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305 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. FERRIN

Cite as 305 Neb. 762

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Benjamin L. Ferrin, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 8, 2020. No. S-19-594.

1. Criminal Law: Courts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In an appeal 

of a criminal case from the county court, the district court acts as an 

intermediate court of appeals, and its review is limited to an examination of the record for error or abuse of discretion. Both the district court 

and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county 

court for error appearing on the record. When reviewing a judgment for 

errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether 

the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, 

and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

2. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.

3. Evidence: Records: Appeal and Error. A bill of exceptions is the 

only vehicle for bringing evidence before an appellate court, and evidence which is not made a part of the bill of exceptions may not be 

considered.

4. Records: Appeal and Error. As a general proposition, it is incumbent 

upon the appellant to present a record supporting the errors assigned; 

absent such a record, an appellate court will affirm the lower court’s 

decision regarding those errors.

5. Trial: Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings: Evidence: Juries: Appeal and 

Error. A motion in limine is a procedural step to prevent prejudicial 

evidence from reaching the jury. It is not the office of a motion in limine 

to obtain a final ruling upon the ultimate admissibility of the evidence. 

Therefore, when a court overrules a motion in limine to exclude evidence, the movant must object when the particular evidence is offered 

at trial in order to predicate error before an appellate court.

6. Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. An appellant who 

has assigned only that the trial court erred in denying a motion in limine 

has not triggered appellate review of the evidentiary ruling at trial.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

07/24/2020 08:08 AM CDT
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7. Motions to Dismiss: Directed Verdict: Waiver: Appeal and Error. A 

defendant who moves for dismissal or a directed verdict at the close of 

the evidence in the State’s case in chief in a criminal prosecution and 

who, when the court overrules the dismissal or directed verdict motion, 

proceeds with trial and introduces evidence, waives the appellate right 

to challenge correctness in the trial court’s overruling the motion for 

dismissal or a directed verdict but may still challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence.

8. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, 

the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the 

evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact.

9. Criminal Law: Statutes. To determine the elements of a crime, courts 

look to the text of the statute.

10. ____: ____. Penal statutes are considered in the context of the object 

sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose sought to be served.

11. ____: ____. Effect must be given, if possible, to all parts of a penal 

statute; no sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as meaningless 

or superfluous if it can be avoided.

12. Statutes. In the absence of anything indicating otherwise, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.

13. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Judges: Proof: Intent.

To show a violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016), 

the State must prove that (1) the defendant intentionally obstructed, 

impaired, or hindered either a peace officer, a judge, or a police animal 

assisting a peace officer; (2) at the time the defendant did so, the peace 

officer or judge was acting under color of his or her official authority to 

enforce the penal law or preserve the peace; and (3) the defendant did 

so by using or threatening to use either violence, force, physical interference, or obstacle.

14. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Intent. Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016) does not proscribe all conduct that intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders officers who are acting under color 

of their authority to either enforce the penal law or preserve the peace. 

Instead, it proscribes only conduct that involves using or threatening to 

use “violence, force, physical interference, or obstacle.”
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15. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Convictions: Evidence. Evidence showing a defendant resisted handcuffing, struggled with an officer, and 

continued to resist restraint is alone sufficient to sustain a conviction for 

obstructing a peace officer under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1) (Reissue 

2016).

16. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs. The act of running away 

from police interposes a physical obstacle that can obstruct, impair, or 

hinder an officer’s efforts to preserve the peace under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016).

17. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Judges: Intent. The 

proper inquiry under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016) is 

not whether a defendant has engaged in “some sort of physical act,” 

but, rather, whether a defendant’s conduct, however expressed, used or 

threatened to use either violence, force, physical interference, or obstacle to intentionally obstruct, impair, or hinder a peace officer or judge 

who was acting to either enforce the penal law or preserve the peace 

under color of his or her official authority.

18. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles.

Officers making a traffic stop may order the driver and passengers to get 

out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop.

19. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: 

Evidence. Evidence that a defendant repeatedly refused to comply with 

police orders to exit a vehicle during a traffic stop is sufficient to show 

the use of either “physical interference” or “obstacle” under Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 28-906(1) (Reissue 2016).

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County, George 

A. Thompson, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court 

for Sarpy County, Robert C. Wester, Judge. Judgment of 

District Court affirmed.

John H. Sohl for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Matthew Lewis 

for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Stacy, J.

The district court for Sarpy County affirmed Benjamin L. 

Ferrin’s conviction and sentence for the misdemeanor offense 
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of obstructing a peace officer under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906 

(Reissue 2016), which provides in relevant part:

A person commits the offense of obstructing a peace 

officer, when, by using or threatening to use violence, 

force, physical interference, or obstacle, he or she intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders (a) the enforcement of the penal law or the preservation of the peace 

by a peace officer or judge acting under color of his or 

her official authority or (b) a police animal assisting a 

peace officer acting pursuant to the peace officer’s official authority.

The primary question on appeal is whether the evidence in 

this case was sufficient to support Ferrin’s conviction. Finding 

it was, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2018, at 1:54 p.m., two Bellevue, Nebraska, 

police officers were dispatched to a domestic disturbance call. 

When they arrived, they spoke with M.H., who had called 

police for assistance. M.H. told police she and her husband, 

Ferrin, were having marital difficulties, and she reported 

he had locked her out of their residence. M.H. spoke with 

police outside the residence, and the conversation was video 

recorded.

M.H. told police she had spoken with Ferrin by telephone 

earlier that day and was concerned about his state of mind, 

explaining “he just appeared to have snapped.” M.H. reported 

that Ferrin had been verbally and physically abusive in the 

past, and she told the officers Ferrin had sexually assaulted her 

about 3 weeks earlier. M.H. told the officers that Ferrin owned 

several guns and that he had been suicidal months before. She 

warned officers that Ferrin may be uncooperative if they tried 

to talk with him.

1. Traffic Stop

While police were interviewing M.H. outside her residence, 

Ferrin drove past in his pickup truck. One of the officers got 
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into his cruiser and followed Ferrin’s truck, activating his overhead lights. The officer testified that the purpose of the traffic 

stop was twofold: to investigate a possible crime against M.H. 

and to check on Ferrin’s well-being.

Ferrin pulled his truck to the side of the road and stopped. 

The first officer parked his cruiser behind Ferrin’s truck and 

waited for the second officer to arrive and provide backup. 

According to the first officer, he did not want to contact Ferrin 

without backup, because he was concerned about Ferrin’s state 

of mind and the possibility there were guns in his truck.

The second officer arrived at the traffic stop shortly thereafter, and the officers positioned themselves near the first officer’s cruiser and directed Ferrin to exit his pickup truck and 

walk back to them. Ferrin, whose window was rolled down, 

replied that he could not hear the officers. Using the public 

address system in one of the cruisers, the officers again asked 

Ferrin to open his pickup door, exit the pickup, and walk back 

to where the officers were positioned. Ferrin responded, “‘No, 

thank you.’”

At that point, the officers considered it a “high-risk” traffic 

stop and drew their firearms. They again asked Ferrin to step 

out of his truck and walk back to them. Ferrin responded that 

he did not want to leave his truck, because he had a dog inside. 

The officers suggested Ferrin roll up the window so that the 

dog could not get out, and they again directed him to exit the 

truck and walk back to them. Again Ferrin refused to comply. 

The officers informed Ferrin that if he did not comply with 

their request to get out of his truck, he could be charged with a 

crime. Ferrin asked why he had been stopped, and the officers 

told him they were “investigating a domestic incident.” Ferrin 

replied that the officers had no reason to stop him, and he 

remained inside the truck. The officers again instructed Ferrin 

to get out of the truck and walk back to them so that they could 

talk with him. Ferrin remained in the truck. The video shows 

that the officers made approximately eight requests for Ferrin 

to step out of the truck and that he complied with none.
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After approximately 3 to 5 minutes of this back-and-forth 

communication, the officers advised Ferrin he was under arrest 

for obstructing a peace officer. Ferrin responded, “‘Fuck off.’” 

He remained in his truck for a few more seconds, then opened 

the door and got out. When the officers instructed Ferrin where 

to put his hands, he again responded, “‘Fuck off.’” The officers 

then instructed Ferrin to lift his shirt so that they could see his 

waistband and to walk toward them until he was told to stop. 

Ferrin complied with these requests. The officers then directed 

Ferrin to get down on his knees. Ferrin initially refused that 

request, but complied after further direction. At that point, 

Ferrin was handcuffed, searched, and placed in the cruiser. The 

entire stop and arrest was video recorded.

2. Criminal Proceedings

On March 7, 2018, the State filed a criminal complaint in 

Sarpy County Court charging Ferrin with obstructing a peace 

officer, in violation of § 28-906. Ferrin entered a plea of 

not guilty.

(a) Motion to Suppress

Ferrin filed a motion to suppress, contending the traffic stop 

and subsequent arrest were not supported by probable cause. 

A suppression hearing was held, but that hearing was not 

included in the record on appeal. In a written order, the county 

court overruled the suppression motion in all respects. The 

matter was set for a jury trial.

(b) Motion in Limine

Before trial, Ferrin filed a motion in limine seeking to 

preclude the State from referring to, or offering evidence of, 

M.H.’s statements to police before the traffic stop. Ferrin 

argued that M.H.’s statements had no relevance to the charged 

offense and would serve only to prejudice the jury. The State 

responded that M.H.’s statements, which included allegations 

of criminal conduct by Ferrin, formed the basis for the traffic 

stop and were inextricably intertwined with evidence of the 
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obstruction crime with which Ferrin had been charged. The 

court denied Ferrin’s motion in limine, but indicated it would 

give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the proper use 

of M.H.’s statements.

(c) Jury Trial

At trial, both officers testified to the facts summarized 

above. A video recording of the traffic stop, including M.H.’s 

statements to the officers prior to the stop, was offered and 

received over Ferrin’s relevancy and hearsay objections. The 

court gave the jury a limiting instruction essentially admonishing them to consider M.H.’s statements only for the purpose of 

determining whether police were conducting a criminal investigation or preserving the peace. Similar admonishments were 

repeated several times during the trial and were included in the 

written jury instructions.

At the close of the State’s case in chief, Ferrin moved for 

directed verdict, arguing the State had failed to prove the 

material elements of the charged offense. Summarized, Ferrin 

argued the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 

prove a violation of § 28-906(1), because it showed merely 

that he refused to cooperate with police. The court overruled 

Ferrin’s motion, after which he testified in his own defense.

At the close of all the evidence, Ferrin renewed his motion 

for a directed verdict without additional argument. The court 

summarily overruled the motion and submitted the case to the 

jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court sentenced 

Ferrin to 7 days in the county jail, 1 month of probation, and a 

$50 fine. Ferrin timely appealed his conviction and sentence to 

the district court, sitting as an appellate court.

3. Appeal to District Court

Ferrin assigned four errors before the district court: (1) 

There was insufficient evidence to convict him, (2) the county 

court erred by overruling his motion to suppress, (3) the county 

court erred by admitting evidence that had a prejudicial impact 

on the jury, and (4) the sentence imposed was excessive.
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The district court rejected all four assignments of error and 

affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Ferrin timely appealed, and 

we moved the case to our docket on our own motion.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal to this court, Ferrin assigns, restated and reordered, that the district court erred in affirming the judgment of 

the county court, because the county court erred in (1) overruling his motion to suppress, (2) overruling his motion in limine, 

and (3) overruling his motions for directed verdict, because 

there was insufficient evidence to prove the material elements 

of the crime.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, 

the district court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, and 

its review is limited to an examination of the record for error 

or abuse of discretion. 1 Both the district court and a higher 

appellate court generally review appeals from the county court 

for error appearing on the record. 2 When reviewing a judgment 

for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry 

is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by 

competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor 

unreasonable. 3

[2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. 4

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Motion to Suppress

Ferrin’s first assignment of error challenges the overruling 

of his motion to suppress, but the bill of exceptions in this case 

does not contain the suppression hearing.

1 State v. Becker, 304 Neb. 693, 936 N.W.2d 505 (2019).

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 State v. Brye, 304 Neb. 498, 935 N.W.2d 438 (2019).
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[3,4] A bill of exceptions is the only vehicle for bringing 

evidence before an appellate court, and evidence which is 

not made a part of the bill of exceptions may not be considered. 5 As a general proposition, it is incumbent upon the 

appellant to present a record supporting the errors assigned; 

absent such a record, an appellate court will affirm the lower 

court’s decision regarding those errors. 6 Because our record 

does not include the suppression hearing, we do not consider 

Ferrin’s assignment of error regarding the ruling on his motion 

to suppress.

2. Motion in Limine

[5] Ferrin’s second assignment of error challenges the 

overruling of his motion in limine, which sought to preclude 

admission of M.H.’s video-recorded statements to police. We 

have repeatedly held that a motion in limine is a procedural 

step to prevent prejudicial evidence from reaching the jury. 7 It 

is not the office of a motion in limine to obtain a final ruling 

upon the ultimate admissibility of the evidence. 8 Therefore, 

when a court overrules a motion in limine to exclude evidence, the movant must object when the particular evidence 

is offered at trial in order to predicate error before an appellate court. 9

Ferrin’s brief notes that he objected at trial when the video 

recording of M.H.’s statements was offered, but he has not 

assigned error to the ruling during trial. To be considered by 

an appellate court, an alleged error must be both specifically 

5 Bohling v. Bohling, 304 Neb. 968, 937 N.W.2d 855 (2020).

6 D.I. v. Gibson, 295 Neb. 903, 890 N.W.2d 506 (2017).

7 Pantano v. American Blue Ribbon Holdings, 303 Neb. 156, 927 N.W.2d 

357 (2019); Golnick v. Callender, 290 Neb. 395, 860 N.W.2d 180 (2015); 

State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. 393, 754 N.W.2d 742 (2008).

8 Pantano, supra note 7.

9 Id.
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assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error. 10

[6] An appellant who has assigned only that the trial 

court erred in denying a motion in limine has not triggered 

appellate review of the evidentiary ruling at trial. 11 Because 

Ferrin’s second assignment of error challenges only the ruling on the motion in limine, it presents nothing for appellate 

review.

3. Motions for Directed Verdict/

Sufficiency of Evidence

Ferrin’s third assignment of error challenges the overruling 

of his motions for directed verdict made at the close of the 

State’s case and renewed at the conclusion of all the evidence. 

Both motions asserted the evidence was insufficient to prove 

the material elements of the charged offense.

[7] A defendant who moves for dismissal or a directed verdict at the close of the evidence in the State’s case in chief 

in a criminal prosecution and who, when the court overrules 

the dismissal or directed verdict motion, proceeds with trial 

and introduces evidence, waives the appellate right to challenge correctness in the trial court’s overruling the motion for 

dismissal or a directed verdict but may still challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 12 We therefore consider Ferrin’s third 

assignment of error as one challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence to prove the offense of obstructing a peace officer.

[8] When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of 

the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for 

an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

10 State v. Dady, 304 Neb. 649, 936 N.W.2d 486 (2019).

11 See Pantano, supra note 7.

12 State v. Briggs, 303 Neb. 352, 929 N.W.2d 65 (2019).
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a reasonable doubt. 13 An appellate court does not resolve 

conflicts in the evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or 

reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. 14

(a) Obstructing Peace Officer

[9-12] We begin by identifying the material elements the 

State must prove to show a violation of § 28-906(1). To 

determine the elements of a crime, we look to the text of the 

statute. 15 And when analyzing the text of a criminal statute, 

we follow settled principles of statutory construction. Penal 

statutes are considered in the context of the object sought to be 

accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, 

and the purpose sought to be served. 16 Effect must be given, 

if possible, to all parts of a penal statute; no sentence, clause, 

or word should be rejected as meaningless or superfluous if it 

can be avoided. 17 And in the absence of anything indicating 

otherwise, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 18

[13] Under the plain language of the statute, to show a 

violation of § 28-906(1), the State must prove that (1) the 

defendant intentionally obstructed, impaired, or hindered either 

a peace officer, a judge, or a police animal assisting a peace 

officer; (2) at the time the defendant did so, the peace officer 

or judge was acting under color of his or her official authority to enforce the penal law or preserve the peace; and (3) the 

defendant did so by using or threatening to use either violence, 

force, physical interference, or obstacle.

On appeal, Ferrin does not argue there was insufficient 

evidence to establish the first two of these elements. Rather, 

13 State v. Olbricht, 294 Neb. 974, 885 N.W.2d 699 (2016).

14 Id.

15 State v. Mann, 302 Neb. 804, 925 N.W.2d 324 (2019).

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 State v. Stanko, 304 Neb. 675, 936 N.W.2d 353 (2019).
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his insufficiency argument is focused on the third element, 

which addresses the proscribed conduct. We limit our analysis 

accordingly.

(i) Proscribed Conduct

[14] Section 28-906(1) does not proscribe all conduct that 

intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders officers who are 

acting under color of their authority to either enforce the 

penal law or preserve the peace. Instead, it proscribes only 

conduct that involves using or threatening to use “violence, 

force, physical interference, or obstacle.” We have rejected 

the suggestion that these statutory terms are unconstitutionally 

vague, finding instead that they are commonly used words 

and are understandable by those of ordinary intelligence. 19

[15] We have consistently recognized that evidence showing a defendant resisted handcuffing, struggled with an officer, 

and continued to resist restraint is alone sufficient to sustain a 

conviction for obstructing a peace officer. 20 But here, the State 

generally concedes that Ferrin’s conduct during the traffic 

stop did not involve using or threatening to use either violence 

or force. We agree, and we confine our analysis to whether the 

record contains sufficient evidence that Ferrin used or threatened to use either “physical interference” or “obstacle” within 

the meaning of § 28-906(1). Nebraska’s appellate courts have 

considered these terms in several cases.

This court first considered the meaning of the phrase 

“physical interference, or obstacle” as used in § 28-906(1) 

in the 1987 case In re Interest of Richter. 21 In that case, 

two uniformed officers responded to a domestic disturbance 

call requesting police assistance in removing a disruptive 

youth from a home. When officers arrived, the youth was 

19 State v. Lynch, 223 Neb. 849, 394 N.W.2d 651 (1986).

20 State v. Campbell, 260 Neb. 1021, 620 N.W.2d 750 (2001); Lynch, supra

note 19.

21 In re Interest of Richter, 226 Neb. 874, 415 N.W.2d 476 (1987).
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arguing, cursing, and yelling, and officers told him he would 

be taken to a youth shelter for the evening. While officers 

were escorting the youth for transport, he ran away. They 

pursued him on foot and eventually located him an hour later, 

at which point he tried to run from the officers a second time. 

Based on these events, the State alleged the youth was within 

the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because he committed 

an act which would constitute a violation of § 28-906(1). 22

In response, the youth argued that to prove a violation 

of § 28-906(1), the State had to show he used or threatened to use “some physical means to thwart the officers” 23

that involved more than simply running away from police. 

We disagreed.

[16] We gave § 28-906(1) its plain and ordinary meaning, 

and reasoned that even if the word “physical” modified both 

“interference” and “obstacle,” the act of running away from 

police interposed a physical obstacle that obstructed, impaired, 

or hindered the officers’ efforts to preserve the peace. 24

Ten years later, we decided State v. Yeutter. 25 In that case, 

city police discovered Edwin Yeutter’s dog running at large in 

violation of a city ordinance, and an officer went to Yeutter’s 

home to issue a citation. Yeutter refused to provide his identifying information, and the officer could not complete the 

citation. When Yeutter was told that if he did not cooperate, 

he would be arrested for obstructing an officer, he held out 

his arms and said, “‘[G]o ahead and take me.’” 26 The officer 

22 See, generally, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) (Reissue 2016).

23 In re Interest of Richter, supra note 21, 226 Neb. at 876, 415 N.W.2d at 

478.

24 In re Interest of Richter, supra note 21. Accord U.S. v. Sledge, 460 F.3d 

963 (8th Cir. 2006) (under Nebraska law, mere act of running away from 

law enforcement officers constitutes physical interference or obstacle 

within meaning of § 28-906(1)).

25 State v. Yeutter, 252 Neb. 857, 566 N.W.2d 387 (1997).

26 Id. at 859, 566 N.W.2d at 390.
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instructed him to put his hands on a nearby car, Yeutter 

refused, and a physical struggle ensued. During the struggle, 

Yeutter grabbed the officer’s baton, grabbed the officer’s 

handcuffs, bit the officer’s finger, and generally resisted being 

taken into custody and placed in the police cruiser.

Yeutter was convicted for assaulting an officer, resisting 

arrest, and obstructing a peace officer. The Nebraska Court 

of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion filed on December 

18, 1996, in case No. A-96-255, reversed the conviction for 

obstructing a peace officer and otherwise affirmed. We granted 

Yeutter’s petition for further review to determine just one 

question: whether he was entitled to a jury instruction on 

self-defense.

But before we addressed that question, we described 

Yeutter’s arrest for obstructing a peace officer as “an illegal 

arrest,” 27 noting that at the time the officer attempted to place 

him under arrest for obstruction, Yeutter had not “used or 

threatened to use violence or force or physically interfered with 

the officer.” 28 We then went on to state that “the mere verbal 

refusal to provide information to an officer does not constitute 

an obstacle to the enforcement of the penal laws as contemplated by § 28-906. There must be some sort of physical act in 

order for a violation of this statute to occur.” 29 These propositions of law, while dicta, have been cited by both the Nebraska 

Court of Appeals and the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Nebraska. 30 We therefore conclude it is necessary to revisit our 

statements in Yeutter to ensure they comport with the statutory 

language of § 28-906(1).

27 Id. at 861, 566 N.W.2d at 391.

28 Id.

29 Id. at 862, 566 N.W.2d at 391.

30 See, Deezia v. City of Lincoln, 350 F. Supp. 3d 868 (D. Neb. 2018); State 

v. Ellingson, 13 Neb. App. 931, 703 N.W.2d 273 (2005); State v. Owen, 7 

Neb. App. 153, 580 N.W.2d 566 (1998).
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The plain language of § 28-906(1) makes it a crime not just 

to use violence, force, physical interference, or obstacle, but 

also to threaten to do so. Consequently, while Yeutter correctly 

observed that “the mere verbal refusal to provide information 

to an officer does not constitute an obstacle to the enforcement of the penal laws as contemplated by § 28-906,” 31 our 

opinion was imprecise when it went on to state that “some sort 

of physical act” 32 is always required. Because threats can be 

expressed verbally as well as through gestures and physical 

acts, 33 our language in Yeutter was too restrictive, and it failed 

to give effect to all of the statutory language the Legislature 

included in § 28-906(1).

[17] We now clarify that the proper inquiry under § 28-906(1) 

is not whether a defendant has engaged in “some sort of physical act,” but, rather, whether a defendant’s conduct, however 

expressed, used or threatened to use either violence, force, 

physical interference, or obstacle to intentionally obstruct, 

impair, or hinder a peace officer or judge who was acting to 

either enforce the penal law or preserve the peace under color 

of his or her official authority.

(ii) Sufficient Evidence of 

Proscribed Conduct

Ferrin argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to 

show he used or threatened to use physical interference or 

obstruction. He describes his conduct as “merely refus[ing] 

to come back and talk to the officers” 34 when requested to 

do so, and he equates such conduct with “the mere verbal 

refusal to provide information to an officer,” which we stated 

31 Yeutter, supra note 25, 252 Neb. at 862, 566 N.W.2d at 391.

32 Id.

33 See Owen, supra note 30 (holding no clear error in jury instruction stating 

“obstacle” under § 28-906(1) could be either verbal or physical).

34 Brief for appellant at 19.
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STATE v. FERRIN

Cite as 305 Neb. 762

in Yeutter was insufficient to constitute an “obstacle” under 

§ 28-906.

The State argues Yeutter is inapplicable because Ferrin’s 

conduct involved more than just a mere verbal refusal to 

provide information. The State generally describes Ferrin’s 

conduct as a series of defiant refusals to exit his vehicle 

that presented an obstacle to the officers’ investigation under 

§ 28-906(1).

[18,19] It is well settled that officers making a traffic stop 

may order the driver and passengers to get out of the vehicle 

pending completion of the stop. 35 Here, when officers ordered 

Ferrin to get out of the truck, he repeatedly refused to comply 

and instead defiantly remained inside the truck. This conduct 

did not involve using violence or force. However, a reasonable jury could find that evidence that a defendant repeatedly 

refused to comply with police orders to exit a vehicle during 

a traffic stop is sufficient to show the use of either “physical 

interference” or “obstacle” under § 28-906(1).

The terms “interference” and “obstacle” have similar meanings. Used in its common and ordinary sense, the word “interference” means “[t]he action or fact of interfering or intermeddling (with a person, etc., or in some action).” 36 Similarly, 

“obstacle” means “[s]omething that stands in the way or 

that obstructs progress (literal and figurative); a hindrance, 

impediment, or obstruction.” 37 Given the commonly understood meaning of these terms, a reasonable fact finder could 

conclude that Ferrin’s conduct in repeatedly refusing to comply with police orders to exit his truck during a traffic stop 

35 See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 

(1997).

36 “Interference,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/

view/Entry/97762 (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).

37 “Obstacle,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/view/

Entry/129940 (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

305 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. FERRIN

Cite as 305 Neb. 762

amounted to using either “physical interference, or obstacle” 

under § 28-906(1). And although we are mindful that cases 

from other jurisdictions apply different statutory language, 

this holding is in accord with decisions from other state and 

federal courts which hold that refusal to comply with an officer’s requests to exit the vehicle during a traffic stop can support an arrest or conviction for obstruction. 38

Here, the evidence showed the traffic stop was part of 

an active police investigation of a reported domestic dispute involving possible domestic violence and sexual assault 

crimes. As part of that investigation, Ferrin was repeatedly 

asked to step out of his truck so officers could question him, 

and he repeatedly refused to comply with those requests, 

even after being told the nature of the investigation and being 

advised that he could be charged with a crime if he did not 

comply. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to 

find that Ferrin used “physical interference, or obstacle” to 

intentionally obstruct, impair, or hinder the officers in their 

investigation.

38 See, e.g., Skube v. Koester, 120 F. Supp. 3d 825 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (prolonged 

refusal to comply with police orders to exit vehicle can constitute crime 

of obstruction); Taylor v. State, 326 Ga. App. 27, 755 S.E.2d 839 (2014) 

(evidence sufficient to prove obstruction when, among other things, 

defendant refused police orders to exit truck during investigation and 

instead locked door); State v. Orr, 157 Idaho 206, 335 P.3d 51 (Idaho 

App. 2014) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for obstruction 

where suspect refused police requests to exit vehicle); People v. Synnott, 

349 Ill. App. 3d 223, 811 N.E.2d 236, 284 Ill. Dec. 941 (2004) (defendant 

knowingly obstructed police investigation by repeatedly refusing orders 

to exit vehicle); Wilson v. Village of Los Lunas, 572 F. Appx. 635 (10th 

Cir. 2014) (refusing officer’s requests to exit vehicle during traffic stop 

provided probable cause to arrest for obstructing officer); United States 

v. Thomas, No. 97-4827, 1998 WL 852951 (4th Cir. Dec. 10, 1998) 

(unpublished disposition listed in table of “Decisions Without Published 

Opinions” at 166 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 1998)) (refusing orders to exit vehicle 

constituted resisting, delaying, or obstructing officer).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

305 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. FERRIN

Cite as 305 Neb. 762

Finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we 

reject Ferrin’s third assignment of error.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly 

affirmed the judgment of the county court, and we likewise 

affirm the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed.