OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

July 28, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMANDIRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, U.S. 

ARMY CORP OF ENGINEERS 

SUBJECT: Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons 

Delaware, Inc. (SIGIR 08-019) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed this audit in 

accordance with our statutory responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended. 

This law provides for independent and objective audits of policies designed to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness of programs and operations and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, 

and abuse. This report discusses the results of our review of Parsons Delaware, Inc. Contract 

W914NS-04-D-0009 for design and construction services in Iraq’s security and justice sector. 

This audit was conducted as project number 8006. 

We considered comments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division when 

preparing the final report. The comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and a 

copy is included in the Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Glenn D. Furbish (703) 428-1058 / glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 1 

Contract Outcome and Cost 3 

Contract Management and Oversight 19 

Conclusions, Recommendation, and Lessons Learned 24 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 26 

B. Award Fee Schedule 30 

C. Acronyms 31 

D. Audit Team Members 32 

Management Comments 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - GRD 33 
i 

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice 

Contract With Parsons Delaware, Inc. 

SIGIR-08-019 July 28, 2008

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

A December 2006 amendment to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s 

(SIGIR) enabling legislation and an expanded mandate in the 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act, P.L. 110-181, require that SIGIR prepare a final forensic audit report “on all 

amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq.” Under this 

requirement, SIGIR has undertaken a series of focused contract audits to examine major Iraq 

reconstruction contracts. The objective of these audits is to examine contract outcome, cost, and 

management oversight, emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

This report is the seventh in a series of focused contract audits. It examines reconstruction work 

contracted by the U.S. government and performed by Parsons Delaware, Inc. (Parsons). In March 

2004, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, on behalf of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 

awarded Parsons a cost-plus award-fee contract (W914NS-04-D-0009) to provide design and 

construction services in Iraq’s security and justice sector. 

This contract was one of twelve design-build construction contracts approved by the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement to provide an overarching 

framework of construction capability to restore the Iraqi infrastructure. The contracts were issued 

in six defined work sectors, such as water, oil, transportation, and electric. The contracts were 

competitively awarded and included a two-year base period with three one-year option periods. 

This contracting approach was intended to allow continuity of operations and facilitate recompetition after the completion of these contracts. 

A variety of U.S. agencies have been responsible for program management and contract 

management of this contract. Initially, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Program 

Management Office had program management responsibilities; however, in May 2004, the 

Project and Contracting Office replace the Program Management Office and took over those 

responsibilities. In October 2006, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division 

(GRD), replaced the Project and Contracting Office. In November 2004, the Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) assumed contract management responsibilities from the 

Coalition Provisional Authority. 

Because of the large number of program and contract management offices involved and the 

changes in responsibilities, SIGIR refers collectively to these offices as “U.S. government.” 
ii 

Funding for this contract was provided by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and 

the Development Fund for Iraq. 

Limitation on the Audit 

The scope of the audit work was limited by incomplete contract documentation. SIGIR contacted 

a number of responsible contracting offices, but at the conclusion of our review the U.S. 

government has been unable to locate the files for the contract bid and award process. Most 

recently, officials at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, 

and Technology informed SIGIR that they would make inquiries to assist in locating the contract 

award files. SIGIR also could not locate inventory records for items purchased by the contractor 

in support of construction activities. 

During this review, the SIGIR audit team did not visit project construction locations; however, 

SIGIR has visited Parson’s construction sites on other audits and inspections. As appropriate, 

this report includes information from that work. SIGIR could not locate individuals who worked 

directly on the contract during the construction period to discuss contract history or project 

management issues. Consequently SIGIR relied primarily on the contract files and discussions 

with current contract officials to accomplish this work. 

Results 

Far less was accomplished under this contract than originally planned; only about one-third of 

the planned projects were completed. Although the failure to complete some of the work is 

understandable because of its complex nature and the unstable security environment in Iraq, 

millions of dollars in waste are likely associated with incomplete, terminated and abandoned 

projects under this contract. However, precise amounts of funds expended for projects that have 

not been completed are not easily aggregated because of the uncertain future of incomplete 

projects. Some measure of the funds expended for which there was not a usable facility is 

suggested by the fact that slightly more than $142 million, or almost 43% of the contract’s 

disbursed funds, were spent on projects that were either terminated or canceled, although a 

number of projects were subsequently completed. Contract management weaknesses also played 

a key role in the contract outcomes. 

As of May 21, 2008, almost $333 million had been disbursed against the contract’s $900 million 

construction ceiling,1

 and an additional $34 million was obligated for the settlement of claims 

made by Parsons and its subcontractors.2 Of the 56 task orders issued under the contract, 3 were 

for mobilization, program support, and contract closeout; 53 were for construction projects. 

Of the 53 construction project task orders, 18 were completed, 7 were partially completed before 

being terminated for the U.S. government’s convenience, 2 were terminated for default, and 26 

 

1

 The contract had a $900 million ceiling, consisting of $789,300,000 for construction, a base fee of $2,700,000, and 

a maximum award fee of $108,000,000. Final contract costs are pending required incurred-cost audits of the 

contractor’s work by DCAA and the settling of contractor claims. 

2

Under the Parson’s contract, when the government terminates a task order for default, the U.S. government remains 

liable to Parson’s subcontractors for any unsettled amounts that are determined to be allocable, allowable, and 

reasonable. 
iii 

were canceled before any significant construction activity.3

 The U.S. government cited repeated 

delays in construction as the reason for terminating seven task orders for convenience and two 

for default. One of the defaulted task orders, the partially competed Kahn Bani Sa’ad Corrections 

Facility, was followed by a bridge contract and two follow-on construction contracts in an 

attempt to complete the project. In June 2007, the U.S. government, citing security concerns, 

terminated the remaining, but incomplete, follow-on construction contract and abandoned the 

partially completed Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correctons Facility. This decision was made after the U.S. 

government disbursed approximately $40 million against project costs and the project was 

reported to be approximately 52% complete. Of this amount, $31 million was paid to Parsons, 

and $9 million was paid to other contractors. Parsons received no award fee on this task order. At 

this point the entire amount disbursed for this project may ultimately be wasted because the 

Government of Iraq (GOI) currently has no plan for completing or using this facility. 

The other task order terminated for default was Phase I of the An Nassriya Corrections Facility. 

The project included the construction of 2 maximum/medium-security buildings and 13 other 

administrative and operations buildings at the An Nassriya site. The task order called for 

completion of construction in November 2005. In July 2006, after repeated delays in 

construction, the government terminated the task order for default. At termination, the two 

security buildings were approximately 45% complete, and the remaining 13 buildings ranged 

from 26% to 48% complete. A total of $30,998,481 was disbursed in payment for this work, and 

about $17 million in obligations still need to be settled. Further, SIGIR was unable to determine 

the status of about $3 million in property purchased under this task order, including four armored 

vehicles valued at $150,000 each. Parsons received no award fee on this task order. 

After terminating the task order, the government awarded a short-term bridge contract to 

Parsons’ subcontractor for continuity of operations. It also awarded a contract for the remaining 

work on Phase I to a different Iraqi contractor. The bridge contract and the follow-on contract 

had a total value of approximately $16.5 million. Phase I of this project, the same phase started 

by Parsons in 2004, was completed by the follow-on contractor and turned over to the GOI in 

May 2008. As of May 21, 2008, disbursements for work performed by Parsons, the bridge and 

the new contract totaled $47,491,742– about 4% more than the original estimate–with almost 

$17 million in obligations still to be settled.4 

Table 1 shows for each group of task orders the current obligation and disbursement status for 

each group of task orders.5

 Although all task orders under the contract have been completed, 

terminated, or canceled, the contract costs are not final until the contractor’s claims are settled 

and the required audits have been completed. 

 

3

 Completed task orders, for purposes of this report, are defined as task orders where Parsons fulfilled its contractual 

obligations and finished work that was requested of them by the U.S. government. 

4

 Obligations refer to unpaid invoices and other commitments the U.S. government is obligated to pay. 

5

 Definitization is the process whereby the U.S. government and the contractor reach agreement on the key terms 

and conditions of the task order, including scope of work, schedule, and cost. 
iv 

Table 1 - Summary of Task Order Outcome and Costs as of 5/21/2008 

Task Orders 

Number 

of Task 

Orders Obligations Disbursements 

Percent of 

Contract 

Disbursements

Administrative Task Orders for 

Mobilization, Program Support, 

or Closeouta

3 $57,491,471 $57,491,247 17%

Canceled Task Ordersb 26 5,874,409 5,884,037 2%

Completed Task Orders 18 133,672,928 132,830,287 40%

Task Orders Terminated for 

the Government’s 

Convenience 

7 

92,204,702 74,368,239 22%

Task Orders Terminated for 

Default 2 77,148,414 62,055,678 19%

Totals 56 $366,391,924 $332,629,488 100%

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008.

a Administrative costs are understated because program support costs were charged directly to project task orders before 

November 2004.

b Disbursements for canceled task orders exceed obligations by $9,628. This amount is attributable to Task Order 46. JCCI/A is aware of this difference and is researching it.

The terminated and canceled task orders accounted for $142,307,954–almost 43% of the 

contract’s $332,629,488 in disbursements. In many cases, terminating or canceling a task order 

should not be construed as a negative action. Depending on the facts and circumstances, 

termination may be the best business decision the government can make. Some of the terminated 

task orders had substantial work completed before their termination, and three of the task orders 

with disbursements of approximately $87.1 million were subsequently completed by other 

contractors. 

Table 2 shows the outcome for the 27 completed or terminated task orders by the type of facility 

constructed. The most successful projects were for the construction of border control facilities 

and other security-related facilities. Projects for the construction of fire stations, police facilities, 

and courthouses had less successful outcomes. 
v 

Table 2 – Task Order Outcome by Type of Facility 

Type of Facility 

Number 

of Task 

Orders 

Task Orders 

Completed Task Orders Terminated 

Border Control Facilities 8 8 0 

Police and Civil Defense Training 

Facilities 3 1 2 

Corrections, Courthouse, and 

Municipal Facilities 5 3 2 

Fire Stations 7 2 5 

Other Security Related Facilities 4 4 0 

Totals 27 18 9 

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

The following summarizes what SIGIR found by type of facility: 

Border Control Facilities. Eight task orders were awarded to build border control facilities, and 

all eight were completed with disbursements of $76 million– about 23% of the total 

disbursements under this contract. SIGIR reviewed the three largest task orders (Task Orders 3, 

34, and 36) and found that they called for the construction of 123 facilities at an estimated cost of 

about $57 million. Ultimately, 114 border control facilities were constructed under these task 

orders with disbursements of about $63 million as of May 21, 2008. 

Police and Civil Defense Training Facilities. Three task orders were awarded to build police 

and civil defense training facilities, and one was completed. Two task orders to construct the 

Baghdad Police Academy were terminated for the convenience of the government because of 

repeated delays, the failure to remediate construction deficiencies, and increasing costs. At 

termination, most of the buildings at the Baghdad Police Academy were approximately 95% 

complete; a dining hall was approximately 75% complete, and the gymnasium was 

approximately 55% complete. A total of about $56 million was disbursed as of May 21, 2008, 

under the task orders. The award fee paid to Parsons for work on these tasks order was 

$3,568,303–approximately 51% of the total award fee available. 

After Parsons was terminated, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq chose to 

use the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment to award a contract to repair the 

defective work. The Center awarded a $9 million contract to a different contractor to repair 

defective work under the original contract and to complete the facilities. Some problems could 

not be fixed, however. For example, the failure to properly install expansion joints could not be 

remediated, and in several buildings the plumbing deficiencies were so significant that the water 

had to be turned off and a separate building erected for shower and lavatory use. 
vi 

Corrections, Courthouses, and Municipal Facilities. Five task orders were awarded for 

corrections, courthouses, and municipal facilities (Task Orders 7, 8, 50, 52, and 54), and three 

were completed. Two task orders for the construction of prisons were terminated for default. 

Approximately $85 million was disbursed on these five task orders as of May 21, 2008. The 

completed task orders were for the construction of the Iraqi Special Tribunal ($19 million) and 

the Central Court in Baghdad ($4 million).6 The government’s original estimated cost for the 

Iraqi Special Tribunal was $12,658,294, but disbursements totaled more than $19 million as of 

May 21, 2008 because of administrative changes, scope and funding changes, and cost overruns. 

The award fee paid to Parsons for this task order was $1,232,765– 79% of the available award 

fee. In March 2006, a Department of Justice project engineer noted significant deficiencies in the 

construction of the Iraq Special Tribunal. To correct these deficiencies, approximately $2 million 

in additional contracts were awarded to other contractors. 

The two task orders terminated for default were the Kahn Bani Sa’ad Corrections Facility and 

Phase I of the An Nassriya Corrections Facility. Both facilities were terminated for default in 

June 2006. In June 2007, the U.S. government, citing security concerns, abandoned further 

attempts to complete the Kahn Bani Sa’ad Corrections Facility after approximately $40 million 

had been disbursed. The An Nassriya Corrections Facility was terminated after approximately 

$31 million had been disbursed. This project was subsequently awarded to another contractor 

and completed. 

Fire Stations. Seven task orders were awarded for the construction of fire stations, of which 

only two were completed. Five task orders were terminated for the convenience of the 

government. Approximately $23 million was disbursed for these seven task orders–about 7% of 

total disbursements under this contract. SIGIR reviewed the largest task order, Task Order 51, 

which called for Parsons to design and construct 21 fire stations in the central Iraq areas of 

Anbar and Baghdad. Because of multiple delays and cost increases, the U.S. government reduced 

the number of stations to be constructed to 11. Later, another fire station was eliminated before 

construction began because of land ownership issues, and a second was terminated for the 

convenience of the government after it was bombed twice during construction, leaving nine. In 

2006, Parsons completed the nine fire stations and transferred them to the GOI. The award fee 

paid to Parsons for work on this task order was $296,294–23% of the total available award fee.

Other Security Related Facilities. Four task orders were awarded for other security related 

services (Task Orders 14, 15, 47 and 48), and all four were completed with disbursements of 

about $26 million–about 8% of total disbursements under this contract. Key projects include the 

National Iraqi Police Service Counter Terrorism Training Facility (with disbursements of almost 

$8 million), the Taji Military Training Facility, (with disbursements of almost $9 million), and 

the Dignitary Protective Service Academy, (with disbursements of about $9 million.) 

SIGIR’s work identified significant weaknesses in the U.S. government’s oversight of the 

contract. These weaknesses created an environment that was conducive to waste and 

inefficiency, as evidenced by the large number of project terminations and cancellations. The 

weaknesses included a high turnover of contracting officers, a heavy contracting officer 

workload, missing records, and a failure to follow-up on deficiencies. More specifically: 

 

6

 Task Orders 50 and 52 were both for Central Court construction. 
vii 

The government’s contracting and program management oversight was hindered by high 

personnel rotation. About 18 contracting officers worked on this contract over its two-year life 

from award to termination, which resulted in poor continuity of operations, lack of historical 

knowledge specific to the contract, and weak working relationships between the U.S. 

government and Parsons. 

The government’s contracting and project management officials had an excessively high 

workload with responsibility for a significant number of contracts, many with multiple task 

orders. SIGIR could find no criteria detailing the number of contracting and project management 

staff that should be assigned to a contract. However, a JCC-I/A official said that a contract the 

size of the Parsons Security and Justice contract in the United States might have 50-60 

contracting professionals assigned, including administrative contracting officers, contracting 

specialists, and contracting officer representatives. Yet only 10 to 12 contracting officers and 

specialists were working on the Security and Justice contract in Iraq, according to a senior 

contracting officer. This workload appears to have prevented contracting officials from devoting 

the time and attention necessary to properly oversee the contract. 

SIGIR could not locate inventory records for items purchased by the contractor in support of 

construction activities and contract award documentation. The exact value of inventory 

purchased to support the task orders is unknown. However, under Task Order 8, the value of 

inventory purchased for one project, the An Nassriya Corrections Facility project, was 

approximately $3 million. Without proper accountability, inventory purchased to support task 

orders is vulnerable to loss and theft. In its comments on a draft of this report, GRD reported that 

it believes it has located these records. SIGIR also could not locate contract award 

documentation. SIGIR contacted a number of responsible contracting offices, but at the 

conclusion of our review the U.S. government has been unable to locate the files for the contract 

bid and award process. Most recently, officials at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology informed SIGIR that they would make 

inquiries to assist in locating the contract award files. 

SIGIR found no evidence that the U.S. government tracked construction deficiencies to ensure 

that Parsons remediated faulty work on a timely basis. The review identified multiple incidents 

in which contracts were later awarded to fix construction deficiencies in the original contractor’s 

work. 

Recommendation 

SIGIR recognizes that GRD bears limited responsibility for issues identified in this report 

because many of these issues occurred before GRD assumed responsibility for the contract. 

Nonetheless, Parsons left Iraq approximately two years ago, and responsibility for closing this 

contract now lies with GRD and JCC-I/A. Consequently, SIGIR recommends that the 

Commanding General, GRD, and the Commander, JCC-I/A, take action to locate the property 

records and ensure that property purchased by Parsons and paid for by the U.S. government 

under the contract is tracked and accounted for through its final disposition, in accordance with 

the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 
viii 

SIGIR also recommends that the Commanding General, GRD, and the Commander, JCC-I/A, 

locate the contract award file and ensure that it is included in the master contract file. 

Lessons Learned 

The reconstruction projects under this contract were executed in unstable security conditions and 

were beset by insufficient contract management and oversight personnel. Because of poor 

security conditions and limited personnel resources, it was difficult for responsible government 

officials to visit project sites, plan and define project requirements, and oversee contractor 

performance once construction began. These conditions created a high-risk contracting 

environment and approaches that ultimately led to a high level of project failure and waste. 

SIGIR has identified the following lessons that the U.S. government should consider before 

undertaking reconstruction projects in a similar contingency environment: 

• In operation plans, the government should include reconstruction risk guidance specific 

to the operation–including risk-benefit analysis guidelines if possible–that commanders 

and civil agency managers can use to guide their reconstruction planning and 

management decision-making process. These guidelines at a minimum should address the 

degree of risk that is acceptable as it relates to an operation’s reconstruction goals and 

federal resource stewardship responsibilities. 

• Commanders should avoid initiating projects without comprehensive preconstruction 

planning, including realistic and well-defined work scopes and cost and schedule 

estimates unless strategic objectives are deemed to outweigh the risks of project failure. 

In such situations the projects should receive the explicit approval of senior commanders 

or government managers before initiation. 

• If the government decides to undertake a high-risk construction project, it should prepare 

a comprehensive and independent government estimate that accurately identifies the costs 

associated with the project, particularly those costs associated with the accepted risk. This 

information should be a mandatory part of the risk-benefit analysis. 

• If government oversight and surveillance of project activities is impeded to any 

significant degree by security concerns, senior management should be made aware and 

construction should continue only when strategic objectives are deemed to outweigh the 

risks of project failure. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

GRD provided comments and stated that it concurred with the recommendations in the report. 

GRD also stated that it took exception to the use of the word “waste” throughout the report when 

used to describe incomplete, terminated, and abandoned projects. SIGIR considered this 

comment and revised certain language to clarify our message. Specifically, SIGIR believes that 

waste can occur if incomplete and terminated projects are not ultimately finished and used by the 
ix 

Iraqi government. GRD’s comments are printed in their entirety in Appendix E of this report. 

GRD also provided technical comments that are addressed in the report where appropriate.
1 

Introduction 

A December 2006 amendment to the enabling legislation of the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) requires that, before its termination, SIGIR prepare a final forensic 

audit report on funds made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). To help 

meet this requirement, SIGIR is undertaking a series of focused contract audits examining major 

Iraq reconstruction contracts. These audits examine contract outcomes and the U.S. 

government’s contract management and oversight of cost, with emphasis on issues related to 

fraud, waste, and abuse. This report, the seventh in the series of such reviews, examines 

reconstruction work contracted for by the U.S. government and performed by Parsons Delaware, 

Inc. (Parsons). 

Background 

In March 2004, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, on behalf of the Coalition Provisional 

Authority awarded Parsons a cost-plus -award-fee, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract 

(W914NS-04-D-0009) to provide design and construction services for Iraq’s security and justice 

sector. Funding for this contract was provided by the IRRF and the Development Fund for Iraq. 

This contract was one of ten design-build construction contracts approved by the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement to provide an overarching 

framework of construction capability to restore the Iraqi infrastructure. The contracts were issued 

in six defined work sectors, including the water, oil, transportation, and electric sectors. The 

contracts were competitively awarded and included a two-year base period with three one-year 

option periods. This contracting approach was intended to allow continuity of operations and 

facilitate re-competition after the completion of these contracts. 

Responsible Organizations 

From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority was responsible for 

overseeing, directing, and coordinating the relief and reconstruction effort in Iraq. In early 2004, 

when Parsons was awarded contract W914NS-04-D-0009, the Coalition Provisional Authority 

had a two-tier process in place to manage and implement the Iraq reconstruction program. To 

administer the program, it established the Program Management Office to prioritize and manage 

projects and provide contract support. To assist in managing projects, the Program Management 

Office established six sector program-management offices, such as electricity and public 

works/water. These offices were led by U.S. government employees. However, to provide 

program-management support services for these offices, seven contracts were awarded in March 

2004—one for PMO support and one for each sector office. These contractors were known as 

Sector Program Management Office Contractors. 

When the Coalition Provisional Authority was dissolved in June 2004, two new offices were 

established. The Project and Contracting Office replaced the Program Management Office and 

was to provide acquisition and project management support of activities in Iraq. The other 

office—the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office—was established under the Department of 
2 

State to coordinate reconstruction priorities for the Ambassador. As a result of this change, the 

Sector Program Management Office became the Sector Project and Contracting Office, and the 

supporting contractors became known as Sector Project and Contracting Office Contractors. 

Over the next three years, additional changes were made in the organizations responsible for 

project management and contract administration. In October 2006, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD) replaced the Project and Contracting Office. GRD and 

its three district offices—Gulf Region North, Central, and South— provided construction 

management direction and quality assurance for the projects under this contract. Also, in May 

2007 the Iraq Transition Assistance Office was created as the successor organization to the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office. 

Other U.S. government organizations having responsibilities for contract W914NS-04-D-0009 

include the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), which assumed contract 

management responsibilities in November 2004. In addition, the Defense Contract Audit Agency 

provided support in auditing proposals and other contract actions. 

Objective 

The SIGIR reporting objective for this audit was to examine contract outcome, cost, and 

management oversight, with an emphasis on any vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For a summary of award fees paid to Parsons, see Appendix B. For acronyms used, 

see Appendix C. For the audit team members, see Appendix D. 
3 

Contract Outcome and Cost 

Far less was accomplished under this contract than was originally planned. The contract records 

shows that only 34% of the task orders were completed and 66% were terminated or canceled. 

These terminated and canceled task orders accounted for approximately $142 million, or 43 

percent, of the contract’s disbursements. 

The contract’s $900 million ceiling consisted of $789.3 million for construction, a base fee of 

$2.7 million, and a maximum award fee of $108 million. From March 2004 to November 2004, 

53 task orders were issued for construction projects, plus one task order for mobilization and 

another for program support services. A final, contract closeout task order was issued in August 

2006—for a total of 56 task orders issued under this contract. Because of the U.S. government’s 

concerns over Parsons’ slow progress, 26 task orders were canceled from August through 

December 2004 before any significant construction activity.7

 Of the 53 task orders for 

construction projects, 18 were generally considered successful and completed. 

The completed task orders resulted in material improvements in Iraqi security and justice 

infrastructure, including new or reconstructed border control facilities, courts, fire stations, and 

military and protective service academies. Another nine task orders were terminated, either for 

the government’s convenience or for default. Some projects under these task orders had 

significant construction deficiencies, some of which were not corrected by Parsons. One of the 

terminated task orders, the Kahn Bani Sa’ad Corrections Facility, was abandoned after 

approximately $40 million had been spent. This decision was made after the U.S. government 

expended approximately $40 million and the project was reported to be approximately 52% 

complete.8 

Table 1 below shows that as of May 21, 2008, over $366 million had been obligated and almost 

$333 million disbursed on the Parsons security and justice contract. The $33 million obligated 

but not disbursed represents invoices submitted and unpaid, as well as amounts available for 

negotiated settlements to Parsons and its subcontractors.9

 

7

 Total disbursements for the 26 canceled task orders through May 21, 2008, were $5,884,037. See Table 3 for a 

complete list of canceled task orders. 

8

 $31 million was disbursed to Parsons under this contract, and another $9 million was paid to a bridge and followon contractor to continue work after Parsons’ termination. 

9

 Final contract costs are pending required incurred-cost audits of the contractors work by DCAA and the settling of 

contractor claims. Under this contract, when the government terminates a task order for default, the U.S. government 

remains liable to Parsons’ subcontractors for any unsettled amounts. 
4 

Table 1 – Summary of Task Order Outcome 

Category 

Number 

of Task 

Orders Obligated Disbursed

Percent of 

Contract 

Disbursements

Administrative Task Orders for 

Mobilization, Program Support, 

or Closeout 

3 $57,491,471 $57,491,247 17%

Canceled Task Orders 26 5,874,409 5,884,037 2%

Completed Task Orders 18 133,672,928 132,830,287 40%

Task Orders Terminated for the 

Government’s Convenience 7 92,204,702 74,368,239 22%

Task Orders Terminated for 

Default 2 77,148,414 62,055,678 19%

Totals 56 $366,391,924 $332,629,488 100%

Source: SIGIR Analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

The following sections provide further information on the task orders in each of these categories. 

Administrative Task Orders 

The three administrative task orders, totaling $57,491,247, were for mobilization, program 

support services, and closeout. Mobilization includes costs to mobilize project management staff, 

including direct labor, indirect labor, travel, housing and life support, office computer and 

equipment, security, and communications. Program support services include costs for life 

support, security management, information technology, direct and indirect labor for in-country 

project management staff, travel, project office, insurance, warranty, and Defense Base Act 

insurance. Closeout includes costs associated with the disposition of government property, final 

settlement proposals, obtaining lien releases, closeout of subcontracts, submission of files and 

records, and responding to audit findings. Table 2 shows obligations, and disbursements for the 

three administrative task orders. As the table shows, most of the disbursements (86%) for this 

category relate to program support services. 
5 

Table 2 – Administrative Task Orders 

Task 

Order Task Order Name Modifications Obligated Disbursed

1 Mobilization 3 $6,735,183 $6,734,959

55 Program Support Services 19 49,607,965 49,607,965

56 Closeout Support 1 1,148,323 1,148,323

Totals $57,491,471 $57,491,247

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data as of May 21, 2008.

Previous SIGIR and Government Accountability Office reports have identified average contract 

administrative costs for work in Iraq of about 33% of total contract costs, considerably higher 

than the 17% for the Parsons contract.10 An explanation for this difference was offered by a 

contracting official who noted that the program support task order was not approved until 

November 2004, eight months into the contract, and that Parsons was charging administrative 

costs directly to project-related task orders during that eight-month period. 

Canceled Task Orders 

In August 2004, the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

expressed concern about Parsons’ lack of progress on numerous projects. As a result, task orders 

with $5,884,037 in disbursements were canceled by mutual agreement before any significant 

construction activity. The task orders were for a variety of facilities, including 16 for police 

facilities, 6 for border facilities, 3 for training facilities, and 1 for courts. Table 3 shows the 

canceled task orders and their obligations and disbursements. The disbursements were for costs 

incurred by Parsons, such as planning and design work, along with a negotiated 9% profit. 

 

10Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts, SIGIR-06-028 (October 23, 2006); 

Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD’s Reconstruction Program, GAO-07-30R (December 15, 2006) 
6 

Table 3 – Canceled Task Orders 

Task 

Order Task Order name Modifications Obligated Disbursed

4 Zurbatia Point of Entry 1 $395,056 $395,056

9 Muntheria Point of Entry 1 211,491 211,491

13 Haj Omeran Point of Entry 1 142,924 142,924

17 Police Stations/Joint Coordination 

Centers (JCC) 2 105,093 105,093

18 GRD North Regional Police HQ 2 71,344 71,344

19 GRD Central Regional HQ 3 308,034 308,034

20 GRD South JCCs 2 65,434 65,434

23 GRD Central Regional HQ and JCCs 3 239,059 239,059

24 GRD South JCCs 2 49,787 49,787

25 GRD South Regional Police HQ 2 43,451 43,451

26 GRD South Police HQ/JCCs 2 42,287 42,287

27 GRD South JCCs 2 71,344 71,344

30 Police Stations/Joint Coordination 

Centers 2 48,691 48,691

31 Police Stations/Joint Coordination 

Centers 3 1,197,891 1,197,891

33 GRD North Class A Points of Entry 4 230,413 230,413

37 Grade Access Roads 1 98,195 98,195

38 Grade Access Roads 1 87,703 87,703

40 Construct Highway Patrol Stations* 3 41,703 41,703

41 GRD South Police Stations - New 2 34,882 34,882

42 GRD Central Police Stations 3 442,510 442,510

43 GRD North Police Stations 2 27,538 27,538

44 GRD Central Courts 2 1,121 1,121

45 Kirkuk Public Safety Training Academy 3 1,457,229 1,457,229

46 Reconstruct Police Stations* 3 35,384 45,012

49 Basrah Public Safety Training Academy* 1 107,605 107,605

53 TIPS Training Academy 2 318,240 318,240

Totals $5,874,409 $5,884,037

Source: SIGIR Analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008.

*

DFI-funded task orders

Completed Task Orders 

The 18 completed task orders, totaling $132,830,286 in disbursements, included border control 

facilities, security-related facilities, prisons, courts, municipal facilities, fire stations, and a civil 

defense training facility. Table 4 provides the details for these task orders. 
7 

Table 4 – Completed Task Orders 

Task 

Orders Task Order Name Modifications Obligated Disbursed

2 Civil Defense Headquarters 8 $2,981,688 $2,981,688

3 Border Denial Points 15 9,413,204 9,413,204

5 Al Shalamacha Point of Entry 7 2,691,841 2,691,841

10 Ar Ar Class A Point of Entry 10 3,049,846 3,049,846

11 Safwan Point of Entry 7 2,764,018 2,764,018

12 Rabea'a Point of Entry 9 1,754,651 1,754,651

14 National Iraqi Police Services 

Counterterrorism 16 7,879,290 7,879,290

15 Taji Military Training Facility* 5 9,427,024 8,606,713

21 GRD North Fire Stations 7 3,330,562 3,330,562

32 GRD Central Class A Points of 

Entry 5 2,564,402 2,564,402

34 GRD South Class C Points of 

Entry 9 16,947,161 16,947,161

36 GRD North Class C Points of 

Entry 13 36,833,224 36,833,224

39 GRD North Fire Stations - New 6 1,365,240 1,365,240

47 Dignitary Protective Service 

Academy* 4 8,797,132 8,780,042

48 Provide Security Updates* 3 1,014,293 1,011,613

50 GRD Central Court Building 11 2,023,853 2,021,292

52 GRD Central Court Construction 5 1,542,677 1,542,677

54 Iraqi Special Tribunal 19 19,292,822 19,292,822

Totals $133,672,928 $132,830,286 

Source: SIGIR Analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

*

DFI-funded task orders

Task Orders Terminated for the Government’s Convenience 

Seven task orders, totaling $74,368,240 in disbursements, were mostly completed but terminated 

for the government’s convenience. Federal acquisition regulations do not require the government 

to provide a reason when terminating a contract for convenience; however, a review of the 

contract files showed a general dissatisfaction with construction progress. Two of the task orders 

were for the Baghdad Police Academy, and five were for fire stations. Table 5 provides the 

details for these task orders. 
8 

Table 5 – Task Orders Terminated for the Government’s Convenience 

Task 

Orders Task Order Name Modifications Obligated Disbursed

6 

29 

Baghdad Police Academy 

Baghdad Police Academy* 

18 

8 

$42,909,234 

29,344,909 

$32,160,675 

23,912,084

16 National Fire Station 5 487,326 487,326

22 GRD Central Fire Stations 8 2,831,349 2,083,163

28 

GRD South Fire Stations 

Renovation 8 5,040,107 4,544,156

35 GRD South Fire Stations - New 5 1,128,746 717,805

51 GRD Central Fire Stations 13 10,463,031 10,463,031

Totals $92,204,702 $74,368,240

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

*

DFI funded task orders

Task Orders Terminated for Default 

Two task orders, totaling $62,055,678 in disbursements, were not completed and were 

terminated for default. Both were for western-style prisons. The stated reasons for the 

termination were Parsons’ failure to make sufficient progress on the projects so as to endanger 

performance, lack of schedule adherence, and a failure to control costs so as to endanger the 

government’s ability to adequately fund the projects to completion. At the Kahn Bani Sa’ad 

prison, 4 security buildings were approximately 25% complete and 15 other buildings required 

under the task order ranged from 0% to 30% complete. At the An Nassriya prison, 2 security 

buildings were approximately 45% complete, and 13 other buildings required under the task 

order ranged from 26% to 48% complete. Table 6 provides details on these task orders. 
9 

Table 6 – Task Orders Terminated for Default 

Task 

Orders Task Order Name Modifications Obligated Disbursed

7 Kahn Bani Sa’ad Prison 10 $31,057,197 $31,057,197

8 An Nassriya Prison 10 $46,091,218 $30,998,481

Totals $77,148,415 $62,055,678

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

Selected Task Orders Illustrate Accomplishments and Shortfalls in 

Planned Outcomes 

We selected the 10 most expensive task orders for detailed review.11 These task orders accounted 

for about $219,857,921 of the disbursements (66%) under the contract through May 21, 2008. 

Five of the task orders were completed, three were mostly completed and terminated for the 

government’s convenience, and two were terminated for default. The five completed task orders 

show that results were achieved consistent with the contract’s initial goals. However, others 

show inefficient contracting practices, waste, and outcomes that are less than originally planned. 

Table 7 shows the status and funds obligated and disbursed for the 10 task orders. 

 

11 See Appendix A for further explanation of audit scope and methodology. 
10 

Table 7 – Task Orders Reviewed in Detail 

Task 

Orders Description Status Obligated Disbursed 

3 Border Denial Points Completed $9,413,204 $9,413,204

34 GRD South Class C Points of 

Entrya

 

Completed 

$16,947,161 $16,947,161

36 GRD North Class C Points of 

Entry 

Completed 

$36,833,224 $36,833,224

54 Iraqi Special Tribunal Completed $19,292,822 $19,292,822

47 Dignitary Protective Service 

Academy 

Completed 

$8,797,132 $8,780,042

51 GRD Central Fire Stations Terminated for 

Convenience $10,463,031 $10,463,031

6 

29 

Baghdad Police Academy Terminated for 

Convenience 

Terminated for 

Convenience 

$42,909,234 

$29,344,909 

$32,160,675

$23,912,084

7 Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correction 

Facility 

Terminated for 

Default and 

abandoned because 

of security problems $31,057,197 $31,057,197

8 An Nassriya Correction 

Facility 

Terminated for 

Default due to 

construction 

deficiencies. $46,091,218 $30,998,481

Subtotals $251,149,132 $219,857,921

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

Notes: 

a Points of Entry are border facilities where cross traffic is permitted. Border forts are facilities meant to deny entry.
11 

Task Orders for Border Control Facilities 

In 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued eight task orders to build or repair border 

forts and border denial points along the Iraq-Iran border. The three task orders we reviewed 

(Task Orders 3, 34, and 36) directed the construction of 123 facilities and had an estimated cost 

of about $57 million. As work progressed, the number of border facilities to be constructed was 

reduced to 114, and the amount of funds disbursed increased to about $63 million. Each of these 

projects was completed. Table 8 shows obligations and disbursements for these task orders. 

Our review identified the following construction issues. 

• During construction a structural change was made to the border fort design in which concrete 

beams were replaced with steel beams to reduce construction time. However, inspectors later 

observed that the steel beams were sagging under the weight of the roofing material. This 

occurred because Parsons’ subcontractor used beams with the wrong specifications and, in 

some cases, improperly installed the beams. JCC-I/A identified problems at 45 border forts 

and directed the contractor to fix the deficiencies. The task order was also modified to correct 

the design deficiency. This resulted in additional construction time and increased costs by 

approximately $3 million. 

• In August 2005, JCC-I/A noted that Parsons had incurred $1.2 million in costs above the 

approved funding level for Task Order 3 and that JCC-I/A had not been notified as required 

by the contract and federal regulations. JCC-I/A stated in a letter to Parsons that the problem 

resulted from Parsons’ failure to maintain an effective accounting system and maintain 

proper cost controls. 

• In November 2005, JCC-I/A noted that Parsons incurred costs for the construction of two 

roads that were not in a task order’s scope of work. Nonetheless, the government paid for the 

roads at a cost of about $1 million. Although the need for these roads may have been 

legitimate, the contract should have been modified before construction. 

• During 2005 and 2006 Parsons completed Task Orders 3, 34 and 36 and transferred 114 

border forts and border denial points to the Iraqi Government. The total award fee paid to 

Parsons for Task Orders 3 and 34 was $1,039,479, or 49% of the available award fee pool. 

No award fee was paid for work on Task Order 36. See appendix B for a complete listing of 

award fees by task order. 
12 

Figures 1 and 2 show border forts that were built under Task Orders 1 and 2. 

Figure 1 Task Order 34 – Border Fort at Arafat Figure 2 Task Order 36 – Border Fort at Esawi 

Source: Parsons Report to Award Fee Determination Official, Presented May 3, 2006 

Table 8 – Task Orders 3, 34, 36 

Task 

Orders Modifications Definitized Cost Obligated Disbursed

3 15 $7398191 $9,413,204 $9,413,204

34 9 $13,632,636 $16,947,161 $16,947,161

36 13 $35,900,149 $36,833,224 $36,833,224

Totals $56,930,976 $63,193,589 $63,193,589

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

Task Order for Central Fire Stations 

In July 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued seven task orders to build or repair fire 

stations in the Iraq governorates. We reviewed Task Order 51, the largest of the seven task 

orders, representing almost 46% of the $22,991,283 disbursed for fire stations. Table 9 shows 

obligations and disbursements for this task order. 

Task Order 51 called for Parsons to design and then construct 21 fire stations in the central Iraq 

areas of Anbar and Baghdad. During construction, multiple delays occurred and costs increased. 

As a result, the U.S. government decided to reduce the number of stations to be constructed to 

11. Later, another fire station was dropped before the start of construction because of land 

ownership issues, and a second was terminated for the convenience of the government after it 

was bombed twice during construction. This left nine fire stations on the task order. In 2006, 
13 

Parsons completed the nine fire stations and transferred them to the Iraqi government. The award 

fee paid to Parsons for work on this task order was $296,294, which was 23% of the total 

available award fee. 

Figures 3 and 4 show two of the fire stations built under Task Order 51. 

 

Figure 3 Task Order 51 – Fire Station at Husainea Figure 4 Task Order 51- Fire Station at Yarmook

Source: Parsons Delaware Design Build Cost Plus Award Fee Report to Award Fee Determination Official, Presented May 3, 

2006 

Table 9 – Task Order 51 

Task 

Orders Modifications Definitized Cost Obligated Disbursed

51 13 $12,462,141 $10,463,031 $10.463,031

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

Task Order for Iraqi Special Tribunal 

In August 2004, Parsons was issued Task Order 54 to renovate the Iraqi Special Tribunal facility 

in Baghdad, which is used to adjudicate individuals for crimes against humanity. The project was 

completed by Parsons in April 2005. The government’s original estimated cost for this facility 

was $12,658,294, but disbursements totaled more than $19 million as of May 21, 2008, because 

of multiple modifications for administrative changes, scope and funding changes, and cost 

overruns. The award fee paid to Parsons for this task order was $1,232,765, or 79% of the 

available award fee. 

Table 10 – Task Order 54 
14 

Task 

Orders Modifications Definitized Cost Obligated Disbursed

54 19 $12,658,294 $19,292,822 $19,292,822

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

In March 2006, a Department of Justice Project Engineer noted significant construction 

deficiencies. Approximately $2.5 million in contracts were awarded to remediate these 

deficiencies. Some of the remediation work included the following: 

• sewer system renovation ($200,000) 

• heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system renovations ($2 million) 

• water leak repairs ($50,000) 

• removal of more than 10 tons of construction debris left behind by Parsons ($100,000) 

Task Order for Dignitary Protective Services Academy 

In June 2004, Parsons was issued Task Order 47 to design and construct facilities for the 

Dignitary Protective Service. These facilities are training sites for agents that protect local and 

national officials and visiting foreign dignitaries. The facilities include educational and 

residential buildings as well as recreational and maintenance areas. In December 2007, the 

facilities were completed and transferred to the Ministry of Interior. The award fee paid to 

Parsons for work on this task order was $725,934, which was 78% of the total award fee pool for 

this task order. 

Table 11 – Task Order 47 

Task 

Orders Modifications Definitized Cost Obligated Disbursed

47 4 $9,000,000 $8,797,132 $8,780,042

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

Task Orders for the Baghdad Police Academy 

Parsons was issued two task orders for work at the Baghdad Police Academy. Task Order 6 was 

issued in May 2004 to “construct and/or renovate buildings to expand and supplement the 

existing Public Safety Training Academy.” Task Order 29 was issued in June 2004 “to provide 

all labor, materials and services necessary to perform the work of constructing new buildings 

and/or renovating, improving or expanding existing buildings to supplement the Baghdad Public 

Safety Training Academy.” Table 12 shows obligations and disbursements for Task Orders 6 and 

29. 

Table 12 – Task Orders 6 and 29 
15 

Task 

Orders Modifications Definitized Cost Obligated Disbursed

6 18 $37,777,415 $42,909,234 $32,160,675

29 8 $29,968,685 29,344,909 23,912,084

Totals $67,746,100 $72,254,143 $56,072,759

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

Construction at the Baghdad Police Academy was deficient and delayed. In prior inspection 

reports, SIGIR identified weaknesses and deficiencies including failure to design project 

components before construction and work that did not meet standards of the contract or task 

orders, such as poor plumbing installation and substandard expansion joints.12 SIGIR’s 

inspection report also noted that although Parsons’ quality-control plan was sufficiently detailed, 

Parsons failed to identify significant construction deficiencies during the implementation, and the 

government’s quality-assurance program was essentially nonexistent prior to Parsons’ 

termination. 

Work under Task Order 6 was originally scheduled for completion in January 2005. After 

repeated delays and increasing costs, the government terminated the task order for convenience 

in May 2006. Work under Task Order 29 was originally scheduled for completion in July 2005. 

In May 2006, it was also terminated for the convenience of the government because of repeated 

delays and construction deficiencies. At termination most of the buildings at the Baghdad Police 

Academy were approximately 95% complete. A dining hall was approximately 75% complete, 

and the gymnasium was approximately 55% complete. The award fee paid to Parsons for work 

on this task order was $3,568,303 or approximately 51% of the total award fee available. 

After Parsons’ termination, responsibility for contract management transferred from GRD to the 

Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment. The Center awarded a $9 million 

contract to a different contractor to repair defective work under the original contract and to 

complete the facilities. Some problems could not be fixed, however. For example, the failure to 

properly install expansion joints could not be remediated, and in several buildings the plumbing 

deficiencies were so significant that the water had to be turned off and a separate building 

erected for shower and lavatory use. 

 

12 SIGIR PA-06-078.2 and SIGIR PA-06-079.2, Baghdad Police College, January 29, 2007 
16 

Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 show the Baghdad Police Academy. 

Figure 5 BPA Language Building A Figure 6 BPA Classroom Building B 

Source: Parsons Delaware Design Build Cost Plus Award Fee Report to Award Fee Determination Official, Presented May 3, 

2006.

Figure 7 BPA Improper Plumbing Installation in cadets’ barracks and expansion crack on rear side of instructors’ 

barracks 

Source: BPA Baghdad, Iraq, SIGIR PA-06-078.2, PA-06-07902, January 29, 2007 
17 

 

Figure 8 BPA-Improperly placed and exposed reinforcement bar and PVC conduit 

Source: SIGIR PA-06-078.2, PA-06-07902, January 29, 2007 

Task Order for Kahn Bani Sa’ad Corrections Facility 

In May 2004, Parsons was issued Task Order 7 for the phase I construction of a new correction 

facility in Kahn Bani Sa’ad, Iraq. The objective of the task order was to increase the Iraqi 

Corrections Service’s prison capacity. Parsons was to provide design/build, procurement, 

construction, testing, and commissioning services for a maximum- and medium-security facility. 

The task order was modified 10 times because of changes in the scope of work and funding. The 

project included the construction of three medium-security buildings and one maximum-security 

building, as well as 15 other buildings for such functions as segregation, visitation, medical, 

education, prayer, and facility support. Following phases to the project would provide additional 

wings and increase capacity. 

In June 2007, the U.S. government, citing security concerns, abandoned in a partially completed 

state, the Kahn Bani Sa’ad Corrections Facility. This decision was made after the U.S. 

government disbursed approximately $40 million against project costs and the project was 

reported to be approximately 52% complete. Of this amount, $31 million was paid to Parsons 

and $9 million to other contractors. 

In June 2008, the SIGIR Inspectors visited the Kahn Bani Sa’ad site to inspect the project and 

issued a draft report on July 7, 2008, on the results of its inspection that provided additional 

detail on the project.13 According to the report, Task Order 7 had a projected start date of May 

12, 2004, and a required completion date of November 12, 2005. The task order was definitized 

on August 11, 2004, in the amount of $72,934,413; however, construction did not begin until 

November 2004. On June 16, 2006, the U.S. government notified Parsons that it was terminating 

the task order for default because of a failure to make progress. According to the U.S. 

government’s termination letter, “Parsons has endangered completion both by continued 

 

13 (SIGIR PA-08-138) 
18 

schedule slips and by incurring massive cost overruns that cannot be sustained by the 

government.” Parsons received no award fee on this task order. 

After terminating Parsons, the U.S. government believed the Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correctional 

Facility was still required by the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and awarded a firm fixed price bridge 

contract to Parsons’ subcontractor to continue construction of the facility. The intent of the 

bridge contract was to continue construction until a new contract could be awarded. The focus 

was on the completion of prefabricated buildings, essential concrete pours for the superstructure, 

masonry work, and facility systems. The bridge contract was awarded on June 19, 2006 for a 

fixed period, in the amount of $3,299,983. The contract ended on September 15, 2006. When the 

contract ended, the contractor had completed the concrete pours and other miscellaneous work; 

however, the project was not complete. 

To complete the project, the U.S. government awarded two other contracts in September 2006. A 

contract in the amount of $42,467,440 was awarded on September 15, 2006 to continue 

construction, and an electrical contract in the amount of $1,644,900 was awarded on September 

19, 2006, to rehabilitate the existing Kahn Bani Sa’ad substation and install and commission an 

underground feeder line. In March 2007, the U.S. government notified the follow-on contractor 

of items the contractor had failed to deliver. The U.S. government also proposed a 45 day period 

to “assess three evaluation factors critical to the success” of Kahn Bani Sa’ad. The contractor 

was instructed to halt construction while the structural assessment was performed. On June 30, 

2007, the U.S. government informed the contractor that the contract was “terminated partially for 

the government’s convenience...” At the time of termination, the follow-on contractor had 

partially completed the prefabricated facilities; however, the project was not complete. 

Included in the cost of this project is about $1.2 million of construction materials that the 

government left at the site because it could not find anyone to load and transport the materials to 

another construction site. SIGIR requested a list and accounting of equipment and property 

purchased under this contract, but GRD has been unable to provide such a list or accounting. 

Additionally, the $40 million disbursed on this contract does not include the project’s share of 

the amounts paid to Parsons for mobilization, program support, and contract closeout that are 

included in administrative task orders. Additional amounts paid to GRD for project support are 

also not included in the $40 million total. Parsons received no award fee on this task order. 

The SIGIR Inspection report assessed the role of security on the ultimate failure of this project. 

In August 2005, the site manager for one of Parsons’ subcontractors was shot and killed in his 

office. Parsons argued that the U.S. government misrepresented that there would be a permissive, 

benign environment for Parsons to work. Parsons claimed that on an almost daily basis, its 

subcontractors faced security threats that either shut down work or curtailed performance. 

GRD officials stated that there was no mention of a permissive or benign environment in 

Parsons’ base contract or in any task order. Further, the U.S. government argued that Parsons’ 

proposal stated that they understood the security environment. Regarding Parsons’ claim of daily 

threats, the U.S. government countered that Parsons submitted only infrequent reports of security 

threats. For example, according to the Corps of Engineers, the “record shows that Parsons 

Schedule Delay Request log reflects an accumulation of only seven days of requests due to 
19 

ongoing violence...only seven days have been beyond the control and without the fault or 

negligence of the contractor.” 

The U.S. government ultimately decided to terminate Parsons’ contract because it determined 

that “Parsons’ failure to perform under this task order is undeniable...” Specifically, the U.S. 

government stated that “Parsons provided inadequate field oversight as the design build 

contractor. Its “hands-off” approach to monitoring construction is instrumental in its imminent 

failure...Parsons failure to perform has been a systemic issue related to management of the 

project. 

In SIGIR’s July 2008 inspection report on the Kahn Bani Sa’ad facility, we detailed significant 

construction deficiencies that could have been the result of fraudulent procedures. Based on that 

report and our audit work, we are referring these matters to our investigative staff for further 

review. 

Figures 9 and 10 show the Kahn Bani Sa’ad facility. 

 Figure 9 Task Order 7 Kahn Bani Sa’ad Building 6, Wing 3 Figure 10 Task Order 7 - Kahn Bani Sa’ad 

Building 02 

Source: Parsons Delaware Design Build Cost Plus Award Fee, Report to Award Fee Determination Official, Presented May 3, 

2006 
20 

Table 13 – Task Order 7 

Task 

Orders Modifications Definitized Cost Obligated Disbursed

7 10 $72,934,413 $31,057,197 $31,057,197

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

Task Order for the An Nassriya Corrections Facility 

In May 2004, Parsons was issued Task Order 8 for the construction of phase I of a new 

corrections facility in An Nassriya, Iraq. The objective of the task order was to increase the 

prison capacity of the Iraqi Corrections Service for the Iraqi Ministry of Justice. 

Parsons was to provide design/build, procurement, construction, testing, and commissioning 

services for a maximum- and medium-security facility. The 10 modifications on this task order 

refined the scope of work and changed the funding. The project included the construction of two 

maximum/medium-security buildings as well as 13 other administrative and operations buildings 

at the An Nassriya site. Following phases to the project would provide additional wings and 

increase capacity. 

The task order called for completion of construction in November 2005. In July 2006, after 

repeated delays in construction, the government terminated the task order for default. At 

termination, the two security buildings were approximately 45% complete, and the remaining 13 

buildings ranged from 26% to 48% complete. A total of $30,998,481 was disbursed in payment 

for this work. Parsons received no award fee on this task order. 

After terminating Parsons, the U.S. government awarded a firm fixed price bridge contract with a 

value of $2,615,000 to Parsons’ subcontractor to continue construction of the facility. The intent 

of the bridge contract was to continue construction until a new contract could be awarded. The 

U.S. government then awarded a contract to complete the Phase I work to a different Iraqi 

contractor. This contract had a value of $15,632,352. Phase I was completed by the follow-on 

contractor and turned over to the GOI in May 2008. 

As of May 21, 2008, disbursements for work performed by Parsons plus the two new contracts 

totaled $47,491,742. This was about 4% more than the original estimate. Approximately $17 

million in obligations14 remain to be settled. 

We were unable to determine the status of equipment and property purchased under this contract. 

SIGIR identified more than 400 items valued at about $3 million that were purchased with 

government funds to support this task order. These included four armored vehicles costing about 

$150,000 each, generator sets valued at $70,000 each, residential trailers valued at $24,000 each, 

and other equipment such as computers, handheld radios, radio base stations, satellite 

 

14 Obligations refer to unpaid invoices and other commitments the U.S. government is obligated to pay. 
21 

transceivers, and utility vehicles. As of June 2008, the Corps of Engineers has not provided 

information on the status of this equipment. 

Table 14 – Task Order 8 

Task 

Orders Modifications Definitized Cost Obligated Disbursed

8 10 $45,884,166 $46,091,218 $30,998,481

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data, as of May 21, 2008. 

Figure 11 shows the An Nassriya Prison 

Figure 11 Task Order 8 - An Nassriya Prison

Source: Parsons Delaware Design Build Cost Plus Award Fee Report to Award Fee Determination Official, Presented May 3, 

2006 
22 

Contract Oversight and Administration 

During our review, we identified weaknesses in the U.S. government’s contract oversight and 

project management processes. These weaknesses include high contracting officer turnover, high 

contracting officer workload, and a failure to remedy construction deficiencies. These 

weaknesses contributed to the construction quality deficiencies, cost overruns, and waste. 

High Contracting Officer Turnover 

We identified over18 contracting officers assigned to this contract from March 2004, when the 

contract was awarded, through termination of the last task order in July 2006,.15 The high 

turnover of contracting officers limits historical knowledge of previous contracting actions, 

contractor performance issues, scope of work changes, construction deficiencies, and quality 

assurance. Parsons officials also identified the frequent rotation of contracting officers as perhaps 

the most burdensome of the problems that affected its Iraq reconstruction activities. 

Compounding the lack of familiarity caused by high turnover was the lack of any written record 

of significant contract events. Communicating all the nuances of the contract, especially one with 

56 task orders, would be difficult without a written record. Furthermore, although contracting 

files were available to incoming contracting officers, the documents in those files did not appear 

to be organized in any particular format and were sometimes quite voluminous. Although JCCI/A has a standard format for organizing contract files, it did not appear to have been used on this 

contract. 

High Contracting Officer Workload 

According to a JCC-I/A official, as of March 12, 2008, JCC-I/A had 8,977 active contracts being 

managed by 100 contracting officers in Iraq, an average of almost 90 contracts per contracting 

officer. With many contracts containing multiple task orders, the scope of work for each 

contracting officer is enormous. While we could find no criteria for the number of contracting 

personnel that should be assigned to a contract, one official said that a contract in the United 

States the size of this contract would likely have 50 to 60 contracting professionals assigned, 

including administrative contracting officers, contracting specialists, and contracting officer 

representatives. According to a senior contracting officer, only 10 to 12 contracting officers and 

specialists were working on the security and justice contract in Iraq. 

Missing Records 

SIGIR could not locate inventory records for items purchased by the contractor in support of 

construction activities and contract award documentation. The exact value of inventory 

purchased to support the task orders is unknown. However, under Task Order 8, the value of 

inventory purchased for one project, the An Nassriya Corrections Facility project, was 

 

15 The number of contracting officers we identified is based on a count of the different authorizing signatures on 

contract task orders during the contract period. There is no formal listing of contracting officers maintained by JCCI/A. 
23 

approximately $3 million. Without proper accountability, inventory purchased to support task 

orders is vulnerable to loss and theft. In its comments on a draft of this report, GRD reported that 

it believes it has located these records. 

SIGIR also could not locate contract award documentation. SIGIR contacted a number of 

responsible contracting offices, but at the conclusion of our review the U.S. government has been 

unable to locate the files for the contract bid and award process. Most recently, officials at the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

informed SIGIR that they would make inquiries to assist in locating the contract award files. 

Lack of Follow Through on Construction Deficiencies 

Although significant construction deficiencies under this contract 16 were noted, such as major 

plumbing deficiencies and substandard expansion joints in concrete structures at the Baghdad 

Police Academy, we found that Parsons was not required to make the necessary repairs. Instead, 

the U.S. government awarded a bridge contract to Parsons’ subcontractor and a contract to a 

different Iraqi contractor to continue construction and to remediate the deficiencies. As of June 

2008, JCC-I/A had not taken any action to recover the cost of remediating these deficiencies; 

however, according to the contracting officer it remains an option in settling final costs. 

 

16 Plumbing fittings were assembled using masonry cement versus PVC glue. As a result, sewage began leaking 

from drainage joints shortly after the facilities were occupied. Expansion joints are necessary to keep buildings from 

cracking and potentially causing the structure to fail. 
24 

Conclusion, Recommendation, and Lessons Learned 

Conclusion 

Although the government and Parsons accomplished a great deal of work under this contract, 

approximately 43% of the money disbursed, about $142 million, went to projects that were either 

terminated or canceled by the government, although a number of projects were subsequently 

completed. Funds disbursed for canceled and incomplete projects may be considered wasted 

depending on whether the Iraq government uses the designs, plans, and incomplete facilities that 

were produced. The problems stem in large part from the unstable security environment and the 

problems it caused in visiting job sites, developing realistic plans, and remediating construction 

deficiencies. Shortages of qualified contracting personnel and high personnel turnover also 

played a role in the poor outcome of this contract. 

The absence of records to support the contract award decision, and the disposition of inventory 

purchased by the government to support the task orders impeded our full review of this contract. 

The multiple agencies involved in this contract likely contributed to the recordkeeping problem. 

However, as SIGIR has pointed out in several reports, contract file management is a continuing 

problem. 

Recommendation 

SIGIR recognizes that GRD bears limited responsibility for issues identified in this report 

because many of the issues identified existed before it assumed responsibility for the contract. 

Nonetheless, Parsons left Iraq approximately 2 years ago, and responsibility for closing this 

contract lies with GRD and JCC-I/A. Consequently, we recommend that the Commanding 

General, GRD, and the Commander, JCC-I/A, take action to locate the property records and take 

all necessary actions to ensure that property purchased by Parsons and paid for by the U.S. 

government in furtherance of the contract is tracked and accounted for through its final 

disposition, in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

We also recommend that the Commanding General, GRD, and the Commander, JCC-I/A, locate 

the contract award file and ensure it is made a part of the master contract file. 

Lessons Learned 

The reconstruction projects under this contract were executed in unstable security conditions and 

were beset by insufficient contract management and oversight personnel. Because of poor 

security conditions and limited personnel resources, it was difficult for responsible government 

officials to visit project sites, plan and define project requirements, and oversee contractor 

performance once construction began. These conditions created a high-risk contracting 

environment and approaches that ultimately led to a high level of project failure and waste. 

SIGIR has identified the following lessons that the U.S. government should consider before 

undertaking reconstruction projects in a similar contingency environment: 
25 

• In operation plans, the government should include reconstruction risk guidance specific 

to the operation–including risk-benefit analysis guidelines if possible–that commanders 

and civil agency managers can use to guide their reconstruction planning and 

management decision-making process. These guidelines at a minimum should address the 

degree of risk that is acceptable as it relates to an operation’s reconstruction goals and 

federal resource stewardship responsibilities. 

• Commanders should avoid initiating projects without comprehensive preconstruction 

planning, including realistic and well-defined work scopes and cost and schedule 

estimates unless strategic objectives are deemed to outweigh the risks of project failure. 

In such situations the projects should receive the explicit approval of senior commanders 

or government managers before initiation. 

• If the government decides to undertake a high-risk construction project, it should prepare 

a comprehensive and independent government estimate that accurately identifies the costs 

associated with the project, particularly those costs associated with the accepted risk. This 

information should be a mandatory part of the risk-benefit analysis. 

• If government oversight and surveillance of project activities is impeded to any 

significant degree by security concerns, senior management should be made aware and 

construction should continue only when strategic objectives are deemed to outweigh the 

risks of project failure. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

GRD provided comments and stated that it concurred with the recommendations in the report. 

GRD also stated that it took exception to the use of the word “waste” throughout the report when 

used to describe incomplete, terminated, and abandoned projects. SIGIR considered this 

comment and revised certain language to clarify our message. Specifically, SIGIR believes that 

waste can occur if incomplete and terminated projects are not ultimately finished and used by the 

Iraqi government. GRD’s comments are printed in their entirety in Appendix E of this report. 

GRD also provided technical comments that are addressed in the report where appropriate. 
26 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

This audit was performed by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction under the 

authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and 

responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. It was completed 

during the period of November 2007 through June 2008. It addressed the U.S. government’s 

contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc., for reconstruction projects in Iraq’s security and justice 

sector. It specifically examined contract outcome, cost, and management oversight, with an 

emphasis on any vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

To determine the outcome and related cost of work initiated under the contract, we did the 

following: 

obtained and reviewed their financial reports, formal policies, and procedures 

obtained and gained an understanding of the basic contract, contract task orders, change orders, 

and scope modifications

reviewed in detail task order modifications and outcome for 10 of the largest task orders

gained an overall understanding of the status of task orders not reviewed in detail 

obtained and reviewed the most recent task order status spreadsheet prepared by JCC-I/A 

obtained the most recent U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System report to 

determine the status of disbursements and obligations 

interviewed key officials at the Gulf Region Division, Joint Area Support Group-Iraq, MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq, the Department of State’s Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the Joint Contracting Command – 

Iraq/Afghanistan. 

To determine the adequacy of internal controls used for contract and project management we did 

the following: 

reviewed cost-plus award-fee contract administration desk guide 

obtained Parsons’ responses to an audit questionnaire, including responses concerning the 

subcontractor bid-to-award process, oversight process for subcontractor, and challenges that may 

have resulted in terminations 

reviewed relevant Defense Contract Audit Agency and Government Accountability Office 

reports 

inquired of Parsons’ and GRD’s Project Management Offices as to the number and frequency of 

quality-assurance and costs reports; determined how many site visits were made to projects by 

Parsons and GRD project management personnel; reviewed previous SIGIR audit and inspection 

reports for similar weaknesses, if any, in contract and project management systems 
27 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

This report also incorporates findings of selected SIGIR inspection reports providing information 

on construction quality and weaknesses. These reports were completed in accordance with the 

Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Limitations on the Audit 

The scope of the audit work was limited by incomplete contract documentation. SIGIR contacted 

a number of responsible contracting offices, but at the conclusion of our review the U.S. 

government has been unable to locate the files for the contract bid and award process. Most 

recently, officials at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, 

and Technology informed SIGIR that they would make inquiries to assist in locating the contract 

award files. 

SIGIR also could not locate inventory records for items purchased by the contractor in support of 

construction activities. The exact value of inventory purchased to support the task orders is 

unknown. However, under Task Order 8, the value of inventory purchased for one project, the 

An Nassriya Corrections Facility project, was approximately $3 million. Without proper 

accountability, inventory purchased to support task orders is vulnerable to loss and theft. In its 

comments on a draft of this report, GRD reported that it believes it has located these records. 

During this review, the SIGIR audit team did not visit project construction locations; however, 

SIGIR has visited Parson’s construction sites on other audits and inspections. As appropriate, 

this report includes information from that work. SIGIR could not locate individuals who worked 

directly on the contract during the construction period to discuss contract history or project 

management issues. Consequently SIGIR relied primarily on the contract files and discussions 

with current contract officials to accomplish this work. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We reviewed financial data relating to contract costs maintained in the Corps of Engineer’s 

Financial Management System. We relied on the financial system as the official source because 

it is the most complete source for such data. However, almost all of the key financial data used 

in this report was traced to and validated with supporting documentation in the contract files. 

Accordingly, we determined that performing substantive testing of the reliability of Financial 

Management System data was not necessary. 

Internal Controls 

We reviewed the specific controls used in managing and administering this Parsons contract. 

This included reviewing controls related to contract award, contract oversight, definitization of 
28 

cost and schedule estimates, DCAA support, quality-assurance processes, and award-fee 

decisions. 

Prior Coverage 

In conducting this audit, we reviewed applicable reports issued by SIGIR, DCAA, and GAO. 

These reports include the following: 

SIGIR Inspection Reports 

REPORT NO. SIGIR PA-06-036, Fire Station Construction Ankara, Iraq, April 12, 2006

REPORT NO. SIGIR PA-06-054, Nassriya Prison Facility, Nassriya, Iraq, July 24, 2006 

REPORT NO. SIGIR PA-06-078&79.2, Baghdad Police College, Baghdad, Iraq, January 29, 

2007. 

REPORT NO. SIGIR PA-05-021, 022, 023&024, Border Forts Numbered 602, 604, 628, and 

634, Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, January, 2006 

DCAA Reports: 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N17900011, Property on Design-Build Construction, May 26, 2005

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N17900012, Agreed-Upon Procedures of Government Property for 

Task Order NO. 14, July 2, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N17900013, Agreed-Upon Procedures of Government Property for 

Task Order NO. 47, July 4, 2005

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000007, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization proposal for Task Order NO. 5, May 20, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000009, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 007, August 13, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000010, Parts of a Cost Plus Award Fee Re-definitization 

Proposal for Task Order NO. 8, May 31, 200 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000011, Post Definitization Audit of Task Order NO. 10, May 16, 

2005 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000012, Post Definitization Audit of Task Order NO. 11, May 20, 

2005 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000013, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 12 July 24, 2005
29 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000014, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 14, June 23, 2005

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000015, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 15, May 31, 2005

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000016, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 21, August 19, 2005

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000017 Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 22, June 26, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000018, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 28, August 20, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000019, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 29, July 11, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000020, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 32, August 8, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000022, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 35, July 23, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000023, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 36, August 22, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000024, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 39, August 19, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000025, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 47, June 24, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000026, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 48, July 10, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000027, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 50, June 22, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000028, Parts of a Cost Plus fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 51, August 21, 2005

REPORT NO. 2131– 2005N27000029, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 52, July 17, 2005 

REPORT NO. 2131–2005N27000030, Parts of a Cost Plus Fixed Fee and Award Fee Post 

Definitization Proposal for Task Order NO. 54, August 19, 2005 
30 

REPORT NO. 2131– 2006N21000018, Audit of Task Order NO. 56, S&J Programmatic Close 

Out, July 31, 2006 

REPORT NO. 4901– 2006B17900006, Audit of Public Voucher Numbers 1-12, Task Order No. 

07, February 21, 2007 

REPORT NO. 4901–2006B17900021, Parsons Global Service, Inc.’s (PGSI) cost billed on 

Public Voucher No. 1-33 and 39, Task Order NO. 21, March 12, 2007
31 

Appendix B—Award Fees Paid 

Award Fee Schedule 

Task 

Order Description Award Fees 

1 Mobilization $457,730 

2 Civil Defense HQ 139,159 

3 Border Denial Points 444,173 

5 Al Shalamacha Point of Entry 205,154 

6 Baghdad Police Academy 1,846,798 

10 Ar Ar Class A Point of Entry 192,497 

11 Safwan Point of Entry 159,100 

12 Rabea'a Point of Entry 142,896 

14 National Iraqi Police Services Counterterrorism 772,389 

15 Tajdi Military Training Facility* 620,663 

21 GRD North Fire Stations 199,001 

22 GRD Central Fire Stations 146,743 

28 GRD South Fire Stations Renovation 265,280 

29 Baghdad Police Academy* 1,721,505 

32 GRD Central Class A Point of Entry 140,468 

34 GRD South Class C Points of Entry 595,306 

39 GRD North Fire Stations - New 34,343 

47 Dignitary Protective Service Academy* 725,934 

48 Provide Security Updates* 89,435 

50 GRD Central Court Bldg 165,668 

51 GRD Central Fire Stations 296,294 

52 GRD Court Central Construction 141,755 

54 Iraqi Special Tribunal 1,232,765 

55 Program Support Services 546,441 

Total $11,281,497 

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A contract data as of May 21, 2008. 

* DFI Funded.
32 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DFI Development Fund for Iraq 

GRD Gulf Region Division 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

JCC Joint Coordination Center 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
33 

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The following staff members conducted the audit and contributed to the report: 

Rick Kusman 

Waheed Nasser 

James Pollard 

Diane Recio 
34 

Management Comments 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers – GRD 
35 
36 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the 

American people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle 

Director for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil