In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1356 

ADEMUS AKADEAMEUER SAECHAO, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

CHERYL EPLETT, Warden, Oakhill Correctional Institution, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 17-cv-370-slc — Stephen L. Crocker, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2020 — DECIDED MARCH 16, 2021 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges. 

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Charged in Wisconsin state 

court with armed robbery, false imprisonment, and related 

offenses, Ademus Saechao retained a[orney Jay Kronenwe[er to represent him. The state charged Manuel AlonsoBermudez, Joseph Rohmeyer, and Harley Schul^ with participating in the same crimes, though their cases proceeded 

separately from Saechao’s. Because the dockets were separate, the state’s public defender organization did not know 
2 No. 20-1356 

that Kronenwe[er was representing Saechao when it appointed him to represent Alonso-Bermudez too. This created 

problems that have led to this petition for collateral relief 

under 28 U.S.C. §2254. 

Everyone quickly saw that there was a potential for conflict of interest, if only because Alonso-Bermudez might decide to testify against Saechao, or the reverse. Kronenwe[er 

himself told the judge in Saechao’s prosecution that he was 

concerned about the potential conflict and uneasy about representing both defendants. But he did so for some six weeks, 

until he withdrew as Alonso-Bermudez’s lawyer and the 

public defender organization named John Bachman to take 

his place. This did not satisfy the judge in Saechao’s prosecution; he wanted an unconditional waiver of any conflict from 

both Saechao and Alonso-Bermudez. Saechao provided one; 

Alonso-Bermudez declined. He said that he would waive a 

conflict in Saechao’s current prosecution but not with respect 

to other offenses in which the two may have been confederates. Bachman told the judge in Saechao’s case that his client’s refusal to execute a general waiver made Kronenwe[er’s position as Saechao’s lawyer untenable. As the trial 

date approached, and the prosecutor listed AlonsoBermudez as a potential witness in Saechao’s case, the trial 

judge reached that conclusion and disqualified Kronenwe[er. 

By then Bachman had indicated that Alonso-Bermudez 

was willing to sign a general waiver. Bachman announced 

that position, however, about the same time as AlonsoBermudez fired him, and the judge thought that Bachman no 

longer could speak for Alonso-Bermudez. Saechao went to 

trial with a new lawyer and was convicted. Wisconsin’s ap-
No. 20-1356 3 

pellate court affirmed, rejecting his argument that the trial 

judge had violated the Constitution by depriving him of his 

chosen lawyer. And a federal district court denied Saechao’s 

request for collateral relief. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33308 (W.D. 

Wis. Feb. 24, 2020). The magistrate judge’s comprehensive 

and thoughtful opinion makes it unnecessary for us to provide greater detail about the events in state court. 

A state court’s decision addressing the merits of a legal 

claim, as Wisconsin’s judiciary did, cannot be upset on collateral review unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision 

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States”. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 

Wisconsin’s Court of Appeals recognized that Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), supplies the controlling authority, and the federal district court held that the state judiciary 

had applied Wheat reasonably. Indeed, the combination of

Wheat with §2254(d)(1) gives the state a double dose of deference. Under Wheat, even in federal court (and even on direct appeal, and even when there have been unequivocal 

waivers of any conflict), the trial judge has discretion to disqualify counsel to avoid a serious risk of conflict. 486 U.S. at 

158–64. And “[t]he more general the [federal] rule, the more 

leeway [state] courts have in reaching outcomes in case-bycase determinations.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 

664 (2004). 

Wheat does insist that disqualification is inappropriate 

unless there is serious risk of an actual conflict, and Saechao 

pitches his argument on this point. He observes that the trial 

judge disqualified Kronenwe[er in part because the judge 

did not think that criminal-defense lawyers ever should rep-
4 No. 20-1356 

resent multiple clients charged with the same crime. Moreover, Saechao adds, the state’s court of appeals gave some 

weak reasons for thinking that Kronenwe[er faced a serious 

risk of conflict. The prosecutor has abandoned a few of the 

state court’s reasons. But the fact remains that the weakness 

of some reasons is just a case-specific shortcoming, not a legal conflict between the state judiciary’s approach and the

Wheat standard. As long as other, sufficient, reasons remain, 

the state’s decision withstands federal collateral review. 

The federal magistrate judge thought that at least one of 

the state judiciary’s reasons suffices, given the deference required by Wheat and the additional layer of deference provided by §2254(d)(1): the fact that Alonso-Bermudez appeared on the prosecution’s witness list. That created a risk 

that Kronenwe[er would be called on to cross-examine his 

former client, potentially using confidential information he 

had received. Saechao concedes that this is a good reason for 

disqualification in principle but maintains that it is not a 

good reason in practice, because (he insists) the prosecutor 

was unlikely to call Alonso-Bermudez. Saechao was charged 

with being one among a criminal gang of four. Rohmeyer 

and Schul^ had agreed to testify for the prosecution. So 

why, Saechao asks, would the prosecutor have called 

Alonso-Bermudez, who was standing on his right to a trial 

and was unlikely to turn state’s evidence? 

We know that, when Saechao’s trial came, the prosecutor 

did not call Alonso-Bermudez. But hindsight is a poor guide 

to action. Raising the possibility of calling Alonso-Bermudez 

as a witness is hard to call a ploy to achieve Kronenwe[er’s 

removal. All too often co-defendants who have promised to 

testify balk or “lose their recollection” at trial. And co-
No. 20-1356 5 

defendants who proclaim their innocence and insist that 

they will go to trial change their minds on the eve of trial, 

agree to plead guilty, and negotiate for terms—which may 

include a promise to testify against a confederate in crime. 

On the day that the trial judge disqualified Kronenwe[er, 

Rohmeyer and Schul^ were promising to cooperate, while 

Alonso-Bermudez said that he would not do so. By the day 

of trial the situation could have been reversed. An unconditional waiver of conflicts from Alonso-Bermudez might have 

persuaded the trial judge to take the risk that a decision by 

Alonso-Bermudez to testify would not ruin the trial if 

Kronenwe[er remained as Saechao’s lawyer, but AlonsoBermudez was unwilling to provide a comprehensive waiver—and that was a problem, because cross-examination of 

Alonso-Bermudez at Saechao’s trial could have ventured into some of Alonso-Bermudez’s other crimes. This left a serious risk, and Wheat gives the trial judge a measure of deference when deciding how to proceed. 

Saechao maintains that reasoning along the lines just laid 

out would conflict with United States v. Turner, 594 F.3d 946 

(7th Cir. 2010), which tells district judges not to assume too 

readily that a potential for conflict will ripen into a serious 

actual conflict. Put that way, the devil is in the phrase “too 

readily”; of course a judge should not do anything too readily 

and should not be a sucker for claims about conflicts that 

may never come to fruition. The issue in any given case is 

whether the trial judge abused his discretion in thinking that 

the risk of a serious conflict had been established. An affirmative answer for Turner does not imply that the same answer 

is called for in Saechao’s case. 
6 No. 20-1356 

Perhaps more important, Turner just doesn’t ma[er on 

collateral review under §2254(d)(1), which says that the writ 

must not issue unless the state court’s decision is contrary to 

“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States” (emphasis added). This means that 

decisions by the federal courts of appeals do not count, except to the extent that they illuminate the meaning of the 

Supreme Court’s decisions. See Kernan v. Cuero, 138 S. Ct. 4 

(2017); Parker v. MaEhews, 567 U.S. 37, 48–49 (2012); Fayemi v. 

Ruskin, 966 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2020). Turner concerned 

how federal district judges should manage the discretion 

they possess under Wheat; it does not modify the Supreme 

Court’s own standard or limit the discretion of state judges. 

AFFIRMED