In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1377 

SHIRLENA BARNES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

CITY OF CENTRALIA, ILLINOIS, and MICHAEL PEEBLES,

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 3:17-cv-01366-NJR-RJD — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 26, 2019 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. While arresting gang members in 

Centralia, Illinois, police officer Michael Peebles felt intimidated when Shirlena Barnes, a city resident with gang connections, drove up and yelled derogatory epithets. Later, Barnes 

posted statements on social media that Peebles believed 

threatened him and his family. As a private citizen, Peebles 

submitted a complaint to the police department and 
2 No. 19-1377 

participated no further. After a police investigation, Barnes 

was arrested, and a criminal prosecution followed. The state 

later dismissed the charges, and Barnes sued Peebles and the 

City of Centralia asserting her civil rights were violated. The 

district court granted summary judgment to the officer and 

the city, which we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, drawing our own legal and factual conclusions 

from the record. Tapley v. Chambers, 840 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 

2016). We construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the 

nonmovant Barnes’s favor. Id. (citing Gordon v. FedEx Freight, 

Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2012)). 

A gang named the “Rude Boyz” is well known in the City 

of Centralia in downstate Illinois. Two of its members threatened a twelve-year-old boy who witnessed a gang-related 

shooting in a park. The threats were investigated by Peebles, 

who over the years has arrested many of the Rude Boyz and 

became the “go-to guy” in the Centralia police department for 

intelligence on the gang. Peebles and Centralia Police Sergeant Jamie James found and arrested the two gang members 

on open warrants for weapons and other charges. 

As the officers took the two into custody, Barnes drove by 

the scene. According to Peebles, Barnes parked her car across 

the street and yelled “bald motherf*****” and “thirsty.”1 In a 

witness statement given later that day, Peebles identified 

Barnes as yelling the epithets at him. In later deposition 

 1 Per Barnes’s counsel at oral argument and references in discovery, 

“thirsty” means overzealous or overaggressive in arresting individuals. 
No. 19-1377 3

testimony, Peebles admitted he could not identify exactly who 

was yelling. He concluded the insults were directed at him 

because he was the only bald individual there. 

James was present at the arrests and did not recall specifically what Barnes yelled. He believed Barnes was angry and 

that she tried to intimidate Peebles into not arresting the two 

gang members. Barnes later denied yelling at the arrest scene 

and said she was speaking with a relative in another vehicle. 

Law enforcement knew that Barnes had connections with 

the gang. Barnes and Peebles were familiar with each other 

through police contacts with several of Barnes’s family members. Officers understood that the Rude Boyz used Barnes’s 

home as a safehouse. Video of the park shooting shows 

Barnes’s daughter retrieving the suspect’s bicycle. Before the 

arrests, Barnes complained about Peebles to city authorities. 

According to Barnes, she did not know if, at the time of the 

arrests, any of her family members were involved in gang activity. She also said she did not know the two Rude Boyz 

whom Peebles and James arrested. 

The evening of the arrests, Barnes posted on Facebook: 

“This thirsty b  Mike out here on the same on [sic] bulls** *.” 

After someone responded to her post, Barnes posted a second 

time: “But this b**** don’t believe that what goes around 

come[s] around and when you got kids of your own.” 

A secretary at the Centralia police department saw the 

posts and texted Peebles who was at home. Peebles felt, based 

on earlier attempts by the gang at intimidation, that these 

were credible threats against him and his family, so he called 

Assistant State’s Attorney Melissa Doran. The prosecutor told 

Peebles she could not tell him what to do but that he could file 
4 No. 19-1377 

a report like a private citizen if he desired. Peebles then called 

Sergeant James about the Facebook posts and the conversation with Doran. He told James he felt Barnes had threatened 

his family. 

Sergeant James dispatched another officer to Peebles’s 

house to take a written voluntary statement. Peebles said 

Barnes was at the scene of the arrest of known gang members 

and yelled “bald head motherf*****” at him. Peebles also relayed the content of Barnes’s Facebook posts, his belief that 

his “kids and family” were threatened, and his desire “to 

make sure nothing happens to [his] family.” 

James also texted the assistant state’s attorney: 

Sgt. James: Hey Melissa, its [J.] [J]ames. I talked 

with [Peebles] and just wanted to clarify before 

we acted. You want us to arrest her after 9 but 

no offense report just a vague pc [probable 

cause] sheet? 

Prosecutor Doran: Pretty much. That will give 

me a chance to talk to Matt about it before he 

decided right away what to do with the case[.] 

However, as I told [Peebles], I can’t tell you guys 

that you should or should not arrest anyone. 

That discretion lies solely with you. As the statute re: intimidation of a public official is written 

this is a debatable case since it isn’t clear to me 

whether this was a specific unique threat of 

harm vs a generalized threat of harm (as the 

statute reads). As always however, what may 

not be able to be proven beyond a reasonable 
No. 19-1377 5

doubt still may have probable cause since it is a 

much lower burden. 

Based on Barnes’s association with the Rude Boyz and the 

content of her posts, James concluded Barnes had credibly 

threatened Peebles and his family. James testified that he believed the Rude Boyz had “put out a hit” on Peebles, and he 

also witnessed Barnes’s behavior at the arrests. Given this, 

James decided to arrest Barnes for intimidation. He concluded 

this decision was within his sole discretion. After the arrest, 

the Marion County State’s Attorney charged Barnes with intimidation and aggravated intimidation. See 720 ILCS 5/12-6; 

720 ILCS 5/12-6.2. Three months later the state stopped pursuing those charges and Barnes’s prosecution ended.2 

As a result of Barnes’s arrest and prosecution, she sued 

Peebles for unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois state law. She also claimed the 

City of Centralia, under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City 

of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), was civilly liable for an express policy or widespread practice that motivated her arrest 

and prosecution. 

The parties engaged in discovery, including several depositions. Peebles and James testified Peebles made his complaint against Barnes as a private citizen. Peebles said his only 

role in the arrest and prosecution was as the complaining witness providing a voluntary statement. He did not know what 

crimes Barnes was eventually charged with and was never 

 2 The handwritten nolle prosequi (refuse to pursue) motion by prosecutor Doran states “[d]ue to the Court’s recent ruling in the People v. Reichenbach preliminary hearing, the People are electing not to proceed at this 

time.” 
6 No. 19-1377 

contacted by the assistant state’s attorney after the case was 

filed. Peebles also said that when he made his statement he 

was seeking to get Barnes arrested and prosecuted. Barnes admitted she wrote the Facebook posts about Peebles but said 

she did not intend that Peebles see them. Per Barnes, her statement about “what goes around comes around” referred to 

“karma” and that you should treat other people’s kids the 

way you want yours to be treated. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all of 

Barnes’s claims, which the district court granted. 

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the admissible 

evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co., 751 F.3d 788, 

791 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). For Barnes’s 

§ 1983 claims to survive summary judgment, she must present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that 

a constitutional deprivation occurred. Homoky v. Ogden, 816 

F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 2016). 

A. Under Color of State Law

A law enforcement officer can be liable under § 1983 if the 

officer deprives the plaintiff of a federally guaranteed right 

while acting “under color of state law.” Wilson v. Price, 624 

F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2010). “Action is taken under color of 

state law ‘when it involves a misuse of power, possessed by 

virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Id. (quoting 

Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 484–85 (7th Cir. 2001)). Not 

every action by a state official or employee occurs under color 
No. 19-1377 7

of state law. Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1989). 

“A state officer’s conduct does not constitute acting under 

color of state law unless it is ‘related in some way to the performance of the duties of the state office.’” Wilson, 624 F.3d at 

392 (quoting Honaker, 262 F.3d at 485). “Section 1983 does not 

cover disputes between private citizens, even if one happens 

to be an officer.” Plaats v. Barthelemy, 641 F. App’x 624, 627 (7th 

Cir. 2016). 

Although Peebles is a police officer, and the interaction 

with Barnes which led to her arrest occurred during Peebles’s 

employment, Peebles complained about Barnes’s yelling and 

Facebook posts as a private citizen, not as an investigating officer. The circumstances surrounding Barnes’s arrest and 

prosecution confirm Peebles’s role was limited to that of a 

complaining witness. A different officer took Peebles’s statement. Peebles did not arrest Barnes and had no role in her arrest. James had sole discretion to decide whether to arrest 

Barnes, and Peebles did not know if Barnes would be arrested. 

James also witnessed some of Peebles’s allegations because 

James was present when the two gang members were arrested. Based on this evidence James concluded probable 

cause existed that Barnes had committed the crime of intimidation. James’s text message with the prosecutor shows she 

was not directing James to arrest Barnes. Further, Peebles did 

not know what crimes the state would charge Barnes with, if 

any. And during the prosecution, the assistant state’s attorney 

did not contact Peebles. All of this confirms Peebles acted as a 

private citizen complaining about a purported crime, distinct 

and apart from his job as police officer. 

No evidence supported Barnes’s allegation that Peebles 

acted under color of state law when Peebles claimed Barnes 
8 No. 19-1377 

had threatened him. See, e.g., Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 

1510, 1516 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[A] mere assertion that one is a 

state officer does not necessarily mean that one acts under 

color of state law.”). Peebles reported an alleged crime. This 

was a private act that did not involve any exercise of state authority. Law enforcement officers, like all other citizens, may 

invoke the state’s protection without rendering themselves liable under § 1983. See Mauntel v. Briscoe, 1995 WL 319646, at 

*1 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (citing Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 

(6th Cir. 1975)) (holding police officer was not acting under 

color of state law when he called the station to report assault 

and the department knew he was a police officer). Indeed, in 

her deposition Barnes admitted Peebles’s complaint was private. 

Barnes argues the statements she made at the arrest of the 

gang members were constitutionally protected and thus cannot be used to establish probable cause of a crime. This argument misses the mark because Barnes’s protests connected 

her to Peebles (the only bald officer at the arrests) and to her 

later social media posts, a fact she admitted toward the end of 

her deposition. She also contends repeatedly that “a reasonable jury may conclude” alternative outcomes based on the 

facts discovered. None of these scenarios contains evidence 

that Peebles was anything other than a private citizen or that 

his police duties related to Barnes’s claims. See Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (noting “some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” does not defeat 

summary judgment motion). 

With no evidence Peebles acted under color of state law in 

his role as a witness in Barnes’s arrest and prosecution, Barnes 

cannot prove Peebles violated Barnes’s Fourth Amendment 
No. 19-1377 9

rights against unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution under § 1983. 

B. Alleged Monell Violation

Barnes also alleges the City of Centralia, through its police 

department, should be liable as a result of Peebles’s actions. 

Because a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on 

a theory of respondeat superior, Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, a 

plaintiff must identify a municipal “custom, policy or practice 

that effectively caused or condoned the alleged constitutional 

violations.” Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 

(7th Cir. 2012). 

In the district court, Barnes based her Monell claim on the 

city’s alleged failure to discipline officers who unlawfully 

seize others and purportedly cover up unlawful seizures. The 

district court granted defendants summary judgment on that 

claim, concluding Barnes had failed to offer admissible evidence in support of her assertions. On appeal, Barnes alters 

her theory, arguing the city failed to train and supervise its 

officers, which caused her alleged constitutional violation. 

Barnes’s new theory of liability under Monell meets the 

same fate as her previous one. First, by failing to argue this 

theory in the district court, she has waived it on appeal. See 

Economy Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 

F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “[T]o reverse 

the district court on grounds not presented to it would undermine the essential function of the district court.” Id. (quoting 

Boyers v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 848 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 

1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Second, Barnes has not identified any evidence that supports her new theory of liability. While Barnes has cited cases 
10 No. 19-1377 

in the failure to train and failure to supervise contexts, she has 

neither referenced nor even alluded to any evidence to support Monell liability based on her new theory. Monell claims 

require evidence, but Barnes has offered none. See Jenkins v. 

Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 491–93 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting municipality may not be held liable under Monell for failure to adequately train or supervise officers when plaintiff fails to 

demonstrate any constitutional violation by municipal employee). 

Barnes’s sole contention on this topic is that Centralia 

failed to train its officers in handling profanity and that her 

profanity was the cause of her arrest. But Barnes submits no 

evidence in support of this claim, much less evidence that a 

failure to train or supervise was “the moving force” behind 

Peebles reporting her or James arresting her. See Monell, 436 

U.S. at 694 (referencing “official policy as the moving force of 

the constitutional violation”). So Barnes’s Monell claim 

against Centralia fails. 

C. Illinois Malicious Prosecution Claim

Finally, Barnes claims that Peebles instituted legal proceedings against her, violating Illinois’s law against malicious 

prosecution. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate: (1) the commencement or continuance by the 

defendant of an original judicial proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) 

malice; and (5) damages. Grundhoefer v. Sorin, 20 N.E.3d 775, 

780 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). Illinois courts have long recognized 

that suits for malicious prosecution are not favored because 

persons acting in good faith should not be deterred from reporting crimes by the fear of unfounded suits. See, e.g., Beaman 
No. 19-1377 11

v. Freesmeyer, 131 N.E.3d 488, ¶ 24 (Ill. 2019); Joiner v. Benton 

Comm. Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Ill. 1980). 

Under its supplemental jurisdiction, the district court concluded probable cause existed that Barnes committed a crime. 

Because the third element (absence of probable cause) could 

not be satisfied, the court granted Peebles summary judgment 

on this claim. We need not reach the question of probable 

cause, though, because we see two flaws with Barnes’s claim: 

she has not shown malice (the fourth element) or termination 

of the criminal case in her favor (the second element). 

First, to show malice, Barnes must prove the prosecution 

was initiated for a reason other than to bring Barnes to justice. 

Holland v. City of Chicago, 643 F.3d 248, 255 (7th Cir. 2011). In 

her summary judgment response, Barnes asserted “her arrest 

was a result of malice of Defendant Peebles.” On appeal, she 

states: “Peebles was doing more than merely relaying facts to 

the Centralia police department [and] that he was acting with 

malice.” That is all Barnes claims regarding Peebles’s alleged 

malice. And Barnes cites no evidence in support of these bare 

assertions, notwithstanding opportunity to do so. Barnes 

“does not address the other officers, nor does [she] offer any 

details about why [she] believes [Peebles] acted maliciously.” 

Jackson v. Village of Grayslake, 2016 WL 8731441, *5 (N.D. Ill. 

Sept. 9, 2016). Unsupported recitation of the elements without 

actual evidence cannot survive a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Jones v. Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 42 F.3d 

1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1994). 
12 No. 19-1377 

Second, Barnes failed to show why the case was terminated in her favor.3 In her response to defendants’ summary 

judgment motion, Barnes argued the second element was satisfied because defendants “admit the charges against Plaintiff 

were dismissed.” But dismissal is not the requirement; rather, 

Barnes must show termination of the proceeding in her favor 

“for reasons that indicate [her] innocence.” Filimoniuk v. 

Nilles, 2019 WL 2510355, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. June 14, 2019) (citing Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 820 N.E.2d 455, 461 (Ill. 2004)); 

see also Joiner, 411 N.E.2d at 232 (“It is clear that the settled law 

bars a malicious prosecution action predicated upon criminal 

proceedings which were terminated in a manner not indicative of the innocence of the accused.”). 

Here, the nolle prosequi order did not reflect the specific 

reasons for its entry. The order merely stated: “Due to the 

Court’s recent ruling in the People v. Reichenbach preliminary 

hearing, the People are electing not to proceed at this time.” 

The record does not reveal the nature of the ruling, or how the 

Reichenbach case might relate to Barnes. The order also does 

not indicate the case was dismissed with prejudice such that 

the State of Illinois will not pursue the charge in the future. 

See Filimoniuk, 2019 WL 2510355, at *5 (noting an “order dismissing the case without prejudice removes the case from the 

docket, but allows the person who filed it to refile the charges 

within the applicable statute of limitations period”). While the 

nolle prosequi order ended the prosecution, it was not 

 3 While the parties did not address this issue on appeal, we elect to 

address it for the sake of completeness. See, e.g., Wallace v. Baldwin, 895 

F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2018). 
No. 19-1377 13

indicative of Barnes’s innocence or that the case had terminated in her favor. 

Barnes has not submitted evidence as to why the prosecutor entered the nolle prosequi order. Given this, “we cannot 

presume that the charges were dismissed without prejudice 

because plaintiff was innocent.” Id. Because the “bare use of 

the nolle prosequi order, which did not state its reasons for its 

entry, did not establish that the criminal proceedings were 

terminated in a manner consistent with [Barnes’s] innocence,” 

this claim fails. Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1243 (Ill. 

1996) (clarifying a plaintiff’s burden of proof in a malicious 

prosecution action to require evidence of termination in a 

manner consistent with plaintiff’s innocence). 

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.