J-S74019-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH WALLACE

Appellant No. 1714 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-15-CR-0001266-2000

BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and McLAUGHLIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 15, 2019

Appellant Joseph Wallace pro se appeals from the April 19, 2018 order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, dismissing as 

untimely his second petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we 

affirm.

The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. As 

recounted by a prior panel of this Court:

On February 28, 2000, [Appellant] stabbed his wife Eileen 

as she slept in her bed. Eileen [] died as a result of her wounds. 

On December 6, 2000, [Appellant] entered a plea of guilty but 

mentally ill to the charges of third[-]degree murder, possessing 

an instrument of crime and tampering with physical evidence. He 

was sentenced that day to a term of imprisonment of twenty-three 

and one-half to forty-seven years. [Appellant] did not appeal his 

sentence. On September 3, 2013, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA 

petition. Because this was [Appellant’s] first PCRA petition, [the 

PCRA court] appointed Robert Brendza, Esquire [“Attorney 

Brendza”] as [Appellant’s] counsel. [Attorney] Brendza reviewed 

[Appellant’s] claims and court file, determined that [Appellant’s] 
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PCRA [petition] was not timely, and moved to withdraw his 

appearance as PCRA counsel. [The PCRA court] also reviewed the 

file and record, [and] also determined that [Appellant’s] PCRA 

[petition] was untimely, and on June 18, 2014, [the PCRA court] 

gave [Appelant] notice of [the court’s] intent to dismiss his 

petition without a hearing. [Appellant] responded to this notice 

with two pro se filings. On July 17, 2014, [the PCRA court] 

directed that [Attorney] Brendza review these submissions, and 

inform the [c]ourt of his findings. [Attorney] Brendza complied 

with this order, and after [the PCRA court’s] review revealed that 

[Appellant] was entitled to no post-conviction relief, [the court] 

dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA petition on September 24, 2014 

[and granted Attorney Brendza’s Motion to withdraw].

Commonwealth v. Wallace, No. 2868 EDA 2014, unpublished 

memorandum, at 1-2 (Pa. Super. March 31, 2015) (citations omitted). On 

appeal, Appellant argued, inter alia, that his petition was timely because he 

satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. 

Specifically, Appellant argued that one of the defense psychologists, Dr. 

Gerald Cooke, who evaluated him was unaware of the prescription 

medications that Appellant was taking, including Ambien, Ritalin and Paxil, 

when he murdered Eileen. In support, Appellant presented the supplemental 

opinion of Dr. Cooke, concluding that the medications may have exacerbated 

Appellant’s psychosis and may provide Appellant with a partial defense of 

involuntary intoxication. Id. at 4. Nonetheless, Dr. Cooke deferred to a 

psychopharmacologist to provide expert opinion on this issue. We concluded 

that “these are not ‘newly-discovered facts,’ but merely ‘a newly willing source 

for previously known facts.’” Id. As a result, we held that Appellant’s claim 

did “not invoke the timeliness exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). 

Accordingly, on March 31, 2015, we affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of 

Appellant’s first petition. Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, 
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which our Supreme Court denied on July 29, 2015. Commonwealth v. 

Wallace, 119 A.3d 351 (Pa. 2015). 

On February 26, 2018, Appellant filed the instant, his second, PCRA 

petition, which was dated February 20, 2018. On March 5, 2018, the PCRA 

court issued a notice of its intention to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a 

hearing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On April 19, 2018, the PCRA dismissed as 

untimely Appellant’s second petition. On May 15, 2018, Appellant pro se filed

a notice of appeal and a motion for reconsideration, which the PCRA court 

denied on May 22, 2018.1 Appellant and the PCRA court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal,2 Appellant raises five issues for our review:

[I.] Did the PCRA court commit legal error in failing to recognize 

newly discovered facts with regard to the timely filing of 

Appellant’s PCRA petition?

[II.] Did the lower court commit legal error and/or abuse its 

discretion when it; a) dismissed newly discovered facts without an 

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1 Because the PCRA court had until May 21, 2018 to rule on Appellant’s 

reconsideration motion, its May 22, 2018 denial of the same is null and void 

because it fell outside of the thirty-day period. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) 

(providing that a trial court may grant reconsideration of an order subject to 

a petition for reconsideration, if the petition is filed “within the time provided 

or prescribed by law,” and the trial court enters an order expressly granting 

reconsideration within the time for filing a notice of appeal); see also

Commonwealth v. Moir, 766 A.2d 1253, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2000) (noting

that “[f]ailure to ‘expressly’ grant reconsideration within the time set by the 

rules for filing an appeal will cause the trial court to lose its power to act on 

the application for reconsideration.” (citation omitted)). 

2 “In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s 

determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’” 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)).
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evidentiary hearing; b) ruled Appellant’s response to notice of 

intent to dismiss untimely; c) denied pro se Appellant a chance to 

amend brief, and; d) failed to order the district attorney to 

produced records requested in PCRA?

[III.] Did the court incorrectly rule that Appellant’s mental health 

has already been fully considered?

[IV.] Did the court commit legal error by failing to address 

material issues of fact regarding the merit of Appellant’s due 

process claims of; a) incompetency; b) unlawfully induced plea 

and ineffective assistance of counsel; c) miscarriage of justice?

[V.] Did the court commit legal error by failing to allow Appellant 

to withdraw guilty plea?

Appellant’s Brief at ix (unnecessary capitalizations omitted) (sic). 

Before we may address the merits of this appeal, we must determine 

whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to entertain the underlying PCRA 

petition. The PCRA contains the following restrictions governing the timeliness 

of any PCRA petition. 

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 

or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by 

that court to apply retroactively. 
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(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) 

shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented. 

(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at 

the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in 

the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b) (emphasis added). Section 9545’s timeliness 

provisions are jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 

2014). Additionally, we have emphasized repeatedly that “the PCRA confers 

no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the 

PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.” 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (citations 

omitted).

Here, the record reflects Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final 

on January 5, 2001. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). 

Because Appellant had one year from January 5, 2001, to file his PCRA 

petition, the current filing is facially untimely given it was filed on February 

26, 2018.

3

 

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth and the PRCA court note that Appellant did not raise his 

newly-discovered facts claim within sixty days of the date the claim could have 

been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b) (2). Appellant counters that 

the instant PCRA petition was filed within sixty days because he dated and 

mailed the petition on February 20, 2018. The certified record here, however, 

does not contain the envelope in which Appellant’s PCRA petition was mailed 

and Appellant does not otherwise provide any certificate of mailing, cash slip, 

prison account deduction slip, or affidavit. As noted earlier, even though the 
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The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a petitioner 

alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 

714, 719 (Pa. 2008). Here, Appellant alleges that he was unaware of the facts 

underlying his claim and thereby calls upon the newly-discovered facts 

exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Before

Appellant may avail himself of this exception, he first must establish that the

facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown and that he could not 

have ascertained those facts by the exercise of due diligence. 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Appellant asserts that on December 22, 2017, he obtained his 

prison medical records revealing that he was mentally unfit to plead guilty on 

December 6, 2000. In particular, Appellant refers to a March 2, 2000 note in 

his medical chart that states “[u]nclear whether Ritalin use contributed to any 

psychotic symptoms.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 45. Additionally, 

Appellant claims that a psychiatric evaluation performed on December 28, 

2000 (approximately three weeks after this guilty plea) at SCI Camp Hill, 

reveals that “Appellant was in no condition to enter contract or assist attorney 

____________________________________________

instant PCRA petition was dated February 20, 2018, it was not docketed until 

February 26, 2018. Nonetheless, for purposes, and based on the outcome, of 

this appeal, we need not address whether Appellant’s newly-discovered facts 

claim was filed within sixty days of the date the claim could have been 

presented. 
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regarding relevant information due to being heavily medicated at the time.” 

PCRA Petition, 2/26/18, at 3A. 

Appellant is not entitled to relief. As detailed above, Appellant raised

the issue challenging his mental fitness at the time of the guilty plea on his 

first PCRA petition, the dismissal of which the prior panel of this Court 

affirmed. See Wallace, supra. Indeed, issues previously raised and litigated 

are not cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (issue is 

“previously litigated” if “it has been raised and decided in a proceeding 

collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence”). Moreover, his prison 

records merely provide a new source for a previously known fact that his use 

of medications, including Ritalin, could have impaired him or rendered him 

incompetent at the time of the guilty plea. See Marshall, 947 A.2d at 720 

(The focus of the exception is “on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly 

discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.”). Thus, the

issue continues to fail to satisfy the timeliness exception. Accordingly, we 

affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s second petition as untimely. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/19