OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Lt Col Robert W. Christensen)

Certified by: HQ AFDC/DR (Col Thomas A. Bowermeister)

Pages: 46

Distribution: F

Approved by: TIMOTHY A. KINNAN, Major General, USAF

 Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2–4.1

29 October 1999

BY ORDER OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
i

FOREWORD

Increases in the lethality of international and domestic threats dictate

that the Air Force must take strong measures to protect our personnel

and installations, at home and deployed. How the Air Force protects its

forces is critical to global engagement. An aerospace expeditionary force

(AEF) that is poised to respond to global taskings within hours reasonably

expects its forces to be protected.

Commanders at all levels must have an effective force protection program. Commanders are responsible for protecting their people and the

war-fighting resources necessary to perform any military operation. We

are obligated by our past, present, and future to ensure force protection is

a part of Air Force culture.

The Air Force must continue to develop and refine doctrine that promotes the most effective way to achieve force protection. Understanding

and utilizing this doctrine are the paths to successful protection of our

people and resources.

 TIMOTHY A. KINNAN

 Major General, USAF

 Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center

 29 October 1999
ii
iii

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... v

CHAPTER ONE—Force Protection Overview ................................... 1

Force Protection Defined .................................................................... 1

Defensive Force Protection ............................................................ 2

Offensive Force Protection ............................................................. 2

Force Protection Fundamentals .......................................................... 3

Force Protection Constructive Model ................................................. 4

Intelligence .................................................................................... 4

Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment .................................. 6

Countermeasures ........................................................................... 6

Awareness ...................................................................................... 7

Command and Control ................................................................... 8

CHAPTER TWO—Organizing for Force Protection ......................... 9

Command Responsibility.................................................................... 9

Command Relationships..................................................................... 9

HQ USAF ........................................................................................ 9

Major Command (MAJCOM) ......................................................... 9

Numbered Air Force (NAF) .......................................................... 10

Air Force Forces (AFFOR) ............................................................ 10

Wing ..............................................................................................11

CHAPTER THREE—Force Protection Threats ............................... 13

Force Protection Threat Spectrum ................................................... 13

Threat Level ..................................................................................... 15

Basic Threats ................................................................................ 16

Level I Threats ............................................................................. 16

Level II Threats ............................................................................ 17

Level III Threats ........................................................................... 17

Threat Methods of Attack and Objectives......................................... 17

Methods of Attack......................................................................... 17

Objectives of Methods of Attack ................................................... 19

CHAPTER FOUR—Countering the Threats .................................... 21

Risk Assessment Process .................................................................. 21

Threat Assessment ....................................................................... 21

Vulnerability Assessment ............................................................. 22

Risk Assessment ........................................................................... 22

TABLE OF CONTENTS
iv

Force Protection Countermeasure Planning .................................... 22

Deny Information ........................................................................ 23

Deny Access ................................................................................. 25

Deny Influence ............................................................................ 28

CHAPTER FIVE—Force Protection Trends ..................................... 33

Suggested Readings ............................................................................ 37

Glossary ............................................................................................... 39
v

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) establishes doctrinal guidance for organizing and employing force protection capabilities at the

operational level across the full range of military operations. It is a critical element of US Air Force operational-level doctrine and as such should

form the basis from which Air Force commanders plan and execute their

force protection mission. This AFDD implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-13, Air and Space Doctrine.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all Air Force military and civilian personnel (includes AFRC and ANG units and members). The doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to

consider not only the contents of this AFDD, but also the particular situation when accomplishing their missions.

SCOPE

Air Force assets (people, weapons, information, and support systems)

can be used across the range of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This AFDD discusses the fundamentals

of organization and employment of Air Force force protection capabilities required to support the operational missions assigned to commanders in chief (CINCs) and carried out by air component commanders.
vi
1

CHAPTER ONE

FORCE PROTECTION OVERVIEW

The post-Cold War period is characterized by a significant shift in the

Air Force functions and an increased exposure of its resources to the worldwide enemy threat. Today, potential opponents are more unpredictable

and US assets are more at risk to enemy attack. Additionally, there is an

increase in the availability of high and low technology weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). US aerospace power requires protection

from these threats at home station and abroad.

FORCE PROTECTION DEFINED

Force protection (FP) is a collection of activities that prevents or mitigates successful

hostile actions against Air Force

people and resources when they

are not directly engaged with

the enemy. A successful hostile

action is one that, if executed,

would directly or indirectly

threaten our ability to accomplish

the combatant commander’s mission. Such hostile actions may include environmental, health, and

safety threats.

FP is accomplished by a security program designed to protect

service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and

equipment in all locations and situEvery airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air groundmen,

and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected

by detachments of soldiers.

Winston Churchill

 29 June 1941

		

2

ations. This is accomplished through planned and integrated application

of the following: combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, and personal protective services. FP is supported by intelligence,

counterintelligence, and other security programs.

FP measures are layered to be defensive (passive and active) or offensive, and each should include an awareness of the actions of every

element of a combat force.

Defensive Force Protection

Passive Force Protection

Passive force protection (PFP)

measures negate or reduce the

effects of hostile acts or environmental and health threats

on Air Force assets by making

them more survivable. This

can be proactively accomplished through training, education, hardening, camouflage,

concealment, deception, information security, and operations

security. Some examples of PFP

are hardened facilities, immunizations against biological agents, comprehensive individual fitness programs, predawn AEF deployment, and movement of family members onto the base during emergencies.

Active Force Protection

 Active force protection (AFP) measures provide a defense against a

perceived or actual threat and, if necessary, serve to deny, defeat, or

destroy hostile forces in the act of targeting Air Force assets. Some examples include: enhanced owner/user work area security; executing

countersurveillance operations; surveillance of vulnerability points; and

defeating a hostile force in a firefight at the perimeter.

Offensive Force Protection

Offensive force protection (OFP) is preemptive measures taken to

deny, defeat, or destroy hostile forces before they are committed to


 	 	

				


3

direct hostile activity but whose intent is to target Air Force assets when

they are not engaged in combat operations. Some examples are detecting, capturing, and detaining known terrorists and shunning network

hackers prior to their affecting computer networks.

FORCE PROTECTION FUNDAMENTALS

The following is what airmen should know.

 Force protection is critically important. It is each commander’s and

individual’s responsibility.

 Force protection means the Air Force can execute its mission with

increased freedom and reduced fear in an era of heightened

threats.

 Force protection does not mean the Air Force will be free from

attack; it assumes enemy action and threatening conditions.

 Force protection represents the Air Force’s best methods for dealing

with the potential for attack, and it preserves freedom of action.

 Force protection does not apply to aerial combatants engaged with an

enemy in combat air operations. If you are not directly engaged in

combat air operations against the enemy, you are engaged in

force protection.

 Force protection is built on the concept of full-dimensional protection.

It provides multilayered protection of forces and facilities at all

levels.

I expect that our combat battalions will be used primarily to go

after the VC [Viet Cong] and that we will not be forced to expend our

capabilities simply to protect ourselves....Therefore, ....all forces of

whatever service who find themselves operating without infantry

protection ...will be organized, trained, and exercised to perform the

defense and security functions.

General William C. Westmoreland, 1965
4

 Force protection requires a collaborative, integrated, cross-functional

effort. Members of civil engineers, security forces, medical, communications, explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence, and counterintelligence communities all play key roles in force protection.

FORCE PROTECTION CONSTRUCTIVE MODEL

Intelligence, risk-based assessments, countermeasures, and awareness underpin every FP effort. These, coupled with command and

control, result in a constructive model for FP. The constructive model in

figure 1.1 outlines the relationships among these areas of FP. This constructive model adequately describes the elements of FP. However, to be

effective they should be integrated in the overall FP operational effort.

Intelligence

Effective intelligence is critical to determining the threats to the force.

Identifying a threat strengthens the overall force protection effort. FP

intelligence and counterintelligence personnel should be capable of anaDefense of air bases against ground attack has been traditionally

viewed within the USAF as a Security Police problem....it is more

properly viewed as an airpower problem because airpower is so critical

to US national military strategy and the US way of war.

 David Shlapak and Alan Vick,

Check Six Begins on the Ground

			



	



	
		

	

		

	

	

		
5

lyzing a broad range of threats. These threats may be conventional military units, special forces, terrorist groups, riotous civil populations, environmental and health hazards, chemical or biological agents, radioactive

material, cyberterrorists, criminal elements, religious zealots, extremist

groups, and the weapons any of these groups might select. With this

extremely wide variety of threat considerations, it becomes readily apparent that intelligence support to FP should be implemented robustly in

Air Force processes, particularly threat assessments.

The threat drives everything accomplished in FP. Identifying, understanding, and assessing the threat are the first steps in FP planning, followed by selecting the appropriate FP countermeasures. Threat assessments

for FP should be systematic and continuous to reduce uncertainties

concerning the enemy and the battlespace for all types of operations. A

force protection threat assessment analyzes and assesses the applicable

area’s land, sea, and aerospace dimensions. In addition to the typical

threat-related areas, force protection threat assessments should include

environmental, health, infrastructure, economic, political, and cultural

aspects of the particular area of interest.

Force protection threat assessments should be all-source, fused analytical assessments. All-source should include using national-level assets (Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]; National Security Agency [NSA];

 !"	

6

Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]; State Department Armed Forces

Medical Intelligence Center [AFMIC]; Bureau of Intelligence and Research,

Department of State [INR], etc.), theater-level assets (Joint Intelligence

Center [JIC], Office of Special Investigations [OSI]), in-country assets

(US Embassy, other in-country service components, etc.) and local assets (host-nation military, local law enforcement, etc.). Intelligence from

these sources should be compiled, compared, evaluated, analyzed, and

assessed by a threat assessment team comprised of available force protection personnel. The end product should provide commanders a baseline

for conducting a vulnerability assessment and later for applying the

appropriate FP measures for countering the threat. Timely and accurate threat assessments are the key components in FP planning

and operations.

Once the threats are identified, the commander should employ a multifunctional vulnerability assessment team with expertise in the following areas: physical security; civil, electrical, and structural engineering;

special operations; operational readiness; law enforcement and operations; infrastructure; weapons of mass destruction; health services; and

intelligence/counterintelligence. In exceptional cases, commanders may

tailor the team composition and the scope of the assessment to meet the

unique requirements of a particular activity, however, commanders should

meet the intent of providing a comprehensive assessment. The assessment team conducts an evaluation of the force to reveal the vulnerabilities and potential solutions relating to present and future threats.

Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessments

Conducting threat, vulnerability, and risk assessments as parts to an

overall risk assessment process permits commanders to identify potential threats and analyze vulnerabilities in order to determine the risks at a

given location for a required mission. Chapter four discusses in detail

these force protection tools available to commanders.

Countermeasures

At the heart of force protection doctrine is the need to counter the

spectrum of threats against Air Force combat power when not directly

engaged with the enemy. Countermeasures against one threat are often

effective against a variety of similar or lesser threats. Chapter four discusses in detail force protection tools available to the commander to

counter the threat.
7

Awareness

Commanders should ensure

there is a fundamental emphasis on awareness of force protection challenges. All personnel, regardless of rank or specialty,

should be trained in basic force protection skills needed to survive and

operate. These should include

basic weapons skills; basic

ground combat skills; self-aid and

buddy care; nuclear, biological,

and chemical (NBC) defense; antiterrorism; field hygiene; threat awareness; safety awareness; and other essential common skills. Threat awareness training should include the full spectrum of threats and should emphasize that airmen understand all aspects of FP.

Awareness programs should raise the comprehension of Air Force personnel and their dependents of the general spectrum of threats and measures that will reduce personal vulnerability. Fundamental knowledge of

the threats spectrum and measures to reduce personal vulnerability to

threats should include:

 Spectrum of threat.

 Threat methods of attack and operations.

 Detecting surveillance by threat groups/agents.

 Individual protective measures.

 Hostage survival procedures.

 Threat levels and terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONs).

 Local threat updates.

Timely threat awareness updates are essential. Everyone, at all

levels of command, needs to know about significant threat variations as

soon as possible to implement force protection measures tailored to the

		
	
		

		



8

changing threat. Intelligence and effective on-site surveillance are the

keys to timely threat awareness.

Command and Control

The command and control structure responds to threats and

implements countermeasures against those threats. Commanders

need intelligence on threat changes to make effective decisions to modify

force protection postures and ensure personnel receive near-real-time

awareness updates. A command and control structure should allow subordinate commanders to expedite requests for essential force protection

resources and additional personnel from more senior command levels.

For additional information, see the AFDD on Command and Control.
9

CHAPTER TWO

ORGANIZING FOR FORCE PROTECTION

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

Commanders at all levels have the responsibility for protecting Air

Force assets. Command and control structures should enable commanders to rapidly and effectively address passive defense issues and quickly

react to force protection threats with active defensive or offensive operations. Commanders are accountable for force protection within their areas. The unique nature of the force protection effort requires it be coordinated and integrated at the highest levels and across all functional areas.

Integrating all aspects of force protection into operations at all

levels of command is one of the largest challenges of the commander.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

HQ USAF

The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF), is responsible for

providing guidance on how to organize, train, and equip forces. The CSAF

exercises control over force protection programming, training, staffing,

manning, and developing force protection policy. The Air Staff’s primary

function lies in allocating additional forces and funding as needed to fulfill force protection requirements.

Major Command (MAJCOM)

MAJCOM commanders are responsible for organizing, training, and

equipping forces. MAJCOM commanders should integrate force protection requirements into every aspect of their activities. They should authorize cross-functional coordinating bodies to establish guidance, program for, and manage all force protection requirements for the MAJCOM,

and to coordinate with the Air Staff.

...we can’t be the best at building airplanes and submarines and

second or third best at protecting our men and women.

General Shalikashvili, November 1996
10

Numbered Air Force (NAF)

The NAF should provide representation to the MAJCOM cross-functional staffs for force protection or provide inputs on requirements to

their MAJCOM force protection focal point.

	



A Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR), will serve as the commander of Air Force forces assigned or attached to a joint task force. A

CINC-aligned NAF is typically redesignated as the AFFOR (e.g., 9 AF

serves as US Central Command Air Forces [USCENTAF]). This organizational structure may be tailored by the COMAFFOR to fit specific mission needs. This staff does not exercise direct control but serves a planning, coordination, and oversight role. The organizational structure represented in figure 2.1 shows one example of how a COMAFFOR may

organize the staff. Centralized control of force protection resources

and decentralized execution of force protection measures are essential to effectively protect our forces against each threat.

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Wing

Wing commanders face three major force protection challenges:

training for force protection, planning for its integration and support as

tasked in applicable operational plans, and providing force protection

for assigned forces. Forward-based aerospace expeditionary wings (AEWs),

similar to the standard AEW in figure 2.2, have the added responsibility of

accomplishing force protection planning for the units identified to deploy

to their location during contingency operations. Wing commanders should

integrate force protection teams into their groups to establish guidance,

program for, and manage force protection requirements for the wings.

Wing commanders should also appoint a single force protection

focal point who should be an individual trained and knowledgeable in force protection issues; the Support Group commander has

units with the resources to accomplish many force protection tasks

and can serve in this capacity.

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CHAPTER THREE

FORCE PROTECTION THREATS

The essential goal of force protection doctrine is to describe the

best way to counter threats against Air Force assets. Air Force personnel must identify the threats and determine ways to counter them

before becoming directly engaged with the enemy.

FORCE PROTECTION THREAT SPECTRUM

The Air Force considers the

following categories as serious

threats that require force protection measures:

 Conventional Threat— Regular military forces supported

by a recognized government

are categorized as a conventional threat. Included in this

threat are large tactical force

operations including airborne,

artillery, and missile attacks.

 Unconventional Threat—

This threat encompasses a

broad spectrum of military and

paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces

who are organized, trained,

equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an

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Always presume that the enemy has dangerous designs and always

be forehanded with the remedy. But do not let these calculations

make you timid.

Frederick the Great
14

external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the

indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and

evasion and escape networks.

 Terrorism Threat—This threat is a calculated use of violence or threat

of violence to instill fear and intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political,

religious, or ideological.

 Criminal Threat— Criminal activity trends may help us predict future

actions or even advanced warning of attack. Increased drug activity,

unusual patterns of break-ins, bank robberies and stolen trucks could

all indicate pending hostile action. Country, region, and international

criminal activities with applicability to potential enemy actions or threat

to friendly forces are the focus.

 Insider Threat— This threat comes from assigned personnel (military

or civilian), host-country nationals (military or civilian), third country

nationals (contract employees) or other persons assigned to or transiting the area of interest. Any of these groups of people may threaten

Air Force assets primarily by disclosing sensitive or classified information, making decisions that favor dissident groups, and by attacking

with weapons, explosives, biological agents, and computers. They may

target individuals, groups, facilities, weapon systems, or information

systems. The Air Force should assume this threat always exists and

take appropriate precautionary measures.

 Environmental Threat— Air Force assets may be threatened by hazardous waste areas and hazardous materials production facilities. The

threat also involves medical concerns such as disease, pestilence, and

effects of the environment on individuals.

 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat— The WMD threat

comes from systems that are capable of a high order of destruction or

of being used to destroy large numbers of people. It can be nuclear,

chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but a WMD threat excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such

means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.
15

 Civil Unrest Threat— This threat reflects country-specific concerns

of violence by the population related to friendly force operations. The

threat can come from anti-American groups, protests, demonstrations,

refugees, and humanitarian operations, and any local tensions that may

escalate into a direct threat to our forces.

 Information/Data Threat— This threat results from attempts made

by an enemy to achieve information superiority by affecting Air Force

information, information-based processes, information systems, and

computer-based networks while leveraging and defending their own

information, information-based processes, information systems, and

computer-based networks.

 Future Threat— New threats such as laser, microwave, acoustic weapons, or other high-technology weapons that adversaries may possess,

have access to, or are developing should also be considered.

THREAT LEVELS

The categorized threats are grouped into four major threat levels: basic threats, level I threats, level II threats, and level III threats (see figure

3.1).

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Basic Threats

Experience has shown that criminal activity, protests, riots, natural

disasters, environmental, health, and disease threats, and attacks against

information resources are basic threats that occur during peace and war.

These threats can undermine mission capability as severely as sabotage

or engagement with enemy forces as indicated in the bullets below.

 Criminal: Damaged or stolen government property and personal injury or death.

 Natural disasters: Damage or property losses, personal injuries or

deaths due to severe thunderstorms, floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, ice

storms, fires, and earthquakes.

 Environmental and Health Threats: Property and personnel losses,

access or use denial due to fuel or chemical spills, pollution of resources,

high incidence of disease in local population, and inadvertent or accidental release of toxins from hazardous materials production and destruction facilities.

 Operational and Occupational Mishaps: Personnel injuries and

losses, and systems, facilities, and property damage and losses resulting from conditions other than natural disasters and intended losses or

destruction.

 Protestors, Rioters: Physical damage, personal injury or death, and

denial of access to resources.

 Threats to Information Resources: Unauthorized access, manipulation or destruction, hostile logic attack (for additional information, see

the AFDD on Information Operations).

In addition to these basic threats, other threats have traditionally been

divided into three more levels commonly accepted by all Services.

Level I Threats

Level I threats are characterized as small-scale operations conducted

by agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, partisans, extremists, and agent-supervised or independently initiated terrorist activities. Level I threats
17

may be unorganized or well orchestrated and may take the form of espionage, demonstrations, riots, random sniper incidents, information warfare, physical assaults, kidnappings, aircraft hijackings, or bombings. This

level of threat must be defeated by force protection measures.

Level II Threats

Level II threats include long-range reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, information warfare, and the sabotage of air or ground operations

conducted by special-purpose, guerrilla, and unconventional forces or

small tactical units. This level of threat must be defeated or delayed and

mitigated by force protection measures until response forces arrive.

Level III Threats

Level III threats are major attacks by large tactical forces who may use

airborne, heliborne, amphibious, and infiltration operations. Attacks may

also come from aircraft and theater missiles/artillery armed with conventional and NBC weapons. This level of threat must be delayed and

mitigated by force protection measures until the arrival of a tactical combat force (TCF). The US Air Force also uses its air warfare functions to

counter and engage this threat; engagement of these forces in this manner takes it out of the realm of force protection.

THREAT METHODS OF ATTACK AND OBJECTIVES

 Threats against Air Force assets are divided into the categories of methods of attack and the objectives those methods seek to accomplish.

Methods of Attack

 Standoff Attacks—These attacks are carried out from outside, sometimes far outside, a base perimeter.

 Standoff attacks were used in 75 percent of attacks since World

War II.

It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power

by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his

flying birds in the air.

Giulio Douhet, 1921
18

Attacks by a small force with the limited objective of destroying

aircraft have succeeded in destroying or damaging over 2,000 aircraft

between 1940 and 1992. This fact is a powerful testimony to the

effectiveness of small units using unsophisticated weapons against

typical air base defenses and is a sobering precedent for those

responsible for defending USAF bases against the threat.

 Alan Vick,

Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest

 Standoff attacks are difficult to counter.

 Penetration Attacks—A penetration attack is a form of offensive in

which the enemy seeks to break through our defense and disrupt the

defensive system.

 Penetration efforts were used in 22 percent of attacks since World

War II.

 Penetration attacks were more prevalent in World War II and less

in Vietnam.

 Biological/Chemical Attacks—Biological attacks use living organisms

(naturally or artificially occurring) or their toxic by-products to produce casualties in personnel, animals, or plants and to contaminate

food and water supplies. Chemical attacks employ chemical agents to

kill, injure, or incapacitate personnel or animals for a significant period of time, and such attacks deny or hinder the use of areas, facilities,

or material.

 Chemical and biological agents are possessed by many nations

and nonstate actors.

 Information on development and use of biological and chemical

agents is widely available.

 The FBI routinely conducts investigations into suspected use or

plans to use biological or chemical agents. Bureau officials say a

major attack in the US no longer seems unlikely.

 Terrorist Attack—Most recent threat trends involve the terrorist use

of asymmetrical systems such as vehicle bombs against personnel, mov-
19

ing the focus away from the historically more common direct attacks

against aircraft and their support infrastructure.

 Objectives of Methods of Attack are to:

 Injure or kill personnel to create a tactical and/or strategic event.

 Destroy war-fighting or war-supporting assets.

 Deny use of war-fighting or war-supporting assets through damage or contamination.

 Change ideology of governments.

 Force nations deployed on foreign soil to end operations and depart the deployed location.

 Thrust a nation into civil unrest resulting in civil war.

 Force a government agency or corporation to alter its environmental policies.

Chemical and biological weapons have been used throughout history

in military combat. In 1710, during the war between Russia and

Sweden, Russian troops used the cadavers of plague victims to create

an epidemic. In 1767, during the French and Indian Wars, an English

general surreptitiously provided the Indians loyal to the French with

blankets infected with smallpox. In World War II, the Japanese used

bubonic plague, cholera, anthrax, dysentery, typhoid, and

paratyphoid in southeastern China. The Iraqi military used chemical

weapons against both Iranians and Kurds in recent years. Chemical

weapons were used by a terrorist group in a March 1995 attack on

the Tokyo subway.

Multiple Sources
20
21

CHAPTER FOUR

COUNTERING THE THREATS

This chapter identifies a set of force protection tools for commanders

to consider when preparing to counter threats in their areas. This begins

with the risk assessment process and proceeds to force protection countermeasure planning and implementation.

RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Commanders should begin by conducting a risk-based assessment. The

process consists of identifying the potential threats and analyzing the

vulnerabilities to determine the risks. Force protection working groups

could manage this process for commanders.

Threat Assessment

A force protection threat assessment is the product of a threat analysis

for a particular area. Force protection threat assessments fuse intelligence

from human (HUMINT), signals (SIGINT), imagery (IMINT), and measurement and signature (MASINT) sources; counterintelligence; environmental; medical; information/data threat; and other information into a

cohesive threat picture helpful to FP decision makers. Force protection

threat assessments are conducted based upon specific criteria and the

threat levels explained earlier in this document.

The threat analysis is a continual process of compiling and examining

all available information concerning potential threats. A threat analysis

will review the factors of a threat’s existence, capability, intention, history, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which

friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying

the probability of attack and results in a threat assessment.

...the Khobar Towers attack should be seen as a watershed event

pointing the way to a radically new mindset and dramatic changes

in the way we protect our forces....

William J. Perry,

Secretary of Defense,

September 1996
22

Vulnerability Assessment

Commanders should prepare a vulnerability assessment for facilities,

installations, and operating areas within their area. The assessment will

address the broad range of physical threats to the security of personnel

and assets and it should be conducted periodically.

Vulnerability assessments for an area will normally be conducted by

the installation commander. They should consider the range of identified and projected threats against a specific location or installation personnel, facilities, and other assets. They should evaluate the safety and

vulnerability of local food and water sources, evaluate local medical capabilities, determine adequacy of hygiene of local billeting and public facilities, and perform an occupational and environmental risk evaluation. The

assessments should identify vulnerabilities of Air Force assets, prioritized

by their criticality to the mission, and propose solutions for enhanced

protection.

Risk Assessment

Commanders should utilize threat and vulnerability assessments to

make decisions about what level of risk they are willing to accept. Risks

to the most critical Air Force assets should be eliminated whenever possible, but it is ultimately the commander’s decision about what level of

risk to accept.

Once the risk assessment is complete and all risk-level decisions made,

commanders should use this information to plan a course of force protection actions to eliminate the risks they are not willing to accept and mitigate the risks they either cannot eliminate or have decided to accept.

FORCE PROTECTION COUNTERMEASURE PLANNING

Commanders should take deliberate action, once a risk assessment is

made, to implement comprehensive force protection countermeasures to

deny an adversary information, access, and influence. Commanders should exercise these measures to ensure their effectiveness. They

can incorporate the following missions and tasks into their overall defensive and offensive force protection plan.
23

Deny Information

The Air Force denies an adversary information through a variety of

passive defense force protection measures. Protecting sensitive information is the key to force protection countermeasure planning. Denying potential adversaries the intelligence necessary to plan and conduct

hostile actions is the most effective but also the most difficult means to

enhance force protection. The following capabilities exist to assist commanders in executing FP responsibilities:

 Counterespionage Programs—These are activities conducted to detect, deter, and neutralize adversary intelligence gathering. They consist of interdisciplinary measures combining personnel security, awareness, and reporting that prompt investigations to neutralize a threat.

These programs also consist of independent offensive operations to

engage adversarial HUMINT capabilities to deny the adversary’s intelligence objectives or influence the adversary’s understanding of the

environment.

 Technical Security Countermeasure Surveys—These surveys are

the means by which adversary technical intelligence gathering capabilities are detected and neutralized. They contain interdisciplinary

evaluations of physical security, access control, technical security and

the identification of vulnerabilities specific to those disciplines. The

surveys also identify clandestine technical intelligence collection means

to be neutralized or exploited.

 Operations and Information Security Vulnerability Assessments—

These assessments identify vulnerabilities associated with operations

security (OPSEC) and information security (INFOSEC) to include evaluations of sensitive, but unclassified, intelligence information available

to an adversary. The assessments should disclose vulnerabilities of

friendly personnel to adversarial intelligence gathering methods. These

assessments could be useful in raising personnel security awareness

and aid in lowering the observable profile of aerospace operations.

 Information Security and Information Assurance—Information

security provides guidance for classification, protection, and dissemination of classified national security information processed within any

information system. Information assurance provides measures to pro-
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tect friendly information systems by preserving the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the systems and the information contained

within the systems. Air Force communications and information resources are force multipliers that support the current core competencies of the Air Force: air and space superiority, global attack, rapid

global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority, and

agile combat support. The communications and information infrastructure is undergoing significant mission and technology-driven

changes to ensure information is delivered at the right time and place,

anywhere on the globe. These changes demand an integrated information protection approach that embraces the war-fighter’s mission

and ensures operations are done securely. Measures are being implemented to ensure our information resources are adequately protected.

Every commander and information system user should ensure these

measures are used correctly and fully. More guidance can be obtained

in the AFDD on Information Operations.

 Camouflage, Concealment, Deception (CCD)—CCD is the capability to reduce the effectiveness of attacking forces and reconnaissance

assets through the principles of hide, blend, disguise, and decoy to protect friendly assets and aim points with materials and equipment that

alter or obscure part or all of their multispectral signatures.

	

25

 Hide. To conceal an asset from visual or sensor aided acquisition.

 Blend. To combine the parts of a scene or target so as to render

the parts indistinguishable.

 Disguise. To modify so as to prevent recognition of the true identity or character of an asset or activity.

 Decoy. To simulate an object or use a signature generator to simulate a potential target.

Deny Access

The Air Force denies access to adversaries through the application of

defensive and offensive force protection measures. Integrated with

measures that deny information to an adversary are measures to deny

access if an enemy attempts to collect available intelligence. The objective of denying access is to prevent or deter a hostile action by limiting

vulnerabilities of personnel and operations.

Measures to Deny Access

 Surveillance Detection and Countersurveillance—Technical and

human sources of information identify potentially hostile surveillance

to evaluate it as a threat and implement countermeasures. Countermeasures may include relocating targeted assets; increased security

posture; and cover or concealment. Countersurveillance operations

may also be executed offensively to identify suspected surveillance

and disrupt potentially hostile intelligence gathering methods.

 Protective Service Operations—Personal protective operations are

undertaken on behalf of a high risk or key individual to reduce the risk

of assassination, kidnapping, or other physical harm.

 Protective Threat Assessments and Vulnerability Surveys—Time,

location, and threat-specific evaluations of potential individual targets

should be conducted for the identification of particular vulnerabilities.

These assessments and surveys help meet a short-term need to increase

the security posture of the facility evaluated or person being protected.
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Air Force Assets

The Air Force routinely categorizes assets as priority resources (mission-essential aircraft, weapon systems, and command, control, and communications, space, and intelligence resources) and nonpriority resources (other high value Air Force assets such as ground vehicles, petroleum storage sites, nonoperational transport aircraft, etc.).

 Priority Resources—

Physical security is a tightly

focused security capability

that deters and responds to

hostile operations against

priority Air Force resources.

Physical security achieves

the appropriate degree of deterrence and is effective

through designing and fielding security systems that:

 Control entry and access to sensitive areas with priority assets;

 Detect hostile activity against priority assets; and

 If necessary, defeat a hostile force targeting priority assets.

 Nonpriority Resources—Resource protection is a broad-based security capability for protecting nonpriority Air Force resources through

four objectives:

 Maintain the Air Force warfighting capability by reducing damage to nonpriority Air Force resources.

 Safeguard Air Force property by reducing the opportunity for

theft or attack by making a potential nonpriority target inaccessible or unattractive.

 Use Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

principles that focus on preventing resource loss through facility and environmental planning. CPTED examples include

better use of lighting and architectural designs that emphasize

ease of surveillance by friendly forces.


	
					

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 Ensure everyone safeguards government property.

Combatting Terrorism

Combatting terrorism is actions taken to

protect Air Force personnel and property from

terrorist acts and to oppose terrorism in all

forms. Combatting terrorism includes antiterrorism (defensive measures

taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts)

and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to

prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). Actions may include implementation of random

measures to protect Air Force populace from terrorist activities, installation of physical security aids, and education and awareness training.

Air Base Defense

Air base defense generally describes actions taken by force protection forces in theater preparing for an overt attack by level I, II, or III

threats.

 Forces should be organized to prevent

and defeat attacks.

 Forces should be integrated into rear

security operations with other Services, host-nation

and allied or coalition forces.

 The senior Air Force

commander respon-

	 		  		

	
	


 	 			 	   	



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sible for each air base may delegate authority to conduct air base defense to a subordinate commander.

Deny Influence

The Air Force denies adversarial influence through force health protection, disaster preparation, and ability to survive and operate (ATSO) actions.

Force health protection denies influence by:

 Promoting fitness for enhanced performance at all times, including

before and during deployments.

 Assuring healthy and safe food and water.

 Providing mission-tailored casualty care capability.

 Preventing or controlling infectious diseases including those from

biological agents.

 Ensuring awareness of environmental and occupational threats.

				
	

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 Protecting personnel from hazardous materials including chemical agents.

 Preventing injuries from combat action, mishaps, and recreation.

 Conducting medical surveillance and information.

For additional information, see the AFDD on Health Services.

Disaster preparation is the capability to deny influence by enhancing force survivability and mission continuation through:

 Dispersal, sheltering, evacuation, or relocation of materiel and

people needed for mission accomplishment and recovery tasks.

 Use of individual protective equipment.

 Mutual support agreements with civilian authorities, local US and

DOD agencies, and host nation.

	 	 		 	 
  



30

 NBC contamination control, warning, plotting, predicting, and

reporting.

 Mitigating the effects of and enhancing recovery from major accidents and natural disasters.

Ability to survive and operate (ATSO) denies influence through

the ability to preserve, sustain, or restore a force’s mission capability before, during, and after an enemy attack. Capabilities should include:

 Attack detection and warning.

 Reconnaissance after attack.

 NBC contamination avoidance.

 Damage repair, fire protection, and individual protection.

 Structural engineering, hardening, and infrastructure engineering to increase structural strength and ballistic protection.

 Explosive ordnance disposal to protect personnel and resources

from unexploded ordnance.

Static aircraft protection embarked on a new phase in 1968 as

the Air Force launched a crash shelter construction program....The

protection afforded aircraft by hardened shelters confirmed the

soundness of the program....Seventh Air Force on 3 June 1969

cited two cases in which aircraft parked in shelters escaped

destruction by direct rocket hits. On another occasion shelters

saved several aircraft from damage or destruction when a nearby

munitions storage area exploded. In spring 1970 a USN EC-121

crashed and burned at Da Nang, but adjacent hardened shelters

saved three USAF F-4Ds from destruction and two others from

major damage. The estimated dollar savings attributed to shelters

in these incidents more than paid for the $15.7 million program

in [the Republic of Vietnam].

Roger P. Fox,

Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 1961-1973
31

In summary, the comprehensive measures outlined above are tasks

and objectives historically proven to be effective in providing force protection when properly implemented. Recent trends in the development of

aerospace expeditionary forces could lead to tasks and objectives not conducted in past operations.
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33

CHAPTER FIVE

FORCE PROTECTION TRENDS

Since the end of the Cold War, the US Air Force has made great strides

toward becoming an expeditionary aerospace force. Since 1986, the Air

Force has downsized by 36 percent while overseas contingencies have

greatly increased. In 1989, the Air Force averaged 3,400 people deployed

for contingencies and exercises. Since the end of DESERT STORM, the

average had grown to 14,600 in FY 97. Many deployments, due to short

time constraints and/or austere conditions, cannot expect external (US

Army, host nation, or coalition) force protection forces to be available.

These contingencies and AEF deployments require the Air Force to go

forward with an organic force protection capability.

Protecting the force is everyone’s duty. Force protection should be

a basic military skill taught to all Air Force members. Security forces (SF)

should not hold sole responsibility for defending the force. Marines and

soldiers are trained as infantry first, regardless of their military specialty.

In the Navy all sailors are trained in fire and damage control. Decreases

in Air Force manpower and increases in operational demands mandate

that everyone in the Air Force assume a greater force protection role.

Everyone has a role either in generating or sustaining aerospace power

under all conditions and protecting the force at all times.

Security no longer ends at the base perimeter. We must assume

responsibility for a much larger tactical perimeter that will keep the

threat away from our people and equipment.

General Ronald R. Fogleman, 1997

[In 1964] General LeMay...revealing he knew the token character

of the USAF general military training program...ordered that “the

means each individual has for self-protection and weapons

qualification” be given special attention.

Roger P. Fox,

Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 1961-1973
34

			


Every Air Force installation, base, or deploying organization requires organic force protection assets. Commanders field all required

force protection assets based on a risk assessment of force vulnerability,

which will also be accomplished at the home station so as to not be compromised when that unit is deployed.

Advancements in technology can provide force enhancement

but not always force replacement. This is a critical distinction. For

example, sensors and imaging devices release force protection personnel

from static posts and allow them increased mobility and flexibility. Technology can assist force protection, yet may still require the person to accomplish the mission.

Force protection resource allocations are risk based and programmatically sustained. Force protection is a long-term investment

program. In the past, the United States has increased force protection

investments only after something devastating has happened. A cyclical

pattern has not worked in the past and it will not work to protect Air

Force assets in the future. Past oversights and shortcomings must be

changed through a sustained effort. History has demonstrated that only

when an adequate force protection infrastructure is in place should an

Air Force system be fielded.
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Force protection resources, including manpower, are properly borne

by the system program and are part of the acquisition program baseline.

This is increasingly important as we close installations and maintain the

strategy of forward presence required by global engagement.

At the Very Heart of Warfare lies Doctrine . . .
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Suggested Readings

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.2, Health Services.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Information Operations.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8, Command and Control.

Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than

War.

Joint Publication 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations.

Joint Publication 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base

Defense.

Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Doctrine for NBC Defense.

Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 1961-1973, (USAF

Office of History), 1979.

Keith William Nolan, The Battle for Saigon—Tet 1968, (Pocket Books), 1996.

David A. Shlapak & Alan Vick, Check Six begins on the ground, (RAND),

1995.

Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest, (RAND), 1995.
38
39

Glossary

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AEF aerospace expeditionary force

AEW Aerospace Expeditionary Wing

AFDD Air Force doctrine document

AFFOR Air Force forces

AFMIC Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

AFP Active Force Protection

AOR area of responsibility

ATSO ability to survive and operate

CCD camouflage, concealment, deception

CINC commander in chief

COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces

CPTED Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CSAF Chief of Staff, US Air Force

CSAR combat search and rescue

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces

DOD Department of Defense

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FP force protection

HUMINT human intelligence

IMINT imagery intelligence

INFOSEC information security

INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department

of State

JAOC joint air operations center

JFACC joint force air component commander

JP joint publication

MAJCOM major air command

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence

NAF numbered air force
40

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical

NSA National Security Agency

OFP Offensive Force Protection

OPSEC operations security

OSI Office of Special Investigations

PFP Passive Force Protection

SF security forces

SIGINT signals intelligence

TCF tactical combat force

THREATCON terrorist threat conditions

USCENTAF US Central Command Air Forces

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Definitions

active force protection. Measures to defend against or counter a perceived or actual threat and, if necessary, to deny, defeat, or destroy hostile forces in the act of targeting Air Force assets.

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to

plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism

(offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism),

taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-

02)

force health protection. A comprehensive threat-based program directed

at preventing and managing health-related actions against Air Force uncommitted combat power.

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in

all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated
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application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02) Because terminology

is always evolving, the Air Force believes a more precise definition is:

[Measures taken to prevent or mitigate successful hostile actions against Air

Force people and resources while not directly engaged with the enemy.] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for

clarity.}

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information

and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02) Because terminology is always evolving, the Air Force believes a better definition of information

operations is: [Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend, or attack information and information systems. This includes both information in warfare (IIW)

and information warfare (IW).] {Italicized definition in brackets applies

only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

offensive force protection. Proactive measures taken to deny, defeat,

or destroy hostile forces who currently are not committed to direct hostile activity but whose intent is to target Air Force assets not currently

engaged in combat operations.

passive force protection. Measures to negate or reduce the effects of

hostile acts on Air Force assets by making them more survivable. This

can be proactively accomplished through training, education, hardening,

camouflage, concealment, deception, information security, and low/zero

observable execution.

tactical combat force. A combat unit, with appropriate combat support

and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats.(JP 1-02)
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