. The dog “alerted” on Jensen’s vehicle, 

indicating the presence of drugs. The entire time between when Stone arrived on 

the scene and when the dog alerted on Jensen’s vehicle was approximately five 

minutes. 

¶5 As Stone was returning his dog to his squad car, Steffen exited his 

squad car and again made contact with Jensen. Steffen spent about two minutes 

issuing Jensen the exhaust warning and verifying Jensen’s insurance information. 

The law enforcement officers then conducted the search of Jensen’s vehicle that is 

the subject of the suppression motion. 

¶6 At the suppression hearing, the circuit court made specific factual 

findings that Steffen did not ask Stone to perform a K9 sniff on Jensen’s vehicle; 

that Steffen and Stone’s initial conversation related to the original purpose of the 

traffic stop; that, because Steffen did not like Stone, Steffen did not give Stone “a 

wink and a nod” to perform the K9 sniff or otherwise purposely act to extend the 

stop so that Stone would have time for the K9 sniff; that Steffen’s estimate that it 

would take him only two minutes to prepare the citation was “unreasonable” and 

“grossly inadequate”; that Steffen was working on creating the written warning on 

his laptop the entire time Stone was interacting with Jensen and conducting the K9 

sniff; and that Stone completed the K9 sniff before Steffen completed the tasks 

related to the original reason for the traffic stop.
No. 2021AP683-CR

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¶7 The circuit court concluded there was no constitutional violation 

because the K9 sniff did not add any time at all to the permissible length of the 

traffic stop. The court denied Jensen’s suppression motion, and Jensen appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶8 When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we will uphold the 

circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. WIS. STAT.

§ 805.17(2) (2019-20)1; State v. Hindsley, 2000 WI App 130, ¶22, 237 Wis. 2d 

358, 614 N.W.2d 48. We will independently determine, however, whether the 

facts found by the circuit court satisfy applicable constitutional provisions. 

Hindsley, 237 Wis. 2d 358, ¶22. 

¶9 An investigatory stop “must be temporary and last no longer than is 

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 

500 (1983). Thus, when an initially justified detention of an individual extends 

beyond the purpose of the stop, it becomes illegal. State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 

¶38, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72. However, routine measures such as 

checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants 

against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of 

insurance do not unreasonably extend a traffic stop because they are related to the 

same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the 

road are operated safely and responsibly. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 

U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (holding that a dog sniff is not part of the traffic mission and 

does not justify prolonged detention once a ticket has been issued). Moreover, if 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2021AP683-CR

5

during an investigatory stop, an officer becomes aware of facts sufficient to give 

rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is committing a 

distinct offense, the purpose of the stop may expand and the length of the stop may 

be properly extended to investigate the new suspicion. State v. Colstad, 2003 WI 

App 25, ¶¶11-13, 260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394.

¶10 Jensen first challenges as clearly erroneous the circuit court’s finding 

regarding the inaccuracy of Steffen’s estimate that generating a written warning 

would only take two minutes. Next, from the alternative premise that the 

two-minute estimate was in fact accurate, Jensen argues that Steffen 

impermissibly extended the stop by about six minutes, that Jensen deems to be 

unaccounted for while Steffen waited in his squad car for Stone to finish the K9 

sniff.

¶11 We do not agree that the circuit court’s finding was clearly 

erroneous. A factual finding is not clearly erroneous unless—after accepting all 

credibility determinations made and reasonable inferences drawn by the fact

finder—the great weight and preponderance of the evidence support a contrary 

finding. Noll v. Dimiceli’s, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 641, 643-44, 340 N.W.2d 575 

(Ct. App. 1993).

¶12 Here, Steffen had already been working on the written warning in 

his squad car for four minutes before Stone arrived at the scene. That fact alone 

would support the circuit court’s finding that Steffen’s estimate as to how long it 

would take to generate the written warning was “grossly inadequate.” The amount 

of time Steffen had been working on the written warning before Stone arrived

would also support a reasonable inference that the citation form did not 

autopopulate and that Steffen was required to manually enter all of the necessary 
No. 2021AP683-CR

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information. Having to manually enter all of the information would, in turn, lead 

to a further reasonable inference that generating the written warning in this case 

would have taken longer than the “average” time to do so.

¶13 In addition, Steffen expressly testified that he was “doing stuff on 

the computer” while Stone was speaking to Jensen and conducting the K9 sniff. 

The circuit court implicitly determined that testimony was credible when the court

made reference to it and commented that there was no indication that Steffen just 

sat in the squad car and did nothing but watch the dog sniff rather than work on 

the written warning. 

¶14 Jensen does not point to any evidence—much less the great weight 

of the evidence—that directly contradicts Steffen’s testimony that he was working 

on his computer while Stone conducted the K9 sniff. Rather, Jensen urges this 

court to draw an inference contrary to the reasonable inferences and credibility 

determinations supporting the circuit court’s determination. We will not do so.

¶15 Having accepted the circuit court’s factual findings, we conclude 

that they support the conclusion that the police did not unlawfully extend the 

duration of Jensen’s traffic stop to conduct a drug investigation. The K9 sniff was 

conducted contemporaneously with the investigation into, and written warning for, 

Jensen’s defective exhaust system. We therefore affirm the suppression ruling and 

judgment of conviction.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.