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Liberation:

Marines in the Recapture of Guam

by Cyril I. O'Brien

ith the instantaneous

opening of a twohour, ever-increasing

bombardment by six

battleships, nine cruisers, a host of destroyers and rocket

ships, laying their wrath on the wrinkled black hills, rice paddies, cliffs,

and caves that faced the attacking

fleet on the west side of the island,

Liberation Day for Guam began at

0530, 21 July 1944.

Fourteen-inch guns belching fire

and thunder set spectacular blossoms

of flame sprouting on the fields and

hillsides inland. It was all very plain

to see in the glow of star shells which

illuminated the shore, the ships, and

the troops who lined the rails of the

transports and LSTs (Landing Ships,

Tank) which brought the U.S. Marines and soldiers there.

The barrages, which at daylight

would be enlarged by the strafing

and bombing of carrier fighters,

bombers, and torpedo planes, were

the grand climax of 13 days (since 8

July) of unceasing prelanding

On the Cover: Marines of Battery I, 14th

Defense Battalion, man their twinbarrelled, Mark IV, Oerlikon-designed

20mm guns on top of Chonito Ridge,

overlooking Adelup Point. In the initial

stages of the Guam operation, these antiaircraft guns fired in support of the 3d

Marines. Department of Defense Photo

(USMC) 93063

At left: A threatening 75mm Japanese

gun pokes its barrel out of the Gaan

Point pilibox where a companion piece

and a 37mm gun wreaked havoc on the

assault waves of the 22d Marines on WDay, destroying approximately 24 troopcarrying amphibian tractors, before the

enemy position was taken out. Department of Defense Photo (USN) 247618

softening-up. Indeed, carrier aircraft

of Task Force 58 had been blasting

Guam airfields since 11 June, while

the first bombardment of the B-24s

and B-25s of the Fifth, Seventh, and

Thirteenth Air Forces fell as early as

6 May.

Up at 0230 to a by-now traditional

Marine prelanding breakfast of steak

and eggs, the assault troops, laden

with fighting gear, sheathed bayonets

protruding from their packs, hurried

and waited, while the loudspeakers

shouted "Now here this . . . . Now

hear this:' Unit commanders on

board the LSTs visited each of their

men, checking gear, straightening

packs, rendering an encouraging pat

on a shoulder, and squaring away the

queues going below to the well decks

before boarding the LVTs (Landing

Vehicles, Tracked).

Troops on the APAs (attack transports) went over the rail and down

cargo nets to which they—weighed

down with 40-pound packs as well

as weapons — held on for dear life,

and into LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel). These troops

would transfer from the landing craft

to LVTs at the reef's edge, if all went

as planned.

Aircraft went roaring in over mast

tops and naval guns produced a continuous booming background noise.

Climaxing it all was the voice of

Major General Roy S. Geiger, commanding general of III Amphibious

Corps, rasping from a bulkhead

speaker:

You have been honored. The

eyes of the nation watch you as

you go into battle to liberate this

former American bastion from

the enemy. The honor which

has been bestowed on you is a

signal one. May the glorious

1

traditions of the Marine Corps'

esprit de corps spur you to victory. You have been honored.

In the crowded, stifling well decks

of the LSTs, the liberators climbed on

board the LVTs and waited claustrophobic until the LST bow doors

dropped and the tracked landing vehicles rattled out over these ramps

into the swell of the sea. As the amphibian tractors circled (about 0615)

near the line of departure, a flight of

attack aircraft from the Wasp

drowned out the whine of the amtrac engines and whirled up clouds

of fire and dust, obscuring the landing beaches ahead. Eighty-five fighters, 65 bombers, and 53 torpedo

planes executed a grass-cutting strafing and bombing sweep along all of

the landing beaches from above the

SAIPAN

TINAN AGUAN

GUAM

SO('T!IERV

L MARIA NAS
General Roy S. Geiger

ajor General Roy S. Geiger,

as the other general officers

in the Guam invasion force,

was a World War I veteran. He also was

an early Marine Corps aviator. He was

the fifth Marine to become a naval

aviator—in 1917—and the 49th in the

naval service to obtain his wings. He

went to France in July of that year and

commanded a squadron of the First Marine Aviation Force. In the war and after, he saw service with Marine Corps air

units. He also was well educated professionally, for he attended the Army Command and General Staff School at Fort

Leavenworth in 1924-1925 and was a student in the Senior and Advanced

Courses at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1939-1941. In August 1941, he became commanding

general of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

and led it at Guadalcanal during the

difficult days from September to November 1942. Back in Washington in 1943,

he was Director of Aviation, until, on

the untimely death of Major General

Charles D. Barnett, Commanding

General, I Marine Amphibious Corps,

just prior to the Bougainville landings,

General Geiger was rushed out to the Pacific to assume command and direct the

landings at Empress Augusta Bay on 1

November 1943. He was the first Marine

aviator to head as large a ground command as IMAC, which was redesignated III Amphibious Corps in April 1944.

He led this organization in the liberation

of Guam in July 1944, and in the landings on Peleliu on 15 September 1944.

General Geiger led this corps into action

for the fourth time as part of the Tenth

Army in the invasion of Okinawa. Upon

the death of Army Lieutenant General

Simon B. Buckner, Geiger took command of the Tenth Army, the first Marine to lead an army-sized force. In July

1945, at the end of the Okinawa operation, General Geiger assumed command

of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific at Pearl

Harbor. In November 1946 he returned

to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, in

Washington, and died the following

year. By an act of Congress, he was

posthumously promoted to the rank of

general.

northern beaches of Agana, south

for 14 miles to Bangi Point.

"My aim is to get the troops ashore

standing up7 said Rear Admiral

Richard L. Conolly, Southern Attack

Force (Task Force 53) commander,

who earned the nickname "Close-in

Conolly" during the Marshalls operations for his insistence on having his

naval gunfire support ships firing

from stations very close to the

beaches.

Private First Class James C. Helt, a

radioman with Headquarters and

Service Company, 1st Battalion, 3d

Marines, in the bow of an LVT moving towards shore, wondered, as did

many others, if anything could be

still be alive on Guam? Ashore, Lieutenant Colonel Hideyuki Takeda, on

the staff of the defending 29th Div ision, said the island could only be

defended if the Americans did not

land. In a diary, one Japanese officer

noted that the only respite from the

bombardment was a "stiff drink:'

The next best thing to a welcome

mat for Marine assault waves had

been laid by the audacious Navy Underwater Demolition Teams 3, 4, and

6, who cleared the beach obstacles.

Navy Chief Petty Officer James R.

Chittum of Team 3 noted that these

pathfinders were usually close

enough to draw small arms fire. At

Asan, they exploded 640 wire obstacle cages filled with cemented coral,

and at Agat they blew a 200-foot

hole for unloading in the coral reef.

Team 3, under Navy Reserve Lieutenant Thomas C. Crist, also removed half of a small freighter from

a channel blocking the way of the

Marines.

Swimmers as well as scouts, the

"demos" reconnoitered right up on the

landing beaches themselves. They

left a sign for the first assault wave

at Asan: 'Welcome Marines — USO

This Way."

At 0730 a flare was shot in the air

above the waiting flotilla and Admiral Conolly commanded: "La'nd

the Landing Force:' At 0808, the first

wave of the 3d Marine Division

broke the circle of waiting LVTs to

2

form a line and cross the 2,000 yards

of water to the 2,500-yard-wide

beach between Asan and Adelup

points. At 0829, the first elements of

the 3d Marine Division were on

Guam. Three minutes later, 0832,

lead assault troops of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade crossed the

shelled-pocked strand at Agat, six

miles south of the Asan-Adelup

beachhead.

Guam, along with the Philippines,

became a territorial possession of the

United States with the signing of the

Treaty of Paris in 1899, ending the

Spanish-American War. Earlier, on

21 June 1898, First Lieutenant John

Twiggs "Handsome Jack" Myers had

led a party of Marines ashore from

the protected cruiser Charleston to

accept the surrender of the Spanish

authorities, who didnt know that a

state of war then existed between

Spain and the United States. Thus began a long Marine presence on

Guam. The island, southernmost of
-r 4

F

the Marianas chain, was discovered

by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, but

• not occupied until 1688 when a small

mission was established there by a

Spanish priest and soldiers. When

control of the rest of the Mariana Islands, including Saipan and Tinian,

all once German possessions, was

given to Japan as a mandate power

in 1919, Guam became an isolated

and highly vulnerable American outpost in a Japanese sea.

This American territory, 35 miles

long, nine miles at its widest and four

at its narrowest, shaped like a

peanut, with a year-long mean temperature of 79 degrees, fell quickly

and easily in the early morning of 10

December 1941. Much of the Japanese attack on Guam came from her

sister island of Saipan, 150 miles to

the north.

The governor of Guam, Captain

George J. McMilIan (the island

governor was always a U.S. Navy

officer), aware that he could expect

no reinforcement or relief, decided to

surrender the territory to Japanese

naval forces. Foremost in his mind

was the fate of the 20,000 Guamanians, all American nationals, who

would inevitably suffer if a strong

defense was mounted. He felt "the situation was simply hopeless." He sent

word to the 153 Marines of the barracks detachment at Sumay on Orote

Peninsula and the 80-man Insular

Guard to lay down their arms. Even

so, in two days of bombing and fighting, the garrison lost 19 men killed

and 42 wounded, including four Marines killed and 12 wounded.

In late 1943, both the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (JCS) and, later, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) agreed to

the further direction of the Pacific

War. General Douglas MacArthur,

commander of the Southwest Pacific

Area, was to head north through

RAdm Richard L. Conolly, Southern Attack Force commander right: BGen Alfred H. Noble, assistant division commander,

for the Guam landings, confers on Guadalcanal with the 3d Marine Division; Cdr Patrick Buchanan, USN, comcommanders of the Northern Attack Group during rehearsals mander, Northern Transport Group; Adm Conolly; MajGen

prior to the departure for the Marianas target. From left to Allen Turnage, commanding general, 3d Marine Division.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 50235

3

()pL'u tiviz iU(1?!
• —w

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General Allan H. Turnage

han H. Turnage was commissioned in 1913, and went to

France as commanding officer

of the 5th Machine Gun Battalion, 5th

Brigade of Marines. In the interwar period, Turnage had an assortment of assignments to sea duty and to duty

overseas, and in 1935 he reported as

director of The Basic School, then at the

Philadelphia Navy Yard. At the outset

of World War II, he commanded Camp

Lejeune and its training center, which

was responsible for the organization and

training of two regimental combat teams

slated for duty with the 3d Marine Division. In October 1942 he became assistant division commander of the 3d

Marine Division and its commander the

next September. General Turnage led the

division in the landing on Bougainville

and the liberation of Guam. Following

the end of the war, he became Assistant

Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Lieutenant General Turnage's final assignment was command of Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific at Pearl Harbor. Upon his

retirement in 1948, because he was decorated in combat, he received a fourth

star. He died in October 1971.

New Guinea to regain the Philippines. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific

Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Areas

(CinCPac/CinCPOA), proposed a

move through the Central Pacific to

secure a hold in the Marianas. The

strategic bombing of Japan would

originate from captured fields on

Guam, Saipan, and Tinian. The new

strategic weapon for these attacks

would be the B-29 bomber, which

had a range of 3,000 miles while carrying 10,000 pounds of bombs. The

code name of the Marianas operation

was "Forager." The Central Pacific

drive began with the landing on

Tarawa in November 1943, followed

by the landings in Kwajalein Atoll on

Roi-Namur, Eniwetok, and

Kwajalein itself.

In January 1944, Admiral Nimitz

made final plans for Guam, and

selected his command structure for

the Marianas campaign. Accordingly,

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, the

victor at Midway, was designated

commander of the Fifth Fleet and of

all the Central Pacific Task Forces; he

would command all units involved in

Forager.

Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, who had commanded naval forces

for the landings at Guadalcanal and

Tarawa, headed the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51). Turner

would also command the Northern

Attack Force for the invasion of Saipan and Tinian. Admiral Conolly,

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.

emuel C. Shepherd, Jr., was in

his senior year at the Virginia

Virginia Military Institute and

had not yet graduated when he was commissioned in the Marine Corps. He

sailed to France as a member of the 5th

Regiment of Marines, part of the 4th

Brigade of Marines. He saw considerable action in the war — he was wounded

twice at Belleau Wood and after recovering from his wounds and rejoining his

regiment for the St. Mihiel and MeuseArgonne offensives, he was wounded for

a third time in the latter. Shepherd

served in the Army of Occupation in

Germany, and on his return home, became aide to the Commandant and at

the White House. During the interwar

period, he had a mix of school, staff,

and command assignments. In March

1942, he assumed command of the 9th

Marines and took it overseas as part of

the 3d Marine Division. Upon promotion to flag rank in July 1943, he was assigned to the 1st Marine Division as

assistant division commander and, as

such, participated in the Cape Gloucester

operation. He assumed command of the

1st Provisional Marine Brigade in May

1944, and led it in the landing on Guam.

Following this operation, he received his

second star and took command of the

6th Marine Division, which was formed

from the brigade and participated in the

landings on Okinawa. General Shepherd

commanded Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in the first two years of the Korean

War, and then was chosen as the 20th

4

Commandant of the Marine Corps.

General Shepherd died at the age of 94

in 1990.
\T: ;.a'

a

e

It w& -,

who had commanded the invasion

forces at Roi and Namur in the Marshalls, would head the Southern Attack Force (Task Force 53) assigned

to Guam. Marine Major General

(later Lieutenant General) Holland

M. Smith, the Expeditionary Troops

commander for the Marianas, would

be responsible for the Northern

Troops and Landing Force at Saipan

and Tinian, essentially the Marine V

Amphibious Corps (VAC) Major

General Roy S. Geiger, an aviator

who had conducted the Bougainville

operation, was to command the

Southern Troops and Landing Force,

the III Amphibious Corps, at Guam.

D-Day for the invasion of Saipan

had been set for 15 June. It was an

important date also for the 3d Marine Division, commanded by Major

General Allen H. "Hal" Turnage; the

1st Provisional Marine Brigade under Brigadier General Lemuel C.

Shepherd, Jr.; and the Army's 77th

Infantry Division under Major

General Andrew D. Bruce. They were

to land on Guam on 18 June, but the

3d Division and the brigade first

would wait as floating reserve until

the course of operations on Saipan

became clear. The 77th would stand

by on Oahu, ready to be called forward when needed.

Admiral Spruance kept the floating reserve well south and east of Saipan, out of the path of an expected

Japanese naval attack. A powerful

Japanese fleet, eager to close with the

American invasion force, descended

upon the Marianas. The opposing

carrier groups clashed nearby in the

Battle of the Philippine Sea, one of

the major air battles of the war. The

Imperial Navy lost 330 out of the 430

planes it launched in the fray. The

clash (19 June), called "the Great

Marianas Turkey Shoot;' was catastrophic for the Japanese and ended

once and for all any naval or air

threat to the Marianas invasion.

With the hard fighting on Saipan

turning gradually but inevitably in

favor of the American Marines and

ndrew D. Bruce, a native of

Missouri and a graduate of

Texas A&M in 1916, was commissioned an Army second lieutenant in

June 1917. His association with the Marine Corps goes back to World War I,

when as a member of the 2d Infantry Division's 5th Machine Gun Battalion, he

participated in actions in France in the

Troyon Sector near Verdun, in the Aisne

Defensive operation near Chateau Thierr the Aisne-Marne offensive at Soissons, the fighting at St. Mihiel, and the

Meuse-Argonne offensive at Blanc

Mont. With the rest of the 2d Division,

he hiked into Germany to become part

of the occupation force.

In the interwar period, he had a mix of

staff, command, and school assignsoldiers battling the Japanese, the

U.S. Navy was ready to direct its attention to Guam, which was now

slated to receive the most thorough

pre-landing bombardment yet seen in

the Pacific War. After weeks at sea,

the 3d Division and the 1st Brigade

were given a respite and a chance to

go ashore to lose their "sea legs" after so long a period on board ships.

The Task Force 53 convoy moved

back to Eniwetok Atoll, whose huge

5

ments. At the outbreak of World War II,

then-Lieutenant Colonel Bruce headed

the Army's Tank Destroyer School,

which was first at Camp Meade,

Maryland, then at Camp Hood near

Kileen, Texas. He assumed command of

the 77th Infantry Division in May 1943.

The division first saw combat at Guam

with the 3d Marine Division and the 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade, and then

landed at Leyte for the Philippines operation. General Bruce's 77th once again

fought with Marines in the landing on

1 April 1945 on Okinawa. When the

XXIV Corps attacked to the south,

General Bruce's soldiers and the 1st Marine Division were neighbors in the

frontlines.

General Bruce retired with three stars

as a lieutenant general and died in 1969.

20-mile-wide lagoon was rapidly becoming a major forward naval base.

The Marines welcomed the break

and the chance to walk on dry land

on the small islands of the atoll.

There was even an issue of warm

beer to all those on shore. The Marine veterans of the fighting on Bougainville, New Georgia, and

Eniwetok had a chance to look over

the soldiers of the 305th Regimental

Combat Team, which now came forMajor General Andrew D. Bruce
r C:

6'

I

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talions of 155mm howitzers and guns

and the 9th and 14th Defense Battalions, whose 90mm guns could and

would fire at both air and ground

targets.

ward from Oahu to be attached briefly to the brigade for the landing on

Guam, set for 21 July and designated

W-Day. The rest of the Army contingent, the 77th Infantry Division, was

well trained and well led, and was

scheduled to arrive at the target on

W plus 1, 22 July.

The 3d Marine Division, composed of the 3d, 9th, and 21st Marines (rifle regiments), the 12th

Marines (artillery), and the 19th Marines (engineers and pioneers), plus

supporting troops, numbered 20,238

men. It had received its baptism of

fire on Bougainville in November

and December 1943 and spent the intervening months on Guadalcanal

training and absorbing casualty

replacements. The 1st Provisional

Marine Brigade, which was organized on Guadalcanal, was also a

veteran outfit. One of its infantry

regiments, the 4th Marines, was

formed from the disbanded raider

battalions which had fought in the

Solomons. The other once-separate

regiment, the 22d Marines, was

blooded in the seizure of Eniwetok

in February 1944. Both regiments

had 75mm pack howitzer battalions

attached, which now joined brigade

For the handling of casualties, III

Corps had a medical battalion, with

equipment and supplies to operate a

1,500-bed hospital. In addition, the

1st Brigade had two medical companies; the 3d Division its own medical

battalion; and the 77th Division a

fully staffed and equipped Army

field hospital. Each of the divisions

had a medium tank battalion and a

full complement of engineers, augmented by two Marine separate engineer battalions and two naval

construction battalions (Seabees).

Two amphibian tractor battalions

and an armored amphibian battalion

would carry the assault waves to

shore. All in all, the III Amphibious

Corps was prepared to land more

than 54,000 soldiers, sailors, and

Marines.

Waiting for the attack and sure

En route to Guam on board the command ship USS Appalachian (AGC 1), Marine III Amphibious Corps commander, MajGen Roy S. Geiger; his chief of staff,

Col Merwin H. Silverthorn; and the Corps Artillery commander, BGen Pedro A.

del Valle, all longtime Marines and World War I veterans, review their copy of

the Guam relief map to assist in their estimates and plans for the operation.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87140

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 90434

BGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade and his principal officers, from left, Col John T Walker, brigade chief of

staff; LtCol Alan Shapley, commander, 4th Marines; and Col Merlin T. Schneider,

commander, 22d Marines, view a relief map of Guam for the brigade's operation.

troops. In all, the brigade mustered

9,886 men.

Corps troops of the III Corps was

heavy with artillery and would use

every gun. III Corps had three bat6
were 5,000 naval troops of the 54th

Keibitai (guard force) and about

2,000 naval airmen reorganized as infantry to defend Orote Peninsula and

its airfield. General Takashina was in

overall tactical command of the

18,500 Army and Navy defenders.

His immediate superior, Lieutenant

General Hideyoshi Obata, commanding the Thirty-first Army, was

also on Guam, though not intentionally. Returning to his Saipan headquarters from an inspection trip to

the Palau Islands, Obata was trapped

on Guam by the American landing

on Saipan. He left the conduct of

Guam's defense to Takashina.

The fact that the Americans were

to assault Guam was no secret to its

defenders. The invasion of Saipan

and a month-long bombardment by

ships and planes left only the question of when and where. With only

15 miles of potential landing beaches

along the approachable west coast,

the Japanese could not be very wrong

no matter where they defended.

Tokyo Rose said they expected us.

On board ship, the Americans heard

her and her pleasant beguiling voice

on the radio. While she made threats

of dire things to happen to invasion

troops, she was never taken seriously by any of her American "fans."

Imperial Japanese Army LtGen Takeshi

Takashina, commander of the 29th Infantry Division, which came to Guam

from Manchuria in early 1944, where it

was part of the Kwantung Army,

was killed on 28 July while directing

the evacuation of his Fonte defenses.

that it would come, but not where,

was the Japanese 29th Infantry Division under Lieutenant General

Takeshi Takashina. The 29th had

served in Japan's Kwantung Army,

operating and training in Manchuria

until it was sent to the Marianas in

February 1944. One of its regiments,

the 18th, fell victim to an American

submarine, the Trout, and lost 2,200

of its 3,500 men when its transport

was sunk. Reorganized on Saipan,

the 18th Infantry Regiment took two

infantry battalions to Guam, together

with two companies of tanks.

Another of the 29th's regiments

garrisoned Tinian and the remaining

unit, the 38th Infantry, together with

division headquarters troops, arrived

on Guam in March. The other major

Army defending units were the 48th

Independent Mixed Brigade and the

10th Independent Mixed Regiment,

both formed on Guam in March

from a six-battalion infantry, artillery, and engineer force sent from

the Kwantung Army. With miscellaneous supporting troops, the total

Army defending force numbered

about 11,500 men. Added to these

7
LtGen Hideyoshi Obata, Thirty-first

Army commander, who took command

of the defense of Guam after Gen

Takashina's death, was himself killed by

soldiers of the 306th Infantry, when they

overran the Mataguac command post.

Major General Kiyoshi Shigematsu, shoring up the morale of his 48th

Independent Mixed Brigade, told his

men: "The enemy, overconfident because of his successful landing on Saipan, is planning a reckless and

insufficiently prepared landing on

Guam. We have an excellent opportunity to annihilate him on the

beaches."

Premier Hideki Tojo, supreme

commander of the war effort for

Japan, also had spirited words for his

embattled commanders: "Because the

fate of the Japanese empire depends

on the result of your operation, inspire the spirit of officers and men

and to the very end continue to destroy the enemy gallantly and persistently; thus alleviate the anxiety of

the Emperor:'

Back to visit Guam a half century

later, a former Japanese lieutenant

said the tremendous American invasion fleet offshore had "paved the sea"

and recalled what he thought on 21

July: "This is the day I will die:'

"Conditions," said Admiral Conolly, "are most favorable for a successful landing:'

Troops of the 3d Marine Division

landed virtually in the lap of the

Japanese island commander, General

Takashina, whose U-shaped cave

command post, carved out of a sandstone cliff, overlooked the AsanAdelup beachhead. The looming

heights dominated the beaches, particularly on the left and center, where

the 3d and 21st Marines were headed

for the shore.

W-Day, 21 July 1944, opened as a

beautiful day, but it soon turned

hazy as the violent clouds of smoke,

dust, and fire spiraled skyward. At

S

0808 an air observer shouted into his

microphone: "First wave on the

beach:' At 0833, the same airborne

announcer confirmed the battle was

on, with: "Troops ashore on all

beaches:'

The 3d Marines under Colonel W.

Carvel Hall struck on the far left of

the 2,500-yard beachhead, the left

flank of the division near Adelup

Point. Ahead was Chonito Cliff, a

ridge later named Bundschu Ridge,

and high, difficult ground in back of

which was the final beachhead line

(FBHL), or first goal of the landing.

The center, straight up the middle,

belonged to the 21st Marines, under

Colonel Arthur H. "Tex" Butler. The

regiment would drive inland, secure

a line of cliffs, and defend them until

the division caught up and was ready

to expand the beachhead outward.

Under Colonel Edward A. Craig, the

9th Marines landed on the right flank

near Asan Point, ready to strike inland over paddies to and across lower

and more hospitable hills, but all part

of the same formidable enemy-held

ridgeline.

The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,

under Lieutenant Colonel Walter Asmuth, Jr., caught intense fire from the

front and right flank near Asan

Point, and he had to call on tanks for

assistance, but one company got to

A, z

F.-. OROTE PENINSULA

I

c
- ____

the ridge ahead quite rapidly and

threw the defenders at Asan Point off

balance, making the regiment's advance easier. (It would also be up to

the 9th Marines to take Cabras, a little island offshore and hard against

Apra Harbor. This would be accomplished with a separate amphibious

landing.) With its 2d and 3d Battalions in the lead, the 9th Marines

drove through its initial objectives

quickly and had to slacken its advance in order not to thin out the divisions lines.

Colonel Butler's 21st Marines, in a

stroke of luck which would later be

called unbelievable, found two unguarded defiles on either side of the

regiment's zone of action. His troops

climbed straight to the clifftops. No

attempt was made to keep contact

going up, but, on top, the 2d and 3d

Battalions formed a bridge covering

both defiles. The 1st Battalion swept

the area below the cliffs.

The 12th Marines (Colonel John B.

Wilson) was quickly on the beach,

with its burdensome guns and equipment, and the 3d Battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, Jr.,

was registered and firing by 1215. By

1640 every battery was in position

and in support of the advance. Captain Austin P. Gattis of the 12th Marines attributed the success of his

regiment in setting up quickly to

"training, because we had done it

over, and over, and over. It was eff iciency learned and practiced and it

always gave the 12th a leg up."

On the far left, the 3d Marines was

getting the worst of the enemy's increasing resistance. The regiment

received intense mortar and artillery

fire coming in and on the beaches,

and faced the toughest terrain — steep

cliffs whose approaches were laced

with interlocking bands of Japanese

machine gun fire. The cliffs were

defended by foes who knew and used

their weapons well. The Japanese,

that close, would roll grenades right

down the escarpment onto the Marines. Snipers could find protection

and cover in the countless folds and

ridges of the irregular terrain, and the

ridgetops were arrayed like the

breastworks of some nightmarish

castle. It appeared that ten on top

could hold off hundreds below.

One of the defenders, Lieutenant

Kenichi Itoh, recalled that despite the

terrible bombardment, he felt secure,

that his countrymen could hold out

for a long time, even win. After the

war, recalling his feelings that eventful day in July 1944, the lieutenant

considered it all a bad dream, "even

Laden amphibious tractors carry troops of the 22d Marines

in the assault wave to Yellow Beaches 1 and 2 south of Agat

in the Southern Sector. Here, they would face murderous fire

from Japanese guns at Gaan Point and from positions overlooking the beaches on Mount Alifan and Maanot Ridge.

Gaan Point was not fully neutralized until 1330, W-Day.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 88093

9

3d Marine Division Insignia

T

he insignia of the 3d Marine

Division was adopted on 25

August 1943, when the division was in training on Guadalcanal

for the upcoming invasion of Bougainyule. Approved in 3d Marine Division

Memorandum 274-43, the insignia

consisted of a caltrop on a triangular,

gold-bordered scarlet shield. The

caltrop was a medieval defensive

weapon used against both cavalry and

infantry. During the warfare of the

Middle Ages, large numbers of caltrops

were scattered by defenders on the

ground in front of an approaching enemy. The four-pronged, forged-iron

caltrop was designed so that no matter which way it landed when thrown

on the ground, one point would be up

with the other three points supporting

it. When used on the insignia, the

caltrop represented not only the 3d

Marine Division, but also the motto

painted on the drums carried by the

Continental Marines in the American

Revolution: 'Dont Tread on Me:'
S•11

absurd" to think that his forces could

ever withstand the onslaught.

On W-Day, Lieutenant Colonel

Ralph E. Houser's 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines, was on the extreme left of

the line, facing Adelup Point, which,

with Asan Point, marked the right

and left flanks of the invasion

beaches. Houser's troops could seize

the territory in his zone only with the

support of tanks from Company C,

3d Tank Battalion, and half-trackmounted 75mm guns. Holding up the

regimental advance was a little nose

projecting from Chonito Ridge facing

the invasion beach in the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines' zone. Early on WDay (about 1045), Captain Geary R.

Bundschu's Company A was able to

secure a foothold within 100 yards

of the crest of this promontory, but

could not hold its positions in the

face of intense enfilading machine

gun fire. Captain Bundschu called for

stretchers and corpsmen, then requested permission to disengage.

Major Henry Aplington II, commanding the 1st Battalion, was "unwilling to give up ground in the tight

area and told Captain Bundschu to

hold what he had."

Colonel Hall ordered the attack to

continue in mid-afternoon behind a

massive 81mm mortar barrage. None

of the companies of Major Aplington's battalion or Lieutenant Colonel

Hector de Zayas' 2d Battalion could

gain any ground beyond what they

already precariously held. Their opponent, the 320th Independent In fantry Battalion held fast.

A couple of hours later, Colonel

Hall ordered another attack, with

Companies A and E in the fore.

Major Aplington recalled:

When the 1700 attack went

off, it was no change. E made

little progress and the gallant

men of A Company attacked

again and again, reached the

10

top but could not hold. Geary

Bundschu was killed and the

company slid back to the former positions.

In the morning light of 22 July (W

plus 1), that small but formidable

Japanese position still held firmly

against the 3d Marines' advance.

During the bitter fighting of the

previous day, Private First Class

Luther Skaggs, Jr., of the 3d Battalion, led a mortar section through

heavy enemy fire to support the attack, then defended his position

against enemy counterattacks during

the night although badly wounded.

For conspicuous gallantry and bravery beyond the call of duty, he was

awarded the Medal of Honor. On the

22d, Private First Class Leonard F.

Mason, a Browning automatic rifleman of the 2d Battalion, earned a

posthumous Medal of Honor for

single-handedly attacking and wiping out an enemy machine gun p0-

Upon reaching the beach, Marines quickly unload over the

gunwales of the amtrac which brought them in and rushed

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)88160

off the beaches. As the frontlines advanced, succeeding waves

of amphibian tractors will carry the troops further inland.
a.-. • . Sc.

--

- ---a - — 'lI

- ---S- C..

sition which threatened his unit.

Although wounded severely, he rejoined his fellow Marines to continue

the attack, but succumbed to his fatal wounds.

During the day's bitter fighting,

Colonel Hall tried to envelop the

Japanese, using Companies A and C

of Aplington's battalion and Company E of de Zayas' On regimental orders, Aplington kicked it off at 1150.

It also got nowhere at first. Company

A got to the top but was thrown off.

Company E was able to move ahead

very slowly. Probe after probe, it

found Japanese resistance perceptibly

weakening. By 1900, the men of E

reached the top, above Company A's

position. The Japanese had pulled

back. In the morning, a further advance confirmed the enemy withdrawal.

In the south at Agat, despite

favorable terrain for the attack, the

1st Brigade found enemy resistance

at the beachhead to be more intense

than that which the 3d Division

found on the northern beaches.

Small arms and machine gun fire,

and the incessant fires of two 75mm

guns and a 37mm gun from a concrete blockhouse with a four-foot

thick roof built into the nose of Gaan

Point, greeted the invading Marines

as the LVTs churned ashore. The

structure had been well camouflaged

and not spotted by photo interpreters

Seen from the air, 9th and 21st Marines assault Green and

Blue Beaches in the Northern Sector on 21 July, W-Day. In

the right, Asan Point casts a foreboding shadow over that

portion of the landing area. Note LSTs beaching at the left.

11
,',,l,,

I

II

I'

- FONTE

PLATEAUS:

Ii

-, /•ç

Si

,1

FRONTLINE: W. DAY

A SAN BEACHHEAD

Only Approximate Form Lines Shown

500 SCALLARDS 'D0

Ii

before the landing nor, unfortunately, selected as a target for bombing.

As a result, its guns knocked out two

dozen amtracs carrying elements of

the 22d Marines. For the assault

forces' first hours ashore on W-Day

on the southern beaches, the Gaan

position posed a major problem.

The assault at Agat was treated to

the same thunderous naval gunfire

support which had disrupted and

shook the ground in advance of the

landings on the northern beaches at

Asan. When the 1st Brigade assault

wave was 1,000 yards from the

beach, hundreds of 4.5-inch rockets

from LCI(G)s (Landing Craft, Infantry, Gunboat) slammed into the

strand. It would be the last of the

powerful support the troops of the

brigade in assault would get before

they touched down on Guam.

While the LVTs, the DUKWs (amphibious trucks), and the LCVPs

were considerably off shore, there

was virtually no enemy fire from the

beach. An artillery observation plane

reported no observed enemy fire. The

defenders at Agat, however, 1st and

2d Battalions, 38th Infantry, would

respond in their own time. The loss

of so many amtracs as the assault

waves neared the beaches meant

that, later in the day, there would not

be enough LVTs for the transfer of all

supplies and men from boats to amtracs at the Agat reef. This shortage

of tractors would plague the brigade

until well after W-Day.

The damage caused to assault and

cargo craft on the reef, and the precision of Japanese guns became real

concerns to General Shepherd. Some

of the Marines and most of the soldiers who came in after the first assault

waves would wade ashore with full

12

packs, water to the waist or higher,

facing the perils of both underwater

shellholes and Japanese fire. Fortunately, by the time the bulk of the

77th Division waded in, these twin

threats were not as great because the

Marines ashore were spread out and

keeping the Japanese occupied.

The Japanese Agat command had

prepared its defenses well with thickwalled bunkers and smaller pillboxes. The 75mm guns on Gaan Point

were in the middle of the landing

beaches. Crossfire from Gaan coordinated with the machine guns on

nearby tiny Yona island to rake the

beaches allocated to the 4th Marines

under Lieutenant Colonel Alan

Shapley. The 4th Marines was to establish its beachhead, and protect the

right or southernmost flank. After

bitter fighting, the 4th Marines

forged ahead on the low ground to
its front and cleared Bangi Point

where bunker walls could withstand

a round from a battleship. Lieutenant

Colonel Shapley set up a block on

what was to be known as Harmon

Road leading down from the mountains to Agat. A lesson well learned

in previous operations was that the

Japanese would be back in strength

and at night.

When the Marines landed, they

found an excellent but undermanned

Japanese trench system on the

beaches, and while the pre-landing

bombardment had driven enemy

defenders back into their holes, they

nonetheless were able to pour heavy

machine gun and mortar fire down

on the invaders. Pre-landing planning called for the Marine amtracs to

drive 1,000 yards inland before discharging their embarked Marines,

but this tactic failed because of a

heavily mined beachhead, with its

antitank ditches and other obstacles.

However, the brigade attack ashore

was so heavy, with overwhelming

force the Marines were able to break

through, and by 1034, the assault

forces were 1,000 yards inland, and

the 4th Marines' reserve battalion

had landed. After receiving extremely heavy fire from all emplaced

Japanese forces, the Marines worked

on cleaning out bypassed bunkers

together with the now-landed tanks.

By 1330, the Gaan Point blockhouse

had been eliminated by taking the

position from the rear and blasting

the surprised enemy gunners before

they could offer effective resistance.

At this time also, the brigade command group was on the beach and

General Shepherd had opened his

command post.

The 22d Marines, led by Colonel

Merlin F. Schneider, was battered by

a hail of small arms and mortar fire

on hitting its assigned beach, and

suffered heavy losses of men and

equipment in the first minutes. Private First Class William L. Dunlap

could vouch for the high casualties.

The dead, Dunlap recalled, included

the battalion's beloved chaplain, who

had been entrusted with just about

everybody's gambling money "to

hold for safekeeping;' the Marines

never for a minute considering that

he was just as mortal as they. The 1st

Battalion, 22d Marines (Lieutenant

Colonel Walfried H. Fromhold), had

left its section of the landing zone

and moved to the shattered town of

Agat, after which the battalion

would drive north and eventually

seal off heavily defended Orote

Peninsula, shortly to be the scene of

a major battle.

The 22d Marines' 2d Battalion,

(Lieutenant Colonel Donn C. Hart),

in the center of the beachhead, quickly and easily moved 1,000 yards

directly ahead inland from the beach.

The battalion could have gone on to

one of the W-Day goals, the local

heights of Mount Alifan, if American

bombs had not fallen short, halting

the attack.

The 1st Battalion moved into the

ruins of Agat and at 1020 was able to

say, "We have Agat," although there

was still small arms resistance in the

rubble. By 1130 the battalion was

also out to Harmon Road, which led

to the northern shoulder of Mount

Alifan. Even as Fromhold's men

made their advances, Japanese shells

hit the battalion aid station, wounding and killing members of the medical team and destroying supplies.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94137

In quick order, the 105mm howitzers of LtCol Alpha L. Bowser's 3d Battalion, 12th

Marines, were landed and set up in camouflaged positions to support the attack.

13
•" j:

—1•

Often, in attacking up the ridges, there was very little cover vanced in the face of heavy artillery, mortar, and machine gun

and hardly any concealment as the Marines and soldiers ad- fire. Evacuation was extremely difficult under these conditions.

Company A, 3d Marines, is in a perilous position on W-Day to Chonito Ridge at the top. The troops were halted by

plus 1, 22 July, as it is held up on Bundschu Ridge on its way Japanese fire, which prevented immediate reinforcement.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87396

14
Medal of Honor Recipients

rivate First Class Luther

Skaggs, Jr.'s Medal of Honor

citation reads as follows: "For

conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity

at the risk of his life above and beyond

the call of duty while serving as squad

leader with a mortar section of a rifle

company in the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces on

the Asan-Adelup beachhead, Guam,

Marianas Islands, 21-22 July 1944.

When the section leader became a

casualty under a heavy mortar barrage

shortly after landing, Private First

Class Skaggs promptly assumed command and led the section through intense fire for a distance of 200 yards

to a position from which to deliver effective coverage of the assault on a

strategic cliff. Valiantly defending this

vital position against strong enemy

counterattacks during the night, Private First Class Skaggs was critically

wounded when a Japanese grenade

lodged in his foxhole and exploded,

shattering the lower part of one leg.

Quick to act, he applied an improvised

tourniquet and, while propped up in

his foxhole, gallantly returned the enemy's fire with his rifle and hand

grenades for a period of 8 hours, later

crawling unassisted to the rear to continue the fight until the Japanese had

been annihilated. Uncomplaining and

calm throughout this critical period,

Private First Class Skaggs served as a

heroic example of courage and fortitude to other wounded men and, by his

courageous leadership and inspiring

devotion to duty, upheld the high traditions of the United States naval

service:'

rivate First Class Leonard

Foster Mason's Medal of

Honor citation reads as follows: "For conspicuous gallantry and

intrepidity at the risk of his life above

and beyond the call of duty as an automatic rifleman serving with the Second Battalion, Third Marines, Third

Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on the AsanAdelup Beachhead, Guam, Marianas

Islands, on 22 July 1944. Suddenly

taken under fire by two enemy

machine guns not more than 15 yards

away while clearing out hostile positions holding up the advance of his platoon through a narrow gully, Private

First Class Mason, alone and entirely

on his own initiative, climbed out of

the gully and moved parallel to it

toward the rear of the enemy position.

Although fired upon immediately by

hostile riflemen from a higher position

and wounded repeatedly in the arm

and shoulder, Private First Class Mason grimly pressed forward and had

just reached his objective when hit

again by a burst of enemy machinegun fire, causing a critical wound to

which he later succumbed. With valiant disregard for his own peril, he

persevered, clearing out the hostile position, killing five Japanese, wounding

another and then rejoining his platoon

to report the results of his action before consenting to be evacuated. His

exceptionally heroic act in the face of

almost certain death enabled his platoon to accomplish its mission and

reflects the highest credit upon Private

First Class Mason and the United

States naval service. He gallantly gave

his life for his country:'

Not until later that afternoon was the

1st Battalion sent another doctor.

On the right of the landing waves,

Major Bernard W. Green's 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, ran head-on into

a particularly critical hill mass (Hill

40) near Bangi Point, which had been

thoroughly worked over by the

Navy. Hill 40's unexpectedly heated

defense indicated that the Japanese

recognized its importance, commanding the beaches where troops

and supplies were coming ashore. It

took tanks and the support of the 3d

Battalion to claim the position.

Before dark on W-Day, the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, could see the 4th

Marines across a deep gully. The latter held a thin, twisted line extending 1,600 yards from the beach to

Harmon Road. The 22d Marines held

the rest of a beachhead 4,500 yards

long and 2,000 yards deep.

At nightfall of W-Day, General

15

Shepherd summed up to General

Geiger: "Own casualties about 350.

Enemy unknown. Critical shortages

of fuel and ammunition all types.

Think we can handle it. Will continue as planned tomorrow:'

Helping to ensure that the Marines

would stay on shore once they landed was a host of unheralded support

troops who had been struggling since

daylight to manage the flow of vital

supplies to the beaches. Now, as W-
The Taking of Chonito Ridge

T

he following is a dispatch written by Marine

Combat Correspondent Private First Class Cyril

J. O'Brien in the field after the combat action he

describes in his story. It was released for publication in the

United States sometime after the event (always after families were notified of the wounding or death of the Marines

mentioned.) This story is reprinted from the carbon copy

of the file which he retained of the stories he filed from

the Pacific

Guam July 24 (Delayed) —The first frontal attack on steep

Chonito Ridge was made one hour after the Marine

landing.

An infantry squad, led by Second Lieutenant James A.

Gallo, 24, 172 Broadway, Haverstraw, N.Y., approached

to within ten yards of the tip. The crest bloomed with

machine gun fire. In the face of it the Marine company tried

its first assault. The company was thrown back before it

had advanced forty yards.

For fifty hours the company remained on the naked

slope, trying again and again to storm the Jap entrenchments hardly one hundred yards away. Battered almost to

annihilation, the tenacious Marines finally saw another

company take the ridge from the rear.

Failing in the first rush the company had formed a flimsy defense line not fifty yards from the enemy. Cover was

scant. Some Marines had only tufts of grass to shield them.

The Japs were rolling grenades down the crest, and blasting the Marines with knee mortars from over the summit.

Under the cover of dusk the company commander led

a second attack. As the Marines rose machine gun fire

swept into them. The commander, and three Marines

reached the crest. The last fifty feet were almost vertical.

The attackers grasped roots and dug their feet into the soft

earth to keep from falling down the incline.

The commander went over the ridge. He never came

back. The remaining three Marines were ripped by cross

fire. One saved himself by jumping into an enemy fox hole.

Beaten again, the company retired to a small ravine, and

remained there all night. One Marine, shot through both

legs, was asking for morphine. Another's thigh was ripped

by shell fragments. A PFC, his dry tongue swollen, tried

to whisper the range of an enemy sniper.

At eleven in the morning of the 22d, with little more

than a third of their original number, the company rushed

the hillside again.

Lieutenant Gallo led an assault on the left flank of the

hill, but he was thrown back. Sergeant Charles V. Bomar,

33, 4002 Gulf St., Houston, Tex., with nine Marines attempted to take the right ground of the slope. Five were

killed as they left the ravine. The sergeant and three others

reached the top of the slope.

The Japs again rolled grenades down the incline. One

exploded under the chest of a Marine nearby, blowing off

his head. Another grenade bounced off the helmet of the

sergeant. It was a dud.

The Marines charged into the Jap entrenchment. The sergeant killed a Jap machine gunner with the butt of his carbine. The assistant gunner exploded a grenade against his

body. The blast threw the Marines out of the hole. They

jumped into vacated enemy foxholes. A lieutenant who had

come to join them was shot between the eyes by a sniper.

The sergeant killed the sniper with his carbine.

Unable to hold their positions, the sergeant and his companies returned to the shelter of the ravine. With the shattered remnants of the company they waited for nearly

another 24 hours, until darting Marines on the top of the

ridge showed Chonito had been taken from the rear.

Field commanders soon came to appreciate the effect

these so-called "Joe Blow" stories had on the morale of their

men. The stories were printed in hometown newspapers and

were clipped and sent to the troops in the Pacific who could

then see that their efforts were being publicized and appreciated at home.

16
4

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)91176

A Japanese cave position on the reverse slope of Chonito Ridge bardment and enabled them to reoccupy prepared positions

offered protection for the enemy from the prelanding bom- from which they could oppose the advance of the 3d Marines.

Day's darkness approached, the 4th

Ammunition Company, a black Marine unit, guarded the brigade's ammunition depot ashore. During their

sleepless night, these Marines killed

14 demolition-laden infiltrators approaching the dump.

Faulty communications delayed

the order to land the Army's 305th

Regimental Combat Team (Colonel

Vincent J. Tanzola), elements of the

assault force, for hours. Slated for a

morning landing, the 2d Battalion of

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Adair

did not get ashore until well after

nightfall. As no amtracs were then

available, the soldiers had to walk in

from the reef. Some soldiers slipped

under water into sheliholes and had

to swim for their lives in a full tide.

The rest of the 305th had arrived on

the beach, all wet, some seasick, by

0600 on W plus-i.

Colonel Tsunetaro Suenaga, commanding officer of the 38th Regiment, from his command post on

Mount Alifan, had seen the Americans overwhelm his forces below.

Desperate to strike back, he telephoned General Takashina at 1730 to

get permission for an all-out assault

to drive the Marines into the sea. He

had already ordered. his remaining

units to assemble for the counterattack. The 29th Division commander

was not at first receptive. Losses

would be too high and the 38th Regiment would serve better defending

the high ground and thereby

threatening the American advance.

Reluctantly, however, Takashina

gave his permission, and ordered the

survivors to fall back on Mount

Alifan if the attack failed, which he

was certain it would. Eventually

17

Colonel Suenaga was forced to share

the general's pessimism, for he

burned his regiment's colors to prevent their capture.

At the focal point of the enemy's

attack from the south, Hill 40, the

brunt of the fighting fell upon First

Lieutenant Martin J. "Stormy" Sexton's Company K, 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines. The enemy's 3d Battalion,

38th Regiment coming north from

reserve positions was still relatively

intact. In the face of Japanese assaults, the company held, but just

barely. Sexton recalls Lieutenant

Colonel Shapley's assessment of the

night's fighting: "If the Japanese had

been able to recapture Hill 40, they

could have kicked our asses off the

Agat beaches:'

Major Anthony N. "Cold Steel"

Walker, S-3 (operations officer) of the

3d Battalion, recalled that the

C

1 el Atcu
Japanese, an estimated 750 men, hit

the company at about 2130, with the

main effort coming to the left or east

of the hill. He remembered:

Finding a gap in our lines and

overrunning the machine gun

which covered the gap the enemy broke through and advanced toward the beaches.

Some elements turned to their

left and struck Hill 40 from the

rear. K Company with about

200 men fought them all night

long from Hill 40 and a small

hill to the rear and northeast of

Hill 40. When daylight came the

Marines counterattacked with

two squads from L Company

and two tanks . . . and

closed the gap. A number of

men from Company K died that

night but all 750 Japanese soldiers were killed. The hill

represents in miniature or symbolically the whole hard-fought

American victory on Guam.

Along the rest of the Marine front,

and in the reserve areas, the fighting

was hot and heavy as the rest of the

38th attacked. Colonel Suenaga

pushed his troops to attack again and

again, in many cases only to see them

mowed down in the light of American flares. No novice to Japanese tactics, General Shepherd had

anticipated this first night's attack

and was ready.

Enemy reconnaissance patrols

were numerous around 2130, trying

to draw fire and determine Marine

positions. Colonel Suenaga was out

in front of the center thrust which began at 2330 after a brisk mortar flurry on the right flank of the 4th

Marines. The Japanese came on in

full force, yelling, charging with their

rifles carried at high port, and throwing grenades. The Marines watched

the dark shadows moving across the

skyline under light of star shells from

the ships. Men lined up hand grenades, watched, waited, and then reacted. The Japanese were all around,

attempting to bayonet Marines in

their foxholes. They even infiltrated

down to pack-howitzer positions in

the rear of the front lines. It was the

same for the 22d Marines. A whole

company of Japanese closed to the vicinity of the regimental command

post. The defense here was held

18

largely by a reconnaissance platoon

headed by Lieutenant Dennis Chavez, Jr., who personally killed five of

the infiltrators at point blank range

with a Thompson sub-machine gun.

Four enemy tanks in that same attack lumbered down Harmon Road.

There they met a bazooka man from

the 4th Marines, Private First Class

Bruno Oribiletti. He knocked out the

first two enemy tanks and Marine

Sherman tanks of Lieutenant James

R. Williams' 4th Tank Company platoon finished off the rest. Oribiletti

was killed; he was posthumously

awarded the Navy Cross for his bravery. Enemy troops of the 38th also

stumbled into the barely set up

perimeter of the newly arrived 305th

Infantry and paid heavily for it.

After one day and night of furious

battle the 38th ceased to exit. Colonel

Suenaga, wounded in the first night's

counterattack, continued to flail at

the Marines until he, too, was cut

down. Takashina ordered the shattered remnants of the regiment north

to join the reserves he would need to

defend the high ground around Fonte

Ridge above the Asan-Adelup beachhead. The general would leave his
troops on Orote to fend for themselves.

The two days of fierce fighting on

the left of the 3d Division's beachhead in the area that was now

dubbed Bundschu Ridge cost the 3d

Marines 615 men killed, wounded,

and missing. The 21st Marines in the

center held up its advance on 22 July

until the 3d Marines could get moving, but the men in their exposed positions along the top of the ridge,

seized so rapidly on W-Day, were

hammered by Japanese mortar fire,

so much so that Colonel Butler

received permission to replace the 2d

Battalion by the 1st, which had been

in division reserve. The 9th Marines

met relatively little resistance as it

overran many abandoned Japanese

positions in its drive toward the

former American naval base at Piti

on the shore of Apra Harbor. The 3d

Battalion, after a heavy barrage of

naval gunfire and bombs, assaulted

Cabras Island in mid-afternoon,

landing from LVTs to find its major

obstacle dense brambles with

hundreds of mines.

General Turnage, assessing the situation as he saw it on the eve of 22

iii!!,

- MTALIFAN

-

FRONTLINE - W- DAY

AGAT BEACHHEAD

<' JAPANESE COUNTERATTACKS

Only Approximate Form Lines Shown

SCALE — YARDS

500 0 500

19

July reported to General Geiger:

Enemy resistance increased

considerably today on Div left

and center. All Bn's of 3rd CT

[combat team] have been committed in continuous attack

since landing. 21st CT less 1 Bn

in Div Res has been committed

continuously with all units in

assault. One of the assault Bn's

of 21st CT is being relieved on

line by Div Res Bn today. Former is approx 40 percent depleted. Since further advance will

continue to thin our lines it is

now apparent that an additional CT is needed. 9th CT is fully committed to the capture of

Piti and Cabras. Accordingly it

is urgently recommended that

an additional CT be attached

this Div at the earliest practicable date.

Turnage did not get the additional

regiment he sought. The night of W

plus 1 was relatively quiet in the 3d

Division's sector except for the 1st

Battalion, 21st Marines, which

repulsed a Japanese counterattack

replete with a preliminary mortar

barrage followed by a bayonet

charge.

On the 23d, III Amphibious Corps

Commander, General Geiger, well

aware that the majority of Japanese

troops had not yet been encountered,

told the 3d Division that it was "essential that close contact between adjacent units be established by later

afternoon and maintained throughout the night" unless otherwise

directed. Despite the order to close

up and keep contact, the 3d Division

was spread too thinly to hold what

it had seized in that day's advance.

When it halted to set up for the night,

it was found that the distance between units had widened. When

night fell, the frontline troops essentially held strongpoints with gaps between them covered by interlocking

bands of fire.

The 3d Marines reached the high

ground of Bundschu Ridge on the
* -

all-out counterattack, just as the Marines, north and south, were getting

ready to drive to the force beachhead

line (FBHL), the objective which

would secure the high ground and

link up the two beachheads.

23d and searched out the remaining

Japanese stragglers. It was obvious

that the enemy had withdrawn from

the immediate area and equally plain

that the Japanese hadn't gone far.

When patrols from the 21st Marines

tried to link up with the 3d Marines,

they were driven back by the fire of

cleverly hidden machine guns, all but

impossible to spot in the welter of undergrowth and rock-strewn ravines.

All across the ridges that the Marines

held, there were stretches of deadly

open ground completely blanketed

by enemy fire from still higher positions. On the night of the 23d, the

9th Marines made good progress

moving through more open territory

which was dotted by hills, each of

which was a potential enemy bastion. A patrol sent south along the

shoreline to contact the 1st Brigade

took fire from the hills to its left and

ran into an American artillery and

naval gunfire concentration directed

at Orote's defenders. The patrol was

given permission to turn back.

On the 24th, the 3d and 21st Marines finally made contact on the

heights, but the linkup was illusory.

There were no solid frontlines, only

strongpoints. No one could be certain that the Japanese had all been

accounted for in the areas that had

been probed, attacked, and now

seemed secure. Every rifleman was

well aware that more of the same lay

ahead; he could see his next objectives looming to the front, across the

Mount Tenjo Road, which crossed

the high ground that framed the

beachhead. Already the division had

suffered more than 2,000 casualties,

the majority in infantry units. And

yet the Japanese, who had lost as

many and more men in the north

alone, were showing no signs of

abandoning their fierce defense.

General Takashina was, in fact, husbanding his forces, preparing for an

Since the American landings,

Takashina had been bringing troops

into the rugged hills along the Mount

Tenjo Road, calling in his reserves

from scattered positions all over the

island. By 25 July, he had more than

5,000 men, principally of the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and the

10th Independent Mixed Regiment,

assembled and ready to attack.

The fighting on the 25th was as intense as that on any day since the

landing. The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert E.

Cushman, Jr., who was to become

the 25th Commandant of the Marine

Corps in 1972), was attached to the

3d Marines to bring a relatively intact unit into the fight for the Fonte

heights and to give the badly battered

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87239

Mount Alifan looms over the men of the 4th Marines as they move through the

foothills to the attack. In the background, a plane being used for observation keeps

track of the front lines for controlling the fire of ships' guns and supporting artillery.

Prior to the anticipated American landing on 21 July 1944, LtGen Takeshi Takashina, right, commanding general of the 29th Infantry Division, inspects defenses

on Agat Beach, with Col Tsunetaro Suenaga, who commanded the 38th Infantry.

20

ra

p

-4

a

'
1st Battalion, 3d Marines, a chance During the Japanese counterattack on the night of 21-22 July, this Japanese light

to rest and recoup. By nightfall, tank was destroyed at the Company B, 4th Marines, roadblock. Note the rubble

Cushman's men had driven a salient of the ground thrown up by U. S. artillery, aerial, and ships' gunfire bombardments.

into the Japanese lines, seizing the

Mount Tenjo Road, 400 yards short

of the Fonte objective on the left and

250 yards short on the right.

During the day's relentless and increasingly heavy firefights, the 2d

and 3d Battalions of the 3d Marines

had blasted and burned their way

through a barrier of enemy cave

defenses and linked up with Cushman's outfit on the left. About 1900,

Company C of the 9th Marines

pulled back some 100 yards to a position just forward of the road, giving it better observation and field of

fire. Company F had reached and occupied a rocky prominence some 150

yards ahead of Companies G and E,

in the center of the salient. It pulled

21

PENINSUL A

SOUTHERN BEACHHEAD

22—24 JULY 944

POSFTIOHS AT 1800

—22 IJULY

0000 23 JULY

24 IJUt,.Y

YARDS CONTOUR INTERL 100 FEET

MAGPO

APAcA

PELAGI

P

tnn ZDQO
In the aftermath of the Japanese counterattack, bodies of the attackers were strewn back a little for better defense, and

on a hillside typical of the terrain over which much of the battle was fought. held. Thus the scene was set for the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 91435 pitched battle of Fonte Ridge, fought

at hand-grenade range and in which

casualties on both sides were largely

caused by small arms fire at pointblank distances. It was in this action

that leadership, doggedness, and organizational skill under fire merited

the award of the Medal of Honor

to the Commanding Officer of Company F, Captain Louis H. Wilson, Jr.,

who became the 26th Commandant

of the Marine Corps in 1976, following in the footsteps of his former battalion commander.

Captain Wilson was wounded

three times leading his own attacks

in the intense crux of this Fonte action, and as his citation relates:

'Fighting fiercely in hand-to-hand encounters, he led his men in furiously

22

3D MARINE DIVISION PROGRESS

22—26 JULY 1944

POSITIONS AT 1800

o o 22 JULY

rmi 24 JULY

• . . 26 JULY

2000

CONTOUR INTERVAL tOO FEET

8UNDSCHU RIC

ITO CLIFF
— - P44;;

4

a

d :

14

waged battle for approximately 10

hours, tenaciously holding his line

and repelling the fanatically renewed

counterthrusts until he succeeded in

crushing the last efforts of the hardpressed Japanese . . . :'

Captain Wilson organized and led

the 17-man patrol which climbed the

slope in the face of the same continued enemy fire to seize the critical high ground at Fonte and keep it.

A half century later, Colonel Fraser

E. West recalled the engagement at

Fonte as bitter, close, and brisk. As

a young officer, he commanded

Company C, and reinforced Wilson's

unit. West joined on Company F's

flank, then reconnoitered to spot enemy positions and shared the night in

a common CP with Captain Wilson.

In late afternoon of the 25th, a platoon of four tanks of Company C,

3d Tank Battalion, had made its way

up to the Mount Tenjo Road and

gone into position facing the most

evident Japanese strongpoints. At the

height of the battle by Wilson's and

West's companies to hold their positions, First Lieutenant Wilcie A.

O'Bannon, executive officer of Company F, managed to get down slope

from his exposed position and bring

up two of these tanks. By use of telephones mounted in the rear of the

tanks to communicate with the Marines inside, Lieutenant O'Bannon

was able to describe targets for the

tankers, as he positioned them in

support of Wilson's and West's Marines. West recalled the tanks came

up with a precious cargo of ammunition. He and volunteers stuffed

grenades in pockets, hung bandoleers

over their shoulders, pocketed clips,

carried grenade boxes on their shoulders, and delivered them all as they

would birthday presents along the

line to Companies C and F and a remaining platoon of Company E.

Major West was also able to use a

tank radio circuit to call in naval gunfire, and guarantee that the terrain

23

before him would be lit all night by

star shells and punished by high explosive naval gunfire.

On the morning of 26 July, 600

Japanese lay dead in front of the 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines positions. But

the battle was not over. General Turnage ordered the military crest of the

reverse slope taken. There would be

other Japanese counterattacks, fighting would again be hand-to-hand,

but by 28 July, the capture of Fonte

was in question no longer. Companies E, F, and G took their objectives

on the crest. Lieutenant Colonel

Cushman's battalion in four murderous days had lost 62 men killed and

179 wounded.

It was not any easier for the 21st

Marines with its hard fighting in the

morning of the 25th. Only by

midafternoon did that regiment clear

the front in the center of the line. The

2d Battalion, 21st Marines, had to

deal with a similar pocket of diehards as that which had held up the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93106

Long Toms of Battery A, 7th 155mm Gun Battalion, III Corps 2 in the shadow of the mountain range secured by the 4th MaArtillery, were set up in the open 500 yards from White Beach rifles and the Army's 305th Infantry after heavy fighting.
General Robert E. Cushman

s a 29-year-old lieutenant

colonel commanding the 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d

Marine Division, on Guam, Robert E.

Cushman, Jr., was awarded the Navy

Cross for extraordinary heroism during

the period 21 July to 30 August 1944.

The medal citation states in part:

When his battalion was ordered

to seize and hold a strongly organized and defended enemy

strong-point which had been holding up the advance for some days,

Lieutenant Colonel Cushman

directed the attacks of his battalion and the repulse of numerous

Japanese counterattacks, fearlessly exposing himself to heavy

hostile rifle, machine gun and

mortar fire in order to remain in

the front lines and obtain first

hand knowledge of the enemy situation. Following three days of bitter fighting culminating in a heavy

Japanese counterattack which

pushed back the flank of his battalion, he personally led a platoon

into the gap and, placing it for

defense, repelled the hostile force.

By his inspiring leadership,

courage and devotion to duty, he

contributed materially to the success of the mission with the annihilation of one enemy battalion

and the rout of another . General Cushman became the 25th

Commandant of the Marine Corps on 1

January 1972. Interestingly enough, he

was succeeded four years later by General Louis H. Wilson, Jr., who commanded a company in Cushman's 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, on Guam.

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, on Fonte.

Holed up in commanding cave positions in the eastern draw of the Asan

River, just up from the beachhead,

the Japanese were wiped out only after repeated Marine attacks and

close-in fighting. The official history of the campaign noted that "every

foot of ground that fell to Lieutenant

Colonel [Eustace R.] Smoak's Marines was paid for in heavy casualties, and every man available was

needed in the assault

The 9th Marines under Colonel

Craig made good progress on the

25th from its morning jump-off and

reached the day's objective, a line

running generally along the course of

a local river (the Sasa) by 0915. The

9th Marines had taken even more

ground than was planned. General

Turnage was then able to reposition

the 9th Marines for the harder fighting on the beleaguered left. The 2d

Battalion pulled out of position to

reinforce the 3d Marines and the remaining two battalions spread out a

little further in position.

The determined counterattack that

hit the 3d Marines on the night of

25-26 July was matched in intensity

all across the 3d Division's front. It

wasn't long before there were enemy

troops roaming the rear areas as they

slipped around the Marine

perimeters and dodged down stream

valleys and ravines leading to the

beaches.

Major Aplington, whose 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, now constituted

the only division infantry reserve,

held positions in the hills on the left

in what had been a relatively quiet

sector. Not for long, he recalled:

With the dark came heavy

rain. Up on the line Marines

huddled under ponchos in their

wet foxholes trying to figure out

the meaning of the obvious activity on the part of the opposing Japanese. Around midnight

there was enemy probing of the

lines of the 21st [Marines], and

slopping over into those of the

9th [Marines]. . . . All was quiet

in our circle of hills and we

received no notification when

the probing increased in intensity or at 0400 when the enemy

opened. . . his attack. . . . My

first inkling came at about 0430

when my three companies on

24

the hills erupted into fire and

called for mortar support. I

talked to the company commanders and asked what was

going on to be told that there

were Japanese all around them

the Japanese had been close.

Three of my dead had been

killed by bayonet thrusts.

In the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines,

sector, Private Dale Fetzer, a dog handler assigned with his black Labrador

Retriever alerted Company C. The

dog, Skipper, who had been asleep

in front of his handler's foxhole suddenly bolted upright, alerting Fetzer.

Skipper's nose was pointed up and

directly toward Mount Tenjo. "Get

the lieutenant!" called handler Fetzer,

"They're coming:'

At about 0400, the Japanese troops

poured down the slopes in a frenzied

banzai attack. Japanese troops had

been sighted drinking during the afternoon in the higher hills, and some

of these attackers appeared drunk.

Marine artillery fire had immediately

driven them to cover then, but they

apparently continued to prepare for

the attack.

In the area of the 21st Marines,
C

aptam Louis Hugh Wilson,

Jr.'s Medal of Honor citation

reads as follows: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at

the risk of his life above and beyond

the call of duty as commanding officer

of a rifle company attached to the 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, in action against enemy

Japanese forces at Fonte Hill, Guam,

25-26 July 1944. Ordered to take that

portion of the hill within his zone of

action, Captain Wilson initiated his attack in midafternoon, pushed up the

rugged, open terrain against terrific

machine gun and rifle fire for 300 yards

and successfully captured the objective.

Promptly assuming command of other

disorganized units and motorized

equipment in addition to his own company and one reinforcing platoon, he

organized his night defenses in the face

of continuous hostile fire and,

although wounded three times during

this 5-hour period, completed his disposition of men and guns before retiring to the company command post for

medical attention. Shortly thereafter,

when the enemy launched the first of

a series of savage counterattacks lasting all night, he voluntarily rejoined

his besieged units and repeatedly exposed himself to the merciless hail of

shrapnel and bullets, dashing 50 yards

into the open on one occasion to rescue a wounded Marine laying helpless

beyond the front lines. Fighting fiercely

in hand-to-hand encounters, he led his

men in furiously waged battle for approximately 10 hours, tenaciously

holding his line and repelling the fanatically renewed counter-thrusts until he succeeded in crushing the last

efforts of the hard-pressed Japanese

early the following morning. Then organizing a 17-man patrol, he immediately advanced upon a strategic slope

essential to the security of his position

and, boldly defying intense mortar,

machine gun and rifle fire which struck

down 13 of his men, drove relentlessly forward with the remnants of his

patrol to seize the vital ground. By his

indomitable leadership, daring combat

tactics, and valor in the face of overwhelming odds, Captain Wilson succeeded in capturing arid holding the

strategic high ground in his regimental sector, thereby contributing essentially to the success of his regimental

mission and to the annihilation of 350

Japanese troops. His inspiring conduct

throughout the critical periods of this

decisive action sustains and enhances

the highest traditions of the United

States naval service."

'Daring Tactics' Gave Capt Wilson Medal of Honor

along a low ridge not far from the

critical Mount Tenjo Road, the human wave struck hard against the 3d

Battalion and the Japanese actually

seized a machine gun which was

quickly recaptured by the Marines.

The 3d Division was holding a front

of some 9,000 yards at the time, and

it was thinnest from the right of the

21st Marines to the left of the 9th

Marines. Much of that line was only

outposted. The 3d Battalion, 21st

Marines, held throughout. Some of

the raiders got through the weakly

manned gap between the battalions.

They charged harum-scarum for the

tanks, artillery, and ammunition and

supply dumps. The attack seemed

scattered, however, and unorganized.

The fighting was fierce, nonetheless,

and it shattered the hastily erected

Marine roadblock between the battalions.

Some of the attackers got through

the lines all along the front. A group

of about 50 reached the division

hospital. Doctors evacuated the badly wounded, but the walking wounded joined with cooks, bakers,

stretcher bearers, and corpsmen to

form the line that fought off the attackers. One of the patients, Private

First Class Michael Ryan, "grabbed

up the blanket covering me and ran

out of the building without another

stitch on." He had to run with a

wounded foot through crossfire to

reach some safety.

Lieutenant Colonel George 0. Van

Orden (3d Division infantry training

officer), on orders from General Turnage, assembled two companies of

the 3d Pioneer Battalion to eliminate

this threat. In three hours the pioneers killed 33 of the assailants and

lost three of their own men. The 3d

25

Medical Battalion had 20 of its men

wounded, but only one patient was

hit and he was one of the defenders.

For many men in the furious and

confused melees that broke out all

over the Marine positions, the experience of Corporal Charles E.

Moore of the 2d Platoon, Company

E, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, wasn't

unique. His outfit held a position

about a quarter mile from Fonte

Plateau. He recalled:

We set up where a road made

a sharp turn overlooking a

draw. It was the last stand of

the second platoon. There were

three attacks that night and by

the third there was nobody left

to fight, so they broke through.

They came in droves throwing

hand grenades and hacked up

some of our platoon. In the
morning, I had only ten rounds

of ammunition left, half the clip

for my BAR. I was holding

those rounds if I needed them

to make a break for it. I had no

choice. Everybody was quiet,

either dead or wounded. The

Japanese came in to take out

their dead and wounded, and

stepped on the edge of my foxhole. I didn't breath. They were

milling around there until dawn

then they were gone.

As Lieutenant Colonel Cushman,

evaluating the action later, said:

With the seizure of Fonte

Hill, the capture of the beachhead was completed. In the

large picture, the defeat of the

large counterattack on the 26th

by the many battalions of the

3d Division who fought valiantly through the bloody night

finished the Jap on Guam

What made the fighting

for Fonte important was the fact

that [the advance to the north

end of the island] could not take

place until it was seized.

The enemy attack failed in the

south also, and in the south it was

just as much touch and go at times.

The Japanese sailors on Orote were

just as determined as the soldiers at

Fonte to drive the Americans from

Guam.

The 22d Marines had driven up

the coast from Agat in a series of

hard-fought clashes with stubborn

enemy defenders. The 4th Marines

had swept up the slopes of Mount

Alifan and secured the high ground

overlooking the beachhead. By the

25th, the brigade was in line across

the mouth of Orote Peninsula facing

a formidable defensive line in depth,

anchored in swamps and low hillocks, concealed by heavy underSherman mediums from the 3d Tank Battalion lumber up the long incline from

the Asan beachhead towards the scene of battle around Fonte and X-Ray Ridges.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93640

26

The Colt .45-Caliber M1911A1 Pistol

T

he Colt M1911A1 pistol was standard issue to

Many Marine officers, noncommissioned

officers, and specialists not armed with either the

Ml carbine or rifle during World War II. From 1911, this

pistol served its Marine owners as well as members of the

other U.S. services armed with it.

The first M1911 pistols were issued to the Marine Corps

in 1912, and shortly afterwards the Corps was able to field

this pistol exclusively. Although Colt manufactured more

than 55,000 pistols by the time the United States entered

World War 1, not enough were on hand to preclude arming some units of the American Expeditionary Force with

revolvers. Subsequently, more than a half million M1911s

were produced before 1926, when the M1911 was modified and the revised pistol now dubbed the M1911A1.

These modifications included a shorter, and serrated,

trigger; wider sights; a contoured handgrip; and a longer

grip safety. Approximately 1.8 million of the newer

M1911A1s were produced and the M1911s also were upgraded to meet these new specifications during World War

II. The advent of World War II also meant further changes

for the pistol. Among these was altering the finish from

the common shiny blue-black to a dull gray, in the process

called "Parkerization7 which was designed to give the pistol

a nonreflective matte surface. Wartime M1911A1s also

sported checkered plastic grips instead of molded rubber.

Colt could not keep up with wartime demand, and the

following firms were licensed to produce the M1911A1:

Remington Arms Company, North American Arms Company Limited, Remington-Rand Company, Ithaca Gun

Company, Union Switch and Signal Company, and Singer

Sewing Machine Company. One curious note is that the

Remington-Rand Company actually outproduced Colt during the wartime years by approximately 500,000 pistols.

During the war, in its table of equipment, a Marine division rated 1,707 pistols, but the actual number it had was

in general substantially higher; a tribute to the popularity

of the M1911A1. A number of Marine aviators, given the

option, chose the .45-caliber Colt over the .38-caliber Smith

& Wesson "Victory" revolver. — Second Lieutenant G. M. Anthony, USMC
growth, and bristling with automatic

weapons.

The 77th Infantry Division had

taken over the rest of the southern

beachhead, relieving the 4th Marines

of its patrolling duties to the south

and in the hills to the west. The division's artillery and a good part of

the III Corps' big guns hammered the

Japanese on Orote without letup. Just

in case of enemy air attack, the beach

defenses from Agat to Bangi Point

were manned by the 9th Defense Battalion. There were not too many

Japanese planes in the sky, and so the

antiaircraft artillerymen could concentrate on firing across the water

into the southern flank of the enemy's

Orote positions. On Cabras Island,

the 14th Defense Battalion moved

into position where it could equally

provide direct flanking fire on the

peninsula's northern coast and stand

ready to elevate its guns to fire at enemy planes in the skies above.

The 5,000 Japanese defenders on

Orote took part in General Takashina's all-out counterattack and it began in the early morning hours of 26

July. The attackers stormed vigorously out of the concealing mangrove

swamp and the response was just as

27

spirited. Here, as in the north, there

was evidence that some of the attackers had fortified themselves with sake

and there were senseless actions by

officers who attacked the Marine

tanks armed only with their samurai

swords. There were deadly and

professional attacks as well, with

Marines bayoneted in their foxholes.

There was one attendant communications breakdown obliging Captain

Robert Frank, commanding officer of

Company L, 22d Marines, to remain

on the front relaying artillery spots

to the regimental S-2 and thence to

brigade artillery.

War Dogs on Guam

Marines made a point of getting them to the rear, to the

veterinarian, as quickly as possible. In the liberation of

Guam, 20 dogs were wounded and 25 killed.

From the end of the campaign to the end of the war in

the Pacific, Guam served as a staging area for war dogs,

of which 465 served in combat operations. Of the Marine

Corps war dogs, 85 percent were Doberman Pinschers, and

the rest mainly German Shepherds.

At the end of the Pacific War, the Marine Corps had 510

war dogs. Of this number, 491 were deprogrammed, a

process that could take a year, and returned to their owners, given to their handlers, or returned to the Army, which

had provided 41 to the Corps. Only four dogs could not

be returned to their masters because, even after extensive

retraining, they proved "incorrigible" and were considered

to be unsafe for civilian life.

n the late summer of 1942, the Marine Corps

decided to experiment with the use of dogs in war,

which may have been a new departure for the Corps,

but not a new idea in warfare. Since ancient times, dogs

have served fighting men in various ways. The Romans,

for instance, used heavy mastiffs with armored collars to

attack the legs of their enemies, thus forcing them to lower their shields.

On Guam, First Lieutenant William R. Putney commanded the 1st Dog Platoon and was the veterinarian for

all war dogs on Guam. First Lieutenant William T. Taylor

commanded the 2d Platoon. Both landed on the AsanAdelup beach on Guam, while the 1st Platoon under Gunnery Sergeant L. C. Christmore landed with the 1st Provisional Brigade at Agat.

Sixty dogs, 90 handlers, 10 NCO assistants, two war dog

corpsmen, and three kennelmen were distributed among

the regimental and division headquarters of the 3d Marine Division. Lieutenant Putney commanded the 36 handlers and 24 dogs out of division headquarters. Overall,

some 350 war dogs served in the Guam operation.

Handlers were trained dog specialists and skilled scouts

as well. Man and dog searched out the enemy, awaited his

coming, and caught him by surprise around the Marine

perimeter or while on patrol. In addition, they found

snipers, routed stragglers, searched out caves and pillboxes, ran messages, and protected the Marines' foxholes as

they would private homes. The dogs ate, slept, walked, and

otherwise lived with their masters.

The presence of dogs on the line could promise the Marines there a night's sleep, for they alerted their handlers

when the enemy came near.

Early on in the Guam operations, some dogs were

wounded or killed by machine gun and rifle fire, and incoming mortars were as devastating to the dogs as they

were to the Marines. When the dogs were wounded, the
IN j3i.

T

p.r 1

IJ4t,

It ?43* itt

The artillery response was intense

and effective. The fire was "drawn in

closer and closer toward our front

lines; 26,000 shells were thrown into

the pocket [of attackers] between

midnight and 3 a.m." The screaming

attacks came at 1230, then again at

0130, and at 0300. At daylight the

muddy ground in front of the Marine positions was slick with blood.

More than 400 Japanese bodies were

sprawled in the driving rain.

General Shepherd, secure in the

knowledge that his frontline troops,

4th Marines on the left, 22d Marines

on the right, had withstood the

night's banzai attacks in good order, directed an attack to be launched

at 0730. But first there would be

another artillery preparation. At

daybreak it opened with the 77th Infantry Division's 105s and 155s, the

brigade's 75s, the defense battalions

90s, and whatever guns the 12th Marines could spare. It was one of the

more intense preparations of the

campaign. Major Charles L. Davis,

S-3 of 77th Division Artillery,

recalled how, on the request of

General Shepherd, he had turned the

heavy 155mm battalion and two

105mm battalions around to face

Orote to soften the Japanese positions. The 155s and 105s battered

well-prepared positions, and ripped

the covering, protection, and

camouflage from bunkers and

trenches. Pieces of men soon hung in

trees. Marines saw that this fire

counted and made it a point to return

to congratulate and thank the 77th's

artillery section leaders.

The advance, when it came, only

went 100 yards before it was addressed by a blistering front of

machine gun and small arms fire.

Enemy artillery fire came falling

almost simultaneously with the cessation of American support,, leaving

the Marines to think the fire was

from their own guns, a favorite

Japanese ruse. For a moment there,

the Japanese return fire on the 22d

Marines disorganized its forward

move. It was about 0815 before the

attack was on again in full force,

spearheaded by Marine and Army

tanks.

Immediately to the front of the 22d

Marines was the infernal mangrove

28

swamp from where the banzai attack

had been mounted the night before.

It was still manned heavily by

Japanese, was dense, and the only

means of penetrating it was by a

200-yard-long corridor along the

regimental boundary which was covered by Japanese enfilade fire and

could only be navigated with the

cover of tanks. The armor gunners

and commanders directed their fire

just over the head of prone Marines

and into the gunports of enemy pillboxes. By 1245, Colonel Schneider's

regiment had worked its way

through all bottlenecks past the mangrove swamps, destroying bunkers

with demolitions and flamethrowers.

The 4th's assault battalions kept pace

with this advance, finding somewhat

easier terrain but just as determined

defenders. By evening the brigade

had advanced 1,500 yards from its

jump-off line. Both regiments, weary,

wary, and waiting, dug in with an allaround defense.

Again, there was a heavy preattack barrage on the 27th and the

Marines were stopped again before

they'd gone 100 yards. The 3d BatStretchers for wounded Marines lie scattered among the bodies of Japanese dead in the wake of the attack on the 3d Dlvision hospital the evening of 25-26 July. Doctors, corpsmen,

and wounded Marines joined in the fight to repulse the enemy.
talion, 4th Marines, facing a welldef ended ridge, a coconut grove, and

a sinister clearing, was nearing the

sentimental and tactically important

goals of the old Marine barracks, its

rifle range, and the runways of Orote

airfield. With heavy tank support,

the 22d Marines surged forward past

the initial obstacles and by afternoon

had reached positions well beyond

the morning's battles. On the left of

the 4th Marines, where resistance

was lighter, the assault was led by

tanks that beat down the brush.

While inspecting positions there,

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel D. Puller,

the 4th's executive officer and brother

of famed Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B.

"Chesty" Puller, was killed by a

sniper.

By mid-afternoon, the 4th Marines' assault elements broke out of

the grove just short of the rifle range,

only to stall in a new complex at dugin defenses and minefields. Strangely,

and yet not unusual in the climax of

a losing engagement, a Japanese

officer emerged to brandish his sword

at a tank. It was easier than ritual

suicide.

The horror of the American guns

again must have been too much for

the Japanese defending the immediate front. Surprisingly, they just cut

and ran from their strong, welldefended positions. The elated Marines, who did not care why the

enemy ran — just that they ran —now

dug in only 300 yards from the prized

targets. Their capture would wait for

tomorrow, 28 July. The Japanese

were now squeezed into the last

quadrant of the peninsula. All of

their strongly entrenched defenses

had failed to hold. The Orote airfield, the old Marine barracks, the

old parade ground which had not felt

an American boot since 10 December

29

1941, were all about to be retrieved.

General Shepherd sounded a great

reveille on 28 July for what was left

of the Japanese naval defenders: a

45-minute air strike and a 30-minute

naval gunfire bombardment, joined

by whatever guns the 77th Division,

brigade, and antiaircraft battalions

could muster. At 0830 the brigade

would attack for Orote airfield.

Colonel Schneider's 22d Marines

would take the barracks and Sumay

and Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines

would take the airfield and the rifle

range. Japanese artillery and mortar

fire had diminished, but small arms

and machine guns still spoke intensely when the Marines attacked. At

this bitter end, the Japanese were

evoking a last-ditch stubbornness.

American tanks were called up but

most had problems with visibility

and control. Wherever the thick

scrub brush concealed the enemy,
Major John S. Messers' 2d Battalion,

4th Marines called for increased tank

support when one of his companies

began taking heavy casualties. In

response to General Shepherd's request, General Bruce sent forward a

platoon of Army tank destroyers and

a platoon of light tanks to beef up the

attack.

General Shepherd wanted the battle over now. He ordered a massive

infantry and tank attack which

kicked off at 1530 on the 28th. The

Japanese did not intend to oblige this

time by quitting; this was do or die.

By nightfall all objectives were in

plain sight, but there were still a few

hundred yards to be gained. The Marines stood fast for the night, hoping

the Japanese would sacrifice themselves in counterattack, but no such

luck occurred.

When the attack resumed on the

29th, after the usual Army and Marine artillery preparation and an awesomely heavy air strike, Army and

Marine tanks led the way onto the

airfield. Resistance was meager. By

early afternoon, the airfield was secured and the 22d Marines had occupied what was left of the old

Marine barracks. A bronze plaque,

which had long been mounted at the

entrance to the barracks, was recovered and held for reinstallation at

a future date.

The Japanese found this latest advance difficult to accept. Suicides

were many and random. Soldiers

jumped off cliffs, hugged exploding

grenades, even cut their own throats.

Private First Class George F.

Eftang, with the 4th Marines' supporting pack howitzer battalion, saw

the suicides: "1 could see the Japanese

jumping to their deaths. I actually

felt sorry for them. I knew they had

families and sweethearts like anyone

else'

While the embattled peninsula still

swarmed with patrols, Admiral Spruance; Generals Smith, Geiger, Larsen

(the future island commander), and

Shepherd; Colonels Shapley and

Schneider, and others who could be

spared, arrived for a ceremonial flag

raising and heartfelt tribute to an old

barracks and those Marines who had

made it home. General Shepherd

called it hallowed ground and told

the distinguished assemblage, which

included a hastily cleaned-up honor

guard of brigade troops: "you have

avenged the loss of our comrades

who were overcome by a numerically

superior force three days after Pearl

Harbor. Under our flag this island

again stands ready to fulfill its destiny as an American fortress in the

Pacific'

Many of the Marines standing at

attention, watching the historic

ceremony, could only thank God that

they were still alive. At the end of

this ceremony, engineers moved onto

the airfield to clear away debris and

fill the many shell and bomb holes.

30

Only six hours after the first bulldozer clanked onto the runways, a Navy

torpedo bomber made an emergency

landing. Soon the light artillery spotting planes were regularly flying

from them.

The capture of Orote Peninsula

had cost the brigade 115 men killed,

721 wounded, and 38 missing in action. The enemy toll of counted dead

was 1,633. It was obvious that on

Orote as at Fonte, there were many

Japanese still unaccounted for and

presumably ready still to fight to prevent the island's capture.

With the breakthrough at Fonte

and failure of Takashina's mass counterattack, the American positions

could be consolidated. The 3d and

21st Marines squared away their
holds on heights and the 9th Marines

(July 27-29) pushed its final way up

to Mount Alutom and Mount

Chachao.

The most serious resistance to occupying the Mount Alutom-Mount

Chachao massif and securing the

Force Beachhead Line (FBHL) across

the hills was a surprisingly strong

point at the base of Mount Chachao.

Major Donald B. Hubbard, commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (replacing Lieutenant Colonel

Asmuth, wounded on W-Day),

called down artillery, and, after the

barrage, his Marines attacked with

grenades and bayonets. They destroyed everything that stood in their

path. When that fight was over,

Major Hubbard's battalion counted

135 Japanese dead. As the assault

force pushed up these commanding

slopes, the Marines could spot men

of Company A of the 305th Infantry atop Mount Tenjo to the west.

Lieutenant Colonel Carey A. Randall's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, then

moved up and made contact with the

Army troops. Originally, Mount

Tenjo had been in the 3d Division

zone, but General Bruce had wanted to get his men on the high ground

so they could push ahead along the

heights and not get trapped in the ravines. He also wanted to prevent the

piecemeal commitment of his division and to preserve its integrity.

Conservative estimates put the

Japanese dead as a result of the counterattack at 3,200 men. The loss of

Takashina's infantry officers, including General Shigematsu, who had

commanded the 48th Independent

Mixed Brigade, was held to be as high

as 96 percent. Takashina himself fell

to the fire from a machine gun on an

American tank as he was urging survivors out of the Fonte position and

on to the north to fight again. With

Takashina's death, tactical command

of all Japanese forces remaining on

Guam was assumed by General Obata. He had only a few senior officers

remaining to rally the surviving

defenders and organize cohesive units

from the shattered remnants of the

battalions that had fought to hold the

heights above the Asan-Adelup

beaches.

All through the night of 28 July,

Japanese troops trudged along the

paths that led from Fonte to Ordot,

finding their way at times by the light

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 88153

A Marine uses a flamethrower on a Japanese-occupied pilibox on what had been

the Marine golf course on Guam, adjoining the Marine Barracks on 0 rote Peninsula.

This Japanese airstrip on 0 rote Peninsula was one of the prime

objectives of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in its zone.

Pockmarks on the strip resulted from the aerial, ships'

gunfire, and artillery bombardments directed at this target.

Department of Defense Photo (IJSMC)88134

31

— - ,t.. fl- --n-._ -

- - I' - : .-.. nt

j')'Tt. - -'

4 r
I L 4

of American flares. At Ordot, two

traffic control points guided men

toward Barrigada, where three composite infantry companies were forming, or toward Finegayan, where a

force of five composite companies

was to man blocking positions. As he

fully expected the Americans to conduct an aggressive pursuit on the

29th, General Obata ordered Lieutenant Colonel Takeda to organize a

delaying force that would hold back

the Marines until the withdrawal

could be effected.

Contrary to the Japanese commander's expectations, General

Geiger had decided to rest his battleweary troops before launching a fullscale attack to the north. The substance of his orders to the 3d and.

77th Divisions on 29 July was to

eliminate the last vestiges of Japanese

resistance within the FBHL, organize

a line of defense, and patrol in

strength to the front. With capture of

the beachhead line and its critical

high ground and the annihilation of

great numbers of Japanese, the turning point of the Guam campaign had

been reached.

Yet, few Japanese had surrendered

and those captured were usually

dazed, wounded, or otherwise unable to resist. Almost all of the enemy died fighting, even when their

lives were lost without sense or purpose. Still, a substantial number of

troops from the 29th Division were

still not accounted for.

General Geiger's intelligence sections could only list about one quarter of the estimated soldier-sailor

strength that had been on the island,

and he needed to make certain that

his rear was secure from attack before heading north after the enemy.

Captured Japanese documents and

prisoners of war, and sightings from

aircraft, all indicated to Geiger that

the Japanese had withdrawn to the

north to better roads, denser and

more concealing jungle, and commanding terrain for strongpoints.

To ensure that his rear area was

not threatened, General Geiger had

the 77th Division detail patrols to

scour the southern half of Guam,

repeating and intensifying the

searches the brigade had made.

These soldiers, as the Marines before

them, found Guamanians everywhere, some in camps established by

the Japanese, others on their farms

and ranches. The natives, some surprised to see Americans so soon after the landings, reported the

presence of only small bands of

Japanese and often only single soldiers. It became increasingly evident

that the combat units that remained

were in the north, not the south. The

best estimates of their strength

ranged around a figure of 6,000 men.

Obata had expected a hasty pursuit, and set up strong rear guards to

give time for his retreating forces to

organize. Victory was no longer even

a hope, but the Japanese could still

extract a painful cost. General Geiger,

who had a little time now, could give

his troops a rest and move into attack positions across the width of the

island. Strong and frequent patrols

were sent out to find routes cross

A tank-infantry team from the 4th Marines advances slowly

through the dense scrub growth that characterized the terDepartment of Defense Photo (USMC) 88152

rain in the regiment's zone on Orote Peninsula. The attack

moved forward yard by yard until the objective was secured.

Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade hurl hand grenades at enemy positions on

the other side of one of the rice paddies that slowed their advance toward 0 rote.

32

U4

ct' I(1

Is? tP'

'•1

., .-,-I r- c:

4tv_ta
1

—t

• trenches, anything, by the Navy Marines, and Army spotter planes which

were constantly overhead.

country and glimpse clues of enemy

strength and dispositions.

Obata organized delaying defenses

to include the southwest slopes of

Mount Barrigada, midway across the

island from Tumon Bay, and the little town of Barrigada itself, barely 20

houses. On all approaches to his final defensive positions near Mount

Santa Rosa, in the northwest corner

of the island, he organized roadblocks at trail and road junctions,

principally at Finegayan and Yigo,

and concealed troops in the jungle to

interdict the roads which were the

only practical approach routes to the

northern end of the island. The

Japanese commander felt sorely besieged, and as his notes later revealed:

"the enemy air force seeking our units

during daylight hours in the forest,

bombed and strafed even a single

soldier:' Perhaps even more damaging than the air attacks were artillery

and naval gunfire bombardments

brought down on men, guns,

III Corps's Geiger knew Obata's

probable route of retreat and drew up

a succession of objectives across the

island which would incrementally

seize all potential enemy strongpoints. Jump-off for the drive north

was 0630 31 July with the 3d Marine

Division on the left and the 77th Infantry Division on the right, dividing

the island down the middle. The Marine zone would include the island

capital of Agana, the Japanese airfield at Tiyan, Finegayan, and the

shores of Tumon Bay. The 77th

would have Mount Barrigada, Yigo,

and Mount Santa Rosa in its zone.

The 1st Marine Brigade relieved the

77th Division of the defense of the

southern portion of the FBHL and

would continue to patrol the

southern half of Guam. As the Corps

attack moved northward and the island widened, the brigade would

eventually take part in the drive to

the extreme north coast of the island.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93468

Marines bypass two smoldering Japanese light tanks, knocked out of action by

Marine Sherman medium tanks on the road to Sumay on Orote Peninsula.

Marine artillerymen, members of Battery C, 7th 155mm (Long

Toms) Gun Battalion, III Amphibious Corps Artillery, take

advantage of a lull in fire missions to swab the bore of their

gun. Soon after, the gun was back in battery firing missions.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 91347

33

- j;-- 3

74;
'C

midriff of the island, the Agana-Pago

Road would prove critical in winning

the battle of Guam.

The 3d Division reached Ordot in

the center of its zone where Obata

had directed some of his survivors.

The 3d Battalion, 21st Marines, ran

into them and one of their pillboxes,

which the Marines thoroughly gutted. The Americans also accounted

for 15 infantrymen and two light

tanks which were the targets of M-ls

and bazookas.

The honor of liberating Agana fell

to the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The

riflemen entered the town's ruins

treading carefully, sizing up the stark,

dusty building walls for snipers. A

few enemy riflemen emerged from

behind concrete outcroppings then

dropped back into eternity. The

Japanese guards were stragglers, the

wounded, or a few foolish enough to

stay. In one house, a Marine opened

a closet to reveal a Japanese officer,

sword in hand. The Marine slammed

the door, riddled it with an automatic rifle, and didn't bother to look

again. The once-beautiful old Plaza

de Espana was in American hands 15

minutes after the town was entered.

By noon it was secured.

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Marines,moved along to the critical

Agana-Pago Road. At 1350 the 21st

Marines was right up there with

them after the few engagements with

pillboxes, snipers, and tanks. By

1510, Colonel Craig's 9th Marines on

the division's right was partially

across the road and seized the remaining portion of that highway in

its sector on the next day. Hardsurfaced, with two lanes across the

Leaving Agana and its historic rescue of the capital, the 3d Battalion,

3d Marines, under Major Royal R.

Bastian, Jr., who had taken command when Lieutenant Colonel

Houser was wounded on 22 July,

moved on with relative ease. Before

dusk the battalion had seized 1,400

yards of other critical roads and trails

which led to strategic and defended

strongpoints of Finegayan and Barrigada.

General Turnage got well within

striking distance of the Tiyan airfield

and the little town of San Antonio,

on the 31st, but the next day, 1 August, his advance was seriously

slowed by mines. It took the cool skill

and slow and steady hands of the

bomb disposal specialists of the 25th

Naval Construction Battalion and the

19th Marines' engineers to reduce

those obstacles.

Students of the battle and those

who were there consider the taking

of the cross-island Agana-Pago Road

as a major factor in guaranteeing the

success of the drive northward. Its

capture solved a host of logistic

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93543

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific commander LtGen Holland M. Smith, right, stands with

the leaders of the successful retaking of Orote Peninsula. From left to right, LtCol

Alan Shapley; BGen Lernuel C. Shepherd, Jr.; and Col Merlin F Schneider.

As the regimental field music sounds "To the Colors," Col Schneider and his 22d

Marines staff and command salute as the American flag is raised over Guam for

the first time since it was taken down by the Japanese invaders in December 1941.

34

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.9

• .., I l Vr .1 —. — : w. • We I — C 1• 4.. 4—

d. _1ialt :.__• '_

4

a

posed, the 77th by noon of 1 August

was across the Pago River. Residents

of the area said the Japanese had left

in a hurry for Barrigada, a destination where III Corps intelligence already anticipated the enemy would

hold up. The jungle-covered mountain there, 674 feet high, dominated

the area.

General Bruce assigned the capture

of Barrigada to the 307th. It was to

maintain contact with the 3d Marine

Division on the left and push

through the town, then continue

about a mile to seize Mount Barrigada. The 305th to the right of the

307th would attack in the same direction east of the town and Barrigada

mountain and protect to the coast.

The town was in a clearing fully

swept with defensive machine gun

fire. In the same clearing was a

much-desired well. Its capture meant

the world to the parched troops.

At 0630, 2 August General Bruce Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93571

Troops of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, enter the wreckage of Agana in the trace dispatched a dozen tanks of the 706th

of retreating Japanese forces, who had planted land mines before they left. Tank Battalion on a reconnaissance.

As the "recon" armor turned into Barproblems, for the 77th particularly.

The Army division, for example, had Soldiers of the 77th Division reach the end of the road bulldozed by the 302d Enno roads heading north initially in its gineer Combat Battalion, and strike out cross country in the 31 July advance.

zone of advance and needed such a

road over which it could supply its

troops as they came down out of the

hills and cut their way through the

jungle. Frontline troops in the Army

zone were soon running low on supplies, especially water. General Bruce

promised his people a hot breakfast

as soon as they and the Marines

could give him the road. Trucks were

soon thick on the road even while

SeaBees and engineers were enlarging and repairing it.

The 77th had moved out on schedule just after daylight on 31 July, with

the 307th Infantry in the advance,

followed by the 305th. As was the situation facing the 3d Division, enemy

resistance to the Army advance was

negligible. Within two hours, both

Army regiments had secured the

cross-island road in their zones. The

307th rescued 2,000 Guamanians in

the detention camp at Asinan. Unop35

: t

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7
GUAM

On'y Aoo*e orm Unes 5'

PAT P OL

AREA

LAMLAM / 2000C F- r0 4000 6000 8000 r —r—----— - 1 YARDS

tasked the 1st Battalion, 22d Marines; the 7th Antiaircraft Artillery

Battalion; and the 9th Defense Battalion, all under Lieutenant Colonel

Archie E. O'Neil, who commanded

the 9th.

rigada town, the enemy opened up

with a torrent of fire. The determined

Japanese fiercely resisted the 307th

when it reached the town and were

equally determined to stop the 305th

on the right as that regiment's assault

companies tried to outflank the town.

Repeated tank attacks and heavy artillery support netted only a few

yards at a time, but the soldiers kept

advancing and by 4 August, the 77th

Division held the town, or what was

left of it, its precious well, and the

crest of the mountain.

Captured documents and interviews with prisoners again left little

doubt that the 77th Division's major

obstacle would be rugged, heavily

crevassed, and jungled Mount Santa

Rosa. It is six and a half miles northeast of Barrigada and a short distance

from the ocean on the east coast.

First to be addressed on the way

were well-armed outposts like

Finegayan and Yigo. Each promised

casualties, blood, and delay. General

Geiger employed the 77th to reduce

Yigo and take Santa Rosa, and left

the capture of Finegayan and the rest

of northern Guam principally to the

3d Marine Division. He brought up

General Shepherd's brigade to assist

in the final drive. To protect the Force

Beachhead Line, care for the Guamanians, and hunt down enemy stragglers in the south, General Geiger

36

Before moving on, the brigade had

aggressively sought out Japanese

holdouts, brought the fearful

Guamanians into friendly compounds, and provided security for

those who chose to remain in their

own homes and again work their

own ranches. As late as 2 August, 4th

Marines' patrols approaching Talof ofo Bay on the southeast coast, came

across some 2,000 natives, still apprehensive of the Japanese, who were

directed to a compound which

promised safety and at least minimum comforts. The Guamanian people in their own residential and farm

areas could, however, still readily call

upon the civil affairs sections for

food, protection, medicine, and

shelter. Such civil care was integral to

the American occupation and was

controlled by Marine General Larsen,

who would head the garrison force

as soon as the island was again under the American flag.

During the night of 2-3 August,

the 12th Marines delivered 777

rounds of harassing and interdictory

fire on the roads and trails the division would encounter around

Finegayan. At 0700 on 3 August, the

3d and 9th Marines moved in assault

well past the Tinyan airfield. Then,

about 0910 the 9th encountered a

block at the cross roads approaching

Finegayan village. The situation and

terrain favored the Japanese with excellent fields of fire. After the

Japanese position was finally overrun with tanks, Lieutenant Colonel

Carey Randall, commanding 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, said that these

defenses were the toughest he had

faced on Guam.

That contest for Finegayan was the

last major battle for the 3d Division

on Guam. The Japanese made it

something to remember. A 3d Divi-
ii

4* if

of a mortar barrage and it looked like

the beginning of a counterattack. Artillery stilled that Japanese effort.

The enemy tanks were driven off but

survived to reappear again another

day.

It was in one of those typical sudden enemy attacks around Finegayan

that Private First Class Frank P. Witek, with automatic rifle and

grenades, raced ahead of his own

tanks to destroy an eight-man

Japanese position which was holding

back elements of his 1st Battalion,

9th Marines. He succeeded, but was

killed. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

sion armored reconnaissance patrol

headed for Ritidian Point on the

northernmost point of the island ran

into Japanese defenses located on the

Finegayan trails bristling with antitank weapons and artillery pointed

in the direction of the patrol. The

Americans were surprised and

The Japanese were plenty feisty at

Finegayan, and in a telling thrust dispatched two medium tanks which

skirted the crossroads of the 9th Marines at Junction 177 and went up the

Finegayan-Mount Santa Rosa Road.

Impervious to Marine fire, the tanks

shot up the area and got away.

On 4 August, the new frontlines

and scheme of maneuver were being

set up to keep pressure on General

Obata and his holdouts, and make

a place for General Shepherd and his

brigade. During the afternoon, the

brigade reached its northern assembly area and General Shepherd set up

his CP near San Antonio. In the final advance north, the brigade would

be on the left with its inland flank

within a mile of the western beaches.

The 3d Division would be in the

center deploying its units on a threeregiment front which would swerve

to the east to take in the whole northern end of the island and as well supDepartment of Defense Photo (USMC) 92327

The Catholic cemetery of Anigua became the home of approximately 7,000 Guamanians liberated from Japanese rule. Here a family lives in a temporary shelter.

bruised, did the Japanese some harm, Another tank force of undetermined

but sensibly cancelled the mission. size then rumbled down under cover

37
port the 77th Division.

The Japanese now faced an overwhelming number of attack forces.

And there would be plenty of help

from the sea and from the air. General Bruce's soldiers made the principal

corps drive to destroy the remaining

Japanese and attacked Mount Santa

Rosa. Priority of fires of corps artillery, air support, and ships gunfire

was now given to the Army. These

new arrangements were to take effect

on 7 August.

Making new strides to end the

campaign, the 3d and 21st Marines

progressed handily but the 9th Marines kept running into dense jungle

that was such a tangled mess that

tanks passed each other 15 feet apart

without knowing the other was

there. The division accelerated its advance in battalion columns. On 6 August, it had progressed 5,000 yards

along the road to Ritidian Point, the

end of the island and the end of the

battle for Guam. As that evening fell,

the 3d Division was in visual contact

north of Guam. Here, a blinding flash from a Long Tom lights

up the dark Guam night as it joins other guns in the shelling.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93340

During the night of 2-3 August, U.S. artillery delivered many

rounds of harassing and interdiction fire on the enemy in the

38
S it

Captured by 1st Brigade Marines, rebuilt by Marine engineers, Squadrons 217, 225, and 321, and Marine Night Fighter Squaand in full-scale operation, the Orote Peninsula airstrip is dron 534. Taxiing down the strip are Vought F4U Corsair fighthome to Marine Aircraft Group 21 and its Marine Fighter ers, while parked off the runway are Grumann F6F Heilcats.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 92396

39

PFC Witek's Medal of Honor Hailed 'Inspiring Acts'

rivate First Class Frank Peter d' Witek's Medal of Honor citation reads as follows: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at

the risk of his life above and beyond

the call of duty while serving with the

1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine

Division, during the Battle of

Finegayen at Guam, Marianas Islands,

on 3 August 1944. When his rifle platoon was halted by heavy surprise fire

from well camouflaged enemy positions, Private First Class Witek daringly remained standing to fire a full

magazine from his [Browning] automatic [rifle] at point-blank range into

a depression housing Japanese troops,

killing eight of the enemy and enabling

the greater part of his platoon to take

cover. During his platoons withdrawal for consolidation of lines, he remained to safeguard a severely

wounded comrade, courageously

returning the enemy's fire until the arrival of stretcher bearers, and then

covering the evacuation by sustained

fire as he moved backward toward his

own lines. With his platoon again

pinned down by a hostile machine

gun, Private First Class Witek, on his

initiative, moved forward boldly to the

reinforcing tanks, and infantry, alternately throwing hand grenades and firing as he advanced to within 5 to 10

yards of the enemy position, and destroying the hostile machine-gun emplacement and an additional eight

Japanese before he himself was struck

down by an enemy rifleman. His valiant and inspiring action effectively

reduced the enemy's firepower, thereby enabling his platoon to attain its objective, and reflects the highest credit

upon Private First Class Witek and the

United States naval service. He gallantly gave his life for his country:'
.4

fresh regiment, the 306th, which had

come up from the south where it had

patrolled with the brigade. It was in

contact with the 9th Marines on the

division boundary. Colonel Douglas

C. McNair, 77th Division chief of

staff, was there, too, seeking a site for

a division CF and was killed by a

sniper. Colonel McNair's father,

Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair,

was killed in France 12 days earlier

during an American bombing raid.

The attack on Mount Santa Rosa

began at noon, 7 August. Behind the

rumble of artillery and rattle of

tanks, answered in kind by the enemy, the 77th took Yigo, the door to

Santa Rosa, and continued General

Bruce's wheeling maneuver. Bulldozers blazed trails, and tanks and infantry overran machine gun

positions. The 77th was dug into positions on the night of 7-8 August

ready for the final attack on the

mountain. The expected big Japanese

counterattack still did not come. The

rapid advance of the Americans accompanied by heavy artillery support likely forestalled that forelorn

hope.

Two regiments, the 305th and

307th, proceeded rapidly on 8 August. By 1240, the northern half of

with the 77th Infantry Division, Sherman tanks of the Army 706th Tank Battalion pass through Agcina before takwherever the all-encompassing jun- ing the cross-island road to join the 77th Division prior to the Barrigada action.

gle allowed.

Meanwhile, heavy Seventh Air

Force bombing as well as artillery

and naval shelling of enemy areas

had been going on for days. Night

fighters were now assigned to support the advance, so even darkness

afforded the Japanese no protection.

By that same 6 August, the defense

line that General Obata had set

across Guam had been shattered and

overrun. Only isolated pockets now

existed before Santa Rosa.

No American commander could

say on 7 August when the fight for

Guam would be over. General Bruce

in his attack first to Yigo and then

Santa Rosa would have a relatively

40
Mount Santa Rosa was in American

hands, and the troops moved to secure the rest of the mountain. By

1440 the Army had reached the cliffs

by the sea and could look right down

to the ocean. The 306th infantry had

also completed an enveloping move

to take the northern slopes of Mount

Santa Rosa.

Only 600 enemy bodies were

found after the two-day fight for

Yigo and Santa Rosa. Yet, estimates

of the enemy personnel at Santa Rosa

had been as high as 5,000. So this

meant that enemy troops in significant number now infested the jungled

terrain everywhere on Guam. Worse,

some enemy tanks were also unaccounted for. Enemy survivors of the

Mount Santa Rosa battle kept drifting into the 9th Marines lines on the

Army flank, slowing the regiment's

advance. Sharp-eyed Marines noted

more than a smattering of enemy

movement near a particular hill in

the Army zone. This was believed to

be the command post area of General

Obata.

The 3d Marines on the left of the

division's zone had progressed with

the same occasional enemy opposition. A 19-man roadblock held up

the Marines, but was taken out

quickly. Searching a corridor between the 3d and the 9th Marines,

the 21st Marines came upon the bodies of 30 Guamanians near Chaguian. They had been beheaded.

The brigade had it a little easier on

the far west, for it found negligible

resistance as it advanced along fairly good trails. On 8 August, a patrol

of the 22d Marines reached Ritidian

Point, the northernmost point of the

island. Moving along a twisting cliff

trail to the beach, the Marines encountered less-than-aggressive

Japanese defenses which they quickly

overcame. General Shepherd's 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade had the

distinction of being first to reach both

the southernmost point of the island

in the early days of the campaign and

the northernmost section of Guam at

Ritidian Point at this time.

General Shepherd's Marines began

vigorously patrolling the area it they

occupied, but found few Japanese.

As a result, General Geiger reduced

the amount of naval gunfire placed

on the area, while Saipan-based

Seventh Air Force P-47's made their

last bombing and strafing runs on

Ritidian Point. The 22d Marines was

down below the cliffs at Ritidian,

scouring along the beaches where

there are many caves. The 4th Marines was on the north coast at Mengagan Point and tied by patrols to the

22d Marines. At 1800, 9 August,

41

General Shepherd declared organized

resistance had ceased in his zone.

It was not so easy for the 3d Marines. On the night of 8-9 August

near Tarague, the regiment was hit

by a last-resort Japanese mortar and

tank attack. Marine antitank

grenades and bazooka rockets were

wet and ineffective and the Japanese

blazed away with impunity and then

ducked back into the woods. Amazingly, when Major William A. Cu!-

pepper, commanding the 2d

Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel de

Zayas had been killed on 26 July),

counted heads, he found that he had

suffered not a single casualty.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94395

MajGen Henry L. Larsen, left, designated island commander, meets with BGen

Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade,

and Col Robert Blake, Gen Larsen's chief of staff. With them are three Guamanians who enlisted in the Navy before the war and are now visiting their homes.
Patrols of the 9th Marines advanced to Pati Point, the northeast

projection of the island. Intelligence

sources then reported to Colonel

Craig that a mass of Japanese (maybe

2,000) troops were holed up at

Savana Grand, a wild tract of jungle, coconut trees, and high grasses

near the coast. Colonel Craig did not

want to risk casualties so close to the

end of the campaign, so the artillery

supporting the 9th Marines fired a total of 2,280 rounds. The few Japanese

survivors were either killed or became prisoners. The final American

positions formed along the coast. By

nightfall of 8 August, Colonel Craig's

Marines could wave to the soldiers of

the 306th patrolling to their south.

General Geiger was not ready to

declare Guam secure until a pocket

of tanks still existing in the 3d Division zone was wiped out. That had

to be done by the 10th, for that was

the day Admiral Nimitz was scheduled to arrive on a visit. There were

tanks indeed and the task of finding

and eliminating them was given to

Major Culpepper's 2d Battalion, 3d

Marines. Advancing at 0730, the battalion and a platoon of American

Sherman tanks soon found two enemy mediums firing, only 400 yards

up the trail the Marines were following. The Shermans left their counterparts black and burning. Seven more

enemy mediums were abandoned. A

Japanese infantry platoon withdrew

to the coastal cliffs and was killed

there.

On that day, 10 August, at 1131

as he learned that the last Japanese

tanks still in action had been destroyed, General Geiger declared all

organized resistance on Guam had

ended. It was a great day for the

Guamanians. The island was theirs

again.

It was also the next to the last day

for General Obata. His Mount

Mataguac position was strongly

defended, so much so that when the

306th had tried to force it earlier it

failed. On the morning of 11 August

1944, when the general knew his

headquarters had been discovered

and that his enemy was coming for

him, Obata signalled to his emperor:

We are continuing a

42

THE FINAL DRIVE- 7-JO AUGUST

SHOWING NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS OF &SSAIJLT BATTALIONS - =
I'

'1 p

I. •7

'U

r

k

;-.- ..eJ\ .rt

Prisoners of war in the Guam stockade stand with bowed heads as they are read the August 1945 surrender announcement.

desperate battle. We have only

our bare hands to fight with.

The holding of Guam has become hopeless. Our souls will

defend the island to the very

end. I am overwhelmed with

sorrow for the families of the

many officers and men. I pray

for the prosperity of the

Empire.

The 306th made the last assault

supported by tanks and demolition

squads. The enemy defenders killed

seven Americans and wounded 17

before they went down to defeat, buried in the rubble of blown caves and

emplacements. General Obata took

his own life or was killed sometime

during those last hours of the battle

of Guam.

Major General Henry L. Larsen as-

• sumed command of the Guam Island

Command at 1200, 15 August. Under him, and largely with the forces

of the 3d Marine Division, the mopping up continued.

Part of Japan's terrible cost on

Guam was the 10,971 bodies already

counted. Yet there were some 10,000

Enemy holdouts accompanied by their

mascot are brought in to surrender after

intensive preparations by the Island

Command Psychological Warfare Unit.

43

Japanese still on the island. At first

some of these men fought and staged

ambushes, and a few sniped at the

Americans, but soon the remaining

Japanese sought only one thing—

food! Most of the others fled when

encountered. The Japanese now had

no central command. They starved,

died of dysentery, became too weak

to flee, and then blew themselves up

with the one precious grenade which

they saved to take their own lives.

Aggressive American patrols were

soon killing or capturing 80 Japanese

soldiers and sailors a day. A daring

few stole into Marine food storage

areas at night. One soldier scribbled:

"All around me are enemy only. It

takes a brave man indeed to go in

search of food:'

In addition to the battlefield

casualties, more than 8,500 Japanese

were killed or captured on Guam between August 1944 and the end of
-

-- \

\

the war in August 1945.

In the 21 days of the Guam campaign ending 10 August, Marine

units of the III Amphibious Corps

reported 1,190 men killed in action,

377 dead of wounds, and 5,308

wounded. The 77th Division's casualties were 177 soldiers killed and 662

wounded. The Army and the Marines were a closely knit team in the

recapture of Guam. It is reputed that

General Holland Smith was the first

to refer to General Bruce's troops as

the "77th Marines." Major Aplington,

a battalion commander in the 3d Marines, commented on the soldiers:

In their fatigues so different

from our herringbone utilities

and their olive drab ponchos

(ours were camouflaged) so

different from us . . . there was

no doubt in our minds that the

77th were good people to have

alongside in a fight and as a

result we referred to them as

"The 77th Marine Division:'

On the same busy day, 10 August,

only hours after Major Culpepper's

battalion had knocked out the last of

the Japanese tanks, the Indianapolis

(CA 35) steamed into Apra Harbor

with Marine Corps Commandant

Lieutenant General Alexander A.

Vandegrift on board, accompanying

Admiral Nimitz. On 15 August, Admiral Nimitz directed that his forward CinCPac-CinCPOA headquarters be established on Guam, and

from here, he directed the rest of the

Pacific War. Soon after, from airfields on Guam, as well as those on

Tinian, B-29s were blasting the

Japanese home islands. Hard fighting was yet to be experienced by Marine divisions on Peleliu, Iwo Jima,

and Okinawa. But whether they

knew it or not, the end of the war

was less than a year away.

Spruance to the island. From left are MajGen Roy S. Geiger,

Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps; Adm Spruance;

LtGen Holland M. Smith, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; Adrn Nimitz; and Gen Vandegrift. While

together they discussed the future course of the Pacific War.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 92087

The architects of victory in the Pacific met together on Guam

on 10 August 1944, when Indianapolis (CA 35) brought Commandant of the Marine Corps LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift

together with Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Adm Chester

W Nimitz and Fifth Fleet Commander Adm Raymond L.

44
In addition to the official Marine

Corps histories of the Guam campaign, Major 0. Robert Lodge's The

Recapture of Guam (Washington,

1954), and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin H. Turnbladh's Central Pacific Drive, vol

III, History of U.S. Marine Corps

Operations in World War II

(Washington 1966), the author consulted the Army's official history,

Philip A. Crowl's Campaign in the

Marianas (Washington, 1960). Of

value also were the 3d Division's

history by Robert A. Aurthur and

Kenneth Cohimia, The Third Marine Division (Washington, 1948),

the classic U.S. Marines and Amphibious War by Jeter A. Iseley and

Philip A. Crowl (Princeton, 1951),

RAdm Samuel Eliot Morison's The

Two Ocean War (Boston, 1976),

The Fall of Japan by William A.

Craig (New York, 1967), and LtGen

Victor H. Krulak's First to Fight

(Annapolis, 1984).

Historians at all the Services'

Washington historical offices were

universally helpful, but I would

particularly like to thank Dr. Terrence J. Gough of the Army's

Center of Military History and Dr.

Robert Browning, the Coast Guard

historian for their assistance. Conversations and correspondence, and

oral history interviews, with the

following were helpful: Jack Kerrins; MajGen Charles L. Davis,

AUS (Ret); BGen Vincente (Ben)

Blaz, USMC (Ret); Col Martin I.

"Stormy" Sexton, USMC (Ret); Col

Fraser E. West, USMC (Ret); LtCol

Wilcie A. O'Bannon, USMC (Ret);

Col Henry Aplington II, USMC

(Ret); Dr. William H. Putney; Dale

M. Quillan; William L. Dunlap;

Paul Ulrich; and Alfred G. Don.

Even if their words were not used,

their thoughts and observations

were carefully considered. The

author's own experiences on Guam

as a Marine combat correspondent

pervaded his whole account.

C

yril J. O'Brien served in a line company with

the 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division,

on Bougainville, and then as a Combat Correspondent in the battles for Guam and Iwo Jima.

Following World War II, he covered Capitol Hill

as a Washington correspondent, then joined the

staff of the John Hopkins University Applied

Physics Laboratory where he was a science writer

and supervisor of media relations. He attended

St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, and the

American University, Washington, D.C. He lives

in Silver Spring, Maryland.

An editing error appears in the 1994 History and Museums Division pamphlet,

A Different War: Marines in Europe and North Africa, by Lieutenant Colonel Harry

W. Edwards, USMC (Ret), from the "World War II Commemorative Series." On

page 8, the photo caption which begins "Then-Col Julian C. Smith, left , should

read "Then-Col Julian C. Smith, below

94 i9

WORLD WAR II

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the

World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by

the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,

Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance

of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by

a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband,

Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple

Heart.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Benis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT

George C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information

Specialist; Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical Center

Building 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1994

PCN 190 003126 00