J-S34025-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: N.W., A MINOR

No. 2059 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Dispositional Order November 5, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-JV-0000551-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2015

N.W., a minor,1appeals from the dispositional order entered 

November 5, 2014, by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile 

Division. The juvenile court adjudicated N.W. delinquent on charges of 

aggravated assault and resisting arrest,2and entered a dispositional order 

placing N.W. on formal probation, requiring attendance at the Harrisburg 

Abraxas Student Academy and participation in the Abraxas Non-Residential 

Treatment after-school program. On appeal, N.W. challenges the sufficiency 

and weight of the evidence supporting her adjudications. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 N.W. was born in July of 2000.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(3) and 5104, respectively.
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The juvenile court summarized the facts, recounted during the 

adjudication hearing, as follows:

[N.W.] was charged with Aggravated Assault – Injury to 

Police Officer, Resisting Arrest, and Criminal Trespass – Defiant 

Trespasser for an incident that occurred at the Chestnut Pointe 

Apartments on June 29, 2014. [N.W.] and her family had been 

residents of Chestnut Pointe Apartments until the family was 

evicted on October 29, 201[3], and given a no trespass letter.

On June 29, 2014, [N.W.] and her sister [A.B.] were seen 

at the Chestnut Pointe Apartments by Emil Hohman[3]

(hereinafter “Mr. Hohman”), the courtesy officer. Mr. Hohman 

approached the juveniles and told them they were not allowed 

on the property. A.B. ignored him, and tried to walk away. Mr. 

Hohman then called Swatara Township Police Department for 

assistance.

Officer Timothy Bloss, Officer Justin Wolford, and Corporal 

Jeremy Barrick ... of the Swatara Township Police Department 

were dispatched to Chestnut Pointe Apartments. Upon arrival, 

Officer Bloss spoke with Mr. Hohman first, and asked for a copy 

of the trespassing notice that was provided to [N.W.]’s family. 

While waiting for Mr. Hohman to return, N.W. and A.B. 

approached Officer Bloss’ patrol car. The juveniles told Officer 

Bloss that they were visiting family and were allowed on the 

property as they had already gone to court for the issue. A.B. 

began to walk past Officer Bloss, who told her to wait as they 

were not free to go yet. A.B. continued to walk away and Officer 

Bloss reached for her arm in an attempt to stop her. Officer 

Bloss then pulled out his handcuffs with the intention of 

detaining her to gather more information. While Officer Bloss 

attempted to get handcuffs on A.B., he was suddenly hit on his 

right side by [N.W.] and fell to the ground on his knees.

Officer Wolford and Corporal Barrick arrived on scene while 

Officer Bloss was attempting to detain A.B. Officer Wolford 

witnessed [N.W.] hit Officer Bloss while he was attempting to 

____________________________________________

3 We note that the witness’s last name is correctly spelled “Hohmann.” N.T., 

10/24/2014, at 2. 
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detain A.B. He testified that “[N.W.] came at Officer Bloss from 

his right-hand side, kind of jumped up or something, and made 

contact with her body against his which resulted in all of them 

going to the ground.” Corporal Barrick also witnessed [N.W.] 

strike Officer Bloss. He testified that [N.W.] “ran into Officer 

Bloss knocking all three parties to the ground.[”] At that point, 

Officer Wolford and Corporal Barrick ran to assist Officer Bloss 

and physically removed [N.W.] from the scuffle.

Corporal Barrick then attempted to handcuff and restrain 

[N.W.]. He testified that “[N.W.] was pulling away from me, not 

listening to my commands to go on her stomach and stop 

resisting. She began to pull her legs up ..., so I unholstered my 

taser, ... told her she would be tased. At that point, she did 

comply.” Both juveniles were then taken into custody. 

A.B. testified that [she] and N.W. were visiting family who 

lived at Chesnut Pointe Apartments and went to visit some 

friends at the basketball court. While they were walking there, 

Mr. Hohman was following them. When the officers arrived, A.B. 

and N.W. walked up to the officer who told them that Mr. 

Hohman had stated they were not allowed on the property. A.B. 

then asked if they were allowed to leave and started to walk 

away, but was pulled back by the officer. A.B. admitted that she 

did not want Officer Bloss to arrest her and continued to back 

away. A.B. testified that N.W. was trying to help her get away 

from Officer Bloss and then all three fell to the ground. 

Similarly, N.W. testified that they were on the property 

visiting family and friends who still lived there. She testified that 

while Officer Bloss was attempting to detain A.B., N.W. was 

pulling on A.B.’s waist to help her get out of Officer Bloss’ grasp. 

N.W. testified that while trying to help A.B., Officer Bloss “was 

backing up and he bumped into a car and he fell on his knee 

trying to arrest her and then she fell – they both fell when he 

fell.” [N.W.] testified that she did not fall over with A.B. and 

Officer Bloss.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/10/2014, at 1-4 (footnotes and record citations 

omitted).
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On July 2, 2014, a juvenile petition was filed against N.W., charging 

her with aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and criminal trespass.4 An 

adjudication hearing was held on October 24, 2014. At the conclusion of 

the hearing, the juvenile court judge determined that the charges of 

aggravated assault and resisting arrest were substantiated, but the charge 

of criminal trespass was not substantiated. The judge deferred his 

determination of delinquency pending the results of a psychological 

examination. 

A dispositional hearing was subsequently held on November 5, 2014. 

At that time, the juvenile court judge adjudicated N.W. delinquent on the 

charges of aggravated assault and resisting arrest, and placed her on formal 

probation with attendance at the Harrisburg Abraxas Student Academy, 

participation in the Abraxas Non-Residential Treatment after-school 

program, and a curfew. On November 13, 2014, N.W. filed a postdispositional motion challenging the weight of the evidence supporting her 

adjudication. She then filed a notice of appeal on December 4, 2014.

5

____________________________________________

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(ii).

5 On December 12, 2014, N.W. filed an application in this Court seeking 

remand of the appeal so that the juvenile court could address her postdispositional motion. By order dated January 6, 2015, this Court noted that 

an appeal filed while a post-dispostional motion is pending may be 

premature under the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. See

Order, 1/6/2015, citing Pa.R.J.C.. 620. Accordingly, we remanded the 

appeal and directed N.W. to file a praecipe in the juvenile court for the entry

of an order denying her post-dispostional motion by operation of law. N.W. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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First, N.W. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to 

both adjudications. 

As with any sufficiency claim, our review of an adjudication of 

delinquency is well-settled:

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

following an adjudication of delinquency, we must review the 

entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth.

In determining whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence to meet its burden of proof, the test to be applied is 

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences 

therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to find every element of 

the crime charged. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden

of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.

The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not be absolutely incompatible with a defendant’s 

innocence. Questions of doubt are for the hearing judge, unless 

the evidence is so weak that, as a matter of law, no probability 

of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth.

In re V.C., 66 A.3d 341, 348-349 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation omitted), 

appeal denied, 80 A.3d 778 (Pa. 2013).

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

complied with this Court’s directive, and, on January 9, 2015, the juvenile 

court entered an order denying N.W.’s post-dispositional motion. 

Thereafter, on January 13, 2015, the juvenile court directed N.W. to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). N.W. complied, and filed a concise statement on January 29, 

2015.

 
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In the present case, N.W. was adjudicated delinquent on charges of 

aggravated assault and resisting arrest. “A person if guilty of aggravated 

assault if [she] ... attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes 

bodily injury to any [police officer] in the performance of duty[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2702(a)(3). The Crimes Code defines “bodily injury” as “[i]mpairment of 

physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.

N.W. contends the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate she 

caused or attempted to cause bodily injury to a police officer. First, she 

argues Officer Bloss did not suffer bodily injury, as defined in the Crimes 

Code. She notes the only injury he sustained was a scrape on his knee, 

which he treated with a band-aid. Moreover, N.W. points to the fact that 

Officer Bloss testified he did not even realize he was injured until his 

adrenaline wore off and he experienced “some pain” in his right knee. N.T., 

10/24/2014, at 18. Additionally, N.W. asserts the evidence was insufficient 

to demonstrate she intended to cause bodily injury to the officer. In 

support of her claim, she emphasizes her own testimony that “her intent was 

merely to separate her sister from Officer Bloss, not injur[e] Officer Bloss.” 

N.W.’s Brief at 14, citing N.T., 10/24/2014, at 46-48.

Our review of the record reveals more than sufficient evidence to 

sustain N.W.’s conviction for aggravated assault. This Court has previously 

opined: 

[I]n a prosecution for aggravated assault on a police officer the 

Commonwealth has no obligation to establish that the officer 

actually suffered a bodily injury; rather, the Commonwealth 
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must establish only an attempt to inflict bodily injury, and 

this intent may be shown by circumstances which reasonably 

suggest that a defendant intended to cause injury.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 560 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted and emphasis supplied). Assuming arguendo, Officer Bloss did not 

suffer “bodily injury,” as defined in the Crimes Code, we find the 

Commonwealth demonstrated N.W. acted with the specific intent to cause 

bodily injury to the officer, notwithstanding her own self-serving testimony 

to the contrary. 

Here, Officer Bloss explained that while he was attempting to handcuff 

A.B., “all of a sudden from [his] right side a person just almost kind of like 

tackled [him], threw their whole body into [him], into [his] right side,” which 

caused him to fall to the ground. N.T., 1/24/2014, at 13-14. Corporal 

Barrick testified that N.W. “ran into and jumped onto Officer Bloss knocking 

all three parties to the ground.” Id. at 31. Similarly, Officer Wolford 

described N.W.’s actions as follows:

I don’t think there was very much distance between them to 

start with so I don’t think she got into a full sprint or anything, 

but she was moving with a purpose. It wasn’t like she was 

just walking up behind him. She came at him, jumped up, and 

knocked him to the ground.

Id. at 26 (emphasis supplied). We conclude N.W.’s actions in tackling 

Officer Bloss with such force that he fell to the ground was sufficient to 

demonstrate her intent to cause him bodily injury. 

N.W. also challenges her adjudication on the charge of resisting arrest, 

which is defined in Section 5104 of the Crimes Code as follows:
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A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with 

the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful 

arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone 

else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force 

to overcome the resistance.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. N.W. does not challenge the lawfulness of her arrest. 

Rather, she argues the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate her actions 

created a substantial risk of bodily injury, since Corporal Barrick did not 

“incur any injuries trying to detain [her,]” or her actions required substantial 

force to overcome. N.W.’s Brief at 15. 

Again, with our standard of review in mind, we conclude the evidence 

was sufficient to sustain her adjudication. At the adjudication hearing, 

Officer Bloss testified that after he finally subdued A.B., he observed both 

Officer Wolford and Corporal Barrick “attempting to detain” N.W. N.T., 

10/24/2014, at 14. Officer Wolford corroborated this testimony by stating 

that he and Corporal Barrick “physically assisted” to removed N.W. from 

Officer Bloss and A.B. Id. at 27. Corporal Barrick described the scene as 

follows:

Officer Wolford and I ran over and physically removed [N.W. 

from Officer Bloss]. At that point in time, I attempted to 

handcuff and restrain [N.W.]. She was pulling away from me, 

not listening to my commands to go on her stomach and stop 

resisting. She began to pull her legs up in an act that I felt she 

was going to try to kick me, so I unholstered my taser, held it to 

her stomach, told her she would be tased. At that point, she did 

comply, went to her stomach, and she was handcuffed.

Id. at 31-32. 
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as verdict winner, we conclude the evidence was sufficient 

to support N.W.’s adjudication on the charge of resisting arrest. First, N.W. 

created a “substantial risk of bodily injury” to Officer Bloss when she tackled 

him as he was trying to subdue her sister. It then took two officers to 

remove her from Officer Bloss. Moreover, as Corporal Barrick tried to 

restrain her, N.W. pulled her legs back as if to kick him, and only complied 

with his commands when he placed his taser gun on her stomach, and

informed her he would fire if she persisted. Under these circumstances, we 

conclude the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court to conclude 

N.W.’s actions created a substantial risk of bodily injury to both Officer Bloss 

and Corporal Barrick while they were performing official duties, and her 

resistance to their commands required the use of substantial force to 

overcome.

In her final claim, N.W. contends her adjudication was against the 

weight of the evidence.6

Our review of a weight claim in an appeal from a juvenile adjudication 

is the same as our review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence in an 

appeal from a criminal conviction:

____________________________________________

6 N.W. properly preserved her weight of the evidence claim by raising it in 

her post-dispositional motion. See In re J.B., 106 A.3d 76 (Pa. 2014).
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[W]e may only reverse the [juvenile] court’s [adjudication of 

delinquency] if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's 

sense of justice. Moreover, where the [ ] court has ruled on the 

weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider 

the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to 

whether the [juvenile] court palpably abused its discretion in 

ruling on the weight claim.

Hence, a [juvenile] court’s denial of a weight claim is the least 

assailable of its rulings. Conflicts in the evidence and 

contradictions in the testimony of any witnesses are for the fact 

finder to resolve. 

In re J.M., 89 A.3d 688, 692 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal 

denied, 102 A.3d 986 (Pa. 2014).

N.W. argues her adjudications were against the weight of the evidence 

because both she and her sister testified that she did not strike or jump on 

Officer Bloss. N.W.’s Brief at 17. Rather, they claimed N.W. was only trying 

to pull A.B. away from the officer when he lost his balance. Id. Moreover, 

she maintains the “three responding officers who testified gave varying 

accounts of which officers detained which juveniles, and one of the testifying 

officers described his memory of the incident as a ‘blur’.” Id.

While we agree N.W.’s and A.B.’s account of the events in question 

differed from that of the police officers, any conflicts in the testimony were 

“for the fact finder to resolve.” J.M., supra, 89 A.3d at 692 (citation 

omitted). Moreover, our review of the officers’ testimony from the 

adjudication hearing does not reveal “varying accounts” of the events, but 

rather, corroborative testimony regarding N.W.’s actions in tackling Officer 

Bloss, in an attempt to free her sister, followed by her obstinate refusal to 
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comply with the officers’ attempts to subdue her. Because N.W. has failed 

to demonstrate the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her weight 

of the evidence claim, her second issue fails.

Therefore, we conclude N.W.’s challenges to both the sufficiency and 

weight of the evidence supporting her adjudication of delinquency are 

meritless, and, accordingly, we affirm the dispositional order on appeal.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2015