[Cite as Evans v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2019-Ohio-3788.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Williams H. Evans, Jr., : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 18AP-713 

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2018-587JD)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 19, 2019 

 

On brief: William H. Evans, Jr., pro se. 

On brief: [Dave Yost], Attorney General, and Timothy M. 

Miller, for appellee. 

 

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio 

KLATT, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, William H. Evans, Jr., appeals a judgment of the Court of 

Claims of Ohio that dismissed his action against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction ("ODRC"). For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment. 

{¶ 2} Evans, an inmate at Ross Correctional Institution ("RCI"), filed a complaint 

against ODRC on April 4, 2018. In his complaint, Evans alleged that, on February 21, 2018, 

he sent a kite to RCI's cashier asking the cashier to prepare a statement setting forth the 

balance of Evans' inmate account for the preceding six months.1 The kite included a copy 

 

1 A "kite" is a form of written communication between inmates and institutional staff. 
No. 18AP-713 2 

of a complaint that Evans sought to file in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, as 

well as a stamped, unsealed envelope addressed to the court. Evans requested that the 

cashier place the completed six-month statement and the complaint in the enclosed 

envelope and mail the envelope. Evans asked the cashier to perform these actions in order 

to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C), which requires inmates who seek a waiver of court filing 

fees to provide "[a] statement that sets forth the balance in the inmate account of the inmate 

for each of the preceding six months, as certified by the institutional cashier." R.C. 

2969.25(C)(1). 

{¶ 3} Although the cashier received Evans' kite on February 21, 2018, the common 

pleas court did not receive the complaint (and the six-month account statement) until 

March 14, 2018. Evans contended in his complaint that the cashier "intentionally delayed 

it's [sic] mailing for the 3 weeks/21 days," which adversely affected Evans' ability to 

successfully prosecute his action. (Compl. at ¶ 7.) 

{¶ 4} Evans also alleged that, on March 19, 2018, he again requested via a kite that 

the cashier prepare a six-month account statement. Evans enclosed a different complaint, 

along with a stamped, unsealed envelope addressed to the common pleas court, and asked 

that the cashier mail the complaint and completed statement. As of March 30, 2018, the 

date on which Evans drafted the instant complaint, the common pleas court had yet to 

receive the complaint and statement. 

{¶ 5} Based on these facts, Evans sought recovery from ODRC pursuant to R.C. 

2307.60(A)(1). According to R.C. 2307.60(A)(1), "[a]nyone injured in person or property 

by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically 

excepted by law." Evans alleged that the intentional delay in mailing his complaints (and 

the six-month account statements) violated R.C. 2921.32(A)(4) and (6) (obstructing 

justice), R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and (3) (theft), 18 U.S.C. 1702 (obstruction of correspondence), 

18 U.S.C. 241 (conspiracy against rights), and 18 U.S.C. 242 (deprivation of rights under 

color of law). Evans claimed that the alleged commission of the offenses listed constituted 

criminal acts for which ODRC was civilly liable to him. 

{¶ 6} Evans also sought to recover under the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act, which, in 

R.C. 2923.34, grants a civil remedy to a person injured or threatened with injury by a 

violation of R.C. 2923.32. Pursuant to R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), "[n]o person employed by, or 
No. 18AP-713 3 

associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the 

affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity." In his complaint, Evans 

asserted that ODRC's alleged criminal acts (as listed above) constituted a pattern of corrupt 

activity. 

{¶ 7} ODRC moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction and Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim. The Court of 

Claims granted that motion in a judgment dated September 12, 2018. 

{¶ 8} Evans now appeals the September 12, 2018 judgment, and he assigns the 

following error: 

[THE] TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WHEN PLAINTIFF 

[SPECIFICALLY] SET FORTH FACTS ESTABLISHING THE 

ELEMENTS OF EACH CRIMINAL VIOLATION ALLEGED 

AND ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THIS IS FOR RECOVERY 

FOR VIOLATION OF A CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER O.R.C. 

§2307.60(A)(1). 

{¶ 9} A trial court must grant a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction if the complaint fails to raise a cause of action cognizable by the forum. 

State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989). Because whether a court 

possesses subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, appellate courts review a ruling 

on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion de novo. Crosby-Edwards v. Ohio Bd. of Embalmers and 

Funeral Dirs., 175 Ohio App.3d 213, 2008-Ohio-762, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). 

{¶ 10} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc., 

125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, ¶ 11. In construing a complaint upon a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 

motion, a court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and make 

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at ¶ 12; LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & 

Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007-Ohio-3608, ¶ 14. " '[A]s long as there is a set of facts, 

consistent with the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the 

court may not grant a defendant's motion to dismiss.' " Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 

95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, ¶ 5, quoting York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio 

St.3d 143, 144 (1991). Appellate court review of a trial court's decision to dismiss a claim 
No. 18AP-713 4 

pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is de novo. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. v. McKinley, 130 Ohio 

St.3d 156, 2011-Ohio-4432, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 11} By his assignment of error, Evans argues that the Court of Claims erred in 

dismissing his action because he pleaded the facts necessary to state a claim under R.C. 

2307.60(A)(1).2 Even if we presume Evans stated an R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) claim, reversal of 

the Court of Claims' judgment is not warranted because the Court of Claims lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over Evans' claim. 

{¶ 12} The Court of Claims does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal 

matters against the state. Burse v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-452, 

2019-Ohio-2882, ¶ 15. Consequently, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction "to 

determine whether or not a crime has occurred for the purpose of awarding civil penalties 

for criminal violations of state statute." Id. at ¶ 16. The Court of Claims, therefore, lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction over Evans' R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) claim. 

{¶ 13} Accordingly, Evans' assignment of error is moot, and we decline to address 

it. The judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

 

 

2 In his reply brief, Evans also argues that he stated a civil claim under the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act. That 

argument, however, does not correlate with Evans' sole assignment of error. Because we determine appeals 

based on assignments of error, not mere arguments, we do not address Evans' argument. See App.R. 

12(A)(1)(b); Bonn v. Bonn, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-1047, 2013-Ohio-2313, ¶ 9.