II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 687 

To advance a policy for managed strategic competition with the People’s 

Republic of China. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 10, 2021 

Mr. RISCH (for himself, Mr. ROMNEY, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. 

ROUNDS, Mr. WICKER, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. HAGERTY, and Mr. PORTMAN) 

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To advance a policy for managed strategic competition with 

the People’s Republic of China. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Strengthening Trade, 

5 Regional Alliances, Technology, and Economic and Geo6 political Initiatives concerning China Act’’ or the ‘‘STRA7 TEGIC Act’’. 

8 SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

9 The table of contents for this Act is as follows: 


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Sec. 1. Short titles. 

Sec. 2. Table of contents. 

Sec. 3. Definitions. 

TITLE I—A COMPREHENSIVE CHINA POLICY 

Sec. 101. Findings. 

Sec. 102. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 103. Sense of Congress. 

TITLE II—PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES FROM CHINA’S 

DISCRIMINATORY ECONOMIC PRACTICES 

Sec. 201. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC’s industrial policy. 

Sec. 202. Intellectual property violators list. 

Sec. 203. Government of the People’s Republic of China subsidies list. 

Sec. 204. Review of petitions related to intellectual property theft and forced 

technology transfer. 

Sec. 205. Predatory pricing by entities owned, controlled, or directed by a foreign state. 

Sec. 206. Reporting on requests to comply with the corporate social credit system in the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 207. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United States 

capital markets. 

TITLE III—REINVESTING IN AMERICAN AND ALLIED 

TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITIVENESS 

Sec. 301. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners. 

Sec. 302. Authorization to assist United States companies with supply chain diversification and management. 

Sec. 303. Scientific and private sector advisory panel on protection of critical 

technologies. 

Sec. 304. Establishment of a tech coalition. 

Sec. 305. United States representation in standards-setting bodies. 

TITLE IV—SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 

Sec. 401. Amendment to Foreign Agent Registration Act regarding gifts made 

to universities. 

Sec. 402. Designation of a country of national security concern in the Foreign 

Agent Registration Act. 

Sec. 403. Ban on Senate-confirmed Department of State officials representing 

countries of national security concern. 

Sec. 404. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act. 

TITLE V—MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL 

ORGANIZATIONS 

Sec. 501. Office of Integrity in the United Nations system. 

TITLE VI—BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND ALLIED DEFENSE 

AND SECURITY 

Sec. 601. Findings. 


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Sec. 602. Statement of policy expressing the political will of the United States 

to defend its interests in the Indo-Pacific and pursue expanded 

political-military cooperation with allies and partners. 

Sec. 603. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships in the 

Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 604. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners. 

Sec. 605. Statement of policy on unmanned aerial systems and the missile technology control regime. 

Sec. 606. Report on national technology and industrial base. 

Sec. 607. Authorization of appropriations for Southeast Asia maritime security 

programs and diplomatic outreach activities. 

Sec. 608. Report on China Coast Guard. 

Sec. 609. Report on Chinese military activity in Djibouti. 

Sec. 610. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of United 

Nations sanctions on North Korea. 

TITLE VII—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY 

Sec. 701. Findings on strategic security and arms control. 

Sec. 702. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue. 

Sec. 703. Agreements. 

1 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese 

4 Communist Party. 

5 (2) CENTRALLY ADMINISTERED, STATE-OWNED

6 ENTERPRISE.—The term ‘‘centrally administered, 

7 state-owned enterprise’’ means any company that 

8 previously was or currently is— 

9 (A)(i) incorporated in the PRC; and 

10 (ii) supervised and managed by the State11 owned Assets Supervision and Administration 

12 Commission of the State Council of the PRC; 

13 or 

14 (B) an owned or controlled subsidiary of 

15 an enterprise meeting the requirements under 

16 subparagraph (A). 


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1 (3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The 

2 terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean 

3 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China. 

4 (4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and 

5 ‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China. 

6 TITLE I—A COMPREHENSIVE 

7 CHINA POLICY 

8 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

9 Congress makes the following findings: 

10 (1) The People’s Republic of China has in11 creased its political, diplomatic, economic, military, 

12 technological, and ideological power to become a 

13 strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United 

14 States. The policies increasingly pursued by the 

15 PRC in each of these domains are contrary to the 

16 interests and values of the United States, its part17 ners, and much of the rest of the world. 

18 (2) The current competition between the United 

19 States and the PRC— 

20 (A) is taking place over the future char21 acter of the international order; 

22 (B) will shape the rules, norms, and insti23 tutions that govern relations among states in 

24 the coming decades; 


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1 (C) will determine the ability of the United 

2 States to secure its national interests; and 

3 (D) will determine future levels of peace, 

4 prosperity, and freedom for the United States 

5 and the international community in the coming 

6 decades. 

7 (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with 

8 the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked 

9 to advance the PRC’s economic and social develop10 ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefitted 

11 from, the free and open international order. The 

12 United States pursued these goals and contributed 

13 to the welfare of the Chinese people by— 

14 (A) increasing the PRC’s trade relations 

15 and access to global capital markets; 

16 (B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the 

17 World Trade Organization; 

18 (C) providing development finance and 

19 technical assistance; 

20 (D) promoting research collaboration; 

21 (E) educating the PRC’s top students; 

22 (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 

23 technologies and scientific knowledge; and 

24 (G) providing intelligence and military as25 sistance. 


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1 (4) It is now clear that the PRC has no inten2 tion of reforming politically or economically. Instead, 

3 it is pursuing state-led, mercantilist economic poli4 cies, increasing restrictions on personal freedoms, 

5 and implementing an aggressive and assertive for6 eign policy. These policies frequently and delib7 erately undermine United States interests and are 

8 contrary to core United States values and the values 

9 of other nations, both in the Indo-Pacific and be10 yond. In response to this strategic decision of the 

11 PRC, the United States was compelled to reexamine 

12 and revise its strategy towards the PRC. 

13 (5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Com14 munist Party and the President of the People’s Re15 public of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the ‘‘Great 

16 Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’’ as central to 

17 the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His pro18 gram demands— 

19 (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership; 

20 (B) concentration of military power; 

21 (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state 

22 and the economy; 

23 (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking 

24 control over broadly asserted territorial claims; 

25 and 


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1 (E) the denial of any universal values and 

2 individual rights that are deemed to threaten 

3 the CCP. 

4 (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of gov5 ernance, ‘‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’’, as 

6 superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional 

7 models of the United States and other democracies. 

8 This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP 

9 as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a global 

10 leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 

11 2013 speech, President Xi said, ‘‘We firmly believe 

12 that as socialism with Chinese characteristics devel13 ops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superi14 ority of our socialist system will be increasingly ap15 parent . . . [and] our country’s road of development 

16 will have increasingly greater influence on the 

17 world.’’. 

18 (7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish 

19 regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to 

20 use that dominant position to propel the PRC to be21 come the ‘‘leading world power’’. The PRC seeks to 

22 shape an international order that is conducive to the 

23 interests of authoritarian and autocratic regimes. 

24 Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC 

25 into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using 


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1 a strong military and advanced technological capa2 bility to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of 

3 other countries’ interests. 

4 (8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter5 national order, which was built upon free and open 

6 ideals and principles, by conducting global informa7 tion and influence operations, redefining inter8 national laws and norms to align with the objectives 

9 of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy of internation10 ally recognized human rights, and securing leader11 ship positions in multinational organizations to alter 

12 their agendas. In December 2018, President Xi sug13 gested that the CCP views its ‘‘historic mission’’ as 

14 not only to govern China, but also to profoundly in15 fluence global governance to benefit the CCP. 

16 (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to 

17 follow its model of ‘‘socialism with Chinese charac18 teristics’’. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, 

19 President Xi said that the PRC could serve as a 

20 model of development for other countries by utilizing 

21 ‘‘Chinese wisdom’’ and a ‘‘Chinese approach to solv22 ing problems’’. 

23 (10) The PRC is promoting its governance 

24 model and attempting to weaken other models of 

25 governance by— 


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1 (A) undermining democratic institutions; 

2 (B) subverting financial institutions; 

3 (C) coercing businesses to accommodate 

4 the policies of the CCP; and 

5 (D) using disinformation to disguise the 

6 nature of the actions described in subpara7 graphs (A) through (C). 

8 (11) The PRC is getting close to its goal of be9 coming the global leader in science and technology. 

10 In May 2018, President Xi said that for the PRC 

11 to reach ‘‘prosperity and rejuvenation’’, it needs to 

12 ‘‘endeavor to be a major world center for science and 

13 innovation’’. The PRC has invested the equivalent of 

14 billions of dollars into education and research and 

15 development and established joint scientific research 

16 centers and science universities. Scientists and schol17 ars from the PRC have made numerous contribu18 tions to a wide array of fields, including through 

19 international partnerships. 

20 (12) The PRC’s drive, however, to become a 

21 ‘‘manufacturing and technological superpower’’ and 

22 to promote ‘‘innovation with Chinese characteristics’’ 

23 is coming at the expense of human rights, national 

24 security, and longstanding international rules and 

25 norms about economic competition. In particular, 


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1 the PRC advances its illiberal political and social 

2 policies through mass surveillance, social credit sys3 tems, and a significant role of the state in internet 

4 governance. Through these means, the PRC in5 creases direct and indirect government control over 

6 its citizens’ everyday lives. Its national strategy of 

7 ‘‘civil-military fusion’’ mandates that civil and com8 mercial research, which increasingly drives global in9 novation, is leveraged to develop new military capa10 bilities. 

11 (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means 

12 to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing 

13 and technological superpower. The PRC uses state14 directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to 

15 ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP 

16 engages in and encourages actions that actively un17 dermine a free and open international market, such 

18 as intellectual property theft, forced technology 

19 transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and 

20 mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part 

21 of business and commercial agreements between Chi22 nese and foreign companies. 

23 (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) 

24 freeze United States and other foreign firms out of 

25 the PRC market, while eroding competition in other 


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1 important markets. The heavy subsidization of Chi2 nese companies includes potential violation of its 

3 World Trade Organization commitments. In May 

4 2018, President Xi said that the PRC aims to keep 

5 the ‘‘initiatives of innovation and development secu6 rity . . . in [China’s] own hands’’. 

7 (15) The PRC advances its global objectives 

8 through a variety of avenues, including its signature 

9 initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to 

10 in this section as ‘‘BRI’’), which is enshrined in the 

11 Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk 

12 Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes 

13 BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan 

14 for all countries. In practice, it seeks to advance an 

15 economic system with the PRC at its center, making 

16 it the most concrete geographical representation of 

17 the PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the eco18 nomic influence of state-owned Chinese firms in 

19 global markets, enhances the PRC’s political lever20 age with government leaders around the world, and 

21 provides greater access to strategic nodes such as 

22 ports and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks 

23 political deference through economic dependence. 

24 (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish 

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1 place the United States from the region. As a Pa2 cific power, the United States has built and sup3 ported enduring alliances and economic partnerships 

4 that secure peace and prosperity and promote the 

5 rule of law and political pluralism in the Pacific. In 

6 contrast, the PRC uses economic and military coer7 cion in the region to secure the interests of the CCP. 

8 (17) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep 

9 the United States military from operating in the 

10 Western Pacific and erodes United States security 

11 guarantees. 

12 (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclu13 sive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air 

14 space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually 

15 exercising greater influence beyond the region. This 

16 includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy 

17 exploration, transport, and the exercise of security 

18 operations in areas permitted under international 

19 law. 

20 (19) The PRC seeks unification with Taiwan 

21 through whatever means may ultimately be required. 

22 The CCP’s insistence that ‘‘reunification’’ is Tai23 wan’s only option makes this goal inherently coer24 cive. In January 2019, President Xi stated that the 

25 PRC ‘‘make[s] no promise to renounce the use of 


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1 force and reserve[s] the option of taking all nec2 essary means’’. Taiwan’s embodiment of democratic 

3 values and economic liberalism challenges President 

4 Xi’s goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The 

5 PRC plans to exploit Taiwan’s dominant strategic 

6 position in the First Island Chain and to project 

7 power into the Second Island Chain and beyond. 

8 (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe9 cuted an illegal island-building campaign that inter10 feres with freedom of navigation, damages the envi11 ronment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabili12 ties, and coerces and intimidates other regional 

13 claimants in an effort to advance its unlawful claims 

14 and control the waters around neighboring countries. 

15 Despite President Xi’s September 2015 speech, in 

16 which he said the PRC was not militarizing the 

17 South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Con18 gress, President Xi announced that ‘‘construction on 

19 islands and reefs in the South China Sea have seen 

20 steady progress’’. 

21 (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA 

22 to attain a level of capacity and capability superior 

23 to the United States in terms of equipment and con24 duct of modern military operations by shifting its 

25 military doctrine from having a force ‘‘adequate 


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1 [for] China’s defensive needs’’ to having a force 

2 ‘‘commensurate with China’s international status’’. 

3 Ultimately, this transformation will enable China to 

4 impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through the 

5 threat of military force. In 2017, President Xi estab6 lished the following developmental benchmarks for 

7 the advancement of the PLA: 

8 (A) A mechanized force with increased 

9 informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020. 

10 (B) The complete modernization of China’s 

11 national defense by 2035. 

12 (C) The full transformation of the PLA 

13 into a world-class force by 2050. 

14 (22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting poli15 cies described in this section undermine United 

16 States interests, such as— 

17 (A) upholding a free and open inter18 national order; 

19 (B) maintaining the integrity of inter20 national institutions with liberal norms and val21 ues; 

22 (C) preserving a favorable balance of 

23 power in the Indo-Pacific; 

24 (D) ensuring the defense of its allies; 

25 (E) preserving open sea and air lanes; 


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1 (F) fostering the free flow of commerce 

2 through open and transparent markets; and 

3 (G) promoting individual freedom and 

4 human rights. 

5 (23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has in6 tensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s 

7 behavior and therefore increased the need for United 

8 States global leadership and a competitive posture. 

9 The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the 

10 COVID–19 pandemic by— 

11 (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong 

12 Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so13 called ‘‘national security law’’ on Hong Kong; 

14 (B) aggressively imposing its will in the 

15 East and South China Seas; 

16 (C) contributing to increased tensions with 

17 India; and 

18 (D) engaging in a widespread and govern19 ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob20 scure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up 

21 the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion 

22 about the origination of the outbreak, and dis23 credit the United States, its allies, and global 

24 health efforts. 


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1 (24) In response to the PRC’s strategy and 

2 policies, the United States must— 

3 (A) adopt a strategy of managed strategic 

4 competition with the PRC to protect our vital 

5 interests; and 

6 (B) seek opportunities to cooperate with 

7 the PRC when such cooperation is in the 

8 United States’ national interests. 

9 SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

10 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United 

11 States, in pursuing managed strategic competition with 

12 the PRC, to pursue the following objectives: 

13 (1) The United States’ global leadership role is 

14 sustained and its political system and major founda15 tions of national power are postured for long-term 

16 political, economic, technological, and military com17 petition with the PRC. 

18 (2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific re19 mains favorable to the United States and its allies. 

20 The United States and its allies maintain unfettered 

21 access to the region and the PRC neither dominates 

22 the region nor coerces its neighbors. 

23 (3) The allies and partners of the United 

24 States— 


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1 (A) maintain confidence in United States 

2 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa3 cific region; 

4 (B) can withstand and combat subversion 

5 and undue influence by the PRC; and 

6 (C) align themselves with the United 

7 States in setting global rules, norms, and stand8 ards. 

9 (4) The combined weight of the United States 

10 and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem11 onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to 

12 dominate other states outweigh the potential bene13 fits. 

14 (5) The United States leads the free and open 

15 international order, which is comprised of resilient 

16 states and institutions that uphold and defend prin17 ciples, including sovereignty, rule of law, individual 

18 freedom, and human rights. The international order 

19 is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization 

20 by illiberal and authoritarian actors. 

21 (6) The key rules, norms, and standards of 

22 international engagement in the 21st century— 

23 (A) protect human rights, commercial en24 gagement and investment, and technology; and 


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1 (B) are in alignment with the values and 

2 interests of the United States, its allies and 

3 partners, and the free world. 

4 (7) The CCP cannot and does not— 

5 (A) subvert open and democratic societies; 

6 (B) distort global markets; 

7 (C) manipulate the international trade sys8 tem; 

9 (D) coerce other nations via economic and 

10 military means; or 

11 (E) use its technological advantages to un12 dermine individual freedoms or other states’ na13 tional security interests. 

14 (8) The United States deters military con15 frontation with the PRC and both nations establish 

16 structured dialogue and negotiation mechanisms to 

17 reduce the risk of conflict. The United States has a 

18 mutually respectful relationship with the PRC, and 

19 the American people maintain friendly relations with 

20 the Chinese people. 

21 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, 

22 in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— 

23 (1) to strengthen the United States’ domestic 

24 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic 

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1 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that 

2 improve the United States’ ability to pursue its vital 

3 economic, foreign policy, and national security inter4 ests; 

5 (2) to pursue a strategy of managed strategic 

6 competition with the PRC in the political, diplo7 matic, economic, development, military, informa8 tional, and technological realms that maximizes 

9 United States strengths and increases the costs for 

10 the PRC of harming United States interests; 

11 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure inter12 national system characterized by respect for sov13 ereignty, rule of law, open markets and the free flow 

14 of commerce, and a shared commitment to security 

15 and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, 

16 and transparent and citizen-centric governance; 

17 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli18 ances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific 

19 and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi20 lateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared in21 terests and bolster partner countries’ confidence that 

22 the United States is and will remain a strong, com23 mitted, and constant partner; 

24 (5) to encourage and aid United States allies 

25 and partners in boosting their own capabilities and 


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1 resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared in2 terests and values, free from coercion and external 

3 pressure; 

4 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 

5 healthy competition in United States-China economic 

6 relations by— 

7 (A) advancing policies that harden the 

8 United States economy against unfair and ille9 gal commercial or trading practices and the co10 ercion of United States businesses; and 

11 (B) tightening United States laws and reg12 ulations as necessary to prevent the PRC’s at13 tempts to harm United States economic com14 petitiveness; 

15 (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector16 led growth in emerging markets around the world, 

17 including through the use of United States Govern18 ment tools that— 

19 (A) support greater private sector invest20 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives 

21 that are grounded in the rule of law; 

22 (B) promote open markets; 

23 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 

24 frameworks; 


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1 (D) improve the management of key eco2 nomic sectors; 

3 (E) reduce corruption; and 

4 (F) foster collaboration with partner coun5 tries and the United States private sector to de6 velop secure and sustainable infrastructure; 

7 (8) to lead in the advancement of international 

8 rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade 

9 and open and integrated markets; 

10 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy 

11 in support of United States companies and busi12 nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi13 tion; 

14 (10) to support greater private sector coopera15 tion between the United States and its partners; 

16 (11) to ensure that the United States leads in 

17 the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, 

18 such as next-generation telecommunications, artifi19 cial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconduc20 tors, and biotechnology, by— 

21 (A) providing concrete incentives for the 

22 private sector to accelerate development of such 

23 technologies; 

24 (B) improving contracting processes to en25 able the United States Government— 


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1 (i) to allocate capital and work with 

2 start-up companies more efficiently; and 

3 (ii) to increase investment in experi4 mental technologies; 

5 (C) modernizing export controls and in6 vestment restrictions to place a ‘‘high fence 

7 around a small yard’’ of critical technologies; 

8 (D) enhancing United States leadership in 

9 technical standards-setting bodies and avenues 

10 for developing norms regarding the use of 

11 emerging critical technologies; 

12 (E) reducing United States barriers and 

13 increasing incentives for collaboration with al14 lies and partners on the research and codevelop15 ment of critical technologies; 

16 (F) collaborating with allies and partners 

17 to protect critical technologies by— 

18 (i) crafting multilateral export control 

19 measures; 

20 (ii) building capacity for defense tech21 nology security; 

22 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in the 

23 supply chains; and 

24 (iv) ensuring diversification; and 


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1 (G) designing major defense capabilities 

2 for export to allies and partners; 

3 (12) to enable the people of the United States, 

4 including the private sector, civil society, universities 

5 and other academic institutions, State and local leg6 islators, and other relevant actors to identify and re7 main vigilant to the risks posed by undue influence 

8 of the CCP in the United States; 

9 (13) to enact legislation, regulations, and other 

10 measures to mitigate the risks referred to in para11 graph (12), while still preserving opportunities for 

12 economic engagement, academic research, and co13 operation in other areas where the United States 

14 and the PRC share interests; 

15 (14) to collaborate with advanced democracies 

16 and other willing partners to promote ideals and 

17 principles that— 

18 (A) advance a free and open order; 

19 (B) strengthen democratic institutions; 

20 (C) protect and promote human rights; 

21 and 

22 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re23 porting; 

24 (15) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 

25 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other 


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1 multilateral organizations and defend the integrity 

2 of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal 

3 and authoritarian nations; 

4 (16) to prioritize the defense of fundamental 

5 freedoms and human rights in the United States’ re6 lationship with the PRC; 

7 (17) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul8 tilateral organizations to hold the Government of the 

9 PRC accountable for— 

10 (A) violations and abuses of human rights; 

11 (B) restrictions on religious practices; 

12 (C) abrogation of treaties and other inter13 national agreements related to human rights; 

14 and 

15 (D) other affronts to the freedom and indi16 vidual liberty of the citizens of the PRC; 

17 (18) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re18 pression, coercion, and other malign behavior to at19 tain unfair economic advantage and deference of 

20 other nations to its political and strategic objectives; 

21 (19) to maintain United States access to the 

22 Western Pacific, including by— 

23 (A) increasing or regaining the qualitative 

24 advantage of United States forward-deployed 

25 forces in the Indo-Pacific region; 


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1 (B) modernizing the United States military 

2 through investments in existing and new major 

3 platforms, emerging technologies, critical in-the4 ater force structure and enabling capabilities, 

5 joint operational concepts, and access agree6 ments; and 

7 (C) operating and conducting exercises 

8 with allies and partners— 

9 (i) to mitigate the PLA’s ability to 

10 project power and establish contested zones 

11 within the First and Second Island Chains; 

12 (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA 

13 to coerce its neighbors; 

14 (iii) to maintain open sea and air 

15 lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, 

16 the East China Sea, and the South China 

17 Sea; and 

18 (iv) to project power from the United 

19 States and its allies and partners to dem20 onstrate the ability to conduct contested lo21 gistics; 

22 (20) to deter the PRC from— 

23 (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, includ24 ing by developing more combat-credible forces 

25 that are integrated with allies and partners in 


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1 contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to de2 feat any PRC theory of victory in the First or 

3 Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific 

4 and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National 

5 Defense Strategy; 

6 (B) using gray-zone tactics below the level 

7 of armed conflict; or 

8 (C) initiating armed conflict; 

9 (21) to strengthen United States-PRC military10 to-military communication and improve de-escalation 

11 procedures to deconflict operations and reduce the 

12 risk of unwanted conflict; and 

13 (22) to cooperate with the PRC if interests 

14 align, conduct persistent and determined diplomacy 

15 that clarifies United States interests and values to 

16 Chinese officials, and pursue confidence-building 

17 measures in areas particularly susceptible to esca18 lation. 

19 SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

20 It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the 

21 policy described in section 102(b) requires the following 

22 actions: 

23 (1) Managed strategic competition with the 

24 PRC will require the United States— 


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1 (A) to marshal sustained political will to 

2 protect its vital interests and advance its eco3 nomic and national security objectives for dec4 ades to come; and 

5 (B) to achieve this sustained political will, 

6 persuade the American people and United 

7 States allies and partners of— 

8 (i) the challenges posed by the PRC; 

9 and 

10 (ii) the need for long-term competition 

11 to defend shared interests and values. 

12 (2) The United States must— 

13 (A) coordinate closely with allies and part14 ners to compete effectively with the PRC; 

15 (B) cooperate with the PRC where our in16 terests align; and 

17 (C) pursue its interests, while still account18 ing for partner country viewpoints on how to 

19 best approach the challenges posed by the PRC. 

20 (3) At the same time, other countries must step 

21 up to assume greater roles in balancing and check22 ing the aggressive and assertive behavior of the PRC 

23 than the roles they have assumed in the past. 

24 (4) The President of the United States must 

25 lead and direct the entire executive branch to make 


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1 the People’s Republic of China the top priority in 

2 United States foreign policy. At present, the United 

3 States identifies it as such in the 2017 National Se4 curity Strategy and the 2018 National Defense 

5 Strategy, but must further increase the 

6 prioritization of managed strategic competition with 

7 the PRC and broader United States interests in the 

8 Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of foreign policy 

9 to implement the strategic imperatives outlined in 

10 those documents. 

11 (5) The President should ensure that any senior 

12 official in the Executive Office of the President ap13 pointed to coordinate the United States’ strategy of 

14 managed strategic competition with the PRC across 

15 the entire United States Government has the au16 thority and resources to do so. 

17 (6) The head of every Federal department and 

18 agency should designate a senior official at the level 

19 of Under Secretary or above to coordinate the de20 partment’s or agency’s policies with respect to man21 aged strategic competition with the PRC. 

22 (7) The ability of the United States to execute 

23 a strategy of managed strategic competition with the 

24 PRC will be undermined if our attention is repeat25 edly diverted to challenges that are not vital to 


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1 United States economic and national security inter2 ests. 

3 (8) In the coming decades, the United States 

4 must prevent the PRC from— 

5 (A) establishing regional hegemony in the 

6 Indo-Pacific; and 

7 (B) using that position to advance its as8 sertive political, economic, and foreign policy 

9 goals around the world. 

10 (9) The United States must ensure that the 

11 Federal budget is properly aligned with the strategic 

12 imperative to compete with the PRC by— 

13 (A) authorizing sufficient levels of funding 

14 to resource all instruments of United States na15 tional power; and 

16 (B) coherently prioritizing how such funds 

17 are used. 

18 (10) Sustained prioritization of the challenge 

19 posed by the PRC requires— 

20 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Con21 gress; and 

22 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 

23 collaboration and consultation between the exec24 utive and legislative branches. 


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1 (11) The United States must ensure close inte2 gration among economic and foreign policymakers, 

3 the private sector, civil society, universities and aca4 demic institutions, and other relevant actors in free 

5 and open societies affected by the challenges posed 

6 by the PRC to enable such actors— 

7 (A) to collaborate to advance common in8 terests; and 

9 (B) to identify appropriate policies— 

10 (i) to strengthen the United States 

11 and its allies; 

12 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of 

13 a free and open order; and 

14 (iii) to push back against detrimental 

15 policies pursued by the CCP. 

16 (12) The United States must ensure that all 

17 Federal departments and agencies are organized to 

18 reflect the fact that competing with the PRC is the 

19 United States’ top foreign policy priority, including 

20 through the assigned missions and location of 

21 United States Government personnel, by— 

22 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo23 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and 

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1 evant to advancing competition with the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China; 

3 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign 

4 service officers, international development pro5 fessionals, members of the foreign commercial 

6 service, intelligence professionals, and other 

7 United States Government personnel in the 

8 Indo-Pacific region; and 

9 (C) ensuring that this workforce, both ci10 vilian and military, has the training in lan11 guage, technical skills, and other competencies 

12 required to advance a successful competitive 

13 strategy with the PRC. 

14 (13) The United States must place renewed em15 phasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments 

16 of national power, including diplomacy, information, 

17 technology, economics, foreign assistance and devel18 opment finance, commerce, intelligence, and law en19 forcement, which are crucial for addressing the 

20 unique economic, political, and ideological challenges 

21 posed by the PRC. 

22 (14) The United States should— 

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1 ticulated in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 

2 (Public Law 115–409); and 

3 (B) ensure prioritization of the military in4 vestments necessary to achieve United States 

5 political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, includ6 ing— 

7 (i) promoting regional security in the 

8 Indo-Pacific; 

9 (ii) reassuring allies and partners 

10 while protecting them from coercion; and 

11 (iii) deterring conflict with the PRC. 

12 (15) Competition with the PRC requires the 

13 United States’ skillful adaptation to the information 

14 environment of the 21st century. United States pub15 lic diplomacy and messaging efforts must effec16 tively— 

17 (A) promote the value of partnership with 

18 the United States; 

19 (B) highlight the risks and costs of 

20 enmeshment with the PRC; and 

21 (C) counter CCP propaganda and 

22 disinformation. 


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1 TITLE II—PROTECTING THE 

2 UNITED STATES FROM CHI3 NA’S DISCRIMINATORY ECO4 NOMIC PRACTICES 

5 SEC. 201. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING 

6 THE PRC’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY. 

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find8 ings: 

9 (1) The People’s Republic of China, at the di10 rection of the Chinese Communist Party, is advanc11 ing an ecosystem of anticompetitive economic and 

12 industrial policies that— 

13 (A) distort global markets; 

14 (B) limit innovation; 

15 (C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the 

16 expense of the United States and other foreign 

17 firms; 

18 (D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice con19 sumer choice; and 

20 (E) do not align with the ethical uses and 

21 development of technologies embraced by demo22 cratic nations. 

23 (2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and 

24 industrial policies pursued by the PRC, the mass 

25 subsidization of Chinese firms, intellectual property 


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1 theft, and forced technology transfer are among the 

2 most damaging to the global economy. 

3 (3) Through regulatory interventions and direct 

4 financial subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of ad5 vancing national political and economic objectives, 

6 directs, coerces, and influences in anti-competitive 

7 ways the commercial activities of firms that are di8 rected, financed, influenced, or otherwise controlled 

9 by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and 

10 ostensibly independent and private Chinese compa11 nies, such as technology firms in strategic sectors. 

12 (4) The PRC Government, at the national and 

13 subnational levels, grants special privileges or status 

14 to certain PRC firms in key sectors designated as 

15 strategic, such as telecommunications, oil, power, 

16 aviation, banking, and semiconductors. Enterprises 

17 receive special state preferences in the form of favor18 able loans, tax exemptions, and preferential land ac19 cess from the CCP. 

20 (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as de21 scribed in paragraphs (3) and (4)— 

22 (A) enables these companies to sell goods 

23 below market prices, allowing them to outbid 

24 and crowd out market-based competitors and 

25 thereby pursue global dominance of key sectors; 


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1 (B) distorts the global market economy by 

2 undermining longstanding and generally accept3 ed market-based principles of fair competition, 

4 leading to barriers to entry and forced exit from 

5 the market for foreign or private firms, not only 

6 in the PRC, but in markets around the world; 

7 (C) creates government-sponsored or sup8 ported de facto monopolies, cartels, and other 

9 anti-market arrangements in key sectors, lim10 iting or removing opportunities for other firms; 

11 and 

12 (D) leads to, as a result of the issues de13 scribed in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines 

14 in profits and revenue needed by foreign and 

15 private firms for research and development. 

16 (6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chi17 nese actors to steal critical technologies and trade 

18 secrets from private and foreign competitors oper19 ating in the PRC and around the world, particularly 

20 in areas that the CCP has identified as critical to 

21 advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by 

22 the CCP, also continues to implement anti-competi23 tive regulations, policies, and practices that coerce 

24 the handover of technology and other propriety or 


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1 sensitive data from foreign enterprises to domestic 

2 firms in exchange for access to the PRC market. 

3 (7) Companies in the United States and in for4 eign countries compete with state-subsidized PRC 

5 companies that enjoy the protection and power of 

6 the state in third country markets around the world. 

7 The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined 

8 with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC 

9 market itself, severely hamper the ability of United 

10 States and foreign firms to compete, innovate, and 

11 pursue the provision of best value to customers. The 

12 result is an unbalanced playing field. Such an 

13 unsustainable course, if not checked, will over time 

14 lead to depressed competition around the world, re15 duced opportunity, and harm to both producers and 

16 consumers. 

17 (8) As stated in the United States Trade Rep18 resentative’s investigation of the PRC’s trade prac19 tices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 

20 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 2018, ‘‘When 

21 U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on their 

22 investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the 

23 growth necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this 

24 sense, China’s technology transfer regime directly 

25 burdens the innovation ecosystem that is an engine 


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1 of economic growth in the United States and simi2 larly-situated economies.’’. 

3 (9) In addition to forced technology described 

4 in this subsection, the United States Trade Rep5 resentative’s investigation of the PRC under section 

6 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also 

7 identified requirements that foreign firms license 

8 products at less than market value, government-di9 rected and government-subsidized acquisition of sen10 sitive technology for strategic purposes, and cyber 

11 theft as other key PRC technology and industrial 

12 policies that are unreasonable and discriminatory. 

13 These policies place at risk United States intellectual 

14 property rights, innovation and technological devel15 opment, and jobs in dozens of industries. 

16 (10) Other elements of the PRC’s ecosystem of 

17 industrial policies that harm innovation and distort 

18 global markets include— 

19 (A) advancement of policies that encourage 

20 local production over imports; 

21 (B) continuation of policies that favor 

22 unique technical standards in use by Chinese 

23 firms rather than globally accepted standards, 

24 which often force foreign firms to alter their 

25 products and manufacturing chains to compete; 


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1 (C) requirements that foreign companies 

2 disclose proprietary information to qualify for 

3 the adoption of their standards for use in the 

4 PRC domestic market; and 

5 (D) maintenance of closed procurement 

6 processes, which limit participation by foreign 

7 firms, including by setting terms that require 

8 such firms to use domestic suppliers, transfer 

9 know-how to firms in the PRC, and disclose 

10 proprietary information. 

11 (11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 

12 associated industry-specific efforts under this initia13 tive, such as the Digital Silk Road, are key vectors 

14 to advance the PRC’s mercantilist policies and prac15 tices globally. The resulting challenges do not only 

16 affect United States firms. As the European Cham17 ber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report, 

18 the combination of concessional lending to Chinese 

19 state-owned enterprises, nontransparent procure20 ment and bidding processes, closed digital standards, 

21 and other factors severely limit European and other 

22 participation in BRI and make ‘‘competition [with 

23 Chinese companies] in third-country markets ex24 tremely challenging’’. This underscores a key objec25 tive of BRI, which is to ensure the reliance of infraVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:56 Apr 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S687.IS S687

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1 structure, digital technologies, and other important 

2 goods on PRC supply chains and technical stand3 ards. 

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con5 gress that— 

6 (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket 

7 economy like the PRC’s economy, which has cap8 tured such a large share of global economic ex9 change, are in many ways unprecedented and re10 quire sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term 

11 focus and engagement; 

12 (2) while the Economic and Trade Agreement 

13 Between the Government of the United States and 

14 the Government of the People’s Republic of China, 

15 done at Washington January 15, 2020, makes initial 

16 progress in several areas, including intellectual prop17 erty and trade secret protection, significant further 

18 steps are still required to address some of the more 

19 difficult economic and industrial policies issues in 

20 the PRC, which affect the United States and other 

21 nations; 

22 (3) in order to truly address the most detri23 mental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist eco24 nomic strategy, the United States must adopt poli25 cies that— 


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1 (A) expose the full scope and scale of intel2 lectual property theft and mass subsidization of 

3 Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the 

4 United States, foreign markets, and the global 

5 economy; 

6 (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs 

7 and consequences for anticompetitive behavior; 

8 (C) provide options for affected United 

9 States persons to address and respond to un10 reasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed in11 dustrial policies; and 

12 (D) strengthen the protection of critical 

13 technology and sensitive data, while still fos14 tering an environment that provides incentives 

15 for innovation and competition; 

16 (4) the United States must work with its allies 

17 and partners through the Organization for Economic 

18 Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World 

19 Trade Organization, and other venues and fora— 

20 (A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac21 cepted principles of fair competition and market 

22 behavior and address the PRC’s anticompetitive 

23 economic and industrial polices that undermine 

24 decades of global growth and innovation; 


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1 (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted 

2 the same treatment as that of a free-market 

3 economy until it ceases the implementation of 

4 laws, regulations, policies, and practices that 

5 provide unfair advantage to PRC firms in fur6 therance of national objectives and impose un7 reasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens 

8 on market-based international commerce; and 

9 (C) to align policies with respect to curbing 

10 state-directed subsidization of the private sec11 tor, such as advocating for global rules related 

12 to transparency and adherence to notification 

13 requirements, including through the efforts cur14 rently being advanced by the United States, 

15 Japan, and the European Union; and 

16 (5) the United States and its allies and part17 ners must collaborate to provide incentives to their 

18 respective companies to cooperate in areas such as— 

19 (A) advocating for protection of intellectual 

20 property rights in markets around the world; 

21 (B) fostering open technical standards; 

22 and 

23 (C) increasing joint investments in over24 seas markets. 


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1 SEC. 202. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the 

3 date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently 

4 than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordi5 nation with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States 

6 Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intel7 ligence, shall create a list (referred to in this section as 

8 the ‘‘intellectual property violators list’’), which identifies 

9 all centrally administered, state-owned enterprises that 

10 have benefitted from— 

11 (1) a significant act or series of acts of intellec12 tual property theft that subjected a United States 

13 economic sector or particular company incorporated 

14 in the United States to harm; or 

15 (2) an act or government policy of involuntary 

16 or coerced technology transfer of intellectual prop17 erty ultimately owned by a company incorporated in 

18 the United States. 

19 (b) RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION.—To determine 

20 whether there is a credible basis for determining that a 

21 company should be included on the intellectual property 

22 violators list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with 

23 the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Rep24 resentative, and the Director of National Intelligence, 

25 shall consider— 


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1 (1) any finding by a United States court that 

2 the company has violated relevant United States 

3 laws intended to protect intellectual property rights; 

4 (2) a decision by the President to impose sanc5 tions authorized under section 204(e); or 

6 (3) substantial and credible information re7 ceived from any entity described in subsection (c) or 

8 other interested persons. 

9 (c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the 

10 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

11 Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and 

12 the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as nec13 essary and appropriate, with— 

14 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde15 pendent agencies; 

16 (2) the private sector; and 

17 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex18 pertise. 

19 (d) REPORT.— 

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

21 publish, in the Federal Register, an annual report 

22 that— 

23 (A) lists the companies engaged in the ac24 tivities described in subsection (a)(1); and 


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1 (B) describes the circumstances sur2 rounding actions described in subsection (a)(2), 

3 including any role of the Government of the 

4 PRC; and 

5 (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the 

6 economic advantage derived by the companies 

7 engaged in the activities described in subsection 

8 (a)(1). 

9 (2) FORM.—The report published under para10 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a 

11 classified annex. 

12 (e) DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.—The Direc13 tor of National Intelligence may authorize the declassifica14 tion of information, as appropriate, to inform the contents 

15 of the report published pursuant to subsection (d). 

16 (f) REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT BUSINESS-CON17 FIDENTIAL INFORMATION.— 

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and 

19 the heads of all other Federal agencies involved in 

20 the production of the intellectual property violators 

21 list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary in22 formation submitted by a private sector participant 

23 and marked as business-confidential information, 

24 unless the party submitting the confidential business 

25 information— 


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1 (A) had notice, at the time of submission, 

2 that such information would be released by the 

3 Secretary; or 

4 (B) subsequently consents to the release of 

5 such information. 

6 (2) NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF REPORT.— 

7 If confidential business information is provided by a 

8 private sector participant, a nonconfidential version 

9 of the report under subsection (d) shall be published 

10 in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, 

11 if necessary, the confidential business information. 

12 (3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Propri13 etary information submitted by a private party 

14 under this section— 

15 (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets 

16 and commercial or financial information (as de17 fined under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United 

18 States Code); and 

19 (B) shall be exempt from disclosure with20 out the express approval of the private party. 

21 SEC. 203. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

22 CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST. 

23 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 

24 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 

25 Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States 


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1 Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, 

2 shall publish an unclassified report in the Federal Register 

3 that comprehensively identifies and measures— 

4 (1) subsidies provided by the Government of the 

5 PRC to enterprises in the PRC in contravention of 

6 agreed trade and other rules; and 

7 (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enter8 prises in the PRC over foreign market participants. 

9 (b) SUBSIDIES DESCRIBED.—In compiling the report 

10 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall con11 sider— 

12 (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or pro13 moted by the Government of the PRC that— 

14 (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in 

15 the PRC at the expense of foreign market par16 ticipants; 

17 (B) shield centrally administered, state18 owned enterprises from competition; or 

19 (C) otherwise suppress market-based com20 petition; 

21 (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lend22 ing terms, from or promoted by the Government of 

23 the PRC or centrally administered, state-owned en24 terprises that materially benefit PRC enterprises 


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1 over foreign market participants in contravention of 

2 generally accepted market principles; and 

3 (3) any subsidy that violates the agreement re4 ferred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay 

5 Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)) 

6 (commonly known as the World Trade Organiza7 tion’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 

8 Measures). 

9 (c) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State, in co10 ordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United 

11 States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and ap12 propriate, consult with— 

13 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde14 pendent agencies; 

15 (2) the private sector; and 

16 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex17 pertise. 

18 SEC. 204. REVIEW OF PETITIONS RELATED TO INTELLEC19 TUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND FORCED TECH20 NOLOGY TRANSFER. 

21 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

22 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT23 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com24 mittees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

2 the Senate; 

3 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

4 and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 

5 (C) the Committee on Commerce, Science, 

6 and Transportation of the Senate; 

7 (D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

8 Senate; 

9 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

10 the House of Representatives; 

11 (F) the Committee on Financial Services 

12 of the House of Representatives; 

13 (G) the Committee on Energy and Com14 merce of the House of Representatives; and 

15 (H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

16 House of Representatives. 

17 (2) COMMITTEE.—The term ‘‘Committee’’ 

18 means the committee established or designated 

19 under subsection (b). 

20 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign per21 son’’ means a person that is not a United States 

22 person. 

23 (4) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The term ‘‘in24 tellectual property’’ means— 


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1 (A) any work protected by a copyright 

2 under title 17, United States Code; 

3 (B) any property protected by a patent 

4 granted by the United States Patent and 

5 Trademark Office under title 35, United States 

6 Code; 

7 (C) any word, name, symbol, or device, or 

8 any combination thereof, that is registered as a 

9 trademark with the United States Patent and 

10 Trademark Office under the Act entitled ‘‘An 

11 Act to provide for the registration and protec12 tion of trademarks used in commerce, to carry 

13 out the provisions of certain international con14 ventions, and for other purposes’’, approved 

15 July 5, 1946 (commonly known as the 

16 ‘‘Lanham Act’’ or the ‘‘Trademark Act of 

17 1946’’) (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.); 

18 (D) a trade secret (as defined in section 

19 1839 of title 18, United States Code); or 

20 (E) any other form of intellectual property. 

21 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

22 ‘‘United States person’’ means— 

23 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law24 fully admitted for permanent residence to the 

25 United States; or 


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1 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

2 the United States or any jurisdiction within the 

3 United States, including a foreign branch of 

4 such an entity. 

5 (b) ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall— 

7 (A) establish a multi-agency committee to 

8 carry out this section; or 

9 (B) designate an existing multi-agency 

10 committee within the executive branch to carry 

11 out this section if the President determines that 

12 the existing committee has the relevant exper13 tise and personnel to carry out this section. 

14 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Committee shall be 

15 comprised of the following officials (or, subject to 

16 paragraph (3), a designee of any such official): 

17 (A) The Secretary of the Treasury. 

18 (B) The Secretary of Commerce. 

19 (C) The Secretary of State. 

20 (D) The Attorney General. 

21 (E) The Director of National Intelligence. 

22 (F) The heads of such other agencies as 

23 the President determines appropriate, generally 

24 or on a case-by-case basis. 


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1 (3) DESIGNEE.—An official specified in para2 graph (2) may select a designee to serve on the 

3 Committee from among individuals serving in posi4 tions appointed by the President by and with the ad5 vice and consent of the Senate. 

6 (4) CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR.—The President 

7 shall appoint a chairperson and a vice chairperson of 

8 the Committee from among the members of the 

9 Committee. 

10 (c) SUBMISSION OF PETITIONS.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—A United States person de12 scribed in paragraph (3) may submit a petition to 

13 the Committee requesting that the Committee— 

14 (A) review, under subsection (d), a signifi15 cant act or series of acts described in para16 graph (2) committed by a foreign person; and 

17 (B) refer the matter to the President with 

18 a recommendation to impose sanctions under 

19 subsection (e) to address any threat to the na20 tional security of the United States posed by 

21 the significant act or series of acts. 

22 (2) SIGNIFICANT ACT OR SERIES OF ACTS DE23 SCRIBED.—A significant act or series of acts de24 scribed in this paragraph is a significant act or se25 ries of acts of— 


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1 (A) theft of intellectual property of a 

2 United States person; or 

3 (B) forced transfer of technology that is 

4 the intellectual property of a United States per5 son. 

6 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON DESCRIBED.—A 

7 United States person is described in this paragraph 

8 if— 

9 (A) a court of competent jurisdiction in the 

10 United States has rendered a final judgment in 

11 favor of the United States person that— 

12 (i) the foreign person identified in the 

13 petition submitted under paragraph (1) 

14 committed the significant act or series of 

15 acts identified in the petition; 

16 (ii) the United States person is the 

17 owner of the intellectual property identified 

18 in the petition; and 

19 (iii) the foreign person is using that 

20 intellectual property without the permis21 sion of the United States person; and 

22 (B) the United States person can provide 

23 clear and convincing evidence to the Committee 

24 that the value of the economic loss to the 


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1 United States person resulting from the signifi2 cant act or series of acts exceeds $10,000,000. 

3 (d) REVIEW AND ACTION BY THE COMMITTEE.— 

4 (1) REVIEW.—Upon receiving a petition under 

5 subsection (c), the Committee shall conduct a review 

6 of the petition in order to determine whether the im7 position of sanctions under subsection (e) is nec8 essary and appropriate to address any threat to the 

9 national security of the United States posed by the 

10 significant act or series of acts identified in the peti11 tion. 

12 (2) ACTION.—After conducting a review under 

13 paragraph (1) of a petition submitted under sub14 section (c), the Committee may take no action, dis15 miss the petition, or refer the petition to the Presi16 dent with a recommendation with respect to whether 

17 to impose sanctions under subsection (e). 

18 (e) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose 

20 the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with re21 spect to a foreign person identified in a petition sub22 mitted under subsection (c) if the President deter23 mines that imposing such sanctions is necessary and 

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1 curity of the United States posed by the significant 

2 act or series of acts identified in the petition. 

3 (2) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 

4 days after the Committee refers a petition to the 

5 President with a recommendation under subsection 

6 (d)(2), the President shall submit to the appropriate 

7 congressional committees a notice of the determina8 tion of the President under paragraph (1) with re9 spect to whether or not to impose sanctions de10 scribed in paragraph (3) with respect to each foreign 

11 person identified in the petition. Each notice re12 quired under this paragraph shall be submitted in 

13 unclassified form, but may include a classified 

14 annex. 

15 (3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions 

16 that may be imposed under paragraph (1) with re17 spect to a foreign person identified in a petition sub18 mitted under subsection (c) are the following: 

19 (A) EXPORT SANCTION.—The President 

20 may order the United States Government not to 

21 issue any specific license and not to grant any 

22 other specific permission or authority to export 

23 any goods or technology to the person under— 

24 (i) the Export Control Reform Act of 

25 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.); 


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1 (ii) the Arms Export Control Act (22 

2 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); 

3 (iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 

4 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); or 

5 (iv) any other statute that requires 

6 the prior review and approval of the 

7 United States Government as a condition 

8 for the export or reexport of goods or serv9 ices. 

10 (B) LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINAN11 CIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The President may pro12 hibit any United States financial institution 

13 from making loans or providing credits to the 

14 person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 

15 12-month period unless the person is engaged 

16 in activities to relieve human suffering and the 

17 loans or credits are provided for such activities. 

18 (C) LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINAN19 CIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The President may direct 

20 the United States executive director to each 

21 international financial institution to use the 

22 voice and vote of the United States to oppose 

23 any loan from the international financial insti24 tution that would benefit the person. 


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1 (D) PROHIBITIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTI2 TUTIONS.—The following prohibitions may be 

3 imposed against the person if the person is a fi4 nancial institution: 

5 (i) PROHIBITION ON DESIGNATION AS

6 PRIMARY DEALER.—Neither the Board of 

7 Governors of the Federal Reserve System 

8 nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New 

9 York may designate, or permit the continu10 ation of any prior designation of, the fi11 nancial institution as a primary dealer in 

12 United States Government debt instru13 ments. 

14 (ii) PROHIBITION ON SERVICE AS A

15 REPOSITORY OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS.— 

16 The financial institution may not serve as 

17 agent of the United States Government or 

18 serve as repository for United States Gov19 ernment funds. 

20 (E) PROCUREMENT SANCTION.—The 

21 President may prohibit the United States Gov22 ernment from procuring, or entering into any 

23 contract for the procurement of, any goods or 

24 services from the person. 


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1 (F) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The President 

2 may, pursuant to such regulations as the Presi3 dent may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in 

4 foreign exchange that are subject to the juris5 diction of the United States and in which the 

6 person has any interest. 

7 (G) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The Presi8 dent may, pursuant to such regulations as the 

9 President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers 

10 of credit or payments between financial institu11 tions or by, through, or to any financial institu12 tion, to the extent that such transfers or pay13 ments are subject to the jurisdiction of the 

14 United States and involve any interest of the 

15 person. 

16 (H) PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.—The 

17 President may, pursuant to such regulations as 

18 the President may prescribe, prohibit any per19 son from— 

20 (i) acquiring, holding, withholding, 

21 using, transferring, withdrawing, trans22 porting, importing, or exporting any prop23 erty that is subject to the jurisdiction of 

24 the United States and with respect to 


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1 which the person identified in the petition 

2 has any interest; 

3 (ii) dealing in or exercising any right, 

4 power, or privilege with respect to such 

5 property; or 

6 (iii) conducting any transaction in7 volving such property. 

8 (I) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR

9 DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.—The President 

10 may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines 

11 as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 

12 United States person from investing in or pur13 chasing significant amounts of equity or debt 

14 instruments of the person. 

15 (J) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFI16 CERS.—The President may direct the Secretary 

17 of State to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of 

18 Homeland Security to exclude from the United 

19 States, any alien that the President determines 

20 is a corporate officer or principal of, or a share21 holder with a controlling interest in, the person. 

22 (K) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE

23 OFFICERS.—The President may impose on the 

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1 tions and with similar authorities as such offi2 cer or officers, any of the sanctions described in 

3 this paragraph. 

4 (f) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.— 

5 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex6 ercise all authorities provided to the President under 

7 sections 203 and 205 of the International Emer8 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 

9 1704) to carry out this section. 

10 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at11 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a 

12 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or 

13 order issued to carry out this section shall be subject 

14 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) 

15 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco16 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex17 tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de18 scribed in subsection (a) of that section. 

19 (g) CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.— 

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Committee shall protect 

21 from disclosure any proprietary information sub22 mitted by a United States person and marked as 

23 business confidential information, unless the person 

24 submitting the information— 


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1 (A) had notice, at the time of submission, 

2 that the information would be released by the 

3 Committee; or 

4 (B) subsequently consents to the release of 

5 the information. 

6 (2) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Propri7 etary information submitted by a United States per8 son under this section shall be— 

9 (A) considered to be trade secrets and 

10 commercial or financial information (as defined 

11 under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United 

12 States Code); 

13 (B) exempt from disclosure without the ex14 press approval of the person. 

15 (h) RULEMAKING.—The President may prescribe 

16 such licenses, orders, and regulations as are necessary to 

17 carry out this section, including with respect to the process 

18 by which United States persons may submit petitions 

19 under subsection (c). 

20 SEC. 205. PREDATORY PRICING BY ENTITIES OWNED, CON21 TROLLED, OR DIRECTED BY A FOREIGN 

22 STATE. 

23 (a) PROHIBITED ACTS.— 

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—It is contrary to public pol25 icy, illegal, and void for a combination, conspiracy, 


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1 trust, agreement, or contract executed by an entity 

2 owned, controlled, or directed by a foreign state or 

3 an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state (as de4 fined in section 1603 of title 28, United States 

5 Code) and participating in international commerce 

6 to engage in acts to establish or set prices below the 

7 average variable cost in a manner that may 

8 foreseeably eliminate market competitors. 

9 (2) ECONOMIC SUPPORT.—In determining the 

10 average variable cost under paragraph (1), the court 

11 may take into account the effects of economic sup12 port provided by the owning or controlling foreign 

13 state to the entity on a discriminatory basis that 

14 may allow the entity to unfairly price at or below 

15 marginal cost. 

16 (3) GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES.—In determining 

17 the foreseeability of the elimination of market com18 petitors under paragraph (1), the court may take 

19 into account the aggravating factor of the actions of 

20 the foreign state owning or controlling the entity re21 ferred to in such paragraph to use government re22 sources to subsidize or underwrite the losses of the 

23 entity in a manner that allows the entity to sustain 

24 the predatory period and recoup its losses. 


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1 (b) RECOVERY OF DAMAGES BY CLAIMANT FOR VIO2 LATIONS OF THIS SECTION.—Any person (as defined in 

3 section 1(a) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a))) whose 

4 business or property is injured as a result of the actions 

5 of an entity described in subsection (a) shall be entitled 

6 to recovery from the defendant for damages and other re7 lated costs under section 4 of such Act (15 U.S.C. 15). 

8 (c) ELEMENTS OF PRIMA FACIE CASE.—A plaintiff 

9 may initiate a claim against a defendant in an appropriate 

10 Federal court for a violation of subsection (a) in order to 

11 recover damages under subsection (b) by— 

12 (1) establishing, by a preponderance of the evi13 dence, that the defendant— 

14 (A) is a foreign state or an agency or in15 strumentality of a foreign state (as defined in 

16 section 1603 of title 28, United States Code); 

17 and 

18 (B) is not immune from the jurisdiction of 

19 the Federal court pursuant to section 

20 1605(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code; and 

21 (2) setting forth sufficient evidence to establish 

22 a reasonable inference that the defendant has vio23 lated subsection (a). 

24 (d) COURT DETERMINATION LEADING TO EVI25 DENTIARY BURDEN SHIFTING TO DEFENDANT.—If a 


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1 Federal court finds that a plaintiff has met its burden of 

2 proof under subsection (c), the court may determine 

3 that— 

4 (1) the plaintiff has established a prima facie 

5 case that the conduct of the defendant is in violation 

6 of subsection (a); and 

7 (2) the defendant has the burden of rebutting 

8 such case by establishing that the defendant is not 

9 in violation of subsection (a). 

10 (e) FILING OF AMICUS BRIEFS BY THE DEPART11 MENT OF STATE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL COMITY.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—For the purposes of consid13 ering questions of international comity with respect 

14 to making decisions regarding commercial activity 

15 and the scope of applicable sovereign immunity, the 

16 Federal court may receive and consider relevant 

17 amicus briefs filed by the Secretary of State. 

18 (2) SAVINGS PROVISION.—Nothing in para19 graph (1) may be construed to limit the ability of 

20 the Federal court to receive and consider any other 

21 amicus briefs. 


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1 SEC. 206. REPORTING ON REQUESTS TO COMPLY WITH THE 

2 CORPORATE SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM IN THE 

3 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

4 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘cor5 porate social credit system,’’ as established by the ‘‘Plan6 ning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit Sys7 tem’’ released by the State Council of the Government of 

8 the People’s Republic of China in 2014, means a nation9 wide network of systems operated by private and state ac10 tors, that— 

11 (1) use existing financial credit systems, public 

12 records, online activity, government licenses and reg13 istrations, and other information to collect, aggre14 gate, and integrate data regarding corporate entities 

15 that come within the jurisdiction of the PRC, includ16 ing United States companies operating in the PRC; 

17 (2) use the data referred to in paragraph (1)— 

18 (A) to monitor a corporate entity’s activi19 ties; and 

20 (B) to evaluate and rate certain financial, 

21 social, religious, or political behaviors of the en22 tity and its key personnel; 

23 (3) rates such corporate entities according to 

24 their trustworthiness (as defined by the CCP and 

25 the Government of the PRC); and 


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1 (4) implements punishments and rewards based 

2 on such ratings that have a direct bearing on a cor3 porate entity’s activities within the PRC. 

4 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—The President, act5 ing through the Secretary of Commerce, and in consulta6 tion with the Secretary of State and any other individuals 

7 the President determines should be consulted, shall issue 

8 regulations requiring United States entities with at least 

9 $100,000,000 of assets or other investment in the PRC 

10 to submit a semiannual report regarding the impact of the 

11 corporate social credit system on the ability of such United 

12 States companies to conduct business or otherwise operate 

13 in the PRC. 

14 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The regulations 

15 issued pursuant to subsection (b) shall require each entity 

16 described in such subsection to report information regard17 ing— 

18 (1) the positive and negative impacts of the cor19 porate social credit system on the ability of the enti20 ty to conduct business in the PRC; 

21 (2) major disruptions to the business operations 

22 of the entity that are directly linked to the corporate 

23 social credit system, including in hiring, making con24 tracts, implementing partnerships with other enti25 ties, and other appropriate matters; 


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1 (3) whether the entity has been placed on or re2 moved from a blacklist, untrustworthy entities list, 

3 priority key watchlist, or a redlist within the cor4 porate social credit system; 

5 (4) whether the Government of the PRC took 

6 any actions directed at the entity as a result of a list 

7 described in paragraph (3), including any specific 

8 punishments or rewards; 

9 (5) any instances in which an agent of the Gov10 ernment of the PRC has asked for the resignation 

11 of key leadership within the company due to their 

12 individual social credit scores; 

13 (6) any instances in which an entity within the 

14 Government of PRC at the national, local, or munic15 ipal level informed the entity that it will face a nega16 tive impact on its rating within the corporate social 

17 credit system unless the entity takes a certain course 

18 of action or refrains from taking a certain course of 

19 action; 

20 (7) any instances in which the entity was asked 

21 by an agent of the Government of the PRC to take 

22 an action to accommodate a political position of the 

23 CCP or the Government of the PRC for the pur24 poses of complying with the corporate social credit 

25 system; and 


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1 (8) any instances in which the entity was re2 quired to provide sensitive proprietary business in3 formation to comply with the corporate social credit 

4 system. 

5 (d) CONSULTATION WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR.— 

6 In developing the regulations required under subsection 

7 (b), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the 

8 Secretary of State, shall consult with United States enti9 ties with significant business operations in the PRC. 

10 (e) WILLFUL FAILURE TO REPORT.—Not later than 

11 180 days after the issuance of regulations pursuant to 

12 subsection (b), any United States entity required to report 

13 under such subsection who knowingly and willfully fails 

14 to make such report may, in addition to other penalties 

15 provided by law, be fined not more than $25,000. 

16 SEC. 207. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE 

17 COMPANIES IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL 

18 MARKETS. 

19 (a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 

20 In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com21 mittees’’ means— 

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

23 Senate; 

24 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

25 Senate; 


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1 (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

2 Urban Affairs of the Senate; 

3 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

4 House of Representatives; 

5 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel6 ligence of the House of Representatives; and 

7 (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the 

8 House of Representatives. 

9 (b) REPORT.— 

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

11 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an12 nually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec13 retary of State, in consultation with the Director of 

14 National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treas15 ury, shall submit an unclassified report to the appro16 priate congressional committees that describes the 

17 risks posed to the United States by the presence in 

18 United States capital markets of companies incor19 porated in the PRC. 

20 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

21 required under paragraph (1) shall— 

22 (A) identify companies incorporated in the 

23 PRC that— 

24 (i) are listed or traded on 1 or several 

25 stock exchanges within the United States, 


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1 including over-the-counter market and ‘‘A 

2 Shares’’ added to indexes and exchange3 traded funds out of mainland exchanges in 

4 the PRC; and 

5 (ii) based on the factors for consider6 ation described in paragraph (3), have 

7 knowingly and materially contributed to— 

8 (I) activities that undermine 

9 United States national security; 

10 (II) serious abuses of internation11 ally recognized human rights; or 

12 (III) a substantially increased fi13 nancial risk exposure for United 

14 States-based investors; 

15 (B) describe the activities of the companies 

16 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and 

17 their implications for the United States; and 

18 (C) develop policy recommendations for the 

19 United States Government, State governments, 

20 United States financial institutions, United 

21 States equity and debt exchanges, and other 

22 relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed 

23 by the presence in United States capital mar24 kets of the companies identified pursuant to 

25 subparagraph (A). 


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1 (3) FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.—In com2 pleting the report under paragraph (1), the Presi3 dent shall consider whether a company identified 

4 pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)— 

5 (A) has materially contributed to the devel6 opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated 

7 procurement by the PLA, of lethal military 

8 equipment or component parts of such equip9 ment; 

10 (B) has contributed to the construction 

11 and militarization of features in the South 

12 China Sea; 

13 (C) has been sanctioned by the United 

14 States or has been determined to have con15 ducted business with sanctioned entities; 

16 (D) has engaged in an act or a series of 

17 acts of intellectual property theft; 

18 (E) has engaged in corporate or economic 

19 espionage; 

20 (F) has contributed to the proliferation of 

21 nuclear or missile technology in violation of 

22 United Nations Security Council resolutions or 

23 United States sanctions; 

24 (G) has contributed to the repression of re25 ligious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, 


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1 including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re2 gion or Tibet Autonomous Region; 

3 (H) has contributed to the development of 

4 technologies that enable censorship directed or 

5 directly supported by the Government of the 

6 PRC; 

7 (I) has failed to comply fully with Federal 

8 securities laws (including required audits by the 

9 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) 

10 and ‘‘material risk’’ disclosure requirements of 

11 the Securities and Exchange Commission; or 

12 (J) has contributed to other activities or 

13 behavior determined to be relevant by the Presi14 dent. 

15 (c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub16 section (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 

17 may include a classified annex. 

18 (d) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the 

19 report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to 

20 the public online through relevant United States Govern21 ment websites. 


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1 TITLE III—REINVESTING IN 

2 AMERICAN AND ALLIED 

3 TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETI4 TIVENESS 

5 SEC. 301. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND 

6 PARTNERS. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi8 nation with the heads of other participating executive 

9 branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to 

10 facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United 

11 States Government regulatory and technical agencies and 

12 their counterpart organizations in allied and partner coun13 tries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institu14 tions and organizations— 

15 (1) to promote best practices in regulatory for16 mation and implementation; 

17 (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory 

18 outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other 

19 relevant principles; 

20 (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment 

21 of regulations and regulatory practices; 

22 (4) to build consensus around industry and 

23 technical standards in emerging sectors that will 

24 drive future global economic growth and commerce; 

25 and 


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1 (5) to promote United States standards regard2 ing environmental, labor, and other relevant protec3 tions in regulatory formation and implementation, in 

4 keeping with the values of free and open societies, 

5 including the rule of law. 

6 (b) PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In facilitating 

7 expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall 

8 prioritize— 

9 (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with 

10 countries where greater regulatory coherence, har11 monization of standards, or communication and dia12 logue between technical agencies is achievable and 

13 best advances the economic and national security in14 terests of the United States; 

15 (2) multilateral coordination and coordination 

16 where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization 

17 of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regu18 latory matters is achievable and best advances the 

19 economic and national security interests of the 

20 United States, including with— 

21 (A) the European Union; 

22 (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera23 tion; 

24 (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Na25 tions (ASEAN); 


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1 (D) the Organization for Economic Co2 operation and Development (OECD); and 

3 (E) multilateral development banks; and 

4 (3) regulatory practices and standards setting 

5 bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerg6 ing technologies. 

7 (c) PARTICIPATION BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTI8 TIES.—With regard to the program described in sub9 section (a), the Secretary may facilitate, including through 

10 the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection 

11 (e), the participation of private sector representatives and 

12 other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant 

13 expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such par14 ticipation advances the goals of such program. 

15 (d) DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE SEC16 RETARY.—The Secretary of State is authorized to delegate 

17 the responsibilities described in this section to the Under 

18 Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the 

19 Environment. 

20 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 

22 appropriated $2,500,000 for each of the fiscal years 

23 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section. 


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1 (2) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary may obli2 gate amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph 

3 (1) in a manner that— 

4 (A) facilities participation by representa5 tives from technical agencies within the United 

6 States Government and their counterparts; and 

7 (B) complies with applicable procedural re8 quirements under the State Department Basic 

9 Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et 

10 seq.) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

11 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.). 

12 (f) AGREEMENTS.— 

13 (1) SUBMISSION.—The text of any agreement 

14 concluded under the authorities provided under this 

15 section shall be submitted to the Committee on For16 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

17 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives not 

18 later than 60 days after any notice of intent to be 

19 formally bound by the terms of such agreement. 

20 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each agreement de21 scribed in paragraph (1) shall be legally effective 

22 and binding upon the United States, in accordance 

23 with the terms provided in the agreement, beginning 

24 on— 


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1 (A) the date on which appropriate imple2 menting legislation is enacted into law, which 

3 shall provide for the approval of the specific 

4 agreement or agreements, including attach5 ments, annexes, and supporting documentation; 

6 or 

7 (B) if the agreement is concluded and sub8 mitted as a treaty, the date on which such trea9 ty is ratified by the Senate. 

10 SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM11 PANIES WITH SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICA12 TION AND MANAGEMENT. 

13 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The 

14 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

15 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili16 tate the contracting by United States embassies for the 

17 professional services of qualified experts, on a reimburs18 able fee for service basis, to assist interested United States 

19 persons and business entities with supply chain manage20 ment issues related to the PRC, including— 

21 (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating 

22 certain production facilities to locations outside the 

23 PRC; 


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1 (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef2 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside 

3 of the PRC; 

4 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal5 lenges in the course of the activities described in 

6 paragraphs (1) and (2); and 

7 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc8 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including 

9 through providing market intelligence, facilitating 

10 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, 

11 and other services. 

12 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons 

13 hired to perform the services described in subsection (a) 

14 shall— 

15 (1) be under the authority of the United States 

16 Chief of Mission in the country in which they are 

17 hired, in accordance with existing United States 

18 laws; 

19 (2) coordinate with Department of State and 

20 Department of Commerce officers; and 

21 (3) coordinate with United States missions and 

22 relevant local partners in other countries as needed 

23 to carry out the services described in subsection (a). 

24 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME25 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in 


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1 subsection (a) shall be prioritized to assisting micro-, 

2 small-, and medium-sized enterprises. 

3 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

4 authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of the 

5 fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of car6 rying out this section. 

7 SEC. 303. SCIENTIFIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ADVISORY 

8 PANEL ON PROTECTION OF CRITICAL TECH9 NOLOGIES. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

11 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall es12 tablish an advisory panel comprised of representatives of 

13 the United States private sector, and other members of 

14 the scientific and technology community— 

15 (1) to advise the President on regulatory and 

16 policy matters related to critical infrastructure and 

17 critical technologies (as such terms are defined in 

18 paragraphs (5) and (6) of section 721(a) of the De19 fense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)); 

20 and 

21 (2) to ensure regular consultation and engage22 ment by the Federal Government with the United 

23 States private sector and scientific and technology 

24 community with respect to the matters described in 

25 paragraph (1). 


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1 (b) DUTIES.—In addition to other topics considered 

2 relevant by the President, the National Security Advisor, 

3 the Director of the National Economic Council, or the ad4 visory panel established pursuant to subsection (a), the 

5 advisory panel shall provide information, analysis, and rec6 ommendations to the President, including— 

7 (1) assessing key developments in the economic 

8 and industrial sectors relevant to critical tech9 nologies and critical infrastructure; 

10 (2) safeguarding critical technologies and crit11 ical infrastructure, including the Federal Govern12 ment’s role and the role of the United States private 

13 sector; 

14 (3) developing regulations and policies to con15 tribute to and sustain the United States technology 

16 base; 

17 (4) developing partnerships with United States 

18 allies and partners in scientific and technological de19 velopment, including changes to existing regulations 

20 and policies to better facilitate the development of 

21 such partnerships; 

22 (5) providing assessments of the impact on the 

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1 lations and policies related critical technologies and 

2 critical infrastructure; 

3 (6) engaging in consistent consultations with 

4 the United States private sector during regulatory 

5 and policy formation; and 

6 (7) making available to the United States pri7 vate sector an accurate understanding of new regula8 tions and policies. 

9 (c) MEMBERSHIP.—Members of the advisory panel— 

10 (1) shall be appointed by the President, based 

11 on recommendations of the National Security Advi12 sor, the Director of the National Economic Council, 

13 and the heads of executive agencies designated by 

14 the President; 

15 (2) shall be broadly representative of the key 

16 industries and sectors relevant to the duties and 

17 functions of the panel; 

18 (3) shall consist of not more than 10 private 

19 sector corporate members or executives of industry 

20 and trade associations representing critical tech21 nology sectors; and 

22 (4) shall consist of not more than 10 members 

23 with distinguished backgrounds in relevant scientific 

24 and technological fields or with substantial expertise 

25 in the direct management and oversight of United 


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1 States critical infrastructure, including at least 2 

2 members from the National Academies of Sciences, 

3 Engineering, and Medicine. 

4 (d) PARTICIPATION BY EXECUTIVE AGENCIES.—The 

5 President shall direct— 

6 (1) the Council of Economic Advisors and the 

7 Office of Science and Technology Policy to appoint 

8 personnel to participate in the activities of advisory 

9 panel; and 

10 (2) the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

11 Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sec12 retary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of De13 fense, the Secretary of Energy, and the head of any 

14 other relevant Federal agency to provide personnel 

15 to participate in the task force. 

16 (e) DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICER.—The Presi17 dent shall appoint a full-time or permanent part-time Fed18 eral officer or employee to manage the activities of the 

19 advisory panel. 

20 (f) AUTHORITIES.—The advisory panel shall be gov21 erned by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. 

22 App.). 

23 SEC. 304. ESTABLISHMENT OF A TECH COALITION. 

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that— 


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1 (1) the United States and its allies and part2 ners should collaborate to advance and encourage 

3 the use of international technical standards for new 

4 and emerging technologies; 

5 (2) widespread acceptance of international 

6 standards— 

7 (A) improves the quality of technologies; 

8 (B) reduces barriers to market access for 

9 technology companies; and 

10 (C) ensures the global interoperability of 

11 products and services; 

12 (3) the United States and its allies and part13 ners should lead in defining and upholding norms 

14 for the responsible and ethical development and use 

15 of new and emerging technologies, including— 

16 (A) cybersecurity technologies; 

17 (B) artificial intelligence; 

18 (C) next-generation telecommunications; 

19 (D) semiconductors; 

20 (E) quantum computing; 

21 (F) biotechnology; 

22 (G) the internet; and 

23 (H) the Internet of Things; 

24 (4) the United States should collaborate with 

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1 mote an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable in2 formation and communications infrastructure that 

3 supports international trade and commerce, 

4 strengthens international security, and fosters free 

5 expression and innovation in which norms of respon6 sible behavior guide states’ actions, sustain partner7 ships, and support the rule of law in cyberspace,’’ as 

8 stated in the United States International Strategy 

9 for Cyberspace, which was issued in May 2011; 

10 (5) as stated in the National Cyber Strategy of 

11 the United States of America, issued in September 

12 2018, ‘‘[i]nternational law and voluntary non-bind13 ing norms of responsible state behavior in cyber14 space provide stabilizing, security-enhancing stand15 ards that define acceptable behavior to all states and 

16 promote greater predictability and stability in cyber17 space. . . . Increased public affirmation by the 

18 United States and other governments will lead to ac19 cepted expectations of state behavior and thus con20 tribute to greater predictability and stability in 

21 cyberspace.’’; 

22 (6) the United States and its allies and part23 ners— 

24 (A) should be at the forefront of— 


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1 (i) promoting and sustaining a multi2 stakeholder model for internet governance; 

3 and 

4 (ii) defining standards and norms in 

5 the use of emerging technologies; 

6 (B) should develop norms for the respon7 sible and ethical development and use of tech8 nology, in consultation with the private sectors, 

9 academic institutions, international organiza10 tions, and other relevant experts; and 

11 (C) must collaborate to advance appro12 priate confidence-building measures between 

13 states regarding the development of new and 

14 emerging technologies, which will create a 

15 framework for cooperation and promote greater 

16 stability in cyberspace; 

17 (7) the private sector must continue to play the 

18 leading role in— 

19 (A) developing and deploying new and 

20 emerging technologies; 

21 (B) advancing international technical 

22 standards in appropriate standards-setting in23 stitutions; and 

24 (C) sharing responsibility for implementing 

25 norms and standards; 


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1 (8) the United States should ensure a coordi2 nated approach across the entire Federal Govern3 ment for advocating for international standards and 

4 norms relevant to new and emerging technologies; 

5 (9) the United States Government should re6 view how it can best support private sector-led initia7 tives to set new international standards and norms; 

8 and 

9 (10) the establishment of a technology coalition 

10 between the United States and interested, like-mind11 ed partners is necessary to uphold existing, and to 

12 establish new, standards and norms that will sustain 

13 an open internet, safeguard free and open societies, 

14 and set the standards for new and emerging tech15 nologies. 

16 (b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 

17 In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com18 mittees’’ means— 

19 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

20 Senate; and 

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

22 House of Representatives. 

23 (c) TECH COALITION.—The President should seek to 

24 establish a coalition of countries that are committed to— 


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1 (1) the safe and responsible development and 

2 use of new and emerging technologies and the estab3 lishment of related norms and standards; 

4 (2) a secure internet architecture governed by a 

5 multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized gov6 ernment control; 

7 (3) robust international cooperation to promote 

8 an open internet and interoperable technological 

9 products and services that are necessary to freedom, 

10 innovation, transparency, and privacy; and 

11 (4) multilateral coordination, including through 

12 diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other 

13 activities, to defend the principles described in para14 graphs (1) through (3) against efforts by state and 

15 non-state actors to undermine them. 

16 (d) FUNCTIONS.—The President, acting through the 

17 Secretary of State, should undertake regular efforts to co18 ordinate with other members of the coalition established 

19 pursuant to subsection (c)— 

20 (1) to establish and advocate for norms, stand21 ards, and regulations to ensure that the development 

22 and application of new and emerging technologies 

23 uphold the goals of shared prosperity, security, and 

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1 gagement in international organizations and stand2 ards-setting bodies, such as— 

3 (A) the International Organization for 

4 Standardization; 

5 (B) the Internet Engineering Task Force; 

6 (C) the Internet Electrotechnical Commis7 sion; 

8 (D) the United Nations International Tele9 communication Union; 

10 (E) the United Nations Internet Govern11 ance Forum; 

12 (F) the United Nations Group of Govern13 mental Experts on Developments in the Field of 

14 Information and Telecommunications in the 

15 Context of International Security (UN CGE); 

16 (G) the United Nations Open-Ended 

17 Working Group on Developments in the Field 

18 of Information and Telecommunications in the 

19 Context of International Security; 

20 (H) the United Nations Commission on 

21 Science and Technology for Development 

22 (CSTD); 

23 (I) the Directorate for Science, Technology 

24 and Innovation of the Organisation for Eco25 nomic Co-operation and Development; and 


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1 (J) other international standards organiza2 tions and multilateral norm-setting bodies, as 

3 appropriate; 

4 (2) to support and expand adherence to inter5 national treaties and frameworks governing respon6 sible behavior in cyberspace and the use of new and 

7 emerging technologies, including— 

8 (A) the Council of Europe’s Convention on 

9 Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 23, 

10 2001; 

11 (B) the Organization for Security and Co12 operation in Europe Decision 1202 on Con13 fidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks 

14 of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Informa15 tion and Communication Technologies, decided 

16 in Vienna March 10, 2016; 

17 (C) the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza18 tion Cyber Defense Pledge, done in Warsaw 

19 July 8, 2016; 

20 (D) the G7 Declaration of Responsible 

21 States Behavior in Cyberspace, done in Lucca, 

22 Italy April 11, 2017; 

23 (E) the Prague Proposals, done in Prague 

24 May 3, 2019; and 


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1 (F) other relevant international frame2 works, as appropriate; 

3 (3) to support and expand adherence to inter4 national frameworks governing responsible regula5 tion of new and emerging technologies to support 

6 international trade and economic development, in7 cluding through World Trade Organization agree8 ments, such as— 

9 (A) the Agreement on Technical Barriers 

10 to Trade, done at Geneva April 12, 1979; 

11 (B) the General Agreement on Trade in 

12 Services (entered in force January 1, 1995); 

13 and 

14 (C) agreements by the United Nations 

15 Working Group on Electronic Commerce; 

16 (4) to coordinate export control policies, includ17 ing through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export 

18 Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 

19 Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague Decem20 ber 1995, supply chain security, and investment in 

21 or licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-use 

22 technologies; 

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1 cial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum com2 puting, and other industries; 

3 (6) to coordinate, as appropriate, dialogues and 

4 other initiatives between United States domestic reg5 ulatory agencies, States, local governments, private 

6 sector entities, and nongovernmental organizations, 

7 with their counterpart organizations in other coun8 tries that are members of the coalition established 

9 pursuant to subsection (c), on best practices in de10 veloping and upholding standards and norms for 

11 emerging technologies, including through the pro12 gram established under section 301; and 

13 (7) to deter state and non-state actors from en14 gaging in malicious and illegal activities in cyber15 space and from using new and emerging technologies 

16 in violation of the norms and standards described in 

17 this subsection. 

18 (e) BRIEFING.—The Secretary of State, or the Sec19 retary’s designee, shall semiannually brief the appropriate 

20 congressional committees regarding the activities de21 scribed in subsection (d). Such briefings shall include rep22 resentatives from other Federal agencies who participate 

23 in such activities, as appropriate. 

24 (f) AGREEMENTS.— 


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1 (1) SUBMISSION.—The text of any agreement 

2 concluded under the authorities provided under this 

3 section shall be submitted to the Committee on For4 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

5 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives not 

6 later than 60 days after any notice of intent to be 

7 formally bound by the terms of such agreement. 

8 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each agreement de9 scribed in paragraph (1) shall be legally effective 

10 and binding upon the United States, in accordance 

11 with the terms provided in the agreement, beginning 

12 on— 

13 (A) the date on which appropriate imple14 menting legislation is enacted into law, which 

15 shall provide for the approval of the specific 

16 agreement or agreements, including attach17 ments, annexes, and supporting documentation; 

18 or 

19 (B) if the agreement is concluded and sub20 mitted as a treaty, the date on which such trea21 ty is ratified by the Senate. 


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1 SEC. 305. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND2 ARDS-SETTING BODIES. 

3 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

4 ‘‘Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G 

5 Act of 2020’’. 

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con7 gress that— 

8 (1) the United States and its allies and part9 ners should maintain participation and leadership at 

10 international standards-setting bodies for 5th and 

11 future generations mobile telecommunications sys12 tems and infrastructure; 

13 (2) the United States should work with its allies 

14 and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop15 ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th 

16 and future generations mobile telecommunications 

17 systems and infrastructure; and 

18 (3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu19 rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between 

20 the United States and its allies and partners is a na21 tional security interest of the United States. 

22 (c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP

23 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS24 SETTING BODIES.— 

25 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall— 


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1 (A) establish an interagency working group 

2 to provide assistance and technical expertise to 

3 enhance the representation and leadership of 

4 the United States at international bodies that 

5 set standards for equipment, systems, software, 

6 and virtually-defined networks that support 5th 

7 and future generations mobile telecommuni8 cations systems and infrastructure, such as the 

9 International Telecommunication Union and the 

10 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and 

11 (B) work with allies, partners, and the pri12 vate sector to increase productive engagement. 

13 (2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The 

14 interagency working group described in paragraph 

15 (1)— 

16 (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of 

17 State or a designee of the Secretary of State; 

18 and 

19 (B) shall consist of the head (or designee) 

20 of each Federal department or agency the 

21 President determines appropriate. 

22 (3) BRIEFING.— 

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 

24 days after the date of the enactment of this 

25 Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided in 


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1 subparagraph (A), the interagency working 

2 group described in paragraph (1) shall provide 

3 a briefing to the Committee on Foreign Rela4 tions of the Senate and the Committee on For5 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives 

6 that includes— 

7 (i) a strategy to promote United 

8 States leadership at international stand9 ards-setting bodies for equipment, systems, 

10 software, and virtually-defined networks 

11 relevant to 5th and future generation mo12 bile telecommunications systems and infra13 structure, taking into account the different 

14 processes followed by the various inter15 national standard-setting bodies; 

16 (ii) a strategy for diplomatic engage17 ment with allies and partners to share se18 curity risk information and findings per19 taining to equipment that supports or is 

20 used in 5th and future generations mobile 

21 telecommunications systems and infra22 structure and cooperation on mitigating 

23 such risks; 

24 (iii) a discussion of China’s presence 

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1 setting bodies relevant to 5th and future 

2 generation mobile telecommunications sys3 tems and infrastructure, including infor4 mation on the differences in the scope and 

5 scale of China’s engagement at such bodies 

6 compared to engagement by the United 

7 States or its allies and partners and the 

8 security risks raised by Chinese proposals 

9 in such standards-setting bodies; and 

10 (iv) a strategy for engagement with 

11 private sector communications and infor12 mation service providers, equipment devel13 opers, academia, federally funded research 

14 and development centers, and other pri15 vate-sector stakeholders to propose and de16 velop secure standards for equipment, sys17 tems, software, and virtually-defined net18 works that support 5th and future genera19 tion mobile telecommunications systems 

20 and infrastructure. 

21 (B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon re22 ceiving a request from the Committee on For23 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 

24 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa25 tives, or as determined appropriate by the chair 


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1 of the interagency working group established 

2 pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency 

3 working group shall provide the requesting com4 mittee an updated briefing that covers the mat5 ters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of sub6 paragraph (A). 

7 TITLE IV—SAFEGUARDING 

8 AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 

9 SEC. 401. AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION 

10 ACT REGARDING GIFTS MADE TO UNIVER11 SITIES. 

12 Section 3(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 

13 of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613(e)) is amended— 

14 (1) by striking ‘‘Any person’’ and inserting the 

15 following: 

16 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Any person’’; and 

17 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

18 ‘‘(2) WAIVER OF EXEMPTION RECOMMENDA19 TION.—The Secretary of Education, the Secretary of 

20 State, and the Attorney General may jointly submit 

21 a recommendation to the President to waive the ex22 ception under this subsection for an institution of 

23 higher education (as defined in section 101 of the 

24 Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001) 

25 that has accepted a gift from, or has entered into a 


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1 contract, agreement, affiliation, or similar trans2 action (not including tuition payments) with, a for3 eign government that requires a disclosure under 

4 section 117 of such Act (20 U.S.C. 1011f). 

5 ‘‘(3) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.—The 

6 President, after consideration of a joint rec7 ommendation submitted pursuant to paragraph (2), 

8 may determine that a foreign source gift, contract, 

9 agreement or similar transaction required to be dis10 closed under section 117 of the Higher Education 

11 Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) that has been accept12 ed by an institution of higher education has created 

13 a relationship of foreign agency with a foreign 

14 source that requires registration of the appropriate 

15 representatives of the institution as a foreign agent 

16 or agents under section 2(a).’’. 

17 SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF A COUNTRY OF NATIONAL SE18 CURITY CONCERN IN THE FOREIGN AGENT 

19 REGISTRATION ACT. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3 of the Foreign Agents 

21 Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613) is amended by 

22 adding at the end the following: 

23 ‘‘(i) COUNTRIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY CON24 CERN.—The President may issue a finding that a country 

25 constitutes a significant threat to the national security of 


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1 the United States and should be designated a ‘country of 

2 national security concern’ after— 

3 ‘‘(1) considering a joint recommendation sub4 mitted pursuant to section 402(c) of the Strength5 ening Trade, Regional Alliances, Technology, and 

6 Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives concerning 

7 China Act; 

8 ‘‘(2) consulting with the Committee on Foreign 

9 Relations of the Senate, the Committee on the Judi10 ciary of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Af11 fairs of the House of Representatives, and the Com12 mittee on the Judiciary of the House of Representa13 tives; and 

14 ‘‘(3) providing a written detailed justification 

15 for such designation to the appropriate congressional 

16 committees.’’. 

17 (b) WAIVER OF EXEMPTIONS.— 

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Upon designating a country 

19 as a ‘‘country of national security concern’’ under 

20 section 3(i) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 

21 of 1938, as added by subsection (a), the President 

22 may waive any of the exemptions for agents of for23 eign principals set forth in subsections (d), (e), and 

24 (h) of section 3 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 613) for up 

25 to 1 year. 


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1 (2) RENEWALS.—The President may renew 

2 waivers under this subsection for additional 1-year 

3 periods, in accordance with paragraph (1), while the 

4 country in question continues to present a threat to 

5 the national security of the United States. 

6 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of 

7 this section, a waiver under paragraph (1) shall not 

8 apply to bona fide religious pursuits referred to in 

9 section 3(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 

10 of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613(e)). 

11 (c) RECOMMENDATION.—The Secretary of State, in 

12 coordination with the Attorney General, may jointly sub13 mit a recommendation to the President that a country 

14 constitutes a significant national security threat to the 

15 United States of such nature that 1 or more of the exemp16 tions set forth in subsections (d), (e), and (h), of section 

17 3 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 

18 U.S.C. 613) should be waived for up to 1 year. 

19 (d) TERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.—The Presi20 dent may suspend or terminate the designation of a coun21 try as a country of national security concern under section 

22 3(i) of such Act, as added by subsection (a), and any asso23 ciated reporting requirements, if the President determines 

24 such country no longer presents a threat to the national 

25 security of the United States. 


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1 (e) ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE MEASURES.—The At2 torney General, in coordination with the Secretary of 

3 State, may establish enhanced reporting requirements 

4 under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 

5 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) for agents representing foreign prin6 cipals of a designated ‘‘country of national security con7 cern’’ under section 613(i) of such Act, as added by sub8 section (a), including enhanced transparency and report9 ing requirements, as appropriate. 

10 SEC. 403. BAN ON SENATE-CONFIRMED DEPARTMENT OF 

11 STATE OFFICIALS REPRESENTING COUN12 TRIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN. 

13 (a) DEFINED TERM.—Section 1 of the Foreign 

14 Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611) is 

15 amended by inserting after subsection (i) the following: 

16 ‘‘(j) The term ‘country of national security concern’ 

17 means a country designated under section 3(i).’’. 

18 (b) REPRESENTATION AFTER SERVICE.—Section 

19 207(f) of title 18, United States Code, is amended— 

20 (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as para21 graph (4); and 

22 (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the fol23 lowing: 

24 ‘‘(3) SPECIAL RULE FOR SENIOR OFFICIALS OF

25 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—With respect to a 


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1 person serving as a senior official at the Department 

2 of State who was appointed by the President and 

3 confirmed by the Senate, the restrictions described 

4 in paragraph (1) shall apply to representing the gov5 ernment of a country of national security concern 

6 (as defined in section 1(j) of the Foreign Agents 

7 Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(j))) at any 

8 time— 

9 ‘‘(A) after the termination of such service; 

10 and 

11 ‘‘(B) during the period that such country 

12 is designated a country of national security con13 cern.’’. 

14 (c) LIMITATION ON APPOINTMENT AS A SENATE15 CONFIRMED DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIAL.—Section 

16 841 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 

17 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended by adding at the end 

18 the following: 

19 ‘‘(h) LIMITATION ON APPOINTMENTS.—A person who 

20 has directly represented the government of a country of 

21 national security concern (as defined in section 1(j) of the 

22 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 

23 611(j))) may not be appointed by the President to serve 

24 in a position within the Department of State that requires 

25 Senate confirmation.’’. 


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1 SEC. 404. AMENDMENT TO THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL 

2 AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT. 

3 The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act 

4 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.) is amended by inserting 

5 after section 108A the following: 

6 ‘‘SEC. 108B. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO 

7 PARTICIPATION BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN 

8 CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS INVOLV9 ING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

10 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—In applying section 108A of the 

11 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (22 

12 U.S.C. 2458a) with respect to any cultural exchange pro13 gram that involves the Government of the People’s Repub14 lic of China, the Secretary of State shall require a report 

15 to be submitted to the Department of State, not later than 

16 January 31, 2022, and annually thereafter through 2027, 

17 by— 

18 ‘‘(1) any element within the Government of the 

19 People’s Republic of China that has an agreement 

20 currently in force with the Department of State pur21 suant to section 108A; and 

22 ‘‘(2) any United States entity that carries out 

23 a program pursuant to an agreement described in 

24 paragraph (1). 


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1 ‘‘(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report sub2 mitted under subsection (a) shall include, for the relevant 

3 reporting period— 

4 ‘‘(1) the total number of cultural exchange pro5 grams conducted by the reporting entity; 

6 ‘‘(2) a description of each program referred to 

7 in paragraph (1), including— 

8 ‘‘(A) the purpose of each such program; 

9 and 

10 ‘‘(B) an agenda or itinerary that describes 

11 the activities engaged in by program partici12 pants; and 

13 ‘‘(3) a list of participants in each such pro14 gram, including the names and professional affili15 ation of the participants during such program. 

16 ‘‘(c) FAILURE TO REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF

17 THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—If any entity de18 scribed in subsection (a)(1) fails to submit the report re19 quired under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall 

20 suspend the agreement between the entity and the Depart21 ment of State until the entity within the Government of 

22 the People’s Republic of China has submitted such report. 

23 ‘‘(d) FAILURE TO REPORT BY A UNITED STATES

24 ENTITY.—Any United States entity described in sub25 section (a)(2) that fails to submit the report required 


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1 under subsection (a) shall be ineligible to receive any 

2 funds, in the form of grants or otherwise, from the De3 partment of State until such entity has submitted such 

4 report. 

5 ‘‘(e) RULEMAKING.—The Secretary of State shall 

6 promulgate regulations to carry out this section. 

7 ‘‘(f) SUMMARY REPORT.— 

8 ‘‘(1) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later 

9 than July 30, 2022, and annually thereafter through 

10 2027, the Secretary of State shall submit a sum11 mary of the reports received from the entities de12 scribed in subsection (a) to the appropriate congres13 sional committees. 

14 ‘‘(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The sum15 mary required under paragraph (1) shall include, for 

16 the reporting period— 

17 ‘‘(A) the total number of cultural exchange 

18 programs conducted; 

19 ‘‘(B) the total number of participants in 

20 such cultural exchange programs; 

21 ‘‘(C) a list of the professional affiliations of 

22 such participants; 

23 ‘‘(D) an overview of the cultural exchange 

24 programs, including illustrative examples of ac25 tivities in which participants engaged; 


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1 ‘‘(E) an assessment of whether the cultural 

2 programs conducted during the reporting period 

3 adhere to purposes set forth in section 101, in4 cluding a description of any noticeable devi5 ations from such purposes; and 

6 ‘‘(F) a description of all actions by the De7 partment of State to remediate deviations from 

8 such purposes. 

9 ‘‘(3) FORM OF REPORT.—The summary re10 quired under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in 

11 unclassified form.’’. 

12 TITLE V—MAINTAINING THE IN13 TEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL 

14 ORGANIZATIONS 

15 SEC. 501. OFFICE OF INTEGRITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS 

16 SYSTEM. 

17 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.— 

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

19 establish, within the Bureau of International Organi20 zation Affairs of the Department of State, the Office 

21 of Integrity in the United Nations System (referred 

22 to in this section as the ‘‘UN Integrity Office’’). 

23 (2) OFFICE LEADERSHIP.— 

24 (A) HEAD OF OFFICE.—The Secretary of 

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1 ior Foreign Service to head the UN Integrity 

2 Office. 

3 (B) SPECIAL ENVOY.—The Secretary of 

4 State may appoint a Special Envoy for Integ5 rity in the United Nations System. 

6 (b) PURPOSE OF OFFICE.—The UN Integrity Office 

7 shall assume the primary responsibility for— 

8 (1) promoting United States participation in 

9 the United Nations System; 

10 (2) ensuring that United Nations employees up11 hold the principals of impartiality enshrined in the 

12 United Nations charter, rules, and regulations; 

13 (3) monitoring and countering undue influence, 

14 especially by authoritarian nations, within the 

15 United Nations System; 

16 (4) promoting participation and inclusion of 

17 Taiwan in the United Nations System; and 

18 (5) advancing other priorities deemed relevant 

19 by the Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity 

20 of the United Nations System. 

21 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the 

22 amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Department 

23 of State for administration of foreign affairs, not less than 

24 $1,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 


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1 2022 and for each subsequent fiscal year for the UN In2 tegrity Office. 

3 TITLE VI—BOLSTERING UNITED 

4 STATES AND ALLIED DE5 FENSE AND SECURITY 

6 SEC. 601. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) The People’s Republic of China aims to use 

9 its growing military might in concert with other in10 struments of its national power to displace the 

11 United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish he12 gemony over the region. 

13 (2) The military balance in the Indo-Pacific re14 gion is increasingly unfavorable to the United States 

15 because— 

16 (A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and 

17 expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project 

18 power and create contested areas across the en19 tire Indo-Pacific region; 

20 (B) PLA modernization has largely fo21 cused on areas where it possesses operational 

22 advantages and can exploit weaknesses in the 

23 United States’ suite of capabilities; and 

24 (C) current United States force structure 

25 and presence do not sufficiently counter threats 


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1 in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, 

2 bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific re3 gion are concentrated in large bases that are 

4 highly vulnerable to the PRC’s strike capabili5 ties. 

6 (3) This shift in the regional military balance 

7 and erosion of conventional deterrence in the Indo8 Pacific region— 

9 (A) presents a substantial and imminent 

10 risk to the security of the United States; and 

11 (B) left unchecked, could embolden the 

12 PRC to take actions, including the use of mili13 tary force, to change the status quo before the 

14 United States can mount an effective response. 

15 (4) The PRC believes the political bonds be16 tween the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies 

17 are weakening. The PRC sees an opportunity to di18 minish confidence among United States allies and 

19 partners in the strength of United States commit20 ments, even to the extent that these nations feel 

21 compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect 

22 their interests. The PRC is closely monitoring the 

23 United States’ reaction to PRC pressure and coer24 cion of United States allies, searching for indicators 

25 of United States resolve. 


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1 (5) Achieving so-called ‘‘reunification’’ of Tai2 wan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC 

3 to achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The 

4 PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its 

5 exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as 

6 amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in the Tai7 wan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Tai8 wan, and flights across the unofficial median line in 

9 the Taiwan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s 

10 full submission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates 

11 the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the 

12 defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority. 

13 (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to— 

14 (A) retaining the United States’ credibility 

15 as a defender of the democratic values and free16 market principles embodied by Taiwan’s people 

17 and government; 

18 (B) limiting the PLA’s ability to project 

19 power beyond the First Island Chain, including 

20 to United States territory, such as Guam and 

21 Hawaii; 

22 (C) defending the territorial integrity of 

23 Japan; and 


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1 (D) preventing the PLA from diverting 

2 military planning, resources, and personnel to 

3 broader military ambitions. 

4 (7) The PRC has capitalized on the world’s at5 tention to COVID–19 to advance its military objec6 tives in the South China Sea, intensifying and accel7 erating trends already underway. The PRC has sent 

8 militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclu9 sive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of 

10 an administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel 

11 Islands under the Chinese local government of 

12 Sansha, aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine 

13 navy ship, encroached on Indonesia’s fishing 

14 grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, announced 

15 new ‘‘research stations’’ on Fiery Cross Reef and 

16 Subi Reef, and landed special military aircraft on 

17 Fiery Cross Reef to routinize such deployments. 

18 (8) On July 13, 2020, Secretary of State Mi19 chael R. Pompeo clarified United States policy on 

20 the South China Sea and stated, ‘‘Beijing’s claims 

21 to offshore resources across most of the South China 

22 Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of 

23 bullying to control them.’’. 

24 (9) These actions enable the PLA to exert in25 fluence and project power deeper into Oceania and 


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1 the Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil Davidson, Com2 mander of Indo-Pacific Command, testified in 2019, 

3 ‘‘In short, China is now capable of controlling the 

4 South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with 

5 the United States.’’. 

6 (10) The PLA also continues to advance its 

7 claims in the East China Sea, including through a 

8 high number of surface combatant patrols and fre9 quent entry into the territorial waters of the 

10 Senkaku Islands, over which the United States rec11 ognizes Japan’s administrative control. In April 

12 2014, President Barack Obama stated, ‘‘Our com13 mitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article 

14 five [of the U.S.-Japan security treaty] covers all 

15 territory under Japan’s administration, including the 

16 Senkaku islands.’’. 

17 (11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Mi18 chael R. Pompeo stated, ‘‘As the South China Sea 

19 is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Phil20 ippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South 

21 China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations 

22 under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.’’. 

23 (12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining crit24 ical capability in every branch and every domain, in25 cluding— 


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1 (A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a 

2 great maritime power or ‘‘blue-water’’ navy that 

3 can completely control all activity within the 

4 First Island Chain and project power beyond it 

5 with a massive fleet of 425 battle force ships by 

6 2030; 

7 (B) increasing the size and range of its 

8 strike capabilities, including approximately 

9 1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate10 range missiles capable of targeting United 

11 States allies and partners in the First and Sec12 ond Island chains, United States bases in the 

13 Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea; 

14 (C) boosting capabilities for air warfare, 

15 including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters 

16 and S-400 air defense systems, new J-20 5th 

17 generation stealth fighters, and Y-20 heavy lift 

18 aircraft; and 

19 (D) making critical investments in new do20 mains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, elec21 tronic warfare, and space warfare. 

22 (13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization 

23 through all means at its disposal, including its Mili24 tary-Civil Fusion initiative, which, as United States 

25 Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford said 


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1 in March 2020, ‘‘aims to make any technology ac2 cessible to anyone under the PRC’s jurisdiction 

3 available to support the Chinese Communist Party’s 

4 ambitions.’’ It enlists the whole of PRC society in 

5 developing and acquiring technology with military 

6 applications to pursue technological advantage over 

7 the United States in artificial intelligence, 

8 hypersonic glide vehicles, directed energy weapons, 

9 electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons, 

10 and other emerging capabilities. 

11 (14) The United States’ lead in the develop12 ment of science and technology relevant to defense 

13 is eroding in the face of competition from the PRC. 

14 United States research and development spending on 

15 defense capabilities has declined sharply as a share 

16 of global research and development. The commercial 

17 sector’s leading role in innovation presents certain 

18 unique challenges to the Department of Defense’s 

19 reliance on technology for battlefield advantage. 

20 (15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic re21 search and development expenditures, supported the 

22 growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped 

23 into a large workforce to invest in fostering science 

24 and engineering talent. 


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1 (16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense 

2 and security capabilities to build its defense tech3 nology and industrial base and improve its own mili4 tary capabilities. For example, the PRC has enjoyed 

5 particular success in exporting numerous unmanned 

6 aerial systems (UAS). Such exports have helped it 

7 establish new defense relationships, test its systems 

8 under operational conditions, and refine its designs 

9 for its own forces. The PRC has exploited an avail10 able gap in the global market, as the PRC does not 

11 subject itself to the limitations of the Missile Tech12 nology Control Regime, which is a voluntary protocol 

13 under which the United States and other members 

14 restrict their own UAS exports. PLA military ana15 lyst Song Zhongping has noted that ‘‘the Chinese 

16 [defense] product now doesn’t lack technology, it 

17 only lacks market share, and the United States re18 stricting its arms exports is precisely what gives 

19 China a great opportunity.’’. 


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1 SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY EXPRESSING THE POLIT2 ICAL WILL OF THE UNITED STATES TO DE3 FEND ITS INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

4 AND PURSUE EXPANDED POLITICAL-MILI5 TARY COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PART6 NERS. 

7 It is the policy of the United States— 

8 (1) to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region as the 

9 most important political-military theater for United 

10 States foreign policy; 

11 (2) to prioritize resources for achieving United 

12 States political and military objectives in this most 

13 critical region, while still balancing resources for 

14 other lower-priority security challenges across the 

15 globe; 

16 (3) to reaffirm and strengthen United States 

17 commitments to treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific re18 gion, as articulated by successive United States ad19 ministrations and in the Asia Reassurance Initiative 

20 Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5387), 

21 including— 

22 (A) with respect to Japan— 

23 (i) upholding the Treaty of Mutual 

24 Cooperation and Security Between Japan 

25 and the United States of America, done at 


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1 Washington January 19, 1960, and all re2 lated and subsequent security agreements; 

3 (ii) recognizing Japan’s administrative 

4 control over the Senkaku Islands and mar5 itime exclusive economic zones in the East 

6 China Sea; and 

7 (iii) further advancing defense co8 operation in priority areas, such as long9 range precision fires, missile defense, mari10 time security, space, cyberspace, and the 

11 electromagnetic spectrum; 

12 (B) with respect to the Republic of 

13 Korea— 

14 (i) upholding the Mutual Defense 

15 Treaty Between the United States and the 

16 Republic of Korea, done at Washington 

17 October 1, 1953, and all related and subse18 quent security agreements; and 

19 (ii) strengthening alliance defense and 

20 deterrence capabilities; 

21 (C) with respect to Australia and New 

22 Zealand— 

23 (i) upholding the Security Treaty Be24 tween the United States, Australia, and 

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1 tember 1, 1951, and all related and subse2 quent security agreements; 

3 (ii) increasing collaboration to address 

4 shared security challenges; and 

5 (iii) providing mutual support in the 

6 face of coercion; 

7 (D) with respect to the Philippines— 

8 (i) upholding the Mutual Defense 

9 Treaty Between the United States and the 

10 Republic of the Philippines, done at Wash11 ington August 30, 1951, including commit12 ments relevant to the South China Sea, 

13 and all related and subsequent security ar14 rangements; and 

15 (ii) cooperating with the Philippines 

16 to build and maintain defense capabilities, 

17 particularly in the maritime domain, that 

18 enable the Philippines to protect its sov19 ereignty and resist external coercion; and 

20 (E) with respect to Thailand— 

21 (i) upholding the security treaties and 

22 all related and subsequent security ar23 rangements that underpin the United 

24 States-Thailand alliance; and 


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1 (ii) reinvigorating defense cooperation 

2 and partnership through exercises, train3 ing, and interoperability that enable it to 

4 protect its sovereignty and resist external 

5 coercion; 

6 (4) to collaborate with United States treaty al7 lies in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral 

8 security and defense cooperation with other regional 

9 partners; 

10 (5) to sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public 

11 Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ‘‘Six As12 surances’’ provided by the United States to Taiwan 

13 in July 1982 as the foundations for United States14 Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent 

15 possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations 

16 of the United States and Taiwan, including coopera17 tion to support the development of a capable, ready, 

18 and modern forces necessary for the defense of Tai19 wan; 

20 (6) to enhance security partnerships with India, 

21 across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the 

22 Indo-Pacific, including as described in sections 204, 

23 205, and 208 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 

24 of 2018 (Public Law 115–409); 


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1 (7) to deter, in the shorter term, the PRC from 

2 capitalizing on the world’s focus on the COVID–19 

3 pandemic to advance its military objectives in the 

4 Western Pacific, including deterring more aggressive 

5 behavior towards Taiwan and in the South China 

6 Sea; 

7 (8) to deter, over the longer term, acts of ag8 gression or coercion by the PRC against United 

9 States and allies’ interests along the First Island 

10 Chain and in the Western Pacific by showing PRC 

11 leaders that the United States can and is willing to 

12 deny them the ability to achieve their objectives, in13 cluding by— 

14 (A) consistently demonstrating the political 

15 will of the United States to deepening existing 

16 treaty alliances and growing new partnerships 

17 as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched stra18 tegic advantage to the PRC’s growing military 

19 capabilities and reach; 

20 (B) maintaining a system of forward-de21 ployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the 

22 most visible sign of United States resolve and 

23 commitment to the region, and as platforms to 

24 ensure United States operational readiness and 


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1 advance interoperability with allies and part2 ners; 

3 (C) adopting a more dispersed force pos4 ture throughout the region, particularly the 

5 Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access 

6 for United States mobile and relocatable 

7 launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and 

8 hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific 

9 region; 

10 (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike 

11 networks to United States and allied forces, in12 cluding ground-launched cruise missiles, under13 sea and naval capabilities, and integrated air 

14 and missile defense in the First Island Chain 

15 and the Second Island Chain, in order to im16 pose high risks on the PRC for operating in 

17 these zones, and maximize the United States’ 

18 ability to operate; 

19 (E) strengthening extended deterrence to 

20 demonstrate that escalation against key United 

21 States interests would be costly, risky, and self22 defeating; and 

23 (F) collaborating with allies and partners 

24 to accelerate their roles in more equitably shar25 ing the burdens of mutual defense, including 


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1 through the acquisition and fielding of advanced 

2 capabilities and training that will better enable 

3 them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and 

4 (9) to convey to the PRC that, in the event that 

5 deterrence by denial fails, the United States, if nec6 essary— 

7 (A) will impose prohibitive diplomatic, eco8 nomic, financial, reputational, and military 

9 costs on the PRC for its aggression; and 

10 (B) will defend itself and its allies regard11 less of the point of origin of attacks against 

12 them. 

13 SEC. 603. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING 

14 SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PA15 CIFIC. 

16 It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster 

17 United States security partnership in the Indo-Pacific 

18 must include— 

19 (1) supporting Japan in its development of 

20 long-range precision fires, air and missile defense ca21 pacity, interoperability across all domains, maritime 

22 security, and intelligence, and surveillance and re23 connaissance capabilities; 

24 (2) launching a United States-Japan national 

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1 vate sector cooperation for new technologies that 

2 could benefit the United States’ and Japan’s mutual 

3 security objectives; 

4 (3) promoting a deeper defense relationship be5 tween Japan and Australia, including supporting re6 ciprocal access agreements and trilateral United 

7 States-Japan-Australia intelligence sharing; 

8 (4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan’s accel9 erated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, 

10 which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan 

11 from invasion, including long-range precision fires, 

12 anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-armor, air 

13 defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, con14 trol, communications, computers, intelligence, sur15 veillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and resilient 

16 command and control capabilities, and increasing 

17 the conduct of relevant and practical training and 

18 exercises with Taiwan’s defense forces; and 

19 (5) prioritizing building the capacity of United 

20 States allies and partners to protect defense tech21 nology. 

22 SEC. 604. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO23 PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS. 

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that— 


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1 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and 

2 strengthen existing measures under the United 

3 States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide 

4 capabilities to allies and partners, prioritizing allies 

5 and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accord6 ance with United States strategic imperatives; 

7 (2) the United States should design for export 

8 to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities crit9 ical to maintaining a favorable military balance in 

10 the region, including long-range precision fires, air 

11 and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise mis12 siles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional 

13 hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and re14 connaissance capabilities, and command and control 

15 systems; 

16 (3) the United States should pursue, to the 

17 maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology 

18 security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems 

19 described in paragraph (2); and 

20 (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 

21 the Secretary of Defense, should— 

22 (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 

23 sufficient quantities of munitions to meet con24 tingency requirements and avoid the need for 

25 accessing United States stocks in wartime; and 


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1 (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 

2 munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ 

3 capacity to produce such munitions. 

4 (b) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘ap5 propriate congressional committees’’ means— 

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

7 Senate; 

8 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

9 Senate; 

10 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

11 House of Representatives; and 

12 (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

13 House of Representatives. 

14 (c) REPORT.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

16 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

17 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De18 fense, shall submit a report to the appropriate con19 gressional committees that— 

20 (A) describes United States priorities for 

21 building more capable security partners in the 

22 Indo-Pacific region; and 

23 (B) identifies legal, regulatory, or other ob24 stacles to advancing such priorities. 


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1 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

2 required under paragraph (1) shall— 

3 (A) provide a priority list of defense and 

4 military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and 

5 partners must possess for the United States to 

6 be able to achieve its military objectives in the 

7 Indo-Pacific region; 

8 (B) identify, from the list referred to in 

9 subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 

10 provided, or can only be provided, by the 

11 United States; 

12 (C) identify— 

13 (i) actions required to prioritize 

14 United States Government resources and 

15 personnel to expedite fielding the capabili16 ties identified in subparagraph (B); and 

17 (ii) steps needed to fully account for 

18 and a plan to integrate all means of 

19 United States foreign military sales, direct 

20 commercial sales, security assistance, and 

21 all applicable authorities of the Depart22 ment of State and the Department of De23 fense; 

24 (D) assess the requirements for United 

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1 national Military Education and Training, in 

2 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means 

3 to deliver critical partner capability require4 ments identified in subparagraph (B); 

5 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet 

6 the requirements for United States security as7 sistance, and identify resource gaps; 

8 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 

9 requirements for United States security assist10 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re11 sources and personnel limits, legislative and pol12 icy barriers, and factors related to specific part13 ner countries; 

14 (G) identify limitations on the United 

15 States ability to provide such capabilities, in16 cluding those identified under subparagraph 

17 (B), because of existing United States treaty 

18 obligations, or United States law, policies, or 

19 other regulations; 

20 (H) recommend changes to existing laws, 

21 regulations, or other policies that would reduce 

22 or eliminate limitations on providing critical ca23 pabilities to allies and partners in the Indo-Pa24 cific region; 


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1 (I) identify requirements to streamline the 

2 International Trafficking in Arms Regulations 

3 (22 C.F.R. 120 et seq.) that would enable more 

4 effective delivery of capabilities to allies and 

5 partners in the Indo-Pacific region; 

6 (J) recommend improvements to the proc7 ess for developing requirements for partners ca8 pabilities; and 

9 (K) recommend other legal, regulatory, or 

10 policy changes that would improve delivery 

11 timelines. 

12 (3) FORM.—The report required under this 

13 subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a 

14 classified annex. 

15 SEC. 605. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNMANNED AERIAL 

16 SYSTEMS AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY 

17 CONTROL REGIME. 

18 It is the policy of the United States— 

19 (1) to maintain its commitment to nonprolifera20 tion through voluntary adherence to the 1987 Mis21 sile Technology Control Regime (referred to in this 

22 section as ‘‘MTCR’’); 

23 (2) to exercise its sovereign right within that 

24 regime to define unmanned aerial systems (referred 


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1 to in this section as ‘‘UAS’’) as aircraft rather than 

2 as cruise missiles; 

3 (3) to consider UAS as not subject to MTCR 

4 guidelines, annexes, or any other United States pol5 icy subject to the MTCR; 

6 (4) to ensure that exports of military UAS re7 main subject to the same export considerations as 

8 military aircraft; and 

9 (5) to ensure that military UAS share the same 

10 co-development, co-production, and any other privi11 lege or consideration afforded to military aircraft for 

12 the purposes of direct commercial sale or foreign 

13 military sale. 

14 SEC. 606. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUS15 TRIAL BASE. 

16 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the Sense of Con17 gress that— 

18 (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated 

19 approach, which leverages economies of scale with 

20 major allies, is necessary for the United States to re21 tain its lead in defense technology; 

22 (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or trans23 fer of defense-related technologies and services to 

24 members of the national technology and industrial 

25 base (as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United 


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1 States Code) would advance United States security 

2 interests by helping to leverage the defense-related 

3 technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies 

4 to reduce the dependence on other countries, includ5 ing countries that pose challenges to United States 

6 interests around the world, for defense-related inno7 vation and investment; and 

8 (3) it is in the interest of the United States to 

9 continue to increase cooperation with close allies to 

10 protect critical defense-related technology and serv11 ices and leverage the investments of like-minded, 

12 major ally nations in order to maximize the strategic 

13 edge afforded by defense technology innovation. 

14 (b) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘ap15 propriate congressional committees’’ means— 

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

17 Senate; 

18 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

19 Senate; 

20 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

21 House of Representatives; and 

22 (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

23 House of Representatives. 

24 (c) REPORT.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

3 of State shall submit a report to the appropriate 

4 congressional committees that— 

5 (A) describes the Department of State’s ef6 forts to facilitate access among the national 

7 technology and industrial base to defense arti8 cles and services subject to the United States 

9 Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the 

10 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 

11 2778(a)(1)); and 

12 (B) identifies legal, regulatory, foreign pol13 icy, or other challenges or considerations that 

14 prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any 

15 gaps in the respective export control regimes 

16 implemented by United Kingdom of Great Brit17 ain and Northern Ireland, Australia, or Can18 ada. 

19 (2) FORM.—This report required under para20 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a 

21 classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 607. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR 

2 SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SECURITY PRO3 GRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVI4 TIES. 

5 (a) SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SECURITY PRO6 GRAMS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the 

7 Department of State for the Southeast Asia Maritime Se8 curity Initiative, the Southeast Asia Maritime Law En9 forcement Initiative, and other related regional pro10 grams— 

11 (1) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2022; 

12 (2) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; 

13 (3) $75,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; 

14 (4) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and 

15 (5) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2026. 

16 (b) DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.—There is 

17 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State, 

18 $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 

19 2026, which shall be used— 

20 (1) to conduct, in coordination with the Depart21 ment of Defense, outreach activities, including con22 ferences and symposia, to familiarize partner coun23 tries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with 

24 the United States’ interpretation of international law 

25 relating to freedom of the seas; and 


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1 (2) to work with allies and partners in the 

2 Indo-Pacific region to better align respective inter3 pretations of international law relating to freedom of 

4 the seas, including on the matters of operations by 

5 military ships in exclusive economic zones, innocent 

6 passage through territorial seas, and transits 

7 through international straits. 

8 SEC. 608. REPORT ON CHINA COAST GUARD. 

9 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘ap10 propriate congressional committees’’ means— 

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

12 Senate; 

13 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

14 Senate; 

15 (3) the Committee on Homeland Security and 

16 Governmental Affairs of the Senate; 

17 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

18 House of Representatives; 

19 (5) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

20 House of Representatives; and 

21 (6) the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

22 House of Representatives. 

23 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

24 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 

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1 retary of Homeland Security shall submit to the appro2 priate congressional committees a report on the China 

3 Coast Guard (referred to in this section as the ‘‘CCG’’). 

4 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re5 quired under subsection (b) shall— 

6 (1) describe recent changes in the CCG’s com7 mand structure, including— 

8 (A) its control under the Central Military 

9 Commission’s chain of command; and 

10 (B) whether such changes undermine the 

11 CCG’s claim that it should be treated as a law 

12 enforcement entity; 

13 (2) assess the implications of the new command 

14 structure of the CCG with respect to its role as a 

15 coercive tool in ‘‘gray zone’’ activity in the East 

16 China Sea and in the South China Sea; 

17 (3) assess how changes in the command struc18 ture of the CCG may affect interactions between the 

19 United States Navy and the United States Coast 

20 Guard with the CCG; 

21 (4) assess the implications for the United 

22 States and regional allies of the Coast Guard Law 

23 of the People’s Republic of China, which went into 

24 effect on February 1, 2021; and 


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1 (5) assess whether the CCG should be consid2 ered a military force rather than a civilian law en3 forcement entity, and the implications of such an as4 sessment on United States policy. 

5 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

6 subsection (b) shall be unclassified, but may include a 

7 classified annex. 

8 SEC. 609. REPORT ON CHINESE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN 

9 DJIBOUTI. 

10 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘ap11 propriate congressional committees’’ means— 

12 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

13 Senate; 

14 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

15 Senate; 

16 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

17 House of Representatives; and 

18 (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

19 House of Representatives. 

20 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De22 fense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall 

23 submit a report to Congress regarding Chinese military 

24 activity in Djibouti. 


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1 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re2 quired under subsection (b) shall include— 

3 (1) a summary of any incidents of harassment 

4 of United States military and embassy personnel by 

5 any element within the Government of the PRC; and 

6 (2) an evaluation of the extent to which the 

7 presence of the PLA in Djibouti affects the United 

8 States military’s ability to operate in the region. 

9 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

10 subsection (b) shall be unclassified, but may include a 

11 classified annex. 

12 SEC. 610. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL 

13 IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS 

14 SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA. 

15 It is the policy of the United States to sustain max16 imum economic pressure on the Government of the Demo17 cratic People’s Republic of Korea (referred to in this sec18 tion as the ‘‘DPRK’’) until the regime undertakes com19 plete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward 

20 denuclearization, including by— 

21 (1) encouraging pressing all nations, including 

22 the PRC, to implement and enforce existing United 

23 Nations sanctions with regard to the DPRK; 

24 (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and 

25 in accordance with United Nations Security Council 


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1 resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK 

2 citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such 

3 workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit 

4 source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nu5 clear ambitions; 

6 (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to 

7 pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and 

8 from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers, 

9 consistent with United Nations Security Council res10 olutions; 

11 (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities— 

12 (A) to cease business activities with United 

13 Nations-designated entities and their affiliates 

14 in the DPRK; and 

15 (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who 

16 enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its 

17 nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and 

18 (5) enforcing United Nations Security Council 

19 resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United 

20 States sanctions, including those pursuant to the 

21 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 

22 of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering 

23 America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Pub24 lic Law 115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea 

25 Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 


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1 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 116–92), 

2 and relevant United States executive orders. 

3 TITLE VII—ENSURING 

4 STRATEGIC SECURITY 

5 SEC. 701. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS 

6 CONTROL. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) The United States and the PRC have a 

9 shared interest in strategic security through enforce10 able arms control and non-proliferation agreements. 

11 (2) The United States has long pursued and 

12 continues to seek effective, verifiable, and enforce13 able arms control and nonproliferation agreements 

14 that support United States and allied security by— 

15 (A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate16 rials and technology; 

17 (B) placing limits on the production, stock18 piling and deployment of nuclear weapons; 

19 (C) decreasing misperception and mis20 calculation; and 

21 (D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms 

22 competition. 

23 (3) The PRC has long alleged that it does not 

24 seek to compete in an arms race with nuclear super25 powers. Its 2019 Defense White Paper states, 


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1 ‘‘China does not engage in any nuclear arms race 

2 with any other country and keeps its nuclear capa3 bilities at the minimum level required for national 

4 security.’’ Yet, the behavior of the PRC suggests 

5 otherwise. 

6 (4) The PRC is pushing the boundaries of its 

7 traditional posture of minimum deterrence as it ex8 pands and improves its nuclear forces. The PRC’s 

9 ‘‘No First Use’’ policy—which has always been high10 ly contingent and ambiguous—is increasingly in 

11 doubt. The PRC’s traditional goal of maintaining 

12 only a ‘‘lean and effective’’ deterrent is called into 

13 question by the rapid expansion of its forces. 

14 (5) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intel15 ligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley 

16 stated, ‘‘China is likely to at least double the size of 

17 its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing 

18 the most rapid expansion and diversification of its 

19 nuclear arsenal in China’s history.’’. The PLA is 

20 building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile 

21 ground-based launchers, and new capabilities for nu22 clear-armed bombers and submarine-launched bal23 listic missiles. 

24 (6) In June 2020, the Department of State 

25 raised concerns in its annual ‘‘Adherence to and 


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1 Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, 

2 and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments’’ 

3 report to Congress that the PRC is not complying 

4 with the ‘‘zero-yield’’ nuclear testing ban and ac5 cused the PRC of ‘‘blocking the flow of data from 

6 the monitoring stations’’ in China. 

7 (7) The PRC is conducting research on its first 

8 potential early warning radar, with technical co9 operation from Russia. This radar could indicate 

10 that the PRC is moving to a launch-on warning pos11 ture. 

12 (8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capa13 ble space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities 

14 against United States early warning systems and 

15 critical infrastructure in a crisis scenario. This poses 

16 great risk to strategic security, as it could lead to 

17 inadvertent escalation. 

18 (9) The PRC’s nuclear expansion comes as a 

19 part of a massive modernization of the PLA which, 

20 combined with the PLA’s aggressive actions, has in21 creasingly destabilized the Indo-Pacific region. 

22 (10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which 

23 was elevated in 2015 to become a separate branch 

24 within the PLA, has formed 11 new missile brigades 

25 since May 2017, some of which are capable of both 


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1 conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United 

2 States, which separates its conventional strike and 

3 nuclear capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only 

4 co-locate conventional and nuclear forces, including 

5 dual-use missiles like the DF-26, but to task the 

6 same unit with both nuclear and conventional mis7 sions. Such intermingling could lead to inadvertent 

8 escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense In9 telligence Agency determined in March 2020 that 

10 the PLA tested more ballistic missiles than the rest 

11 of the world combined in 2019. 

12 (11) Planned United States nuclear moderniza13 tion efforts will not increase the size of the United 

14 States nuclear deterrent and the United States Pro15 gram of Record remains within the limits set by the 

16 Treaty between the United States of America and 

17 the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 

18 Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

19 Arms, done at Prague April 8, 2010 (commonly 

20 known as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 

21 (12) The United States’ extended nuclear deter22 rence— 

23 (A) provides critical strategic security 

24 around the world; 


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1 (B) is an essential element of United 

2 States military alliances; and 

3 (C) serves a vital nonproliferation function. 

4 (13) United States declaratory policy has pro5 found implications for extended deterrence and alli6 ance management. Since the PRC has no formal 

7 treaty allies, the PLA has no similar requirement for 

8 extended deterrence. 

9 (14) While the United States has concluded nu10 merous arms control agreements with Russia and 

11 has reduced its nuclear stockpile by 85 percent, the 

12 PRC has repeatedly refused to conduct arms control 

13 negotiations. 

14 (15) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non15 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash16 ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, the PRC 

17 is obligated under Article Six of the treaty to pursue 

18 arms control negotiations in good faith. 

19 (16) In May and July 2019, President Trump 

20 called on the PRC to participate in arms control ne21 gotiations, but the PRC Foreign Ministry indicated 

22 that China would not participate in such talks with23 out further reductions by the United States and 

24 Russia. In December 2019, the United States for25 mally invited the PRC to begin arms control negoVerDate Sep 11 2014 18:56 Apr 08, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S687.IS S687

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1 tiations, but the PRC also rejected this invitation. In 

2 June 2020, the United States once again invited the 

3 PRC to join talks with the Russian Federation in 

4 Vienna, but the PRC declined. 

5 (17) The governments of Poland, Slovenia, 

6 Denmark, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the 

7 Netherlands, Romania, Austria, Albania, and the 

8 Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic 

9 Treaty Organization have all encouraged the PRC to 

10 join arms control discussions. 

11 SEC. 702. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA12 LOGUE. 

13 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

14 United States— 

15 (1) to pursue, in coordination with United 

16 States allies, arms control negotiations and sus17 tained and regular engagement with the PRC— 

18 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth19 er’s respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca20 pabilities; 

21 (B) to improve transparency; and 

22 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula23 tion and misperception; 

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1 rity of United States and allied interests in the face 

2 of the PRC’s military modernization and expansion, 

3 including— 

4 (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic 

5 missiles; 

6 (B) integrated air and missile defense; 

7 (C) hypersonic missiles; 

8 (D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon9 naissance; 

10 (E) space-based capabilities; 

11 (F) cyber capabilities; and 

12 (G) command, control, and communica13 tions; 

14 (3) to maintain sufficient force structure, pos15 ture, and capabilities to provide extended nuclear de16 terrence assurances to United States allies and part17 ners; 

18 (4) to maintain appropriate missile defense ca19 pabilities to protect threats to the United States 

20 homeland and our forces across the theater from 

21 rogue intercontinental ballistic missiles from the 

22 Indo-Pacific region; and 

23 (5) to ensure that the United States declaratory 

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1 rence, to both assure allies and to preserve its non2 proliferation benefits. 

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that— 

5 (1) in the midst of growing competition between 

6 the United States and the PRC, it is in the interest 

7 of both nations to cooperate in insulating their nu8 clear forces from such dynamics, and thereby reduce 

9 risks of escalation; 

10 (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other 

11 PLA attack on United States early warning sat12 ellites, other portions of the nuclear command and 

13 control enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a 

14 high risk to inadvertent but rapid escalation; 

15 (3) no PRC territory used to stage attacks on 

16 the United States or its allies should be considered 

17 safe from potential retaliation; 

18 (4) PRC leaders are unlikely to view any 

19 United States adoption of a ‘‘no first use’’ or ‘‘sole 

20 purpose’’ declaratory policy as credible, and are thus 

21 unlikely to change their behavior in a crisis if the 

22 United States adopted such a policy; 

23 (5) United States allies and partners are likely 

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1 ening of United States security commitments, under2 mining our long-term alliances across the region; 

3 (6) the United States and its allies should pro4 mote international norms on military operations in 

5 space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the 

6 military use of artificial intelligence, as an element 

7 of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and 

8 control; and 

9 (7) United States allies and partners should 

10 share the burden of promoting and protecting such 

11 norms by voting against the PRC’s proposals re12 garding the weaponization of space, highlighting un13 safe behavior by the PRC that violates international 

14 norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity oper15 ations, and promoting responsible behavior in space 

16 and all other domains. 

17 SEC. 703. AGREEMENTS. 

18 (a) SUBMISSION.—The text of any agreement con19 cluded under the authorities provided under this title shall 

20 be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

21 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

22 House of Representatives not later than 60 days after any 

23 notice of intent to be formally bound by the terms of such 

24 agreement. 


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1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Each agreement described in 

2 subsection (a) shall be legally effective and binding upon 

3 the United States, in accordance with the terms provided 

4 in the agreement, beginning on— 

5 (1) the date on which appropriate implementing 

6 legislation is enacted into law, which shall provide 

7 for the approval of the specific agreement or agree8 ments, including attachments, annexes, and sup9 porting documentation; or 

10 (2) if the agreement is concluded and submitted 

11 as a treaty, the date on which such treaty is ratified 

12 by the Senate. 

Æ 


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