SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

CRAIG A. KARSNITZ 1 The Circle, Suite 2

RESIDENT JUDGE GEORGETOWN, DE 19947

April 1, 2024

Douglas E. Hall

SBI #00204986

Sussex Correctional Institution

P.O. Box 500

Georgetown, DE 19947

Re: State of Delaware v. Douglas E. Hall

Def. ID# 2302005470

Motion for Postconviction Relief (R-1) 

Dear Mr. Hall:

You pled guilty to a fifth DUI offense before me on July 19, 2023. That same 

day I sentenced you to two years at Level V followed by 18 months at Level III. 

There was no direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.

On November 15, 2023, you timely filed your first Rule 61 Petition. You state 

three (3) grounds for relief: (1) your trial counsel (“Trial Counsel”) was ineffective 

in failing to investigate and review police reports which tended to substantiate your 

actual innocence; (2) you are actually innocent in fact; and (3) there is insufficient 

evidence of the element of “control” under the DUI statute.
2

Before addressing the merits of your Rule 61 Motion, I must first address the 

four procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).1 If a procedural bar 

exists, as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim.2 

Under the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, procedural 

default, or former adjudication.3 

First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed 

more than one year after the conviction becomes final, or if it asserts a retroactively 

applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, 

more than one year after the right was first recognized by the Supreme Court of 

Delaware or the United States Supreme Court.4 In this case, your conviction became 

final for purposes of Rule 61 on August 19, 2023, 30 days after I imposed the 

sentence.

5 Thus, you filed your Petition well within the one-year period. Therefore, 

consideration of the Rule 61 Motion is not procedurally barred by the one-year 

limitation. 

1

 Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 

1990). 

2

 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. 

Super. April 28, 2009).

3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).

4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).

5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1).
3

Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not 

permitted unless certain conditions are satisfied.6 Since this is your first Rule 61 

Motion, this bar does not apply.

Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the 

judgment of conviction” are barred unless the movant can show “cause for relief from 

the procedural default” and “prejudice from a violation of [movant’s] rights.”7 Your

first ground for relief is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is well 

settled under Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims are properly raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings.8 Thus, 

this bar does not apply in this case, and I will consider Ground 1 on the merits, below.

Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including 

“proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction 

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.9 Your third ground for 

relief asserts insufficient evidence of guilt on the “control” element under the DUI 

statute. However, you chose not to raise this in your case. Indeed, you pled guilty to 

6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).

7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).

8

State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State, 

2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at 

*2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective 

assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”).

9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
4

all elements of the charge. You cannot use Rule 61 as a vehicle to relitigate your case

or to withdraw your guilty plea. Ground 3 is barred by this provision.10

Finally, the four procedural bars do not apply to a claim that pleads with 

particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference of actual 

innocence.

11 Your second ground asserts that you are actually innocent in fact. 

However, not only did you plead guilty, but in your Rule 61 Petition you have not 

pled with particularity any new evidence that exists that creates a strong inference of 

actual innocence. Thus, the basis for Ground 2 is not satisfied.

This leaves only your Ground 1, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

You assert that Trial Counsel conducted no investigation and did not review the 

police reports which tended to substantiate your actual innocence. However, other 

than this conclusory statement, you give no supporting evidence or persuasive 

arguments whatsoever on this ground one. Self-serving assertions are no substitute 

for facts and evidence. I find that, based on your Petition and my thorough review 

of the record of the prior proceedings in this case, that you are not entitled to relief. 

I am therefore entering an order for summary dismissal under Rule 61.

12

10 It is also barred by Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3), grounds not asserted below.

11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i).

12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).
5

Your Rule 61 Petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

/s/Craig A. Karsnitz

Craig A. Karsnitz, Resident Judge

cc: Prothonotary