1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-81363-CIV-ALTMAN

BLANCHE DIXON and ROY J. DIXON, JR.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

EPIQ CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, LLC, 

et al., 

Defendants.

_________________________________________/ 

ORDER

Blanche and Roy Dixon—litigants in several Florida state-court cases1—have sued the Clerk 

of the Palm Beach Courts (the “Clerk”) and Ericka Chase (the buyer of their foreclosed home) for 

what the Dixons characterize as “heinous” and “egregious” constitutional violations.2 See Third Am. 

Compl. [ECF No. 191]. The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 193], 

after which Chase was voluntarily dismissed from the case, see Notice of Voluntary Dismissal [ECF 

No. 195]; Order Dismissing Party [ECF No. 198]. As to Chase, then, the Motion is DENIED as 

moot. 

With respect to the Clerk, the Dixons ask us—not for the first time—to intervene in a statecourt case that’s been closed since 2015, to overturn the state judges’ decisions, and to compel the 

1 The relevant state-court case is an employment matter Mr. Dixon filed twice. See Roy Dixon v. Bd. of 

Cnty. Comm’rs, Palm Beach Cnty., Case No. 2012-ca-022556 (Fla. Palm Beach Cnty. Ct. Dec. 11, 2012); 

Roy Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Palm Beach Cnty., Case No. 2014-ca-014168 (Fla. Palm Beach Cnty. 

Ct. Nov. 26, 2014). Note (as a prelude to our standing discussion) that Mrs. Dixon was not involved

in either case. One more thing: The operative Third Amended Complaint also discusses a separate 

foreclosure action a third party filed against both Dixons. See Green Tree Serv., LLC v. Roy J. Dixon, et 

al., Case No. 2014-ca-013158 (Fla. Palm Beach Cnty. Ct. Oct. 28, 2014). But this latter case appears 

to be unrelated to the due-process claim the Dixons have advanced here against the Clerk. 2 This case originally included various claims against several other defendants, all of whom have been 

dismissed. See generally Docket.

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Clerk (and the state court) to act on their behalf. But there are four major problems with the Dixons’ 

Amended Complaint. First, as we’ve foreshadowed, Mrs. Dixon lacks standing to pursue her only

remaining claim. Second, even as to Mr. Dixon, at least half of his claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine.

3 Third, as to the half of his claim that Rooker-Feldman might not bar, Mr. Dixon has missed, 

by a significant margin, the four-year statute of limitations. Fourth, and in any event, the Dixons’ 

official-capacity claim fails the test the Supreme Court laid out for suits against governmental entities

in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). We thus GRANT the Clerk’s Motion and

DISMISS the Dixons’ complaint without leave to amend.

OUR SOURCES

We begin with a word about our sources. Normally, on a motion to dismiss, we’d constrain

our analysis to the four corners of the complaint. Here, though, we’ll consider the dockets in the 

Dixons’ state-court cases—and the documents the various parties filed on those dockets—because 

they’re “inextricably intertwined” with the claims before us. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a 

federal court to take judicial notice of state-court records because, generally, those records “can be 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 652 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 201(b)). 

“Rule 201 does not require courts to warn parties before taking judicial notice of some fact, but, upon 

the party’s request, it does require an opportunity to be heard after the court takes notice.” Id. “The 

reason for this caution is that the taking of judicial notice bypasses the safeguards which are involved 

with the usual process of proving facts by competent evidence in [the] district court.” Dippin’ Dots, Inc. 

v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 

211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997)). We’ll therefore allow this Order to serve as notice of our intent to take 

3 The doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court decisions: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 

413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

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judicial notice of the state-court dockets. If the Dixons object to this decision, they may note that 

objection in a motion for reconsideration. Any such motion must be filed within 28 days of this 

Order and may be no more than five pages in length. If the motion for reconsideration is late or 

exceeds five pages, it will be stricken for non-compliance. 

THE FACTS

The Dixons’ claim arises from a state-court action. See Roy J. Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Palm 

Beach Cnty., Case No. 2012-ca-022556 (Fla. Palm Beach Cnty. Ct. Dec. 11, 2012) (the “Employment 

Case”).4 In that case, Mr. Dixon sued the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners and 

the Palm Beach County Parks and Recreation Department for (what he claimed was) retaliatory firing 

in violation of Florida’s Whistle-Blower’s Act. See Original Compl. [Employment Doc. No. 5]. After

the defendants moved for summary judgment, see Motion [Employment Doc. No. 57], Mr. Dixon 

filed a series of motions asking the court to strike the summary-judgment motion as a sanction for 

(what he insisted was) fraud on the court. See Motions to Strike [Employment Doc. Nos. 64, 72]. Over 

the course of two days, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Mr. Dixon’s sanctions 

motions. See Order Continuing Evidentiary Hearing [Employment Doc. No. 108]. As relevant here, 

on the morning of the second day, Mr. Dixon filed a document he captioned “Supplemental Forensic 

Emails Evidence Demonstrating Defendant Has Been Engaging in Fraud on the Court: With 

Attached Exhibits #1–#23 In Support.” Notice of Filing [Employment. Doc. No. 121] (errors in 

original).5 In the claim they’ve brought here, the Dixons allege that they had just received the Forensic 

Evidence from their expert that morning. See Third Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Later that afternoon, Mr. Dixon 

filed a motion for a continuance, asking the court for a third day of hearings because (he said) the

4 We’ll cite docket entries from the Employment Case as [“Employment Doc. No. __”]. And, because 

the Fourth DCA doesn’t number its docket entries, we’ll cite the filings in the subsequent appeal as 

[“Appeal Doc. [date]”]. 

5 We’ll call this the “Forensic Evidence.”

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expert who could “validate the authenticity of the emails produced during [the expert’s] e-discovery 

inspection [i.e., the Forensic Evidence]” wasn’t available to testify on either of the first two days of the 

hearing. See Motion for Continuance [Employment Doc. No. 113]. The state court denied Mr. Dixon’s 

continuance request. See Order Denying Continuance [Employment Doc. No. 116].

A few days later, the state court denied Mr. Dixon’s sanctions motions on the merits, see

Omnibus Order [Employment Doc. No. 118], and granted the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, finding that Mr. Dixon’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, see Order

Granting Summary Judgment [Employment Doc. No. 117]. In so holding, the state court noted that

Mr. Dixon had previously filed virtually identical whistleblower claims in no fewer than five other

federal cases,

6 all of which had been dismissed—and one of which the Eleventh Circuit had already 

affirmed on appeal.

7 Id. at 2–3. Mr. Dixon filed a motion for rehearing on one of his sanctions motions, 

see Motion for Rehearing [Employment Doc. No. 121], which the court quickly denied, see Order

Denying Rehearing [Employment Doc. No. 126]. An appeal followed. See Roy J. Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. 

Comm’rs, Palm Beach Cnty., Case No. 4D13-4045 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 29, 2013). 

While Mr. Dixon’s case was on appeal, he discovered (on April 7, 2014) that the “92 pages of 

forensic evidence wasn’t transferred to the 4th DCA as part of the record on appeal and [he thus] filed 

a Motion in the 4th DCA Court of Appeals [sic] . . . requesting the appellate court to instruct [the 

Clerk] to transfer the omitted 92 pages of forensic evidence to the appellate court.” Third Am. Compl. 

6 See Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs Palm Beach Cnty., Fla., et al., 2011 WL 13225173 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 

2011) (Ryskamp, J.); Dixon v. Palm Beach Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, et al., Case No. 11-80448 (S.D. 

Fla. July 26, 2011) (Ryskamp, J.); Dixon v. Palm Beach Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, et al., Case No. 12-

80008 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012) (Middlebrooks, J.); Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Palm Beach Cnty., et al., 

Case No. 12-80442 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2012) (Ryskamp, J.); Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Palm Beach 

Cnty., 2014 WL 2938350 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2014) (Marra, J.). 7 See Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Palm Beach Cnty., Fla., et al., 518 F. App’x 607 (11th C. 2013) (affirming 

on the merits the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Dixon’s case with prejudice because, the court said, 

Mr. Dixon’s complaint was barred by res judicata).

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¶ 14. In all, Mr. Dixon would end up filing six motions to supplement the record.

8 See generally Appeal

Docket. The Fourth DCA granted three of these motions, see Orders Granting Motions to Supplement

[Appeal Docs. June 23, 2014; Sept. 22, 2014; Oct. 24, 2014], and denied the rest, see Orders Denying 

Motions to Supplement [Appeal Docs. Aug. 19, 2014; Jan. 8, 2015 (denying two motions)]. Mr. Dixon 

hasn’t told us—nor can we tell from the docket—which of these motions relates specifically to the 

Forensic Evidence. 

Ultimately, the Fourth DCA summarily affirmed the trial court’s denial of Mr. Dixon’s motion 

for sanctions. See Roy Dixon v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Palm Beach Cnty., 158 So. 3d 596, 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2015). Mr. Dixon filed a motion for rehearing en banc, see Motion for Rehearing [Appeal Doc. Jan. 21, 

2015], which the Fourth DCA denied, see Order Denying Rehearing [Appeal Doc. Feb. 24, 2015]. The

Fourth DCA’s mandate issued on March 13, 2015, see Mandate [Appeal Doc. Mar. 13, 2015], and the 

court denied Mr. Dixon’s motion to recall it, see Motion to Recall [Appeal Doc. Apr. 28, 2015]; Order

Denying Recall [Appeal Doc. May 18, 2015]. 

But the Dixons weren’t done yet. Five years later, in August of 2020, they filed this federal 

case, see Compl. [ECF No. 1], which they’ve since amended four separate times, see Am. Compl. [ECF 

No. 36]; Verified Am. Compl. [ECF No. 38]; Second Am. Compl. [ECF No. 139]; Third Am. Compl. 

[ECF No. 191]. The Amended Complaint—filed in October 2020—was the first to advance 

constitutional claims against the Clerk.9 In their sole remaining claim, the Dixons allege that the Clerk 

violated Mr. Dixon’s due-process rights by “suppressing 92 pages of forensic evidence on the circuit 

8 These came in on May 27, 2014 (amended on May 29, 2014); July 31, 2014; September 15, 2014; 

October 7, 2014; December 8, 2014; and December 16, 2014.

9 When the Plaintiffs first filed this lawsuit, Sharon Bock was the Clerk. During the life of this litigation, 

though, Bock’s tenure ended, and Joseph Abruzzo became the Clerk. As Bock’s successor, Abruzzo 

was automatically substituted as a party to this case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d) (“An action does not 

abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity . . . ceases to hold office while the 

action is pending. The officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.”); see also Omnibus 

Order [ECF No. 189] (acknowledging Abruzzo’s substitution).

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court docket” and by “heinously and egregiously [not transferring] the 92 pages of forensic evidence 

to the 4th district Court of Appeals [sic] as part of the record on appeal.” Third Am. Compl. ¶ 57

(errors in original). As redress, the Dixons seek an order of default judgment against the Clerk—plus 

compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 12. The Dixons also ask (though, confusingly, not in their 

prayer for relief) that we (a) “issue an Order for Defendant Joseph Abruzzo to transfer the suppressed 

92 pages of forensic evidence to the 4th District Court of Appeals [sic] and to instruct the appellate 

court to reopen the case and correct the record pursuant to FRAP Rule 9.200(f)(2),” id. ¶ 11; and (b) 

“issue an Order instructing [the Clerk] to grant the Clerk’s default against Philip Johnsey for his failure 

to respond to the amended complaint,”10 id. ¶ 13. 

THE LAW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), a complaint may be dismissed for one of seven 

defects. Two such defects are relevant here: the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)) and 

the failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)). 

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when 

the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 

663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d, 568 U.S. 85 (2013). Challenges under Rule 12(b)(1) come in two 

forms: as “[f]acial attacks on the complaint[, which] require the court merely to look and see if the 

plaintiff has alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction,” or as “[f]actual attacks [that] challenge the 

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings and matters outside the 

pleadings[.]” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (cleaned up). “[A] factual attack 

challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction using material extrinsic from the pleadings[.]” 

Stalley ex rel. United States v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2008). 

10 Based on what we’ve seen in the Amended Complaint, it looks like Mr. Johnsey was a defendant in 

one of the Dixons’ state-court cases.

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“In a factual attack, courts are free to weigh the evidence to satisfy themselves they have the power to 

adjudicate the case.” Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (Altonaga, 

J.). In the case of factual attacks, the plaintiff’s allegations don’t enjoy a presumption of validity, and 

“the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that jurisdiction exists.” OSI, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 

951 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 

2005). 

When we adjudicate a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we must accept the complaint’s 

factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Michel 

v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 694 (11th Cir. 2016). To survive a motion to dismiss, the 

complaint’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—

with “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Under this standard, bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth” and are insufficient, standing alone, to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 

relief.” Id. at 678 (cleaned up). “The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to 

survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (cleaned 

up), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012).

When the defendant challenges the complaint under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), we ask

whether there’s any overlap between the jurisdictional inquiry and the merits. “[W]here a plaintiff fails 

to plausibly allege an element that is both a merit element of a claim and a jurisdictional element, the 

district court may dismiss the claims under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). Or both.” Brownback v. King, 

___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 740, 749 n.8 (2021). But, where the “overlap between merits and jurisdiction 

may not exist,” the district court “might lack subject matter jurisdiction for non-merits reasons, in 

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which case it must dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(1).” Id. The district court should “rely on Rule 

12(b)(1) if the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” 

Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). 

The Dixons filed their complaint pro se. A “pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must 

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erikson v. Pardus, 551 

U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We also construe 

the complaint liberally because it was filed pro se.”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so 

construed as to do substantial justice.”). Although we treat pro se litigants with some leniency, “this 

leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise 

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Schwarz v. Ga. Composite Med. Bd., 2021 WL 4519893, 

at *2 (11th. Cir 2021) (quoting GJR Inv., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)). 

The requirement that “a complaint must contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state a claim for 

relief that is plausible on its face . . . also applies to pro se complaints.” Wells v. Miller, 652 F. App’x 874, 

875 (11th Cir. 2016); see also Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1266 (recognizing that Twombly and Iqbal apply to pro 

se complaints). 

ANALYSIS

I. Standing

“It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts 

must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual 

case or controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). “Standing is a threshold 

jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party’s 

claims.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005). Standing is the “irreducible 

minimum required by the Constitution” for a plaintiff to proceed in federal court. Ne. Fla. Chapter, 

Assoc’d Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 664 (1993). To establish their standing 

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to sue, the Dixons must show (1) an “injury-in-fact,” (2) “a causal connection between the asserted 

injury-in-fact and the challenged action of the defendant,” and (3) “that the injury will be redressed by 

a favorable decision.” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013). 

Mrs. Dixon fails to establish her standing at the first step. In their due-process claim, the 

Dixons allege that the Clerk “violated Plaintiff Mr. Dixon’s Constitutional Due Process rights” and 

that “Plaintiff Mr. Dixon has suffered a significant Deprivation of Due Process Rights.” Third Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 57–58. But the Dixons allege no injury to Mrs. Dixon, nor do they seek any relief on her 

behalf. See generally id. And this makes sense because, as we’ve noted (q.v. note 1), Mrs. Dixon wasn’t 

even a plaintiff in the state-court cases the Dixons are here complaining about. Mrs. Dixon’s dueprocess claim, then, is DISMISSED for lack of standing. 

Mr. Dixon, by contrast, has satisfied his standing obligations at both step one (by alleging that 

he suffered an injury-in-fact when he was denied the “opportunity to be fairly and lawfully heard on

appeal,” Third Am. Compl. ¶ 16,) and step two (by suggesting that he lost the “opportunity to be fairly 

heard” because the Clerk suppressed the Forensic Evidence, id. ¶ 57). He’s also met his burden at step 

three. Recall that step three “focus[es] on the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 

(1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S 118, 126–

27 (2014). If there’s no “connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested,” the 

injury isn’t redressable. Id. As we’ve explained, Mr. Dixon seeks two forms of relief: (1) a default 

judgment against the Clerk, plus (2) compensatory and punitive damages. See Third Am. Compl. at 12. 

As to the latter, a favorable decision for Mr. Dixon would redress his injury. He’s alleged that the Clerk 

harmed him by failing to include the full record on appeal. He wants money as recompense for that 

harm. That’s sufficient to assert standing at this early stage of the litigation.

As to the former, though, the problem isn’t so much one of standing as it is one of procedure.

We’ve repeatedly denied the Dixons’ motions for default judgment because, to put it simply, the Clerk 

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didn’t default. See Orders Denying Motions for Default [ECF Nos. 128, 138, 150, 205]. More 

problematically, the “[p]laintiff’s apparent attempt to seek default in [the complaint] is entirely 

improper in that it is wholly unsupported by any relevant documentation and contrary to the 

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 4FLAC LLC v. Transcol, S.A., 2021 WL 

680708, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2021) (Bloom, J.). We thus DISMISS Mr. Dixon’s request for a 

default judgment.

One last thing. In fairness to Mr. Dixon, his complaint also appears to seek injunctive relief 

against the Clerk and the Fourth DCA. See Third Am. Compl. ¶ 11 (asking us to “issue an Order for 

Defendant Joseph Abruzzo to transfer the suppressed 92 pages of forensic evidence to the 4th District 

Court of Appeals [sic] and to instruct the appellate court to reopen the case and correct the record 

pursuant to FRAP Rule 9.200(f)(2)”). The second part of this request—which asks us to “instruct the 

appellate court . . . .”—we dismiss for two reasons. One, the Fourth DCA isn’t a party to this case, so 

we can’t order it to do anything. See Estimar v. Sergeant Sims et al., 2016 WL 11695474, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 

Nov. 21, 2016) (White, Mag. J.) (“Generally, the person from whom injunctive relief is sought must 

be a party to the underlying action.” (citing In re Infant Formula Antitrust Litig., 72 F.3d 842, 842 (11th 

Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court’s denial of injunctive relief against nonparties because the 

district court lacked authority to enjoin entities that hadn’t been sued))), report and recommendation adopted, 

2016 WL 11695473 (Dec. 16, 2016) (Dimitrouleas, J). Two, even if the Fourth DCA were a party, 

Rooker-Feldman (as we’re about to see) would preclude us from ordering that court to reverse its prior 

decision denying Mr. Dixon’s motion to supplement. See Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 

2021) (“[Rooker-Feldman] bars all appeals of state court judgments—whether the plaintiff admits to 

filing a direct appeal of the judgment or tries to call the appeal something else.”). As to the first part 

of this injunctive request, though (the part that seeks an injunction against the Clerk), we conclude 

that Mr. Dixon done enough—at this early phase of the case—to assert his standing to pursue that 

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injunction.

II. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is a jurisdictional rule that precludes the lower federal courts 

from reviewing state court judgments.” Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 

2012). The rule “follows naturally from the jurisdictional boundaries that Congress has set for the 

federal courts”: first, that “federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction,” which “generally 

cannot hear appeals”; and, second, that “only the Supreme Court can reverse or modify state court 

judgments.” Behr, 8 F.4th at 1210 (cleaned up). Under Rooker-Feldman, “a party losing in state court is 

barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state court judgment in a 

United States District Court based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates 

the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994). “Allowing federal district 

courts to alter or directly review the judgment of state courts would violate both of those jurisdictional 

grants.” Behr, 8 F.4th at 1210. In other words, the doctrine “means that federal district courts cannot 

review or reject state court judgments rendered before the district court litigation began.” Id. at 1212. 

Rooker-Feldman is “confined” to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 

inviting district court review and rejection of these judgments.” Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). It’s thus “a narrow jurisdictional doctrine,” Behr, 8 F.4th at 1208, that 

“will almost never apply,” id. at 1212. Indeed, Rooker-Feldman is not “a one-size-fits-all preclusion 

doctrine for a vast array of claims relating to state court litigation.” Id. at 1208. At the same time, the 

doctrine “also does not prioritize form over substance.” Id. at 1211. “It [thus] bars all appeals of state 

court judgments—whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal of the judgment or tries to call 

the appeal something else.” Id. And, while courts often misapply the doctrine, id. at 1211 (noting our 

Circuit’s “overcomplicat[ion]” of Rooker-Feldman), the Eleventh Circuit has recently clarified that 

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Rooker-Feldman presents “a simple inquiry” into “whether the plaintiff’s claim directly challenged a 

state court loss,” id. 

A claim “[can]not be pursued [when] it is ‘inextricably intertwined with [the state court’s] 

decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny plaintiffs’ petitions.’” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 286 (quoting 

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87). A claim is “inextricably intertwined” if the federal court’s decision would 

have the effect of nullifying the state-court decision, see Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (citing Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996)), or if the claim “succeeds only to 

the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues,” Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 

1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). This “inextricably intertwined” analysis isn’t a separate sub-doctrine of 

Rooker-Feldman; it’s “merely a way of ensuring that courts do not exercise jurisdiction over the appeal 

of a state court judgment simply because the claimant does not call it an appeal of a state court 

judgment.” Behr, 8 F.4th at 1212. 

When assessing the application of Rooker-Feldman, a “claim-by-claim approach is the right one” 

because the doctrine “requires a more targeted approach.” Id. at 1213. For this reason, the Eleventh 

Circuit has admonished us to remember that “the claim for relief does matter.” Id. at 1214. In other 

words, “[b]ecause Rooker-Feldman bars only claims that invite a district court’s ‘review and rejection’ of 

a state court judgment, claims that seek only damages for constitutional violations of third parties—not 

relief from the judgment of the state court—are permitted.” Id. (emphasis added). So, we must ask 

whether our plaintiff “seeks relief for violations that happened during the state court process,” rather 

than the “rejection of the state court judgment” itself. Id. at 1213; see also id. (holding that the “claim 

that various defendants . . . discriminated against [plaintiffs] on the basis of gender, religious belief, 

and disability . . . falls outside Rooker-Feldman” because the plaintiffs sought money damages for 

constitutional violations that occurred in the state-court process and didn’t ask for the “rejection of 

the state court judgment”). 

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Given our obligation to take a targeted, claim-by-claim approach to the Rooker-Feldman inquiry, 

see Behr, 8 F.4th at 1213, we pause here to note something important about Mr. Dixon’s claim: It’s

actually two distinct claims. What we’ll call the first claim—which we’ll address second—is Mr. Dixon’s 

contention that the Clerk “suppress[ed] the 92 pages of forensic evidence on the circuit court docket 

under ‘Notice’ and [did not] transfer the 92 pages of forensic evidence to the 4th District Court of 

Appeals [sic] as part of the record on appeal.” Third Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Although Mr. Dixon doesn’t 

tell us when this suppression occurred, it seems reasonably clear that he’s referring to the Clerk’s 

compilation and transmission of the initial record on appeal—which the appellate court received on 

February 20, 2014. [Appeal Doc. Feb. 20, 2014]. The second claim—which we’ll address first—is that

“the 4th DCA heinously and egregiously denied the motion [to supplement] and, ruled a per curiam 

affirmed. In doing so violating Mr. Dixon’s Due Process Rights . . . to be fairly and lawfully heard on 

appeal.” Third Am. Compl. ¶ 16 (errors in original). As redress for this second claim, Mr. Dixon urges

us to “issue an Order for Defendant Joseph Abruzzo to transfer the suppressed 92 pages of forensic 

evidence to the 4th District Court of Appeals [sic] and to instruct the appellate court to reopen the 

case and correct the record pursuant to FRAP Rule 9.200(f)(2).” Id. ¶ 11. 

So, we have two claims: the first asking us to punish the Clerk for failing to submit the Forensic 

Evidence to the Fourth DCA in the first instance; the second asking us to override the Fourth DCA’s 

denial of his motion to supplement the record with those same 92 pages of Forensic Evidence. As we 

can see, in this second claim at least, Mr. Dixon is asking us to overturn the Fourth DCA’s denial of 

his motion to supplement the record. See Third Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Here, then, he’s “directly 

challeng[ing] a state court loss,” Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211—and so, Rooker-Feldman plainly bars this second 

claim. 

Admittedly, Rooker-Feldman doesn’t typically bar a claim when the parties in the state and federal 

cases aren’t identical. See, e.g., In re Hazan, 10 F.4th 1244, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Rooker-Feldman 

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does not apply when the parties to the federal case are not the same as the parties to the state case.”).

But this general rule doesn’t apply where, as here, the state-court loser names the state-court judge or 

the state-court system as the defendant in the federal action. See, e.g., Nash v. Fifth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 806 

F. App’x 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Liberally construed, Nash argues on appeal that, in her amended 

complaint, she identified two due-process violations arising from the state-court proceedings: (1) the 

entry of the foreclosure judgment before she could present her affirmative defenses; and (2) the judges’ 

application of the law-of-the-case doctrine to bar her from presenting argument on that issue in her 

second appeal. The district court did not err by concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred 

both of these claims.”); Tarver v. Reynolds, 808 F. App’x 752, 754 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The district court 

was right that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars most (if not all) of Tarver’s claims. Tarver repeatedly 

argued in state court that Judge Reynolds lacked jurisdiction under federal law to divide his disability 

benefits. He makes the same argument here. But Judge Reynolds repeatedly rejected this claim. And 

Alabama’s appellate courts repeatedly affirmed Judge Reynolds’s ruling. Success in this lawsuit hinges 

on whether those courts were wrong.” (citations omitted)). 

On the application of Rooker-Feldman to a state-court clerk, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in

Macleod v. Bexley, 730 F. App’x 845 (11th Cir. 2018), is instructive. In that case, a plaintiff who had 

been declared a “vexatious litigant” under Florida law sued the clerk of Flagler County in federal court 

for refusing to accept and file the plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint. Id. at 848.

11 The district court dismissed 

the claim, citing (among other things) Rooker-Feldman. Id. The plaintiff appealed, but the Eleventh 

Circuit affirmed, agreeing that, “under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court did not have 

jurisdiction to consider Macleod’s complaint because it falls into the class of ‘state-court losers 

11 Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law provides, in relevant part, as follows: “The clerk of the court shall 

not file any new action by a vexatious litigant pro se unless the vexatious litigant has obtained an order 

from the administrative judge permitting such filing.” FLA. STAT. § 68.093(5).

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complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Id. (quoting Exxon,

544 U.S. at 284). And it didn’t matter that Macleod had sued the clerk rather than the court because,

“[a]lthough couched in different terms, Macleod essentially asks the federal courts to review the state 

court order.” Id. So too here. By asking us to instruct the Clerk to give him the relief the Fourth DCA 

has already denied him, Mr. Dixon is a “state-court loser[ ] complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court 

review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284).12

We see the first part of Mr. Dixon’s claim somewhat differently. The Clerk says that RookerFeldman bars this first claim, too, as a “direct challenge to the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 

decision in the appeal.” Motion at 5. We disagree. That claim (it’s true) likewise arises from the statecourt proceedings. But its success doesn’t necessarily “hinge on whether those [state] courts were 

wrong.” Tarver, 808 F. App’x at 754. That’s because the conduct the Dixons are here complaining 

about—the Clerk’s omission of the Forensic Evidence from the record on appeal—preceded (and may 

not have been vindicated by) the Fourth DCA’s later resolution of Mr. Dixon’s motion to supplement. 

To understand why, we need to look back at the timeline. On February 20, 2014, the Fourth

DCA received the record from the Clerk. See Acknowledgement of Received Records [Appeal Doc. 

Feb. 20, 2014]. On April 7, 2014, Mr. Dixon “discovered the 92 pages of forensic evidence weren’t 

transferred to the 4th DCA as part of the record on appeal[.]” Third Am. Compl. ¶ 14. Mr. Dixon 

then filed his six motions to supplement the record (three of which were granted, see Orders Granting 

Motions to Supplement [Appeal Docs. June 23, 2014; Sept. 22, 2014; Oct. 24, 2014], and three denied, 

12 As we’ve explained (q.v. Section I), to the extent that this second claim asserts a cause of action 

against the Fourth DCA itself, we dismiss it both because the Fourth DCA isn’t a party here and under 

Rooker-Feldman. 

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see Orders Denying Motions to Supplement [Appeal Docs. Aug. 19, 2014; Jan. 8, 2015]). As we’ve 

said, we don’t know which of these orders addressed the Forensic Evidence directly, but Mr. Dixon

alleges that “the 4th District Court of Appeals [sic] heinously and egregiously denied the motion” to 

supplement the record with the Forensic Evidence. Third Am. Compl. ¶ 15. 

We’ve already held that Mr. Dixon can’t challenge the Fourth DCA’s ruling on that motion to 

supplement. But this claim is slightly different: Here, Mr. Dixon seems to want money damages for 

something that happened before the court rejected his motion to supplement. Why does that matter?

Well, because a motion to supplement under Florida law must be properly filed, and it must establish

some material “error or omission in the record.” FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200(f); see also Thornber v. City of 

Walton Beach, 534 So. 2d 754, 755 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (“This rule is intended to assure that any portion 

of the record before the lower tribunal which is material to a decision by the court be made available 

to the court so that appellate proceedings will be decided on their merits.”). Had the Clerk included 

the Forensic Evidence in the record, that evidence (it’s almost tautological to say) would’ve been 

included in the record. Since the Clerk failed to include that evidence, Mr. Dixon had to follow the 

strictures of Florida law to get that evidence in through a motion to supplement. In other words, he 

had to file a proper motion to supplement with the Fourth DCA that identified a material error or 

omission in the record. Given what we’ve seen of the Dixons’ filings in this case, we think it reasonable 

to assume that Mr. Dixon’s motion to supplement might have been denied, not because the Fourth 

DCA determined that the Clerk had rightly excluded the Forensic Evidence, but because Mr. Dixon’s 

motion to supplement wasn’t, for whatever reason, properly filed. It may have been too late. Or it 

may have been improperly docketed. Or it may have failed to explain, in clear and explicit language, 

how the Forensic Evidence was material to the appeal. And, if any of that’s true, then the Clerk’s 

failure to include the Forensic Evidence—which Mr. Dixon alleges deprived him of the right to be 

“fairly and lawfully heard on appeal,” Third Am. Compl. ¶ 16—could’ve been a link in the chain of 

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events that led the Fourth DCA to deny his appeal. Viewed this way, Mr. Dixon’s first claim doesn’t 

seem to call the Fourth DCA’s judgment into question at all. 

Now, it may well be that the Fourth DCA did dispose of the motion to supplement on the

merits—rather than on account of some technical deficiency in the filing. If that were the case, though, 

we would’ve expected the Clerk to say so—to attach, in other words, the specific ruling Mr. Dixon is 

here trying to overturn. But the Clerk hasn’t done that. And since, at this stage, we must draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Dixon, we’ll assume that the Fourth DCA didn’t reject Mr. 

Dixon’s motion to supplement on its merits—that, instead, it denied the motion to supplement 

because the motion was technically deficient in some way. When we do that, we have no choice but 

to deny the Clerk’s Rooker-Feldman request—at least as it relates to the Clerk’s misfeasance in compiling 

and submitting the appellate record in the first instance (the first claim). Still, as we’ve said, we

GRANT the Motion to Dismiss as to the second claim (the one that explicitly challenges the Fourth 

DCA’s ruling on the motion to supplement). 

III. The Statute of Limitations

All that said, we dismiss Mr. Dixon’s due-process claim against the Clerk because it’s untimely. 

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is determined by the state’s residual personal-injury 

statute—which, in Florida, is four years. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam) (“Florida’s four-year statute of limitations applies to such claims of deprivation of rights under 

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.”); Ellison v. Lester, 275 F. App’x 900, 901 (11th Cir. 2008) (reversing the 

district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 complaint as untimely because the district court erroneously 

applied a one-year statute of limitations rather than the appropriate four-year limitations period); see 

also FLA STAT. § 95.11(3) (setting a four-year statute of limitations for, among other things, “any action 

not specifically provided for in these statutes”). That limitations period begins to run when “the 

plaintiffs know or should know (1) that they have suffered the injury that forms the basis of their 

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complaint and (2) who has inflicted the injury.” Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1283 (citing Mullinax v. McElhenny, 

817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987)). 

The Dixons knew all about the (allegedly) injurious conduct—and they knew precisely who had 

inflicted that injury—way back in 2014. As they explained in their complaint:

On April 07, 2014, Plaintiff Mr. Dixon discovered the 92 pages of forensic evidence 

wasn’t transferred to the 4th DCA as part of the record on appeal and filed a Motion 

in the 4th DCA Court of Appeals [sic] under Case NO.: 4D 13-4045 L.T. No.: 

502012CA022556XX requesting the appellate court to instruct [the Clerk] to transfer 

the omitted 92 pages of forensic evidence to the appellate court pursuant to FRAP 

Rule 9.200(a)(1)(f)(2).

Third Am. Compl. ¶ 14 (errors in original). The statute of limitations, then, began to run on April 7, 

2014, and the claim expired four years later—on April 7, 2018. The Dixons’ case against the Clerk, 

first filed on October 8, 2020, see Am. Compl. [ECF No. 36], is thus two years too late. Because the 

Dixons’ due-process claim is time-barred, we GRANT the Motion to Dismiss on any aspect of the 

claim that has survived the standing and Rooker-Feldman inquiries.

IV. Official Capacity

Even if the Dixons’ claim weren’t barred by the statute of limitations, we’d still dismiss it for 

failure to state a claim. The Dixons have sued the Clerk in his official capacity. See, e.g., Third Am. 

Compl. at 1 (listing the Defendant as “Joseph Abruzzo, in his Official Capacity as successor of Sharon 

Bock, Clerk and comptroller of Palm Beach County” (errors in original)). When a government official 

is sued in his official capacity, we treat the claim as if it were brought against the governmental entity

itself. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that official-capacity claims 

are “simply another way of pleading an action against the entity of which an officer is an agent”). But 

a governmental entity isn’t liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees. See Monell, 436 U.S. at

694. Instead, a § 1983 plaintiff pursuing municipal liability “must allege facts showing: ‘(1) that his 

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted 

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deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the 

violation.’” Guerra v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 657 F. App’x 886, 893 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).

The Dixons never allege that Palm Beach County implemented any “custom or policy” that 

resulted in the deprivation of their constitutional rights. See generally Third Am. Compl. On the 

contrary, their complaint is based entirely on the alleged failure of one individual, then-Clerk Sharon 

Bock, to submit the Forensic Evidence to the Fourth DCA. That’s precisely the sort of respondeatsuperior liability Monell proscribes. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. We thus GRANT the Motion to Dismiss

as to any part of the Dixons’ claim that has survived the standing, Rooker-Feldman, and statute-oflimitations bars.

V. Leave to Amend

The Defendants ask us to dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice. See Motion at 13. But 

we can’t do that—at least not entirely. Although “a district court need not allow a plaintiff to amend 

a complaint if the amendment would not serve to cure the defective pleading,” Wittbold v. Miami-Dade 

Cnty., 2013 WL 3280039, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2013) (Cooke, J.), a dismissal that’s based on 

jurisdictional deficiencies must be without prejudice, see Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1232 (“[S]ince the district 

court did not have subject matter jurisdiction in this case, [the plaintiff’s] complaint should have been 

dismissed without prejudice.”); see also Doane v. Tele Cir. Network Corp., 852 F. App’x 404, 408 n.2 (11th 

Cir. 2021) (“A dismissal for lack of standing, however, is a jurisdictional ruling that is entered without 

prejudice.”). And—notably—a dismissal under Rooker-Feldman must likewise be without prejudice. See 

Scott v. Frankel, 606 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A] Rooker-Feldman dismissal is a dismissal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and ‘[a] dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a 

judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice.’” (quoting Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1232); see also 

Boda v. United States, 698 F.2d 1174, 1177 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that dismissal “on jurisdictional 

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grounds . . . is without prejudice”). So, to the extent that the Dixons’ claim is dismissed either for lack 

of standing or under Rooker-Feldman, it’s DISMISSED without prejudice. For that part of the claim 

that’s barred either by the statute of limitations or by Monell, we DISMISS with prejudice. 

Either way, we dismiss without leave to amend because any further amendment would be futile. 

“Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly 

dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 

F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007). Despite having amended their complaint four times overall and once 

in response to the Defendants’ compelling Rooker-Feldman, Monell, and statute-of-limitations 

challenges—see generally Second Am. Compl. [ECF No. 139]; Motion to Dismiss Second Amended 

Complaint [ECF No. 164] (presenting the same statute-of-limitations, Monell, and Rooker-Feldman

arguments we’ve reviewed here); Third Am. Compl.t [ECF No. 191]—the Dixons haven’t been able

to remedy their claim’s many deficiencies. 

Where (as here) “the district court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over” any future 

amended complaint, “amendment would be futile.” Johnson v. Regions Mortg., 503 F. App’x 810, 811

(11th Cir. 2013); see also Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding 

that “denial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the complaint as amended is still subject to 

dismissal” under Rooker-Feldman); Blakenship v. Claus, 149 F. App’x 897, 899 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(recognizing that “any amendment would be futile” when “no amendment will create diversity 

jurisdiction” and where “nothing will confer federal question jurisdiction under [federal statutes]”); 

Hatcher v. Ala. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Child Support Enf’t Div., 747 F. App’x 778, 782 (11th Cir. 2018)

(holding that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend when it 

concluded that amendment would be futile based on Younger grounds”). Our careful review of the 

Dixons’ complaint—and its many irreparable failings—leaves us with the firm impression that 

allowing them to amend again would only result in another dismissal.

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* * *

The Dixons may be dissatisfied with the outcome of Mr. Dixon’s state-court case. But their 

frustration doesn’t authorize us to overturn, or interfere with, the decisions of the Fourth DCA. Nor 

does it empower us to adjudicate a case that was filed two years after the statute of limitations expired.

So, after careful review, we ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows: 

(1) As to the Defendant, Ericka N. Chase, the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 193] is DENIED 

as moot.

(2) As to Joseph Abruzzo in his official capacity as the Clerk of the Circuit Court & 

Comptroller, Palm Beach County, the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 193] is GRANTED.

(3) The Third Amended Complaint [ECF No. 191] is DISMISSED with prejudice (in part)

and without prejudice (in part) and, in either case, without leave to amend. 

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on the 24th day of June 2022.

_________________________________

ROY K. ALTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

Roy and Blanche Dixon, pro se

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