### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 20

- 00134

- CR

William Ellis Douglass , Appellant

v.
The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE 453RD DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY NO. CR

- 18

- 0884

- E , THE HONORABLE DAVID JUNKIN , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Following the denial of his p retrial motion to suppress evidence, appellant
William Ellis D ouglass pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon ; possession
of marijuana , in the amount of 50 po unds or less b u t more than five p ounds ; and pos session with
intent to deliver a controlled substance, tetrahy drocann abinols , in the amount of four gr ams or more but less than 400 grams

. See Tex. P enal Code § 46.04(a) ; T ex. Health & Safet y Code § § 481 .113 (d), 481.121( b)(4 )

. Pursuant to a plea agre ement , D ouglass pleaded true to an enhancement p aragraph, and the trial court sentenced h im to fifteen years ’ confin ement for each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently

. See Tex. P enal Code § § 3.03 ( a) , 12.32(a). I n a singl e point of error, D ouglass challenges the trial court ’ s denial of his motion to suppress. We
will affirm the trial cou rt ’ s judgments of conviction.2 BACKGROUND 1
On the morning of February 2, 2018, in a 911 call to the Kyle Police Department (KP D ), 2 an unidentified individual reported that a package containing marijuan a had been mailed
to his house via FedEx. The individual requested that officers “ intercept ” the package,

ex plaining that he was “ tired of doing what [he ’ s] doing ” and had “ made en o ugh money

. ” He
insisted that officers not come to hi s house but instead c onfisca te the package before it arrived,

as “ once it lands, [he ’ s] re sponsible. ” When the 911 operator asked the individual ’ s name, he
demurred , responding, “ I don ’ t want n o n ames
. I ’ m not try ing to get in t rouble. ” Nevertheless , he provided the operato r with a n addre ss in Kyle, T e xas, as well as the package ’ s tracking num ber.
KPD Officer Du sti n Shuler testified that inv estigators were inte rested in the
individual based upon the possibility of his possessing narcotics or the proceeds of their sale.
Of ficers identified the caller as D ouglass by matching the caller ’ s num ber and the address he provided to him

. Shuler discussed the case with KPD Detective Joseph Swonke . Swon ke had

prev iously spoken with a detective in the Austin Police Department, who had been contacted by

someone “ trying to get out of the game , and [who] wanted a p ackage intercepted. ”
Shuler , driving a marked patrol vehicle, parked near Douglass ’ h ouse and beg an

s urve illing him, “ hopin g to

. . . get him leavin g the house and get him at a tr affic stop for further investigation. ” Over the next ten to fi fteen minutes, Shuler witnes sed D ouglass make

1 The facts recited are taken from the testimony and evidence presented at the sup pression hea ring.

2 A recording of the 911 call was admitted in to evidence at the suppressing hearing.3 appro ximately five trips between his home and vehicle , loading th e S UV with a “ large quan tity
of things ” and locking the v ehicle each time he went back inside. Eventually, Douglass drove his vehicle down Am berwood South toward i ts
intersection with the Interstate 35 Frontage Road. The intersection, a t whi ch Amb erwood So uth
dead

- ends into the f rontage road, contains a stop sign facing traffic on Amberwood So u th ; t here is no crosswalk or stop line

. Shuler followed Doug lass ’ vehicle and , he testified , m aintained a “ constant
visual

. ” 3 As Shuler a pproached the intersectio n , Douglass ’ vehicle wa s stopped behind another , near the intersection

. A third vehicle was positioned between Sh uler ’ s patrol car and Douglass ’
vehicle. After the vehicle in fron t cleared the intersection, Douglass turned right onto the
f rontage roa d wi tho ut stopping a second time

. Although Shule r testified that there were “ several things ” that could have obstructed Do uglass ’ view while he wa s stopped, t hree defense expert s
testified that there w ere no obstructions present at the intersec tion.
S huler te st i fied that h e stopped Douglass ’ v ehicle after it made the turn “ [b] ased off reasonable suspicion of there possibly being narcotics or proceed s of, or distribution of
narcotics within the vehicle as well as the traffic offense [he] observed

. ” Officers se arc hed the
vehicle and d iscovered 2.6 pounds of marij uana, THC edible chocolates, drug paraphernalia, a firearm, and money bel ieved to be the proceeds of the distribution of na rcotics. Douglass filed a motion to suppress , challenging the ad missibility of the seized
evidence

. T h e trial court denied the motion following a pretrial evidentiary hearin g
. Both parties ’ argument s at the hearing p rincipally concerned the m eaning of s ection 544.010 ( c) of the

3 A dashcam video fro m S huler ’s p atrol car, admitted into eviden ce at the hearing, begins just before Shuler turns onto Amberwood South.4 Texas Tra nsportation Code and whether Sh uler ha d reason able suspicion to belie v e t hat Douglass had com mitted a traffic violation under the statute

. As defense counsel explained :

“ [T] he question is the stop. Our position is they had no reasonable suspicion, certainly not under the law, and ther e was not a tra ffic offense. ” Upon Do u glass ’ req uest, t he tria l court issued , in
part, the following written finding s of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

. . . . 3. Officer Shuler observed the Defendant ’ s vehicle approach the intersection of Amberwood [So uth] and the Interstate 35 (“I

- 35”) frontage road. There was
one vehicle between Officer Shuler ’ s patrol car and the Defendant ’ s vehicle.
4. [T] here was no crosswalk or clearly marked stop line at the intersection of Amberwood [ So uth] and the I

- 35 fronta ge ro ad. The Court finds th a t Officer Shuler observ ed that there was no crosswalk or clearly marked stop line at that intersection.
5. [T] he Defendant ’ s vehicle came to a complete stop behind another vehicle that was also stopped at the inter section of A mberw ood [South] and the I

- 35 fr o ntage road.
6. [T] he Defen dant ’ s vehicle stopped at a distance of at least one car length away from the intersection. “Intersection ” as used herein refers to the line where Amberwood [South] and the I

- 35 frontag e road mee t.
7. [A] fter the vehicle in front o f the Defendant ’ s vehicle proceeded to tu rn right onto the I

- 35 frontage road, the Defendant ’ s vehicle also proceeded to turn right onto the frontage road wit hout stopping a second time at the intersection.
8. [ T] here was n o evidence of any obstructions th a t would have interfered with the Defendant ’ s view of the approaching traffic on the I

- 35 frontage road if he had stopped at the place nearest the intersection.
9. Officer Shuler observed the following: (i) the Defend ant ’ s vehicle stopped behind the vehic l e immediately in front of it at the intersection; (ii) the Defendant ’ s vehicle stopped at least one car length away from the intersection; (iii) the vehicle in front of the Defendant ’ s vehicle turned onto th e I

- 35 fro ntage road; and (iv) the Defendant ’ s v e hicle turned onto the I

- 35 frontage road without stopping a second time at the intersection.5 10. Officer Shuler reasonably believed that, based on the above observations, the Defendant had committed a traffi c violatio n. 11

. Officer Shuler subsequently sto p ped the Defendant ’ s vehicle.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

. . . . 4. [V] iewing the credible evidence objectively, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the Defendant did come to a complete stop before arriv ing at th e int ersection of Amberwood [South] and the I

- 35 frontage ro ad.
5. [V] iewing the credible evidence objectively, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the Defendant did not stop at the place nearest the intersecting roadway

— the I

- 35 front age roa d

— whe re he had an unimpeded view of approachi n g traffic.
6. [V] iewing the credible evidence objectively, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that Officer Shuler had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the Defendant engaged in a traffic viol ation

.

. . . . 8. [V] iewing the credible evi d ence objectively, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that Officer Shuler had re asonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop.
9. [ T] he Court finds that the motion to suppress based on t he sto p sho uld be denied.

After the denial of his motion to supp ress, Do uglass pleaded guilty to the charged
offenses pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. As par t of the plea agreement, Douglass pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph

. In a ccordan ce wit h the plea agre ement, the trial court
sentenced Doug l ass to fifte en years ’ confinement for each offense and ordered that th e sentences

run concu rrently . The co urt certified Douglass ’ right to appeal the pretria l ruling on his motion

to suppress.6 DI SCUSSI ON
I n his sole issue on a ppe al, Douglass contends tha t the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion t o suppress be cause there was no legal basis for the traffic stop.
S ince the stop was improper , he argues, “ the fruits of that searc h shou ld hav e been suppressed. ” We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of
discre t ion, applying a bifurcated standar d of review. State v. Cortez , 543 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “ A trial court ’ s ruling o n a mo tion t o suppress
. . . should be reversed only if it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. ” Wexler v. S t ate , 625 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), cert. denied , 142 S. Ct. 821 (2 022)

. We afford almost total deference to the
trial co urt’s findin gs of historical fact and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and dem e anor if the y are reasonably supported by the record. State

v. Arellano , 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). We review de novo a trial court ’s determination of legal questions and its application of the law to facts that do not turn upon a
determin a tion of wit ness credibility and demeanor. Id

. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Lerma

v. State , 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “ When a police officer stops a defendant without a warrant, the State has the b u rden of proving the reasonableness of the stop at a suppression hearing. ” Cortez , 543 S.W.3d at 204

. A n officer may conduct a wa rrant less t raffic
stop in compl iance with the Fourth Amendment if the “ reasonable suspicion ” standard is
satisfied. Jaganath a n v. State , 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ; s ee Hamal v. State , 3 90 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) . The validity o f the stop s hould be determined

“ solely b y analyzing objectively the facts surrounding the event. ” Garcia v. State , 827 S.W.2d 937 , 943 (Tex. C rim. App. 1992) . The proper inquiry “ is not whether appellant was guilty of the7 traffic offense but whether the troop er had a reasonable suspicion that she was. ” Jaganathan , 479 S.W.3d at 247.
An offic er has reasonable suspicion if “ he has specific, articulable fac ts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that

t he per son detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. ” Derichsweiler

v. State , 348 S.W.3 d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) . The standard is objective and disregards the subjective intent of the officer, instead lo oking to wh ether there ex isted “ an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. ” Id

. It requires only “ some minimal level of o bjective justification” for the stop. Hamal , 390 S.W.3d at 306. Whether a n officer had reasonable suspicion is a mi xed questio n of la w and fact s ubject to de novo review on appeal. I d .; Ornelas
v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)

. In determin i ng whether Shuler had reasonable suspicion to stop Doug lass for a
traffic violation under s ection 544.010 (c) , our analysis begins at th e plai n langu age of t he statute.
It pr ovides , in relevant part, that drivers a pproaching an intersection wit h a stop sign “ shall stop at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic
on the intersecting roadway. ” Tex. Transp. Code § 544.010 (c)

. Dougl ass and the State urge different reading s of where, under th e statute, a dr iver is required to stop. Douglass ins ists that the statute requires drivers to stop “ neare st to the point
where th eir view allows them t o make ” a determination as to whether the intersection is clear and

may be entered safely

. He alleges t hat this “ means any stop before the in tersection where [the
d river] can see approachi ng traffic well enough to det ermine if it is safe to use the inters ection

c o mplies with the law. ” T he State, conv ersely, claims, “ There is only one way to read this8 prov i sion: it r e quires a driver to stop at a p oint as close as possible to the inters ecting ro adway without actually entering that r oad way. ”

“ All statutory construct ion questions are questions of law, so we review them de

novo. ” Martin v. State , 635 S.W.3d 6 7 2, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Alfaro

- Jimenez

v. State , 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019))

. T he Tr ansportation Co de is sub ject to

const ruction u nder Chapter 311 of the Governmen t Code, which mandates that “ [w] ords an d phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common

usage , ” un less they have “ acquired a technical or particula r meaning. ” Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 311.011 ; see Tex. Transp. Code § 1.002 ; Lang v. State , 561 S.W.3d 174, 1 8 0 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ( “ We read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. ” ). When interpre ting a statute , we “ se ek to effec tuate the collective intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted t he le gislation. ” Lang , 561 S.W.3d at 179. To do so , “ we look to
the literal text of the s tatute for its meaning. ” Martin , 635 S.W.3d at 677

. “ [W] e m ust ‘ presume
that ever y word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonab ly pos s ible. ’ ” Lang , 561 S.W.3d at 180 (quoting State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 997))

. The statute mu st be read as a whole , and it is presumed that the entire statute is intended to be effective

. Franklin , 579 S.W.3d at 386.
Words not d e f ined in the statute a re used “ in th eir o rdinary and common s ense. ” Avery v. State , 359 S.W.3d 230, 237 ( Tex. Crim. A pp. 2012) ( quoting Prud holm v. State , 333 S.W.3d 590, 594 (Tex. Crim A p p. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Fisk v. State , 574 S.W.3d 917, 926 (Tex.
C r im . App. 2019))

.9 The issue before the Court has be en addressed in an unpublished opinion from our
sist er court. The facts in Cart er v. State , No. 01

- 09

- 010 6 9

- CR, 2010 WL 2650538 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] July 1, 2010 , no pet. ) (mem. op., not designated for publication) , are sim ilar to those of the present case:

[Deputy] Lina sa w a small car pull up to the stop sign and stop. Carter, driving an SUV, al s o pulled up and stopped behind the stopped car. That car then drove thro ugh the intersection. Carter immediately pulled ahead and turned right onto Ninth Street, without stoppin g a second time or wai ting until t he car ahead of him cleared the intersecti o n. Lina agreed with defense counsel that Carter had stopped “one small car length or less than one small car length” from the stop sign, depending on where the car in front of hi m stoppe d.

Id . at *1. Carter was subse qu en tly stopp ed and arrested f or dri v ing while intoxicat ed. Id

. In a

mot ion to suppress, Carter argued that Lina lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him or probabl e

cause t o arrest him for D WI. Id

. E mphasizing th e language “ nearest th e intersectin g road wa y, ”
the appellate court exp lained :
Because the Transportation Code requires a driver to stop at the place “nearest the intersecting roadway” where he can see approaching traffic, and Carter stopped approximately one car length before the stop sign, we hold that the trial court
r easonably could have determined that Lina had probable cause to believe that Carter violated section 544.010(c).

Id

. at *2. Mirroring Douglass ’ pro ffered interpretation here, Carter conten ded that the statute

“ only required [him] to ‘ stop at the place where he had a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway ’ ” a nd not at the stop si gn. Id . at *3. The court rejected Carter ’ s interpretation, adding :
The Transportation Code re quires that a driver sto p in a place w here he has a view of approaching traf f ic on the intersecting roadway. The Transportation Code also, however, requires the driver to stop at the place “nearest the intersecting10 roadway” where he has a view of approach ing traffic. Lina agree d that Carter could see approaching traffic from his position, but Lina also testified that Carter stopped approximately one car length behind the stop sign and drove through the intersection without waiting for the c ar ahead of him to clear it. Carter, t herefore, did not stop at the “place nearest the int e rsecting roadway” where he could see approaching traffic.

Id

. Douglass ’ contention that the C a rter dec ision did not consider his int erpretation
of 544.010 (c) and instead “ me rely a ssumed the statute rea ds the way the S tate suggests ” is

una vailing. Car ter advoca ted for preci sel y the reading advanced by Douglass in the present case. Similarly, his attempt to distinguish Carter owing to the fact that the defendant in that case pull ed into the intersection before the car ahea d had cleared it is unpersuasi ve. The Carter

court ’ s p r obabl e cause holding rested so lely upon a violation of 544.010 ( c ) and not, as Douglass

sugg ests, of s ect ion 545.151. 4 See id

. We conclude that the relevant langua ge of the statu te is not ambigu ous and agree
with the Carter court that a plain

- text reading of the la nguage of section 544.010 (c) , as it pert ains
to inter sections l a cking crosswalks or stop lines, requires a driver both to (1) stop at the place

near est th e intersecting roadway and (2) have a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway. See Tex. Transp. Code § 544.010 ( c)

. “ [ W]here the operator has a vi ew of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway ” is a relative clause that modifies the noun phrase “ p lace
nearest the inter secting roadway

. ” To interpret the statute in the manner Douglas s proposes, by contrast, reads the la ng uage “ nearest the inte rse cting roadway ” ou t of the statu te. Requiring

4 Section 545.151 of the Transportation Code provides in relevant pa rt that a d river approaching an intersection may procee d, after stoppi ng, “ when the inte rsection can b e safely entered without interference or collision with traffic using a different street or roadway. ” Tex. Transp. Code § 545.151.11 drivers to stop neares t t o whe re t heir view allows them to determine whethe r an intersection is
safe to enter d is regards t he statute ’ s w ording. Because we must presume that every word i n t he

sta tu te was used for a purpose and ens ure that each word , phrase, and clause is given e ffect, we
are unable to adopt Dougla ss ’ interpretati on
. See Lang , 561 S.W.3d at 180. G ivi ng full effect to
the lit eral text of th e statute requires more than that a driver merely stop where he or she can see approaching traffic. 5

U nder this interpretation of section 544.010 (c) , the trial court could rea sonably have determined that Shuler had reasonable suspicion to stop Do uglass for a v iol ation of the

statute. Douglass st opped at le ast one car

- length from the intersect ion

— which the office r could have reasonably believed was not “ the plac e nearest the in tersecti ng r oadw ay ”

— and did not stop again prior to entering it

. The trial court ’ s ruling was not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement

. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial co urt did not abuse its discretion in
de nying Douglass ’ motion to suppr ess. We overrul e his sole issue.

CONCLUSION Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Douglass ’ motion to suppress, we affirm the trial co urt ’ s judgments of conviction.

5 Douglass also argues that r equ iring a driver to stop “ at the place nearest the inter secti ng roadway ” i s a s tandard “ ef fec tively impossible to meet ” due to the alleged subject ive nature of
s uch a determination . In somuch as he intends t o suggest that reading the statute as written wo uld lead to absurd consequences th at the Legislature could not have intende d , we reject his ar gument

. See , e.g. , Sessions v. Dimaya , 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1214 (2018) ( observing that “ [m] any perfectly constitutional statutes use imprecise terms ” ).12 ____________ ________________ ______________ Edward Smith , Justice
Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Smith
Af fir med
Filed: February 24, 2022
Do Not Publish