STATEMENT SUBMITTED

BY THE

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

TO THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGENT THREATS, 

AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FOR THE HEARING ON

EMERGING THREATS: ASSESSING PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY MEASURES AT

NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES

SUBMITTED BY

HUBERT MILLER, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR

REGION I

Submitted: March 10, 2003
Introduction

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to

appear before you today to discuss Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) actions with respect

to security and emergency preparedness at nuclear power facilities and communications with

local and State officials regarding these activities.

NRC’s primary mission is to regulate nuclear reactors, materials and waste facilities in a

manner that protects the health and safety of the public and promotes the common defense

and security. Security and emergency preparedness are key elements of the “defense in

depth” safety philosophy we employ for nuclear power plants. This philosophy: ensures high

quality in design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants; requires redundant safety

systems that reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents; and recognizes that in

spite of all these precautions, accidents could occur. That is why, for example, containment

structures and other safety features are required to minimize the potential for the release of

fission products off site. Through emergency planning and preparedness, additional

mechanisms are in place to protect the public in the unlikely event that these barriers were to

fail. 

Security at Nuclear Power Plants

Security of nuclear power plants across the country -- long the subject of NRC

regulatory oversight -- has been given even greater priority at NRC since the September 2001

terrorist attack. Within minutes of the attack, NRC directed the licensees for plants across the

country to go to the highest level of security. While for many years, all nuclear power plants

have been required to have security programs sufficient to defend against violent assaults by
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well-armed, well-trained attackers, numerous additional steps have been taken since

September 2001 to thwart terrorist acts. Through formal Orders, NRC has required increased

security staffing, posts and patrols, installation of substantial additional physical barriers,

greater stand-off distances for vehicle bombs, and more restrictive site access controls, to

name only a few of these measures. 

Over the past 17 months, the Commission has undertaken a comprehensive review of

safeguards and security programs, in close consultation with the Department of Homeland

Security and other Federal agencies and with significant involvement by State agencies. We

have been working with the intelligence community and appropriate Federal agencies to assess

the need to revise the design basis threats and continue to assess the need for specific

additional guidance in areas such as security officer training and fatigue, taking into account

experience since the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

Through audits and inspections of the security programs, NRC inspectors have

confirmed that the required security enhancements have been implemented at all nuclear

power facilities, including the Indian Point facility in New York and the Millstone facility in

Connecticut. We have been conducting enhanced table-top security exercises at our reactor

facilities and have recently begun enhanced force-on-force exercises. We will conduct forceon-force exercises on a 3-year cycle and expect the Indian Point facility to be among the first to

conduct one of these exercises.

For many years, the NRC has provided and continues to pursue legislative proposals to

Congress detailing specific initiatives that would further enhance security of NRC-licensed

activities. These proposals address a wide spectrum of activities. One provision would

authorize guards at NRC-regulated facilities to use deadly force to protect property significant to
3

the common defense and security. This would give guards protection from State criminal

prosecution for actions taken during the performance of their official duties. Another provision

would allow the Commission, in consultation with the Attorney General, to confer upon guards

at NRC-designated facilities the authority to possess or use weapons that are comparable to

those used by the Department of Energy’s guard forces. Some State laws currently preclude

private guard forces at NRC-regulated facilities from utilizing a wide range of weapons.

Another provision would make it a Federal crime to bring unauthorized weapons and explosives

into NRC-licensed facilities. The NRC would also make Federal prohibitions on sabotage

applicable to the operation and construction of certain nuclear facilities. The NRC hopes that

these and other more recently developed legislative initiatives, such as in the area of access

authorization, will be enacted early in the 108th Congress.

Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness

As noted earlier, emergency planning is one tier in the NRC’s “defense in depth” safety

philosophy. The overall objective of emergency response planning is to assure that, in the

event of an accident at the facility, radiation doses to persons off site would be below doses that

could result in acute or long term health effects. Following the accident at Three Mile Island in

1979, the NRC determined that improved emergency planning by Federal, State and local

governments was needed to respond to possible reactor accidents. In addition, President

Carter, in December 1979, directed that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

take the lead in initially reviewing and assessing offsite planning and response and in assisting

State and local governments, while NRC reviews and assesses the licensee’s onsite planning

and response. The NRC reviews FEMA findings on offsite planning and, in conjunction with its 

own onsite findings, makes a determination on the overall state of emergency preparedness

prior to issuing licenses and in continuing oversight of operating reactors. 
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To compel improvement, NRC issued new regulations that establish planning standards

and define the responsibilities of plant operators, as well as State and local organizations

involved in emergency response. These regulations as well as published guidance have been

developed over many years with input from all major stakeholders. 

For planning purposes, we define two planning zones around nuclear power plant sites. 

The first is an emergency planning zone covering an area of about 10 miles in all directions

around nuclear power plants where the greatest potential for radiological effects from a release

exists. Protective actions for members of the public in this zone could involve evacuation or

sheltering. Consideration of these protective actions is prompted at very low projected dose

levels. They are also doses far below a level that would lead to long term or appreciable health

effects. A second extended planning zone of about 50 miles is also established around each

plant to deal with potential lower-level, long-term risks primarily due to exposure from ingestion

of contaminated food and water.

It is not likely that protective actions would need to be taken for the entire 10-mile

emergency planning zone, even for a significant release. A radioactive plume from a nuclear

power plant does not move in all directions at once, but travels in the general direction to which

the wind is blowing. As a result, only a small fraction of the population in the emergency

planning zone would be in the pathway of the plume.

 Each licensee has its own onsite emergency plan, and State and local governments

have detailed plans for both the 10 and 50-mile emergency planning zones. These emergency

response plans are multifaceted and perform a number of functions -- joint NRC-FEMA

guidance identifies some 16 planning standards that are to be addressed. Emergency planning

provides: defined roles for emergency responders; a framework for monitoring and assessing
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conditions onsite and offsite; mechanisms for communication of key information between onsite

and offsite officials; and preestablished criteria and guidelines for making prompt decisions on

protective actions such as evacuation and sheltering. State and local emergency response

plans contain the procedures for implementing protective actions for the public.

Emergency planning is a dynamic process. Emergency response plans are tested in

frequent small-scale drills and periodic full-scale emergency exercises that simulate serious

reactor accidents. The plans and their implementation are periodically reviewed to confirm that

they are being adequately maintained and address changing circumstances appropriate to any

given site. NRC’s February 2002 security Orders specifically required licensees to enhance

their emergency response plans as appropriate in light of the current threat environment. 

Licensees were required to ensure that emergency response plans appropriately recognized

the potential for security threats and that response actions were compatible with enhanced

security measures. 

If FEMA, in its role as the lead Agency for assessing offsite planning and response, 

finds that offsite plans or preparedness are not adequate, FEMA, by its process, will inform the

Governor of the State and the NRC. The NRC will then work with the reactor licensee and, in

conjunction with FEMA and with State and local jurisdictions as appropriate, to address the

identified deficiencies. Ultimately, we will take into account information provided by FEMA as

well as others in making final determinations.

The NRC recently received a copy of a draft report prepared by James Lee Witt

Associates, LLC, at the request of New York State Governor Pataki regarding emergency

preparedness at the Indian Point Energy Center. The matters addressed in the draft report in

large measure relate to offsite planning and preparedness, which falls primarily under FEMA's
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authority. While any judgment as to the overall state of emergency planning and preparedness

is for the NRC to reach, in keeping with the longstanding memorandum of understanding

between FEMA and the NRC, we look initially to FEMA for its views on the draft report relating

to offsite preparedness. On February 21, 2003, FEMA issued its report on the September 2002

emergency preparedness exercise at Indian Point which addresses a variety of planning issues

including FEMA’s conclusions regarding concerns raised by Witt Associates. We are now

reviewing this FEMA report and will closely monitor steps being taken in the coming months by

FEMA, the State, counties, and plant operator, Entergy, to address these concerns.

One of the issues raised in the Witt report involved emergency response in the event of

a terrorist attack. Emergency plans are intentionally written to be broad and flexible in order to

provide for responses to a wide spectrum of events, including those involving rapid, large

releases of radioactivity. Necessary protective actions and offsite response are not predicated

on the specific cause of an event. Nor do they consider the probability of a given accident

sequence. Rather, emergency planning assumes the improbable has already occurred and

develops a response to address the consequences of potential releases. Whether releases

from the plant occur as a result of terrorist acts or equipment malfunctions, emergency plans

provide an effective framework for decision making and response. Preliminary results from our

vulnerability studies do not indicate an increased source term or quicker release from terroristinitiated events than is already addressed by the emergency planning basis required by NRC

regulations. 

Following the February 2000 steam generator tube failure event at Indian Point 2, the

General Accounting Office conducted an audit of emergency response issues associated with

the plant. In its report, the GAO recommended that the NRC assess its position of generally

communicating with State officials during non-emergency situations given that the responsibility
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for responding to radiological emergencies at a large percentage of the Nation’s nuclear power

plants rests with an entity other than the State. Our assessment of NRC communication

practices concluded that existing practices are generally adequate and the level of interaction

and communication needed between the NRC and local officials is a site specific variable. To

further enhance the availability of NRC staff to local officials and members of the public, the

NRC has revised inspection guidance for regional management to consider the site specific

needs for contacts with the members of the public and offsite officials.

In the case of Indian Point, over the past several years the NRC has had extensive

interactions with local officials regarding developments at that site. The NRC has briefed local

officials on important plant events and NRC actions on a continuing basis. The NRC routinely

holds meetings in the local area which are open to public observation and provide opportunities

for comments and questions from the local public. Local officials or their staffs attend these

meetings. On a number of occasions the NRC conducted pre-meeting briefings for local

officials to facilitate information exchange. The NRC also consistently provides early

notifications to Congressional, State and local officials of any significant site activity or

significant correspondence with the licensee. 

The NRC has expanded our outreach efforts for county officials who have vital roles in

emergency response for Indian Point. We have, for example, participated in a number of

meetings and have frequently communicated with and supported county officials responsible for

emergency planning on topics such as potassium iodide, bus resources, exercise conduct, and

dose assessment.

For several years, we have maintained a heightened level of oversight of Indian Point 2,

especially since the February 2000 steam generator tube failure event. The concerns from that
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event were principally associated with plant equipment problems, but, as noted in the GAO

report, several emergency response issues also surfaced. We have closely monitored the

station’s improvement programs through expanded inspection efforts. In August 2001, after

evaluating the licensee’s performance during an emergency exercise, we concluded that the

most significant of past weaknesses in the onsite emergency preparedness program had been

substantially addressed. However, much work remains to be done at the station, and we have

maintained heightened oversight of the plant. The most recent emergency exercise at Indian

Point occurred on September 24, 2002. This biennial full-participation exercise reflected

positively on the Entergy management team and the ability of the emergency response

organization to effectively implement the onsite emergency preparedness program. While

some areas for improvement were identified, we judged the overall licensee performance to be

satisfactory.

Conclusion

In short, we have a comprehensive and aggressive security program. Nuclear facilities

had very significant security before September 11th and that security has been greatly

strengthened in the aftermath of the attacks. Furthermore, the NRC will continue to work with

FEMA and other Federal agencies, as well as licensees, State and local officials, in ongoing

efforts to strengthen emergency planning and preparedness. 

This concludes my remarks. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.