For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Wednesday,

April 26, 2000

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

DEFENSE ACQUISITION

Employing Best Practices

Can Shape Better Weapon

System Decisions

Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the

United States

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management

Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO
Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues the Department of Defense

(DOD) faces in its acquisition of weapon systems and the application of

best practices to help address those issues. With DOD’s annual research,

development, and production spending for weapon systems at about $85

billion—coupled with suggestions from within DOD and the Congress that

it should be substantially higher—the Subcommittee’s oversight of

acquisition policy can have a major impact on the value the taxpayer gets

for that expenditure.

After having done hundreds of reviews of major weapon systems over the

last 20 years, we have seen many of the same problems recur—cost

increases, schedule delays, and performance problems. At your request,

we have undertaken a body of work that examines weapon acquisition

issues from a different, more cross-cutting perspective—one that draws

lessons learned from the best commercial product development efforts to

see if they apply to weapon system development. In the past few years,

leading commercial firms have developed increasingly sophisticated

products in significantly less time and at lower cost. These firms include

the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Bombardier Aerospace,

Caterpillar, Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Hughes Space

and Communications, Motorola Corporation, and 3M. Our work shows

that valuable lessons can be learned from the commercial sector and can

be applied to the development of weapon systems.

My testimony focuses on how best commercial practices help shape

improvements in the way DOD operates and makes decisions through the

weapons acquisition process. Specifically, I will discuss why weapon

system acquisition problems persist and how a process based on best

practices can lead to better weapon system outcomes. These issues have

significant implications for decisions made on individual programs and for

DOD’s larger modernization goals, which I will also discuss.

The pressures of competing for the funds to launch and sustain a weapon

system program create incentives for starting programs too early;

overpromising performance capabilities; and understating expected costs,

schedules, and risks associated with developing and producing the

weapon. Leading commercial firms have adopted a knowledge-based

approach to developing new products that embodies incentives that

encourage realism, candor, and meeting product expectations. Making

sure that new technology is mature—that is, demonstrated that it works—

is the foundation for this approach. DOD’s variances from best

Results in Brief
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

commercial practices result in higher costs, compromised performance,

and questionable cost benefit approaches. A knowledge-based approach

can be used to reshape DOD’s acquisition process. By itself, such a

process will not produce better program outcomes unless it influences the

decisions made on individual weapon systems. If a knowledge-based

acquisition process is put in place and used, there are potential benefits

that transcend individual program outcomes. Specifically, the ability to

execute a program more predictably within cost and schedule estimates

would lessen the need to offset cost increases by disrupting other

modernization programs.

Despite good intentions and some progress, our ongoing reviews of DOD’s

major weapon system acquisitions are showing that significant reforms

have not yet been reflected in the management and decision-making on

individual programs. The flagship systems, as well as many other top

priorities in each of the services, continue to cost significantly more, take

longer to produce, and deliver less than was promised.

The differences in the practices employed by the leading commercial firms

and DOD reflect the different demands imposed on programs by the

environments in which they are managed. Specific practices take root and

are sustained because they help a program succeed in its environment.

The way success and failure are defined for commercial and defense

product developments differs considerably, which creates a different set

of incentives and evokes different behaviors from the people managing the

programs. Attempts at reforming weapon acquisitions have not succeeded

because they did not change these incentives. All of the participants in the

acquisition process play a part in creating incentives. In this context, the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the services’

organizations each play a critical role in getting the better outcomes

sought on major weapon system programs.

The basic management goal for a weapon system program in DOD is

similar to that of a major commercial undertaking: to develop and deliver a

product that meets the customer’s needs. The product development efforts

of leading commercial firms are guided by achieving a sensible balance

among customer needs, product capabilities, and investment resources.

However, the pressures of successfully competing for the funds to start

and sustain a DOD acquisition program make for a much different

business case. Compared with commercial programs, the DOD

environment encourages launching product developments that embody

more technical unknowns and less knowledge about the performance and

production risks they entail. A new weapon system is encouraged to

Persistent Problems

Are Reinforced By the

Current Process
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

possess performance features that significantly distinguish it from other

systems. Consequently, DOD program managers have incentives to

promote performance features and design characteristics that rely on

immature technologies. These managers rely much more on maturing

technology during product development—when attention should be

focused on design and manufacturing—than do commercial programs.

Even though less information about a new product development is

available at the time of launch, the competition for funding requires

detailed projections to be made based on this information. Product

development cannot be launched unless a program’s development and

production cost, as well as timing, coincides with available funding.

Because DOD relies largely on forecasts of cost, schedule, and

performance that are comparatively soft, competing for funds encourages

the estimates to be squeezed into profiles of available funding. Additional

requirements, such as high reliability and maintainability, serve to make

the fit even tighter. As competition for funding will continue throughout

the program’s development, success becomes identified with the ability to

secure the next installment. The risks associated with developing new

technologies and the product together—within tight estimates—have

come to be accepted as standard. Production realities are usually too

distant to have a curbing effect on early technology decisions.

Rewards for discovering and recognizing potential problems early in a

weapon system development are few. Less available knowledge makes it

harder for program managers to say “no” to unreasonable expectations.

Other factors, such as short tenures and career pressures, discourage

program managers from saying no. In contrast with leading commercial

firms, not having attained knowledge—such as the demonstrated maturity

of a technology or a key manufacturing process—can be perceived as

better than knowing that problems exist. For these reasons, the practices

associated with successful commercial ventures are not readily adopted in

DOD.

Leading commercial firms expect that their program managers will deliver

high quality products on time and within budget. Doing otherwise could

result in the customer walking away. Thus, the firms have created an

environment and adopted practices that put their program managers in a

good position to succeed in meeting these expectations. Collectively, these

practices comprise a process that is anchored in knowledge. It is a process

in which technology development and product development are treated

differently and managed separately. The process of developing technology

culminates in discovery—the gathering of knowledge—and must, by its

How a KnowledgeBased Process Can

Lead to Better

Weapons Acquisitions
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

nature, allow room for unexpected results and delays. Leading firms do

not ask their product managers to develop technology.

On the other hand, product development in commercial ventures is a

clearly defined undertaking for which firms insist on having in hand the

technology that meets customers’ needs before starting. The process of

developing a product culminates in delivery, and therefore, gives great

weight to design and production. The firms demand—and receive—

specific knowledge about a new product before production begins. A

program does not go forward unless a strong business case on which the

program was originally justified continues to hold true. This process is

depicted in figure 1.

Figure 1: Knowledge-based Process for Applying Best Practices to the Development of New Products

Such a knowledge-based process is essential to commercial firms getting

better cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. It enables

decisionmakers to be reasonably certain about critical facets of the

product under development when they need it. This knowledge can be

broken down into three knowledge points:

• when a match is made between the customer’s needs and the available

technology;

• when the product’s design meets performance requirements,

• and when the product can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality

targets.

There is a synergy in this process, as the attainment of each successive

knowledge point builds on the preceding one. Metrics gauge when the

requisite level of knowledge has been attained. The result is a product

development process that delivers excellent results in a predictable

manner. On the other hand, in DOD’s current acquisition process,

Technologies

match

requirements

Technology

Development

Product Development Production

Design

performs as

expected

Production can meet

cost, schedule, and

quality targets
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge is attained

concurrently—in the higher cost environment of product development—

throughout the weapon system phases. This process and the knowledge

gathering that takes place is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: DOD’s Current Weapon System Acquisition Cycle

We have reported our findings on best commercial practices to DOD, and

have made recommendations on how they can be applied to weapon

systems. A listing of these reports is included in the appendix. DOD has

agreed with these recommendations and they have been reflected in

DOD’s draft revision of its regulations that guide the acquisition process.

We have incorporated some of the terms from the draft regulations in the

acquisition process outlined in the pages that follow.

As a technology is developed, it moves from a concept to a feasible

invention to a component that must fit onto a product and demonstrate

that it can function as expected. Leading commercial firms do not let a

new technology onto the product development until it reaches this level of

demonstration. To minimize technology development during product

development, leading commercial companies employ disciplined

processes to match requirements with technological capability before the

product development is launched. Prior to launching the product

development program companies confront production realities and

demand proof that the technology will work and can be successfully

Technology and

Requirements Must Match

Before a Program Can Be

Launched

Begin product

development

Program

launch

Production

and Fielding

Knowledge

attainment

Technology

Design

Manufacturing

Concept

Exploration

Engineering and

Manufacturing

Development

Program

Definition and

Risk Reduction
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

produced. The companies bring solid technological knowledge to the

requirements process in the form of current, valid information from

predecessor programs, experienced people, and new technologies that

have been demonstrated to a high level of maturity. In addition, the

companies communicate extensively with customers to match their wants

and needs with the firm’s available technology and with its ability to

manufacture an appropriate product. They have learned not to commit to

new products that outstrip their technological know-how. These practices

stem from their recognition that resolving technology problems in product

development can result in at least a ten-fold cost increase; resolving them

in production could increase costs by a hundred-fold.

Other practices contribute to successfully developing technology. These

are:

• flexibility in both the resources provided and the product’s performance

requirements to allow for the uncertainties of technical progress;

• disciplined paths for technology to take toward inclusion in products, with

strong gatekeepers to decide when to allow it into a product development

program;

• high standards for judging the maturity and readiness of technology;

• the imposition of strict product development cycle times; and

• rules concerning how much innovation can be accepted on a product

before the next generation must be launched.

Collectively, these factors create a healthy environment for developing

technology and making good decisions on what to include in a product.

These practices can be adapted to the front end of DOD’s weapon

acquisition process. They can relieve the pressure to launch programs with

immature technologies and underestimated resources that are

overmatched by requirements. In fact, in some cases because of unique

circumstances, DOD has applied these practices with successful

outcomes. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

matured a revolutionary periscope technology to a very high maturity level

before it was included on the Virginia class attack submarine development

program. To date, this new technology has not caused cost and schedule

problems for the submarine’s development program. More typically,

however, DOD launches programs with immature technologies and does

not get a match between mature technology and the weapon’s

requirements until late in product development. For example, we found

key technologies for the Army’s Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition were at

very low maturity levels when the acquisition program was launched. This

was a significant gap between technology maturity and weapon system
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

requirements that was not closed until well into the program. Problems

with the technologies were a main contributor to the program’s 88-percent

cost growth and 62-percent slip in schedule.

DOD’s current acquisition process begins with a determination that a

military need must be met with a new weapon system. Different concepts

are explored to determine the best type of weapon system to meet the

need. Once the concept has been selected, DOD typically launches the

development program and assigns a program manager responsibility for

formulating the weapon system design and maturing essential

technologies. DOD refers to this phase as program definition and risk

reduction. In applying best practices, we have recommended that DOD not

launch a program until the technologies needed to meet a new weapon’s

requirements are mature. To separate this technology development from

the program, best practices suggest that a technology and concept

maturation phase follow concept exploration and precede program

launch. This and the concept exploration phase are illustrated in figure 3.

Figure 3: Weapon Acquisition Phases That Should Precede Launching A

New Program

Once the concept phase has concluded with selecting a weapon system

concept, such as a satellite, to meet a need, the technology and concept

maturation phase would start. Practices included in this phase are:

• assigning science and technology organizations responsibility for

identifying key technologies and maturing them to acceptable levels;

• developing a preliminary system design;

Need recognized Concept selected

Concept

Exploration

Technology and Concept

Maturation

Technology

matches need
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

• identifying enabling technologies and applying standards for managing and

assessing their maturity using technology readiness levels1;

• using a hybrid organization or some other means to smoothly transition

the responsibility for technologies from science and technology

organizations to the program manager, and

• establishing a baseline set of weapon system requirements, within

reasonable cost and schedule expectations, that can be met with mature

technologies.

These practices would separate technology development from an

acquisition program. They would also result in an established baseline

requirement, a best technical approach, and technologies matured to a

high standard. This would make it possible to achieve a match between

performance requirements and mature technologies—a key knowledge

point—and would enable decisionmakers to not launch a program if the

match was not demonstrated. Given a baseline design, decisionmakers

could also defer unmet requirements and the associated technologies to

future upgrades, allowing technology development to take place in a more

flexible, failure-tolerant environment. Collectively, these practices would

curb incentives to overpromise the capabilities of a new weapon system

and to rely on immature technologies. This would put the program

manager in a better position to succeed once the program is launched.

The decision to launch a major new product development is a watershed

event for leading commercial firms. A product development will not be

launched unless the following elements are present:

• a clear market (customer requirements) exists;

• the firm possesses the technology and engineering capability to design the

product and bring it to market on time;

• the firm can afford the financial investment to develop the product; and

• the product can be manufactured on time, at high quality, and at a cost

that enables an acceptable return on investment.

If the firm does not have confidence in one or more of these elements, it

does not launch the product. On the other hand, if all the elements are

there, the manager of the product development effort is in a good position

1 In our review of best practices for including new technology in products (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July

1999), we applied a scale of technology readiness levels pioneered by the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration and adapted by the Air Force Research Laboratories. These levels have proven

to be reliable indicators of technology maturity and eventual success in product development.

Product Development

Should Deliver a Mature

Design and Key Processes
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

to succeed. The technology needed for the product is proven, the firm has

evidence that it can develop and produce the product as scheduled, and

the venture can be afforded. Time constraints are an important element. If

the product development cannot be completed within a set schedule,

competitors might beat the firm to market and the cost of schedule

overruns would hurt profits. Time constraints are also used to limit the

initial product’s requirements. Another, perhaps more basic, consideration

limits the product development schedule: the amount of time one can

reasonably expect people to drive to a goal like delivering a product. One

commercial executive observed that it is unreasonable to expect people to

focus on a goal (such as production start-up) that is 4 or more years away.

To live within these time constraints and keep innovation alive,

commercial firms have adopted the practice of saving requirements that

cannot be met with proven technologies for the next generation product.

In DOD’s current acquisition process, the decision point that most closely

resembles commercial firms’ product development phase is the

engineering and manufacturing development decision. Although the

decision to launch the weapon system acquisition program has already

been made years earlier, the engineering and manufacturing development

phase represents DOD’s effort to design, test, and begin production of the

new weapon. Its broad scope places an enormous burden on the program

manager. Technologies still must be matured and integrated into a system,

testing conducted, and production processes readied. Although this range

of activities can take 8 to 10 years, the program manager is expected to

develop and be accountable for a precise cost and schedule estimate made

at the decision to go forward with development. Because of their short

tenures, it normally takes several program managers to complete this

phase alone. Consequently, the program manager that commits to the cost

and schedule estimate during the program definition and risk reduction

phase is not the same person responsible for achieving it.

Best practices can be applied to this scope of activities, starting with the

premise that key technologies are matured and matched to a basic set of

user requirements. Best practices suggest a product development phase

consisting of two elements—system integration and system

demonstration—to be completed in 5 years. Leading commercial firms

commit to product development as a single phase that combines both

elements. About midway through product development, they become

certain of the product design’s ability to meet customer requirements,

indicated by having 90 percent of engineering drawings completed. In

addition to this knowledge point, they also have all key production
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

processes under statistical control by the end of product development—

the third knowledge point.2 In applying best practices to DOD, there may

be more discovery—that is, more potential to find the unexpected—when

the individual components and technologies are brought together as a

whole. Thus, a distinct system integration effort makes sense. Similarly,

DOD programs may also have more discovery on production processes,

given the long time spans between programs. Therefore, key production

processes should be demonstrated by the end of system demonstration,

with full process control being achieved during low rate initial production.

Figure 4 illustrates a product development phase incorporating best

practices.

Figure 4: Product Development Phase to Deliver a Mature Design and Key

Processes

The system integration component of this phase is the first point in the

process that vests full responsibility in the program manager, but

recognizes that a fair amount of system-level discovery can still occur

when components and technologies are integrated into a complete

weapon system. Because of this, the program manager should not be held

to precise cost and schedule estimates to complete development and

production because requisite knowledge is absent. Therefore, system

integration activity should be accomplished in a flexible cost and contract

environment. System integration should be used by the program manager

2 Statistical process control is a technique for monitoring production processes to see if they are

consistently producing output that is within the quality standards and tolerances set for the overall

product.

System Integration System Demonstration

Program launch

with mature

technologies

Design is

mature

Product and

processes

demonstrated

5-year Product Development
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

to gather the knowledge necessary to build firm cost and schedule targets

and to firm the weapon’s design. Activities included in this phase are:

• program launch;

• integration of all technologies into a complete system;

• maturation of the system design;

• completion of at least 90 percent of the system’s engineering drawings;

• development of knowledge-based cost and schedule estimates; and

• finalization of the system’s requirements.

System integration should conclude with a critical design review of

engineering drawings and confirmation that the system’s design will meet

requirements—a key knowledge point. It should also result in firm cost

and schedule targets and a final set of requirements for the initial version

of the weapon. Decision-makers should insist on a mature design—

supported with completed engineering drawings—before proceeding to

system demonstration. Having such knowledge at this point in time

contributes to product success.

For example, Boeing had released over 90 percent of the engineering

drawings for its 777-200 airplane half-way through its product

development program. This allowed Boeing to have near certainty that the

design for the 777-200 airplane would meet requirements. On the other

hand, DOD’s C-17 program had released only 56 percent of its engineering

drawings at approximately the same point in development. We estimate

that the C-17 program did not release over 90 percent of its initial drawings

until more than three years later and after 7 production aircraft had been

delivered. The C-17 encountered numerous technical problems in testing

that resulted in redesigns, cost increases, and schedule delays.

I have mentioned the value of setting time constraints for product

development. The leading commercial firms we have visited consciously

limited their development phases, ranging from 18 months to just over 4

years. We have identified a 5-year limit for weapon developments that

reflects both commercial practices and guidance provided by the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics that

weapons should complete development and initial production within 7

years. This would make it possible for DOD to extend the tenure for a

single program manager to the entire product development phase—

providing the manager a more realistic responsibility but with more

accountability. Accordingly, the system integration phase should last no

longer than half—2.5 years—of the product development phase.
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

System demonstration is the point in product development when the

program manager can legitimately commit to firm cost, schedule, and

performance targets within which to deliver the weapon system. In turn,

the program manager should secure a full funding commitment from DOD

fund managers. Included in system demonstration are:

• building of weapon system prototypes;

• test and evaluation of those prototypes; and

• test and evaluation of the key processes used to build them.

Demonstrating the system should conclude with demonstrations of the

product in a realistic environment and of the key manufacturing processes

used to build the product. It should be completed no later than 5 years

after the start of system integration. We believe this activity would make

the program manager and contractor accountable for a low-risk product

development phase with precise cost and schedule targets. It would enable

the use of a tighter, less flexible contract that contains a pricing structure

for which the contractor can be held accountable. At its conclusion,

decisionmakers could make an accurate, informed decision to move from

product development into production.

At the conclusion of product development, leading commercial firms

reach the point at which they know that manufacturing processes will

produce a new product conforming to cost, quality, and schedule targets

before they begin producing a system. Reaching this point means more

than knowing the product can be manufactured; it means that all key

processes are under control, such that the quality, volume, and cost of

their output are proven acceptable. Commercial firms rely on good

supplier relationships, known manufacturing processes, and statistical

process control to achieve this knowledge early. In fact, they have all their

key processes under statistical process control when production begins.

The ability to establish control for key processes before production begins

is the culmination of all the practices employed to identify and reduce risk

and is the final knowledge point. All of the companies we visited agreed

that knowledge about technology and design early in the process makes

the control of processes possible.

In the current weapon acquisition process, DOD breaks production into

two phases—low-rate initial production and full-rate production.

Ostensibly, the purpose of low-rate production is to produce the minimum

quantity of a new weapon for operational tests and establishment of a

production base that allows for an orderly increase to full production

rates. Typically, however, development work is not concluded before lowSuccessful Product

Development Allows a

True Production Focus
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

rate production is started and thus both are done concurrently.

Consequently, significant cost increases that cause schedule and other

problems are not uncommon in early production, and production

processes are often not able to be statistically controlled even when fullrate production begins.

Applying best commercial practices to the production of weapon systems

could relieve the pressures to complete product development concurrently

with low-rate production. If the product design and key manufacturing

processes are fully demonstrated in product development, the scope of

low-rate production can be reduced to building operational test articles

and maturing the production processes. Low-rate production could safely

conclude when a product has met user requirements in operational

conditions and manufacturing processes are under statistical process

control—the third key knowledge point.

Putting all of the pieces together, DOD could adopt a weapon acquisition

process that is knowledge-based and reflects best commercial practices,

as shown in figure 5.

Figure 5: Potential DOD Technology and Product Development Process Incorporating Best Practices

System

Demonstration

Concept

Technology

System

Integration

Low Rate Full Rate

Production

Product Development

(5 years)

Technology Development

Program Launch

(Technologies match

requirements)

Design

performs as

expected

Product and

processes

matched

Production can

meet cost,

schedule, and

quality targets
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

This process centers on the separation of technology development from

product development and the accumulation of technology, design, and

process knowledge measured at key junctures. As I noted earlier, DOD is

currently rewriting its acquisition policy to reflect these concepts among

many other changes. It should be recognized that the acquisition offices

preparing this new policy cannot succeed without the agreement and

cooperation of other key communities that influence the acquisition

process. These include the organizations responsible for writing and

approving weapon system requirements, conducting science and

technology, and programming modernization funds.

While an acquisition policy anchored in best practices principles is

essential to getting better program outcomes, it is the actions taken on

individual programs that determine whether real change will occur. Within

the current process, actions are taken on individual programs that run

counter to policy and compromise sound principles. Yet individual

actions—not policy—communicate the broader message of “what will

work” to others in the process. The real test of a policy that applies best

practices will be the decisions made on individual program launch and

funding decisions. These decisions define what success means in DOD and

what practices contribute to success. Decisions to advance or fund

programs that do not have enough knowledge to meet best practices

standards send signals to managers that not having the necessary level of

knowledge is acceptable.

The principles embodied in policy have proven difficult to apply on

individual programs. Pressing circumstances are invoked as reasons for

making exceptions for the program at hand. Thus, on a case-by case basis,

decisions to approve programs despite knowledge shortfalls or their

failure to live up to advertised expectations can be rationalized in a

number of ways: an urgent threat needs to be met; a production capability

needs to be preserved; despite shortfalls, the new system is more capable

than the one it is replacing; the new system’s problems will be fixed in the

future. The challenge for acquisition participants is to treat individual

program decisions as more than the case at hand. They must weigh and be

accountable for the broader implications of what is acceptable or “what

will work” and be willing to say no to programs that run counter to best

practices. We have made recommendations along these lines to the

Secretary of Defense and the Congress. Acting on them will be key to the

success of an acquisition policy anchored in best practices.

If DOD succeeds in applying knowledge-based practices to the weapons

acquisition process, the benefits transcend the management of individual

Implications of a

Knowledge-Based

Acquisition Process

for the Future
Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

programs. Programs managed using best practices are more likely to be

executed within cost and schedule estimates. This will minimize surprises

in the form of cost and schedule increases that are often accommodated

by disrupting the funding of other programs. Without such disruptions,

DOD can better stabilize its overall modernization effort. Decisionmakers

may be more able to focus on a balanced investment strategy rather than

continue the practice of making decisions about how much each

program’s funding and quantities should be reduced so that all programs

can continue to be funded.

We also believe that the idea of a phased investment strategy for a

program—with contracts tailored for more clearly defined phases of work,

such as technology maturation, system integration, and system

demonstration—can leave the potential for competition open longer, both

across the defense and nondefense industries. Finally, limiting product

development cycle times to 5 years or less would allow for more frequent

assimilation of new technologies into weapon systems, thereby reducing

obsolescence and allowing better management of the industrial base.

Reduced cycle times, coupled with planned upgrades, could make for

more frequent and predictable work in production, where contractors and

the industrial base can profit.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may

have.

For future contact regarding this testimony, please contact Mr. Lou

Rodrigues at (202)512-4842. Individuals making key contributions to this

testimony include Katherine Schinasi, Paul Francis, Michael Sullivan,

Matthew Lea, and Katrina Taylor.

Contact and

Acknowledgments
Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can

Improve Weapon System Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 30, 1999).

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program

Outcomes (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116, Mar. 17, 1999).

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible (GAO/TNSIAD-98-123, Mar. 17, 1998).

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires

Changes in DOD’s Environment (GAO/NSIAD-98-56, Feb. 24, 1998).

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer

Improvements for DOD (GAO/NSIAD-96-162, Aug. 26, 1996).

(707497)

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