National Highway

Traffic Safety

Administration

U.S. Department

of Transportation

People Saving People

http://www. n htsa. dot. gov

Auto Theft and Recovery: Effects

of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992

and the Motor Vehicle Theft Law

Enforcement Act of 1984

Report to the Congress

My 1998

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents i

List of Figures iv

List of Tables vii

Executive Summary viii

Recommendations xvi

Discussion of Recommendations Received from Commenters xix

Introduction 1

Motives and The Market 5

Theft, Theft Rates, and Recovery Rates, 1984-1995 8

Effect of Parts Marking and Antitheft Devices on Thefts and Recovery Rates 14

Effect of Vehicle Age on Theft and Recovery Rates 19

Collection and Dissemination of Theft and Recovery Information 20

The Economic Cost of Auto Theft 23

The Cost of Marking Parts 25

Arrest and Prosecution 27

Surveys of District Attorneys 28

Surveys of Law Enforcement Agencies 29

Surveys of Motor Vehicle Administrations 30

Insurance Premiums 30

Insurance Claim Payments for Recovered Vehicles Before and After

Inception of Parts Marking 32

Used Replacement Parts 34
The Condition of Recovered Vehicles 35

Adequacy of Theft Laws 39

The Adequacy of Tracking Systems for Theft Investigators 40

Benefits of Parts Marking to Other Classes of Motor Vehicles 41

APPENDIX A - Effects of Parts Marking and Antitheft Devices on Theft and Recovery Rates

Potential Effects of Parts Marking or Antitheft Devices A-l

The Confounding Effect of "Regression to the Mean" A-4

Preview of Analyses A-5

Long-Term Theft and Recovery Rates (model years 1976-1995) A-7

Parts Marking and Theft Rates Just Before and After Model Year 1987 A-13

Parts Marking, Recovery Rates and Unrecovered-Theft Rates Before/After Model Year 1987A-29

Effects of Antitheft Devices Introduced in MY 1989-92 Domestic Cars A-35

Effects of Factory-installed Antitheft Devices in Other Cars A-41

"In-part" Recovery Rates Just Before and After Model Year 1987 A-53

Conclusions A-59

APPENDIX B - Analysis of Regression to the Mean in Theft Rates of Cars

With Marked and Unmarked Parts

Estimation of Regression to the Mean Effects B-3

Effects of Regression to the Mean on Average Theft Rates B-6

APPENDIX C - Vehicle Age and Passenger Car Theft and Recovery Experience

The Effect of Vehicle Age on Thefts and Recoveries C-l
Vehicle Age and Theft Rates of Passenger Cars C-l

Recovery Rates for Passenger Cars C-4

Vehicle Age and Theft and Recovery Rates for Light Trucks C-4

Effects of Parts Marking on Vehicle Age and Theft and Recovery Rates C-5

APPENDIX D - Summary and Discussion of Docket Comments - Docket No. 97-042, Notice 1

97-042-NO1-002 Jaguar Cars. Inc. D-2

97-042-NO1 -003 Florida Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Authority D-2

97-042-NO 1 -004 American Automobile Manufacturers Association D-3

97-042-NO 1 -005 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety '. D-5

97-042-NO 1 -006 Nissan North America. Inc. D-6

97-042-NO 1 -007 Dade County Multi-Aeencv Auto Theft Task Force D-6

97-042-NO 1 -008 Florida Auto Theft Intelligence Unit D-7

97-042-NO 1 -009 Volkswagen of America. Inc. D-8

97-042-NO 1-010 State Farm Insurance Companies D-ll

97-042-NO 1-011 International Association of Auto Theft Investigators D-12

97-042-NO 1-012 Highway Loss Data Institute D-12

97-042-NO 1-013 Document does not exist D-13

97-042-NO 1-014 Toyota D-13

97-042-NO 1-015 3-M Safety and Security Systems D-13

97-042-NO 1-016 Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM) D-14

97-042-NO 1-017 Iowa State Patrol D-14

Discussion D-15

iii
LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1A. Motor Vehicle Thefts by Vehicle Type 10

Figure IB. Total Motor Vehicle Thefts 10

Figure 2A. Motor Vehicle Theft Rates by Vehicle Type 11

Figure 2B. Theft Rates for All Vehicles 11

Figure 3 A. Motor Vehicle Recovery Rates All Vehicles 13

Figure 3B. Motor Vehicle Recovery Rates by Type 13

Figure 4. Federal Court Motor Vehicle Theft Statistics 27

APPENDIX A

Figure A-l. Passenger Car Theft Rates by Model Year, 1976-95 A-8

Figure A-2. Theft Rate Differential, MY 1976-95 Make-Models That Got

Parts Marking or Antitheft Devices in 1987 Versus Make-Models

That Never Had Them at Anytime A-11

Figure A-3. Passenger Car Recovery Rates by Model Year, 1976-95 A-14

Figure A-4. Recovery Rate Differential, MY 1976-95 Make-Models That Got

Parts Marking or Antitheft Devices in 1987 Versus Models That

Never Had Them At Any Time A-l5

Figure A-5. Unrecovered Theft Rates by Model Year, 1976-95 A-16

Figure A-6. Unrecovered Theft Rate Differential, MY 1976-95 Make-Models That Got

Parts Marking in 1987 Versus Make-Models that never had Them at any time A-17

Figure A-7. Passenger Car Theft Rates by Model Year, 1984-89 A-20

Figure A-8. Theft Rate Differential, MY 1984-89 Make-Models That Got Parts

Marking in 1987 Versus Make-Models Without Parts Marking or

Antitheft Devices in 1984-89 A-21

IV
Figure A-9. Theft Rate Differential, MY 1984-89, Brand New Cars Make-Models

that got Parts Marking in 1987 versus Make-Models without Parts Marking

or Antitheft Devices in 1984-89 A-26

Figure A-10. Brand-New Passenger Car Theft Rates by Model Year, 1984-89 A-27

Figure A-l 1. Brand-New Passenger Car Overall Theft Rates by Model Year, 1984-89 A-31

Figure A-12. Passenger Car Recovery Rates by Model Year, 1984-89 A-32

Figure A-13. Recovery Rate Differential, MY 1984-89 Make-Models That Got

Parts Marking in 1987 Versus Make-Models Without Parts Marking

or Antitheft Devices in 1984-1989 A-42

Figure A-14. Unrecovered Theft Rate Differential, MY 1984-89 Make-Models That Got Parts

Marking in 1987 Versus Make-Models Without Parts Marking or Antitheft Devices

in 1984-89 A-43

Figure A-15. Unrecovered Theft Rate Differential, MY 1984-89 Brand-New Cars Make-Models

That Got Antitheft Devices in 1987 Versus Make-Models Without Pans Marking

or Antitheft Devices in 1984-89 A-44

Figure A-16. Passenger Car Theft Rates by Model Year, 19B8-95 A-47

Figure A-17. Theft Rate Differential, MY 1988-95, LeSabre +88+

Bonneville (Antitheft Devices in 1992-95) versus Taurus +Sable

(No Parts Marking or Antitheft Devices 1988-95) A-48

Figure A-18. Recovery Rate Differential, MY 1988-95, LeSabre +88+

Bonneville (Antitheft Devices in 1992-95) versus Taurus +Sable

(No Parts Marking or Antitheft Devices 1988-95) A-49

Figure A-19. Unrecovered Theft Rate Differential, MY 1988-95, LeSabre +88+

Bonneville (Antitheft Devices in 1992-95) versus Taurus +Sable

(No Parts Marking or Antitheft Devices 1988-95) A-50

Figure A-20. Theft Rate Differential

General Motors Cars that Got Antitheft Devices, Starting in 1989-92

versus Control Group Cars that did not get Antitheft Devices in 1985-95 A-51

Figure A-21. Unrecovered Theft Rate Differential

General Motors Cars that Got Antitheft Devices, Starting in 1989-92

versus Control Group Cars that did not get Antitheft Devices in 1985-95 A-52
APPENDIX B

Exhibit 1. Theft Rates for Current Year Cars B-2

APPENDIX C

Figure C-l. Theft Rates - Calendar Year for Passenger Cars C-l

Figure C-2. Theft Rates - Model Year of Passenger Cars C-2

Figure C-3. Model Year 86 - Theft Rates - Passenger Cars C-2

Figure C-4. Model Year 87 - Theft Rates - Passenger Cars C-2

Figure C-5. Model Year 88 - Theft Rates - Passenger Cars C-2

Figure C-6. Model Year 89 - Theft Rates - Passenger Cars C-3

Figure C-l. Model Year 90 - Theft Rates - Passenger Cars C-3

Figure C-8. Model Year 91 - Theft Rates - Passenger Cars C-3

Figure C-9. Model Year 92 - Theft Rates - Passenger Cars C-3

Figure C-10. Theft Rates - Model Year 86-88 - Passenger Cars C-3

Figure C-l 1. Recovery Rates - Model Year 86-88 - Passenger Cars C-4

Figure C-12. Theft Rates - Model Year 85-95 - Light Trucks C-4

Figure C-l3. Recovery Rates - Model Year 86-95 - Light Trucks C-5

Figure C-l4. Theft Rates - Model Year 86-88 Unmarked, Marked, Antitheft Passenger Cars C-5

Figure C-l5. Recovery Rates - Model Year 86-88 Unmarked, Marked, Antitheft Device Cars C-6

VI
LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1. Motor Vehicle Thefts 10

Table 2. Motor Vehicle Theft Rates by Vehicle Type 11

Table 3. Motor Vehicle Recovery Rates by Vehicle Type 12

Table 4. Average Theft Claim Payments and Number of Claims for CMY Marked, &

Unmarked, and Antitheft Device Passenger Cars 33

Table 5. Percent of Claims and Average Payments for In-Part, Intact, and

In-whole Insurance Claims 38

APPENDIX B

Table 1. Average Theft Rates Current Year Passenger Vehicles by Type 1984-1991 B-9

Table 2. Thefts, Registrations and Theft Rates for Current Year Marked and Unmarked

Passenger Vehicles 1984-1991 B-10

Table 3. Theft Rate Correlation Matrix 1984-1991 B-l 1

Table 4. Calculation of Expected Regression Marked and Unmarked

Passenger Vehicles B-12

vn
Executive Summary

Motor vehicle theft was a growing problem in the early and mid 1980's. In 1984, Congress

enacted the Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act in order to reduce the incidence of motor

vehicle thefts and facilitate the tracing and recovery of stolen motor vehicles and parts from stolen

vehicles. The Department of Transportation implemented the 1984 Act by issuing the Federal

Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard, which requires manufacturers of designated high theft

passenger car lines to inscribe or affix the Vehicle Identification Number (VTN) onto the engine,

the transmission, and 12 major body parts. As an alternative to parts marking, manufacturers

could choose to install antitheft devices as standard equipment on a limited number of those lines.

The objective of parts marking is to allow law enforcement agencies to identify stolen vehicles or

parts removed from stolen vehicles - and to deter professional thieves since they will have

difficulty in marketing stolen marked parts and are more likely to get caught if they steal cars with

marked parts. The high-theft car lines were designated in 1985, and actual parts marking began

with model year 1987.

In 1991, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) presented a report to the

Congress assessing the auto theft problem in the United States and, in particular, attempting to

evaluate parts marking. At that time, however, only two years of theft and recovery data were

available for cars with marked parts. Evidence of the effectiveness of parts marking could not be

obtained through statistical analysis of theft and recovery rates. Nevertheless, the Department

found wide support in 1991 for parts marking from the law enforcement community. Investigators

believed that parts marking provided them with a valuable tool for detecting, apprehending, and

prosecuting thieves. After considering the analyses, surveys and public comments obtained during

the preparation of the 1991 report, the Department recommended that the theft prevention

standard be continued with minor changes.

In 1991-92, motor vehicle theft was still a large problem. Thefts had increased from 830,000 in

1984 to 1,270,000 by 1990. In search of stronger remedies, and in response to the Department's

recommendation and other information, Congress enacted the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992. The

1992 Act built on the 1984 Act in several ways: Federal penalties were enhanced; a grant program

was authorized to help law enforcement agencies concerned with auto theft; steps were taken to

Vlll
improve motor vehicle titling, registration, and salvage; the Theft Prevention Standard was to be

expanded to other passenger car lines and high theft multipurpose passenger vehicles and light

trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings of 6,000 pounds or less, which became effective starting

with the 1997 model year; rules were established regarding salvage or junk vehicles; a stolen parts

information system was to be maintained by the Attorney General; dealing in stolen marked parts

became a Federal crime; and random customs inspections were allowed.

The 1992 Act requires the Department of Transportation to provide a report to the Congress

updating the findings of the 1991 report and evaluating the effects of the 1984 and 1992 acts. As

a first step, the Department published a Preliminary Report for public review and issued a notice

in the Federal Register on June 26, 1997 announcing a 45 day opportunity for public comment

Comments received have been summarized and discussed as part of this Final Report that will be

transmitted to the Congress.

The goals of this report are:

• To update the detailed statistics on motor vehicle theft and recovery presented in the 1991

report. For this report, theft and recovery data were available from 1984 through 1995, and

insurance data from 1986 through 1992.

• To revisit the evaluation of parts marking and antitheft devices, now that extensive data are

available on the theft experience of cars with those remedies. (However, since theft data were

available only through 1995, the effectiveness of the 1992 Act as regards expanded coverage

in 1997 and later models cannot be analyzed at this time.)

• To evaluate other provisions of the 1992 Anti Car Theft Act and the 1984 Act, focusing on

changes that have occurred since the 1991 report.

The basic reasons for stealing cars have not changed since the 1991 report. Cars are stolen for

transportation, joyriding, export, for repair parts, and to obtain expensive items such as stereo

equipment for a quick profit. Since the last report to Congress, a new type of auto theft crime has

emerged - carjacking -- but the theft motives are still the same. Fundamentally, though, two

IX
types of auto theft may be recognized: (1) Professional thefts for profit, such as thefts to supply

chop shops, retagging and retitling, or for illegal export. These thefts often result in a total loss to

the original owner, but there is hope they can be deterred by remedies such as parts marking.

They are believed to account for at least 23 percent of all thefts, and perhaps substantially more.

(2) Nonprofessional thefts for purposes such as joyriding or to obtain temporary transportation.

The vehicles are mostly recovered; on the other hand, parts marking would not appear as likely to

deter these thefts.

Overall theft and recovery statistics: As in the 1991 report, theft and recovery data come from the

FBI's National Crime Information Center. The data do not indicate the motives for individual

thefts or separate the "professional" from the "nonprofessional" thefts. Analyses based on

aggregate data cannot identify the effectiveness of each subsection of the 1984 and 1992 Acts, but

can provide insights on the trend in thefts and recoveries.

The principal finding of this evaluation is that the auto theft problem, which was growing during

the mid 1980's, leveled off or even began to decline after 1989-90. In 1995, there were 1,180,000

motor vehicles stolen, a decline of seven percent from the all-time peak of 1,270,000 experienced

in both 1990 and 1992. However, the 1995 thefts are still 39 percent more than the 830,000

experienced in 1984. The theft rate per 100,000 registered vehicles increased from 543 in 1984 to

714 in 1990, but had dropped back to 597 by 1995.

Passenger cars account for 71 percent of all motor vehicle thefts, followed by light trucks - pickup

trucks, sport utility vehicles and vans - at 24 percent. The remaining thefts are split between

heavy trucks and motorcycles. Theft rates for all four vehicle types have declined since 1990.

Recoveries of stolen vehicles have kept pace with thefts over the years - recovery rates have

remained stable at close to 80 percent of thefts throughout 1984-95. Passenger cars have slightly

higher recovery rates than light trucks. Motorcycles have substantially lower recovery rates, and

they have gotten worse. It is estimated that the annual economic loss resulting from vehicle thefts

- and from the fact that many vehicles are never recovered or only recovered in a damaged

condition - is at least $4 billion and could be as high as $8 billion.
Effect of parts marking and antitheft devices: The average consumer cost of parts marking in

1995 models was $4.92 per car. At that cost, just a 2 percent reduction in the theft rate would

create consumer benefits exceeding the cost of parts marking.

Theft and recovery rates for car lines that got parts marking in 1987 were compared to the rates

for the same car lines before 1987 and to the rates for car lines that did not get either parts

marking or antitheft devices. However, the fact that, originally, only high-theft car lines got parts

marking resulted in biases in the data that made it essentially impossible to reliably attribute a

specific percentage reduction in thefts or increase in recoveries to parts marking. Still, the

analyses provided five indications (hedged with caveats) that parts marking quite possibly had

beneficial effects at times, apparently greater than 2 percent:

• There was a conspicuous shift in theft rates in model years 1986-87, coinciding with the

introduction of parts marking. Cars with marked parts had lower theft rates than expected,

while those with unmarked parts had higher rates than expected. The effect was as strong as

20 percent when cars were new, but it weakened as they became older and seemed to have

vanished by the time they were two years old. The latter is a noteworthy finding, since it is

consistent with the view that many professional thieves subsequently learned how to obliterate

the markings, and found them less of a deterrent.

• Recovery rates for 1987 cars with marked parts were consistently higher than for

corresponding 1986 models, even as the cars got older. However, this favorable effect in

model year 1987 consistently deteriorated in later model years.

• In calendar year 1987, the unrecovered-theft rate of model year 1987 cars with parts marking

was 26 percent lower than expected. As the model year 1987 cars got older, the benefit

diminished, but still persisted at about 6 percent. However, the latter estimate is within the

"noise range" of possible biases in the data and it cannot be attributed to parts marking

without considerable doubt.

• Almost all car lines had lower theft rates in their early 1990's models than in their late 1970's

models. However, the long-term reduction was substantially greater in the car lines that got

xi
parts marking or antitheft devices than in the car lines that did not. It is not so clear what

happened during the crucial intervening years, the 1980's.

• There was a strong reduction after 1987 in the percentage of vehicles that were only

recovered in-part - i.e., missing their engine, transmission or a major body part (those which

for high theft lines are required to have markings). There was a corresponding increase in

percentage of vehicles recovered in-whole (no major parts missing) or intact. This trend was

especially strong in the car lines with marked parts.

By contrast, for at least one type of factory-installed antitheft device, the available data

unequivocally show effectiveness. The system installed by a domestic manufacturer as standard

equipment in various car lines during 1989-94 was associated with an immediate, and persistent

70 percent reduction in the theft rate and a 58 percent reduction in the unrecovered-theft rate.

This device appears to be quite effective in reducing both "professional" and "casual" thefts. Of

course, a system of this type has a far higher cost than parts marking.

Fewer data were available on the antitheft devices factory-installed by other manufacturers.

Specific estimates were not obtained, but there appeared to be considerable variation in

effectiveness. With some of the devices, little change was seen in theft rates; with others, there

were reductions comparable to those for the domestic manufacturer. No data were available for

evaluating the effect of aftermarket antitheft devices.

On the whole, the analysis results seem to suggest that the approach of Chapter 331 of the Ami

Car Theft Act, which views both parts-marking and factory-installed antitheft devices as effective

deterrents to automobile theft, has had benefits. There is some indication that the effect of parts

marking might have been greater than two percent needed for cost-effectiveness, at least at

certain times. Parts marking and antitheft devices have complementary roles: antitheft devices

make it harder to steal a car, while parts marking deters professional thieves because it makes it

easier to apprehend and convict them. The two remedies seem to be integral components of a

larger program to combat auto theft. That program has, on the whole, had an impact, as

evidenced by the leveling off and reduction of theft rates after 1990.

Xll
Discussion of other provisions of the 1984 and 1992 Acts: Collection and dissemination of theft

and recovery information has improved since 1991, primarily because technical advances in

communications and computer equipment made databases more complete and accessible to

agencies needing the information. The two systems called for in the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 -

the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System and the National Stolen Auto Part

Information System - are either not completely in place or are so new that their effects on vehicle

theft (prevention, recovery or apprehension of thieves) cannot be evaluated at this time.

In tandem with the number of motor vehicle thefts, arrests for auto theft peaked in 1989 and have

leveled off since then. In 1994, an estimated 200,000 were arrested for auto theft or attempted

theft in the United States.

While recent surveys of district attorneys and law enforcement agencies did not provide detailed

statistical data on arrests, prosecutions, and convictions for auto theft, they present an even more

encouraging picture than corresponding surveys in the earlier report. Since 1991, there have been

moderate increases in the number of prosecutions under both Federal Acts. There have also been

increases in the level of effort directed to each prosecution. Now that they have better evidence

with which to work, both prosecutors and officers are willing to invest more effort at obtaining a

conviction. By 1996, prosecutors saw an increase of over 20 percent in the number of prosecuted

cases, and 10 percent said that theft rates had declined in their jurisdictions. By 1996, in contrast

to almost no effect seen in 1991, almost half of the district attorneys reported an increase in

convictions - and most of them attributed it to the Federal Acts. Stiffer sentencing was occurring

in 45 percent of the convictions, including a 75 percent increase in jail sentences. This could be

even higher, they report, but for prison overcrowding.

Law enforcement agencies report the same attitudes about the deterrent effects of parts marking

in 1996 as they did in 1991. They feel that auto thefts for chop shop operations will continue if

there is a demand for a part, marked or not. But almost half of the investigators feel that parts

marking makes professional thieves more cautious or even deters them completely from stealing

cars with marked parts. All investigators thought parts marking had no effect on amateur thieves.

Xlll
Parts marking seems to have the greatest effect on chop shop operators because of the increased

cost of "doing business."

Auto theft investigators feel that parts marking is a valuable tool for arresting and prosecuting

thieves. In 1991, they saw little or no effect, but by 1996, most of them felt that parts marking

did assist in identifying and recovering stolen parts and vehicles. About three fourths of the law

enforcement agencies in big cities said parts marking helped in arresting both chop shop operators

and professional thieves. Auto theft investigators, as in 1991, still say that more permanent

methods for parts marking are needed. Even though it is unlawful to remove labels from marked

parts and the labels are required to leave evidence that they were once on the marked part, thieves

have found methods for removing both the label and its "footprint". The investigator then has to

be sufficiently knowledgeable to recognize that the part should have a label. Also without the

label it is very difficult to trace the part back to the vehicle from which it was stolen.

Data received from the Customs Service since the 1991 report, indicates it has improved its ability

to recoup stolen vehicles.

Insurance companies have not reported any effects of parts marking on insurance premiums.

Some insurance companies do offer discounts on comprehensive premiums for vehicles equipped

with certain types of anti theft devices. Analysis of claim payments also has not shown any

specific effects of either parts marking or antitheft devices. Insurance companies report that their

used part policies have not changed since 1986. About three fourths of the reporting companies

encourage the use of used parts for crash repairs. Most companies rely on the repair shops to

obtain parts from reputable sources.

In conclusion, it appears that parts marking and other provisions of the 1984 and 1992 Acts have

given the law enforcement community tools they can use to deter thefts, trace stolen vehicles and

parts, and apprehend and convict thieves. Theft rates leveled off after 1989-90 and have begun to

drop. While the program to reduce auto theft has had an impact, there appear to be four areas

with potential room for improvement: (1) Insurance companies and motor vehicle departments

could take better advantage of the existing parts marking program by routinely requiring

xiv
inspection of the markings of used parts acquired at body shops and used vehicles brought in for

new titles. The current setup, where some models have parts marking and others do not, may

discourage routine inspections. (2) To the extent that current parts markings can be obliterated,

their long-term deterrent effect may be diminished. (3) Since many vehicles still do not have

marked parts, the deterrent effect of parts marking at this time may be offset by increased thefts of

the vehicles without marked parts. (4) Appropriate antitheft devices can substantially reduce all

types of thefts, but are currently standard equipment on only a limited number of car lines.

However, to the extent that antitheft devices and parts marking are complementary strategies,

more extended availability of antitheft devices ought not come at the expense of eliminating parts

marking. The best results are likely to be obtained when vehicles have both remedies.

XV
Recommendations

Section 33113(b)(l 1) of Title 49, USC Chapter 331 requires the Department to "...include

recommendations (including, as appropriate, legislative and administrative recommendations) for

(A) continuing without change the standards prescribed under this chapter, (B) amending this

chapter to cover more or fewer lines of passenger motor vehicles, (C) amending this chapter to

cover other classes of motor vehicles, or (D) ending the standards for all future motor vehicles."

Some analyses of the data suggest that parts marking has shown effectiveness as a theft deterrent

at times greater than the two percent cost beneficial threshold. Comments received from the law

enforcement community, prosecutors, and motor vehicle administrations indicate that parts

marking has been an aid in detecting, apprehending, prosecuting and convicting auto thieves.

These officials also recommend extending parts marking to all passenger motor vehicles, requiring

more permanent marking methods, adding other parts for marking, and eliminating anthitheft

device exemptions. In contrast, the auto industry favors discontinuing parts marking, or if that is

not done, having more exemptions for antitheft devices.

Insufficient information was received from the public comments to determine the cost of more

permanent marking methods. Likewise, no information was provided on the cost of marking air

bags - the one part that appears worthy of consideration for addition to the list of major parts to

be marked. Airbags are expensive to replace costing between $500 and $1,500 and are

frequently stolen. Because the Justice Department is required to evaluate the effectiveness of

antitheft devices by December 31, 1999, decision making regarding exemptions should be

postponed until that time.

Within the authority provided by the current legislation, the Department is considering taking

several actions:

The Department is considering issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to obtain data

on parts marking methods. This information was requested when the preliminary report was

published. No public comments were received on parts marking methods. Currently, parts

xvi
marking sources are being surveyed for more information and there is some indication that more

permanent marking methods are under development. If there is sufficient information obtained

from the advance notice to indicate that more permanent methods beyond adhesive labels can be

used which have a cost less than the cost limitations specified in Section 33105 of Chapter 331,

then the Department could proceed with rulemaking to require more permanent marking methods.

This action is warranted because the analyses suggest that the reason parts marking effectiveness

seems to be short termed is that professional thieves have discovered ways to remove the adhesive

marking labels along with the label's footprint. There is also evidence that professional thieves

are counterfeiting labels. In one case, a vehicle had the VTN plate on the dashboard replaced with

a plate and counterfeit labels that had the same VTN were put on major parts in place of the

original labels. Hence more permanent marking methods should increase effectiveness to the

extent that benefits exceed the added marking cost.

The Department is contemplating issuing another Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to

obtain data on the cost of marking air bags and glazing. Currently information is being sought

from the auto industry. One manufacturer indicated that it costs them about $2 per vehicle to

mark airbags and maintain cross reference information after a one time cost of about $14 per

vehicle for facilities investments. Another manufacturer indicated that they used a low-cost

adhesive label to mark its airbags. No manufacturer reported marking glazing. If there is

sufficient information obtained from the Advance Notice to indicate that one or both can be

marked so that the total parts marking cost is less than the cost limitations specified in Section

33105 of Chapter 331, then the Department could proceed with rulemaking to require air bags

and/or glazing be marked.

This action is warranted for air bags which, in addition to being a safety item, cost $500 to $1,500

to replace (based on one comment received). Air bags are theft targets (several comments

indicated this). While air bags do have serial numbers, they may not easily be identified with the

vehicles from which they were taken. Some manufacturers indicate that they are crossreferencing the air bag serial number with the VTN. Marking air bags with the VTN, which would

have to be done during the assembly process, would aid in parts recovery and for use as evidence

xvii
of vehicle theft. Marking glazing is not for the purpose of preventing glazing from being stolen

but to act as a theft deterrent, especially for retag operations. Marking glazing has been

previously considered and rejected for cost reasons. However, it might be worth taking another

look at this alternative since it has a great deterrent possibility.

Pending the Justice Department's 1999 evaluation, the Department would consider making a

recommendation to have the legislation changed to eliminate granting exemptions from parts

marking for vehicles equipped with antitheft devices which meet certain requirements. This report

found that parts marking and antitheft devices address different theft problems. Antitheft devices

tend to have a greater deterrent effect on amateur thieves who steal vehicles for joy riding or

transportation. Professional thieves and chop shops still want vehicles that are likely to have

antitheft devices because these vehicles are often more expensive and thus these vehicles and their

parts will potentially bring a better price on the illicit market. The evidence to support these

conclusions is the fact that vehicles equipped with antitheft devices show lowered theft rates but

their recovery rates, which were always lower than the average stolen vehicle, does not improve

to the same level as vehicles without antitheft devices. Vehicles that are stolen by amateurs have

a high recovery rate. Vehicles stolen by professional thieves and for chop shops are more often

either dismantled or exported and are less likely to be recovered.

Parts marking deters professional thieves and chop shops because the marked parts aid law

enforcement in detecting a stolen vehicle or part and also help get the criminals convicted of

motor vehicle theft. Parts marking also helps in recovering stolen vehicles and parts. Thus,

antitheft devices systems are not a replacement for the parts marking system. Both systems

complement each other. Having vehicles with antitheft devices and with marked parts should

prove to be sufficiently effective to warrant the cost of both the devices and the cost of parts

marking.

After receiving the Justice Department findings, the Department will determine whether to

propose that the theft prevention standard be amended to require all passenger vehicles, rated at

6,000 pounds gross vehicle weight or less, to have marked parts, except pickup trucks and

vehicles granted exemptions for antitheft devices.

xvin
Discussion of Recommendations Received from Commenters

Section 614(c)(4) states that at least 90 days before submitting this report to Congress, the

Secretary shall publish the proposed report for public review and for an opportunity for written

comment of at least 45 days. The Secretary shall include a summary of such comments with the

final report.

Comments were received from 17 companies, automobile manufacturers, automobile

associations, and state enforcement agencies recommending modifications to the parts marking

standard. Listed below is a summary by issue of recommendations received from commenters.

All comments received are discussed in Appendix D.

Extend Parts Marking to Other Vehicles

Eight commenters recommend extending the parts marking to other vehicles currently exempt.

Seven commenters (Florida Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Authority (FL MVTPA), Advocates

for Highway and Auto Safety, Dade County Multi-Agency Auto Theft Task Force, State Farm

Insurance Companies, International Association of Auto Theft Investigators (IAATI), 3-M Safety

and Security Systems, and Iowa State Police) recommend extending parts marking to all

passenger vehicles (passenger cars, sport utility vehicles, and light duty trucks). Advocates,

IAATI, Florida Auto Theft Intelligence Unit (FL ATIU) and 3-M also recommended extending

the parts marking to vehicles with antitheft devices. State Farm wants to extend parts marking to

vehicles with ineffective antitheft devices. Two commenters (IAATI and 3-M) even recommend

eliminating the 6,000 pounds weight exemption.

The auto industry comments were opposed to parts marking. They feel that parts marking should

either be terminated, phased out, or limited to only high theft lines. The industry favors antitheft

devices over parts marking because of demonstrated effectiveness. Auto manufacturers say that

parts marking costs are higher than the government estimate, hence they say the cost benefit is

either lower or nonexistent.

xix
parts marking costs are higher than the government estimate, hence they say the cost benefit is

either lower or nonexistent.

RESPONSE:

The Department tentatively believes that parts marking should be extended to other passenger

vehicles and light trucks for the following reasons: (1) parts marking has shown effectiveness that

at times exceeded the threshold for cost effectiveness, and (2) law enforcement, prosecutors, and

motor vehicle administrations have presented evidence that parts marking is effective in detecting,

arresting, prosecuting, and convicting auto thieves. If all passenger vehicles are marked, law

enforcement officers, repair shops, and insurance agents will know that any used major part from

vehicles made after the effective date must be marked.

While the position of the auto industry is understandable, parts marking effectiveness has been

demonstrated even though it is difficult to quantify. We agree that antitheft devices are effective

but not necessarily as a substitute for parts marking which acts both as a deterrent and for tracing

stolen parts and vehicles. The government calculation of the cost for parts marking has been

estimated by two different sources with similar results using recognized-standard estimating

procedures. Little cost information was provided by the auto manufacturers - only estimates from

Nissan and Volkswagen which were higher than the government estimates, but still within the

statutory cost limit. Nissan stated that other manufacturers with low volume production lines

subject to parts marking might have costs in excess of the Congressional ceiling.

Extend Parts Marking to Additional Parts

Six commenters recommend extending parts marking to additional parts. FL MVTPA, Dade

County, FL ATIU, State Farm, 3-M, and Iowa State Police recommend parts marking for air

bags. Three of these commenters (Dade County, FL ATIU, and State Farm) also recommend

parts marking for glazing and two of these commenters (3-M and Iowa State Police) also

recommend parts marking for sound systems. Toyota opposes marking glazing because of the

unreasonable labor costs to coordinate marked glazing to their respective vehicles and the lack of

demonstrable benefits.

xx
RESPONSE:

One comment indicated that the replacement cost of air bags was between $500 and $1,500.

While air bags have serial numbers, tracing an air bag back to its rightful vehicle without parts

marking is more difficult to do. Marking glazing has a deterrent effect but its cost may exceed the

Congressional limit per vehicle. The cost estimate of marking glazing was excessive a few years

ago when the Department considered rulemaking to require glazing be marked. The theft of

sound systems is more related to theft of vehicle contents rather than stealing the entire vehicle.

Thus, the Department does not support marking sound systems.

No data on the cost of marking for any of these additional parts was provided with the comments

received. To consider rulemaking for inclusion of any of these parts, the Department would have

to obtain cost data. In addition, information would be needed to indicate that marking any of

these parts would reduce vehicle thefts. Rulemaking would only proceed if there was evidence

that adding one or more of these parts could be done without increasing the total cost of parts

marking above the Congressional threshold and that there would be sufficient reductions in auto

thefts to pay for the costs.

Make Parts Marking More Permanent

FL MVTPA, Advocates, Dade County, and FL ATIU recommend making parts marking more

permanent. FL ATIU mentions invisographic type labels which leave the full VIN as its footprint

if the label is peeled off.

RESPONSE:

While more permanent marking methods have merit, no data were provided in the comments

received to support this initiative. The Department is interested in pursuing this recommendation

but needs additional information before arriving at a final decision. Parts marking manufacturers

have given some indication that such technology is under development.

xxi
Expand Exemptions of the Parts Marking Standard

Volkswagen of America, Inc recommends that NHTSA request Congress to allow exempting at

least two car lines per year, instead of one and Association of International Automobile

Manufacturers (AIAM) recommends expanding antitheft device exemptions.

RESPONSE:

The Department made this recommendation in the 1991 Report to Congress. However, given the

variety of effectiveness of antitheft devices, the Department defers any decision making until the

Justice Department has finished its 1999 study.

xxu
AUTO THEFT AND RECOVERY

Effects of

The Anti Car Theft Act Of 1992

and

The Motor Vehicle Theft Law

Enforcement Act Of 1984

July 1998
Auto Theft and Recovery

Introduction

Every year, more than one million motor vehicles are stolen. Estimates show that the economic

loss resulting from these thefts is at least $4 billion, and it could be as high as $8 billion. In 1991,

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration presented a report to the Congress assessing

the auto theft problem in the United States and the measures employed to fight theft. The basic

reasons for stealing cars have not changed since the 1991 report. For example, cars are stolen for

transportation (including unauthorized use of a vehicle or for use in transporting stolen goods or

committing other types of crimes), joyriding, export, for repair parts, and for obtaining expensive

stereo equipment to sell for a quick profit. A substantial economic loss continues to result from

thefts motivated to meet the demands for replacement parts. Since the last report to Congress, a

new type of auto theft crime has emerged ~ carjacking — but the motives for auto theft are still

the same.

Auto theft was an escalating problem that caused Congress to enact the Motor Vehicle Theft Law

Enforcement of 1984 (the 1984 Theft Act). The Theft Act was designed to reduce the incidence

of motor vehicle thefts and simplify the tracing and recovery of parts from stolen vehicles. The

Act directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue a theft prevention standard requiring

manufacturers to inscribe or affix numbers or symbols on major parts of passenger-car, high-theft

lines for identification "purposes. The Act also addressed other issues such as criminal penalties,

export of stolen motor vehicles, and comprehensive insurance premiums.

In October 1985, the Department issued the Federal Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard

(49 CFR Part 541) which requires manufacturers of designated high theft passenger car lines to

inscribe or affix the vehicle identification number (VIN) onto the following major parts: engines,

transmissions, fenders, doors, bumpers, quarter panels, hoods, and decklids/tailgates and/or

hatchbacks. In the case of engines and transmissions, either the 17-digit vehicle identification

number (VTN) or an eight digit VTN derivative must be engraved or stamped. Manufacturers can

meet the affixation requirements with indelibly marked labels that cannot be removed without

becoming torn or rendering the number on the label illegible. The labels must also leave a residue

on the part after being removed.

1
As a further theft deterrent, the 1984 Act allowed for an exemption from the parts-marking

requirements for certain car lines where antitheft devices were installed as standard equipment in

factory-delivered passenger cars. The Act limited each manufacturer to two car line exemptions

per model year. The manufacturer has to petition NHTSA for an exemption which is granted if it

is determined that the devices are likely to be as effective in reducing and deterring motor vehicle

theft as compliance with parts marking. The common features of antitheft devices installed as

standard equipment for which exemptions have been granted include "passive" systems, which

means that the system engages automatically without any extra action by motorists. Such systems

are activated automatically by removing the key from the ignition and locking the doors. Sensors

located in the doors, hood, trunk, and key cylinders activate alarms when unauthorized entry is

attempted. The approved systems have a starter or ignition interrupt and power (battery)

protection. Most systems granted exemptions in full have an audio and/or visual alarm (some of

the GM systems which use the PASS-Key have been granted exemptions in full but have no visual

or audio alarm). Systems granted a partial exemption because they do not have the audio/visual

alarm, must have the engines and transmissions marked.

In the 1991 report, theft rates between marked and unmarked cars was found to be statistically

insignificant. Recovery rates also showed no statistically significant differences between marked

and unmarked car lines. Cars with antitheft devices did not show a significant difference in theft

rates of cars containing marked parts. Recovery rates of antitheft device equipped cars appeared

to be lower than those of marked cars. Analysis of theft claims costs resulted in the same

conclusion. At the time of the 1991 report, evidence of the effectiveness of the theft standard

could not be obtained through statistical analysis of the data sets examined.

However, the Department did find wide support in 1991 for parts marking from the law

enforcement community. Law enforcement agents concerned with prevention and deterrence of

motor vehicle theft or the capture and prosecution of perpetrators believed that marking parts

provided them a valuable tool.
After considering the analyses, surveys, and public comments obtained during the preparation of

the 1991 report, the Department recommended that the theft prevention standard be continued

with several minor changes.

As a result of the Department's recommendation and other information received by the Congress,

the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 was enacted. This Act built on the 1984 Act in several ways:

Federal penalties for auto theft were enhanced. A grant program was authorized to help state and

local law enforcement agencies concerned with auto theft. Experts were called on to look into

and report on motor vehicle titling, registration, and salvage (the report was published in February

1994). The National Motor Vehicle Title Information System was to be established and the states

were required to participate in the system; the Theft Prevention Standard was expanded, rules

were established to check if salvage or junk vehicles are stolen; and the Attorney General is to

maintain a National Stolen Auto Part Information System. Selling or distributing marked parts

that are stolen became a Federal crime. Random customs inspection to detect stolen vehicles

being exported were allowed. A pilot study on a nondestructive inspection system was

authorized. As in the 1984 Act, the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 calls for a report to the Congress

on the effects of the Act on trends in motor vehicle thefts and recovery. The report is due five

years after the legislation was enacted (October 25, 1992). As in the 1984 Act, a preliminary

report was published in June 1997 and announced in the Federal Register (June 26, 1997 page

34494) with a 45 day comment period ending August 11. The comments received are

summarized and discussed in Appendix D of this report.

The 1992 Act's amendments on theft prevention include: expanding coverage to selected lines

that were below the 1990/1991 median theft rate, and including high theft multipurpose passenger

vehicles and light trucks that are rated at not more than 6,000 pounds gross vehicle weight under

the provisions of the theft standard. These changes had to be made two years (1994) after the

enactment of the Act. Three years later (1997), based on the Attorney General's findings, the

Secretary of Transportation shall designate all remaining such lines of passenger motor vehicles

(other than light-duty trucks), unless the Attorney General determines such additional parts

marking would not substantially inhibit chop shop operations and vehicle thefts. By the end of

1999, the Attorney General shall determine if the rules have been effective in inhibiting chop
shops and vehicle theft and send these findings to the Secretary. These findings are to include an

analysis of the effectiveness of factory-installed antitheft devices as a substitute for parts marking.

The rulemaking process and manufacturer comments regarding lead time to implement parts

marking resulted in expansion of the Theft Prevention Standard to a selected group of low theft

line vehicle lines and other passenger vehicles beginning with the 1997 model year. The most

recent theft data available for this report from the National Crime Information Center is the 1995

file. Thus the effectiveness of the Anti Car Theft Act as regards to expanded coverage cannot be

determined with the available data at this time. Other provisions of the 1992 Anti Car Theft Act

and the effectiveness of the 1984 Act are evaluated in this report.

Both the 1984 and the 1992 Acts require the Secretary to include the following information in the

evaluation report: motor vehicle theft and recovery statistics as well as their collection and

reliability; the extent to which motor vehicles are dismantled or exported; the market for stolen

parts; the cost and benefit of marking parts; arrest and prosecution of auto theft offenders; the

Act's effect on the cost of comprehensive premiums; the adequacy of Federal and State theft laws;

and an assessment the potential benefits of parts marking on other classes of motor vehicles. The

1991 report studied and discussed each of these topics in depth. This report focuses on changes

that have occurred since the 1991 report. It also updates detailed statistics on motor vehicle theft

and recovery. Theft data were available from 1984 through 1995, and insurance data from 1986

through 1992.

The Department obtained data from sources specified in the Act and available elsewhere,

including: the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the U.S. Attorney Generals

Office, the Bureau of Customs, the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI), the National Insurance

Crime Bureau (NICB), and individual insurance companies. Surveys or interviews were

conducted with officials of state, county and city enforcement agencies, motor vehicle

administrations and court systems; and with personnel at auto body repair shops.
In preparing this report, the Department worked with and consulted the Department of Justice's

National Institute of Justice.

Motives and the Market

Thieves differ in their motives for stealing motor vehicles. The 1991 report included two surveys,

performed in 1989, that estimated the distribution of car thefts by motive. Fundamentally, some

vehicles are stolen in more or less professional operations for profit, while other thefts are

typically the work of individuals, for profit or for other reasons. Here are some of the most

common motives for theft:

Thefts to supply vehicles or parts for resale:

• Chop shop operations: businesses that acquire stolen vehicles or hire thieves to provide

vehicles so that parts can be removed and sold for profit. These parts may eventually be

sought by others to repair damaged vehicles, since they sell for substantially less than original

equipment parts. (The 1989 surveys estimated that chop shops account for between 10 and

16 percent of all thefts.)

• Theft and retag: vehicles are stolen and sold for profit to be registered under another VTN.

The new VTN and title are obtained by purchasing a junked vehicle of the same make-model.

The VTN plate is transferred from the junked vehicle to the stolen vehicle and the title may

need slight alteration to match the stolen vehicle (an estimated 15 percent of thefts).

• Thefts for export: vehicles are stolen and illegally shipped out of the United States to be sold

for profit (4 to 17 percent of thefts).

Other motives for theft:
• Insurance fraud: "stealing" your own car, or having somebody else "steal" and hide it, so you

can collect its insured value. After the insurance company pays off, the vehicle may be

abandoned by the thieves, eventually recovered, and end up as the property of the insurance

company. Insurance fraud might be contemplated, for example, if the owner has financial

distress, or if the vehicle is in much worse shape than its insured value (9 to 23 percent of

thefts).

• For concealing one's identity while committing another crime: stealing a vehicle as temporary

transportation to and from the scene of another crime. The stolen vehicle does not belong,

and cannot be traced, to the criminal. Soon afterwards, it may be abandoned and eventually

recovered (an estimated 13 percent of thefts).

• Joyriding or temporary transportation: the vehicle is usually abandoned and recovered after a

matter of hours or days (estimates ranged from 25 percent up to 68 percent of thefts).

Of the million vehicles stolen each year, 200,000 are never recovered. Chop shop operations,

export, insurance fraud, and retagging are believed to account for most of the unrecovered

vehicles. Before parts marking, passenger cars represented 57 percent of the unrecovered

vehicles, but from 1987 through 1995, this has increased to over 62 percent. The number of

unrecovered passenger cars has varied from as few as 87,000 in 1985 to over 170,000 in 1991.

No new surveys have been conducted on the distribution of thefts, by motive. Assuming, for the

moment, that the distributions were similar in 1995 and 1988, the estimated counts and costs for

chop shop operations, fraud and export in 1995 are as follows:

• Between 84,000 and 135,000 passenger cars valued from over $600 million to almost $1

billion were stolen to remove parts in chop shops.

• Fraud of all kinds accounted for anywhere between 75,000 to 320,000 stolen passenger cars,

valued from $550 million to $2.4 billion; and
• Between 30,000 and 123,000 of the 143,000 unrecovered passenger cars are believed to have

been stolen for export, with an estimated value of $221 million to S905 million.

However, the Customs Service has provided more recent estimates of vehicles stolen for export.

They estimated that in 1995 as many as 375,000 (the FBI data indicates that 200,000 is a better

estimate of unrecovered vehicles) cars may have been stolen and exported. Using the Customs

Service value of recovered stolen cars in 1994 of $13,100, the upper bound estimated value of

stolen exported passenger cars could be as much as $4.9 billion. The Customs Service also

estimated that 200,000 passenger cars were stolen and exported in 1990 with a market value of

$800 million (at a reported average of $4,000 per vehicle in 1990).

Exports of stolen vehicles are extremely difficult to estimate. In 1988 and 1989, Customs agents

report seizing 1,292 stolen passenger cars, a fraction of the estimated total. The Customs Service

has improved its ability to recoup stolen passenger cars and reported 1,700 recovered in 1992 and

2,300 recovered in 1994. However, no inferences can be drawn from the trend in recoveries to

the number exported and not recovered. While 1992 and 1994 show an improvement in

recoveries over 1988 and 1989, there are still tens of thousands of stolen vehicles being exported

illegally out of this country. Because law enforcement officials believe most stolen vehicles and

parts are exported in sealed containers or crates, two provisions of the Anti Car Theft Act of

1992 specifically address that issue. One provision allows for random customs inspections to

detect stolen vehicles being exported, and the other authorizes a pilot study of a nondestructive

inspection system.

The 1991 report estimates that almost 32 million passenger cars during 1988 had crash damage

which cost an estimated $28.6 billion in parts to repair. The used/rebuilt portion of the parts

market in 1988 was thought to be 4 to 5 percent or $1.6 billion at that time. That portion appears

to have grown over time. A survey of repair shops in 1989 indicated that used parts were

employed in making repairs about 10 percent of the time; a similar survey in 1996 indicates that

used parts comprise 14 percent of the repair parts. Assuming that the same number of cars as in

1988 need repair today and using current dollars, the estimated portion for used/rebuilt repair

parts is about $5.3 billion. Stolen parts comprise a portion of that used parts market.
The lack of information for making good estimates on the motives for auto theft results in broad

and sometimes overlapping ranges. Thus, in the remainder of this evaluation, vehicle thefts and

recoveries are analyzed only in the aggregate, without identifying the motives.

Thefts. Theft Rates, and Recovery Rates. 1984-1995

The FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC), once again is the source of theft and

recovery data for this report as it was for the 1991 report. Theft data from 1984 through 1995

were available. Because of differences in screening, vehicle definitions, and aggregating the data,

totals shown for 1984 through 1988 are slightly different from the 1991 report. The NCIC

information is considered the most accurate and precise available. Each record contains the make,

line, theft and recovery dates of individual stolen motor vehicles. The summary information

compiled from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which are based on reports by local police

agencies, is not presented here, as it had been in the 1991 report. Comparisons were made

between the NCIC and UCR data bases in the 1991 report, and the NCIC data base was found to

be more definitive for analysis purposes. The UCR data base includes attempted thefts as well as

successful thefts.

Thefts: The principal finding of this evaluation is that the auto theft problem, which was growing

during the mid 1980's, leveled off or even began to decline after 1989-90. In 1995, there were

1,179,856 motor vehicles stolen, a rise of 39 percent since 1984, but a decline of 7 percent since

1990. In 1995, passenger cars account for 71 percent of all motor vehicle thefts; light trucks -

i.e., pickup trucks, vans and sport utility vehicles (SUV's) account for 24 percent. The remaining

five percent are thefts of heavy trucks, buses and motorcycles. Total thefts increased steadily

from 830,545 in 1984 to 1,234,088 in 1989, an 8 percent annual rate of increase. They leveled

off in the early 1990's, with a reduction from 1,227,768 in 1994 to 1,179,856 in 1995. The sharp

increase in thefts of pickup trucks, vans and SUV's throughout this period is proportionate to

their increasing share of the vehicles on the road. Annual thefts of motor vehicles from 1984

through 1995 are shown in Table 1 and Figures 1A and IB.
Theft rates (Thefts per 100,000 registered vehicles2

) are shown in Table 2 and Figures 2A and 2B.

The theft rate for all types of vehicles has the same trend as overall thefts. The theft rate

increased from 543 in 1984 to 714 in 1990. It has declined to 597 by 1995. The rates for

passenger cars and light trucks show a similar pattern. (Even though thefts of light trucks have

increased, their registrations grew even more rapidly, so the theft rate declined after 1989.) Theft

rates for heavy trucks, buses and motorcycles have experienced even larger reductions.

Recovery rates: The number of recoveries have kept pace with thefts over the years. The

recovery rate (recoveries/thefts) has remained stable. Table 3 and Figures 3 A and 3B indicate

that overall recovery rates during 1984-95 have ranged from a low of 78 percent to a high of 87

percent but the trend has been neither increasing nor decreasing: the rate has been consistently

close to 83 percent. NCIC recovery data for 1995 was still incomplete at the time of this study.

The 1995 rates in Table 3 can be expected to increase if vehicles stolen in 1995 and recovered in

1996 (after the cutoff date for the file used in this study) were to be included.

Passenger cars have slightly higher recovery rates than pickup trucks/vans/SUV's or heavy trucks.

Motorcycles have substantially lower recovery rates, and they have gotten worse. After 1990,

recovery rates for all types of vehicles tend to be higher in the even years than the odd years. The

reason for that pattern is unknown.

Registered vehicles are the number of vehicles registered by the states and reflects the

fleet of vehicles on the road. The data comes from the R. L. Polk Co. which compiles the

information obtained from the states usually at the end of June which is the fiscal year for most

states. Registered vehicle data is essential since it can be separated by model year.




Effect of Parts Marking and Antitheft Devices on Theft and Recovery Rates

A key outcome of the Antitheft Act of 1984 was that a large number of model year 1987

passenger cars would get marked parts. A smaller number would get factory-installed antitheft

devices in 1987, or a few years earlier or later. At the time of the 1991 Report to the Congress, a

comprehensive evaluation was impossible simply because there were not yet enough data on cars

with marked parts or antitheft devices. By now, those cars have been on the road for a much

longer time. Their theft and recovery rates can be tracked for several years and compared to the

corresponding rates for cars without either measure. Appendix A of this report presents the

analyses that were performed to evaluate the effect of parts marking and antitheft devices.

However, biases in the data obstructed the evaluation of parts marking and made it essentially

impossible to attribute a specific percentage reduction in thefts or increase in recoveries to that

remedy. Still, the analyses do suggest that parts marking quite possibly had some beneficial

effects at times. The analyses produced quantitative effectiveness estimates for one type of

antitheft device installed in domestic cars, but the data were insufficient for similar analyses of

other types of antitheft devices. Here is a summary of the analysis objectives, data sources,

findings and conclusions.

If parts marking or antitheft devices are effective, they ought to reduce theft rates and/or

increase recovery rates. These goals would be accomplished through direct effects and

deterrent effects. While there have been numerous cases where parts marking directly helped

recover cars or convict thieves, it is probably safe to say that the deterrent effects are potentially

far larger, in quantitative terms. The primary deterrent effect, of course, would be to dissuade

professional car theft operations, especially chop-shop operations, from stealing cars with marked

parts or antitheft devices. Thefts for joyriding, etc., are less likely to be deterred by parts

marking. A significant reduction in the theft rate might be expected to start in model year 1987

in the make-models that got marked parts that year. However, the effect might not trigger all at

once (i.e., in model year 1987). It might have built up over time as thieves became more aware of

parts marking, or as body shops gradually became more careful about the source of their parts,

and it might even have spilled over onto earlier cars (thieves do not always have time to ascertain

the exact model year, and might avoid stealing cars of the lines that got parts marking, even if

they are slightly pre-1987). A long-term reduction of theft rates might be expected in the lines

14
that got parts marking or antitheft devices, relative to car lines that did not. Thus, it is

appropriate to perform short-term (just before/after model year 1987) and long-term analyses of

theft rates.

The deterrent effect might also impact the recovery rate. When cars are stolen for chop shops,

the overall recovery rate is relatively low and many of the recoveries are only "in part" (as defined

in "Collection and Dissemination of Theft and Recovery Information," later in this report). When

cars are stolen for joyriding, etc., the overall recovery rate is usually high, and most of the

recoveries are "intact" or "in whole." If parts marking deters thefts for chop shops but has little

effect on joyriding, etc., it ought to increase the overall recovery rate and reduce the proportion of

recoveries that are only "in part."

The remedies should reduce the number of unrecovered stolen vehicles per million registered

vehicles. To the extent that many of the vehicles stolen by professional thieves - for chop shops,

salvage switch and retag, or export - are never recovered, this "unrecovered theft rate" may be

considered as a sort of surrogate for the unknown "professional" theft rate. If the remedies

change all three rates in the right direction, so much the better, but even if they change just one,

especially the unrecovered theft rate, it might be good enough.

Only a small reduction in theft is needed to make parts marking cost effective. As discussed in

"The Cost of Marking Parts," later in this report, a relative reduction of two percent in the theft

rate of 0-3 year old cars would already pay for parts marking.

The make-models slated for parts marking or antitheft devices in 1987 were not picked on a

random basis, but were the ones that had the highest theft rates in MY 1983-84. Even without

parts marking or antitheft devices, these make-models would inevitably have experienced a strong

reduction in their theft rates, relative to other car lines, for a number of years after 1984 - a

phenomenon called "regression to the mean." As is explained in Appendix A, parts-marking

effects on the order of, say, two percent cannot readily be discerned from the much stronger

"regression to the mean" effect that went on at the same time. With this fundamental bias in the

data, it becomes almost impossible to produce specific, quantitative effectiveness estimates. A

closer look at "regression to the mean," and an attempt to isolate its effect by statistical tools is

15
documented in Appendix B. However, even with statistical tools, it is difficult to distinguish one

effect from another in the type of data furnished for this evaluation.

The principal data base for the analyses, assembled from NCIC and R.L. Polk data, enumerates

how many cars were registered, stolen and recovered, by make-model, model year and calendar

year. The data base covers calendar years 1984-95, and it includes cars from 0 to 15 years old. It

is useful for studying the short-term and long-term trends in theft rates and overall recovery rates.

Another data base, assembled by HLDI from theft and recovery records supplied by the NICB,

enumerates how many cars were recovered "in part," "in whole," or "intact," by make-model,

model year and calendar year. That data base is complete for calendar years 1986-91, and it

includes cars from 0 to at least 2 years old. It is useful for studying short-term trends of the "in

part" recovery rate.

As stated above, the analyses did not generate a reliable quantitative estimate of the reduction of

thefts or enhancement of recoveries attributable to parts marking, and they did not lead to an

unequivocal conclusion that parts marking has been effective. But the analyses were not totally

inconclusive or neutral. They produced five concrete indications of benefits for parts marking, all

hedged with caveats that made them fall short of firm deductions:

(1) Short-term theft trends: Above all, there was a conspicuous shift in theft rates in 1986-87,

coinciding with the introduction of parts marking. Thefts of 1987 make-models with

marked parts were lower than expected, while thefts of the same make-models in 1986

(unmarked) and thefts of other 1987 make-models (unmarked) were both higher than

expected. The net shift was on the order of 20 percent when the cars were less than a year

old (see Figures A-9 and A-10 in Appendix A). However, the effect was already much

weaker for one-year-old cars and it had vanished by the time the cars were two years old.

Also, the effect was more of a shift in what cars were stolen than a reduction of overall

theft rates.

(2) Short-term recovery trends: Recovery rates for 1987 cars with parts marking were

consistently higher than for the same make-models in 1986, the last year before parts

16
marking. Unlike the effect on theft rates, this benefit persisted as the model year 1987

cars got older. On the other hand, the 1986-87 favorable effect was followed by an

unexplained but consistent deterioration, starting in model year 1988, in the recovery rates

of cars with parts marking relative to other make-models without the markings.

(3) Short-term unrecovered-theft trends: In calendar year 1987, the unrecovered-theft rate of

model year 1987 cars with parts marking was 26 percent lower than expected. As the

model year 1987 cars got older, this benefit diminished, but not to zero; it persisted at

about 6 percent. That is the closest thing to a specific "effectiveness estimate" for parts

marking. However, that observed benefit is within the "noise range" of possible biases in

the data and it cannot be attributed to parts marking without considerable doubt.

(4) Long-term trends: In the very long term (cars of the early 90's vs. cars of the late 70's),

parts marking and antitheft devices appear to be associated with a reduction in theft rates

(see Figures A-l and A-2 in Appendix A). In other words, the make-models that were

selected in 1983-84 to get parts marking or antitheft devices in 1987 historically had

higher theft rates than other make-models, even as far back as model year 1976. But from

model year 1991 onwards, their theft rates were slightly lower than other make models.

Little can be said about the crucial intervening years, the 1980's. The nonrandom selection

of high-theft lines for parts marking caused a "regression to the mean" situation that

obscured all other trends. It is only possible to compare cars of the late 70's and early

90's, before and after the "regression to the mean" phenomenon. So many other factors

could be affecting theft trends over a 20-year period that it would be foolhardy to attribute

the observed long-term reduction to parts marking. Additionally, the unrecovered-theft

rates did not experience a similar long-term improvement.

(5) Short-term "in part" recovery trends: There was a strong reduction of "in part" vehicle

recoveries, and a corresponding increase of "in whole" and "intact" recoveries in all makemodels after parts marking was introduced in 1987, and especially in the make-models that

got the markings. The reduction of "in part" vehicle recoveries could be an indication that

chop shop operations and some other types of professional car theft are declining.

17
However, a closer examination of the data showed that the reduction did not begin

immediately with the introduction of parts marking, but mostly came 1-3 years later,

possibly as a result of factors unrelated to parts marking, such as, perhaps, changes in the

way that recoveries were reported.

By contrast, for at least one type of factory-installed antitheft device, the available data provide

unequivocal evidence of effectiveness. One domestic manufacturer installed a system as standard

equipment in various car lines during 1989-94. This system was associated with an immediate -

and persistent - 70 percent reduction in the theft rate and a 58 percent reduction in the

unrecovered-theft rate. In other words, the devices appear to be quite effective in reducing all

kinds of thefts, both the "professional" and the "casual" type.

Substantially fewer data were available on the antitheft devices installed by other manufacturers.

Specific estimates were not obtained, but the available data suggest considerable variation in

effectiveness. With some of the devices, little change was seen in theft rates; with others, there

were reductions comparable to those for the domestic manufacturer.

On the whole, the analysis results seem to suggest that the approach of Chapter 331 of the Anti

Car Theft Act, which views both parts-marking and factory-installed antitheft devices as effective

deterrents to automobile theft, has had benefits. Only a small effect, such as a 2 percent reduction

of unrecovered thefts is necessary for parts marking to be cost-effective. An effect of that

magnitude would have been obscured in the data available for the analyses. However, the positive

results described above hint that the effect of parts marking might have been greater than 2

percent, at least at certain times. Antitheft devices, at least those installed in certain vehicles, are

many times more effective, but also many times higher in cost. Parts marking and antitheft

devices are components of a larger program that has, on the whole, succeeded. As shown in

Table 2 and Figure 2, theft rates have leveled off and even began to decline after 1989-90. When

the team wins, each of the individual players gets some credit.

Two other issues tie in with the analysis results. (1) The nonrandom selection of high-theft makemodels for parts marking impeded the evaluation, and (2) There is a hint that the initial effect of

18
parts marking may have waned in subsequent years. That's at best a tentative finding, given the

uncertainties in all the analyses. However, it corresponds to the view that many professional

thieves eventually learned how to obliterate the markings. If so, that encourages consideration of

more permanent systems of parts marking: the high potential for benefits might well justify the

higher cost.

Effect of Vehicle Age on Theft and Recovery Rates

A vehicle's age is a theft motive consideration. Chop shop operations involve removing parts

from stolen vehicles for the purpose of providing repair parts for other vehicles that have either

been damaged in collisions or because of wear. As vehicles age, the chance of needing repairs

increases and the chance of being in a collision remains fairly constant. In contrast, vehicles that

are stolen for either joyriding or for the purpose of retagging may more likely be newer vehicles

that are attractive targets with higher market value. Unfortunately, there is no method for

identifying theft motives by vehicle age.

Appendix C shows a detailed analysis of theft rates" by vehicle age to determine if there is a

relationship. Analysis of theft data in aggregate immediately suggested that there were two

possible confounding factors: calendar year effects, and model year effects. In the first situation,

vehicle thefts in any year can be influenced by such things as the weather or economic conditions,

neither of which would have anything to do with vehicle age. For example, the blizzard

conditions in the midwest this spring has meant that some states have virtually no vehicles on the

road and few people out-of-doors. This would mean for that region and time period, vehicle

thefts would be low. Model year influences include such things as major manufacturers making

across the board design changes such as when they went from rear to front wheel drive. Again, if

these changes are radical it can result in fewer vehicle thefts of that model year because parts are

not interchangeable with other older vehicles or because the new model' appearance has less

appeal. The analysis in Appendix C corrected for both calendar year and model year effects.

The result of the vehicle age analysis was that no relationship between vehicle age and theft rate

was found. Current model year cars were just as likely to be stolen as eight year old models.

19
Also, there was no relationship between vehicle age and recovery rate. Thus, current model year

vehicles had the same recovery chance as did eight year old models. What the analysis suggests is

that theft motives, including those of professional thieves, that may change as vehicles age may

have countervailing effects. Thus, as vehicle thefts for used parts may increase as vehicles age,

thefts for retagging or joy riding may decrease with vehicle age in a proportionate manner.

The analysis was extended to light trucks with the same findings: no relationship was found

between vehicle age and theft and recovery rates. The passenger car data was separated by

marked, unmarked and those with antitheft devices with the same result - no vehicle age effect

was found with respect to either theft rates or recovery rates.

What this suggests is that the risk of theft persists over the life of a car. This implies that parts

markings ought to last essentially over the life of the car.

Collection and Dissemination of Theft and Recovery Information

National theft and recovery information is collected and compiled by the same organizations as

discussed in the 1991 report: The Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for the Uniform

Crime Reports (UCR) and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC); the insurance industry

sponsors the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI), the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety

(IMS), and the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB), formerly the National Automobile

Theft Bureau.

The 1991 report discussed the fact that these data sources provide substantial information on the

number of thefts, the costs associated with auto theft, and the recovery of stolen vehicles and their

condition. These systems do not reveal the motives for vehicle thefts. Thus it is not possible to

directly measure changes in thefts so as to determine if the 1984 and 1992 Acts have had an

impact on chop-shop operations and any of the other thefts for profit: retagging, insurance fraud,

and export of stolen vehicles.

20
As in 1991, the UCR collects monthly information from local police agencies on reported vehicle

thefts and attempted thefts, and arrests for these crimes. This information is published at least

annually with the primary objective of providing reliable crime statistics for law enforcement use.

The NCIC has an online-computerized filing system of theft cases with all the key information for

ready access to individual records of reported motor vehicle thefts. This system is used to obtain

information on crimes under investigation. When a vehicle is located, the case is closed. The

NCIC maintains historical information for four years before purging its files. Each case of a

reported stolen vehicle includes the Vehicle Identification Number (VTN) and complete state

registration data as well as the date of the theft, theft location and reporting agency.

The NICB is a clearinghouse for information on motor vehicle thefts reported by the insurance

industry. The NICB provides assistance to law enforcement and other public agencies such as

state motor vehicle administrations. The NICB is the organization designated by the U.S.

Department of Transportation to collect information in a standard reporting system on vehicle

recovery condition:

"In part" One or more major parts missing. "Major" parts are the engine, transmission,

fenders, doors, bumpers, quarter panels, hood, and decklid/tailgate/hatchback -

i.e., the parts that would have been marked if the vehicle had parts marking.

"In whole" No major parts missing; but there is damage to the vehicle such as being stripped

of other than major parts and/or wrecked, burned, etc.

"Intact" No major parts missing; no damage to the vehicle other than that caused when the

thieves entered and operated the vehicle; ordinary wear and tear.

The NICB assists law enforcement agencies by matching reports of stolen vehicles with reports of

vehicle recoveries, and impounded vehicles. The NICB also helps with investigative inquiries.

21
The IMS and HLDI collect and compile the insurance industry annual report on theft experience

and its effect on insurance premiums. This report is submitted to the Department of

Transportation, as required by the 1984 Act. HLDI also compiles and disseminates insurance

claim cost data and insurance theft losses and prepares industry reports annually.

The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 calls for two new or expanded systems: the National Motor

Vehicle Title Information System and the National Stolen Auto Part Information System. The

Justice Department is setting up the first system after considering the recommendations of an

expert advisory committee that prepared a report in 1994 for the President, Congress, and State

Governors. A pilot project for the system is under development in Virginia, Florida, Indiana and

Massachusetts. The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators is managing the

project and the R.L. Polk Company is also participating. Three other states, Maryland, Delaware,

and New York are expected to participate as well. The stolen auto parts system is an expansion

of a NCIC system that existed before the 1992 Act. These two systems are either not completely

in place or are so new that their effects on vehicle theft (on the prevention, recovery or

apprehension of auto thieves) cannot be evaluated at this time.

Current data and views on what changes have taken place in collecting and disseminating motor

vehicle theft information are based on a survey of state motor vehicle administrations and the

annual insurance reporting information sent to the Department. All the state motor vehicle

administrations in 1991 agreed that there had been no changes in information sharing practices

between 1983-1986 (before the 1984 Act's provisions were implemented) and 1987-1988. By

1996, however, one-third had experienced gradual changes in the way information was shared due

mainly to improvements in information-processing technology implemented since 1988.

Nevertheless, the majority still felt that no changes occurred after 1988.

Databases became more complete and accessible to the agencies needing the information. In

1991, three-fourths of the state agencies recorded the recovered vehicle's condition, by 1996 this

had grown to almost 90 percent. Almost 80 percent of the states surveyed in 1996 had made

changes to procedures regarding the collection and recording of vehicle recovery information

since 1986, as a direct result of the 1984 and 1992 Acts. New technology has provided for

increased data collection and dissemination and resulted in changes in these processes. All states

22
surveyed participated with the NCIC and equivalent state-level organizations. Two-thirds

indicated that state and local law enforcement agencies played a major role in collecting and

recording vehicle theft and recovery information. In other words, although there have not been

major changes in the type of information collected, technology improvements have made it easier

to access and share the information.

Each year since 1986, the insurance industry has reported to the Department on collecting and

disseminating motor vehicle theft and recovery data as well as effects on insurance premiums and

other related matters. In 1986, there were 24 companies that reported, while in 1992 (the latest

year of information available for this report), 19 companies reported.

Percent of insurance companies that:

Reported thefts and recoveries to NICB

Notified local law enforcement agencies

Notified other insurance companies or state/federal agencies

Did not notify any outside organization

Insurance companies have made some progress in directly disseminating auto theft and recovery

information, including a threefold increase of reporting to local law enforcement agencies.

Nevertheless, it is clear that insurance companies still rely most heavily on the NICB as a

clearinghouse for such information.

The Economic Cost of Auto Theft

The overall cost of motor vehicle thefts to the United States economy is difficult to estimate

accurately, since not all thefts are reported, the precise value of stolen and recovered vehicles may

be unknown, and ancillary costs such as insurance administration, police work, and loss of

consumers' time are hard to gauge. Based on available data, four estimates were generated,

1986

83

20

33

10

1992

76

60

33

10

23
ranging from about $4.0 to $8.3 billion per year. The best guess is that the actual cost is near the

middle, or somewhat below the middle of that range, i.e., about $5 or $6 billion per year.

The lowest estimate is derived from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR), as summarized in Crime

in the United States, 1994 is the most recent year for which data were available. The total value

of vehicles stolen in 1994, as reported to police agencies, was $7.6 billion (based on Crime in the

United States, 1994, p 50). While over 80 percent of the vehicles were eventually recovered,

many of them are damaged or have parts missing; only 61.1 percent of the value of the stolen

vehicles was recovered (ibid, p. 205). The other 38.9 percent of the value, $2,957 billion was

lost. To those direct losses, it is necessary to add the cost of insurance administration, police

investigation, and time lost by victims (filling out reports, court appearances, acquiring substitute

transportation, etc.): an estimated markup of 33.7 percent (taken from The Economic Cost of

Motor Vehicle Crashes. 1994. DOT HS 808 425, p.7). Thus, the overall cost to the economy

was an estimated $3,954 billion in 1994. Based on the UCR data, the economic cost of motor

vehicle theft escalated from $2.4 billion in 1985 to $4 billion in 1991, and it leveled off after 1991,

consistent with the pattern of overall thefts in Table 1 and Figure 1.

A somewhat higher estimate is derived from NCIC data. In 1995, there were 1,179,856 stolen

vehicles with an average value of $7,350 (based on Crime in the United States). The total value

of the stolen vehicles, according to NCIC, would have been $8,672 billion. If 38.9 percent of that

value is lost, as was estimated in the UCR data, the direct loss was $3,373 billion. With a 33.7

percent markup, the net loss to the economy would have been $4,510 billion.

A nearly identical estimate can be obtained by examining actual premiums paid for comprehensive

insurance. The Insurance Information Institute reports that the comprehensive policies written for

motor vehicles during 1995 amounted to 110.8 million insured vehicle years. The average

premium was $116.91 per year. Thus, consumers actually spent $12,954 billion on

comprehensive premiums. Very close to one-third of comprehensive premiums go to processing

and paying theft claims: $4.318 billion (the remainder goes to processing and paying claims for

vandalism, fires, floods, etc.). When an 8.7 percent markup is added for police investigation and

time lost by victims, the cost to the economy is $4,694 billion.

24
The preceding estimate may be considered low because many stolen vehicles are not insured by

comprehensive policies. For an upper bound, let it be assumed that all of the 196.6 million

vehicles on the road in 1995 had comprehensive insurance, at the same $116.91 premium as

above. In that case, the total cost of premiums would have been $22,985 billion, the portion used

for processing and paying theft claims $7,662 billion, and the cost to the economy, after the 8.7

percent markup, $8,329 billion. However, this is undoubtedly an overestimate. It is primarily

older vehicles that do not have comprehensive policies, and since their value has substantially

depreciated, their average premiums, if they had such policies, would have been less than

$116.91.

The Cost of Marking Parts

To comply with the standard, up to 14 parts have to be marked. These include the engine and

transmission, which historically had already been marked with the entire VIN or a VTN derivative

of eight to nine digits. If manufacturers had been using the VTN derivative on or before October

24, 1984, they were permitted to continue using it. The other parts that were marked were the

front fenders (2), doors (2 or 4), bumpers (2), rear quarter panels (2), hood and

decklid/tailgate/hatchback.

When labels are used, the 17 digit VTN must be printed indelibly, and the label permanently

affixed to the part. If the label is removed it must self-destruct by tearing or making the VTN

illegible. Removing the label must also alter the appearance of the area where it was affixed so

that evidence remains that a label was originally there. Any attempts to alter the number on a

label must leave traces of the original number. Standards also apply to new replacement parts:

they do not have a VTN but instead have the DOT logo and the letter "R" to indicate that they are

new replacement parts.

Since the beginning of parts marking, manufacturers have met the requirements with adhesive

backed labels made by a variety of suppliers. In accordance with Section 604(b)(l) of the 1984

Theft Act, the cost of marking engines and transmissions was not taken into account in estimating

25
the cost of parts marking since these parts have historically been marked with the VIN or VIN derivative.

The 1984 Theft Act limited the cost to manufacturers to $15 per car (in 1984 dollars) or less. In

1995 dollars, the maximum cost per car would be $22 (based on the Consumer Price Index for all

items, United States city average). Using a detailed production analysis process and factors to

estimate the consumer cost, the 1991 report to Congress showed that actual costs were well

within the permissible amount. The highest cost to a manufacturer among the make-models

analyzed was $3.35 per passenger car and the highest cost to purchasers was $5.49 per car. The

average cost per car was $4.14. These estimates were in 1988 dollars. There is no evidence to

suggest that the cost of labels and the cost of the manufacturing assembly process have changed.

Thus the average cost to the purchaser, per car, in 1995 dollars is estimated to be $4.92.

A two percent reduction in thefts among 0-3 year old cars would generate a consumer benefit that

would more than pay for the cost of the labels. The cost-benefit analysis is as follows: in 1995,

when 3.2 million cars with marked parts were sold, the cost to consumers for parts marking was

$15.7 million. Also in 1995, thieves stole 50,131 model year 1992-95 cars with marked parts

(i.e., 0-3 years old). The average market value in 1995 of these new or partially depreciated cars

was $14,833 (Source: Average New Car Prices 1993-1996 Automotive News Market Data

Books and the Used Car Book). The types of theft most likely to be deterred by parts marking

(chop shop operations, retag) typically result in a total or near-total loss of the vehicle ($14,833);

after adding the cost of insurance administration, police investigation and victims' lost time, the

cost to the economy is $19,832. Given the $15.7 million cost of parts marking, thefts of 0-3 year

old passenger cars would have to drop by about 792 (i.e., $15,700,000/$19,832) to have the

benefit in terms of auto thefts avoided equal to the cost of parts marking. That amounts to

approximately 1.6 percent of the 50,131 thefts of 0-3 year old cars with marked parts.

In the 1991 report to Congress, the subject of removal of labels was discussed. It was found at

that time that it was possible to completely remove the label and its adhesive and even any traces

that the parts was originally labeled. A national survey of auto theft investigators conducted for

the Justice Department in 1996 found that the most serious obstacle to making effective use of

labels is their ease of removal. Once the label is removed and its trace wiped out, it is, of course,

26

The Federal statistics seem to indicate that court activity peaked in 1987 and again in 1993. The

actual number of cases is so small that no conclusions can be drawn from these data.

The 1991 report to Congress did not include any statistical analyses of parts marking in

apprehending, arresting, and prosecuting car thieves because of insufficient data, but it contained

summaries of individual cases where parts marking helped accomplish those goals. The report

concluded that auto theft investigators were able to use labels to their advantage in chop shop

cases, inspections of salvage yards, steal-to-order operations, and insurance fraud.

Surveys of District Attorneys

For both the 1991 report to Congress and this report, surveys were conducted of state district

attorneys, motor vehicle administrations and law enforcement agencies to determine the effects of

the 1984 and 1992 Acts on apprehending, arresting, prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing chop

shop owners and "professional" auto thieves as well as chop shop operations and monitoring body

shops. The second survey showed a moderate increase in the number of prosecutions under the

1984 and 1992 Acts and an even larger increase in the level of effort that could be directed to

each prosecution. In 1991, very few of the district attorneys reported that the 1984 Act made

prosecution of professional auto thieves and chop shop operators easier. Similarly, only four

percent reported an increase in the number of prosecuted cases as a result of the 1984 Act and

none of the district attorneys had increased their efforts to prosecute auto theft cases. By 1996,

over 20 percent had seen an increase in the number of prosecuted cases in their jurisdictions and

10 percent saw a decrease in the auto theft rates as a result of the 1984 and 1992 Acts, although

two-thirds of the district attorneys reported that the number of prosecuted cases had not changed

as a result of the 1984 and 1992 Acts. In 1996, two-thirds of the district attorneys did increase

their efforts on a case-by-case basis in prosecuting these cases. Half of them indicated that the

1984 and 1992 Acts were responsible for this increase and the other half indicated that increased

motor vehicle thefts and administrative changes were the cause of their increased efforts.

In 1991, an overwhelming 96 percent of the district attorneys reported that convictions were not

affected by the 1984 Act. There were no changes in sentencing (most said that first offenders got

28
suspended sentences and/or fines and subsequent offenders were put in jail/prison). In contrast,

by 1996, almost half of the district attorneys reported an increase in convictions and most of them

attributed this to the 1984 and 1992 Acts. District attorneys reported stiffer sentencing in 45

percent of the convictions, including a 75 percent increase in jail sentences. This could have been

even higher but prison overcrowding in one jurisdiction necessitated automatic probation for

thefts valued under $20,000. Other benefits of the 1984 and 1992 Acts include: district attorneys

working more closely with law enforcement agencies; auto theft prevention authorities being

established to prevent, arrest, and prosecute auto theft cases; and greater success in catching

violators.

Surveys of Law Enforcement Agencies

The surveys of law enforcement agencies done in 1991 and 1996 did not reveal dramatic changes

in their attitudes about the deterrent effect of parts marking. In 1991, most auto theft

investigators at law enforcement agencies anticipated no effect in reduction of auto thefts for chop

shop operations. They felt that if there was a demand for a part, even if marked, thieves would

steal the part. Nevertheless, about 45 percent of the investigators felt that parts marking might

make professional thieves more cautious or even completely deter them. Another one-third of the

investigators thought that auto thieves looked upon parts marking as an inconvenience. All

investigators thought that parts marking had no effect on amateur thieves. The 1996 survey was

also split. Half the investigators felt that parts marking did deter professional auto thieves and the

other half did not. Those who thought parts marking was beneficial felt that it had the greatest

effect on chop shop operators because it did increase the cost of "doing business".

However, the surveys showed that the agencies had even more positive attitudes about parts

marking as a tool for arresting and prosecuting thieves in 1996 than in 1991. In 1991, while most

law enforcement officers said there was no effect on thefts, arrests, and prosecution of auto

thieves as a result of the 1984 Act, most of them did feel that parts marking did assist in

identifying and recovering stolen parts and vehicles. There were no cases reported that were

prosecuted under the sections of the 1984 Act. By 1996, arrests and prosecutions had changed

dramatically. About three fourths of the law enforcement agencies in the big cities surveyed (31

29
of 32 of the largest cities in the U.S. were surveyed) said that parts marking helped in arresting

both chop shop owners and professional auto thieves for these reasons:

• Labels make it possible to detect stolen parts/vehicles

• Missing, damaged, counterfeit, miss-matched VIN's on parts is sufficient evidence for

officers to seize parts as evidence and make subsequent arrests.

• Without labels serving as "red-flags", investigators would have no reason to suspect cars

or parts are stolen.

• In many inspections of restored salvage vehicles, labels have led to evidence of stolen

parts or the total vehicle.

Surveys of Motor Vehicle Administrations

Surveys for the 1991 report to Congress and again in 1996 show that since 1983 to the present

there has been little or no change in monitoring body shops. Lack of funds for inspectors is the

primary cause for this even though the 1984 and 1992 Acts have given more methods for

inspectors to detect stolen parts being used by body shops.

Motor vehicle administrations have continuously increased their investigative efforts. In 1991,

one fourth reported increased effort as a result of the 1984 Act. By 1996, almost 45 percent of

reporting administrations indicated increased investigative effort.

From the surveys of district attorneys, auto theft investigators, and motor vehicle administrations,

advances in apprehending, arresting, prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing as a result of the

1984 and 1992 Acts seem evident.

Insurance Premiums

Motor vehicle thefts are covered under the comprehensive portion of insurance policies.

Comprehensive also includes coverage for floods, fires and vandalism - events not related to

collisions. At the time of the 1991 report, based on information from insurers, thefts represented

30
about 40 percent of the cost of comprehensive claims. By 1995, according to the Insurance

Information Institute, this proportion had dropped to one-third of the cost of those claims. As

stated in the preceding section on "The Economic Cost of Auto Theft," comprehensive premiums

amounted to $12,954 billion in the United States in 1995. Thus, $4,318 billion of those premiums

were used to process and pay theft claims.

The 1984 Theft Act specifies insurer reporting requirements including an explanation of the basis

for setting comprehensive insurance premiums and premium penalties for motor vehicles

considered as most likely to be stolen. The following is a summary of the insurer's explanations.

Many insurers establish comprehensive rates on a statewide basis using total comprehensive loss

experience — the theft component is not identified. This is done because the insurers' theft loss

experience is insufficient for rate setting. In fact, some insurers' total loss experience is

inadequate to serve as a basis for comprehensive rates. These insurers rely on the aggregate of

many companies, compiled by a rating organization such as the Insurance Services Office, Inc.

(ISO).

Statewide rates are established by individual makes and models based on rating symbols. These

designations reflect the new vehicle price and its damageability/repairability. The individual rating

symbols may be adjusted up or down for the state, based on combining collision losses with all

losses covered by comprehensive insurance. Since the bulk of the total cost experience comes

from physical damage arising from collisions, adjusted rating symbols correlate more closely to

collision experience rather than theft experience. Rates are further adjusted for: the location

where the vehicle is driven, the vehicle age, and driver and vehicle use characteristics. Other

elements for premium rates and penalties include vehicle size, design, performance, sportiness and

production levels.

In addition to the aforementioned factors for rate setting, some states require that rates be

submitted for information only; others approve rates before they can be used, and in a few states

the insurance commissions actually set the premium rates. Before establishing the premium rates

for comprehensive coverage, most insurance companies determine how much is needed statewide

31
to cover their anticipated claims, expenses and profit. Then they adjust for the difference between

what they collect currently and what they need to collect from policies in the state.

While theft losses amount to 33 percent of comprehensive claim payments and only six percent of

all auto insurance claims, they do constitute an implicit basis for setting rates. Insurance claim

payments were analyzed for the 1991 report to the Congress. No significant difference was found

between marked cars and unmarked cars. That analysis was based on 1983 through 1988 claim

payment data for marked and unmarked cars. The Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI), a part of

the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, was the source of the claim data. This data base is

not available to NHTSA beyond 1989, and the analysis in the 1991 report has not been updated.

Insurance Claim Payments for Recovered Vehicles Before and After Inception of Parts Marking

Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) collects information from insurance companies on the

number of thefts, the number of insurance claims, and the average dollar amount paid by the

insurance company for unmarked and marked vehicle lines or vehicles with factory installed antitheft devices. Data on recovery condition is available after 1989 but the average claim data were

not reported after that year. However, the data available for 1990-1992 are not comparable to

previous data and were not included in the analyses.

Average theft claims paid for recovered cars were compared for cars without marked parts, cars

with marked parts, and for cars with factory installed anti-theft devices and their predecessors.

Table 4 presents the average claim amounts in 1995 dollars and number of claims paid for the

three categories of passenger cars for the period prior to parts marking (1983-1986) and the

period after parts marking took effect (1987-1989).

For parts marking to be successful in reducing the proportion of thefts by professional thieves, it

would be expected that the average theft claim cost for recovered marked vehicles would drop.

One might expect the same result for vehicles with factory installed anti-theft devices. While the

average theft claim costs for current model year marked vehicles did decrease by 4.8 percent for

the three year period after the marking program began, claim costs for unmarked vehicles for the

32
same time period were reduced even further by 7 percent. Claim payments for the vehicles with

factory installed anti-theft devices rose by 3.6 percent for the same time period.

For parts marking to have resulted in a decrease in claim payments, marked vehicles would have

to have experienced a larger drop in payments than the unmarked vehicles. This is based on the

assumption that thieves are aware of the vehicle lines that were covered by the marking standard.

However, average claim payments for unmarked vehicles dropped even further than those for the

marked vehicles. There was a reduction in claim payments after implementation of the standard,

but it is not clear that parts marking was the cause of the reduction for both marked and

unmarked vehicles. If thieves were not aware of which lines had marked parts and simply reacted

to the standard, then parts marking may have been responsible for the overall drop in claim

payments after implementation of the standard.

Claim payments for vehicles with factory installed anti-theft devices increased at about the same

percent as the other two dropped. It is possible that the vehicle lines with factory installed antitheft devices are recognized more easily. Thieves may be finding it easier to bypass the devices

and are stealing them more than other vehicles.

TABLE 4. AVERAGE THEFT CLAIM PAYMENTS & NUMBER OF CLAIMS FOR CMY MARKED &

UNMARKED AND ANTI-THEFT PASSENGER CARS

CALENDAR YEAR - CURRENT MODEL YEAR VEHICLES

Reported

In 1995

Dollars

Unmarked

Marked

Anti-Theft

1983 - 1986

Pre-Standard

AvgAmt

Paid

$12,175

$15,625

$19,873

Number

of Claims

2,026

4,250

559

1987 -1988

Post-Standard

AvgAmt

Paid

$11,262

$14,456

$19,485

Number

of Claims

1,300

3,269

2,787

1989

Post-Standard

AvgAmt

Paid

$11,370

$15,288

$21,677

Number

of Claims

951

775

66

1987 - 1989

All Post-Standard Yrs

AvgAmt

Paid

$11,316

$14,872

$20,581

Number

of Claims

2,551

4,044

2,853

Difference in Avg. Amt- P i

1983-1986 vs 1987-1989

Dollar

Difference

-$859

-$753

+$708

Percent

Change

-7.1%

-4.8%

+3.6%

33
The absolute number of claims declined for marked cars, but increased for unmarked and antitheft

cars when comparing the four prestandard years to the three post standard years of claims.

Used Replacement Parts

The 1984 Act requires the insurance industry to respond to the Department of Transportation's

questions on their used part policies. Their responses since the enactment of the 1984 and 1992

Acts have shown little change regarding their policies on used replacement parts. These are their

responses from 1986 through 1992:

• Between 69 and 87 percent of those reporting encourage the use of used parts for auto

crash repairs.

• One-half to two-thirds of the insurance companies rely on repair shops to obtain parts

from reputable sources.

• Less than one percent of the reporting insurers have any actual policy regarding checking

used parts for VIN markings and/or checking with the NICB or law enforcement agencies

if the VIN shows up in theft records.

• In 1986 and 1987, one percent of the responding insurance companies required

documentation of the source of used parts ~ name, address, etc. In 1989 and 1990, this

had increased to 17 percent, but returned to less than one percent in 1991 and 1992. The

1989 and 1990 increase in companies requiring documentation may be a reporting

variation, because in those years, twice the number of companies submitted reports as

compared to the other two time periods.

Insurance companies seem to favor having repair shops fix vehicles with used parts, but do not

seem to have incurred the added expense of having a system to verify that the used parts are

obtained legitimately.

The Condition of Recovered Vehicles

Parts Marking and Insurance Claims. The 1984 and 1992 Theft Acts require major motor vehicle

parts be marked with the VIN. If the program is effective in deterring theft of major parts, there

34
should be fewer stolen marked vehicles that are recovered with these parts missing. If the

program is even more effective, there might be a spill over for unmarked stolen vehicles being

recovered. These vehicles would also have less major parts missing. With this in mind, the 1984

Act required the collection of data on recovered stolen vehicles in three categories: intact (no

parts missing but with damage from unauthorized entry), in-part (major parts, which for marked

vehicles would have VTN markings, missing), and in-whole (other motor vehicle parts that are not

required to be marked are missing).

If the parts marking program aids in reducing the number of vehicles stolen for their parts, then

the percent of marked vehicles which were recovered in-part (i.e., major parts missing) should

decrease after parts marking began. Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI), with vehicle condition

from the NICB, provides insurance data which includes the number of claims and average

payment for vehicles recovered: in-part (i.e., vehicle recovered with one or more major parts

missing at the time of recovery); intact (i.e., vehicle recovered with no major parts missing at the

time of recovery); or in-whole (i.e., vehicle recovered with no major parts missing but may have

other parts missing at the time of the recovery or with damage in addition to that sustained during

unauthorized entry and operation).

Insurance data were compared for pre- (1986) vs. post- standard (1987 - 1989) years. Table 5

shows the intact, in-part, and in-whole percent of claims and average payment for marked and

unmarked vehicles. The pre-standard year (1986) is compared to the post-standard years (1987-

1989). Only one additional year of claim payment data by recovery condition (1989) was

available since the 1991 report to Congress. That year is compared to the 1987-1988 data to

determine any continuing or changing trends. Data on recovery condition for insurance claims but

without claim payment amount was collected after 1989, but this data is not comparable to the

1986 through 1989 data for several reasons: samples were collected from different insurance

companies, the coding identifiers for vehicle condition had been changed and it doesn't appear

that they were consistently applied, motor vehicles were incorrectly placed in vehicle classes.

Therefore, the analysis of recovered stolen vehicle condition had to be based on 1986 through

1989 data.

35
Percent of Claims. In-part claims have dropped from the pre- standard year 1986 through the

post-standard years 1987-1989. The percent of in-part claims for marked vehicles decreased 46

percent from the pre- vs. the two post-standard years (i.e., 1986 vs. 1987-1988). The trend

continued and dropped another 33 percent from 1987-1988 to 1989. In-part claims accounted for

15 percent of claims in 1987-1988 and 10 percent in 1989. At the same time, in-part claims for

unmarked vehicles experienced an overall drop of 52 percent for the pre- vs. the three poststandard years. This trend included drops from 22 percent in 1986 to 11 percent in 1987-1988

and to 10 percent in 1987-1988.

In comparison, the number of in-whole claims have increased by 32 percent for marked and 27

percent for unmarked vehicles during the pre- to three year post-standard time frame. The

increase also continued in 1987-1988 vs. 1989 post-standard time frames from 76 to 80 percent

for marked and 77 to 80 percent for unmarked vehicles. This represents a 5.3 percent increase for

marked vehicles and a 3.9 percent increase for unmarked vehicles.

The claims also dropped for both marked (27 percent) and unmarked (31 percent) vehicles for

that same pre- and post-period time period. Overall intact claims for marked vehicles dropped

from 13 percent in 1986 to 9.5 percent in 1987-1989 and for unmarked vehicles from 16 percent

to 11 percent for that same time period. From 1987-1988 to 1989, intact claims for marked

vehicles increased slightly from 9 to 10 percent and intact claims for unmarked vehicles decreased

from 12 to 10 percent.

Claim Payments. Average claim payments from insurance companies have dropped for all but the

in-whole marked vehicles. The average claim payments for in-part marked vehicles dropped 2.3

percent while the in-whole payments for unmarked vehicles rose 12.6 percent from the 1986 preto the 1987-1989 post-standard years. Unmarked vehicle claim payments dropped 2.6 percent of

in-part, 8.8 percent for in-whole and 13.6 percent for intact payments.

Summary. The data show that in-part claims for both marked and unmarked vehicles dropped

initially after parts marking was introduced and continued to drop from the post-standard 1987-

1988 to 1989 years. Intact claims have also dropped during that period. In comparison, the

36
number of in-whole claims for both marked and unmarked vehicles has increased over the same

time period.

Average payments for all claims except in-whole marked vehicle thefts have also dropped from

the pre- to post-standard time period. It would appear that the marking standard has provided a

deterrent effect to thieves. These trends suggest the possibility that thieves are less willing to

steal major parts from vehicles which may require marking. Instead they are stealing other vehicle

parts which are not covered by the marking standard.

37

Adequacy of Theft Laws

In the 1991 report to Congress, it was too early to make a definitive statement about the

adequacy and effectiveness of the Federal and State laws designed to prevent the distribution of

used parts removed from stolen motor vehicles. While effectiveness still cannot be proved with

statistical confidence, the laws do seem to have led to an improvement in prosecuting and

convicting auto thieves. Comparisons of surveys of district attorneys in 1991 and 1996 show that

the 1984 and 1992 Federal Acts increased prosecutions and, especially, convictions. Since the

number of cases that are prosecuted is influenced by the total court caseload, it is not surprising

that the number of prosecuted theft cases may not have grown as rapidly as might be expected.

However, once a theft case is prosecuted, the probability of conviction has been greater since

passage of the two Federal Acts. Undoubtedly the Acts have helped by providing prosecutors

with better evidence (marked parts) and because they made trafficking in stolen vehicle parts or

tampering with VTN marking Federal offenses. Once a thief is convicted, there is a strong

likelihood that the sentence will be greater, with increased fines and jail time.

Most of the states surveyed in 1996 made legislative changes between 1993 and 1994 in response

to the Federal Acts. For example, the sentencing guidelines were changed and the severity and

length of penalties were increased. The survey done for the 1991 report to the Congress did not

find any changes in state legislation.

It also is still true, as it was for the 1991 report, that the efforts by various state and local

government associations, privately funded organizations, legislators, police agencies, insurance

companies and others in the private sector have been instrumental in creating and sponsoring laws

and statutes dealing with titling, inspections and licensing of vehicle and parts businesses. It is

anticipated that the Motor Vehicle Titling, Registration and Salvage Advisory Committee report

of 1994, as its recommendations are implemented, will also help achieve better and more uniform

statutes dealing with these subjects. The end result will be to make it more difficult for thieves

and forgers to traffic in stolen vehicles and parts.

39
The Adequacy of Tracking Systems for Theft Investigators

Motor vehicle theft investigators were surveyed for both the 1991 report to Congress and this

report. In 1991, law enforcement officials said that professional thieves appeared to be more

cautious when deciding which vehicles to steal, but that they stole cars with marked parts and

took measures to make it difficult for law enforcement to find the stolen car or its parts. The

parts marking standard had not been in effect long enough to be a deterrent to thieves stealing

cars.

By 1996, about half the auto theft investigators interviewed felt that parts marking was effective

in deterring thieves. Professional thieves know which cars have marked parts and won't steal a

vehicle unless there is a safe and sure place to sell/dispose of the vehicle or its parts. Labels won't

deter some thieves but some body shops won't purchase parts with missing labels and they

demand paperwork documenting the parts' source.

A 1996 survey of repair facilities indicated similar benefits for parts marking. Salvage yards are

reluctant to accept or keep parts without labels. Chop shops now do things differently because

there is an increased threat of being inspected and they can be caught for having parts with

missing labels. Legitimate body shops keep records of who brought in parts and honest

businesses very frequently report suspicious parts. They know that they can go to jail if their

business receives stolen unlabelled parts, so there is an incentive for thieves to avoid selling stolen

parts to these businesses.

While some investigators surveyed at seaports felt that labelling deterred crating and exporting

stolen vehicles, others reported that the labels had no impact on exports. None of the reporting

cities included in the survey, however, were located near the borders with Mexico or Canada.

Several investigators volunteered that, even if labels do not have a deterrent eflfect on auto theft,

they do increase the "cost of doing business" to thieves. Stolen parts have to have their labels

removed. That takes time and money and increases the risk of arrest. The extra time thieves need

to select cars without labels also complicates their operations.

40
Labels also reduce the investigative burden. If the VIN's on the labels match the VTN on the

dash, this can reduce the checking process. This saved time may enable investigators to devote

more time to catching thieves. All surveyed investigators found that the labels resulted in more

productive labor on their part.

Benefits of Parts Marking to Other Classes of Motor Vehicles

The statistical analyses of the effectiveness of parts marking in the "high theft" passenger car lines

did not produce specific quantitative estimates of their effect in deterring thieves, but the data

seem to suggest that parts marking has had benefits, quite possibly beyond the break-even point

with the cost of producing the labels and putting them on the designated parts. Because of the

timing of this report and the rulemaking process, data were not available for "low theft" car lines

and multipurpose vehicles that have been marked beginning with the 1997 model year.

Surveys confirm the benefits of parts marking as an important component of the 1984 and 1992

Acts. Auto theft investigators report that labels on parts have saved them investigative time so

they can be more productive. Prosecutors are getting more convictions because of better

evidence with marked parts and additional statutes for charging criminals. Convicted auto thieves

are getting longer jail sentences, thus keeping them off the streets and acting as a better deterrent

to auto theft. All these are benefits of the parts marking system, but they are difficult to measure

in quantitative terms.

One shortcoming of current markings is that they can be obliterated. More permanent methods of

marking parts might substantially improve effectiveness. Since current markings cost less than $5

per car and the Act allows a cost up to $22 per car (in 1995 dollars), there is considerable room

for developing more effective markings, even if they carry some additional cost. Any

improvement in the permanence of marking parts would have to result in better effectiveness in

deterring thefts or increasing recoveries. At the maximum allowed cost per car of $22, parts

marking with more permanence would have an upper effectiveness bound of seven percent to pay

for additional cost of marking.

41
Given that parts marking appears to be effective in the passenger car lines currently marked, there

is little reason to doubt that it could also have benefits for other passenger vehicles, currently

unmarked car lines, light duty pickup trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPV's), since

those vehicles are stolen for similar reasons, including chop shop operations. Parts marking is less

likely to be effective for heavy trucks, buses and motorcycles, vehicle types that generally do not

pass through chop shops.

In 1984, passenger cars represented 73 percent of stolen motor vehicles. Light trucks (pickup

trucks, vans and SUV's) were 14 percent of the stolen vehicles in 1984 followed by motorcycles

at 8 percent and heavy trucks at 5 percent. In 1995, passenger cars still represented 71 percent of

stolen vehicles but light trucks had increased to 24 percent, with motorcycles shrinking to 3

percent and heavy trucks to 2 percent. Obviously, light trucks, because of their growing market

share, account for a growing proportion of motor vehicle thefts. Although theft rates for both

passenger cars and light trucks have dropped since 1989-90, they have nevertheless increased

from 1984 to 1995 by 25 percent and 14 percent respectively. In the other two vehicle

categories, heavy trucks and motorcycles, theft rates have decreased over 50 percent and 20

percent respectively. Since cars and light trucks account for an increasing proportion of thefts,

they are more in need of countermeasures than heavy trucks and motorcycles.

42
APPENDIX A

EFFECT OF PARTS MARKING AND ANTITHEFT DEVICES

ON THEFT AND RECOVERY RATES

A key requirement of the Antitheft Act of 1984 was that a large number of model year 1987

passenger cars would have marked parts or antitheft devices. By now, these cars have been on the

road for a long time. Their theft and recovery rates can be tracked for several years and compared

to the corresponding rates for cars without marked parts or factory-installed antitheft devices -

potentially allowing an evaluation of the effectiveness of those remedies. At the time of the 1991

Report to the Congress, a comprehensive evaluation was impossible simply because there were not

enough data on cars with marked parts or antitheft devices. Now there are many data, but biases in

the data still obstruct the evaluation. The analyses described herein cannot go so far as to attribute

a specific percentage reduction in thefts or increase in recoveries to parts marking or a single

effectiveness number for antitheft devices. Nevertheless, they do suggest that parts marking quite

possibly had some effects at times. They also demonstrate that at least one group of antitheft devices

has been highly effective in reducing thefts. Since even a small benefit of parts marking would be

sufficient to justify its low cost, these fragmentary analysis results can be viewed positively -

especially in the context of the all-encompassing finding of this report: overall theft rates, which grew

in the earlier 1980's, leveled off in the late 1980's and declined in the mid 1990's. Parts marking and

antitheft devices are elements of the 1984-92 battery of measures to deter theft. They are

components of a process that has, on the whole, experienced success.

Potential Effects of Parts Marking or Antitheft Devices

Before proceeding with the analyses, it is appropriate to consider what sorts of effects might be

expected for parts marking and antitheft devices, how large those effects might possibly be, and how

that magnitude compares to the effectiveness level needed for those remedies to have societal benefits

commensurate with their costs. Fundamentally, if the remedies are effective, they ought to reduce

theft rates and/or increase recovery rates. They should reduce the number of unrecovered stolen

vehicles per million registered vehicles. To the extent that many of the vehicles stolen by professional

thieves - for chop shops, salvage switch and retag, or export - are never recovered, this

A-l
unrecovered theft rate" may be considered as a sort of surrogate for the unknown ''professional"'

theft rate. (The data do not and usually cannot describe why a car was stolen, but if that car is not

recovered, it was quite probably stolen by a professional thief.) If the remedies change all three rates

in the right direction, so much the better, but even if they change just one, especially the unrecovered

theft rate, it might be good enough.

These goals would be accomplished through direct effects and deterrent effects. A direct effect of

marked parts or antitheft devices would be to allow identification or location of a stolen car (or parts

of a car), thus assisting the prompt recovery of the car - i.e., an increase in the recovery rate. Above

all, certain types of antitheft devices might make it hard to steal a car at all - i.e., a reduction in theft

rates. A direct consequence of parts marking would be evidence to help convict the people involved

in stealing the cars and put them out of the theft business While there have been numerous cases

where parts marking helped recover cars or convict thieves, it is probably safe to say that the

deterrent effects are potentially far larger, in quantitative terms, than the direct ones.

The deterrent effect would be to dissuade thieves from stealing cars with marked parts (and possibly

other cars). But many types of thieves are unlikely to be deterred by marked parts. People who steal

a car for joyriding, or to commit another crime, and intend to abandon it, intact, after a few hours or

days, have little to fear from parts marking: the marked parts merely duplicate the VTN that can

readily be seen on the intact VTN plate. In fact, many of them might not even know that parts

marking exists, let alone what models have it. The activities most likely to be deterred by parts

marking are chop shops and fraud that involves a change in the reported VTN (salvage switch and

retag for resale). Here, parts marking could reveal the true source of the parts, or the original VTN

of the retagged vehicle. However, the 1991 report suggests that these activities account for only

about 20-30 percent of all car thefts. Thus, even if parts marking were a highly successful deterrent,

it could not reasonably be expected to reduce overall theft rates by more than 20-30 percent and, in

all probability, only a fraction of that reduction can reasonably be expected.

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On the other hand, only a small reduction in theft is needed to make parts marking cost effective. As

discussed in the main report in "The Cost of Marking Parts," a relative reduction in the overall theft

rate of just 2 percent would already pay for parts marking.

Antitheft devices, whose costs exceed parts marking by an order of magnitude, would need to show

substantially higher benefits. On what vehicles would the deterrent effect apply? Most immediately,

on the specific cars that actually had marked parts. In particular, on the make-models that got parts

marking in 1987, there should be a reduction in the model year (MY) 1987 theft rate, relative to the

MY 1986 theft rate for the same models (when they did not yet have marked parts). In other words,

thieves who steal for chop shops might have been instructed to avoid the specific cars with marked

parts. The statistical analysis of the theft data would be easy if this were the only place where an

effect could be expected.

However, there could likely be other deterrent effects, possibly exceeding in magnitude the narrowly

focused MY 86-87 effect described above. There might be fewer thefts in those make-models that

got parts marking even in the model years before the parts were marked. A car thief does not always

have time to inspect the VTN plate carefully and find the exact model year. It might be expedient to

avoid stealing cars of the lines that got parts marking, even if their model years are somewhat earlier

than 1987 Conversely, there might be a delayed effect, for example, as body shops gradually become

more careful about the source of their used parts.

As a consequence, there might be a dual impact on theft rates in the make-models that got parts

marking in MY 1987: a discernable one-time reduction in the theft rate for MY 1987 (with parts

marking) vs. MY 1986 (without parts marking) and, perhaps, a more diffuse, gradual reduction in the

model years slightly before and after 1987, both resulting in a permanent reduction of the theft rate

during the 1980's model years.

Furthermore, the effect is not necessarily limited to the make-models that got parts marking, but

could spill over to the lines that were never marked - and it is not clear if the spillover would be

positive or negative. On the one hand, parts marking, along with other measures of the 1984 and

1992 laws, might discourage professional car thefts of all types, resulting in a long-term reduction

A-3
ot theft rates in all makes and models. On the other hand, parts marking on selected make-models

could motivate discriminating thieves to concentrate their activities on the unmarked lines, with little

change in overall theft rates.

The deterrent effect might impact the recovery rate as well as the theft rate. If parts marking deters

thefts for chop shops (where the recovery rate is relatively low), but has little effect on joyriding, etc.,

(where it's usually high), the overall recovery rate might be expected to rise after parts marking.

The Confounding Effect of "Regression to the Mean"

The analysis of the effectiveness of parts marking and antitheft devices would have been easier if the

make-models slated for parts marking in 1987 had been picked on a random basis. In that case, prior

to 1987, the make-models slated for parts marking would have had the same average theft rate as

other make-models. Any theft reduction in the marked make-make models during or after MY 1987,

relative to the rates in the make-models that never got the remedy, could reasonably be attributed to

the parts marking. Unfortunately for the analyst, the models were not selected on a random basis.

Instead, the make-models that had the highest theft rates in MY 1983-84 were slated to get parts

marking in MY 1987.

It is a basic characteristic of any population that "what goes up must come at least part of the way

down." For example, in a population of 1000 people, the 100 who are the heaviest today will almost

certainly not be the 100 heaviest a year from today. For example, some of those 100 might have a

condition that makes them heavy this year, but will soon return to their normal weight. These 100

will probably still be heavier next year, on the average, than the other 900, but they will not be the

100 heaviest individuals. With each passing year, that original group of 100 will have an average

weight closer to the average for the other 900. This tendency is called "regression to the mean."

Now, if these original 100 had been given some kind of diet treatment, even if that treatment had been

worthless, they still would have exhibited a steady weight loss relative to the other 900, because of

the "regression to the mean" phenomenon.

The same thing happens with theft rates. The make-models slated for parts marking in MY 1987

were the ones with the highest theft rates in 1983-84. They included some make-models with

A-4
chronically high theft rates, but other make-models that, for whatever reason, were highly desirable

to thieves in 1983-84 but soon lost that special attraction Times change, tastes change, even in car

thefts. Even if parts marking had never been implemented, these make-models would undoubtedly

have experienced a reduction in theft rates (relative to the trend in theft rates for other make-models)

as early as 1985, and would have continued to experience reductions in 1986, 1987, 1988...

However, just as it is difficult to predict how quickly tastes change, it is difficult to predict how

quickly the theft rates for the 1983-84 high-theft models ought to regress to the mean, or even to

predict that the regression will be steady from year to year.

Under these circumstances, it will be difficult to discern the specific effect of parts-marking from the

general, uneven regression-to-the-mean trend, unless the former is large relative to the latter. If parts

marking has reduced thefts by, say, 2 or 3 percent (which would make it highly cost-beneficial), that

effect could hardly be distinguished from kinks and bends in the regression-to-the-mean trend. In

short, with these fundamentally biased data, even if none of the analyses were to show an effect for

parts marking, it could still not be concluded that the measure was ineffective, or that it was not costbeneficial.

Preview of the Analyses

The choice of analyses is influenced by the manner in which parts marking and factory-installed

antitheft devices were implemented in the passenger car fleet and by the types of theft, recovery and

registration data that are available.

The principal introduction of parts marking took place in model year 1987. Based on theft rates in

1983-84, a group of make-models with high theft rates, accounting for about 40 percent of passenger

car registrations, was slated for parts marking from 1987 onwards. A few high-theft make-models,

fewer than 5 percent of car registrations, were exempted from parts marking and slated to receive

factory-installed antitheft devices no later than 1987 (and in some cases they got the devices earlier

than 1987). The remaining, low-theft make-models, over 55 percent of registrations, would get

neither countermeasure.

A-5
In 1988 and subsequent years, a small number of additional make-models got parts marking or

antitheft devices. Most of them were new make-models, introduced at that time, and never produced

without the countermeasure. However, during 1989-92 several groups of domestic make-models,

accounting for about 10 percent of car sales in the United States, received antitheft devices in place

of, or in addition to pans marking. Finally, during 1993-95, generally too late to provide data for

these statistical analyses, there were some additional introductions or shifts to pans marking or

antitheft devices.

The principal data base was assembled by NHTSA's contractor from the theft and recovery records

of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and vehicle registration files of R.L. Polk. It

enumerates how many cars were registered, stolen and recovered, by make-model, model year and

calendar year. The data base covers calendar years 1984-95, and it includes cars from 0 to 15 years

old. The following analyses will be performed on the NCIC/Polk data base:

(1) Long-term trends in theft rates, MY 1976-95, make-models that got pans marking or

antitheft devices in 1987 vs. those that were never marked

(2) Long-term trends in recovery rates and unrecovered theft rates

(3) MY 1984-89 trends in theft rates, focusing on changes from MY 86 to 87, make-models that

got parts marking in 1987 vs. those that were never marked

(4) MY 1984-89 trends in recovery rates and unrecovered theft rates: pans marking in 1987 vs.

never marked

(5) MY 1986-94 trends in theft rates, domestic make-models that switched from parts marking

to antitheft devices in 1989-92 vs. control-group make-models

(6) MY 1986-94 trends in recovery rates and unrecovered theft rates, domestic make-models that

switched from parts marking to antitheft devices in 1989-92 vs. control-group make-models

A-6
(7) Trends in the theft rates of other make-models that got antitheft devices before 1995

.Another file was boiled down from data assembled by the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) from

theft and recovery records supplied by the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB). It enumerates

how many cars were stolen and recovered, by make-model, model year and calendar year, and it

enumerates how many of the recoveries were "in part," "in whole," or "intact." Registration data are

not included. The data base is complete only for calendar years 1986-91, and in most of those years

it only includes cars from 0 to 2 years old. The following analysis will be performed on the HLDIMCB data base:

(8) MY 1984-89 trends of "in-part" recoveries vs. other types of recoveries, focusing on changes

from MY 86 to 87, make-models that got parts marking or antitheft devices in 1987 vs. those

that were never marked

Long-Term Theft and Recovery Rates (Model Years 1976-95)

Figure A-l compares the theft rates, by model year, of two groups of passenger cars. The "0" data

points are the theft rates for make-models that existed in 1984 and did not get parts marking or

antitheft devices at any time. The " 1" data points are the theft rates for make-models that existed in

1984 and were selected to get parts marking or antitheft devices starting in 1987 (and possibly

switched from one to the othet in a subsequent year).

The "theft rate" is the logarithm of (thefts/registration years). Cars up to 10 years old are included

in the rates (e.g., the 1984 data point comprises the theft rate of MY 1984 cars throughout CY 1984-

94). The theft rates are derived from the NCIC-Polk file, which was available for calendar years

1984-95 (thus, for example, information on MY 1980 cars is only available from CY 1984 onwards,

i.e., from age 4 onwards). However, for vehicles of the current year (MY = CY), the Polk

registration count is multiplied by 1.495, as recommended by the contractor who developed the data

base; the purpose of this "annualization factor" is to make the Polk data for current-year cars (which

only includes cars registered during the first half of the year) compatible with the NCIC data, which

include any car stolen during the year, regardless when it was registered.

A-7

Figure A-1 includes oniy those make-modeis that were in production throughout MY 1984-89, plus

any earlier or later model years that those make-models existed. Included, for example, are:

• Chevrolet Caprice, MY 1976-95, no parts marking or antitheft devices

• Ford Mustang, unmarked 1976-86, marked 1987-95

• Pontiac Firebird, unmarked 1976-86, marked 1987-89, antitheft 1989-95

• Dodge Aries, unmarked 1981-86, marked 1987-89 (produced only in 1981-89)

• Nissan Sentra, produced 1982-95 and never marked, etc.

Figure A-l excludes make-models that first got pans marking/antitheft devices in 1986, 1988, 1989

or 1990 (most of those were models that did not exist prior to 1987). It also excludes make-models

that were not produced in all the "core" years 1984-89 Excluded, for example, are:

• Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme: first got parts marking in 1988

• Ford Taurus: first produced in 1986 (but not in 1984 or 1985)

• VW Scirocco: last produced in 1988 (but not in 1989)

• Dodge Caravan: not a passenger car

Two vertical lines are drawn on Figure A-1: one between 1983 and 1984, when the selection was

made as to what models would get parts marking or antitheft devices, and one just before 1987, when

the models actually got those remedies.

Figure A-l shows some very strong patterns, but not necessarily anything to establish the

effectiveness of parts marking. The theft rate for the make-models that got parts marking or antitheft

devices (the l's) reaches a majestic peak in MY 1983-84. That is hardly surprising: the

countermeasures were specifically applied to the make-models that had the highest theft rates in

1983-84. Their theft rate immediately begins to drop off in 1985-86, even before parts marking,

exhibiting "regression to the mean," and continues to drop sharply in 1987-89, after parts

marking/antitheft devices. Their theft rates in 1979-83 are practically the mirror image of the pattern

for 1985-89: the steep increase is unrelated to parts marking (which did not exist before 1987) but

an exhibit of "digression from the mean," as it were. The theft rate for these make-models is

relatively stable in 1976-79 and 1991-95.

A-9
By contrast, the theft rates for the make-models that never got parts marking (the O's) are low during

i976-79. rise steadily during 1980-89 until they meet the l's, and are slightly higher than the l's

during 1990-95.

Figure A-2 graphs the difference in the theft rates for the models that eventually got parts marking

or antitheft devices and those that didn't (the 1 's and the O's in Figure A-1). It contains some principal

findings of the long-term analysis. The difference reaches a peak around 1981 and begins to drop

steadily in 1982, five years before the actual implementation of parts marking. It continues to drop

until 1990, when it levels off slightly below zero (i.e., the cars with parts marking or antitheft devices

have lower theft rates that the models that did not get either remedy). Similarly, the difference drops

off as you work backwards from 1984, and it levels off at about 0.3 in 1976-79. Thus, the main

effect in Figure A-2 is regression to and from the mean, and most of it (1980-86) occurred during

years when no cars had parts marking.

Nevertheless, there is another pattern visible in Figure A-2. The average difference for the four years

1976-79 was +.27, but it was -.12 for 1991-95. In the long term, the models that got parts marking

or antitheft devices ended up with lower theft rates (relative to the cars that never got either) than

they had before the whole process started. Quantitatively, the relative reduction is

1 - exp(-. 12 - .27) = 32 percent

The result is "in the right direction" for the hypothesis that parts marking and antitheft devices

deterred thefts, or at least shifted the thefts from the marked to the unmarked models. However, it

would be foolhardy, without additional analysis, to attribute all or even part of this 32 percent longterm reduction to parts marking or antitheft devices. There are simply too many other factors that

could be affecting theft rates. Although the make-models in the analysis had the same names

throughout 1976-95, most of them changed a good deal during that period. There is no reason that

a model with high appeal for thieves in the 1970's would necessarily have the same appeal in the

1990's.

Although the principal hypothesis was that parts marking or antitheft devices would reduce theft

rates, another hypothesis was that recovery rates could increase if parts marking makes it possible

to track down the stolen vehicle or if it deters the types of thefts that are least likely to

A-10

be recovered while having little effect on other thefts (e.g., joyriding). This hypothesis would not

necessarily be valid for antitheft devices; in fact, they may be especially useful in deterring the nonprofessional thefts that are easiest to recover.

Figure A-3 shows the recovery rates [log(recoveries/thefts)] during MY 1976-95 for make-models

that had parts marking or antitheft devices from MY 1987 onwards (l's) vs. make-models that never

had either (O's). The selection of make-models is the same as in Figures A-l and A-2. Here,

however, low rates are "bad" and high rates are "good." Figure A-3 does not exhibit the "regression

to the mean" pattern of Figure A-l. Since make-models were selected for parts-marking based on

their theft rates in 1983-84, not their recovery rates, there is no a priori reason that the one group

should have higher recovery rates than the other. Indeed, throughout MY 1976-84, both groups have

quite similar recovery rates, both rising gradually during those years. However, during MY 1985-95,

the recovery rate for the cars without marked parts stays almost unchanged, while the rate for cars

that got parts marking or antitheft devices decreases rather sharply.

Figure A-4, which graphs the difference in the recovery rates for the models that got marked parts

or antitheft devices and the models that didn't, confirms the negative trend, especially from MY 88

onwards, while the difference was close to zero up through MY 87. Given the hypothesis that

recovery rates could increase with parts marking, this long-term result does not appear favorable for

parts marking. Nevertheless, there is little basis for attributing the unfavorable effect to parts

marking. No substantial change is visible from MY 86 to 87, when the cars first got marked parts.

The subsequent trends may be associated, to some extent, with antitheft devices that are especially

effective in reducing the most easily recovered thefts, or they may be due to other factors unrelated

to parts marking or antitheft devices.

A better impression of the long-term trend in professional thefts can be gained by studying the

"unrecovered theft rate," - i.e., the logarithm of [(thefts-recoveries)/registration years]. It is a sort

of composite of the theft rate and the recovery rate. Figure A-5 shows that the rate was practically

constant during model years 1976-95 for the make-models that did not get marked parts or antitheft

devices (the O's). The make-models that got either of those devices in 1987 had a strong peak in

1981-85, with a sharp drop on either side of the peak (regression to the mean). Before and after this

A-12
peak, in 1976-79 and 1991-95, the l's are moderately higher than the O's. Figure A-6 graphs the

difference in the unrecovered theft rates. Basically, the relative risk ends up where it started. The

average difference for 1976-79 was +.304, and for 1991-95 it was +.307. In the long term, the

unrecovered theft rates of the models that got parts marking or antitheft devices did not change

relative to the cars that never got either.

Parts Marking and Theft Rates Just Before and After Model Year 1987

Figure A-2 showed that the difference in the theft rates for cars that got parts marking or antitheft

devices and the rates for never-marked cars shrank rather steadily from its peak value in MY 1981

to zero in MY 1989, largely due to "regression to the mean" but also, perhaps, as a consequence of

the remedies. The next analyses concentrate on those crucial model years, 1984-89, to see if the

shrinkage was really steady. Specifically, was there a larger-than-usual effect from MY 1986 to MY

1987, when parts marking was actually introduced in the cars, than in the other years?

Figure A-7, as it were, cuts out and enlarges the MY 1984-89 section of Figure A-l. The l's are the

theft rates [log(thefts/registration years)] of make-models that got parts marking in 1987 and the O's

are the theft rates of models that never got parts marking or antitheft devices. The vertical line down

the middle of Figure A-7 separates MY 1984-86, when neither group of make-models had parts

marking, from MY 1987-89, when the l's had parts marking and the O's did not. To limit biases in

the analysis as much as possible, the following restrictions were imposed on the data used to generate

Figure A-7, although not necessarily Figure A-l:

• Just as in Figure A-l, each of the make-models included in the analysis had to be produced

throughout 1984-89. However, since Figure A-7 only looks at theft rates in MY 1984-89,

the effect of this restriction is that exactly the same make-models are used to calculate each

of the l's in Figure A-7, (and the same is true of the O's).

• As in Figure A-1, the relatively few make-models that first got parts marking in 1988 or 1989,

rather than 1987, are excluded from the analysis. Most of these were new make-models that

did not exist during 1984-87.

A-13




• Make-models that got antitheft devices at any time during 1984-89 are not included in the l's

of Figure A-7 (although many were included in Figure A-l). Figure A-7 is purely an analysis

of parts marking.

• Since relatively new cars account for a disproportionate share of the consumer losses

associated with auto theft, Figure A-7 is limited to cars 0-3 years old. CY 1984-92

NCIC/Polk files, together, provide data for this age range for every MY from 1984 to 1989.

(Figure A-1 had to include cars up to 10 years old, or there would have no theft rates for pre1981 cars, given that the NCIC data only were available from CY 1984. Even so, no data are

available for the pre-1984 cars when they were brand new, etc.)

• Since theft rates for imported cars are more variable than those of domestic cars (more

discussion below), and to avoid biases due to market shifts from domestic to imported cars,

or vice-versa, Figure A-7 is limited to domestic cars (including "captive imports").

The make-models included in Figure A-7 that did not get parts marking or antitheft devices during

1984-89 are the following:

Buick Century Buick Skyhawk Chevrolet Caprice/Impala

Chevrolet Cavalier Chevrolet Celebrity Chrysler New Yorker

Dodge Colt Dodge Colt Vista Dodge Omni

Ford Crown Victoria Ford Escort Ford EXP

Ford Tempo Mercury Grand Marquis Mercury Topaz

Oldsmobile Ciera Plymouth Colt Plymouth Colt Vista

Plymouth Horizon Pontiac 6000 Pontiac J2000/Sunbird

A-18
The make-models included in Figure A-7 that got parts marking in 1987 and did not get antitheft

devices in 1984-89 are the following:

Buick Electra Buick LeSabre Buick Riviera

Cadillac DeVille Chevrolet Monte Carlo Chrysler Lebaron

Dodge Aries Dodge Daytona Dodge Diplomat

Ford Mustang Ford Thunderbird Lincoln Continental

Lincoln Mark 7 Lincoln Town Car Mercury Cougar

Oldsmobile Delta 88 Oldsmobile 98 Oldsmobile Toronado

Plymouth Gran Fury Plymouth Reliant Pontiac Bonneville

Figure A-7 shows that the theft rate for make-models that got parts marking (the l's) remained fairly

constant during MY 1984-89. The theft rate for make-models that did not get parts marking or

antitheft devices (the O's) climbed steadily during MY 1984-88 and leveled off in 1989.

Figure A-8 tracks the difference between the l's and the O's in Figure A-7. It is a "close-up" of the

1984-89 trend in the log-theft-rate difference between the models that got parts marking and those

that didn't. That difference shrinks from 0.66 in 1984 to 0.2 in 1988-89. In MY 1984, theft rates of

the make-models that were selected to get parts marking was nearly twice as high as the rate for

make-models that wouldn't get it; by MY 1989, the theft rate of the models that had gotten parts

marking was only 20 percent higher than those that hadn't gotten it. Of course, the principal reason

for the dramatic shrinkage in the observed difference is the regression-to-the-mean effect, very strong

during 1984-89, as a consequence of the completely nonrandom basis for selecting the make-models

that would get parts marking.

A-19


The question is whether any additional effect due specifically to parts marking can be measured within

that overall trend. The measurement procedure entails two assumptions:

(A) The regression-to-the-mean effect ought to be linear - i.e., the D's in Figure A-8 ought to

drop by equal amounts from year to year.

(B) The effect of parts marking ought to be concentrated on the MY 1986-87 change, because

parts marking was introduced in MY 1987 (if it was introduced at all), in the make-models

included in this analysis.

In other words, the drop in the D's from 1986 to 1987 is measured and compared to the average drop

in the other years, when the parts marking status of the various make models did not change: 1984-

85, 1985-86, 1987-88, 1988-89.

An inspection of Figure A-8 reveals that the 1986-87 drop is not conspicuously larger than the

reductions in the other years. On the contrary, the 1987 data point is nearly collinear with the 1984-

86 and 1988 data points. Nevertheless, the slight 1988-89 increase will pull down the average drop

for the other years. The arithmetic for the shrinkage in theft rate differentials works out as follows:

Shrinkage

1984-85

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

Average excluding 1986-87

Excess of 1986-87 over average drop

.147

.123

.102

.126

-.055

.085

.017

A-22
In other words, given the preceding assumptions, the data suggest that the shrinkage in the theft rate

differential from MY 1986 to 1987 was 1.7 percent beyond the "average" annual regression to the

mean. That looks like a nice, plausible result: a 1.7 percent reduction in thefts with parts marking,

approximately equal to the amount needed for the measure to be cost-beneficial.

Unfortunately, this estimate cannot be accepted for three crucial reasons. (1) It relies on two

assumptions that are quite probably untrue, and possibly not even close to the truth. (2) The estimate

is not robust. (3) The shrinkage in the theft rate differential need not represent a "pure" reduction

of thefts of marked cars, but might just be a shift of thefts from marked cars to unmarked cars. These

issues will now be examined in turn.

The assumption that the regression to the mean "ought to" take place at a constant rate, equal from

year to year, might make sense if the data included a large number of make-models (e.g., hundreds),

each having relatively small sales. Instead, there are only 42 distinct domestic make-models in the

analysis, differing widely in sales. A significant redesign or sales shift for a few of the really high-sales

models in a particular year could change theft rates substantially more (or less) than usual that year.

An unsteady "regression to the mean" trend can intuitively be expected.

The assumption that the effect of parts marking ought to be concentrated in the 1986-87 change is

also questionable. Unlike a static crashworthiness device, such as a high-penetration-resistant

windshield, which accomplished its effect as soon as it was installed (in MY 1966 cars and all

subsequent years) and obviously had no effect when it was not installed (MY 1965 and earlier), a

measure such as parts marking mostly works indirectly by creating a deterrent effect in the minds of

thieves, and this effect could be diffused over several model years, as was discussed above. The

analyst's frustration with the data in Figure A-8 is that any "diffuse" effect of parts marking is

undoubtedly lost within the "regression to the mean" effect, and even the "concentrated" 1986-87

effect of parts marking could be obscured by any "lumpiness" in the "regression to the mean effect."

One of the best defenses of the validity of an analytic model is that the results are robust - e.g., that

similar trends and effects are seen in various subgroups of the data as in the entire data set.

Unfortunately, the procedure described above is as robust as gelled desserts and quaking aspens.

A-23
Pnma facie, if the 1988-89 change had not been included in the preceding calculations, the 1986-87

shrinkage would have been less than any of the others, and the effect attributed to pans marking

would have been negative.

Additionally, the procedure was run separately on five manufacturer groups of cars: GM, Ford,

Chrysler, Japanese, European. The results differed greatly (far more than would be expected by

chance, given the sample sizes), both in the average year-to-year regression to the mean and in the

specific 1986-87 change. The only consistent pattern was that GM, Ford and Chrysler had fairly

similar, close to 0.1, average year-to-year regression to the mean (which is another reason why the

analysis in Figures A-7 and A-8 was limited to domestic cars). The incremental 1986-87 effect did

not converge on .017 at all, but ranged from quite positive to quite negative.

Another important finding was that, even among the domestic cars, the effect "attributed" to parts

marking varied according to the age of the car. If the data used in Figures A-7 and A-8 are

subdivided into cohorts of new cars, 1 -year-old cars, etc. (and additional data are obtained for cars

up to 6 years old), the analysis procedure yields the following results:

Vehicle

Age

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Gross

1986-87

Shrinkage

.249

.167

.009

- 010

-.049

-.042

-.065

Avg. Regression

to the Mean

(Excl. 1986-87)

.054

.095

.100

.090

.084

.075

.065

Net

1986-87

Shrinkage

.195

.072

-.091

-.100

-.133

-.117

-.130

A-24
The results are nearly identical for cars age 2-6 and quite different for brand-new cars and, to a lesser

extent. 1 -year-old cars. Moreover, even within each manufacturer group, nearly the same vehicle-age

trend was seen (even though the net 1986-87 shrinkage had different starting points for different

manufacturers, it kept getting worse up to age 2 and then leveled off). Thus, there is a robust pattern

in a mass of results that are, on the whole, not robust.

The data suggest that parts marking had a quite strong effect in model year 1987 cars when they were

less than a year old, a much less strong effect when they were one year old, and negative effects after

that. The observed effect for the brand new cars is so strong that it can hardly be due to chance, or

even an artifact of the "lumpiness" in the year-to-year regression-to-the-mean. In each model year,

about 15,000 brand-new cars were stolen among the models that got parts marking, and another

15,000 among those that didn't. Thus, the "gross 1986-87 shrinkage" is a statistic derived from a

ratio of ratios of rates, involving four rates, each based on about 15,000 thefts. The coefficient of

variation of each of the four rates is less than 1 percent, and for the ratio of ratios, less than 2 percent.

In other words, the confidence bounds on the net effect in brand new cars is about ± 4 percent; the

observed effect of 20 percent is highly significant, deserving a detailed examination.

Figure A-9 is identical to Figure A-8, except that it is limited to cars of vehicle age 0, i.e., the CY

of the theft is the same as the MY of the car (whereas Figure A-8 included 0-3 year old cars). The

naked eye can clearly detect that the drop in the theft differential from MY 1986 to 1987 is about

0.25, while all the other year-to-year changes (except 1984-85) are negligible. At first glance, the

MY 1986-87 effect of parts marking is far stronger than the "regression to the mean" trend.

More insight is gained by looking separately at the theft rates in the models that got parts marking

and those that didn't. Figure A-10 is identical to Figure A-7, except that it is limited to cars of age

0. The four theft rates that explain the 1986-87 effect are the two l's and the two 0's on either side

of the vertical line. The MY 1987 cars with marked parts clearly had a lower theft rate than might

be expected from the trend in the l's. However, these same make models in their last year before

parts marking (1986) had a slightly higher-than-expected theft rate. Conversely, themodes that never

got marked parts had just slightly more thefts than expected in 1987 and slightly fewer than expected

in 1986. With all four of these numbers going in the "right" direction, the 1986-87 change in the

relative difference is substantial.

A-25


In other words, in 1987, thieves stole fewer of the models with parts marking and shifted their

attention to the models with unmarked parts. By contrast, in 1986, they stole some extra cars of the

makes and models that were slated to get parts marking in 1987, but did not yet have it in 1986.

They were, so to speak, "stockpiling" parts from these car lines during the last year when it was

"safe" to steal them. (Of course, all of this is just statistical evidence. From the rates themselves, it

is impossible to determine whether thieves consciously and deliberately "stockpiled" 1986 parts or

shifted their 1987 theft choices. It can only be concluded that the actual theft patterns shifted in those

directions.)

If the effect was so strong for brand-new cars, why did it drop off so quickly as the cars became

older. Several possible explanations can be suggested: (1) The unique opportunity to "stockpile"

parts at a time when no car on the road yet had parts marking was available only in calendar year

1986. In subsequent years, even though the MY 1986 cars were still unmarked, it became harder to

tell them apart from later, marked cars of the same make-models. (2) As cars get older, they become

of considerably less interest to professional thieves; more of them are stolen by nonprofessional

thieves, unlikely to be deterred by parts marking. (3) As time passed, the deterrent effect of parts

marking became more diffuse and less concentrated on MY 1987 vs. 1986 cars; the statistical

procedure used above would be less likely to detect an effect. (4) If professional thieves learned how

to defeat parts marking, or at least became less worried about getting caught as a result of parts

marking, they were not as reluctant to steal cars with marked parts. Only explanation (4) suggests

that parts marking became less effective; the other explanations merely suggest that effects of parts

marking subsequently escaped detection by the statistical procedure used here.

It has been mentioned several times that the shrinkage in the theft rate differential need not represent

a "pure" reduction of thefts of marked cars, but might just be a shift of thefts from marked cars to

unmarked cars. Figure A-l 1 presents the combined, overall theft rate for the 42 domestic make

models listed above, by model year, when the cars were brand new. It shows thefts of MY 1984 cars

in CY 1984, MY 1985 in CY 1985, etc. This composite theft rate rose every year from 1985 to

A-28
1989. by an average of about 6 percent a year - commensurate with the annual increases in thefts of

cars of all ages in the United States during the mid-1980's (see the main report). The increase from

MY 1986 to 1987, 4 percent, is about par for the course. Clearly, the 20 percent shrinkage in the

theft rate differential between marked and unmarked cars was caused by a shift of thefts from marked

to unmarked models, rather than an absolute reduction in thefts. However, that is not necessarily an

unfavorable sign; if all cars on the road had been marked, thieves would have been unable to shift

from marked to unmarked cars, and it is conceivable that thefts would have declined in absolute

terms.

Parts iMarking, Recovery Rates and Unrecovered-Theft Rates Before/After MY 1987

The same data base that was used to analyze possible interactions between parts marking and

theft rates can also be used to study recovery rates. The two major differences are (1) the

"good" outcome is an increase in recovery rates (whereas for theft rates, a drop was

desirable); (2) there is no overwhelming "regression to the mean" after 1984, since the

models that got parts marking were selected because of their high theft rates, not low

recovery rates (compare Figures A-l and A-3).

Figure A-12 displays the recovery rates of 0-3 year old domestic cars during MY 1984-89.

As above, it is based on make-models that were produced throughout 1984-89. The l's are

the recovery rates [log(recoveries/thefts)] of make-models that got parts marking in 1987 and

the 0's are the recovery rates of models that never got parts marking or antitheft devices. The

vertical line down the middle of Figure A-12 separates MY 1984-86, when neither group of

make-models had parts marking, from MY 1987-89, when the l's had parts marking and the

0's did not.

Figure A-12 shows slightly higher recovery rates throughout 1984-89 for the unmarked

models than for the make-models that got parts marking. Both groups' recovery rates had a

slight downward drift during those years. Obviously there is no dramatic change in the

relation of the l's to the 0's in 1987; nevertheless the gap between 0 and 1 is slightly smaller

A-29
in 1987 than in the preceding or the following year (an indication of a result in the "'right"

direction).

Figure A-13 tracks the difference between the l's and the O's in Figure A-12. Since the I's

were always lower than the O's, the difference is consistently negative. If parts marking

increases recovery rates, the difference ought to be less negative in MY 1987 than in MY

1986 - the data point for MY 1987 should be higher than the one for MY 1986 - and indeed

it is. The climb from 1986 to 1987 is in the opposite direction of a somewhat inconsistent

but generally downward trend.

If, as in the preceding section, the change in the D's from 1986 to 1987 is measured and

compared to the average change in the other years, when the parts marking status of the

various make models did not change, the arithmetic for the changes in recovery rate

differentials works out as follows:

Change

1984-85

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

Average excluding 1986-87

+ .0027

- .0078

+ .0036

- .0221

+ .0069

- .0051

Departure of 1986-87 from prevailing trend + .0087

In other words, given the assumption of a constant trend in the recovery rate differential, the

data suggest that the implementation of parts marking in MY 1987 was associated with a 0.9

percent increase in the recovery rate, relative to the trend line.

A-30


L"alike the 1986-S7 etfect on theft rates, which was strong only for brand new cars and disappeared

after the cars were 2 years old, the observed effect on recovery rates remains uniformly favorable,

even for vehicles as old as 6 years:

Brand new +.010

1 year old + .006

2 years old + .002

3 years old +.019

4 years old + .047

5 years old + .027

6 years old + .034

In summary, the results on recovery rates are mixed. On the one hand, Figures A-4 and A-13 show

that, in the long term, the recovery rates of models with parts marking have steadily gotten worse

than those of the models that never got parts marking. On the other hand, in 1987, the specific year

that parts marking was introduced, those models had an increase in the recovery rate, contrary to the

long-term trend. There does not appear to be any satisfactory explanation for the adverse long-term

trend. Of course, if it has any causal relationship to parts marking, it far outweighs the one-time

1986-87 improvement. But if the long-term trend is not causally related to parts marking - e.g., if

it is an artifact of the specific make-models that were selected for parts marking, and it would have

occurred even if those models had never been marked - then the positive effect in 1986-87 might

stand as a benefit for parts marking. Once again, the analysis is frustrated because make-models were

selected for parts marking on a highly nonrandom basis, and there could be all sorts of trends

unrelated to parts marking.

To the extent that many of the vehicles stolen by professional thieves - for chop shops, salvage switch

and retag, or export - are never recovered, the unrecovered theft rate, defined as

log [(thefts - recoveries)/registration years]

A-33
is a sort of surrogate for the "professional" theft rate, and it is a primary goal of parts marking to

lower this rate. Obviously, when the theft rate goes down and the recovery rate goes up, the

unrecovered-theft rate decreases. However, even small increases in the recovery rate, such as those

attributed to parts marking in the preceding analysis, can have substantial effects on the unrecoveredtheft rate: e.g., if the recovery rate increases from 90 to 91 percent, unrecovered thefts are reduced

by 10 percent.

Figure A-14 tracks the differential in the unrecovered-theft rates of 0-3 year old domestic cars that

got parts marking in MY 1987 and those that did not. In general, the models that got parts marking

had initially higher unrecovered-theft rates, but the difference shrank throughout 1984-89 (regression

to the mean). The differential was 0.85 in MY 84 and 0.45 in MY 89. The drop from 1986 to 1987,

although not dramatically larger than the reductions in the other years, is nevertheless greater than

average (and it is exceeded in magnitude only by the 1984-85 drop). That suggests a positive effect

for parts marking; the arithmetic works out as follows:

Shrinkage

1984-85

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

Average excluding 1986-87

Excess of 1986-87 over average drop

.207

.077

.133

.039

-.057

.067

.066

In other words, given the preceding assumptions, the data suggest a

1 - exp(-.O66) = 6.4 percent

A-34
reduction of unrecovered thefts with parts marking. At first glance this reduction seems large in

comparison to the amount needed for parts marking to be cost-beneficial. However, the result falls

short of being conclusive, given the fragility of the assumptions and the rather tentative effect

demonstrated in Figure A-14.

In one sense, however, the results on unrecovered thefts are more robust than the findings on the theft

rate: the positive effect does not vanish as the cars get older:

Vehicle Age Reduction Attributed to Parts Marking (%)

Brand new 25.8

1 year old 23.0

2 years old . - 14.8

3 years old .9

4 years old 20.9

5 years old 4. 2

6 years old 8.8

Initially, the effect is strong because thefts are down and recoveries are up. The observed benefit

disappears when the cars are 2-3 years old, but subsequently returns to the positive, because the

improvement in the recovery rate overshadows the observed negative effects on the theft rate. Figure

A-15 illustrates the substantial benefit of parts marking on the unrecovered-theft rates of brand-new

cars in MY 1987.

Effects of Antitheft Devices Introduced in My 1989-92 Domestic Cars

One domestic manufacturer gradually introduced factory-installed antitheft devices as

standard equipment in a substantial number of make-models during 1986-94. In most of the

vehicles, the equipment included a specially designed ignition key. A computer in the

vehicle reads an encoded capsule embedded in the key and compares it to a microchip within

the computer. The ignition system is shut down if the codes do not match, or it is attempted

A-35
to "hot-wire" the car. A partial list of make-models that have received these devices

includes:

1986 Chevrolet Corvette (system upgraded in 1990)

1989 Chevrolet Camaro, Pontiac Firebird, Cadillac Eldorado, Cadillac Seville

1990 Cadillac DeVille, Buick Riviera, Oldsmobile Toronado

1991 Buick Park Avenue, Oldsmobile 98

1992 Buick LeSabre, Oldsmobile 88, Pontiac Bonnevile

1994 Chevrolet Caprice (partial phase-m began in 1993)

The effects of the antitheft devices on theft, recovery and unrecovered-theft rates will be

studied for the preceding list of make-models with 1989-92 introductions. The Corvette and

Caprice are not included because their analysis is complicated by the two-stage introduction

of the devices, as well as an insufficient amount of data. It is noteworthy that the antitheft

device was not necessarily introduced in the same year that the Government granted these

vehicles an exemption from parts marking; as a result, some cars have parts marking and

antitheft devices in some model years.

As in the three preceding sections, rates for the make-models that got antitheft devices will

be compared to rates for control groups of domestic make-models of a similar market class,

produced in the same model years, that did not get antitheft devices in those years, and did

not change their parts-marking status after 1987. The five cohorts of cars with antitheft

devices, and their control groups are:

Antitheft Cars Control Group Cars

Camaro, Firebird Mustang, Daytona, Thunderbird, Cougar

Eldorado, Seville Lincoln Mark, Continental

DeVille, Riviera, Toronado Town Car, Mark, Continental

Park Avenue, Olds 98 Crown Victoria, Grand Marquis

LeSabre, 88, Bonnevile Taurus, Sable

Figure A-16 compares the theft rates of 0-3 year old LeSabres, Olds 88s and Bonnevilles to

the rate for Taurus and Sables during MY 1988-95. It is based on the same NCIC-Polk data

A-36
files that were used in the preceding section (data up through CY 1995). The 2's denote the

aggregate theft rate [log(thefts/registrations)] for LeSabre, 88 and Bonneville, which received

antitheft devices in 1992 (and had parts marking in 1987-91; LeSabre and 88 also in 1992).

The O's denote the combined theft rate for Taurus and Sable, which did not have parts

marking or antitheft devices during 1988-95.

Figure A-16 leaves no room for doubt about the effectiveness of the antitheft devices. The

log of the theft rate for the GM cars (the 2's) is reasonably close to -5.25 in MY 1988-91; it

drops to about -7 in 1992, when the devices were introduce, and it stays there in later model

years. A drop of 1.75 on the logarithmic scale suggests a very substantial reduction in the

actual theft rate, as will be confirmed below. The theft rate for the control group cars

(Taurus and Sable) shows a comparatively modest decreasing trend in 1988-91 and a modest

increase in 1992-95. Interestingly, the theft rate for the GM cars shows a similar decrease

from 1988 to 1991, and a similar, modest increase from 1992 to 1995, but, of course, a very

large drop from 1991 to 1992.

Figure A-17 tracks the theft rate differential - the difference between the 2's and the O's in

Figure A-16. This differential is relatively constant and close to 1.00 during MY 1988-91,

and it drops abruptly to a relatively constant -0.75 in MY 1992-95. The drop clearly

coincides with the introduction of antitheft devices in the GM cars. Figure A-17 should be

contrasted with Figure A-8, a corresponding analysis of the effect of parts marking. In

Figure A-8, the small effect of parts marking (if any) is obscured by a steady downward trend

throughout 1984-89 (regression to the mean). In Figure A-17, the effect of antitheft devices

is so large as to completely overshadow any other trends, such as regression to the mean.

If the procedure for calculating effectiveness that was employed in the analyses of parts

marking is applied to the data in Figure A-17, the results are:

Shrinkage

1989-90 -.074

1990-91 .076

1991-92 1.780

1992-93 - .027

1993-94 .205

A-37
Average excluding 1991-92 .045

Excess of 1991-92 over average drop 1.735

In other words, the data suggest a

1 - exp(-1.735) = 82 percent

reduction of the theft rate by the antitheft devices in LeSabre, Olds 88 and Bonneville.

Figure A-18 tracks the recovery rate differential for these same groups of cars. For recovery

rates, the "right" direction is the opposite of theft rates: we want them to go up. Thus, the

results in Figure A-18 are definitely in the wrong direction, since the differential drops from

about .10 to zero with antitheft devices. This finding, however, should not come as a

surprise. Unlike parts marking, which is primarily intended to deter the professional thief

and probably his little effect on "casual" thefts such as joyriding, a successful antitheft

device should reduce all types of theft substantially. But it will probably have the greatest

impact on the casual thefts, the types that are most easily recovered. Thus, even though

thefts are greatly reduced, the ratio of recoveries to thefts (the recovery rate) may actually

decrease rather than rise.

Nevertheless, the decrease in the recovery rate is negligible relative to the decrease in the

theft rate. Even though the number of unrecovered cars grows in proportion to the number

of thefts, it will drop relative to vehicle registrations. The differential in the unrecovered

theft rate, defined as

log [(thefts - recoveries)/registration years]

is graphed in Figure A-19. It shows a strong reduction with antitheft devices, from about 0.2

in 1988-91 to about -0.8 in 1992-95. By the computation method used throughout this

A-38
appendix, the data in Figure A-19 correspond to a 58 percent reduction in the unrecoveredtheft rate.

The trends in theft and recovery rates, relative to their respective control groups, are quite

similar for the other four cohorts of domestic make-models that got antitheft devices at some

time between 1989 and 1991. (The results for the Eldorado-Seville cohort are based on

substantially fewer data than the others and subject to correspondingly higher uncertainty.)

The effectiveness estimates for the antitheft devices in each group of cars are as follows:

Percentage Reduction by Antitheft Devices

Camaro, Firebird

Eldorado, Seville

DeVille, Riviera, Toronado

Park Avenue, Olds 98

LeSabre, Olds 88, Bonne vile

Theft

Rate

68

11

47

78

82

Unrecovered

Theft Rate

50

36

58

66

58

A "best estimate" for the effectiveness of these antitheft devices can be obtained by

combining the data for the five make-model groups. The rates are not graphed by absolute

model years, but by the model year relative to the implementation date for antitheft devices.

For example, in Camaro and Firebird, year "0" is model year 1989, when those cars got the

devices. MY 1988 becomes year "-1" and MY 1990 becomes year "1." Thus, also, for their

control group of Mustang, Daytona, etc. But in LeSabre, Olds 88 and Bonneville (and for

their control group cars, Taurus and Sable), MY 1992 becomes year "0," MY 1993 is year

"1," etc.

A-39
Figure A-20 tracks the theft rate differential for the five make-model groups combined.- the

difference between the GM cars and the control group cars. This differential is .75 or larger

during the four model years prior to the installation of antitheft devices in the GM cars (i.e.,

the control group models originally had a lower theft rate). It drops abruptly to a relatively

constant -.5 in the year that the GM cars got the antitheft devices, and it stays there (i.e.,

from that point on, the GM cars have the lower theft rate). Figure A-21 shows a similarly

strong effect of antitheft devices in lowering the unrecovered theft rate. Here are the

calculations of effectiveness based on the data in Figures A-20 and A-21:

Shrinkage in the Rate Differential

3rd MY before to 2nd MY before antitheft

2nd MY before to last MY before antitheft

Last MY before to first MY with antitheft

First MY with to 2nd MY with antitheft

2nd MY with to 3rd MY with antitheft

Average excluding year of transition

Excess of transition drop over average drop

All

Thefts

.138

.309

1.342

.138

-.097

.122

1.220

Unrecovered

Thefts

.346

.146

.974

.201

-.261

.108

.866

In other words, the data attribute to these antitheft devices:

1 - exp(-1.220) = 70 percent reduction of the theft rate

• 1 - exp(-0.866) = 58 percent reduction of the unrecovered-theft rate

A-40
Although these antitheft devices may be especially beneficial in reducing "'casual" thefts for

purposes such as joyriding or temporary transportation, they also appear to be highly

effective in reducing "professional" thefts. To the extent that the unrecovered-theft rate can

serve as a surrogate for professional thefts, these antitheft devices are far more effective than

parts marking (which was associated with perhaps a 6 percent reduction of the unrecovered

theft rate). Of course, when comparing effectiveness, it should not be forgotten that the

antitheft devices cost far more. Also, the roles of antitheft devices and parts marking are

complementary, not redundant. The former makes it hard to steal a car; the latter acts as a

deterrent because it aids in the apprehension and conviction of thieves.

The reductions in thefts persist as the cars get older, and they persist in later model years.

For example, in Camaro and Firebird (the first high-sales make-models to get antitheft

devices), theft rates are low for every model year from 1989 to 1995. Rates have remained

low for the MY 1989 cars even in calendar year 1995, when they were six years old.

Effects of Factory-Installed Antitheft Devices in Other Cars

Since 1984 a number of other manufacturers have introduced factory-installed antitheft devices as

standard equipment in selected make-models. Since the devices vary considerably in design and

function, it is not unreasonable to expect a corresponding variation in their effectiveness. However,

since none of these devices were introduced in numbers anywhere near as large as the system

analyzed in the preceding section, it is difficult to estimate their effectiveness accurately. The analysis

in this section will be limited to inspecting the general trends in the theft rates of 0-5 year old cars of

some of those models. (Even the accuracy of these "general trends" cannot always be assured, since

the data base may have been incomplete for some of the low-sales, imported make-models.)

A-41



According to NHTSA's/foto Theft-Resistance Study, a report to the Congress dated April 1992, the

Nissan 300ZX received antitheft devices in 1984 and the Maxima in 1985. The device disables the

starting mechanism and sounds an alarm when somebody attempts to enter the car without a key.

An inspection of the theft rates for these make-models indicates a 25-35 percent reduction in MY

1984-85. In subsequent years, however, the theft rate climbed back to the pre-1984 level.

BMW passenger cars received a system in 1985 consisting of a key-activated alarm and an optional

code pad requiring the driver to key in a sequence of numbers. Later, the 7-series cars also received

a device to disable the starter mechanism. Theft rates showed a decrease of about 10-20 percent in

MY 1985 and 1986; by 1987-90, theft rates had largely returned to pre-1985 levels

BMW passenger cars received a system in 1985 consisting of a key-activated alarm and an optional

code pad requiring the driver to key in a sequence of numbers. Later, the 7-series cars also received

a device to disable the starter mechanism. Theft rates showed a decrease of about 10-20 percent in

MY 1985 and 1986; by 1987-90, theft rates had largely returned to pre-1985 levels.

Toyota Supra and Cressida received antitheft devices in 1985 with functions similar to the BMW

systems. Later (by 1987?) they received devices to disable the starter mechanism. Theft rates for

these relatively low-sales vehicles do not follow clear trends; nevertheless, there appears to be a

substantial reduction in the Supra (55 percent) and a smaller reduction in the Cressida (10-20

percent). In subsequent years, theft rates stayed at the lower levels.

Starting in 1987, certain make-models were exempted from the parts marking requirement if they

carried antitheft devices that, as a minimum, included a mechanism to disable the starter and trigger

an audio or visual alarm after unauthorized entry. Whereas this device may have been installed in a

model year earlier than the effective date of the exemption (e.g., in the domestic cars analyzed in the

preceding section), it was, at the latest, installed during the exemption year.

Chrysler Conquest and Mitsubishi Starion, two make-models of similar design, received exemptions

from parts marking in 1987. Their theft rates increased steadily throughout the model years that they

were produced (1983-89). Unless the antitheft devices were already present in the first year that

A-45
these models were produced, it may be concluded that they had no obvious beneficial effect on the

theft rate.

Audi 5000S/100/200, Mitsubishi Galant and Isuzu Impulse received exemptions in 1987, and Saab

9000 received one in 1989. Each of these make-models shows steady, gradual reductions in the theft

rate during the model years after the exemption. Typically, the cumulative reduction in the theft rate

was about 50 percent over a 5-year period. Since there was no concentrated drop in a specific year,

it is difficult to judge if the long-term reductions were due to the antitheft devices or to other factors

that may have made these models less enticing to thieves.

Acura Legend received an exemption in 1991. Theft rates, however, steadily increased throughout

the years this model was produced (1986-94). Unless the antitheft devices were already present in

1986, it may be concluded that they had no obvious beneficial effect on the theft rate.

Volkswagen Jetta gained an exemption in 1994. At that time, or shortly earlier, they received an

antitheft system rather similar to the one in the domestic cars analyzed in the preceding section.

There was a dramatic 63 percent reduction in the theft rate from MY 1992 to 1994.

While the above discussion of theft rates does not pretend to have generated specific estimates of the

effectiveness of antitheft devices in any of the individual make-models, it is safe to draw one

conclusion from the great variation of the results from model to model: the mere presence of an

"antitheft device" does not guarantee an immediate, spectacular reduction of the theft rate. It all

depends on the type of antitheft device.

A-46






"In-part" Recovery Rates Just Before and After Model Year 1987

The file assembled by the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) from data supplied by the National

Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) not only specifies what percentage of stolen cars was recovered, but

also what percentage of the recoveries were "in part," "in whole," or "intact." A vehicle is recovered

"in part" if "major" parts are missing (viz., marked parts, or parts that would have been marked if the

car had parts marking). It is recovered "in whole" if only "minor" parts, such as the radio, are

missing, or if the car was damaged but nothing was missing. The recovery is "intact" if the car was

essentially undamaged and no parts were missing. The type of recovery perhaps, but not necessarily

says something about the motive for the theft. In general, cars that have been stolen by

nonprofessional thieves for joyriding or other temporary transportation would more often be

recovered intact or in whole, whereas cars worked over by a chop shop, if they are recovered at all,

would more likely be recovered in part. If parts marking or antitheft devices have a deterrent effect

on chop shop operations, and professional thieves generally - while having little deterrent effect on

joyriders and other nonprofessional thieves - a reduction in the frequency of "in part" recoveries

might be expected, relative to "in whole" and "intact" recoveries. Throughout the analyses that

follow, a reduction of "in part" recoveries is a change in the "right" direction.

At first glance, the HLDI-NICB data are strongly consistent with that hypothesis. These data are

complete from CY 1986 to 1991, and in each of those years include at cars that are 0-2 years old (and

in a few years, some older cars as well). In the analyses that follow, the data have been limited to 0-2

year old cars of model years 1984-89. They are further limited to the specific make-models of

passenger cars that were included in most of the NCIC/Polk data analyses: make-models produced

throughout 1984-89 that (1) got parts marking in 1987 and did not get antitheft devices in 1984-89,

(2) got exemptions from parts marking in 1987 because antitheft devices were installed in 1987 or

earlier, (3) got parts marking in 1987 and antitheft devices in 1989, or (4) did not get parts marking

or antitheft devices throughout 1984-89. For these cars, the overall recovery rate [recoveries/thefts]

in the HLDI-NICB data shows a gradual downward trend throughout 1984-89, no different from the

preceding NCIC/Polk data analyses. However the percentage of in-part recoveries [i.e., in-part

recoveries/total recoveries] shows a much stronger downward trend, especially for the make-models

that got parts marking or antitheft exemptions in 1987:

A-53
Percent Recovered "In Part"

MY

84

85

86

87

88

89

Parts

Marking

in 1987

19.1

19.5

15.7

11.6

10.2

10.3

Antitheft

Exemption

in 1987

10.0

11.1

11.2

7.1

8.2

8.1

P. M. in 87

A-T. D.

in 89

23.9

22.8

21.4

18.2

17.3

14.3

Neither

13.2

12.8

11.7

9.1

9.3

10.7

At first glance, these results appear to have all the desired characteristics: the reduction is stronger

from MY 1986 to 1987, when parts marking was first installed, than in other years. The downward

trend is substantially stronger for cars that got parts marking (from 19 to 10 percent) than for cars

that did not get parts marking or antitheft devices (13 to 10 percent). It looks like a focused deterrent

effect for cars that got parts marking in 1987, with spillover to other cars and subsequent years.

Unfortunately, the HLDI-NICB data are subject to the same bias as all data on parts marking

(regression-to-the-mean effect due to the nonrandom selection of the make-models that got parts

marking) plus possible additional biases of their own. The first indication of possible bias emerges

when the rates are presented by calendar year rather than by model year. Since the data base is

limited to cars 0-2 years old, there is a strong relationship between MY and CY (e.g., data on the MY

1989 cars are derived only from CY 1989-91, while data on the MY 1984 cars are from CY 1986).

The apparent MY effects in the preceding table might, to some extent, be CY effects:

Calendar Year

86

87

88

89

90

91

Percent Recovered In Part - All Cars

18.6

17.2

11.3

10.0

10.1

12.9

A-54
It is immediately apparent that the strong drop of "in part" recoveries takes place in CY 1988, and

not in CY 1987 as might be expected if the effect were really due to parts marking and antitheft

devices. It might be argued that the effect was delayed for a year because it took time for an

awareness of parts marking to "sink in" with professional thieves. Frankly, a more plausible

explanation (although this analyst does not have detailed knowledge of the HLDI-NICB data base

to prove the point) is that the 1988-91 data are not directly comparable with the 1986-87 data; that

the definition of an "in part" recovery may have explicitly or implicitly changed. After all, the analysis

of NCIC/Polk theft data (Figure A-9) showed an immediate effect for parts marking in 1987, not a

delayed effect.

The strength of the calendar year effect, relative to the model year effect, is evident if the rates are

computed by CY and MY:

CY

86

87

88

89

90

91

MY

84

85

86

85

86

87

86

87

88

87

88

89

88

89

89

Percent Recovered

in Part - All Cars

18.1

18.5

19.7

17.2

18.4

15.4

10.9

11.4

12.1

9.9

10.5

9.3

10.6

9.4

12.9

A-55
In any CY, the in-part recovery rate is essentially the same for every MY. Specifically, in CY 1988,

the in-part recovery rate is low even for MY 1986. The only hint of a model year effect is that in CY

1987, the in-part recovery rate is somewhat lower for MY 1987 than for MY 1985 or 1986 (although

not nearly as low as the rates for any MY in CY 1988). This modest MY effect for MY 1987 in CY

1987 raises a hope that parts marking has played a role. However, a further classification of the rates

by CY, MY and make-model group (parts marking in 87 vs. no parts marking; models that got

antitheft devices at any time in 1984-89 are excluded from the table) dashes this hope while creating

others:

Percent Recovered In Part

CY MY

86 84

85

86

87 85

86

87

88 86

87

88

89 87

88

89

90 88

89

91 89

In both cases where a direct comparison of MY 1986 and 1987 are possible - i.e., in CY 1987 and

1988, the year-to-year reduction is actually greater for the cars that did not get marked parts. In CY

1987, the rate for models without marked parts dropped from 13.9 to 10.8, but for the cars that got

marked parts, it only dropped from 19.9 to 17.3. In CY 1988, the rate for cars that did not get

A-56

Parts Marking

in 1987

19.1

19.6

19.7

19.5

19.9

17.3

9.7

11.1

11.2

9.2

10.1

9.9

10.0

9.8

11.3

No Parts

Marking

13.2

13.2

14.7

12.5

13.9

10.8

8.6

8.6

10.1

8.7

8.7

8.7

9.4

9.2

13.6
marked parts remained unchanged at 8.6, but it increased from 9.7 to 11.1 for the cars that got

marked parts. Thus, there does not appear to be a focused effect for marked parts in the expected

direction in 1987.

On the other hand, the preceding table clearly shows a longer-term reduction in the differential

between the models that got marked parts and those that didn't.

In CY 1986, the rate for the models that would subsequently get marked parts was consistently 50%

higher than for those that would not. That differential got smaller every year, especially in 1988, and

by 1991 the cars with unmarked parts had a higher "in part" recovery rate. This long-term trend is

perhaps not related to any possible changes in the HLDI-NICB definitions, since such changes ought

to affect both make-model groups in the same direction. On the other hand, the long-term trend

could well be a reflection of the same regression-to-the-mean pattern that was seen in all the analyses

of theft rates - or, optimistically, it could be a true indication that cars with marked parts were

becoming less and less attractive to chop shops and professional thieves.

Additional insight on the relative strength of the various factors can be obtained by performing

regression analyses on the "in part" recovery rates. One regression that fit the observed rates

exceptionally well had the dependent variable DELRIP, the differential in the logs of the recovery

rates, which was defined for each of the 15 allowed combinations of CY and MY.

DELRIP(CY,MY) = log(rlp/(rrrlp)) -

where

r]p = in-part recoveries, make-models that got parts marking

r, = all recoveries, make-models that got parts marking

r^ = in-part recoveries, make-models that did not get parts marking

r0 = all recoveries, make-models that did not get parts marking

A-57
The independent variables included certain interactions of

MARKED = 1 if MY is 87-89, 0 if MY is 84-86

CYGE88 = 1 if CY is 88-91, 0 if CY is 86-87

MY_87 = MY-87

CY88 = CY-88

and the regression weight factor was r,+r0. With 15 data points, the regression had an R2 of .921 and

an F value of 29.02 (p < .0001). The regression coefficients were

Parameter

INTERCEPT

MARKED

CYGE88

MARKED*MY

CYGE88*CY

87

88

0

0

-

0

Estimate

.4544791569

.1050890833

.3144454287

.0145630024

.1286890860

T for HO:

Parameter=0

13.42

1.71

-5.25

0.34

-3.57

Pr > |T|

0.0001

0.1185

0.0004

0.7421

0.0051

Std Error of

Estimate

0.03386093

0.06154310

0.05994914

0.04304260

0.03599973

In other words, the excess of the "in part" recovery rate for the models that got parts marking in

1987, relative to the models that did not, was originally quite large (INTERCEPT). It shrank

significantly in CY 1988 (CYGE88) and continued to shrink significantly in each subsequent calendar

year (CYGE88*CY_88). The direct effect of parts marking was nonsignificant when it was originally

introduced in MY 1987 (MARKED), and it changed little in subsequent model years

(MARKED*MY_87). By CY 1991, cars with marked parts had slightly lower "in part" recovery

rates than cars without marked parts.

Whereas this particular regression fit the actual recovery rates exceedingly well and suggests that the

CY effect was strong while the direct parts-marking effect was nonsignificant, it should be noted that

other sets of independent variables also fit the data well and some of them showed a stronger partsmarking effect. Thus, it would not be appropriate to draw firm conclusions about the effects of parts

marking, especially under the current circumstances, where possible biases inherent in the data limit

the utility of any regression model.

A-58
Conclusions

The analyses of theft and recovery data were unable to generate reliable quantitative estimates of theft

reductions or recovery enhancements attributable to parts marking. They do not even allow an

unequivocal conclusion that parts marking has been effective. That was almost inevitable given the

highly nonrandom method whereby make-models were selected for parts marking or antitheft devices,

resulting in biases in the theft rate trends that would tend to obscure any effects that could reasonably

be expected for parts marking.

Nevertheless, the analysis results are not totally inconclusive or neutral. They produced five concrete

indications of benefits for parts marking, each one hedged with caveats that made it fall short of a firm

conclusion:

(1) Above all, there was a conspicuous shift in theft rates in 1987, the first year of parts marking.

Thefts shifted from the 1987 make-models with marked parts to their 1986 predecessors

without marked parts, or to other 1987 make-models without marked parts. However, this

effect had vanished by the time the cars were two years old; also, the effect was more a shift

in what cars were stolen than a reduction of overall theft rates.

(2) Recovery rates for 1987 cars with parts marking were consistently higher than for the same

make-models in 1986, the last year before parts marking. Unlike the effect on theft rates, this

benefit persisted as the model year 1987 cars got older. On the other hand, the 1986-87

favorable effect was followed by an unexplained but consistent deterioration, starting in model

year 1988, in the recovery rates of cars with parts marking relative to other make-models

without the markings.

(3) The rate of unrecovered thefts per million registration years is a surrogate for the incidence

of "professional" thefts. In calendar year 1987, the unrecovered-theft rate of model year 1987

cars with parts marking was 26 percent lower than expected. As the model year 1987 cars

got older, this benefit diminished, but not to zero; it persisted at about 6 percent. That is the

closest thing to a specific "effectiveness estimate" for parts marking. However, that observed

benefit is within the "noise range" of possible biases in the data and it cannot be attributed to

parts marking without considerable doubt.

A-59
(4) In the very long term (cars of the early 90's vs. cars of the late 70's), parts marking and

antitheft devices appear to be associated with a reduction in theft rates. In other words, the

make-models that were selected in 1983-84 to get parts marking or antitheft devices in 1987

historically had higher theft rates than other make-models, even as far back as model year

1976. But from model year 1991 onwards, their theft rates were slightly lower than other

make models. Unfortunately, little can be said about the crucial intervening years, the 1980's.

The nonrandom selection of high-theft lines for parts marking caused a "regression to the

mean" situation that obscured all other trends. It is only possible to compare cars of the late

70's and early 90's, before and after the "regression to the mean" phenomenon. So many

other factors could be affecting theft trends over a 20-year period that it would be foolhardy

to attribute the observed long-term reduction to parts marking. Additionally, the

unrecovered-theft rates did not experience a similar long-term improvement.

(5) There was a strong reduction of "in part" vehicle recoveries, and a corresponding increase of

"in whole" and "intact" recoveries in all make-models after parts marking was introduced in

1987, and especially in the make-models that got the markings. The reduction of "in part"

vehicle recoveries could be an indication that chop shop operations and some other types of

professional car theft are declining. However, a closer examination of the data showed that

the reduction did not coincide with the introduction of parts marking, but mostly came 1-3

years later, possibly as a result of factors unrelated to parts marking, such as biases in the

data.

By contrast, for at least one type of factory-installed antitheft device, the available data provide

unequivocal evidence of effectiveness. One domestic manufacturer installed a system as standard

equipment in various car lines during 1989-94. This system was associated with an immediate - and

persistent - 70 percent reduction in the theft rate and a 58 percent reduction in the unrecovered-theft

rate. In other words, the devices appear to be quite effective in reducing all kinds of thefts, both the

"professional" and the "casual" type.

Substantially fewer data were available on the antitheft devices installed by other manufacturers.

Specific estimates were not obtained, but the available data suggest considerable variation in

effectiveness. With some of the devices, little change was seen in theft rates; with others, there were

reductions comparable to those for the domestic manufacturer.

A-60
On the whole, the analysis results seem to suggest that the approach of the Anti Car Theft Acts,

which view both parts-marking and factory-installed antitheft devices as effective deterrents to

automobile theft, has had benefits. Only a small effect, such as a 2 percent reduction of unrecovered

thefts is necessary for parts marking to be cost-effective. An effect of that magnitude would have

been obscured in the data available for the analyses. However, the positive results described above

hint that the effect of parts marking might have been greater than 2 percent, at least at certain times.

Antitheft devices, at least those installed in certain vehicles, are many times more effective, but also

many times higher in cost. Parts marking and antitheft devices are components of a larger program

that has, on the whole, succeeded. As shown in the main report, overall theft rates have leveled off

and even began to decline after 1989-90. When the team wins, each of the individual players gets

some credit.

Two other issues tie in with the analysis results. It has been mentioned repeatedly that the nonrandom

selection of high-theft make-models for parts marking impeded the evaluation, leaving the

effectiveness of parts marking in doubt. Hopefully, future introductions of similar countermeasures

will be done on a random basis or according to an experimental design that makes it easier to measure

effectiveness.

Some of the analyses hinted that parts marking had a short-term effect that may have waned in

subsequent years. That's at best a tentative finding, given the uncertainties in all the analyses.

However, it corresponds to the view that many professional thieves, before too long, learned how

to obliterate the markings. If so, that might encourage consideration of more permanent systems of

parts marking, given the high potential for benefits relative to cost.

A-61
APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF REGRESSION TO THE MEAN IN THEFT RATES OF CARS

WITH MARKED AND UNMARKED PARTS

Prepared by Robert F. Cook and Maria T. Woolverton , KRA Corporation under contract with the NHTSA. Some of

the specific models with antitheft devices we incorrectly classified which is corrected in Appendix A and the main

report. This appendix is retained to illustrate the effect of regression to the mean

The intent behind the introduction of vehicle parts marking (and installation of anti-theft devices) was

to reduce vehicle theft rates. While theft rates of marked and anti-theft equipped vehicles have fallen,

rates for unmarked vehicles have risen. This analysis examines whether this convergence in theft rates

is due to a statistical phenomenon known as regression to the mean.

The phenomenon of regression to the mean can occur as the result of selection of a subgroup from

a larger population using a selection criteria that is somehow related to the variable of interest.

Comparison is then made of the average value on some measure for the subgroup to the average

result from the same subgroup in a later period. The average of the subgroup can change

systematically for purely statistical reasons that have nothing to do with the phenomenon that is

presumably under study. The extent to which this occurs depends upon the correlation of the values

of the measure from one period of time to the next in the overall population.

A good example of this phenomenon is pre- and post-test scores in a class. Suppose students are

given a test of statistical ability at the outset of a class in statistics. Let us assume that the average

grade on the pre-test is 75 percent. Let us further assume, as is often the case, that the class has no

effect on the statistical ability of the average student. Therefore, we would expect that the average

post-test score would also be 75 percent. This result is not terribly satisfying, so we want to see if

the class helped those who were "statistically challenged." We select those students who scored

poorly on the pre-test and find that their average score was 60 percent. In the post-test, the same

sample of students obtains an average score of 70 percent. Should we conclude that the class

"helped" them? The answer is probably not. Since the average score on the two tests remained the

same for all students, if this group of students scored better on the post-test, then some other group

must have scored worse than they did on the pre-test. In fact, this has to be the case. Had we

selected a similarly sized group of those who did well on the pre-test (let us assume an average score

of 90 percent), we would have found that, on average, they did worse on the post-test (likely average

score 80 percent). Is it possible that the class made them worse off? The answer is that unless the

B-l

the groups are roughly equivalent in 1991. This is to be expected if they are selected subgroups of

the general population of cars and the theft rates in any two different time periods are not perfectly

correlated. The issue then is whether regression to the mean can account for all of the apparent

change in vehicle theft rates or whether the requirement of parts marking or installation of anti-theft

devices has had an overall effect on vehicle theft.

Estimation of Regression to the Mean Effects

As alluded to in the above example, the extent of regression to the mean of observed results for a

given selected subgroup (e.g., marked cars) from the population depends upon the correlation

between the two measures (e.g., theft rates) in time in the overall population. If the scores on the pre

and post measures are uncorrelated, then any difference in the average score of a particular subgroup

is purely random. If this is the case, then the most likely value on a second measure is the average

for the population, that is, complete regression to the mean of the population. If, on the other hand,

scores on the two tests are perfectly correlated (r = 1.00), the most likely value for the average theft

rate of a subgroup of cars is the same as in the pre-test (e.g., the average theft rate of the subgroup

in 1984). In this case there would be no regression to the mean (average) of the population.

It follows from the above that, if the correlation of the two scores (theft rates) for the entire

population is known, as well as the average scores for the population on each measure and the

average score of the subgroup for the first measure, we can calculate the expected regression to the

mean. In the current example, if the average theft rates for all passenger vehicles at both points in

time and the correlation between the two theft rates are known, as well as the theft rate of the

subgroups, it is possible to estimate what the theft rate of the subgroup of vehicles would be at a

second point in time if it were due only to the regression to the mean phenomenon.

The formula for the percentage regression to the mean is as follows:

Prm=\00(\-r)

B-3
Where:

Prm

= Percentage regression to the mean

r

~ Correlation between two measures in time

If we then know the average score for the entire population as well as the average score for the

particular subgroup in each time period, we can estimate the expected effect of regression. The

expected value of the average theft rate of the subgroup at the time of the second measurement is

estimated as follows:

Where:

= Expected value of the mean of subgroup on the second measure

2

 = Mean of the measure at a second point in time

= Mean of the subgroup on the first measure

If we know the expected effect of the likely regression to the mean for marked vehicles, then any

residual reduction in the observed theft rate in the later period may be the result of vehicle marking.

We can also perform the same calculation for unmarked vehicles to observe the likely change in the

theft rate of these vehicles. The difference between the actual and expected value of the mean of the

subgroup in the second time period is as follows:

E(DIF)=T2-EX2

B-4
Or, from above:

E(DIF)=T2-{Tr(U2-Yx)(\ -

Where:

E(DIF)= Expected value of the difference in theft rate in time period two

= Mean value for the subgroup in time period two

The point should also be made that, in the current analysis, we are concerned with the entire

population of passenger vehicles of which a subset are marked, unmarked, etc. The theft rate for

each subset is calculated by dividing the number of thefts by the total number of each type of vehicle

registered (in this case for the current year model). Thus, the results are not subject to the usual

measures of sample significance.

From the above example, the population (the class) has to remain the same from the time of the first

measurement to the second. This has not been the case for passenger vehicles. The first passenger

vehicle models to have required parts marking were identified in 1984 and first marked in 1987.

Subsequently, more models have been designated for parts marking and some manufacturers have

elected to install anti-theft devices in lieu of parts marking. For the current analysis, we selected 66

models that were in production continuously from 1984 through 1991. Of these, 43 were marked

or had anti-theft devices installed as of 1987 or 1988. The marked and anti-theft equipped vehicles

were combined into one group, referred to as the "marked" group for the remainder of this paper.3

We started the series in 1984 since that was the year the first models were selected. Continuing the

series through 1991 provided the longest series with the largest cohort of models. Also, successor

Of the 43 models included in the marked group, 30 were marked continuously during the period

1987/1988 to 1991. An additional 7 marked models added anti-theft devices in 1990 or 1991. Six models were

equipped with anti-theft devices continuously during the period 1987/1988 to 1991.

B-5
legislation passed in 1992 designated additional models for marking based on 1990 and 1991 theft

rates.

Effects of Regression to the Mean on Average Theft Rates

Table 1 shows the average theft rates for each type of passenger car (and predecessors) in each year

from 1984 to 1991 and is the data upon which the graph in Exhibit 1 is based. The theft rate for

marked cars declines over the period from 1984 to 1991 from 1.15 percent to . 713 percent. For antitheft equipped vehicles, the theft rate declines from 1.31 percent to .797 percent. At the same time,

the average theft rate for unmarked passenger vehicles increases from .470 percent in 1984 to a high

of .809 in 1989, and then decreases somewhat in 1990 and 1991 to a rate of .650 in 1991.

Table 2 shows the number of registered vehicles, thefts, and theft rates for marked, unmarked, and

total passenger cars in each year from 1984 through 1991 for the 66 models included in this analysis.

For the marked group (including anti-theft vehicles), the theft rate in 1984 is 1.292 percent and

declines to .760 in 1991. The theft rate for unmarked vehicles rises from .444 in 1984 to a high of

.742 percent in 1989 and then declines to .630 in 1991. The weighted average rate for all vehicles

included in the analysis declines over the period from .866 to .689.

Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the overall theft rate by year. The year-to-year correlations

of the theft rate are quite high. However, as might be expected, correlations decline as the time

interval between measurements lengthens. Of importance to the current analysis, the coefficient of

variation (Rsq) for 1984 and 1991 vehicle theft rates is .3242. The correlation coefficient (R) is then

.5694. We would therefore expect the rate for marked vehicles to regress (1-.5694), or

approximately 43 percent of the way from the 1984 rate toward the all-vehicle average rate in 1991,

if regression to the mean were the only factor afFecting the change in theft rates. Similarly, we would

expect the theft rate for unmarked vehicles to rise 43 percent of the distance from the rate in 1984

toward the rate for all vehicles in 1991.

These calculations are shown in Table 4a. The actual rates in 1984 and 1991 are taken from Table

2. The expected rate in 1991 is the 1984 rate plus or minus 43 percent of the difference between the

B-6
1984 rate for each class of vehicle and the all-vehicle rate in 1991 of .689. In Table 4a, we calculated

the average theft rates of marked and unmarked passenger cars as well as the weighted total of the

two. We then calculated the expected theft rates for each type of vehicle and a weighted total in

1991. The difference column in the table shows the difference between the actual and expected theft

rates for each category in 1991.

Over the period 1984 through 1991, the actual theft rate for marked vehicles declines from 1.292

percent to .760 percent. The rate calculated on the basis of the expected degree of regression to the

mean declines to 1.032 percent. Thus, over the entire period, regression effects account for 55

percent of the observed decline in the theft rate for marked vehicles. Over the same period, the theft

rate for unmarked vehicles rises from .444 percent to .630 percent. However, the theft rate expected

in 1991 based on regression to the mean rises only to .550 percent. Thus, regression effects account

for only 57 percent of the observed rise in the theft rate of unmarked vehicles. The combined theft

rate declines from .866 to .689 over the period. However, the expected average rate, which is the

weighted average expected rate for marked and unmarked vehicles, is .768. Thus, overall, regression

to the mean accounts for 55 percent of the decline in the theft rate for all vehicles in the population.

If regression effects account for only slightly more than half of the decline in the theft rate of the

marked group, then some other factors (such as parts marking) must be involved in reducing thefts

of those vehicles. Similarly, if only a little more than half the rise in the theft rate of unmarked

vehicles over the period can be accounted for by regression effects, then something else is

contributing to the rise. One possible explanation for the remainder of the increase is that while parts

marking may contribute to a reduction in theft for marked vehicles, it may also raise the theft rates

of unmarked vehicles by altering the preferences of car thieves.4 However, the overall theft rate

declines by more than can be accounted for by regression effects. This suggests an effect of parts

marking on the overall theft rate.

We performed similar calculations for the 1984 to 1989 interval (Table 4b). The overall correlation

of theft rates for this period (from Table 3) is higher, (.3815). Based on this correlation, we would

4

 A suggested title for this paper was "Do Car Thieves Read the Federal Register." In fact, we found an

article on how to remove marking from vehicle parts on the Internet.

B-7
expect rates to regress approximately 38% of the way toward the mean of the all-vehicle theft rate

for 1989. Similar to results from the 1991 analysis, for marked vehicles the actual theft rate is below

the expected rate and for unmarked vehicles the actual rate is above the expected rate. Thus, the

decline in the theft rate for marked vehicles is greater than can be explained by regression effects.

The same is true for the overall theft rate. Similarly, the theft rate for unmarked vehicles rises by

more than can be explained by regression effects. Of the overall change in theft rates, regression

effects account for 60 percent of the observed change for marked vehicles and 48 percent of the

increase in the theft rate of unmarked vehicles over the period. Again, the rest of the change in theft

rates must be attributable to other causes, including parts marking.

As shown in Table 4c, we also performed the same calculations for the 1984 through 1986 period.

This period was after vehicles had been identified for marking, but before actual marking of parts

began. Over this shorter period, the coefficient of variation of the overall theft rate is considerably

higher (.6295) and so the expected regression effect on theft rates is smaller (21 percent). During

this period, the theft rate for marked vehicles actually declined less than would be expected as the

result of regression to the mean. Therefore, something else was raising the theft rate in this period.

Similarly, the actual theft rate for unmarked vehicles rises less than would be expected as the result

of regression effects (as does the total rate). Therefore, some other cause must be found for the

lower than expected theft rate for unmarked vehicles.

The fact that regression to the mean of the theft rates more than accounts for the actual change in

theft rates in the period before parts marking took effect and for only 55 to 60 percent of the decline

in the theft rate for marked vehicles after parts marking suggests that the "other cause" for the

unexpected decline in theft rates of these vehicles may be at least partially the result of parts marking.

At the same time, similar, but opposite effects for unmarked cars from the period prior to marking

to after parts marking took effect also suggests that parts marking had a positive effect on the theft

rates of unmarked vehicles. That is, parts marking had the effect of changing the preferences of car

thieves toward unmarked vehicles.

A final possibility, not accounted for by this analysis, is a change in taste among those responsible for

vehicle theft. This period also saw the beginning of the rise in the population of minivans and sport

B-8
utility vehicles. It is possible that the decline in passenger vehicle theft is the result of a shift to

increased theft of these other vehicles. Minivans and sport utility vehicles are included in the larger

category of light trucks. However, the theft rate for this category of vehicle parallels that of

passenger vehicles over the period from 1984 to 199 I s

Table 1

Average Theft Rates

Current Year Passenger Vehicles by Type

1984 -1991

(In Percent)

Vehicle

Type

Unmarked

Marked

Anti-Theft

Year

1984

.470

1.15

1.31

1985

.509

1.14

1.25

1986

.546

1.20

1.38

1987

.606

1.08

1.23

1988

.756

1.04

1.46

1989

.809

.899

.926

1990

.673

.731

.787

1991

.650

.713

.797

' The theft rate for light trucks rises from .0387 percent in 1984 to .0557 percent in 1989 and then declines to

.0535 percent in 1991.

B-9



APPENDIX C

VEHICLE AGE AND PASSENGER CAR THEFT AND RECOVERY EXPERIENCE

The Effect of Vehicle Age on Thefts And Recoveries

It is not clear whether vehicle age is a factor in a thief s motive for stealing a vehicle. Data are not

available to determine the motive for thefts or for the theft of a vehicle as the vehicle ages. However,

an overview of the theft and age of

vehicle relationship can be explored FIGURE C-l

by looking at the theft rates as the

vehicle ages.

THEFT RATES - CALENDAR YEAR

PASSENGER CARS

Vehicle Age and Theft Rates of " 400 7

a 300

Passenger Cars *

£500

'200

100

0

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

CALENDAR YEAR

1994 1995

Theft rates6 by vehicle age for model

years 1986 - 1995 were calculated to

determine if a relationship exists. When looking at vehicle age over that period of time it appears that

theft rates actually increase as vehicles age. Ignoring the effects of both calendar year and model year

would lead the analyst to that assumption. The analyses was careful to control for the calendar year

and model year effects on the relationship between vehicle age and theft rates.

The calendar year of theft is the year in which any model year passenger car was stolen. For example,

if a car produced in 1990 was stolen in 1994 then it would be recorded as stolen in calendar year

1994, just like a car produced in 1986 and stolen in 1994 would be considered stolen in calendar year

1994. Figure C-l shows the theft rates for the calendar years 1986-1995. Theft rates for vehicles

stolen have steadily decreased over that 10 year period of time. Obviously passenger cars have been

stolen less often over the past decade.

6Theft rates are the number of stolen vehicles in a given year (from the FBI files) divided

by the number of registered vehicles (from the R.L. Polk files of total vehicles registered by all

states in the U.S. in the same given year).

C-l





APPENDIX D

Summary and Discussion of Docket Comments

Docket No. 97-042, Notice 1

D-l
Summary of Docket Comments

Docket No. 97-042, Notice 1

97-042-NO1 -002 Jaguar Cars Inc.

A. Jaguar says the Preliminary Report incorrectly shows the Jaguar XJS as an unmarked

vehicle for the 1984-1991 model years. According to Jaguar, all models (XJ5, XJ6

Vanden Plas, and Majestic Sovereign) - four-door, coupes, and convertibles have been

marked since 1987, when parts marking began.

97-042-NO 1 -003 Florida Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Authority

A. The Authority fully supports the continuation of the parts-marking program. Parts

marking assists in both investigation and prosecution of thieves. It is an effective deterrent

to professional theft when combined with other proactive law enforcement efforts.

B. The Authority also supports more permanent marking methods since it would further

discourage thefts, making selling stolen parts more difficult, costly and add more risk to

the stolen parts market. As a minimum, current labeling should be continued.

C. The Authority thinks that parts marking should be expanded to all newly manufactured

vehicles, both imports and domestic.

D. The Authority feels the insurance industry should be required to be more proactive, such

as inspecting and verifying VTN numbers and parts before claims are paid or policies

issued.

E. Theft of air bags is a significant problem with few tools to help auto theft investigators.

The Authority supports any laws that would assist in the marking or control of air bags.

D-2
97-042-NO1 -004 American Automobile Manufacturers Association

A. Antitheft Devices

1. AAMA disagrees with the Preliminary Reports finding that antitheft devices are

about as beneficial as parts marking in deterring auto theft.

2. There are errors in the date when certain vehicles had antitheft devices that

influences the findings.

3. Antitheft devices have evolved and active systems have been replaced by passive

systems requiring no action by the driver. Eventually passive systems were

replaced by devices that disabled the engine. The more recent systems are more

effective in reducing auto theft.

4. AAMA cites the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) findings of the effectiveness

of antitheft devices in reducing theft.

5. Vehicles with antitheft devices are less likely to be stolen for joyriding or

transportation, thus their recovery rates are lower.

6. Thirteen states mandate discounts for antitheft devices. No states do so for

vehicles with marked parts according to the AAMA. If antitheft devices did not

reduce vehicle theft, insurers would provide data to persuade legislators to remove

the mandates.

7. In 1997, about 34% of cars and light trucks made by AAMA members had

standard antitheft devices. For 1998, this will increase to 54%.

D-3
B. Parts Marking

1. AAMA's theoretical discussion of parts marking as an auto theft deterrent

indicates that the effect is limited and indirect.

2. AAMA says the Preliminary Report indicates that auto insurers appear to be

putting minimal effort into tracking used parts.

C. The Report's Analysis of Parts marking

1. The short term analysis in the Preliminary Report includes models that were

redesigned between 1984 and 1989.

2. AAMA disagrees with the hypothesis that a significant reduction in theft rate might

be expected starting in 1987. AAMA is not surprised that there was little evidence

to support the hypothesis.

3. AAMA says that if parts marking were an effective deterrent, theft and recovery

trends should be greater as years pass because more thieves are apprehended and

prosecuted. AAMA says the Preliminary Report showed the opposite ~ the initial

reduction in thefts and increase in recoveries vanished by the time cars were two

years old.

4. AAMA says the report is inconsistent: it says that because of other factors, long

term reductions cannot be attributed to parts marking; yet, the report identifies

long term theft trends as one of four indications of the benefits of parts marking.

D. AAMA says that more permanent markings by stamping and marking glazing would

dramatically increase costs.

E. Insurance companies, according to AAMA, should be required to check parts.

D-4
F. Before imposing additional requirements, AAMA contends, the National Motor Vehicle

Title Information System and National Stolen Auto Part Information System should be

evaluated.

97-042-NO1 -OPS Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety

A. Because the Preliminary Report finds parts marking useful arresting and prosecuting auto

thieves, is cost effective while imposing minimal cost to the auto industry, Advocates for

Highway and Auto Safety support the continuation of parts marking which Advocates

feels should be mandatory for all passenger vehicles.

B. The law enforcement agencies surveyed indicated that parts marking was key to detecting

stolen parts and as evidence of trafficking in stolen parts which parallels other law

enforcement programs to mark valuable personal property for detection and recovery of

stolen items and as evidence in prosecuting thieves.

C. The finding in the report that parts marking, plays an important role in detection and

prosecution of professional car thieves and chop shop operators is supported by an article

on car theft in New York City which shows thefts down from 1980 total because of

effective prosecution of professional car theft rings and the closure of chop shops. Parts

marking is part of a comprehensive approach to vehicle theft reduction that can be highly

effective.

D. Advocates does not agree that antitheft devices are equivalent to parts marking in

effectiveness. Granting exemptions may confound the determination of parts marking

effectiveness. Because the report does not desegregate data on antitheft equipped vehicles

which are not exempted, the benefits of parts marking alone are difficult to determine.

Advocates recommends this be done. Because of the high cost of antitheft devices, their

effectiveness must be examined, according to Advocates.

E. Several exempted car lines with antitheft devices continue to have very high theft rates.

D-5
Once granted, the car line exemption seems to continue despite these high theft rates.

Advocates says, NHTSA appears not to show interest in reviewing exemptions in light of

continued high theft rates and, as a result, revoking the exemption in favor of parts

marking.

F. While Advocates endorses more permanent marking methods, it believes that NHTSA

should explore marking all passenger vehicles. Advocates is convinced that this should

include vehicles currently exempted, vehicles with antitheft devices should also have

marked parts.

97-042-NO1 -006 Nissan North America. Inc.

A. Nissan feels the statement in the Preliminary Report that the cost of the labels and their

assembly process has not changed may be in error. Nissan found costs of capitalization

for plant and equipment, theft labels, and labor and related expenses to mark parts

beginning in the 1997 model year for models produced Japan ranged from $14 to $20 per

vehicle. Nissan vehicles produced in the U.S. have a somewhat lower cost.

Approximately 70% of Nissan vehicles are manufactured in the U.S. The overall average

cost for all their vehicles, according to Nissan, is substantially higher than the report's

estimated $4.92. Nissan suggests that other manufacturers with low volume production

lines subject to parts marking might have costs in excess of the $22 Congressional ceiling.

97-042-NO 1 -007 Pade County Multi-Agency Auto Theft Task Force

A. The Task Force includes investigators from the FBI, U.S. Customs Service, IRS, Florida

Highway Patrol, Dade County State Attorney's Office, Metro-Dade Police Department,

Miami Police Department, Miami Beach Police Department, Hialeah Gardens Police

Department, and the NICB. The Task Force found parts marking an invaluable law

enforcement toll for combating auto theft.

D-6
B. In 1996, the Task Force recovered 867 stolen vehicles worth an estimated $17.5 million

and made over 400 arrests. Part labels played an important role in a majority of these

cases. A label on a major component was consistently being missed which allowed

investigators to positively identify stolen vehicles which resulted in vehicles being

recovered in chop shops and being exported. This resulted in federal indictments.

C. The parts marking program should be continued and expanded, according to the Task

Force. All new vehicles should be marked. Since the top stolen vehicles vary by

geographic region, marking all vehicles will better cover the U.S. If all vehicles were

marked, officers in all jurisdictions would become aware of the parts marking program and

its benefits. As more officers are educated, recoveries and arrests will increase and thefts

will decline says the Task Force.

D. The Task Force says more parts should be marked and markings should be more

permanent. Air bags, a safety item, should also be considered a major part to be marked.

With permanent markings, companies could ensure that factory installed airbags were in

vehicles — if there was installation by an unauthorized mechanic, parts marking could

prove tampering had taken place.

E. Factory Etched windows is also recommended by the Task Force. Often windows with

original VIN etching are overlooked by thieves.

F. More permanent markings are better. While the Task Force has been able to prove that

labels have been removed, investigators have been unable to identify the original VIN.

97-042-NO1 -008 Florida Auto Theft Intelligence Unit

A. The Florida unit is a non-profit organization with 468 active members including Federal

State and Municipal law enforcement/auto theft investigators in Florida. Also membership

includes representatives of insurance companies, rental vehicle companies, and auto theft

deterrent manufacturers.

D-7
B. The Unit has a component part labeling course and has instructed over 3,000 officers

nationwide.

C. The Unit says most law enforcement officers are either not aware or do not know how to

identify vehicles using confidential or secondary numbers. Training for parts marking has

not been readily available and is lacking in many jurisdictions. Auto theft investigation

requires expertise particularly in vehicle identification. However, more agencies are

becoming aware of parts marking.

D. Task forces and prevention authorities are being formed in Florida and nationwide to

combat auto theft. Thousands of vehicles have been recovered in Florida as a direct result

of parts marking. The Unit hopes that parts marking will cover more car lines and other

vehicle classes to provide law enforcement with continued investigative tools.

E. Law Enforcement is becoming more educated in parts marking and finding altered and

counterfeit labels. A more secure/permanent means to mark parts should be considered.

Some current labels may be easily peeled while others self destruct and leave footprints. A

system called invisographic type labels leave the full VTN as its footprint.

F. With airbag replacement costing from $500 to $1,500 or more, the Unit recommends that

airbags be marked. VTN etching of windows has proven to be a valuable tool to law

enforcement. In nine years, one investigator only found two cases where etched windows

were replaced.

G. While antitheft devices prevent casual thefts, the professional still can defeat them. The

Unit recommends that cars with antitheft devices also have marked parts rather than being

granted an exemption from marking.

97-042-NO1 -009 Volkswagen of America. Inc.

A. Cost of Compliance

D-8
1. Volkswagen says for its Cabriolet Convertible and Corrado car lines, the cost of parts

marking for labor and materials was $15.77 [in 1990 dollars], excluding the engine and

transmission. From VW's viewpoint, the major disadvantage of parts marking is the

investment in the printing equipment for the labels and the factory logistics for applying

them. Volkswagen questions the Preliminary Report's average cost per vehicle in 1995

dollars of $4.92.

2. VW indicates that should additional vehicles be required to have marked parts, the

investment cost in equipment for production lines and factories not producing parts

marked vehicles would be significant.

3. Import manufacturers such as VW have increasing costs because of parts marking, which

is only required in the United States. In contrast, Antitheft devices not only provide theft

deterrence, but also customer value and security. The cost of such devices can be spread

over larger production volumes because they could be considered as added value features

in other countries.

4. VW marked parts on vehicles sold in Quebec and charged the dealer $35 (Canadian) per

car for parts marking.

B. Antitheft Devices

1. The technology of Antitheft devices has improved including adding ignition system

immobilizer such as GM's PASS-key, BMW's "coded drive-away protection" system,

and, in Germany, VW and other German manufacturers have introduced an electronically

coded key and transponder beginning in 1995. Theft rates in Germany for car lines with

the new German key dropped by nine percent which was below the national theft rate.

2. Antitheft devices, except for thieves equipped with tow trucks and trailers, deter drive

away theft of vehicles for the purpose of selling them to chop shops or for retagging for

resale or for personal use. Parts marking relates primarily to chop shop activity with

D-9
some possible effect on retagging.

4. NHTSA has been approving parts marking exemptions based on installing factory

standard Antitheft devices. In the approval process, NHTSA compares theft rate

reduction for comparative car lines. The VW Canadian experience also shows significant

theft rate reductions for Antitheft devices.

C. VW believes that parts marking should be phased-out or its current requirements reduced.

D. VW says the current statue or the regulations should not be changed to require parts marking

on additional lines of passenger motor vehicles.

E. Volkswagen recommends that NHTSA request Congress to allow exempting at least two car

lines per year.

F. VW believes that the parts marking requirements should be phased-out or limited to car lines

with theft rates above the median as called for in the 1984 Act.

G. VW says there is no basis for expanding parts marking to more car lines. They question that

the cost benefit of parts marking has been established and the regulation is contrary to

international harmonization.

H. An evaluation study done in Canada for VW's with Antitheft devices and with both Antitheft

devices and marked parts showed reduction in auto thefts. The study, VW says, found

Antitheft devices showed a major reduction in auto theft but when marked parts were isolated,

the reduction was not statistically significant.

I. Because the cost benefit of parts marking, according to VW, is inconclusive, VW does not

believe that expanding the components to be marked is justified.

J. VW believes that insurance premium reductions and theft deterrent vehicle designs provide

D-10
positive consumer benefits. Therefore, VW will keep tract of these factors in its product

planning.

K. VW is not currently making any vehicles for sale in the U.S. that have marked parts.

97-042-NO1-010 State Farm Insurance Companies

A. The National Salvage Motor Vehicle Consumer Protection Act of 1997 should help reduce

auto, theft by eliminating opportunities for VIN switching and requiring rebuilt salvage

vehicles be inspected for stolen parts.

B. State Farm develops statistical reports for manufacturers to encourage development of

effective factory-installed antitheft devices. This has resulted in several manufacturers

upgrading their vehicles' antitheft capability. State Farm also evaluates factory-installed

antitheft devices as well as doors, trunks and hoodlatch locking mechanisms.

C. State Farm feels parts marking would be more effective if it were extended to exempted

vehicles which have ineffective antitheft devices and to the remaining [passenger] vehicles not

yet addressed by NHTSA rulemaking.

D. State Farm has experienced a 61% drop in theft claim rates since parts marking began in 1987.

While State Farm could not determine what portion of the decrease came from parts marking,

they believe it has been a valuable law enforcement tool especially in states that have devoted

resources to combat auto theft with programs and organizations. These programs together

with antitheft devices, increased insurance investigation, increased consumer awareness have

also had an impact on auto theft.

E. State Farm agrees that parts marking has caused professional thieves to steal unmarked

vehicles, hence marking all vehicles would made a maximum effect on reducing auto theft.

F. State Farm says law enforcement reporting to the National Crime Information Center on

D-ll
missing parts is incomplete. The Final Report on the National Stolen Passenger Motor

Vehicle Information System supports this finding. This thwarts efforts of insurers and others

who purchase used parts in verifying whether the parts are legitimate or stolen.

G. State Farm says air bags and windows should be marked. A pilot in Indiana on window

etching saw claim frequencies drop over 37%. The manufacturing cost for etching, based on

the Department of Transportation data [says State Farm] was less than $10 per vehicle. Thus

marking air bags and etching, along with the cost of currently marked parts, would be less

than the Congressional limit of $22 per vehicle.

H. Antitheft devices which prevent whole vehicle thefts do little to prevent partial thefts and

damage. The best devices are passive and electronically lock out both fuel and starting. State

Farm only offers discounts when states require it.

97-042-NO1-011 International Association of Auto Theft Investigators

A. I AATI passed a resolution recommending that ihe parts marking requirement be made to

apply to all passenger vehicles, sport utility vehicles, and light duty trucks and that exemptions

for antitheft devices be eliminated as well as the 6,000 pound weight limit.

97-042-NO 1-012 Highway Loss Data Institute

A. HLDI agrees that the theft frequency, discussed in the Preliminary Report, has declined.

However, HLDI says the average theft claim payment has increased fivefold since 1979.

Because of this, overall insurance theft losses have not changed over the 18 years. NHTSA

does not discuss this.

B. Antitheft devices show a stronger rather than equal effect as part marking on theft losses.

C. Recovery data has been erroneously attributed to HLDI.

D-12
97-042-NO1-013 Document does not exist

97-042-N01-014 Toyota

A. Toyota says it has no other idea than the current marking methods: plates for engines,

stamping for transmissions, and printed decals for body panels.

B. Marking costs depend on marking methods and, for example, using plates would exceed the

$22 threshold according to Toyota.

C. Marking glazing was proposed and terminated in 1994 by NHTSA because of public

comments that: NHTSA does not have the authority, the cost would exceed the statutory

maximum, windows are rarely stolen, there is no evidence that vehicles are stolen for their

glazing.

D. Because of the comments above, and the unreasonable labor costs to coordinate marked

glazing to their respective vehicles, and the lack of demonstrable benefits, Toyota opposes

marking glazing.

97-042-NO 1-015 3 -M Safety and Security Systems

A. 3-M believes that antitheft devices and component parts marking should not be seen as

mutually exclusive or independent. Both contribute to auto theft deterrence.

B. 3-M urges that all passenger vehicles, sports utility vehicles, multi-purpose vehicles, and light

duty trucks have marked parts, and that the vehicle weight exemption be eliminated.

C. 3-M is in favor of eliminating the antitheft device exemption provision of the Act.

D. 3-M urges the expansion of major parts to be marked to include air bags and radios.

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97-042-NO1-016 Association of International Automobile Manufacturers TAJ AM)

A. AIAM says NHTSA should not make any recommendations concerning expanding the parts

marking program because the findings are less than conclusive.

B AIAM says NHTSA has no authority to extend the parts marking coverage in the absence of

any Attorney General's finding.

C. AIAM says NHTSA should not expand coverage if benefits are only around two percent.

D. AIAM says NHTSA underestimated parts marking cost and refers to cost estimates provided

under comments 97-042-NO 1-006 and 97-042-NO 1-009.

E. AIAM says NHTSA has underestimated the effectiveness of antitheft devices and should

review its analysis.

F. AIAM recommends eliminating the parts marking requirement.

G. AIAM recommends expanding antitheft device exemptions.

97-042-NO 1-017 Iowa State Patrol

A. In Iowa, few criminal cases are made for possession of a stolen part without its VIN sticker.

This appears to stem from officers not being able to determine if the sticker is removed.

B. The Iowa State Patrol recommends adding air bags and sound systems to the major parts list

to be marked.

C. The Iowa State Patrol recommends stamping all major parts.

D. The Iowa State Patrol suggests that all vehicles be marked, not just high theft lines.

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Discussion of Docket Comments

Docket No. 97-042, Notice 1

Vehicle Designation Changes and Theft Analysis

Comments received indicated that the database of theft and recovery data for the Preliminary

Report included some incorrectly designated models and applicable years. Jaguar models from

1984 through 1991 are shown as unmarked when they actually had marked parts beginning in

1987. Several models, that were granted exemptions from parts marking because they had factoryinstalled antitheft devices, actually were equipped with these devices the year before the

exemption was granted. Also some models included in the analysis were redesigned for marketing

reasons. All these corrections were made to the database and analyses were redone. Both the

charts and discussions in the report have been changed where appropriate. The basic analytical

changes include the GM models with antitheft devices showing greater effectiveness than parts

marking in deterring vehicle theft. Other vehicles, especially imported models, showed mixed

results: some had lower theft rates after being equipped with antitheft devices and others either

showed no reduction or an actual increase in vehicle thefts after being equipped with antitheft

devices. Obviously the type of antitheft device has a significant effect on theft deterrence.

Participation in Theft Prevention System

Auto manufacturers and law enforcement agencies commented that the insurance industry should

take a more active role in having repair parts checked for parts marking and that the VIN marking

be checked with law enforcement agencies to determine that the part is not from a stolen vehicle.

Conversely, the insurance industry says that law enforcement agencies should take a more active

role in checking repair part sources such as salvage yards and body shops.

One comment was that law enforcement officers received little training to determine which cars

are marked, what parts are marked, and where the markings are located. Even fewer officers

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know how to locate secondary or confidential numbers on vehicles. If all passenger vehicles were

marked, the law enforcement community and the insurance industry might be motivated to both

learn what and where parts are marked, and to invest the time to actually monitor the salvage and

auto body repair industries.

Parts Marking Vehicle Coverage

Law enforcement agencies, consumer groups, and the insurance industry submitted comments

that all passenger vehicles should have marked parts. The auto industry comments were against

parts marking because they felt that markings were not proven effective since NHTSA had not

specified a numeric effectiveness answer with confidence bounds. The auto industry feels parts

marking effects are limited and indirect. The auto industry argument is based on parts marking

versus antitheft devices. They argue that since antitheft devices are so effective as compared to

parts marking that the these devices should be the preferred approach to deterring auto theft.

Hence the auto industry feels parts marking should be either terminated, phased out, or limited to

only the high theft lines.

Based on comments received, much of the current trouble in detecting and prosecuting auto

thieves can be eliminated by requiring that all passenger vehicles whether or not they have

antitheft devices - passenger cars and light trucks - have marked parts. Then thieves will not have

the option of selecting unmarked cars to steal, police officers will know that all used parts are to

be marked, the insurance industry can monitor the salvage and repair industry to be sure that used

parts are legal, and stolen vehicles and parts can be more easily traced by to the owner. While the

preliminary report did not include a definite effectiveness number(s), the report did say that parts

marking is effective in reducing auto theft and improving vehicle recovery. Also, parts marking is

an aid in apprehending and convicting auto thieves.

Permanence of Parts Markings

Law enforcement agencies favor more permanent methods of parts marking and say that labels

have been altered and counterfeited. While evidence of label removal has been used to apprehend

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and convict thieves, lack of the VIN has prevented identifying the stolen vehicle/part and owner.

Several auto manufacturers indicated that parts marking was already so expensive and any move

to make them more permanent would result in costs above the Congressional limit. No one

provided any information on more permanent marking methods and their cost. One comment

mentioned a type of label (invisographic) which has a footprint that shows the VIN - a step in the

right direction. More information is needed to be able to make an informed decision regarding

more permanent marking methods.

Additional Parts Recommended for Parts Marking

Several comments were received recommending that airbags be marked as well as glazing and

sound systems. Airbags were recommended because they are safety devices and cost between

$500 and $1,500 to replace. Glazing is recommended as a deterrent to stealing the whole vehicle

rather than for the specific parts themselves. Estimates for etching glazing suggest that this could

result in the total parts marking cost being at or above the Congressional threshold. While airbags

are good candidates for marking, the location and method for marking them will be more difficult

than other major parts. Sound systems are also frequently stolen from vehicles and marking them

would help in recovering the system to the rightful owner. Since the whole vehicle is usually not

stolen, marking the sound system may have a limited deterrent effect.

Antitheft Devices and Parts Marking

Parts marking and antitheft devices have somewhat different effects on vehicle theft and recovery.

According to comments received, parts marking tends to discourage professional thieves and

chop shop operators, antitheft devices seem to deter the amateur auto thief. The Preliminary

Report showed that for parts marking to pay for itself, there only needed to be less than a two

percent decrease in thefts. This is the result of the low cost of parts marking. Even if parts

marking costs were increased to the Congressional limit, parts marking would only have to deter

six to eight percent of vehicle thefts to break even. Antitheft devices are much more expensive

than the cost of marking parts. The analyses in this final report shows that a reduction in thefts of

over 50% is needed to offset a cost of over $200 per vehicle for antitheft devices. Some of these

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devices have achieved that level of effectiveness. One comment indicated that several of the

exempted car lines have continued to have high theft rates. This suggests that a more in-depth

analysis of theft and recovery rates for antitheft devices is needed. The analysis would require

tracing car line experience by specific type of antitheft device to determine effectiveness. This

information could then be supplied to consumers so they could make an informed decision to pay

for these devices. The consumer, as is now being done, would make the decision to pay for

antitheft devices rather than the Federal government become involved in this decision making

process. On the other hand, parts marking, even though estimates are not precise, has been

shown to be effective in both deterring theft and increasing vehicle/part recovery. Requiring all

passenger vehicles be marked, regardless of them being equipped with antitheft devices, would

improve theft deterrence, vehicle recovery, and apprehension and prosecution of thieves.

Cost of Parts Marking

Two comments were received indicating that the government cost estimate to mark parts was too

low. One comment included costs for plant and equipment and reported costs that were three to

four times as large as the government estimate. The other comment included the cost of printing

equipment resulting in their estimate being three times larger than the government cost estimate.

The cost estimate in the Preliminary Report is based on the cost of purchased labels which can be

obtained from several large suppliers and time studies performed in auto manufacturing plants

during the final assembly process. Government cost estimates include factory burden (overhead)

and profit. In another agency study, costs were estimated using a similar approach and with

similar results. The government cost estimate does not include marking engines and

transmissions. The Congressional ceiling on the cost of parts marking also excludes the marking

of engines and transmissions. Traditionally these two parts were marked before the 1984 Theft

Act.

Comments received for the 1991 report to Congress included two manufacturers saying their

costs were higher and one label supplier reporting that they estimated the cost of parts marking to

be lower than the government estimate.

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