[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-14014

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket Nos. 6:14-cv-01556-CEM; 6:13-bkc-10272-CCJ

In re: DUANE WOODMAN, 

 Debtor.

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DUANE WOODMAN,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

U.S. BANK, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(February 15, 2017)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Duane Woodman appeals pro se a judgment dismissing as moot his 

challenges to a decision that granted U.S. Bank relief from the automatic stay in 

Woodman’s bankruptcy case. We affirm.

After Woodman filed a petition for bankruptcy seeking to protect his 

leasehold interest in a residence in Florida, U.S. Bank filed a motion for relief from 

the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). A year earlier, U.S. Bank had acquired the 

property from Woodman’s lessor, A.M. DeAndrade, in a foreclosure sale. U.S. 

Bank sought relief from the automatic stay to evict Woodman from the property.

Woodman objected to the motion of U.S. Bank and argued that the 

foreclosure was fraudulent and that he was a lawful tenant who had an interest in 

the property under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 

111–22, Div. A, Title VII, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660–62 (2009). U.S. Bank responded 

that it had standing to obtain relief from the automatic stay and that Woodman was 

not entitled to the protections of the Tenants Act because his lease had not been 

negotiated in an arms-length transaction and he had not paid fair market rent. U.S. 

Bank submitted copies of the certificate of title and its notice of eviction.

Woodman submitted an affidavit stating that he had been allowed to lease the 

property for less than the market rate in exchange for making repairs and “other 

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agreements.” But the lease agreement provided that Woodman paid $250 in rent, 

he had to reimburse his lessor for repairs, the lease was subject to a potential

foreclosure, and the agreement could not be modified orally. Woodman 

acknowledged that he had known about the foreclosure and had received notice of 

the eviction.

After two evidentiary hearings, the bankruptcy court granted the motion of 

U.S. Bank for relief from the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court ruled that it 

lacked jurisdiction to review the foreclosure proceedings and that U.S. Bank had

standing to move for relief. Woodman was not a bona fide owner entitled to 

protection under the Tenants Act, the bankruptcy court ruled, because he had paid 

less than fair market rent and his lease had terminated when the bank foreclosed on 

the property. Because Woodman was a tenant at sufferance, the bankruptcy court 

stated, U.S. Bank could terminate the tenancy and evict him from the property.

Woodman appealed.

The district court dismissed Woodman’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The 

district court dismissed as moot Woodman’s challenges to the application of the 

Tenants Act, the procedures used during the evidentiary hearings, and the 

evidentiary rulings of the bankruptcy court. The district court mentioned in its 

opinion that Woodman “[had] not challenged [the] ruling” that the bank had

standing to seek relief from the automatic stay. Woodman filed a notice of appeal 

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and a motion for reconsideration, but after the district court denied his motion, 

Woodman never amended his notice of appeal.

“We review the question of mootness de novo.” CAMP Legal Def. Fund, 

Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006). As the second court 

of review, we review de novo the legal conclusions of the district court. In re 

Northlake Foods, Inc., 715 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2013).

The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Woodman’s appeal. The 

jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies. Burke 

v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987). An action becomes moot when it no longer 

presents a “live” controversy or when a ruling on the issues would have no 

practical significance. Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1332 

(11th Cir. 2005). Woodman opposed granting U.S. Bank relief from the automatic 

stay based on the protections given to leaseholders under the Tenants Act, but that 

statute “terminate[d] on December 31, 2014,” Mortgage Reform and AntiPredatory Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010), 

while Woodman’s appeal was pending in the district court. At that point, as the 

district court stated, the Tenants Act could “no longer [serve as] a viable defense” 

for Woodman to avoid eviction. Even if the bankruptcy court had erred, any 

decision by the district court would not entitle Woodman to relief because on 

remand he could not claim the protections of the Tenants Act. Because “it is not 

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enough that there may have been a live case or controversy when the case was 

decided by the court whose judgment” is under review, Burke, 479 U.S. at 363, the 

district court correctly dismissed Woodman’s appeal as moot.

We will not consider Woodman’s remaining arguments. We lack 

jurisdiction to consider Woodman’s argument about standing because he failed to 

perfect the issue for appeal. See Johnson v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (In re Johnson), 

747 F.2d 701, 702 (11th Cir. 1984). After the district court denied Woodman’s 

motion for reconsideration, in which he raised the issue of standing for the first 

time, he failed to file an amended written notice stating that he intended to appeal 

the adverse decision. See Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(2)(A)(ii); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 

8002(b)(3). And we decline to consider Woodman’s arguments about personal 

jurisdiction and the denial of due process that he raises for the first time on appeal. 

See Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 F.3d 1309, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2013); In 

re Holywell Corp., 874 F.2d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 1989).

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Woodman’s appeal.

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