For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m.

Thursday,

April 6, 2000

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

COMBATING TERRORISM

Issues in Managing

Counterterrorist Programs

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director

National Security Preparedness Issues

National Security and International Affairs Division

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,

and Emergency Management, Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure, House of

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO
Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss our prior work and observations on

federal efforts to combat terrorism, especially those to prepare for and

respond to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological or

nuclear (CBRN) materials.1 This is an important issue because responding

to a terrorist CBRN attack would require close coordination among federal

agencies (the Departments of Justice, Defense, the Federal Emergency

Management Agency and others), as well as with state and local agencies.

In addition, the amount of federal spending for combating terrorism has

risen significantly to $11 billion as requested in the President’s fiscal year

2001 budget. With so many players and so many resources at stake, good

management of these programs is both a challenge and an imperative. For

more than 3 years we have evaluated and reported on a number of issues

concerning federal programs and activities to combat terrorism. A list of

related GAO products appears at the end of this statement.

My testimony will first discuss the need to link threats to strategies and

resources in federal efforts to combat terrorism. The second issue I will

discuss is the need to improve federal and state inter-governmental

coordination and program issues. Finally, at your request, I will comment

on the Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response

Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction—better

known as the Gilmore Panel because its chairman is James S. Gilmore, III,

Governor of Virginia.

One of the major deficiencies in federal efforts to combat terrorism is the

lack of linkage between the terrorist threat, a national strategy, and agency

resources. Much of the federal efforts to combat terrorism have been

based upon vulnerabilities rather than an analysis of credible threats. For

example, agencies have used and are still using improbable “worst case

scenarios” to plan and develop programs. While there has been a major

effort to develop a national strategy, to date the strategy does not include a

clear desired outcome to be achieved. Resources to combat terrorism have

increased in terms of both budgets and programs. These increased

resources have not been clearly linked to a threat analysis and we have

found cases where some agency initiatives appear at odds with the

judgments of the intelligence community. This situation also creates the

1 For purposes of this testimony, I will use the term CBRN instead of the more common but less

precise term “weapons of mass destruction.” While some agencies define weapons of mass destruction

to only include chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, others define it to include large

conventional explosives.

Summary
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

potential for agencies to develop their own programs without adequate

coordination, leaving the potential for gaps and/or duplication. Efforts to

track and coordinate federal spending across agencies have started, but

they have only begun to tackle the important task of prioritizing programs.

We have recommended, and the executive branch has agreed to,

conducting threat and risk assessments to improve federal efforts to

combat terrorism. Specifically, such assessments could be an important

step to develop a national strategy and to target resources.

The federal government cannot prepare for CBRN incidents on its own.

Several improvements are also warranted in intergovernmental relations

between federal, state and local governments. For example, we found that

federal agencies developed some of their assistance programs without

coordinating them with existing state and local emergency management

structures. In addition, the multitude of federal assistance programs has

led to confusion on the part of state and local officials. One step to

improve coordination and reduce confusion has been the creation of the

National Domestic Preparedness Office within the Department of Justice

to provide “one stop shopping” to state and local officials in need of

assistance. This office has recently prepared a draft plan on how it will

provide assistance. Another intergovernmental issue requiring resolution

is the matter of command and control at the site of a terrorist incident.

Roles of the federal government versus the state and local governments

need to be further clarified to prevent confusion. The federal government

is making some progress in addressing these command and control issues

through exercises. Federal exercises, in contrast to earlier years, are now

practicing crisis and consequence management simultaneously and

including state and local participation.

Finally, the Gilmore Panel report found many of the same problems that

we have been reporting on, such as the need for (1) more rigorous

analyses of the threat, (2) better management of federal programs, (3)

improvements in coordination with state and local officials, and (4) a

national strategy to combat terrorism. In addition, the report raises some

interesting points for Congress to consider in the future as it oversees

federal programs to combat terrorism.

Two Presidential Decisions Directives—number 39 issued in June 1995

and number 62 issued in May 1998—define U.S. policy to combat

terrorism. These presidential directives and implementing guidance divide

the federal response to terrorist attacks into two categories—crisis

management and consequence management. Crisis management includes

efforts to stop a terrorist attack, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for

criminal prosecution. Consequence management includes efforts to

Background
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from

dangerous areas, and restore government services. The presidential

directives also organize federal efforts to combat terrorism along a lead

agency concept. The Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), is the lead federal agency for crisis management of

domestic terrorist incidents. For managing the consequences of domestic

terrorist incidents, state and local authorities are primarily responsible.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal

agency for consequence management if state or local authorities request

federal assistance.

Congress, concerned about federal programs to combat terrorism, created

the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, better known as the

Gilmore Panel.2 The Panel was chartered to examine federal, state, and

local preparedness, response, and funding issues for responding to

terrorist attacks involving CBRN materials.

A well-organized and efficient national counterterrorism program starts

with a rigorous assessment of the terrorist threat the United States faces.

Included in the analysis should be a clear examination on the

qualifications to that threat. Adjusted threat scenarios would feed a risk

analysis for use in developing a strategy. A strategy should have a desired

outcome to attempt to achieve and to measure progress against. Resource

decisions should be based on both a threat and risk assessment, and a

strategy with a clear desired outcome.

Intelligence agencies continuously assess the foreign and domestic

terrorist threats to the United States. The U.S. foreign intelligence

community, which includes the Central Intelligence Agency and others,

monitors the foreign-origin terrorist threat to the United States. In

addition, the FBI gathers intelligence and assesses the threat posed by

domestic sources of terrorism. According to the U.S. intelligence

community, conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the

weapons of choice for terrorists. The FBI reports an increasing number of

domestic cases involving U.S. persons attempting or threatening to use

such materials. The intelligence community also reports an increased

possibility that terrorists may use CBRN agents in the next decade.

2 The Panel was established in the Strom Thurman National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1999 (Public Law 105-261, Section 1405).

Linking Threats to

Strategies to

Resources

Assessing the Terrorist

Threat
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

What is important about intelligence agency threat assessments is the very

critical distinction between what is conceivable or possible and what is

likely in terms of the threat of a terrorist attack. Some of the public

statements made by intelligence community officials about the terrorist

CBRN threat do not include important qualifications to the information

they present. Based upon our reading of the classified threat documents,

such as national intelligence estimates, such qualifications include the

fidelity and amount of credible intelligence, the terrorists’ intentions

versus their capabilities, whether the target is military or civilian, whether

the target is international or domestic, and whether the enemy is a

government or terrorists without foreign government sponsorship.

Terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational

challenges to successfully make and release chemical or biological agents

of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people

without substantial assistance from a foreign government sponsor. In most

cases, specialized knowledge is required in the manufacturing process and

in improvising an effective delivery device for most chemical and nearly all

biological agents that could be used in terrorist attacks. Moreover, some of

the required components of chemical agents and highly infective strains of

biological agents are difficult to obtain. Finally, terrorists may have to

overcome other obstacles to successfully launch an attack that would

result in mass casualties, such as unfavorable meteorological or

environmental conditions and personal safety risks.

These types of qualifications are important because, without them,

decisionmakers in both the executive or legislative branch, may get an

exaggerated view of the terrorist threat, particularly as it relates to CBRN

materials.

In a prior report, we have recommended that the federal government

conduct sound threat and risk assessments to define and prioritize

requirements and properly focus programs and investments in combating

terrorism.3 The critical first step in a sound threat and risk assessment

process is the threat analysis. The analysis should identify and evaluate

each threat in terms of capability and intent to attack an asset, the

likelihood of a successful attack, and its consequences. The result of this

analysis should be a list of potential terrorist attack scenarios. Next the

3 Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program

Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998)

Understanding

Qualifications to the

Terrorist Threat

Need for Threat and Risk

Assessment
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

risk assessment should be a deliberate, analytical effort that results in a

prioritized list of risks (i.e., threat-asset-vulnerability combinations) that

can be used to select countermeasures to create a certain level of

protection or preparedness.

Without the benefits that a threat and risk assessment provides, many

agencies have been relying on worst case scenarios to generate

countermeasures or establish their programs. Worst case scenarios are

extreme situations and, as such, may be out of balance with the threat. In

our view, by using worst case scenarios, the federal government is

focusing on vulnerabilities (which are unlimited) rather than credible

threats (which are limited). By targeting investments based on worst case

scenarios, the government may be over funding some initiatives and

programs and under funding the more likely threats the country will face.

As an example, we have testified that the Department of Health and

Human Services is establishing a national pharmaceutical and vaccine

stockpile that does not match intelligence agencies’ judgments of the more

likely chemical and biological agents that terrorists might use.4 In some of

our current work at other federal agencies, we are continuing to find that

worst case scenarios are being used in planning efforts to develop

programs and capabilities.

As you know, we have recommended that the threat and risk assessments

be conducted at the local level as a tool to target federal assistance

programs. In addition, since we last testified before this Subcommittee, we

also recommended that the FBI perform a national-level threat and risk

assessment.5 The FBI has agreed in principle with our recommendations

and FBI officials recently updated us on their progress. Regarding local

threat and risk assessments, the FBI and the Department of Justices’

Office of Justice Programs are about to send out threat and risk

assessment information for local governments to use. The local

jurisdictions will then send their assessments to their respective state

governments to compile and analyze. The state governments will use the

findings to develop a state-wide domestic preparedness strategy. The FBI

has agreed to lead a national level threat and risk assessment, but has

noted certain limitations. For example, because of the restrictions it faces

on the use of law enforcement intelligence information, its efforts will first

concentrate on the threats posed by various CBRN agents, as opposed to

4 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/TNSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16,1999).

5 Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and

Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sep. 7, 1999)
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

threats posed by specific terrorist groups. The FBI would then combine

this with threat information in a classified assessment. The FBI officials

did not have an estimate as to when they would formally begin their

national assessment, but they estimated it would take about 6 months.

We also believe there needs to be a federal or national strategy on

combating terrorism which has a clear desired outcome. Such an outcome

would provide a goal to be achieved and allow measurement of progress

toward that goal. The Attorney General’s December 1998, classified 5-year

interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crime represents a

substantial interagency effort to develop a federal government

counterterrorism strategy. The plan includes goals, objectives, and

performance indicators and recommends that specific actions be taken to

resolve interagency problems and issues it identified and assigns relative

priorities to the actions. However, the plan does not have a clear desired

outcome that would be useful to establish requirements and priorities. The

plan also does not link its recommended actions and priorities to budget

resources, although it states that the agencies hope to improve the link

between the plan and resources in subsequent updates. While we hoped to

provide you with new information on this plan since our last testimony,

the first update to the original plan had not been released at the time we

prepared this statement.

Once threat and risks have been assessed and a strategy has been

developed, agencies can target programs and spending appropriately. The

threat and risk assessment, and the development of a strategy are

particularly important given the rapid increase in federal programs and

spending. For example, we have reported on a proliferation of potentially

duplicative programs and initiatives across several agencies to provide

training and/or equipment related to CBRN terrorist attacks to first

responders—the local police, fire, and emergency personnel that would

first respond to the incident.6 Similarly, multiple equipment programs were

causing frustration and confusion at the local level and were resulting in

further complaints that the federal government is unfocused and has no

coordinated plan or desired outcome for domestic preparedness.

Paralleling the growth in federal training and equipment programs, federal

response elements have also expanded and increased. Individual agencies’

initiatives include adding teams or capabilities that can (1) identify and

6 Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and

Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Developing a Strategy With

a Desired Outcome

Linking Resources to the

Threat and Strategy
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

analyze CBRN agents; (2) contain or handle the weapon, device, or area of

an incident; and (3) provide medical support or response for dealing with

potential casualties of an incident.

In addition to reporting on the increase in the number of programs, we

have testified twice on the rapid increase in federal funding to combat

terrorism.7 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported 1998

actual spending at $7.658 billion consisting of $5.871 billion for combating

terrorism, $.645 billion for combating weapons of mass destruction and

$1.142 billion for critical infrastructure protection. The President’s budget

request for fiscal year 2001 totals $11.117 billion consisting of $7.538

billion for combating terrorism, $1.552 billion for combating weapons of

mass destruction and $2.027 billion for critical infrastructure protection.

As proposed in the President’s budget request, total funding would

increase about 45 percent from 1998 to 2001, with component increases of

about 28 percent for combating terrorism, about 140 percent for

combating weapons of mass destruction, and about 77 percent for critical

infrastructure protection. As noted in our earlier work, funding has

increased dramatically at the Departments of Health and Human Services,

Justice, and at the FBI.

In those testimonies, we reported positively on OMB’s efforts to track

budgeting and spending by counterterrorist and CBRN programs. We

believe that the OMB reports on governmentwide spending and budgeting

to combat terrorism are a significant step toward improved management

and coordination of the complex and rapidly growing programs and

activities. Through these reports, the executive branch and Congress have

strategic oversight of the magnitude and direction of federal funding for

this priority national security and law enforcement concern. The OMB

reports to date, however, do not clearly or explicitly describe any

established priorities or duplication of efforts as called for in legislation.8

At the time we prepared this statement, OMB had not released its detailed

spending report for fiscal year 2000. However, OMB officials told us that

they are now collecting detailed programmatic data from each agency,

which will be useful for comparing agencies and analyzing trends. We

7 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD99-107, Mar. 11, 1999) and Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999)

8 The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998 required that OMB establish a system for

collecting and reporting information on executive agencies’ spending and budgets for combating

terrorism (Section 1051 of Public Law 105-85, November 18, 1997). The legislation also required OMB

to submit an annual report to Congress detailing, among other things, any established priorities or

duplication.
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

continue to be hopeful that OMB’s efforts will provide useful information

for prioritizing and targeting resources.

Responders at all levels of potential terrorist attacks must continue to

resolve intergovernmental issues. For example, the multiplicity of federal

assistance programs requires focus and attention to minimize redundancy

of efforts and eliminate confusion at the recipient level. Based on the

concerns of local officials, a single federal office acts as a clearinghouse.

However, command and control roles at incident sites are still unclear

under the current operational environment. To some extent, these issues

can be explored and resolved through exercises that simultaneously

practice crisis and consequence management and that include state and

local participants.

There is still a need to better focus and coordinate federal programs to

assist state and local governments prepare for terrorist CBRN attacks. For

example, while local officials have praised federal CBRN training

programs, some of the initial programs failed to leverage existing state and

local response mechanisms. Further, some local officials have viewed the

growing number of CBRN training programs as evidence of a fragmented

and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism. For

example, at about the same time the Department of Defense was

developing its Domestic Preparedness Program courses, FEMA and the

Department of Justice were jointly developing a similar or potentially

overlapping 2-day basic concepts course on emergency response to

terrorism. Similarly, multiple programs for equipment—such as the

separate DOD and Public Health Service programs and the new

Department of Justice equipment grant program—are causing frustration

and confusion at the local level and are resulting in further complaints that

the federal government is unfocused and has no coordinated plan or

desired outcome for domestic preparedness.

A major federal initiative to provide better focus and to coordinate federal

assistance programs is the National Domestic Preparedness Office. The

Office, which was recently funded in the Consolidated Appropriations Act

for Fiscal Year 2000, is just getting organized.9 The Office will function as

an interagency forum to coordinate federal policy and program assistance

for state and local emergency responders. For instance, the Office will

assess federal training programs to eliminate duplication and ensure that

9 Public Law 106-113, November 29, 1999. The Conference Report on this legislation is House Report

106-479, Nov. 18, 1999.

Addressing

Intergovernmental

Issues

Focusing and Coordinating

Federal Assistance

Programs
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

the training adheres to minimum national standards. It is to coordinate

and serve as an information clearinghouse for federal programs devoted to

supporting state and local emergency responder communities in the area

of CBRN-related domestic preparedness planning, training, exercises, and

equipment research and development. However, the Office will not have

veto power over any agency’s programs, so its authorities to actually

prevent or stop duplicate programs will be limited.

Since our last testimony before this Subcommittee, the National Domestic

Preparedness Office has drafted an action plan. According to the plan, the

Office will focus on (1) identifying existing needs assessment tools, (2)

cataloging all federal domestic preparedness training, (3) verifying that

federal domestic preparedness training initiatives meet the applicable

standards, (4) identifying existing training delivery systems and coordinate

among federal agencies, (5) coordinating the development of sustainment

CBRN training for emergency responders, and (6) facilitating the

incorporation of lessons learned into training curriculums. As requested

by this subcommittee, we plan to obtain updated information on the

National Domestic Preparedness Office and report back to you.

Another intergovernmental issue requiring attention is the issue of

command and control between the federal and state and/or local

governments for crisis management. Except in cases where a terrorist

attack occurred on a federal property (e.g., a military base), local first

responders would initially be in charge. For example, a CBRN incident

involving chemical agents would look like a major hazardous materials

emergency and the local fire chief would usually be the incident

commander. Local officials have expressed concerns about potential

problems if the federal government tries to take over a state and/or local

response already in progress. For example, an Oklahoma City official

testified before this Subcommittee last year that a well-coordinated

response to the Oklahoma City bombing was in progress but that

relationships strained when federal teams arrived from outside the area.10

She stated that there needs to be a uniform command and control

protocol. The emergence of more federal response elements and

capabilities (as discussed earlier) will further increase the challenge for

the federal government to provide a well-coordinated response in support

of a state or local incident commander. For example, FBI officials have

expressed concerns about a conflict between certain DOD teams and their

10 Testimony of Ann Simank, Council Member, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on behalf of the National

League of Cities Before the House Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency

Management, June 9, 1999.

Clarifying Command and

Control at Incidents
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

own Hazardous Materials Response Unit or other federal assets, if all

arrive with the same capabilities and try to give advice to the incident

commander.

This ambiguity over command of an incident is exacerbated by the

separation of crisis management and consequence management. For

terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, two separate federal agencies lead these

activities—the FBI leads crisis management and FEMA leads consequence

management. While the FBI would likely be in command (i.e., leading state

and/or local officials) for the crisis management, FEMA is always in

support of the state and/or local officials for consequence management.

When terrorist attacks occur without adequate threat warning, crisis

response and consequence management will be concurrent activities. This

complicates unity of command because half of the response (crisis

management) will be led by the federal government, and half of the

response (consequence management) will be led by the state and/or local

government.

We found that federal agencies are working to clarify command and

control issues through exercises. Exercises test and validate policies and

procedures, test the effectiveness of response capabilities, and increase

the confidence and skill level of personnel. In addition, exercises identify

strengths and weaknesses before they arise in an actual incident. In

combating terrorism, where operations are inherently interagency and

intergovernmental matters, exercises also allow the various agencies’

personnel to become familiar with the others’ missions and procedures

and learn to coordinate and operate together.

We have observed progress in intergovernmental exercises. In our review

of federal counterterrorist exercises from 1995-98, we found that 69 of 201

exercises (or 34 percent) were intergovernmental—they included state

and local authorities such as police and fire departments.11 However, we

also found that domestic crisis response exercises led by federal law

enforcement agencies did not include many of the state, and local

authorities that would be needed to effectively respond, or the entire

range of activities required to respond to a terrorist crisis. We did note

some improvements as we issued that report in 1999. The FBI began

taking steps to enhance its program and said they viewed participation by

state and local agencies as a top priority as it continued to plan and

11 Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises (GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR, June

25,1999).

Exercises Helping to

Clarify Command and

Control Issues
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

execute counterterrorist exercises. FBI officials noted that staffing and

budget considerations or restrictive union contracts sometimes hinder

state and local participation in federal exercises.

We have also observed increased efforts to conduct exercises that

simulate crisis management and consequence management together.

During our review of federal counterterrorist exercises, we found that

domestic crisis management exercises always ended in the successful

tactical resolution of the incidents and did not include more likely

scenarios where terrorist attacks were successful or occurred without

adequate threat warning. Thus, the full gamut of interagency response

activities was not tested. For example, in the 3 years following Presidential

Decision Directive 39, the FBI did not conduct or participate in a field

exercise that simulated the concurrence of crisis and consequence

management to deal with a major terrorist incident. However, other

agencies did lead exercises that focused on both crisis and consequence

management. While there were none in the first year after PDD-39, there

were 2 exercises in the second year and 33 exercises in the third year that

included both crisis management and consequence management.

The Gilmore Panel issued its first report late last year and it focused

primarily on assessing the threat of CBRN terrorism.12 There are two

aspects of the Panel that we view as very positive. First, by having a 3-year

mandate, the Panel can delve into the issues more deeply and reassess its

work as well as monitor federal programs as they develop. Secondly, the

Panel includes several members from state and local governments, which

will provide an important perspective to federal decisionmakers. As

discussed below, there are many areas where the Panel’s conclusions are

very similar to our findings. In addition, Panel raised some other important

points that Congress might want to study further.

Our work over the last 3 years—much of it summarized earlier in this

statement—has identified a number of areas requiring improvements to

federal programs to combat terrorism. The Gilmore Panel, through its own

analysis, found many of the same deficiencies. Specific examples of the

Panel’s findings with which we have identified similar problems are as

follow:

12 First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic

Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, I. Assessing the Threat,

December 15, 1999.

Comments on the

Gilmore Panel Report

GAO and Gilmore Panel

Find Many Similar

Deficiencies
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

• Federal programs addressing terrorism appear, in many cases, to be

fragmented, overlapping, lacking focus, and uncoordinated.

• A terrorist group would face many difficulties in acquiring or developing

and delivering a device with the capability to cause mass casualties.

• The United States should reconsider the “worst case scenario”

assessments that have dominated domestic preparedness planning for

CBRN terrorism.

• There should be a comprehensive and articulate assessment of potential

credible terrorist threats as part of a risk and vulnerability assessment.

• It is not always clear “who is in charge” at the federal and state or local

level when an incident occurs.

• There should be agreed-upon templates for local to federal handoffs of

command and control, and these should be exercised in advance.

• A national strategy—beyond the existing Attorney General’s Five Year

Plan –-is needed to address domestic preparedness and CBRN terrorism.

The Gilmore Panel also raises some points that this Subcommittee and

Congress as a whole may want to study further. We have not taken specific

positions on these issues in our past reports, but believe they are worth

mentioning in our testimony.

• The Panel concluded that there is ambiguity and lack of consensus on

definitions for terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, mass casualties,

and other terms that federal programs are being built around. Therefore,

some common terms of reference would enhance communication and

coordination among the federal agencies.

• The Panel concluded that the most likely terrorist attacks will involve

large explosives. Therefore, more attention to these types of incidents

would enhance overall preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks.

• The Panel concluded that congressional decisions for authority and

funding to address the issue appear to be uncoordinated. They suggested

that Congress consider forming an ad hoc Joint Special or Select

Committee to provide more efficiency and effectiveness in Federal efforts.

Madame Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I would be

happy to answer any questions at this time.

Other Issues Raised in the

Gilmore Panel Report
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

For additional questions about this testimony, please contact Norman J.

Rabkin, Director for National Security Preparedness Issues, National

Security and International Affairs Division at (202) 512-5140. Individuals

making key contributions to this testimony include Stephen L. Caldwell

and George M. Delgado.

GAO Contacts and

Staff

Acknowledgments
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are

Poorly Managed (GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 29, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological

Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, Oct. 20, 1999).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to Assure

Security of Federal Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-00-7, Oct. 6,1999).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year

2000 Experiences (GAO/AIMD-00-1, Oct. 1, 1999).

Information Security: The Proposed Computer Security Enhancement Act of

1999 (GAO/T-AIMD-99-302, Sept. 30, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of

Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 7, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises

(GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR, June 25, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/TNSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment

and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear

(GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist

Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health

Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism

(GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic

Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-

164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and

Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better

Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy

and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

(702060)
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