NRC NEWS

 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

 Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200

 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov 

 Web Site: www.nrc.gov

No. S-02-024

ONE YEAR AFTER - REFLECTIONS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY

Dr. Richard A. Meserve

Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

at the

INFOCAST Conference 

“The Nuclear Renaissance: Maximizing the Value of Nuclear Assets”

Washington, DC

September 11, 2002

Introduction

We meet today on the anniversary of a singular moment in our Nation’s recent history. I am

sure that each of us has personal memories of the horrifying September terrorist attacks. An image that

remains clear in my mind today is the view from the 17th floor of NRC Headquarters of the smoke

following the attack on the Pentagon. To say that the world was changed forever by these events is both

a cliche and an understatement. For those who lost family members, friends, and colleagues on that

day, the world will surely never be the same again. For those who survived the attacks or were near

enough to be witnesses, the images will be forever seared in memory. For the rest of us, merely seeing

the video images again during this period of remembrance brings back all the emotions we experienced

on that terrible day. 

Given the riveting effect that the attacks have had on the Nation, it is appropriate on this

anniversary to spend a few moments to reflect on the implications of those horrendous events. 

In the aftermath of the attacks, the security surrounding the Nation’s critical infrastructure,

including the Nation’s commercial nuclear power plants, has become a central concern. I have been

particularly gratified to have played a part in the collaborative work that has occurred among the Federal
government, State and local officials, and licensees and industry working groups to ensure that the

already robust protection of these facilities was further enhanced. All levels of government, as well as

NRC licensees, have made significant contributions to bolster defenses against the increased threat of a

terrorist attack. I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to them.

The events of September 11 have also had a broader impact. We all look at the world in a

different way. Society is wary of potential terrorist activities and is concerned about the facilities that

they might be interested in attacking. This heightened alertness is manifested in the increased reporting

by members of the public of possible suspicious activities in the vicinity of nuclear plants. It is also

clear that the threat of terrorism will be an abiding issue for the long term. As a result, there is a

demand for action by government to preserve the security of its citizens. 

The NRC has fully accepted that responsibility. But this is not a task that can be completed

overnight. Although the NRC has taken many significant actions, some major challenges remain. Let

me take a moment to reflect upon the state of security at NRC-licensed facilities and then to focus on

the future.

There are three fundamental points that I would like to emphasize at the outset. First, the

physical protection at nuclear power plants was strong before September 11. I am aware of no other

industry that has had to satisfy the tough security requirements that the NRC has had in place for a

quarter of a century. And these requirements have been significantly augmented over the past year. 

The plants are surrounded by multiple fences with continuously monitored perimeter detection and

surveillance systems. They are guarded by well trained and well armed security forces. Nuclear power

plants are constructed to withstand hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes, making them among the

most formidable structures in existence. The plants also benefit from redundant and diverse safety

equipment so that if any active component becomes unavailable, another component or system will

satisfy its function. Operators are trained to respond to unusual events, and carefully designed

emergency plans are in place. In short, the security at power plants is very strong and the plants have an

inherent capacity to withstand severe events of all types, including those that might be initiated by

terrorists.

Second, there have been no specific credible threats of a terrorist attack on nuclear power plants

since September 11. The NRC has worked closely with intelligence and law enforcement personnel to

assess the threats that may be directed at nuclear facilities. Although it is difficult to predict when and

where terrorists may strike next, the robust security at nuclear plants should serve as a significant

deterrent. Nonetheless, it is prudent to presume that al Qaeda may consider nuclear facilities as

potential targets. As a result, NRC has put in place a five-level threat advisory and protective measures

system that requires licensees to take specific actions in response to changes in the threat conditions. 

Third, in light of the events of September 11, the NRC has recognized the need to reexamine

past security strategies to ensure that we have the right protections in place for the long term. Shortly

after the attacks, we began a comprehensive review of our requirements for physical protection and

security. We are undertaking a reexamination of the assumptions that underlie the current regulatory

framework and we are making any changes that are necessary. We have already taken actions as a

result of this review, and more will be taken in the coming months. 
NRC’s Response following the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

Let me now discuss some of the actions the NRC has taken following the terrorist attacks of

September 11:

 Following the attacks, the NRC issued over 30 safeguards and threat advisories to the

major licensed facilities, placing them on the highest security level. Security across the

nuclear industry was enhanced as a result of these actions, and many of the strengthened

security measures are now requirements as a result of subsequently issued NRC Orders. 

The security enhancements include increased security patrols, augmented security forces,

additional security posts, increased vehicle standoff distances, and enhanced

coordination with the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

 The Commission has also enhanced access control at nuclear power plants. This may be

one of the most effective means of preventing a successful attack, because an insider

could provide significant assistance to an attacking force. NRC regulations require that

individuals having unescorted access to nuclear power plants undergo a background

investigation which includes credit checks, employment history, reference examination,

psychological testing, and a criminal history check conducted by the FBI. Further

restrictions include prohibitions on the use of temporary unescorted access in sensitive

areas.

 Improvements in communications have been a central feature of our activities. Not only

have we had frequent interactions with licensees concerning the security of their

facilities, but also we have improved linkages with other parts of government. For

example, we are in close and continuous contact with the intelligence and law

enforcement communities and we have advised licensees to enhance protocols for

involving governmental entities in the defense of their facilities.

 The Commission has also completed an initial assessment of power reactor

vulnerabilities to the intentional malevolent use of commercial aircraft in suicidal attacks

and has initiated a broad-ranging research program to understand the vulnerabilities of

various classes of facilities to a wide spectrum of attacks. We are developing measures

to mitigate vulnerabilities that are identified. Although our work in this area is ongoing,

the Commission has directed nuclear power plant licensees to develop specific plans and

strategies to respond to an event that could result in damage to large areas of their plants

from impacts, explosions, or fire. In addition, licensees must provide assurance that their

emergency planning resources are sufficient to respond to such an event. 

 The Commission is working closely with other Federal agencies to revise the design

basis threat that provides the foundation for the security programs of power plant

licensees. Significant changes are likely. The Commission’s Orders effectively provide

enhanced security in the interim while this work in underway.

 Inspection of security capability is necessary to provide confidence in the adequacy of

defensive measures. The Commission has decided that full security performance

reviews, including force-on-force exercises, will be carried out in the future at each

nuclear power plant on a three-year cycle, instead of the eight-year cycle that had been

applied in the past. These reviews have commenced with table-top exercises that for the
first time involve a wide array of Federal, State, and local law enforcement and

emergency planning officials.

 The NRC has developed a new Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System in

response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3. When a new threat condition is

declared, the NRC will promptly notify affected licensees of the condition and refer them

to the predefined protective measures that we have developed for each threat level. The

new system has been formally communicated to licensees, Governors, State Homeland

Security Advisors, Federal agency administrators, and other appropriate officials. We

had the opportunity to exercise this system yesterday afternoon when the Attorney

General announced that the threat condition had moved to the Orange (high) level.

 The Commission is actively involved in efforts to defend against possible terrorist use of

radiological dispersal devices. Following the terrorist attacks of last September, NRC

alerted licensees, suppliers, and shippers of the need to enhance security against the

threat of theft of radioactive material. The NRC is conducting a comprehensive

evaluation of controls to protect those radioactive materials that constitute the greatest

hazard to public health and safety. For example, we are evaluating approaches for

“cradle-to-grave” control of radioactive sources which might be used in a radiological

dispersal device and are reexamining the import and export licensing for these isotopes. 

We are also working with the Office of Homeland Security and other agencies to ensure

that the Federal Government is prepared to respond to an event involving a radiological

dispersal device.

 In April, we established the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) to

improve communications and coordination both within and external to the NRC on

security and safeguards issues. This office is responsible for developing overall

safeguards and security policies and is the central point of contact with the Office of

Homeland Security. It contains our Incident Response organization; coordinates with

Federal response and law enforcement agencies; and directs our counter-intelligence,

information security, and secure communications activities.

In short, the NRC has taken a wide variety of steps over the past year in response to the changing

environment in which we find ourselves.

Looking to the Future

Nonetheless, there are issues that remain before us and the Nation. Let me mention a few:

 First, there are limits to the defensive capabilities that should be expected of nuclear

plant operators. For example, the defense against aircraft attacks should certainly be the

responsibility of governmental authorities, as should the defense against attackers with

significant military capabilities. As a result, there must be an allocation of responsibility

between the licensee’s security organization and the government. Establishing the

boundary that defines the responsibilities that should be borne by the private sector and

those that should be assumed by the government has proven difficult for all types of

civilian infrastructure. There is no quick answer that can be developed by the NRC in

isolation from the other parts of government.
Let me note in this connection that, given the current threat environment, an abundance

of governmental response forces -- local, State, and Federal -- would be dispatched to

engage any attackers at a nuclear facility and to lend assistance, regardless of the scope

and nature of the attack. The real issue is not whether governmental entities will provide

assistance, but rather when such resources will arrive and how they will be used to

defend the facility. This has practical implications because the security framework

should reflect the joint security capability of both the licensee and the government.

 Second, there needs to be an integrated national strategy to protect critical infrastructure

of all types. The defense of nuclear facilities should not be viewed in isolation, but

should be part of an overall national defensive scheme. The effort to develop such a

strategy is underway. In some respects the nuclear industry is the pathfinder because of

the extensive security capabilities that it had in place before September 11. Establishing

and implementing an integrated national strategy will be an important task for the new

Department of Homeland Security.

 

 Third, we need to ensure coordination with Agreement and non-Agreement States in

implementing security measures for radioactive materials. Agreement States have

responsibility for roughly three quarters of the radioactive sources in the United States. 

Thus, any action the NRC might take to prevent a terrorist from using a radiological

dispersal device will impact Agreement State licensees. In enhancing the security of

nuclear materials, we must preserve NRC’s ultimate responsibility for protection of

common defense and security, while maintaining the integrity of the Agreement State

programs. Moreover, States must be heavily involved with securing hazardous

unlicensed sources and in establishing holding or disposal areas for materials.

 Fourth, there is a difficult challenge in maintaining the appropriate public access to

information. The NRC has strived to ensure public confidence by being one of the most

open agencies in the U.S. government; we recognize the reality that suspicions are

nurtured if our activities are not fully accessible to the concerned public. But some

information must be withheld because it could help a terrorist. We thus have the

dilemma of trying to balance the public’s right to know against the need for secrecy in

certain areas.

 Fifth, we must confront the reality that the concern for nuclear matters arises from an

abiding public fear that devastating consequences will necessarily result from an attack

on a nuclear power plant or from the detonation of a radiological dispersal device. 

These fears are certainly greatly exaggerated. But putting nuclear events in context has

proven extraordinarily difficult because of ingrained public attitudes. This may have the

unfortunate consequence that too little attention is provided to the defense of other types

of infrastructure for which the consequences of a successful terrorist attack could be far

greater. 

 Finally, although security must be an abiding concern, we cannot allow it to displace or

to diminish the obligation to protect public health and safety from accidents. This has

been a particular challenge in the United States because, for reasons wholly apart from

security, we are in a period of dramatic change. Our nuclear plant licensees continue to

seek to extend their operating licenses beyond the original 40-year term and to increase
the power output of their facilities. There continues to be interest in the possibility of

new construction. And after decades of technical studies and political debate, we

confront the need for decisions associated with the establishment of a possible national

disposal facility for spent fuel and high-level waste. September 11 has added another

important task at a time of intense activity in the nuclear arena.

In conclusion, let me note again that our nuclear facilities are the strongest and most well

protected civilian facilities in our country. But we recognize the need to enhance those protections. The

NRC is dedicated to meeting the obligation to protect the public health and safety and the common

defense and security from threats of all kinds. We have accomplished much over the last year, but we

have more to do and we are on track to do it.

Thank you.