UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:20-cv-23242-BB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. SEDONA 

PARTNERS LLC, 

Plaintiff,

vs.

ABLE MOVING & STORAGE, INC; et al,

Defendants.

RELATOR SEDONA PARTNERS LLC’S OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANTS ABLE MOVING & STORAGE, INC., ARPIN INTERNATIONAL 

GROUP, INC., COLEMAN AMERICAN MOVING SERVICES, INC., HILLDRUP 

COMPANIES, INC., NEW WORLD VAN LINES, INC., PARAMOUNT 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, PAXTON VAN LINES, INC., AND WESTERN 

EXPRESS FORWARDING, LLC’S 

JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a qui tam case alleging that Defendants and other private shipping companies

known as “Transportation Service Providers,” (“TSPs”) submitted fraudulent bids to obtain 

shipping contracts through the United States Department of State (“DOS”) under the supervision 

and guidance of the United States General Services Administration (“GSA”). Specifically, Relator 

alleges that from approximately 2008 through 2018, Defendant TSPs carried out a fraudulent 

scheme whereby hundreds of millions of dollars were illegally taken from taxpayers, American 

workers, and American companies because foreign flag vessels were routinely and illegally used 

by the TSPs, instead of U.S. flag vessels, in violation of longstanding “America-First” policies. 

The scheme was carried out through two false submissions to the government: First, Defendant 

TSPs submitted fraudulent low-ball bids in order to capture awards for very competitive shipping 

routes, referred to as “lanes,” across international waters. Second, in order to profit on their lowball bids, Defendants submitted thousands of false foreign flag waivers, requesting permission to 

use lower costing foreign flag vessels, by fraudulently certifying that no U.S. flag vessels were 

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available to carry-out shipments and/or that a foreign flag vessel was necessary to meet delivery 

requirements. These waivers were routinely granted to Defendants, resulting in hundreds of 

millions of dollars going to foreign companies instead of American companies. 

Joint Defendants’ motion to dismiss fails.1 First, Relator has pled facts sufficient to meet 

the Rule 9(b) requirement of particularity and has shown reliable indicia that claims were 

fraudulently submitted and presented. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Relator need not plead 

exact billing data or attach a representative sample claim. Second, Defendants misunderstand 

damages in a false claims act case. The America-First policy, which is codified in multiple statutes 

and regulations, mandates that each TSP certify if an American vessel is not available. This 

certification is material to the Government’s decision to grant shipping lanes to each TSP. Indeed, 

failing to use American vessels, where available, amounted to millions of dollars in lost revenue 

to United States vessels, and violated the cornerstone of the DOS’s entire program. Law abiding 

American businesses, which federal law prioritize, have been locked out of shipping lane contracts 

because of this fraudulent scheme. 

Further, the public disclosure bar is inapplicable because there was no public disclosure of 

the allegations or transactions at issue. Accordingly, Relator respectfully requests Defendants’

motion to dismiss be denied, or in the alternative, Relator be given leave to amend. 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Federal Centralized Household Goods Traffic Management Program 

(“CHAMP”) and the “America-First” Policy

Defendant Able Moving & Storage Inc. (“Able”) is based in Manassas, Virginia and was 

incorporated in 1987 under the laws of Virginia.

2

 (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 14.) Able

1 For purposes of this Opposition, Defendants Able Moving & Storage, Inc., Arpin Interntional 

Group, Inc., Coleman American Moving Services, Inc., Hilldrup Companies, Inc., New World 

Van Lines, Inc., Paramount Transportation Systems, Paxton Van Lines, Inc., and Western 

Express Forwarding, LLC will be referred to collectively as “Joint Defendants.” 

2 Able and New World International, Ltd. mistakenly claim that the First Amended Complaint 

should have been filed under seal. (See Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 153 n.1.) Relator notes that 

the Government had no objection to the filing of the First Amended Complaint. 

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provides international and domestic shipping and prides itself on frequently awarded contracts from 

the Department of State. (FAC ¶ 14.) .) Defendant Arpin International Group, Inc. (“Arpin”) offers 

international moving and handles approximately 14,000 GSA relocations per year and is located 

in Rhode Island. (FAC ¶ 15.) Defendant Coleman American Moving Services (“Coleman”) is 

headquartered in Midland City, Alabama and was incorporated in 1960. (FAC ¶ 17.) The company 

offers both domestic and international moving services. (FAC ¶ 17.) Defendant Hilldrup Companies, 

Inc. (“Hilldrup”) provides trucking services and corporate and residential moving services, such as 

lump sum programs, relocation assistance, storage, and automobile transportation services. (FAC ¶ 

19.) Hilldrup is based in Stafford, Virginia and is a stockholding representative of UniGroup, a $1.7 

billion transportation and relocation services company. (FAC ¶ 19.) Hilldrup provides moving 

services internationally. (FAC ¶ 19.) 

Defendant New World International, Ltd. (“New World”) is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois 

and was incorporated in 1986. (FAC ¶ 21.) The company offers international services with regional 

coordination offices which work with an extensive network of service partners in 150 countries and 18 

main locations, as well as an affiliated service center in Orlando, Florida. (FAC ¶ 21.) Defendant 

Paramount Transportation Systems (“Paramount”) claims to be a leading provider of global moving 

services with strategically located operational facilities and customer service centers throughout the 

United States, Canada, Asia, and Europe. (FAC ¶ 22.) 

Defendant Paxton Van Lines, Inc. (“Paxton”) offers logistics, freight forwarding, warehousing, 

distribution, brokerage, and cargo services. (FAC ¶ 23.) It is headquartered in Springfield, Virginia 

and was incorporated under the laws of Virginia. (FAC ¶ 23.) Paxton Van Lines, Inc. operates 

worldwide as Paxton Companies, which includes the Paxton International division. (FAC ¶ 23.) 

Paxton International advertises more than 40 years of freight forwarding and international export 

experience, with offices in Afghanistan and Iraq. (FAC ¶ 23.) Defendant Western Express 

Forwarding, LLC (“Western Express”) is based in Marlboro, Maryland, just a few miles from the 

capital building. (FAC ¶ 24.) It provides international and domestic moving services, primarily 

focusing on military personnel moves. (FAC ¶ 24.) 

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The DOS has 307 U.S embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions around the world 

that require a shipping service for relocation of civilian executive branch employees’ Household 

Goods (“HHG”). (FAC ¶ 29.) The shipping services often include moving services, home sale 

services, property management, and office relocation assistance. Many federal civilian offices pay 

for and assist their employees and families in relocating and moving their belongings through a 

GSA program—the Centralized Household Goods Traffic Management Program (“CHAMP”). 

(FAC ¶ 2.) Shipping providers, or TSPs, participate in the CHAMP program and compete for 

shipping contract awards. In providing these shipping services, participants are subject to various 

strict guidelines and requirements that are overseen and set forth in DOS, GSA, and federal laws 

and regulations. (FAC ¶ 2.) 

One of the key requirements TSPs must follow is the “America-First” policy, which is 

based on federal maritime and cargo laws. (FAC ¶ 2.) This policy requires that the companies 

use “U.S. flag vessels” (American shipping carriers), except in unique circumstances where a 

waiver is obtained for use of a “foreign flag vessel.” (FAC ¶ 2.) Foreign flag vessels are much 

cheaper than American carriers, and do not follow U.S. laws and customs. (FAC ¶ 2.) For

example, U.S. flag carriers are required to have U.S. Citizen crews and pay payroll taxes, and crew 

members pay U.S. income taxes. (FAC ¶ 2.) U.S. flag carriers are subject to Coast Guard 

regulations and environmental regulations, and U.S. flag carrier ships must be built (with some 

exceptions) and repaired in U.S. shipyards. (FAC ¶ 2.) This “America-First” policy has been in 

place for decades and is codified in multiple federal statutes, regulations, and guidelines. (FAC ¶ 

3.) 

With 225 embassies and consulates around the world, DOS uses this program thousands 

of times per year to relocate DOS employees by shipping their belongings both domestically and 

internationally. (FAC ¶ 4.) GSA is in charge of administering the CHAMP program. (FAC ¶ 29.) 

The program operates through using TSPs, which are qualified and credentialed American private 

shipping companies vetted by GSA. (FAC ¶ 29.) The TSPs must apply to GSA for approval to 

participate in the program. (FAC ¶ 29.) 

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CHAMP is subdivided into two separate programs – Domestic and International. (FAC ¶ 

30.) Each program, Domestic and International, requires a separate application. (FAC ¶ 31.) GSA 

evaluates TSPs based on their financial stability, business experience, quality assurance, and 

knowledge of the Household Goods Tender of Service (“HTOS”), which is set forth by GSA and 

provides the rules and requirements for performing services as a provider in CHAMP. (FAC ¶ 

31.) Each participating TSP must submit either a domestic or international application worksheet 

form. (FAC ¶ 32.) Included in this form is the HTOS Questionnaire, which asks about provisions 

in the HTOS. (FAC ¶ 32.) In order to attain GSA International Approval, a TSP must file and 

attest to the answers contained in the HTOS Tender of Service Questionnaire. If shipping 

internationally, a TSP will have to answer the International HTOS Questionnaire. (FAC ¶ 32.) 

1. Request for Offers (“RFOs”) and the bidding process.

Every year, GSA issues a Request for Offers (“RFOs”) to all TSPs approved to participate 

in CHAMP. (FAC ¶ 33.) The RFOs solicit rate proposals from TSPs for both domestic and 

international shipping lanes. (FAC ¶ 33.) During subsequent bidding periods, TSPs may submit 

offers to provide household goods transportation services to federal civilian agencies. (FAC ¶ 33.) 

The rate offers are restricted to the GSA-approved scope of operation (e.g., only TSPs approved 

to participate in the international program can propose rates for international shipping lanes). 

(FAC ¶ 33.) Certain federal civilian agencies, including DOS, have additional reporting and 

shipping requirements for the transportation of employees’ household goods. (FAC ¶ 34.) These

agencies regularly work with GSA to promulgate Standing Route Orders (“SROs”), which outline 

the additional requirements. The SROs are then issued in conjunction with the annual RFO 

solicitation process. (FAC ¶ 34.) TSPs submitting offers for shipping lanes subject to SROs must 

abide by the requirements stated in both the RFO and SROs. (FAC ¶ 34.) 

Once a TSP has been federally approved for either international or domestic shipments by 

GSA to participate in CHAMP, the participating TSPs selected take full responsibility and agree 

to all federal rules and requirements outlined in the HTOS guidelines. (FAC ¶ 35.) Once the 

applicable bidding period closes, GSA evaluates the various rate offers, or bids, for each shipping 

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lane and awards contracts to TSPs with the most competitive offers. (FAC ¶ 36.) TSP rate offers 

are evaluated and selected according to GSA’s Value Index (“VI”) system, which assesses offers 

based on the TSP’s prior service performance, as well the attractiveness of its proposed rates. 

(FAC ¶ 36.) 

2. Certified waivers for using foreign flag vessels

Among other RFO requirements, TSPs shipping goods internationally must use U.S. flag 

vessels for the ocean portion of overseas shipments. (FAC ¶ 38.) If a U.S. flag vessel is not 

available to provide the required service, TSPs can request permission to use foreign flag vessels 

prior to shipment. (FAC ¶ 38.) To request permission, a TSP must submit to DOS a “Request for 

Approval of Use of a Foreign Flag Vessel.” (FAC ¶ 38.) It also must certify in writing that US 

flag shipping is not available or that the use of the foreign flag shipping is necessary to meet 

delivery requirements. (FAC ¶ 38; see also ¶ 41 for examples of the waiver forms.) 

The use of U.S. flag vessels is more expensive than the use of foreign flag vessels. (FAC

¶ 39.) As a result, TSPs applying for waiver of the U.S. flag vessel requirement must also submit 

supporting documentation of any changes in the original proposed rate due to the use of foreign 

flag shipping. (FAC ¶ 39.) In the result of an increase or decrease of original rates awarded, a 

TSP is required to submit documentation of differences in rates between the foreign vessel rate 

and the rate originally awarded. (FAC ¶ 40.) 

3. U.S. General Services Administration’s Household Goods Tender of 

Services (“HTOS”)

Pursuant to statute and regulations, GSA oversees and sets forth the governing guidelines 

and regulations TSPs are subject to as CHAMP participants. (FAC ¶ 42.) GSA sets forth these 

guidelines pursuant to the U.S. General Services Administration’s Household Goods Tender of 

Service (“HTOS”). (FAC ¶ 42.) The HTOS provides that all participants in the program agree to 

be bound by the HTOS terms and conditions. (See FAC ¶ 43, HTOS, Aug. 2010 Ed.) 

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The HTOS further provides, 

[t]he TSP shall use vessels of United States registry for the ocean portion of overseas 

shipments and book shipments for container or below deck stowage. However, when it is 

determined that the use of a vessel of United States registry will not provide the required 

service, the TSP shall request permission to use a Foreign Flag vessel prior to start of 

shipment.

Requests for permission to use a Foreign Flag vessel shall be made to RTO on the form 

‘Request for Approval of Use of a Foreign Flag Vessel’ (see Appendix C). Approval will 

be granted only when the TSP certifies in writing that US flag shipping is not available or 

the use of foreign flag shipping is necessary to meet delivery requirements.

(FAC ¶ 43, HTOS, Aug. 2010 Ed.)

Further, the HTOS provides detailed rate information relating to foreign flag vessels:

Adjustments in rates will be permitted when rate differentials are involved due to the use 

of Foreign Flag Shipping. A Justification Certificate (see Appendix C) is required for the 

use of a Foreign Flag vessel. When increases or decreases occur in rates due to the use of 

Foreign Flag Shipping, billing and documentation submitted in connection with the GBL 

shipment will have differences between the Foreign Flag vessel rate and the rate used in 

computing the accepted transportation single factor rate (SFR). The ocean freight bill 

which must be submitted to support each GBL and the rate will be adjusted in favor of the 

TSP or the Government on the basis of this bill. 

(FAC ¶ 44.) 

Moreover, the International HTOS Questionnaire that all aspiring TSPs must complete 

which reemphasizes the importance of these requirements, asks the following questions:

33. When determined that the use of a vessel of the United States registry will 

not provide the required service, the participant will request permission to 

use foreign flag vessel prior to start of movement. (TRUE)

100. Adjustments in rates will not be permitted when rate differentials are 

involved due to the use of Foreign Flag Shipping. (FALSE) 

(FAC ¶ 45.)

B. The Scheme

1. Part One: The submission of the low-ball bids.

As explained above, twice a year, TSPs can submit bids through the RFO process for an 

award of different shipping lanes (e.g., D.C to China, Miami to the United Kingdom, etc.). (FAC

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¶ 50.) DOS has 225 embassies and consulates worldwide, therefore, there are thousands of lanes 

at issue. One or more TSPs are awarded each lane. Once a lane award is secured through GSA, 

DOS managers arranging an employee move are required to use one of the TSPs that have been 

awarded the lane. (FAC ¶ 50.) The process is highly competitive and companies such as 

Defendants submit low-ball bids to capture the lane awards. (FAC ¶ 51.) In fact, the rates 

submitted by Defendants are so low they could only be cost-effective if they intend to unlawfully 

use cheaper foreign flag cargo vessels. (FAC ¶ 51.) Defendants have no intention of using the 

more expensive American carriers, knowing DOS will not audit the submissions. (FAC ¶ 51.) 

Defendants, through the rigged bids, are awarded the most lucrative lanes and lock out law-abiding 

competition. (FAC ¶ 51.)

Examples for submissions by Joint Defendants to obtain lane awards highlight low-ball 

bidding practices for what is known as the surface, or “ocean-going” portion of the shipment lanes 

from Washington D.C. to London. (See FAC ¶¶ 52-69.) The fair market rate of transport for that 

portion of the lane should have been approximately $7,200 at that time. (FAC ¶ 52.) These fair

market amounts are based on standard costs that all Defendants would be subject to. (See FAC ¶ 

52.) There is very little variability between TSPs as far as the costs that they must incur for such 

shipments. (FAC ¶ 52.) This is because most of the work of the shipment is done by other 

companies—i.e., subcontractors. (FAC ¶ 52.) Most notably, none of the TSPs have their own 

ocean shipping vessels, and therefore all must use the relatively small set of ocean shipping 

companies. Despite this standard cost range of $7,200 for the Washington D.C. to London surface 

or ocean-going portion of the lane, the companies submitted bids approximately 25% below those 

market rates. (FAC ¶ 53.) 

According to the GSA’s TMSS HHG query results run in March 2019, Able charged 

$5,696.71, thus Able would be entering into the transaction losing $1,503.29. (FAC ¶ 53.) 

Similarly, according to the GSA’s TMSS HHG query results run in March 2019, Coleman charged 

$5,340.66, thus Coleman would be entering into the transaction losing $1,859.34. (FAC ¶ 53.) 

Furthermore, again according to the GSA’s TMSS HHG query results run in March 2019, Western 

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Express charged $5,498.90, thus Western Express would be entering into the transaction losing 

$1,701.10. (FAC ¶ 53.)

With respect to Defendant Hilldrup, for example, in 2019, it submitted a rate of $11,977 

for the Washington D.C. to the United Kingdom lane. (FAC ¶ 62.) Factoring in the use of a U.S. 

Flag carrier, the cost of shipment on this lane would be $15,703—significantly more than 

Hilldrup’s rate. (FAC ¶ 62.) Hilldrup would only be able to make a profit on a rate of $11,977 if 

it knew in advance that it intended to use foreign flag carriers, which would lower its cost to 

$9,965. (FAC ¶ 62.) In another example, Hilldrup submitted a rate of $13,743 for the Washington 

D.C. to Germany lane. (FAC ¶ 63.) Factoring in the use of a U.S. Flag carrier, the cost of shipment 

on this lane would be $15,759—significantly more than Hilldrup’s rate. (FAC ¶ 63.) Hilldrup 

would only be able to make a profit on a rate of $13,743 if it knew in advance that it intended to 

use foreign flag carriers, which would lower its cost to $11,436. (FAC ¶ 63.) 

With respect to Defendant New World, for example, in 2019, it submitted a rate of $10,672 

for the Washington D.C. to United Kingdom lane. (FAC ¶ 58.) Factoring in the use of a U.S. Flag 

carrier, the cost of shipment on this lane would be $15,730—significantly more than New World’s 

rate. (FAC ¶ 58.) New World would only be able to make a profit on a rate of $10,672 if it knew 

in advance that it intended to use foreign flag carriers, which would lower its cost to $9,965. (FAC 

¶ 58.)

With respect to Defendant Paramount, for instance, in 2019, it submitted a rate of $13,820 

for the Washington D.C. to China lane. (FAC ¶ 54.) Factoring in the use of a U.S. Flag carrier, 

the cost of shipment on this lane would be $13,985—slightly more than Paramount’s rate. (FAC 

¶ 54.) Paramount would only be able to make a profit on a rate of $13,820 if it knew in advance 

that it intended to use foreign flag carriers, which would lower its cost to $9,771. (FAC ¶ 54.) In 

another example, Defendant Paramount, in 2016, submitted a rate of $10,672 for the Washington 

D.C. to United Kingdom lane. (FAC ¶ 55.) Factoring in the use of a U.S. Flag carrier, the cost of 

shipment on this lane would be $15,730—significantly more than Paramount’s rate. (FAC ¶ 55.)

Paramount would only be able to make a profit on a rate of $10,672 if it knew in advance that it 

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intended to use foreign flag carriers, which would lower its cost to $9,965. (FAC ¶ 55.) In a 

further example, Defendant Paramount, in 2019, submitted a rate of $12,054 for the Washington 

D.C. to Germany lane. (FAC ¶ 56.) Factoring in the use of a U.S. Flag carrier, the cost of shipment 

on this lane would be $15,730—significantly more than Paramount’s rate. (FAC ¶ 56.)

Paramount would only be able to make a profit on a rate of $12,054 if it knew in advance that it 

intended to use foreign flag carriers, which would lower its cost to $11,436. (FAC ¶ 56.)

With respect to Defendant Paxton, in 2019, it submitted a rate of $14,204 for the 

Washington D.C. to the United Kingdom lane. (FAC ¶ 59.) Factoring in the use of a U.S. Flag 

carrier, the cost of shipment on this lane would be $15,730—more than Paxton’s rate. (FAC ¶ 

59.) Paxton would only be able to make a profit on a rate of $14,204 if it knew in advance that it 

intended to use foreign flag carriers, which would lower its cost to $9,965. (FAC ¶ 59.)

With respect to Defendant Western Express, in 2019, it submitted fraudulent low-ball bills 

with a rate of $13,897 for the Washington D.C. to China lane. (FAC ¶ 67.) Factoring in the use 

of a U.S. Flag carrier, the cost of shipment on this lane would be $13,985—$12 more than Western 

Express’ rate. (FAC ¶ 67.) Western Express would only be able to make a profit on a rate of 

$13,897 if it knew in advance that it intended to use foreign flag carriers, which would lower its 

cost to $9,771. (FAC ¶ 67.) In another example, Defendant Western Express, also in 2019, 

submitted a rate of $10,642 for the Washington D.C. to the United Kingdom lane. (FAC ¶ 68.)

Factoring in the use of a U.S. Flag carrier, the cost of shipment on this lane would be $15,730—

significantly more than Western Express’ rate. (FAC ¶ 68.) Western Express would only be able 

to make a profit on a rate of $10,642 if it knew in advance that it intended to use foreign flag 

carriers, which would lower its cost to $9,965. (FAC ¶ 68.) 

2. Part Two: Submission of fraudulent flag waivers.

In order to profit on the low-ball bids, Defendants needed to falsely certify the need to use 

foreign carriers, which are much cheaper, by submitting the required waiver form to DOS. 

Pursuant to the laws cited above, and the GSA contract, each TSP certifies that the waiver request 

is accurate and truthful as submitted. (FAC ¶ 70.) The guidelines and GSA contract make clear 

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that foreign flag vessels are meant to be the rare exception to the rule requiring U.S. flag vessels. 

“Approval will be granted only when the TSP certifies in writing that a U.S. flag carrier is 

unavailable or the use of foreign flag shipping is necessary to meet delivery requirements.” (FAC

¶ 71.) Defendants and others relied on DOS’s inability to audit these waivers so they could 

continue to use cheaper foreign vessels and secure lanes with low-ball bids. (FAC ¶ 72.) They 

knowingly submitted thousands of fraudulent waivers claiming U.S. flag vessels were not 

available, when in fact they were. (FAC ¶ 72.)

Further evidence shows that Defendants abandoned the scheme for fear of DOS uncovering 

the fraud. In 2018, Relator and others began raising concerns about the fraudulent practices. (FAC

¶ 73.) As a result, DOS began reemphasizing the U.S. flag requirements during industry 

conferences and through DOS publications. (FAC ¶ 73.) On March 27, 2019, DOS held a 

mandatory TSP meeting. Emanuel (Manny) Hazel was introduced as the Manager of Foreign Flag 

Waivers, a newly created position amidst the crackdown to show DOS’s recognition of the flagrant 

abuse of the CHAMP program through submission of fraudulent bids and waivers. (FAC ¶ 73.)

In response, some Defendants have recently stopped carrying out the scheme in fear of a 

crackdown. The chart included at paragraph 74 of the FAC shows this shift—where some 

Defendant companies barely broke-even or made a minor profit after switching to U.S. flag 

vessels. Other companies’ rates skyrocketed for fear of DOS uncovering the fraud. (FAC ¶ 74.)

Communication between top executives further evidences the fraud. For example, in a late 

2019 meeting between Dawn Fontano of Crown Moving and Daniel Johnson, Director of 

Customer Service at Defendant Worldwide Moving & Storage, New World International Ltd.

Johnson admitted that New World had “lost a huge amount of money” since paring back their use 

of foreign flag vessels. Johnson admitted that abandoning the scheme impacted 40% of their 

international business. (FAC ¶ 79.) 

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. The False Claims Act Must be Interpreted Liberally and Construed Broadly 

“The False Claims Act is intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that 

might result in financial loss to the Government.... The Court has consistently refused to accept a 

rigid, restrictive reading.” U.S. ex rel. Sanchez v. Abuabara, No. 10-61673-CIV, 2012 WL 

254764, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2012) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Indeed, the Act 

“has as its core function the promotion of transparency and honesty amongst government 

contractors.” United States v. Dynamics Research Corp., No. 03cv11965–NG, 2008 WL 886035, 

at *8 (D. Mass., March 31, 2008). The goal of the FCA generally is to ensure integrity in 

government contracting, and the statute embodies “the maxim that [people] must turn square 

corners when they deal with the Government.” United States ex rel. Compton v. Midwest 

Specialties, Inc., 142 F.3d 296, 302 (6th Cir. 1989).

1. The Eleventh Circuit’sstandard for False Claims Act complaints under 

Rule 12 and Rule 9.

The Eleventh Circuit has stated that Rule 9(b) serves an important purpose in fraud actions 

in part by alerting defendants to the precise misconduct with which they are charged. Ziemba v. 

Cascade Int'l., Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001). “The application of Rule 9(b), however, 

must not abrogate the concept of notice pleading.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see 

also Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the complaint does not need detailed factual allegations ... but must give the defendant 

fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”). The “Court must 

not allow the application of Rule 9(b) to vitiate the overall concept of notice pleading.” Associated 

Indus. Ins. Co. v. Advanced Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 12-CV-80393-KAM, 2013 WL 1149668, *8

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2013) (citation omitted).

“The Eleventh Circuit evaluates ‘whether the allegations of a complaint contain sufficient 

indicia of reliability to satisfy Rule 9(b) on a case-by-case basis.’” U.S. ex rel. Mastej v. Health 

Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 591 Fed. App’x. 693, 704 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “Providing 

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exact billing data—name, date, amount, and services rendered-or attaching a representative sample 

claim is one way a complaint can establish the necessary indicia of reliability that a false claim 

was actually submitted. . . However, there is no per se rule that an FCA complaint must provide 

exact billing data or attach a representative sample claim.” Id. at 704 (emphasis added); see also 

Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1512 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Allegations of date, time 

or place satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the alleged fraud must be 

pleaded with particularity, but alternative means are also available to satisfy the rule.”)

Indeed, the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement “must be read in conjunction with Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s directives that a complaint need only provide a short and plain 

statement of the claim,” and courts considering motions to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with 

particularity “should always be careful to harmonize the directives of [R]ule 9(b) with the broader 

policy of notice pleading found in Rule 8.” Hill v. Morehouse Medical Associates, Inc., No. 02–

14429, 2003 WL 22019936, *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In other words, the two pleading standards are considered together, such that “[i]n an 

action under the False Claims Act, Rule 8’s pleading standard is supplemented but not supplanted

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).” Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan University, 780 F.3d 1039, 

1051 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that a 

complaint need only allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), or allege sufficient facts to “raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 672, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly). 

IV. ARGUMENT 

A. Relator Pleads Fraud with the Required Particularity

As stated above in Section III, the Eleventh Circuit has reiterated that while FCA cases 

must be pled with particularity, there is not an exact formula for what must be pled in each case. 

See, e.g., Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

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to dismiss, the complaint does not need detailed factual allegations ... but must give the defendant 

fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”); United States ex 

rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1308–09, 1312 n.21 (11th Cir. 2002)

(providing examples of the types of information that might help a plaintiff plead the submission 

of a claim with particularity, yet cautioning that Rule 9(b) “does not mandate all of this information 

for any of the alleged claims.”) 

1. The “Who” and “What” Has Been Properly Pled

Relator has sufficiently pled “who” made the claims—multiple corporate defendants, 

including Joint Defendants named here, submitted, or presented the false claims through the GSA. 

Relator has also adequately alleged “what” occurred. Contrary to Joint Defendants’ 

argument, exact billing data is not required to properly plead a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 

3729(a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(B). (See Motion to Dismiss at 10-11.) As provided above in Section III, 

“[t]he Eleventh Circuit evaluates ‘whether the allegations of a complaint contain sufficient indicia 

of reliability to satisfy Rule 9(b) on a case-by-case basis.’” Mastej, 591 Fed. App’x. at 704 

(citations omitted). Indeed, “[p]roviding exact billing data—name, date, amount, and services 

rendered-or attaching a representative sample claim is one way a complaint can establish the 

necessary indicia of reliability that a false claim was actually submitted.” Id. “However, there is 

no per se rule that an FCA complaint must provide exact billing data or attach a representative 

sample claim.” Id.; see also Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1312 & n.21 (listing some of the types of 

information that might help a plaintiff plead the submission of a claim with particularity but 

cautioning that Rule 9(b) “does not mandate all of this information for any of the alleged claims”); 

Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1512 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Allegations of date, time 

or place satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the alleged fraud must be 

pleaded with particularity, but alternative means are also available to satisfy the rule.”); U.S. ex 

rel. Lockhart v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341 (N.D. Fla. 2007) (“[O]ne cannot 

give the date of an event that did not happen, or identify the person who made a disclosure that 

was not made. The complaint specifically identifies the tests that were not conducted, and gives 

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precise and credible information on how [Relator] knows what he alleges. This is sufficient to 

satisfy Rule 9(b).”)

Under the Eleventh Circuit’s nuanced, case-by-case approach, other means are available to 

present the required indicia of reliability that a false claim was submitted. “Although there are no 

bright-line rules, our case law has indicated that a relator with direct, first-hand knowledge of the 

defendants’ submission of false claims gained through her employment with the defendants may 

have a sufficient basis for asserting that the defendants actually submitted false claims.” Mastej, 

591 F. App'x at 704–05; see also U.S. ex rel. Walker v. R & F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 

F.3d 1349, 1360 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that Rule 9(b) was satisfied where the relator was a nurse 

practitioner in the defendant’s employ whose conversations about the defendant’s billing practices 

with the defendant’s office manager formed the basis for the relator’s belief that claims were 

actually submitted to the government).

Additionally, joint Defendants miss the mark in relying upon a series of bidding cases. 

(See Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 153 at 9.) This case is not premised only upon submission of a 

rate, but rather, improper certification of unavailability of U.S. carriers in securing government 

contracts—a material condition of awarding contracts and receiving payment from the DOS 

through the CHAMP program. The low-rate submissions evidence part of the scheme as outlined 

above, but unlike the cases cited, this case is not about the bids alone. As explained further below 

in Section IV, C, these certifications of unavailability were material to the government awarding 

contracts and issuing payment to the TSPs. 

For example, A1 Procurement, LLC v. Hendry Corp., No. 11-23582-CIV, 2013 WL 

12065531 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 2013), is inapposite. The case was decided on summary judgment

where the facts were clear that defendant never made a demand for payment after bidding. The 

court stated: “Defendants argue although they bid on the 270 Package Contract, they never 

performed any work and never submitted any invoices for payments on the 270 Package Contract. 

[] As a result, Defendants maintain such bidding does not constitute a “claim” that calls on the 

government fisc, which is a necessary requirement under the FCA. . . .” Id. at *6. There, the 

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parties agreed the Government never paid for any of the bids—"The parties are in agreement 

Defendants did no work in connection with, and never demanded any payment on, the 270 Package 

Contract, as the Coast Guard cancelled the contract before it was performed. [] That Marine 

Construction was initially awarded the contract has no legal significance here — Defendants 

merely submitted a bid with no subsequent request or demand for money in connection therewith.” 

Id. Here, in contrast, Relator alleges that Defendants were not only awarded lanes (i.e., won bids), 

but subsequently performed shipping jobs on those lanes—falsely using foreign flag carriers and 

charging DOS for those shipments. Similarly, reliance on United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 

345 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2004), is misplaced. There, unlike here (where Relator alleges 

Defendants obtained the contracts, and payment), relators alleged unsuccessful bidders were guilty 

of fraud. The court stated: “Thus, even assuming that the unsuccessful bidders falsely certified 

compliance with FCC regulations on their short-form applications, they did not ‘make’ (or cause 

or conspire to be presented) a ‘claim’ within the meaning of the FCA.” Id. at 335–36. 

Lastly, Joint Defendants mistakenly claim Relator fails to identify either “factually” or 

“legally” false claims. False claims under the FCA may assume a variety of forms. “A factually 

false claim occurs ... when a supplier submits a claim that misidentifies the goods supplied or 

requests reimbursement for goods that it never provided.” [] On the other hand, “[a] claim is 

legally false when it rests on a false representation of compliance with an applicable federal statute, 

federal regulation, or contractual term.” United States v. Marder, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1312 

(S.D. Fla. 2016) (citing U.S. ex rel. Davis v. D.C., 793 F.3d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Legally false claims, otherwise known as false certifications, can “be 

either express or implied.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, as explained above, the submissions at 

issue are both legally and factually false, and Relator alleges that Defendants were awarded 

contracts based on these false submissions and certifications. Accordingly, the “what” has been 

properly pled. 

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2. The “How” Has Been Properly Alleged

As detailed in Section II above, the clear rules of the DOS (and GSA) have been violated. 

These rules are based on the “America-First” policy and nearly a century of maritime policy and 

regulation. (See 46 U.S.C. § 55302(b); The Cargo Preference Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b), and 

codified in various subsequent documents 46 USC § 55305; 46 C.F.R. Part 381; see also FAC ¶¶ 

25- 26.) Indeed, the CHAMP Program includes cargoes that are subject to the Cargo Preference 

Act pursuant to 46 C.F.R. Part 381.2(b)(1), and (4). The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 is applied 

to and administered by all Federal departments and agencies (except the Department of Defense). 

See 46 C.F.R. Part 381.3. (FAC ¶ 27.) Further, the Code of Federal Regulations clearly states that 

the preference for privately owned U.S. Flag vessels applies to contractors and subcontractors 

working with the U.S. government. (See 48 C.F.R. Part 47.503(a)(1); FAC ¶ 28.) Accordingly, 

specific federal regulations and laws have been violated by Defendants, establishing the “how.” 

3. The “When” and “Where” are Properly Pled

The “when” has been specified between 2008-2018. The “where” pertains to the 

international routes of Defendants, including Joint Defendants as outlined above in Section II. 

B. The Complaint Pleads the Requisite Element of Scienter 

Rule 9 on its face does not apply to the scienter requirement of the False Claims Act. See

Rule 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 

generally”); see also United States ex rel. Dildine v. Pandya, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1218 (N.D. 

Ga. 2019). Relator alleges that the Defendantsintentionally used non-U.S. ships to obtain shipping 

lanes and increase its profits. The False Claims Act defines “knowingly” as having “actual 

knowledge of the information,” acting “in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the 

information,” or acting “in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3729(b)(1)(A). The Complaint alleges far more than recklessness and deliberate ignorance.

As summarized above, “the Supreme Court has made clear that a complaint need only 

allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570, or allege sufficient facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. 

Case 1:20-cv-23242-BB Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2021 Page 17 of 24
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“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly). 

Here, Relator has plausibly alleged Joint Defendants knowingly submitted false claims through an 

established scheme of submitting fraudulent waivers after obtaining contracts for low bids. 

Contrary to Joint Defendants’ argument, the pattern of conduct of submitting bids that are below 

break-even prices, only to subsequently purportedly need a waiver of the U.S. vessel requirements, 

cannot be explained-away by merely pointing to market forces and inflation. (See Motion to 

Dismiss, ECF. No. 153 at 13-14.) 

C. Relator Has Sufficiently Alleged Materiality

Joint Defendants are mistaken and misunderstand materiality and damages under the FCA

in alleging that “[u]nder the Relator’s theory of the case, the United States and its taxpayers paid 

less than they otherwise would have because cheaper foreign vessels were used,” and thus were 

not damaged. (ECF. No. 153 at 16.) 

“A misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual 

requirement must be material to the Government’s payment decision in order to be actionable 

under the [FCA].” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 

2002 (2016). Further, an alleged violation of an importantstatute generally does not require further 

facts to establish materiality. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Heller v. Guardian Pharmacy, LLC, 

No. 1:18-CV-03728-SDG, 2021 WL 488305, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2021) (“In sum, the Court 

agrees with the position taken by the majority of courts to reach the issue and finds that Heller 

need not allege further facts to establish materiality beyond a facially plausible violation of the 

AKS.”)

As outlined above in Sections II.A.3 and IV.A.2, the “America-First” policy is 

longstanding, is codified in the statutes and regulations cited above, and noted in every contract 

for transport at issue in this case by the DOS and GSA. Further highlighting the mandate to use 

American vessels absent unavailability, there are significant penalties in place for TSPs when 

submitting bids and waivers, in addition to FCA liability. (FAC ¶ 46; see HTOS, Aug. 2010 Ed. 

Case 1:20-cv-23242-BB Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2021 Page 18 of 24
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§ 2.7.) To obtain a contract with DOS, using an American vessel (absent true unavailability), is a 

strict requirement to further the America-First policy, and indeed provide employment 

opportunities, tax revenue and other benefits to the United States and United States’ vessels. 

Accordingly, the allegations against all Defendants are clearly material violations, resulting in 

significant damages. 

D. The Public Disclosure Bar is Not Applicable 

1. Background

Despite its short-hand name, the FCA’s public disclosure bar is not triggered by any public 

disclosure of any generalized information about potential violations of law. Even when the bar is 

implicated, an “original source” exception permits whistleblowers (like Relator) with significant 

information obtained independently of the relevant publicly disclosed information to proceed, 

because they “may still bring something of value to the table and thus deserve[] to benefit.” United 

States ex rel. Colquitt v. Abbott Lab’ys, 858 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2017). 

The channels that trigger the public disclosure bar are very specific; the bar applies only:

if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim

were publicly disclosed—

(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which

the Government or its agent is a party;

(ii) in a congressional Governmental Accountability Office, or other

Federal report, audit, or investigation; or

(iii) from the news media,

unless . . . the person bringing the action is an original source of the information. 

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).

2. No Relevant Public Disclosure Has Occurred

A disclosure occurs where (1) the disclosure at issue occurred through one of the channels 

specified in the statute as outlined above; (2) the disclosure was “public”; and (3) the disclosure 

Case 1:20-cv-23242-BB Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2021 Page 19 of 24
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involves substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim. See

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). Here, none of the requirements can be met. 

Joint Defendants attempt to argue the TMSS 2.0 system referenced in the FAC is a “report” 

pursuant to the public disclosure bar. (ECF No. 153 at 18.) First, the system is a cloud-based 

application specifically engineered to help customers meet transportation needs as an advanced 

management tool. The portal in fact states, “[t]his is a U.S. General Services Administration 

Federal Government computer system that is ‘FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.’” (Emphasis in 

original). Therefore, the portal is not a “report” as contemplated by the public disclosure bar. 

Moreover, fatal to Joint Defendants’ argument, unlike the cases cited, the GSA TMSS 2.0 

system is not accessible to the public. The Portal requires login credentials and is designed for 

CHAMP participants. Finally, the FAC references the portal to highlight the bid submissions; but 

using the portal to highlight a part of the scheme does not qualify as the same “allegations or 

transactions” as are at issue in the complaint. Joint Defendants’ systematic submission of false 

foreign flag waiver certifications has not been made public or quasi-public in any manner. 

Accordingly, there is no qualifying “public disclosure,” and the “original source” inquiry is 

therefore irrelevant.3

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Relator respectfully requests the Court deny Joint Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss, or alternatively, grant leave to amend. 

3 After the 2010 amendments, the Eleventh Circuit, along with other circuits, held the bar is no 

longer jurisdictional. United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 

2015) (“We conclude that the amended § 3730(e)(4) creates grounds for dismissal for failure to 

state a claim rather than for lack of jurisdiction. The plain language of the new provision 

commands this interpretation: it instructs courts to dismiss an action when the public disclosure 

provision applies.”) Accordingly, challenges based on the post-2010 provision should be 

evaluated under the highly deferential standards of Rule 12(b)(6). United States ex rel. Moore & 

Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 300 (3rd Cir. 2016) (reversing district court 

which should have decided public disclosure bar motion under Rule 12(b)(6)). 

Case 1:20-cv-23242-BB Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2021 Page 20 of 24
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Dated: August 31, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Ryon McCabe

Ryon McCabe (FL 009075)

rmccabe@mccaberabin.com

MCCABE RABIN, P.A.

1601 Forum Pl #201

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Telephone (561) 659-7878

COTCHETT, PITRE & MCCARTHY, LLP

Justin T. Berger (admitted pro hac vice)

Sarvenaz J. Fahimi (admitted pro hac vice)

San Francisco Airport Office Center

840 Malcolm Road

Burlingame, CA 94010

LAW OFFICES OF PAUL PELLETIER

Paul E. Pelletier (admitted pro hac vice)

3500 Morningside Drive

Fairfax, VA 22031

Attorneys for Relator Sedona Partners LLC 

Case 1:20-cv-23242-BB Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2021 Page 21 of 24
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 31, 2021 I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document 

is being served this day on all counsel of record or pro se parties identified on the attached Service 

List in the manner specified, either via transmission of a Notice of Electronic Filing generated by 

CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized 

to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.

/s/ Ryon McCabe

Ryon McCabe (FL 009075)

Case 1:20-cv-23242-BB Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2021 Page 22 of 24
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SERVICE LIST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. SEDONA PARTNERS LLC,

v.

ABLE MOVING & STORAGE, INC., et al.

Case No. 20-CV-23242-BLOOM/Louis

U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida

James A. Weinkle

Assistant United States Attorney

Office of the United States Attorney

Southern District of Florida

99 N.E. 4th Street, Suite 300

Miami, Florida 33132

James.Weinkle@usdoj.gov

Counsel for United States of America

Robert Harris

rharris@stackfernandez.com

gmartich@stackfernandez.com

Sammy Epelbaum

sepelbaum@stackfernandez.com

Stack Fernandez & Harris, PA

1001 Brickell Bay Drive, Ste. 2650

Miami, FL 33131

Counsel for Paxton Van Lines, Inc.

Stuart A. Berman

saberman@lerchearly.com

Lerch, Early & Brewer, Chtd.

7600 Wisconsin Avenue, Ste. 700

Bethesda, MD 20814

301.657.0729

Pro Hac Vice Paxton Van Lines, Inc.

Christopher W. Wadsworth,

cw@wmd-law.org

pleadings@wmd-law.org

Wadsworth, Margrey & Dixon, LLP

261 NE 1st Street, 5th Fl.

Miami, FL 33132

305.777.1000

Counsel Able Moving & Storage, Inc.

Matthew J. Landley

mlangley@beneschlaw.com

Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aranoff, 

LLP

71 South Wacker Drive, Ste. 1600

Chicago, IL 60606-4637

312.212.4949

Counsel for DeWitt Companies Limited, LLC

Stephen Chahn Lee

slee@beneschlaw.com

Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, 

LLP

71 S. Wacker Drive, Ste. 1600

Chicago, IL 60606

312.624.6361

Pro Hac Vice DeWitt Companies Limited, 

LLC

Michael B. Silverstein

msilverstein@beneschlaw.com

Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, 

LLP

41 South High Street, Ste. 2600

Columbus, OH 43215

614.223.9362

Pro Hac Vice DeWitt Companies Limited, 

LLC

Case 1:20-cv-23242-BB Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2021 Page 23 of 24
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Barry A. Postman

Barry.postman@csklegal.com

Sara.ghent@csklegal.com

Justin C. Sorel

Justin.sorel@csklegal.com

Loren.ryan@csklegal.com

Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.

222 Lakeview Avenue, Ste. 120

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Counsel for Hilldrup Companies, Inc.

Maura K. Monaghan

mkmonaghan@debevoise.com

Melanie M. Burke

mburke@debevoise.com

Kristin D. Kiehn

kdkiehn@debevoise.com

Debevoise & Plimpton LLP

919 Third Ave.

New York, NY 10022

Pro Hac Vice Hilldrup Companies, Inc.

R. Eric Bilik

ebilik@mcguirewoods.com

Sean P. Walsh

swalsh@mcguirewoods.com

McGuire Woods, LLP

50 North Laura Street, Ste. 3300

Jacksonville, FL 32202-3661

904.798.3200

Counsel for J.K. Moving & Storage, Inc.

Andrew M. Gordon

agordon@hinshawlaw.com

Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP

One East Broward Blvd., Ste. 1010

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

954.467.7900

Counsel for New World Van Lines, Inc.

Brian R. Zeeck

bzeeck@hinshawlaw.com

Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP

151 North Franklin Street, Ste. 2500

Chicago, IL 60606

312.704.3028

Pro Hac Vice New World Van Lines, Inc.

Craig B. Shapiro

cshapiro@belaw.cc

Buchbinder & Elegant, P.A.

46 S.W. 1st Street, 4th Fl.

Miami, FL 33130

305.358.1515

Counsel for Western Express Forwarding, 

LLC

Thomas F. Murphy tmurphy@dclawfirm.com

Friedlander Misler, PLLC

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW

Ste. 660

Washington, DC 20015

202.872.080

Pro Hac Vice Western Express Forwarding, 

LLC

Case 1:20-cv-23242-BB Document 173 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2021 Page 24 of 24