Special Publication 800-82 

SECOND PUBLIC DRAFT 

Guide to Industrial Control 

Systems (ICS) Security 

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed 

Control Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such 

as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) 

Recommendations of the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology 

Keith Stouffer 

Joe Falco 

Karen Scarfone

 
SECOND PUBLIC DRAFT 

Computer Security Division 

Information Technology Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 

Intelligent Systems Division 

Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 

September 2007 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

James Turner, Acting Director 

C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y

Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) 

Security 

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 

systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and 

other control system configurations such as 

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) 

Recommendations of the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology 

NIST Special Publication 800-82 

 
GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY (SECOND PUBLIC DRAFT)

Reports on Computer Systems Technology 

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the nation’s 

measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of 

concept implementations, and technical analysis to advance the development and productive use of 

information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, 

administrative, and management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of 

sensitive unclassified information in Federal computer systems. This Special Publication 800-series 

reports on ITL’s research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security and its collaborative 

activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. 

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this 

document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. 

Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the 

entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-82 (SECOND PUBLIC DRAFT) 

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-82, 157 pages (September 2007) 

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GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY (SECOND PUBLIC DRAFT)

Acknowledgments 

The authors, Keith Stouffer, Joe Falco, and Karen Scarfone of the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST), wish to thank their colleagues who reviewed drafts of this document and contributed 

to its technical content. The authors would particularly like to acknowledge Tim Grance, Ron Ross and 

Stu Katzke of NIST for their keen and insightful assistance throughout the development of the document. 

The authors also gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the many contributions from the public and 

private sectors whose thoughtful and constructive comments improved the quality and usefulness of this 

publication. The authors would particularly like to thank the members of the Process Control Security 

Requirements Forum (PCSRF) and ISA-SP99. The authors would also like to thank the UK National 

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)) for allowing portions of the Good Practice 

Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process Control Network to be used in this document as 

well as ISA for allowing portions of TR99.00.01: Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control 

System and TR99.00.02: Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and Control Systems 

Environment to be used in this document. 

Trademark Information 

All product names are registered trademarks or trademarks of their respective organizations. 

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Table of Contents 

Executive Summary..............................................................................................................ES-1

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................1-1

1.1 Authority...................................................................................................................1-1

1.2 Purpose and Scope .................................................................................................1-1

1.3 Audience..................................................................................................................1-1

1.4 Document Structure .................................................................................................1-2

2. Overview of Industrial Control Systems ........................................................................2-1

2.1 Overview of SCADA, DCS, and PLCs .....................................................................2-1

2.2 ICS Operation ..........................................................................................................2-2

2.3 Key ICS Components ..............................................................................................2-3

2.3.1 Control Components.....................................................................................2-4

2.3.2 Network Components...................................................................................2-5

2.4 SCADA Systems......................................................................................................2-6

2.5 Distributed Control Systems ..................................................................................2-10

2.6 Programmable Logic Controllers ...........................................................................2-12

2.7 Industrial Sectors and Their Interdependencies ....................................................2-13

3. ICS Characteristics, Threats and Vulnerabilities ..........................................................3-1

3.1 Comparing ICS and IT Systems ..............................................................................3-1

3.2 Threats.....................................................................................................................3-5

3.3 Potential ICS Vulnerabilities.....................................................................................3-6

3.3.1 Policy and Procedure Vulnerabilities............................................................3-7

3.3.2 Platform Vulnerabilities.................................................................................3-8

3.3.3 Network Vulnerabilities ...............................................................................3-12

3.4 Risk Factors...........................................................................................................3-14

3.4.1 Standardized Protocols and Technologies .................................................3-15

3.4.2 Increased Connectivity ...............................................................................3-15

3.4.3 Insecure and Rogue Connections ..............................................................3-16

3.4.4 Public Information.......................................................................................3-16

3.5 Possible Incident Scenarios...................................................................................3-17

3.6 Sources of Incidents ..............................................................................................3-18

3.7 Documented Incidents ...........................................................................................3-19

4. ICS Security Program Development and Deployment..................................................4-1

4.1 Business Case for Security......................................................................................4-1

4.1.1 Benefits.........................................................................................................4-1

4.1.2 Potential Consequences...............................................................................4-2

4.1.3 Key Components of the Business Case .......................................................4-3

4.1.4 Resources for Building Business Case ........................................................4-4

4.1.5 Presenting the Business Case to Leadership...............................................4-4

4.2 Developing a Comprehensive Security Program .....................................................4-5

4.2.1 Senior Management Buy-in ..........................................................................4-5

4.2.2 Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team ....................................................4-5

4.2.3 Define Charter and Scope............................................................................4-6

4.2.4 Define ICS Specific Security Policies and Procedures.................................4-6

4.2.5 Define and Inventory ICS Systems and Networks Assets............................4-6

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4.2.6 Perform Risk and Vulnerability Assessment.................................................4-7

4.2.7 Define the Mitigation Controls ......................................................................4-8

4.2.8 Provide Training and Raise Security Awareness .........................................4-9

5. Network Architecture.......................................................................................................5-1

5.1 Firewalls...................................................................................................................5-1

5.2 Logically Separated Control Network.......................................................................5-3

5.3 Network Segregation ...............................................................................................5-3

5.3.1 Dual-Homed Computer/Dual Network Interface Cards (NIC).......................5-3

5.3.2 Firewall between Corporate Network and Control Network..........................5-4

5.3.3 Firewall and Router between Corporate Network and Control Network.......5-6

5.3.4 Firewall with DMZ between Corporate Network and Control Network..........5-7

5.3.5 Paired Firewalls between Corporate Network and Control Network ............5-9

5.3.6 Network Segregation Summary..................................................................5-10

5.4 Recommended Defense-in-Depth Architecture .....................................................5-10

5.5 General Firewall Policies for ICS ...........................................................................5-11

5.6 Recommended Firewall Rules for Specific Services..............................................5-13

5.6.1 Domain Name System (DNS).....................................................................5-14

5.6.2 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)...........................................................5-14

5.6.3 FTP and Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) ...........................................5-14

5.6.4 Telnet..........................................................................................................5-14

5.6.5 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) .......................................................5-14

5.6.6 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) ........................................5-15

5.6.7 Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) ..........................................5-15

5.6.8 SCADA and Industrial Protocols.................................................................5-15

5.7 Network Address Translation (NAT) ......................................................................5-15

5.8 Specific ICS Firewall Issues...................................................................................5-16

5.8.1 Data Historians...........................................................................................5-16

5.8.2 Remote Support Access.............................................................................5-16

5.8.3 Multicast Traffic ..........................................................................................5-17

5.9 Single Points of Failure ..........................................................................................5-17

5.10 Redundancy and Fault Tolerance..........................................................................5-18

5.11 Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attacks ...................................................................5-18

6. ICS Security Controls ......................................................................................................6-1

6.1 Management Controls..............................................................................................6-1

6.1.1 Risk Assessment ..........................................................................................6-2

6.1.2 Planning........................................................................................................6-3

6.1.3 System and Services Acquisition .................................................................6-4

6.1.4 Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments ...............................6-5

6.2 Operational Controls ................................................................................................6-6

6.2.1 Personnel Security .......................................................................................6-7

6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection ........................................................6-7

6.2.3 Contingency Planning.................................................................................6-11

6.2.4 Configuration Management ........................................................................6-13

6.2.5 Maintenance...............................................................................................6-14

6.2.6 System and Information Integrity................................................................6-14

6.2.7 Media Protection.........................................................................................6-18

6.2.8 Incident Response......................................................................................6-18

6.2.9 Awareness and Training.............................................................................6-21

6.3 Technical Controls .................................................................................................6-22

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6.3.1 Identification and Authentication.................................................................6-22

6.3.2 Access Control ...........................................................................................6-27

6.3.3 Audit and Accountability .............................................................................6-31

6.3.4 System and Communications Protection....................................................6-32

List of Appendices 

Appendix A— Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................... A-1

Appendix B— Glossary of Terms.......................................................................................... B-1

Appendix C— Current Activities in Industrial Control System Security ........................... C-1

Appendix D— Emerging Security Capabilities .................................................................... D-1

Appendix E— Industrial Control Systems in the FISMA Paradigm.................................... E-1

Appendix F— References ...................................................................................................... F-1

List of Figures 

Figure 2-1. ICS Operation.........................................................................................................2-3

Figure 2-2. SCADA System General Layout.............................................................................2-7

Figure 2-3. Basic SCADA Communication Topologies.............................................................2-8

Figure 2-4. Large SCADA Communication Topology ...............................................................2-8

Figure 2-5. SCADA System Implementation Example (Distribution Monitoring and Control)...2-9

Figure 2-6. SCADA System Implementation Example (Rail Monitoring and Control).............2-10

Figure 2-7. DCS Implementation Example .............................................................................2-11

Figure 2-8. PLC Control System Implementation Example ....................................................2-12

Figure 3-1. Industrial Security Incidents by Year ....................................................................3-19

Figure 5-1. Firewall between Corporate Network and Control Network....................................5-4

Figure 5-2. Firewall and Router between Corporate Network and Control Network.................5-6

Figure 5-3. Firewall with DMZ between Corporate Network and Control Network....................5-7

Figure 5-4. Paired Firewalls between Corporate Network and Control Network.......................5-9

Figure 5-5. CSSP Recommended Defense-In-Depth Architecture.........................................5-11

Figure E-1. Risk Framework .................................................................................................... E-3

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List of Tables 

Table 3-1. Summary of IT System and ICS Differences ...........................................................3-3

Table 3-2. Adversarial Threats to ICS.......................................................................................3-5

Table 3-3. Policy and Procedure Vulnerabilities .......................................................................3-7

Table 3-4. Platform Configuration Vulnerabilities......................................................................3-8

Table 3-5. Platform Hardware Vulnerabilities .........................................................................3-10

Table 3-6. Platform Software Vulnerabilities...........................................................................3-10

Table 3-7. Platform Malware Protection Vulnerabilities ..........................................................3-11

Table 3-8. Network Configuration Vulnerabilities....................................................................3-12

Table 3-9. Network Hardware Vulnerabilities..........................................................................3-13

Table 3-10. Network Perimeter Vulnerabilities........................................................................3-13

Table 3-11. Network Monitoring and Logging Vulnerabilities..................................................3-14

Table 3-12. Communication Vulnerabilities ............................................................................3-14

Table 3-13. Wireless Connection Vulnerabilities ....................................................................3-14

Table 4-1. Suggested Actions for ICS Vulnerability Assessments............................................4-8

Table E-1. Possible Definitions for ICS Impact Levels Based on ISA-TR99.00.02.................. E-5

Table E-2. Possible Definitions for ICS Impact Levels Based on Product Produced, Industry 

and Security Concerns...................................................................................................... E-5

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Executive Summary 

This document provides guidance for establishing secure industrial control systems (ICS). These ICS, 

which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems 

(DCS), and other control system configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers 

(PLC) are often found in the industrial control sectors. ICS are typically used in industries such as 

electric, water, oil and gas, transportation, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, 

and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) SCADA systems are 

generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control. DCS 

are generally used to control production systems within a local area such as a factory using supervisory 

and regulatory control. PLCs are generally used for discrete control for specific applications and 

generally provide regulatory control. These control systems are critical to the operation of the U.S. 

critical infrastructures that are often highly interconnected and mutually dependent systems. It is 

important to note that approximately 90 percent of the nation's critical infrastructures are privately owned 

and operated. Federal agencies also operate many of the ICS mentioned above; other examples include 

air traffic control and materials handling (e.g., Postal Service mail handling.) This document provides an 

overview of these ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these 

systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks. 

Initially, ICS had little resemblance to traditional information technology (IT) systems in that ICS were 

isolated systems running proprietary control protocols using specialized hardware and software. Widely 

available, low-cost Internet Protocol (IP) devices are now replacing proprietary solutions, which increases 

the possibility of cyber security vulnerabilities and incidents. As ICS are adopting IT solutions to 

promote corporate connectivity and remote access capabilities, and are being designed and implemented 

using industry standard computers, operating systems (OS) and network protocols, they are starting to 

resemble IT systems. This integration supports new IT capabilities, but it provides significantly less 

isolation for ICS from the outside world than predecessor systems, creating a greater need to secure these 

systems. While security solutions have been designed to deal with these security issues in typical IT 

systems, special precautions must be taken when introducing these same solutions to ICS environments. 

In some cases, new security solutions are needed that are tailored to the ICS environment. 

Although some characteristics are similar, ICS also have characteristics that differ from traditional 

information processing systems. Many of these differences stem from the fact that logic executing in ICS 

has a direct affect on the physical world. Some of these characteristics include significant risk to the 

health and safety of human lives and serious damage to the environment, as well as serious financial 

issues such as production losses, negative impact to a nation’s economy, and compromise of proprietary 

information. ICS have unique performance and reliability requirements and often use operating systems 

and applications that may be considered unconventional to typical IT personnel. Furthermore, the goals 

of safety and efficiency sometimes conflict with security in the design and operation of control systems. 

Originally, ICS implementations were susceptible primarily to local threats because many of their 

components were in physically secured areas and the components were not connected to IT networks or 

systems. However, the trend toward integrating ICS systems with IT networks provides significantly less 

isolation for ICS from the outside world than predecessor systems, creating a greater need to secure these 

systems from remote, external threats. Also, the increasing use of wireless networking places ICS 

implementations at greater risk from adversaries who are in relatively close physical proximity but do not 

have direct physical access to the equipment. Threats to control systems can come from numerous 

sources, including hostile governments, terrorist groups, disgruntled employees, malicious intruders, 

complexities, accidents, natural disasters as well as malicious or accidental actions by insiders. Protecting 

the integrity and availability of ICS systems and data is typically of utmost importance, but 

confidentiality is also an important concern. 

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Possible incidents an ICS may face include the following: 

 Blocked or delayed flow of information through ICS networks, which could disrupt ICS operation 

 Unauthorized changes to instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds, which could damage, 

disable, or shut down equipment, create environmental impacts, and/or endanger human life 

 Inaccurate information sent to system operators, either to disguise unauthorized changes, or to 

cause the operators to initiate inappropriate actions, which could have various negative effects 

 ICS software or configuration settings modified, or ICS software infected with malware, which 

could have various negative effects 

 Interference with the operation of safety systems, which could endanger human life. 

Major security objectives for an ICS implementation often include the following: 

 Restricting logical access to the ICS network and network activity. This includes using a 

demilitarized zone (DMZ) network architecture with firewalls to prevent network traffic from 

passing directly between the corporate and ICS networks, and having separate authentication 

mechanisms and credentials for users of the corporate and ICS networks. The ICS should also 

use a network topology that has multiple layers, with the most critical communications occurring 

in the most secure and reliable layer. 

 Restricting physical access to the ICS network and devices. Unauthorized physical access to 

components could cause serious disruption of the ICS’s functionality. A combination of physical 

access controls should be used, such as locks, card readers, and/or guards. 

 Protecting individual ICS components from exploitation. This includes deploying security 

patches in as expeditious a manner as possible, after testing them under field conditions; disabling 

all unused ports and services; restricting ICS user privileges to only those that are required for 

each person’s role; tracking and monitoring audit trails; and using security controls such as 

antivirus software and file integrity checking software where technically feasible to prevent, 

deter, detect, and mitigate malware. 

 Maintaining functionality during adverse conditions. This involves designing the ICS so that 

each critical component has a redundant counterpart. Additionally, if a component fails, it should 

fail in a manner that does not generate unnecessary traffic on the ICS or other networks, or does 

not cause another problem elsewhere, such as a cascading event. 

To properly address security in an ICS, it is essential for a cross-functional cyber security team to share 

their varied domain knowledge and experience to evaluate and mitigate risk to the ICS. The cyber 

security team should consist of a member of the organization’s IT staff, control engineer, control system 

operator, network and system security expertise, a member of the management staff, and a member of the 

physical security department at a minimum. For continuity and completeness, the cyber security team 

should consult with the control system vendor and/or system integrator as well. The cyber security team 

should report directly to site management (e.g., facility superintendent) or the company’s CIO/CSO, who 

in turn, accepts complete responsibility and accountability for the cyber security of the ICS. An effective 

cyber security program for an ICS should apply a strategy known as “defense-in-depth”. This strategy 

means that security mechanisms are layered such that the impact of a failure in any one mechanism is 

minimized. 

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In a typical ICS this means a defense-in-depth strategy that includes: 

 Developing security policies, procedures, training and educational material that apply specifically 

to the ICS. 

 Considering ICS security policies and procedures based on the Homeland Security Advisory 

System Threat Level, deploying increasingly heightened security postures as the Threat Level 

increases. 

 Addressing security throughout the lifecycle of the ICS from architecture design to procurement to 

installation to maintenance to decommissioning. 

 Implementing a network topology for the ICS that has multiple layers, with the most critical 

communications occurring in the most secure and reliable layer. 

 Providing logical separation between the corporate and ICS networks (e.g., stateful inspection 

firewall(s) between the networks). 

 Employing a DMZ network architecture (i.e., prevent direct traffic between the corporate and ICS 

networks). 

 Ensuring that critical components are redundant and are on redundant networks. 

 Designing critical systems for graceful degradation (fault tolerant) to prevent catastrophic 

cascading events. 

 Disabling unused ports and services on ICS devices after testing to assure this will not impact ICS 

operation. 

 Restricting physical access to the ICS network and devices. 

 Restricting ICS user privileges to only those that are required to perform each person’s job (i.e., 

establishing role-based access control and configuring each role based on the principle of least 

privilege). 

 Considering the use of separate authentication mechanisms and credentials for users of the ICS 

network and the corporate network (i.e., ICS network accounts do not use corporate network user 

accounts). 

 Using modern technology, such as smart cards for Personal Identity Verification (PIV). 

 Implementing security controls such as intrusion detection software, antivirus software and file 

integrity checking software, where technically feasible, to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate the 

introduction, exposure, and propagation of malicious software to, within, and from the ICS. 

 Applying security techniques such as encryption and/or cryptographic hashes to ICS data storage 

and communications where determined appropriate. 

 Expeditiously deploying security patches after testing all patches under field conditions on a test 

system if possible, before installation on the ICS. 

 Tracking and monitoring audit trails on critical areas of the ICS. 

 

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NIST has initiated the Industrial Control System Security project1 in cooperation with the public and 

private sector ICS community to develop specific guidance on the application of the security controls in 

NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems to ICS. Please visit 

the project website for the current release of this document. Section 6 of this document summarizes the 

management, operational, and technical controls identified in NIST SP 800-53 and provides initial 

guidance on how these security controls apply to ICS. Initial ICS specific recommendations and 

guidance, if available, is provided in an outlined box for each section. In addition, Appendix C provides 

an overview of the many activities currently ongoing among Federal organizations, standards 

organizations, industry groups, and automation system vendors to make available recommended practices 

in the area of ICS security. 

The most successful method for securing an ICS is to gather industry recommended practices and 

engage in a proactive, collaborative effort between management, the controls engineer and operator, the 

IT organization, and a trusted automation advisor. This team should draw upon the wealth of 

information available from ongoing federal government, industry group, vendor and standards 

organizational activities listed in Appendix C. 

 

1

 The Industrial Control System Security Project Web site is located at: http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/ics/index.html 

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1. Introduction 

1.1 Authority 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed this document in furtherance of its 

statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 

Public Law 107-347 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) of 2003. 

NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for 

providing adequate information security for all agency operations and assets, but such standards and 

guidelines shall not apply to national security systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements 

of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), “Securing Agency 

Information Systems,” as analyzed in A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections. Supplemental 

information is provided in A-130, Appendix III. 

This guideline has been prepared for use by Federal agencies. It may be used by nongovernmental 

organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright, though attribution is desired. 

Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made mandatory and 

binding on Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority, nor should these 

guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, 

Director of the OMB, or any other Federal official. 

1.2 Purpose and Scope 

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for securing industrial control systems (ICS), 

including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), 

and other systems performing control functions. The document provides an overview of ICS and typical 

system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides 

recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks. Because there are many different 

types of ICS with varying levels of potential risk and impact, the document provides a list of many 

different methods and techniques for securing ICS. The document should not be used purely as a 

checklist to secure a specific system. Readers are encouraged to perform a risk-based assessment on their 

systems and to tailor the recommended guidelines and solutions to meet their specific security, business 

and operational requirements. 

The scope of this document includes ICS that are typically used in the electric, water, oil and gas, 

chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (automotive, 

aerospace, and durable goods) industries. 

1.3 Audience 

This document covers details specific to ICS. The document is technical in nature; however, it provides 

the necessary background to understand the topics that are discussed. 

The intended audience is varied and includes the following: 

 Control engineers, integrators, and architects who design or implement secure ICS 

 System administrators, engineers, and other Information Technology (IT) professionals who 

administer, patch, or secure ICS 

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 Security consultants who perform security assessments and penetration testing of ICS 

 Managers who are responsible for ICS 

 Senior management who are trying to understand implications and consequences as they justify 

and apply an ICS cyber security program to help mitigate impacts to business functionality 

 Researchers and analysts who are trying to understand the unique security needs of ICS 

 Vendors that are developing products that will be deployed as part of an ICS 

Readers of this document are assumed to be familiar with general computer security concepts, 

communication protocols such as those used in networking and with using Web-based methods for 

retrieving information. 

1.4 Document Structure 

The remainder of this guide is divided into the following major sections:

 Section 2 provides an overview of SCADA and other ICS as well as their importance as a 

rationale for the need for security. 

 Section 3 provides a discussion of differences between ICS and IT systems, as well as threats, 

vulnerabilities and incidents. 

 Section 4 provides an overview of the development and deployment of an ICS security program 

to mitigate the risk of the vulnerabilities identified in Section 3. 

 Section 5 provides recommendations for integrating security into network architectures typically 

found in ICS, with an emphasis on network segregation practices. 

 Section 6 provides a summary of the management, operational, and technical controls identified 

in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information 

Systems, and provides initial guidance on how these security controls apply to ICS. 

The guide also contains several appendices with supporting material, as follows: 

 Appendix A provides a list of acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. 

 Appendix B provides a glossary of terms used in this document. 

 Appendix C provides a list and short description of some of the current activities in ICS security. 

 Appendix D provides a list of some emerging security capabilities being developed for ICS. 

 Appendix E provides an overview of the FISMA implementation project and supporting 

documents, and the relevancy of FISMA to ICS. 

 Appendix F provides a list of references used in the development of this document. 

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2. Overview of Industrial Control Systems 

Industrial control system (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems, 

including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), 

and other control system configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) 

often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures. ICS are typically used in industries such 

as electrical, water, oil and gas, chemical, transportation, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and 

beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) These control 

systems are critical to the operation of the U.S. critical infrastructures that are often highly interconnected 

and mutually dependent systems. It is important to note that approximately 90 percent of the nation's 

critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated. Federal agencies also operate many of the 

industrial processes mentioned above; other examples include air traffic control and materials handling 

(e.g., Postal Service mail handling.) This section provides an overview of SCADA, DCS, and PLC 

systems, including typical architectures and components. Several diagrams are presented to depict the 

network connections and components typically found on each system to facilitate the understanding of 

these systems. Please note that the diagrams in this section do not represent a secure ICS. Architecture 

security and security controls are discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 of this document respectively. 

2.1 Overview of SCADA, DCS, and PLCs 

SCADA systems are highly distributed systems used to control geographically dispersed assets, often 

scattered over thousands of square kilometers, where centralized data acquisition and control are critical 

to system operation. They are used in distribution systems such as water distribution and wastewater 

collection systems, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power grids, and railway transportation systems. A 

SCADA control center performs centralized monitoring and control for field sites over long-distance 

communications networks, including monitoring alarms and processing status data. Based on information 

received from remote stations, automated or operator-driven supervisory commands can be pushed to 

remote station control devices, which are often referred to as field devices. Field devices control local 

operations such as opening and closing valves and breakers, collecting data from sensor systems, and 

monitoring the local environment for alarm conditions. 

DCS are used to control industrial processes such as electric power generation, oil and gas refineries, 

water and wastewater treatment, and chemical, food, and automotive production. DCS are integrated as a 

control architecture containing a supervisory level of control overseeing multiple, integrated sub-systems 

that are responsible for controlling the details of a localized process. Product and process control are 

usually achieved by deploying feed back or feed forward control loops whereby key product and/or 

process conditions are automatically maintained around a desired set point. To accomplish the desired 

product and/or process tolerance around a specified set point, specific PLCs are employed in the field and 

proportional, integral, and/or derivative settings on the PLC are tuned to provide the desired tolerance as 

well as the rate of self-correction during process upsets. DCS are used extensively in process-based 

industries. 

PLCs are computer-based solid-state devices that control industrial equipment and processes. While 

PLCs are control system components used throughout SCADA and DCS systems, they are often the 

primary components in smaller control system configurations used to provide regulatory control of 

discrete processes such as automobile assembly lines and power plant soot blower controls. PLCs are 

used extensively in almost all industrial processes. 

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The process-based manufacturing industries typically utilize two main processes [1]: 

 Continuous Manufacturing Processes. These processes run continuously, often with transitions 

to make different grades of a product. Typical continuous manufacturing processes include fuel 

or steam flow in a power plant, petroleum in a refinery, and distillation in a chemical plant. 

 Batch Manufacturing Processes. These processes have distinct processing steps, conducted on 

a quantity of material. There is a distinct start and end step to a batch process with the possibility 

of brief steady state operations during intermediate steps. Typical batch manufacturing processes 

include food manufacturing. 

The discrete-based manufacturing industries typically conduct a series of steps on a single device to 

create the end product. Electronic and mechanical parts assembly and parts machining are typical 

examples of this type of industry. 

Both process-based and discrete-based industries utilize the same types of control systems, sensors, and 

networks. Some facilities are a hybrid of discrete and process-based manufacturing. 

While control systems used in distribution and manufacturing industries are very similar in operation, 

they are different in some aspects. One of the primary differences is that DCS or PLC-controlled subsystems are usually located within a more confined factory or plant-centric area, when compared to 

geographically dispersed SCADA field sites. DCS and PLC communications are usually performed using 

local area network (LAN) technologies that are typically more reliable and high speed compared to the 

long-distance communication systems used by SCADA systems. In fact, SCADA systems are 

specifically designed to handle long-distance communication challenges such as delays and data loss 

posed by the various communication media used. DCS and PLC systems usually employ greater degrees 

of closed loop control than SCADA systems because the control of industrial processes is typically more 

complicated than the supervisory control of distribution processes. These differences can be considered 

subtle for the scope of this document, which focuses on the integration of IT security into these systems. 

Throughout the remainder of this document, SCADA systems, DCS and PLC systems will be referred to 

as ICS unless a specific reference is made to one (e.g., field device used in a SCADA system). 

2.2 ICS Operation 

The basic operation of an ICS is shown in Figure 2-1[2]. Key components include the following: 

 Control Loop. A control loop consists of sensors for measurement, controller hardware such as 

PLCs, actuators such as control valves, breakers, switches and motors, and the communication of 

variables. Controlled variables are transmitted to the controller from the sensors. The controller 

interprets the signals and generates corresponding manipulated variables, based on set points, 

which it transmits to the actuators. Process changes from disturbances result in new sensor 

signals, identifying the state of the process, to again be transmitted to the controller. 

 Human-Machine Interface (HMI). Operators and engineers use HMIs to monitor and 

configure set points, control algorithms, and adjust and establish parameters in the controller. 

The HMI also displays process status information and historical information. 

 Remote Diagnostics and Maintenance Utilities. Diagnostics and maintenance utilities are used 

to prevent, identify and recover from abnormal operation or failures.

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A typical ICS contains a proliferation of control loops, HMIs, and remote diagnostics and maintenance 

tools built using an array of network protocols on layered network architectures. Sometimes these control 

loops are nested and/or cascading –whereby the set point for one loop is based on the process variable 

determined by another loop. Supervisory-level loops and lower-level loops operate continuously over the 

duration of a process with cycle times ranging on the order of milliseconds to minutes. 

Figure 2-1. ICS Operation 

2.3 Key ICS Components 

To support subsequent discussions, this section defines key ICS components that are used in control and 

networking. Some of these components can be described generically for use in SCADA systems, DCS 

and PLCs, while others are unique to one. The Glossary of Terms in Appendix B contains a more 

detailed listing of control and networking components. Additionally, Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6 in 

Section 2.4 show SCADA implementation examples, Figure 2-7 in Section 2.5 shows a DCS 

implementation example and Figure 2-8 in Section 2.6 shows a PLC system implementation example that 

incorporates these components. 

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2.3.1 Control Components 

The following is a list of the major control components of an ICS: 

 Control Server. The control server hosts the DCS or PLC supervisory control software that is 

designed to communicate with lower-level control devices. The control server accesses 

subordinate control modules over an ICS network. 

 SCADA Server or Master Terminal Unit (MTU). The SCADA Server is the device that acts 

as the master in a SCADA system. Remote terminal units and PLC devices (as described below) 

located at remote field sites usually act as slaves. 

 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU). The RTU, also called a remote telemetry unit, is special purpose 

data acquisition and control unit designed to support SCADA remote stations. RTUs are field 

devices often equipped with wireless radio interfaces to support remote situations where wirebased communications are unavailable. Sometimes PLCs are implemented as field devices to 

serve as RTUs; in this case, the PLC is often referred to as an RTU. 

 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). The PLC is a small industrial computer originally 

designed to perform the logic functions executed by electrical hardware (relays, switches, and 

mechanical timer/counters). PLCs have evolved into controllers with the capability of controlling 

complex processes, and they are used substantially in SCADA systems and DCS. Other 

controllers used at the field level are process controllers and RTUs; they provide the same control 

as PLCs but are designed for specific control applications. In SCADA environments, PLCs are 

often used as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible, and configurable 

than special-purpose RTUs. 

 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED). An IED is a “smart” sensor/actuator containing the 

intelligence required to acquire data, communicate to other devices, and perform local processing 

and control. An IED could combine an analog input sensor, analog output, low-level control 

capabilities, a communication system, and program memory in one device. The use of IEDs in 

SCADA and DCS systems allows for automatic control at the local level. 

 Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The HMI is software and hardware that allows human 

operators to monitor the state of a process under control, modify control settings to change the 

control objective, and manually override automatic control operations in the event of an 

emergency. The HMI also allows a control engineer or operator to configure set points or control 

algorithms and parameters in the controller. The HMI also displays process status information, 

historical information, reports, and other information to operators, administrators, managers, 

business partners, and other authorized users. The location, platform, and interface may vary a 

great deal. For example, an HMI could be a dedicated platform in the control center, a laptop on 

a wireless LAN, or a browser on any system connected to the Internet. 

 Data Historian. The data historian is a centralized database for logging all process information 

within an ICS. Information stored in this database can be accessed to support various analyses, 

from statistical process control to enterprise level planning. 

 Input/Output (IO) Server. The IO server is a control component responsible for collecting, 

buffering and providing access to process information from control sub-components such as 

PLCs, RTUs and IEDs. An IO server can reside on the control server or on a separate computer 

platform. IO servers are also used for interfacing third-party control components, such as an HMI 

and a control server. 

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2.3.2 Network Components 

There are different network characteristics for each layer within a control system hierarchy. Network 

topologies across different ICS implementations vary with modern systems using Internet-based IT and 

enterprise integration strategies. Control networks have merged with corporate networks to allow control 

engineers to monitor and control systems from outside of the control system network. The connection 

may also allow enterprise-level decision-makers to obtain access to process data. The following is a list of 

the major components of an ICS network, regardless of the network topologies in use: 

 Fieldbus Network. The fieldbus network links sensors and other devices to a PLC or other 

controller. Use of fieldbus technologies eliminates the need for point-to-point wiring between the 

controller and each device. The sensors communicate with the fieldbus controller using a specific 

protocol. The messages sent between the sensors and the controller uniquely identify each of the 

sensors. 

 Control Network. The control network connects the supervisory control level to lower-level 

control modules. 

 Communications Routers. A router is a communications device that transfers messages 

between two networks. Common uses for routers include connecting a LAN to a WAN, and 

connecting MTUs and RTUs to a long-distance network medium for SCADA communication. 

 Firewall. A firewall protects devices on a network by monitoring and controlling communication 

packets using predefined filtering policies. Firewalls are also useful in managing ICS network 

segregation strategies. 

 Modems. A modem is a device used to convert between serial digital data and a signal suitable 

for transmission over a telephone line to allow devices to communicate. Modems are often used 

in SCADA systems to enable long-distance serial communications between MTUs and remote 

field devices. They are also used in SCADA systems, DCS and PLCs for gaining remote access 

for operational and maintenance functions such as entering command or modifying parameters, 

and diagnostic purposes. 

 Remote Access Points. Remote access points are distinct devices, areas and locations of a 

control network for remotely configuring control systems and accessing process data. Examples 

include using a personal digital assistant (PDA) to access data over a LAN through a wireless 

access point, and using a laptop and modem connection to remotely access an ICS system. 

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2.4 SCADA Systems 

SCADA systems are used to control dispersed assets where centralized data acquisition is as important as 

control [3] [4]. These systems are used in distribution systems such as water distribution and wastewater 

collection systems, oil and gas pipelines, electrical utility transmission and distribution systems, and rail 

and other public transportation systems. SCADA systems integrate data acquisition systems with data 

transmission systems and HMI software to provide a centralized monitoring and control system for 

numerous process inputs and outputs. SCADA systems are designed to collect field information, transfer 

it to a central computer facility, and display the information to the operator graphically or textually, 

thereby allowing the operator to monitor or control an entire system from a central location in real time. 

Based on the sophistication and setup of the individual system, control of any individual system, 

operation, or task can be automatic, or it can be performed by operator commands. 

SCADA systems consist of both hardware and software. Typical hardware includes an MTU placed at a 

control center, communications equipment (e.g., radio, telephone line, cable, or satellite), and one or more 

geographically distributed field sites consisting of either an RTU or a PLC, which controls actuators 

and/or monitors sensors. The MTU stores and processes the information from RTU inputs and outputs, 

while the RTU or PLC controls the local process. The communications hardware allows the transfer of 

information and data back and forth between the MTU and the RTUs or PLCs. The software is 

programmed to tell the system what and when to monitor, what parameter ranges are acceptable, and what 

response to initiate when parameters change outside acceptable values. An IED, such as a protective 

relay, may communicate directly to the SCADA master station, or a local RTU may poll the IEDs to 

collect the data and pass it to the SCADA master station. IEDs provide a direct interface to control and 

monitor equipment and sensors. IEDs may be directly polled and controlled by the SCADA master 

station and in most cases have local programming that allows for the IED to act without direct 

instructions from the SCADA control center. SCADA systems are usually designed to be fault-tolerant 

systems with significant redundancy built into the system architecture. 

Figure 2-2 shows the components and general configuration of a SCADA system. The control center 

houses a control server (MTU) and the communications routers. Other control center components include 

the HMI, engineering workstations, and the data historian, which are all connected by a LAN. The 

control center collects and logs information gathered by the field sites, displays information to the HMI, 

and may generate actions based upon detected events. The control center is also responsible for 

centralized alarming, trend analyses, and reporting. The field site performs local control of actuators and 

monitors sensors. Field sites are often equipped with a remote access capability to allow field operators 

to perform remote diagnostics and repairs usually over a separate dial up modem or WAN connection. 

Standard and proprietary communication protocols running over serial communications are used to 

transport information between the control center and field sites using telemetry techniques such as 

telephone line, cable, fiber, and radio frequency such as broadcast, microwave and satellite. 

MTU-RTU communication architectures vary among implementations. The various architectures used, 

including point-to-point, series, series-star, and multi-drop [5], are shown in Figure 2-3. Point-to-point is 

functionally the simplest type; however, it is expensive because of the individual channels needed for 

each connection. In a series configuration, the number of channels used is reduced; however, channel 

sharing has an impact on the efficiency and complexity of SCADA operations. Similarly, the series-star 

and multi-drop configurations’ use of one channel per device results in decreased efficiency and increased 

system complexity. 

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Figure 2-2. SCADA System General Layout 

The four basic architectures shown in Figure 2-3 can be further augmented using dedicated 

communication devices to manage communication exchange as well as message switching and buffering. 

Large SCADA systems, containing hundreds of RTUs, often employ sub-MTUs to alleviate the burden 

on the primary MTU. This type of topology is shown in Figure 2-4. 

Figure 2-5 shows an example of a SCADA system implementation. This particular SCADA system 

consists of a primary control center and three field sites. A second backup control center provides 

redundancy in the event of a primary control center malfunction. Point-to-point connections are used for 

all control center to field site communications, with two connections using radio telemetry. The third 

field site is local to the control center and uses the wide area network (WAN) for communications. A 

regional control center resides above the primary control center for a higher level of supervisory control. 

The corporate network has access to all control centers through the WAN, and field sites can be accessed 

remotely for troubleshooting and maintenance operations. The primary control center polls field devices 

for data at defined intervals (e.g., 5 seconds, 60 seconds) and can send new set points to a field device as 

required. In addition to polling and issuing high-level commands, the SCADA server also watches for 

priority interrupts coming from field site alarm systems. 

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Figure 2-3. Basic SCADA Communication Topologies 

Figure 2-4. Large SCADA Communication Topology 

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Figure 2-5. SCADA System Implementation Example (Distribution Monitoring and Control) 

Figure 2-6 shows an example implementation for rail monitoring and control. This example includes a 

rail control center that houses the SCADA system and three sections of a rail system. The SCADA 

system polls the rail sections for information such as the status of the trains, signal systems, traction 

electrification systems, and ticket vending machines. This information is also fed to operator consoles 

within the rail control center. The SCADA system also monitors operator inputs at the rail control center 

and disperses high-level operator commands to the rail section components. In addition, the SCADA 

system monitors conditions at the individual rail sections and issues commands based on these conditions 

(e.g., shut down a train to prevent it from entering an area that has been determined to be flooded or 

occupied by another train based on condition monitoring).

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Figure 2-6. SCADA System Implementation Example (Rail Monitoring and Control) 

2.5 Distributed Control Systems 

DCS are used to control production systems within the same geographic location for industries such as oil 

and gas refineries, water and wastewater treatment, electric power generation plants, chemical 

manufacturing plants, and pharmaceutical processing facilities. These systems are usually process control 

or discrete part control systems. A DCS uses a centralized supervisory control loop to mediate a group of 

localized controllers that share the overall tasks of carrying out an entire production process [6]. By 

modularizing the production system, a DCS reduces the impact of a single fault on the overall system. In 

many modern systems, the DCS is interfaced with the corporate network to give business operations a 

view of production. 

An example implementation showing the components and general configuration of a DCS is depicted in 

Figure 2-7. This DCS encompasses an entire facility from the bottom-level production processes up to 

the corporate or enterprise layer. In this example, a supervisory controller (control server) communicates 

to its subordinates via a control network. The supervisor sends set points to and requests data from the 

distributed field controllers. The distributed controllers control their process actuators based on control 

server commands and sensor feedback from process sensors. 

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Figure 2-7 gives examples of low-level controllers found on a DCS system. The field control devices 

shown include a PLC, a process controller, a single loop controller, and a machine controller. The single 

loop controller interfaces sensors and actuators using point-to-point wiring, while the other three field 

devices incorporate fieldbus networks to interface with process sensors and actuators. Fieldbus networks 

eliminate the need for point-to-point wiring between a controller and individual field sensors and 

actuators. Additionally, a fieldbus allows greater functionality beyond control, including field device 

diagnostics, and can accomplish control algorithms within the fieldbus, thereby avoiding signal routing 

back to the PLC for every control operation. Standard industrial communication protocols designed by 

industry groups such as Modbus and Fieldbus [7] are often used on control networks and fieldbus 

networks. 

In addition to the supervisory-level and field-level control loops, intermediate levels of control may also 

exist. For example, in the case of a DCS controlling a discrete part manufacturing facility, there could be 

an intermediate level supervisor for each cell within the plant. This supervisor would encompass a 

manufacturing cell containing a machine controller that processes a part and a robot controller that 

handles raw stock and final products. There could be several of these cells that manage field-level 

controllers under the main DCS supervisory control loop. 

Figure 2-7. DCS Implementation Example 

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2.6 Programmable Logic Controllers 

PLCs are used in both SCADA and DCS systems as the control components of an overall hierarchical 

system to provide local management of processes through feedback control as described in the sections 

above. In the case of SCADA systems, they provide the same functionality of RTUs. When used in 

DCS, PLCs are implemented as local controllers within a supervisory control scheme. PLCs are also 

implemented as the primary components in smaller control system configurations. PLCs have a userprogrammable memory for storing instructions for the purpose of implementing specific functions such as 

I/O control, logic, timing, counting, three mode proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control, 

communication, arithmetic, and data and file processing. Figure 2-8 shows control of a manufacturing 

process being performed by a PLC over a fieldbus network. The PLC is accessible via a programming 

interface located on an engineering workstation, and data is stored in a data historian, all connected on a 

LAN. 

Figure 2-8. PLC Control System Implementation Example 

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2.7 Industrial Sectors and Their Interdependencies 

Both the electrical power transmission and distribution grid industries use geographically distributed 

SCADA control technology to operate highly interconnected and dynamic systems consisting of 

thousands of public and private utilities and rural cooperatives for supplying electricity to end users. 

SCADA systems monitor and control electricity distribution by collecting data from and issuing 

commands to geographically remote field control stations from a centralized location. SCADA systems 

are also used to monitor and control water, oil and gas distribution, including pipelines, ships, trucks, and 

rail systems, as well as wastewater collection systems. 

SCADA systems and DCS are often networked together. This is the case for electric power control 

centers and electric power generation facilities. Although the electric power generation facility operation 

is controlled by a DCS, the DCS must communicate with the SCADA system to coordinate production 

output with transmission and distribution demands. 

The U.S. critical infrastructure is often referred to as a “system of systems” because of the 

interdependencies that exist between its various industrial sectors as well as interconnections between 

business partners [8] [9]. Critical infrastructures are highly interconnected and mutually dependent in 

complex ways, both physically and through a host of information and communications technologies. An 

incident in one infrastructure can directly and indirectly affect other infrastructures through cascading and 

escalating failures. 

Electric power is often thought to be one of the most prevalent sources of disruptions of interdependent 

critical infrastructures. As an example, a cascading failure can be initiated by a disruption of the 

microwave communications network used for an electric power transmission SCADA system. The lack 

of monitoring and control capabilities could cause a large generating unit to be taken offline, an event that 

would lead to loss of power at a transmission substation. This loss could cause a major imbalance, 

triggering a cascading failure across the power grid. This could result in large area blackouts that could 

potentially affect oil and natural gas production, refinery operations, water treatment systems, wastewater 

collection systems, and pipeline transport systems that rely on the grid for electric power. 

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3. ICS Characteristics, Threats and Vulnerabilities 

Most ICS in use today were developed years ago, long before public and private networks, desktop 

computing, or the Internet were a common part of business operations. These systems were designed to 

meet performance, reliability, safety, and flexibility requirements. In most cases they were physically 

isolated from outside networks and based on proprietary hardware, software, and communication 

protocols that included basic error detection and correction capabilities, but lacked the secure 

communication capabilities required in today’s interconnected systems. While there was concern for 

Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RMA) when addressing statistical performance and failure, 

the need for cyber security measures within these systems was not anticipated. At the time, security for 

ICS meant physically securing access to the network and the consoles that controlled the systems. 

ICS development paralleled the evolution of microprocessor, personal computer, and networking 

technologies during the 1980’s and 1990’s, and Internet-based technologies started making their way into 

ICS designs in the late 1990’s. These changes to ICS exposed them to new types of threats and 

significantly increased the likelihood that ICS could be compromised. This section describes the unique 

security characteristics of ICS, the vulnerabilities in ICS implementations, and the threats and incidents 

that ICS may face. Section 3.7 presents several examples of actual ICS cyber security incidents. 

3.1 Comparing ICS and IT Systems 

Initially, ICS had little resemblance to IT systems in that ICS were isolated systems running proprietary 

control protocols using specialized hardware and software. Widely available, low-cost Internet Protocol 

(IP) devices are now replacing proprietary solutions, which increases the possibility of cyber security 

vulnerabilities and incidents. As ICS are adopting IT solutions to promote corporate connectivity and 

remote access capabilities, and are being designed and implemented using industry standard computers, 

operating systems (OS) and network protocols, they are starting to resemble IT systems. This integration 

supports new IT capabilities, but it provides significantly less isolation for ICS from the outside world 

than predecessor systems, creating a greater need to secure these systems. While security solutions have 

been designed to deal with these security issues in typical IT systems, special precautions must be taken 

when introducing these same solutions to ICS environments. In some cases, new security solutions are 

needed that are tailored to the ICS environment. 

ICS have many characteristics that differ from traditional Internet-based information processing systems, 

including different risks and priorities. Some of these include significant risk to the health and safety of 

human lives, serious damage to the environment, and financial issues such as production losses, negative 

impact to a nation’s economy, and compromise of proprietary information. ICS have different 

performance and reliability requirements and use operating systems and applications that may be 

considered unconventional to typical IT support personnel. Furthermore, the goals of safety and 

efficiency can sometimes conflict with security in the design and operation of control systems (e.g., 

requiring password authentication and authorization should not hamper or interfere with emergency 

actions for ICS.) The following lists some special considerations when considering security for ICS: 

 Performance Requirements. ICS are generally time-critical; neither delay nor jitter is acceptable 

for the delivery of information, and high throughput is typically not essential. In contrast, IT systems 

typically require high throughput, but they can typically withstand some level of delay and jitter. ICS 

must exhibit deterministic responses. 

 Availability Requirements. Many ICS processes are continuous in nature. Unexpected outages of 

systems that control industrial processes are not acceptable. Outages often must be planned and 

scheduled days/weeks in advance. Exhaustive pre-deployment testing is essential to ensure high 

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availability for the ICS. In addition to unexpected outages, many control systems cannot be easily 

stopped and started without affecting production. In some cases, the products being produced or 

equipment being used is more important than the information being relayed. Therefore, use of typical 

IT strategies such as rebooting a component, are usually not acceptable solutions due to the adverse 

impact on the requirements for high availability, reliability and maintainability of the ICS. Some ICS 

employ redundant components, often running in parallel, to provide continuity when primary 

components are unavailable. 

 Risk Management Requirements. In a typical IT system, data confidentiality and integrity are 

typically the primary concerns. For an ICS, human safety and fault tolerance to prevent loss of life or 

endangerment of public health or confidence, regulatory compliance, loss of equipment, loss of 

intellectual property, or lost or damaged products are the primary concerns. The personnel 

responsible for operating, securing, and maintaining ICS must understand the important link between 

safety and security. 

 Architecture Security Focus. In a typical IT system, the primary focus of security is protecting the 

operation of IT assets, whether centralized or distributed, and the information stored on or transmitted 

among these assets. In some architectures, information stored and processed centrally is more critical 

and is afforded more protection. For ICS, edge clients (e.g., PLC, operator station, DCS controller) 

need to be carefully protected since they are directly responsible for controlling the end processes. 

The protection of the central server is still very important in an ICS, since the central server could 

possibly adversely impact every edge device. 

 Physical Interaction. In a typical IT system, there is not physical interaction with the environment. 

ICS can have very complex interactions with physical processes and consequences in the ICS domain 

that can manifest in physical events. All security functions integrated into the ICS must be tested 

(e.g., off-line on a comparable ICS) to prove that they do not compromise normal ICS functionality. 

 Time-Critical Responses. In a typical IT system, access control can be implemented without 

significant regard for data flow. For some ICS, automated response time or system response to 

human interaction is very critical. For example, requiring password authentication and authorization 

on an HMI should not hamper or interfere with emergency actions for ICS. Information flow must 

not be interrupted or compromised. Access to these systems should be restricted by rigorous physical 

security controls. 

 System Operation. ICS operating systems (OS) and applications may not tolerate typical IT security 

practices. Legacy systems are especially vulnerable to resource unavailability and timing disruptions. 

Control networks are often more complex and require a different level of expertise (e.g., control 

networks are typically managed by control engineers, not IT personnel). Software and hardware 

applications are more difficult to upgrade in an operational control system network. Many systems 

may not have desired features including encryption capabilities, error logging, and password 

protection. 

 Resource Constraints. ICS and their real time OSs are often resource-constrained systems that 

usually do not include typical IT security capabilities. There may not be computing resources 

available on ICS components to retrofit these systems with current security capabilities. Additionally, 

in some instances, third-party security solutions are not allowed due to ICS vendor license and service 

agreements, and loss of service support can occur if third party applications are installed without 

vendor acknowledgement or approval. 

 Communications. Communication protocols and media used by ICS environments for field device 

control and intra-processor communication are typically different from the generic IT environment, 

and may be proprietary. 

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 Change Management. Change management is paramount to maintaining the integrity of both IT and 

control systems. Unpatched systems represent one of the greatest vulnerabilities to a system. 

Software updates on IT systems, including security patches, are typically applied in a timely fashion 

based on appropriate security policy and procedures. In addition, these procedures are often 

automated using server-based tools. Software updates on ICS cannot always be implemented on a 

timely basis because these updates need to be thoroughly tested by the vendor of the industrial control 

application and the end user of the application before being implemented and ICS outages often must 

be planned and scheduled days/weeks in advance. The ICS may also require revalidation as part of 

the update process. Another issue is that many ICS utilize older versions of operating systems that 

are no longer supported by the vendor. Consequently, available patches may not be applicable. 

Change management is also applicable to hardware and firmware. The change management process, 

when applied to ICS, requires careful assessment by ICS experts (e.g., control engineers) working in 

conjunction with security and IT personnel. 

 Managed Support. Typical IT systems allow for diversified support styles, perhaps supporting 

disparate but interconnected technology architectures. For ICS, service support is usually via a single 

vendor, which may not have a diversified and interoperable support solution from another vendor. 

 Component Lifetime. Typical IT components have a lifetime on the order of 3-5 years, with brevity 

due to the quick evolution of technology. For ICS where technology has been developed in many 

cases for very specific use and implementation, the lifetime of the deployed technology is often in the 

order of 15-20 years and sometimes longer. 

 Access to Components. Typical IT components are usually local and easy to access, while ICS 

components can be isolated, remote, and require extensive physical effort to gain access to them. 

Table 3-1 summarizes some of the typical differences between IT systems and ICS. 

Table 3-1. Summary of IT System and ICS Differences 

Category Information Technology System Industrial Control System 

Performance 

Requirements

Non-real-time 

Response must be consistent 

High throughput is demanded 

High delay and jitter maybe acceptable 

Real-time 

Response is time-critical 

Modest throughput is acceptable 

Delay and/or jitter is not acceptable 

Availability 

Requirements

Responses such as rebooting are acceptable 

Availability deficiencies can often be 

tolerated, depending on the system’s 

operational requirements 

Responses such as rebooting may not be 

acceptable because of process availability 

requirements 

Availability requirements may necessitate 

redundant systems 

Outages must be planned and scheduled 

days/weeks in advance 

High availability requires exhaustive predeployment testing 

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Category Information Technology System Industrial Control System 

Risk 

Management 

Requirements

Data confidentiality and integrity is 

paramount 

Fault tolerance is less important – 

momentary downtime is not a major risk 

Major risk impact is delay of business 

operations 

Human safety is paramount, followed by 

protection of the process

Fault tolerance is essential, even momentary 

downtime may not be acceptable 

Major risk impacts are regulatory noncompliance, environmental impacts, loss of 

life, equipment, or production 

Architecture 

Security Focus

Primary focus is protecting the IT assets, and 

the information stored on or transmitted 

among these assets. 

Central server may require more protection 

Primary goal is to protect edge clients (e.g., 

field devices such as process controllers) 

Protection of central server is also important 

Unintended 

Consequences

Security solutions are designed around 

typical IT systems 

Security tools must be tested (e.g., off-line on 

a comparable ICS) to ensure that they do not 

compromise normal ICS operation 

Time-Critical 

Interaction

Less critical emergency interaction 

Tightly restricted access control can be 

implemented to the degree necessary for 

operations 

Response to human and other emergency 

interaction is critical 

Access to ICS should be strictly controlled, 

but should not hamper or interfere with 

human-machine interaction 

System 

Operation

Systems are designed for use with typical 

operating systems 

Upgrades are straightforward with the 

availability of automated deployment tools 

Differing and possibly proprietary operating 

systems, often without security capabilities 

built in

Software changes must be carefully made, 

usually by software vendors, because of the 

specialized control algorithms and perhaps 

modified hardware and software involved 

Resource 

Constraints

Systems are specified with enough 

resources to support the addition of thirdparty applications such as security solutions 

Systems are designed to support the 

intended industrial process and may not have 

enough memory and computing resources to 

support the addition of security capabilities 

Communications Standard communications protocols 

Primarily wired networks with some localized 

wireless capabilities 

Typical IT networking practices 

Many proprietary and standard 

communication protocols 

Several types of communications media used 

including dedicated wire and wireless (radio 

and satellite) 

Networks are complex and sometimes require 

the expertise of control engineers 

Change 

Management

Software changes are applied in a timely 

fashion in the presence of good security 

policy and procedures. The procedures are 

often automated. 

Software changes must be thoroughly tested 

and deployed incrementally throughout a 

system to ensure that the integrity of the 

control system is maintained. ICS outages 

often must be planned and scheduled 

days/weeks in advance 

Managed 

Support 

Allow for diversified support styles Service support is usually via a single vendor 

Component 

Lifetime 

Lifetime on the order of 3-5 years Lifetime on the order of 15-20 years 

Access to 

Components 

Components are usually local and easy to 

access 

Components can be isolated, remote, and 

require extensive physical effort to gain 

access to them 

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In summary, the operational and risk differences between ICS and IT systems create the need for 

increased sophistication in applying cyber security and operational strategies. Available computing 

resources for ICS (including central processing unit [CPU] time and memory) tend to be very limited 

because these systems were designed to maximize control system resources, with little to no extra 

capacity for third-party cyber security solutions. Additionally, in some instances, third-party security 

solutions are not allowed due to vendor license and service agreements and loss of service support can 

occur if third party applications are installed. Another important consideration is that IT cyber security 

and control systems expertise is typically not found within the same group of personnel. A crossfunctional team of control engineers, control system operators and IT security professionals needs to work 

closely to understand the possible implications of the installation, operation, and maintenance of security 

solutions in conjunction with control system operation. IT professionals working with ICS need to 

understand the reliability impacts of information security technologies before deployment. Some of the 

OSs and applications running on ICS may not operate correctly with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) IT 

cyber security solutions because of specialized ICS environment architectures. 

3.2 Threats 

Threats to control systems can come from numerous sources, including adversarial sources such as hostile 

governments, terrorist groups, industrial spies, disgruntled employees, malicious intruders, and natural 

sources such as from system complexities, human errors and accidents, equipment failures and natural 

disasters. To protect against adversarial threats (as well as known natural threats), it is necessary to create 

a defense-in-depth strategy for the ICS. Table 3-2 lists possible threats to ICS. Please note this list is in 

alphabetical order and not by greatest threat. 

Table 3-2. Adversarial Threats to ICS 

Threat Agent Description 

Attackers Attackers break into networks for the thrill of the challenge or for bragging rights in the 

attacker community. While remote cracking once required a fair amount of skill or computer 

knowledge, attackers can now download attack scripts and protocols from the Internet and 

launch them against victim sites. Thus, while attack tools have become more sophisticated, 

they have also become easier to use. Many attackers do not have the requisite expertise to 

threaten difficult targets such as critical U.S. networks. Nevertheless, the worldwide 

population of attackers poses a relatively high threat of an isolated or brief disruption 

causing serious damage. 

Bot-network 

operators 

Bot-network operators are attackers; however, instead of breaking into systems for the 

challenge or bragging rights, they take over multiple systems to coordinate attacks and to 

distribute phishing schemes, spam, and malware attacks. The services of compromised 

systems and networks are sometimes made available on underground markets (e.g., 

purchasing a denial of service attack or the use of servers to relay spam or phishing 

attacks). 

Criminal groups Criminal groups seek to attack systems for monetary gain. Specifically, organized crime 

groups are using spam, phishing, and spyware/malware to commit identity theft and online 

fraud. International corporate spies and organized crime organizations also pose a threat to 

the U.S. through their ability to conduct industrial espionage and large-scale monetary theft 

and to hire or develop attacker talent. 

Foreign intelligence 

services 

Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of their information gathering and 

espionage activities. In addition, several nations are aggressively working to develop 

information warfare doctrines, programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable a single 

entity to have a significant and serious impact by disrupting the supply, communications, 

and economic infrastructures that support military power–impacts that could affect the daily 

lives of U.S. citizens. 

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Threat Agent Description 

Insiders The disgruntled insider is a principal source of computer crime. Insiders may not need a 

great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions because their knowledge of a target 

system often allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to 

steal system data. The insider threat also includes outsourcing vendors as well as 

employees who accidentally introduce malware into systems. Insiders may be employees, 

contractors, or business partners. 

Inadequate policies, procedures, and testing can, and have led to ICS impacts. Impacts 

have ranged from trivial to significant damage to the ICS and field devices. Unintentional 

impacts from insiders are some of the highest probability occurrences. 

Phishers Phishers are individuals or small groups that execute phishing schemes in an attempt to 

steal identities or information for monetary gain. Phishers may also use spam and 

spyware/malware to accomplish their objectives. 

Spammers Spammers are individuals or organizations that distribute unsolicited e-mail with hidden or 

false information to sell products, conduct phishing schemes, distribute spyware/malware, or 

attack organizations (e.g., DoS). 

Spyware/malware 

authors 

Individuals or organizations with malicious intent carry out attacks against users by 

producing and distributing spyware and malware. Several destructive computer viruses and 

worms have harmed files and hard drives, including the Melissa Macro Virus, the 

Explore.Zip worm, the CIH (Chernobyl) Virus, Nimda, Code Red, Slammer, and Blaster. 

Terrorists Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructures to threaten national 

security, cause mass casualties, weaken the U.S. economy, and damage public morale and 

confidence. Terrorists may use phishing schemes or spyware/malware to generate funds or 

gather sensitive information. Terrorists may attack one target to divert attention or 

resources from other targets. 

Industrial Spies Industrial espionage seeks to acquire intellectual property and know-how by clandestine 

methods 

Source: Government Accountability Office (GAO), Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Role in Critical Infrastructure 

Protection (CIP) Cybersecurity, GAO-05-434 (Washington, D.C.: May, 2005). 

3.3 Potential ICS Vulnerabilities 

This section lists vulnerabilities that may be found in typical ICS. The order of these vulnerabilities does 

not necessarily reflect any priority in terms of likelihood of occurrence or severity of impact. The 

vulnerabilities are grouped into Policy and Procedure, Platform, and Network categories to assist in 

determining optimal mitigation strategies. Any given ICS will usually exhibit a subset of these 

vulnerabilities, but may also contain additional vulnerabilities unique to the particular ICS 

implementation that do not appear in this listing. Specific information on ICS vulnerabilities can be 

researched at the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) Control Systems Web 

site.2

When studying possible security vulnerabilities, it is easy to become preoccupied with trying to address 

issues that are technically interesting, but are ultimately of low impact. As addressed in Appendix E, 

FIPS 199 establishes security categories for both information and information systems based on the 

potential impact on an organization should certain events occur which jeopardize the information and 

information systems needed by the organization to accomplish its assigned mission, protect its assets, 

fulfill its legal responsibilities, maintain its day-to-day functions, and protect individuals. 

 

2

 The US-CERT Control Systems Web site is located at http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/. 

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A method for assessing and rating the risk of a possible vulnerability at a specific facility is needed. The 

risk is a function of the likelihood (probability) that a defined threat agent (adversary) can exploit a 

specific vulnerability and create an impact (consequence). The risk induced by any given vulnerability is 

influenced by a number of related indicators, including: 

 Network and computer architecture and conditions 

 Installed countermeasures 

 Technical difficulty of the attack 

 Probability of detection (e.g., amount of time the adversary can remain in contact with the target 

system/network without detection) 

 Consequences of the incident 

 Cost of the incident. 

This assessment of risk is addressed in further detail in Sections 4 through 6. 

3.3.1 Policy and Procedure Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerabilities are often introduced into ICS because of incomplete, inappropriate, or nonexistent security 

documentation, including policy and implementation guides (procedures). Security documentation, along 

with management support, is the cornerstone of any security program. Corporate security policy can 

reduce vulnerabilities by mandating conduct such as password usage and maintenance or requirements for 

connecting modems to ICS. Table 3-3 describes potential policy and procedure vulnerabilities for ICS. 

Table 3-3. Policy and Procedure Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Inadequate security policy for the 

ICS 

Vulnerabilities are often introduced into ICS due to inadequate policies or 

the lack of policies specifically for control system security. 

No formal ICS security training and 

awareness program 

A documented formal security training and awareness program is designed 

to keep staff up to date on organizational security policies and procedures 

as well as industry cyber security standards and recommended practices. 

Without training on specific ICS policies and procedures, staff cannot be 

expected to maintain a secure ICS environment. 

Inadequate security architecture 

and design 

Control engineers have historically had minimal training in security and until 

relatively recently vendors have not included security features in their 

products 

No specific or documented security 

procedures were developed from 

the security policy for the ICS 

Specific security procedures should be developed and employees trained 

for the ICS. They are the roots of a sound security program. 

Absent or deficient ICS equipment 

implementation guidelines 

Equipment implementation guidelines should be kept up to date and readily 

available. These guidelines are an integral part of security procedures in 

the event of an ICS malfunction. 

Lack of administrative mechanisms 

for security enforcement 

Staff responsible for enforcing security should be held accountable for 

administering documented security policies and procedures. 

Few or no security audits on the 

ICS 

Independent security audits should review and examine a system’s records 

and activities to determine the adequacy of system controls and ensure 

compliance with established ICS security policy and procedures. Audits 

should also be used to detect breaches in ICS security services and 

recommend changes as countermeasures which may include making 

existing security controls more robust and/or adding new security controls. 

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Vulnerability Description 

No ICS specific continuity of 

operations or disaster recovery 

plan (DRP) 

A DRP should be prepared, tested and available in the event of a major 

hardware or software failure or destruction of facilities. Lack of a specific 

DRP for the ICS could lead to extended downtimes and production loss. 

Lack of ICS specific configuration 

change management 

A process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware, software, and 

documentation should be implemented to ensure an ICS is protected 

against inadequate or improper modifications before, during, and after 

system implementation. A lack of configuration change management 

procedures can lead to security oversights, exposures, and risks. 

3.3.2 Platform Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerabilities in ICS can occur due to flaws, misconfigurations, or poor maintenance of their platforms, 

including hardware, operating systems, and ICS applications. These vulnerabilities can be mitigated 

through various security controls, such as OS and application patching, physical access control, and 

security software (e.g., antivirus software). The tables in this section describe potential platform 

vulnerabilities: 

 Table 3-4. Platform Configuration Vulnerabilities

 Table 3-5. Platform Hardware Vulnerabilities

 Table 3-6. Platform Software Vulnerabilities

 Table 3-7. Platform Malware Protection Vulnerabilities

Table 3-4. Platform Configuration Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

OS and vendor software patches 

may not be developed until 

significantly after security 

vulnerabilities are found 

Because of the complexity of ICS software and possible modifications to the 

underlying OS, changes must undergo comprehensive regression testing. 

The elapsed time for such testing and subsequent distribution of updated 

software provides a long window of vulnerability 

OS and application security 

patches are not maintained 

Out-of-date OSs and applications may contain newly discovered 

vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Documented procedures should be 

developed for how security patches will be maintained. 

OS and application security 

patches are implemented without 

exhaustive testing 

OS and application security patches deployed without testing could 

compromise normal operation of the ICS. Documented procedures should 

be developed for testing new security patches. 

Default configurations are used Using default configurations often leads to insecure and unnecessary open 

ports and exploitable services and applications running on hosts. 

Critical configurations are not 

stored or backed up 

Procedures should be available for restoring ICS configuration settings in 

the event of accidental or adversary-initiated configuration changes to 

maintain system availability and prevent loss of data. Documented 

procedures should be developed for maintaining ICS configuration settings. 

Data unprotected on portable 

device 

If sensitive data (e.g., passwords, dial-up numbers) is stored in the clear on 

portable devices such as laptops and PDAs and these devices are lost or 

stolen, system security could be compromised. Policy, procedures, and 

mechanisms are required for protection. 

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Vulnerability Description 

Lack of adequate password policy Password policies are needed to define when passwords must be used, 

how strong they must be, and how they must be maintained. Without a 

password policy, systems might not have appropriate password controls, 

making unauthorized access to systems more likely. Password policies 

should be developed as part of an overall ICS security program taking into 

account the capabilities of the ICS to handle more complex passwords. 

No password used Passwords should be implemented on ICS components to prevent 

unauthorized access. Password-related vulnerabilities include having no 

password for: 

• System login (if the system has user accounts) 

• System power-on (if the system has no user accounts) 

• System screen saver (if an ICS component is unattended over 

time) 

Password authentication should not hamper or interfere with emergency 

actions for ICS. 

Password disclosure Passwords should be kept confidential to prevent unauthorized access. 

Examples of password disclosures include: 

• Posting passwords in plain sight, local to a system 

• Sharing passwords to individual user accounts with associates 

• Communicating passwords to adversaries through social 

engineering 

• Sending passwords that are not encrypted through unprotected 

communications 

Password guessing Poorly chosen passwords can easily be guessed by humans or computer 

algorithms to gain unauthorized access. Examples include: 

• Passwords that are short, simple (e.g., all lower-case letters), or 

otherwise do not meet typical strength requirements. Password 

strength also depends on the specific ICS capability to handle 

more stringent passwords 

• Passwords that are set to the default vendor supplied value 

• Passwords that are not changed on a specified interval 

Inadequate access controls applied Poorly specified access controls can result in giving an ICS user too many 

or too few privileges. The following exemplify each case: 

• System configured with default access control settings gives an 

operator administrative privileges 

• System improperly configured results in an operator being unable 

to take corrective actions in an emergency situation 

Access control policies should be developed as part of an ICS security 

program. 

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Table 3-5. Platform Hardware Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Inadequate testing of security 

changes 

Many ICS facilities, especially smaller facilities, have no test facilities, so 

security changes must be implemented using the live operational systems 

Inadequate physical protection for 

critical systems 

Access to the control center, field devices, portable devices, media, and 

other ICS components needs to be controlled. Many remote sites are often 

not staffed and it may not be feasible to physically monitor them. 

Unauthorized personnel have 

physical access to equipment 

Physical access to ICS equipment should be restricted to only the 

necessary personnel, taking into account safety requirements, such as 

emergency shutdown or restarts. Improper access to ICS equipment can 

lead to any of the following: 

• Physical theft of data and hardware 

• Physical damage or destruction of data and hardware 

• Unauthorized changes to the functional environment (e.g., data 

connections, unauthorized use of removable media, 

adding/removing resources) 

• Disconnection of physical data links 

• Undetectable interception of data (keystroke and other input 

logging) 

Insecure remote access on ICS 

components 

Modems and other remote access capabilities that enable control engineers 

and vendors to gain remote access to systems should be deployed with 

security controls to prevent unauthorized individuals from gaining access to 

the ICS. 

Dual network interface cards (NIC) 

to connect networks 

Machines with dual NICs connected to different networks could allow 

unauthorized access and passing of data from one network to another. 

Undocumented assets To properly secure an ICS, there should be an accurate listing of the assets 

in the system. An inaccurate representation of the control system and its 

components could leave an unauthorized access point or backdoor into the 

ICS. 

Radio frequency and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) The hardware used for control systems is vulnerable to radio frequency 

electro-magnetic pulses (EMP). The impact can range from temporary 

disruption of command and control to permanent damage to circuit boards. 

Lack of backup power Without backup power to critical assets, a general loss of power will shut 

down the ICS and could create an unsafe situation. Loss of power could 

also lead to insecure default settings. 

Loss of environmental control Loss of environmental control could lead to processors overheating. Some 

processors will shut down to protect themselves; some may continue to 

operate but in a minimal capacity, producing intermittent errors; and some 

just melt if they overheat. 

Lack of redundancy for critical 

components 

Lack of redundancy in critical components could provide single point of 

failure possibilities 

Table 3-6. Platform Software Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Buffer overflow Software used to implement an ICS could be vulnerable to buffer overflows; 

adversaries could exploit these to perform various attacks. 

Installed security capabilities not 

enabled by default 

Security capabilities that were installed with the product are useless if they 

are not enabled or at least identified as being disabled. 

Denial of service (DoS) ICS software could be vulnerable to DoS attacks, resulting in the prevention 

of authorized access to a system resource or delaying system operations 

and functions. 

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Vulnerability Description 

Mishandling of undefined, poorly 

defined, or “illegal” conditions 

Some ICS implementations are vulnerable to packets that are malformed or 

contain illegal or otherwise unexpected field values. 

OLE for Process Control (OPC) 

relies on Remote Procedure Call 

(RPC) and Distributed Component 

Object Model (DCOM) 

Without updated patches, OPC is vulnerable to the known RPC/DCOM 

vulnerabilities. 

Use of insecure industry-wide ICS 

protocols 

Distributed Network Protocol (DNP) 3.0, Modbus, Profibus, and other 

protocols are common across several industries and protocol information is 

freely available. These protocols often have few or no security capabilities 

built in. 

Use of clear text Many ICS protocols transmit messages in clear text across the transmission 

media, making them susceptible to eavesdropping by adversaries. 

Unneeded services running Many platforms have a wide variety of processor and network services 

defined to operate as a default. Unneeded services are seldom disabled 

and could be exploited. 

Use of proprietary software that 

has been discussed at conferences 

and in periodicals 

Proprietary software issues are discussed at international IT, ICS and “Black 

Hat” conferences and available through technical papers, periodicals and 

listservers. Also, ICS maintenance manuals are available from the vendors. 

This information can help adversaries create successful attacks against ICS. 

Inadequate authentication and 

access control for configuration and 

programming software 

Unauthorized access to configuration and programming software could 

provide the ability to corrupt a device. 

Intrusion detection/prevention 

software not installed 

Incidents can result in loss of system availability; the capture, modification, 

and deletion of data; and incorrect execution of control commands. IDS/IPS 

software may stop or prevent various types of attacks, including DoS 

attacks, and also identify attacked internal hosts, such as those infected with 

worms. IDS/IPS software must be tested prior to deployment to determine 

that it does not compromise normal operation of the ICS. 

Logs not maintained Without proper and accurate logs, it might be impossible to determine what 

caused a security event to occur. 

Incidents are not detected Where logs and other security sensors are installed, they may not be 

monitored on a real-time basis and therefore security incidents may not be 

rapidly detected and countered. 

Table 3-7. Platform Malware Protection Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Malware protection software not 

installed 

Malicious software can result in performance degradation, loss of system 

availability, and the capture, modification, or deletion of data. Malware 

protection software, such as antivirus software, is needed to prevent 

systems from being infected by malicious software. 

Malware protection software or 

definitions not current 

Outdated malware protection software and definitions leave the system 

open to new malware threats. 

Malware protection software 

implemented without exhaustive 

testing 

Malware protection software deployed without testing could impact normal 

operation of the ICS. 

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3.3.3 Network Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerabilities in ICS may occur from flaws, misconfigurations, or poor administration of ICS networks 

and their connections with other networks. These vulnerabilities can be eliminated or mitigated through 

various security controls, such as defense-in-depth network design, encrypting network communications, 

restricting network traffic flows, and providing physical access control for network components. 

The tables in this section describe potential platform vulnerabilities: 

 Table 3-8. Network Configuration Vulnerabilities

 Table 3-9. Network Hardware Vulnerabilities

 Table 3-10. Network Perimeter Vulnerabilities

 Table 3-11. Network Monitoring and Logging Vulnerabilities 

 Table 3-12. Communication Vulnerabilities

 Table 3-13. Wireless Connection Vulnerabilities

Table 3-8. Network Configuration Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Weak network security architecture The network infrastructure environment within the ICS has often been 

developed and modified based on business and operational requirements, 

with little consideration for the potential security impacts of the changes. 

Over time, security gaps may have been inadvertently introduced within 

particular portions of the infrastructure. Without remediation, these gaps 

may represent backdoors into the ICS. 

Data flow controls not employed Data flow controls, such as access control lists (ACL), are needed to restrict 

which systems can directly access network devices. Generally, only 

designated network administrators should be able to access such devices 

directly. Data flow controls should ensure that other systems cannot directly 

access the devices. 

Poorly configured security 

equipment 

Using default configurations often leads to insecure and unnecessary open 

ports and exploitable network services running on hosts. Improperly 

configured firewall rules and router ACLs can allow unnecessary traffic. 

Network device configurations not 

stored or backed up 

Procedures should be available for restoring network device configuration 

settings in the event of accidental or adversary-initiated configuration 

changes to maintain system availability and prevent loss of data. 

Documented procedures should be developed for maintaining network 

device configuration settings. 

Passwords are not encrypted in 

transit 

Passwords transmitted in clear text across transmission media are 

susceptible to eavesdropping by adversaries, who could reuse them to gain 

unauthorized access to a network device. Such access could allow an 

adversary to disrupt ICS operations or to monitor ICS network activity. 

Passwords exist indefinitely on 

network devices 

Passwords should be changed regularly so that if one becomes known by 

an unauthorized party, the party has unauthorized access to the network 

device only for a short time. Such access could allow an adversary to 

disrupt ICS operations or monitor ICS network activity. 

Inadequate access controls applied Unauthorized access to network devices and administrative functions could 

allow a user to disrupt ICS operations or monitor ICS network activity. 

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Table 3-9. Network Hardware Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Inadequate physical protection of 

network equipment 

Access to network equipment should be controlled to prevent damage or 

destruction. 

Unsecured physical ports Unsecured universal serial bus (USB) and PS/2 ports could allow 

unauthorized connection of thumb drives, keystroke loggers, etc. 

Loss of environmental control Loss of environmental control could lead to processors overheating. Some 

processors will shut down to protect themselves, and some just melt if they 

overheat. 

Non-critical personnel have access 

to equipment and network 

connections 

Physical access to network equipment should be restricted to only the 

necessary personnel. Improper access to network equipment can lead to 

any of the following: 

• Physical theft of data and hardware 

• Physical damage or destruction of data and hardware 

• Unauthorized changes to the security environment (e.g., altering 

ACLs to permit attacks to enter a network) 

• Unauthorized interception and manipulation of network activity 

• Disconnection of physical data links or connection of unauthorized 

data links 

Lack of redundancy for critical 

networks 

Lack of redundancy in critical networks could provide single point of failure 

possibilities 

Table 3-10. Network Perimeter Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

No security perimeter defined If the control network does not have a security perimeter clearly defined, 

then it is not possible to ensure that the necessary security controls are 

deployed and configured properly. This can lead to unauthorized access to 

systems and data, as well as other problems. 

Firewalls nonexistent or improperly 

configured 

A lack of properly configured firewalls could permit unnecessary data to 

pass between networks, such as control and corporate networks. This 

could cause several problems, including allowing attacks and malware to 

spread between networks, making sensitive data susceptible to 

monitoring/eavesdropping on the other network, and providing individuals 

with unauthorized access to systems. 

Control networks used for noncontrol traffic Control and non-control traffic have different requirements, such as 

determinism and reliability, so having both types of traffic on a single 

network makes it more difficult to configure the network so that it meets the 

requirements of the control traffic. For example, non-control traffic could 

inadvertently consume resources that control traffic needs, causing 

disruptions in ICS functions. 

Control network services not within 

the control network 

Where IT services such as Domain Name System (DNS),and/or Dynamic 

Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) are used by control networks, they are 

often implemented in the IT network, causing the ICS network to become 

dependent on the IT network that may not have the reliability and availability 

requirements needed by the ICS. 

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Table 3-11. Network Monitoring and Logging Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Inadequate firewall and router logs Without proper and accurate logs, it might be impossible to determine what 

caused a security incident to occur. 

No security monitoring on the ICS 

network 

Without regular security monitoring, incidents might go unnoticed, leading to 

additional damage and/or disruption. Regular security monitoring is also 

needed to identify problems with security controls, such as 

misconfigurations and failures. 

Table 3-12. Communication Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Critical monitoring and control 

paths are not identified 

Rogue and/or unknown connections into the ICS can leave a backdoor for 

attacks. 

Standard, well-documented 

communication protocols are used 

in plain text 

Adversaries that can monitor the ICS network activity can use a protocol 

analyzer or other utilities to decode the data transferred by protocols such 

as telnet, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and Network File System (NFS). 

The use of such protocols also makes it easier for adversaries to perform 

attacks against the ICS and manipulate ICS network activity. 

Authentication of users, data or 

devices is substandard or 

nonexistent 

Many ICS protocols have no authentication at any level. Without 

authentication, there is the potential to replay, modify, or spoof data or to 

spoof devices such as sensors and user identities. 

Lack of integrity checking for 

communications 

There are no integrity checks built into most industrial control protocols; 

adversaries could manipulate communications undetected. To ensure 

integrity, the ICS can use lower-layer protocols (e.g., IPsec) that offer data 

integrity protection. 

Table 3-13. Wireless Connection Vulnerabilities 

Vulnerability Description 

Inadequate authentication between 

clients and access points 

Strong mutual authentication between wireless clients and access points is 

needed to ensure that clients do not connect to a rogue access point 

deployed by an adversary, and also to ensure that adversaries do not 

connect to any of the ICS’s wireless networks. 

Inadequate data protection 

between clients and access points 

Sensitive data between wireless clients and access points should be 

protected using strong encryption to ensure that adversaries cannot gain 

unauthorized access to the unencrypted data. 

3.4 Risk Factors 

Several factors currently contribute to the increasing risk to control systems, which are discussed in 

greater detail in Sections 3.4.1 through 3.4.4: 

 Adoption of standardized protocols and technologies with known vulnerabilities 

 Connectivity of the control systems to other networks 

 Insecure and rogue connections 

 Widespread availability of technical information about control systems. 

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3.4.1 Standardized Protocols and Technologies 

ICS vendors have begun to open up their proprietary protocols and publish their protocol specifications to 

enable third-party manufacturers to build compatible accessories. Organizations are also transitioning 

from proprietary systems to less expensive, standardized technologies such as Microsoft Windows and 

Unix-like operating systems as well as common networking protocols such as TCP/IP to reduce costs and 

improve performance. Another standard contributing to this evolution of open systems is OPC, a protocol 

that enables interaction between control systems and PC-based application programs. The transition to 

using these open protocol standards provides economic and technical benefits, but also increases the 

susceptibility of ICS to cyber incidents. These standardized protocols and technologies have commonly 

known vulnerabilities, which are susceptible to sophisticated and effective exploitation tools that are 

widely available and relatively easy to use. 

3.4.2 Increased Connectivity 

ICS and corporate IT systems are often interconnected as a result of several changes in information 

management practices, operational, and business needs. The demand for remote access has encouraged 

many organizations to establish connections to the ICS that enable ICS engineers and support personnel 

to monitor and control the system from points outside the control network. Many organizations have also 

added connections between corporate networks and ICS networks to allow the organization’s decision 

makers to obtain access to critical data about the status of their operational systems and to send 

instructions for the manufacture or distribution of product. In early implementations this might have been 

done with custom applications software or via an OPC server/gateway; however, in the past ten years this 

has been accomplished with Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networking and 

standardized IP applications like File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Extensible Markup Language (XML) 

data exchanges. Often, these connections were implemented without a full understanding of the 

corresponding security risks. In addition, corporate networks are often connected to strategic partner 

networks and to the Internet. Control systems also make more use of WANs and the Internet to transmit 

data to their remote or local stations and individual devices. This integration of control system networks 

with public and corporate networks increases the accessibility of control system vulnerabilities. Unless 

appropriate security controls are deployed, these vulnerabilities can expose all levels of the ICS network 

architecture to complexity-induced error, adversaries and a variety of cyber threats, including worms and 

other malware. As an example of the change in threats to control systems, an internal survey of an 

unnamed energy organization showed the following: 

 The majority of the business units’ management believed their control systems were not 

connected to the corporate network. 

 An audit showed the majority of the control systems were connected in some way to the corporate 

network. 

 The corporate network was only secured to support general business processes and not safetycritical systems. 

Adding to the complexity of the situation, the goals of IT departments can be fundamentally different 

from those of process control departments. The IT world typically sees performance, confidentiality, and 

data integrity as paramount, while the ICS world sees human and plant safety as its primary 

responsibility, and thus system availability and data integrity are core priorities. Other distinctions, as 

discussed in Section 3.1, include differences in reliability requirements, incident impacts, performance 

expectations, operating systems, communications protocols, and system architectures. This can mean 

significant differences in implementation of security practices. 

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3.4.3 Insecure and Rogue Connections 

Many ICS vendors have delivered systems with dial-up modems that provide remote access to ease the 

burdens of maintenance for the technical field support personnel. Remote access sometimes provides 

support staff with administrative-level access to a system, such as using a telephone number, and 

sometimes an access control credential (e.g., valid ID, and/or a password). Adversaries with war 

dialers—simple personal computer programs that dial consecutive phone numbers looking for modems—

and password cracking software could gain access to systems through these remote access capabilities. 

Passwords used for remote access are often common to all implementations of a particular vendor’s 

systems and may have not been changed by the end user. These types of connections can leave a system 

highly vulnerable because people entering systems through vendor-installed modems are often granted 

high levels of system access. 

Organizations often inadvertently leave access links such as dial-up modems open for remote diagnostics, 

maintenance, and monitoring. Also, control systems increasingly utilize wireless communications 

systems, which can be vulnerable. Access links not protected with authentication and/or encryption have 

the increased risk of adversaries using these unsecured connections to access remotely controlled systems. 

This could lead to an adversary compromising the integrity of the data in transit as well as the availability 

of the system, both of which can result in an impact to public and plant safety. Before deploying 

encryption, first determine if encryption is an appropriate solution for the specific ICS application. 

Section 6.3.4.1 provides additional information on the use of encryption in the ICS environment. 

Many of the interconnections between corporate networks and ICS require the integration of systems with 

different communications standards. The result is often an infrastructure that is engineered to move data 

successfully between two unique systems. Because of the complexity of integrating disparate systems, 

control engineers often fail to address the added burden of accounting for security risks. Many control 

engineers have little if any training in security and often IT security personnel are not involved in ICS 

security design. As a result, access controls designed to protect control systems from unauthorized access 

through corporate networks are usually minimal. Moreover, the behavior of the underlying protocols may 

not be well understood, and thus vulnerabilities can exist that can defeat even advanced security 

countermeasures. Protocols, such as TCP/IP and others have characteristics that often go unchecked, and 

this may counter any security that can be done at the network or the application levels. 

3.4.4 Public Information 

Public information regarding ICS design, maintenance, interconnection, and communication is readily 

available over the Internet to support competition in product choices as well as to enable the use of open 

standards. ICS vendors also sell toolkits to help develop software that implements the various standards 

used in ICS environments. There are also many former employees, vendors, contractors, and other end 

users of the same ICS equipment worldwide who have inside knowledge about the operation of control 

systems and processes. For example, one person used his inside knowledge of a system to cause one of 

the most cited ICS cyber security incidents, the Maroochy Shire sewage spill. Additional information on 

the Maroochy Shire sewage spill incident is available in Section 3.7. 

Information and resources are available to potential adversaries and intruders of all calibers around the 

world. With the available information, it is quite possible for an individual with very little knowledge of 

control systems to gain unauthorized access to a control system with the use of automated attack and data 

mining tools and a factory-set default password. Many times, these default passwords are never changed. 

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3.5 Possible Incident Scenarios 

There are many possible incident scenarios for an ICS including [10]: 

 Control systems operation disrupted by delaying or blocking the flow of information through 

corporate or control networks, thereby denying availability of the networks to control system 

operators or causing information transfer bottlenecks or denial of service by IT-resident services 

(such as DNS) 

 Unauthorized changes made to programmed instructions in PLCs, RTUs, DCS, or SCADA 

controllers, alarm thresholds changed, or unauthorized commands issued to control equipment, which 

could potentially result in damage to equipment (if tolerances are exceeded), premature shutdown of 

processes (such as prematurely shutting down transmission lines), causing an environmental incident, 

or even disabling control equipment 

 False information sent to control system operators either to disguise unauthorized changes or to 

initiate inappropriate actions by system operators 

 Control system software or configuration settings modified, producing unpredictable results 

 Safety systems operation interfered with 

 Malicious software (e.g., virus, worm, Trojan horse) introduced into the system 

 Recipes (i.e., the materials and directions for creating a product) or work instructions modified in 

order to bring about damage to products, equipment, or personnel 

In addition, in control systems that cover a wide geographic area, the remote sites are often not staffed 

and may not be physically monitored. If such remote systems are physically breached, the adversaries 

could establish a connection back to the control network. 

The following are two hypothetical ICS incident scenarios [11]: 

 Using war dialers—simple computer programs that dial consecutive phone numbers looking for 

modems—an adversary finds modems connected to the programmable breakers of the electric power 

transmission control system, cracks the passwords that control access to the breakers, and changes the 

control settings to cause local power outages and damage equipment. The adversary lowers the 

settings from 500 Ampere (A) to 200 A on some circuit breakers, taking those lines out of service and 

diverting power to neighboring lines. At the same time, the adversary raises the settings on 

neighboring lines to 900 A, preventing the circuit breakers from tripping, thus overloading the lines. 

This causes significant damage to transformers and other critical equipment, resulting in lengthy 

repair outages. 

 A power plant serving a large metropolitan district has successfully isolated the control system from 

the corporate network of the plant, installed state-of-the-art firewalls, and implemented intrusion 

detection and prevention technology. An engineer innocently downloads information on a continuing 

education seminar at a local college, inadvertently introducing a virus into the control network. Just 

before the morning peak, the operator screens go blank and the system is shut down. 

Although these scenarios are hypothetical, they represent potential incident scenarios for an ICS. Section 

3.7 provides summaries of several actual ICS incidents. 

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3.6 Sources of Incidents 

An accurate accounting of cyber incidents on control systems is difficult to determine. However, 

individuals in the industry who have been focusing on this issue see similar growth trends between 

vulnerabilities exposed in traditional IT systems and those being found in control systems. There is an 

Industrial Security Incident Database (ISID), which is designed to track incidents of a cyber security 

nature that directly affect ICS and processes. This includes events such as accidental cyber-related 

incidents, as well as deliberate events such as unauthorized remote access, DoS attacks, and malware 

infiltrations. Data is collected through research into publicly known incidents and from private reporting 

by member organizations that wish to have access to the database. Each incident is investigated and then 

rated according to reliability (confirmed, likely but unconfirmed, unlikely or unknown, and hoax/urban 

legend). 

The data collected includes the following: 

 Incident title 

 Date of incident 

 Reliability of report 

 Type of incident (e.g., accident, virus) 

 Industry (e.g., petroleum, automotive) 

 Entry point (e.g., Internet, wireless, modem) 

 Perpetrator 

 Type of system and hardware impacted 

 Brief description of incident 

 Impact on organization 

 Measures to prevent recurrence 

 References. 

As of June 2006, 119 incidents had been investigated and logged in the database, with 15 incidents still 

pending investigation. Of these, 13 were flagged as hoax or unlikely and removed from the study data. 

Figure 3-1 shows the trend of incidents between 1982 and 2006, which shows a sharp increase in 

incidents starting around 2001. The complexity of modern ICS leaves many vulnerabilities as well as 

vectors for attack. Attacks can come from many places, including indirectly through the corporate 

network or directly via the Internet, virtual private networks (VPN), wireless networks, and dial-up 

modems. 

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Other sources of control system impact information show an increase in control system incidents as well. 

It is not clear whether there are more incidents happening or just more are being detected and reported. 

Figure 3-1. Industrial Security Incidents by Year 

There are three broad categories of control system incidents: 

 Intentional targeted attacks such as gaining unauthorized access to files, performing a DoS, or 

spoofing e-mails (i.e., forging the sender’s identity for an e-mail) 

 Unintentional consequences or collateral damage from worms, viruses or control system failures 

 Unintentional internal security consequences, such as inappropriate testing of operational systems or 

unauthorized system configuration changes. 

Of the three, targeted attacks are the least frequent. Targeted attacks are potentially the most damaging, 

but also require detailed knowledge of the system and supporting infrastructure. Therefore, the most 

likely threat agent is the unintentional threat or a disgruntled employee, former employee, or someone 

else who has worked with or for the organization [12]. 

3.7 Documented Incidents 

As mentioned in Section 3.6, there are three broad categories of ICS incidents including intentional 

attacks, unintentional consequences or collateral damage from worms, viruses or control system failures, 

and unintentional internal security consequences, such as inappropriate testing of operational systems or 

unauthorized system configuration changes. Reported incidents from these categories include the 

following: 

Intentional Attacks 

 Worcester Air Traffic Communications3. In March 1997, a teenager in Worcester, Massachusetts 

disabled part of the public switched telephone network using a dial-up modem connected to the 

system. This knocked out phone service at the control tower, airport security, the airport fire 

department, the weather service, and carriers that use the airport. Also, the tower’s main radio 

transmitter and another transmitter that activates runway lights were shut down, as well as a printer 

that controllers use to monitor flight progress. The attack also knocked out phone service to 600 

homes and businesses in the nearby town of Rutland. 

 

3

 Additional information on the Worcester Air Traffic Communications incident can be found at: 

http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9803/18/juvenile.hacker/index.html 

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 Maroochy Shire Sewage Spill4

. In the spring of 2000, a former employee of an Australian 

organization that develops manufacturing software applied for a job with the local government, but 

was rejected. Over a two-month period, the disgruntled rejected employee reportedly used a radio 

transmitter on as many as 46 occasions to remotely break into the controls of a sewage treatment 

system. He altered electronic data for particular sewerage pumping stations and caused malfunctions 

in their operations, ultimately releasing about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into nearby rivers and 

parks. 

Unintentional Consequences 

 CSX Train Signaling System5. In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus was blamed for shutting 

down train signaling systems throughout the east coast of the U.S. The virus infected the computer 

system at CSX Corp.’s Jacksonville, Florida headquarters, shutting down signaling, dispatching, and 

other systems. According to Amtrak spokesman Dan Stessel, ten Amtrak trains were affected in the 

morning. Trains between Pittsburgh and Florence, South Carolina were halted because of dark 

signals, and one regional Amtrak train from Richmond, Virginia to Washington and New York was 

delayed for more than two hours. Long-distance trains were also delayed between four and six hours. 

 Davis-Besse6

. In August 2003, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed that in January 2003, 

the Microsoft SQL Server worm known as Slammer infected a private computer network at the idled

Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, disabling a safety monitoring system for 

nearly five hours. In addition, the plant’s process computer failed, and it took about six hours for it to 

become available again. Slammer reportedly also affected communications on the control networks 

of at least five other utilities by propagating so quickly that control system traffic was blocked. 

 Northeast Power Blackout7

. In August 2003, failure of the alarm processor in First Energy’s 

SCADA system prevented control room operators from having adequate situational awareness of 

critical operational changes to the electrical grid. Additionally, effective reliability oversight was 

prevented when the state estimator at the Midwest Independent System Operator failed due to 

incomplete information on topology changes, preventing contingency analysis. Several key 345kV 

transmission lines in Northern Ohio trip due to contact with trees. This eventually initiates cascading 

overloads of additional 345 kV and 138 kV lines, leading to an uncontrolled cascading failure of the 

grid. A total of 61,800 MW load was lost as 508 generating units at 265 power plants tripped. 

 Zotob Worm8

. In August 2005, a round of Internet worm infections knocked 13 of 

DaimlerChrysler’s U.S. automobile manufacturing plants offline for almost an hour, stranding 

workers as infected Microsoft Windows systems were patched. Plants in Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, 

Ohio, Delaware, and Michigan were knocked offline. While the worm affected primarily Windows 

2000 systems, it also affected some early versions of Windows XP. Symptoms include the repeated 

 

4

 Additional information on the Maroochy Shire Sewage Spill incident can be found at: 

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/ and 

www.iti.uiuc.edu/events/2005_09_15_Jeff_Dagle.pdf 5

 Additional information on the CSX Train Signaling System incident can found at: 

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/21/tech/main569418.shtml and 

http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=13100807 6

 Additional information on the Davis-Besse incident can found at: 

http://www.taborcommunications.com/hpcwire/hpcwireWWW/03/0905/105866.html and 

http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767 7

 Additional information on the Northeast Power Blackout incident can found at: 

http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf 8

 Additional information on the Zotob Worm incident can found at: http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1849914,00.asp

and http://www.computerwire.com/industries/research/?pid=750E3094-C77B-4E85-AA27-2C1D26D919C7 

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shutdown and rebooting of a computer. Zotob and its variations caused computer outages at heavyequipment maker Caterpillar Inc., aircraft-maker Boeing, and several large U.S. news organizations. 

 Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam Failure9

. In December 2005, the Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam 

suffered a catastrophic failure releasing a billion gallons of water. The failure of the reservoir 

occurred as the reservoir was being filled to capacity or may have possibly been overtopped. The 

current working theory is that the reservoir's berm was overtopped when the routine nightly pumpback operation failed to cease when the reservoir was filled. According to AmerenUE, the gauges at 

the dam read differently than the gauges at the Osage plant at the Lake of the Ozarks, which monitors 

and operates the Taum Sauk plant remotely. The stations are linked together using a network of 

microwave towers, and there are no operators on-site at Taum Sauk. 

 Bellingham, Washington Gasoline Pipeline Failure10. In June 1999, 237,000 gallons of gasoline 

leaked from a 16” pipeline and ignited 1.5 hours later causing 3 deaths, 8 injuries, and extensive 

property damage. The pipeline failure was exacerbated by control systems not able to perform 

control and monitoring functions. “Immediately prior to and during the incident, the SCADA system 

exhibited poor performance that inhibited the pipeline controllers from seeing and reacting to the 

development of an abnormal pipeline operation.” A key recommendation from the NTSB report 

issued October 2002 was to utilize an off-line development and testing system for implementing and 

testing changes to the SCADA database. 

Unintentional Internal Security Consequences

 Vulnerability Scanner Incidents11. While a ping sweep was being performed on an active SCADA 

network that controlled 9-foot robotic arms, it was noticed that one arm became active and swung 

around 180 degrees. The controller for the arm was in standby mode before the ping sweep was 

initiated. In a separate incident, a ping sweep was being performed on an ICS network to identify all 

hosts that were attached to the network, for inventory purposes, and it caused a system controlling the 

creation of integrated circuits in the fabrication plant to hang. This test resulted in the destruction of 

$50,000 worth of wafers. See Section 4.2.6 for additional guidance on ICS vulnerability assessments. 

 Penetration Testing Incident12. A gas utility hired an IT security consulting organization to conduct 

penetration testing on its corporate IT network. The consulting organization carelessly ventured into 

a part of the network that was directly connected to the SCADA system. The penetration test locked 

up the SCADA system and the utility was not able to send gas through its pipelines for four hours. 

The outcome was the loss of service to its customer base for those four hours.

 

9

 Additional information on the Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam Failure incident can found at: 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taum_Sauk_Dam_Failure 10 Additional information on Bellingham, Washington Gasoline Pipeline Failure incident can found at 

www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2002/PAR0202.pdf 11 Additional information on vulnerability scanner incidents can found at: 

http://www.sandia.gov/scada/documents/sand_2005_2846p.pdf 12 Additional information on penetration testing incidents can found at: 

http://www.sandia.gov/scada/documents/sand_2005_2846p.pdf

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4. ICS Security Program Development and Deployment 

As described in Section 3.1, there are critical operational differences between ICS and IT systems that 

influence how specific security controls should be applied to the ICS. Accordingly, organizations should 

develop and deploy an ICS security program.13 ICS security plans and programs should be consistent 

with and integrated with existing IT security experience, programs, and practices, but must be tailored to 

the specific requirements and characteristics of ICS technologies and environments. Organizations 

should review and update their ICS security plans and programs regularly to reflect changes in 

technologies, operations, standards, and regulations, as well as the security needs of specific facilities.14

This section provides an overview of the development and deployment of an ICS security program. 

Section 4.1 describes how to establish a business case for an ICS security program, including suggested 

content for the business case. Section 4.2 discusses the development of a comprehensive ICS security 

program and provides information on several major steps in deploying the program. Information on 

specific security controls that might be implemented as part of the security program is given in Sections 5

and 6 of the document. 

4.1 Business Case for Security 

The first step to implementing a cyber security program for ICS is to develop a compelling business case 

for the unique needs of the organization. The business case should capture the business concerns of 

senior management while being founded in the experience of those who are already dealing with many of 

the same risks. The business case provides the business impact and financial justification for creating an 

integrated cyber security program. It should include detailed information about the following: 

 Benefits, including improved control system reliability and availability, of creating an integrated 

security program 

 Prioritized potential costs and damage scenarios if a cyber security program for the ICS is not put into 

place 

 High-level overview of the process required to implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain, and 

improve the cyber security program 

 Costs and resources required to develop, implement and maintain the security program. 

Before presenting the business case to management, there should be a well-thought-out and developed 

security implementation plan. For example, simply requesting a firewall is insufficient for numerous 

reasons. 

4.1.1 Benefits 

Responsible risk management policy mandates that the threat to the ICS should be measured and 

monitored to protect the interests of employees, the public, shareholders, customers, vendors, and the 

larger society. Risk analysis enables costs and benefits to be weighed so that informed decisions can be 

 

13 The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation (ISA) SP99 Committee 

[http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&CommitteeID=6821] is currently developing a standard that 

addresses the development and deployment of an ICS security program in detail. 14 ISA-TR99.00.01, ISA-TR99.00.02, CIDX Guide for Cybersecurity, and other vendor documents provide specific 

information on ICS facilities that supplements NIST Special Publication guidance. These documents were used as reference 

material in the development of this section. 

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made on protective actions. In addition to reducing risks, exercising due-diligence and displaying 

responsibility also helps organizations by: 

 Improving control system reliability and availability 

 Improving employee morale, loyalty, and retention 

 Reducing community concerns 

 Increasing investor confidence 

 Reducing legal liabilities 

 Enhancing the corporate image and reputation 

 Helping with insurance coverage 

 Improving investor and banking relations. 

A strong safety and cyber security management program is fundamental to a sustainable business model. 

4.1.2 Potential Consequences 

The importance of secure systems should be further emphasized as business reliance on interconnectivity 

increases. DoS attacks and malware (e.g., worms, viruses) have become all too common and have 

already impacted ICS. In addition, a cyber breach in some sectors can have significant physical impacts. 

The major categories of impacts are as follows: 

 Physical Impacts. Physical impacts encompass the set of direct consequences of ICS failure. The 

potential effects of paramount importance include personal injury and loss of life. Other effects 

include the loss of property (including data) and damage to the environment. 

 Economic Impacts. Economic impacts are a second-order effect from physical impacts ensuing 

from an ICS incident. Physical impacts could result in repercussions to system operations, which in 

turn inflict a greater economic loss on the facility or organization. On a larger scale, these effects 

could negatively impact the local, regional, national, or possibly global economy. 

 Social Impacts. Another second-order effect, the consequence from the loss of national or public 

confidence in an organization, is many times overlooked. It is, however, a very real target and one 

that could be accomplished through an ICS incident. 

A list of potential consequences of an ICS incident [29] is listed below. Note that items in this list are not 

independent. In fact, one can lead to another. For example, release of hazardous material can lead to 

injury or death. 

 Impact on national security—facilitate an act of terrorism 

 Reduction or loss of production at one site or multiple sites simultaneously 

 Injury or death of employees 

 Injury or death of persons in the community 

 Damage to equipment 

 Release, diversion, or theft of hazardous materials 

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 Environmental damage 

 Violation of regulatory requirements 

 Product contamination 

 Criminal or civil legal liabilities 

 Loss of proprietary or confidential information 

 Loss of brand image or customer confidence. 

Undesirable incidents of any sort detract from the value of an organization, but safety and security 

incidents can have longer-term negative impacts than other types of incidents on all stakeholders—

employees, shareholders, customers, and the communities in which an organization operates. 

4.1.3 Key Components of the Business Case 

There are four key components of the business case: prioritized threats, prioritized business 

consequences, prioritized business benefits, and estimated annual business impact. 

4.1.3.1 Prioritized Threats 

The list of potential threats provided in Section 3.2 needs to be refined to those threats that the 

organization believes could reasonably impact the facility to be secured. For instance, a food and 

beverage organization might not find terrorism a credible threat but might be more concerned with 

viruses, worms, and disgruntled employees. 

4.1.3.2 Prioritized Business Consequences 

The list of potential business consequences provided in Section 4.1.2 needs to be distilled to the particular 

business consequences that senior management will find the most compelling. For instance, a food and 

beverage organization that handles no toxic or flammable materials and typically processes its product at 

relatively low temperatures and pressures might not be concerned about equipment damage or 

environmental impact, but might be more concerned about loss of production availability and degradation 

of product quality. Regulatory compliance might also be a concern. Individuals should not minimize the 

potential consequences to avoid taking proper security risk mitigation actions. 

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires corporate leaders to sign off on compliance with information accuracy 

and protection of corporate information.15 Also, the demonstration of due diligence is required by most 

internal and external audit firms to satisfy shareholders and other organization stakeholders. By 

implementing a comprehensive cyber security program, management is exercising due diligence. 

4.1.3.3 Prioritized Business Benefits 

Improved control systems security and control system specific security policies can potentially improve 

control system reliability and availability. This also includes minimizing unintentional control system 

cyber security impacts from inappropriate testing, policies, and misconfigured systems. 

 

15 More information on the act, and a copy of the act itself, can be found at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. 

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4.1.3.4 Estimated Annual Business Impact 

The highest priority items shown in the list of prioritized business consequences should be scrutinized to 

obtain an estimate of the annual business impact, preferably but not necessarily in financial terms. For 

the food and beverage organization example, the organization may have experienced a virus incident 

within its internal network that the information security staff estimated as resulting in a specific financial 

cost. Since the internal network and the control network are interconnected, it is conceivable that a virus 

originating from the control network could cause the same amount of business impact. NIST SP 800-30 

[19] and ISO 17799 provide additional guidance on business impact. 

4.1.4 Resources for Building Business Case 

The main resources for information to help form a business case are external resources in trade and 

standards organizations, consulting firms and internal resources in related risk management programs or 

engineering and operations. External resources in trade and standards organizations can often provide 

useful tips as to what factors most strongly influenced their management to support their efforts and what 

resources within their organizations proved most helpful. For different industries, these factors may be 

different, but there may be similarities in the roles that other risk management specialists can play. 

Appendix C provides a list and short description of some of the current activities in ICS security. 

Internal resources in related risk management efforts (e.g., information security, health, safety and 

environmental risk, physical security, business continuity) can provide tremendous assistance based on 

their experience with related incidents in the organization. This information is helpful from the 

standpoint of prioritizing threats and estimating business impact. These resources can also provide 

insight into which managers are focused on dealing with which risks and, thus, which managers might be 

the most appropriate or receptive to serving as a champion. Internal resources in control systems 

engineering and operations can provide insight into the details of how control systems are deployed 

within the organization, such as the following: 

 How networks are typically segregated 

 What remote access connections are generally employed 

 How high-risk combustion systems or safety instrumented systems are typically designed 

 What security countermeasures are commonly used 

4.1.5 Presenting the Business Case to Leadership 

The business leadership will be responsible for approving and driving cyber security policies, assigning 

security roles, and implementing the cyber security program across the organization. Funding for the 

entire program can usually be done in phases. While some funding may be required to start the cyber 

security activity, additional funding can be obtained later as the security vulnerabilities and needs of the 

program are better understood and additional strategies are developed. Additionally, the costs (both direct 

and indirect) should be considered for retrofitting the ICS for security vs. addressing security to begin 

with. 

Often, a good approach to obtain management buy-in to address the problem is to ground the business 

case in a successful actual third-party example. The business case should present to management that the 

other organization had the same problem and then present that they found a solution and how they solved 

it. This will often prompt management to ask what the solution is and how it might be applicable to their 

organization. 

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4.2 Developing a Comprehensive Security Program 

Effectively integrating security into an ICS requires defining and executing a comprehensive program that 

addresses all aspects of security, ranging from identifying objectives to day-to-day operation and ongoing 

auditing for compliance and improvement. This section describes the basic process for developing a 

security program, including the following: 

 Obtain senior management buy-in 

 Build and train a cross-functional team 

 Define charter and scope 

 Define specific ICS policies and procedures 

 Define and inventory ICS assets 

 Perform a risk and vulnerability assessment 

 Define the mitigation controls 

 Provide training and raise security awareness for ICS staff. 

More detailed information on the various steps is provided in Part 2 of the ISA SP99 Standard and ISA 

TR99.00.02: Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and Control Systems Environment. 

The commitment to a security program begins at the top. Senior management must demonstrate a clear 

commitment to cyber security. Cyber security is a business responsibility shared by all members of the 

enterprise and especially by leading members of the business, process, and management teams. Cyber 

security programs with adequate funding and visible, top-level support from organization leaders are 

more likely to achieve compliance, function more smoothly, and have greater success than programs that 

do not have that support. 

Whenever a new system is being designed and installed, it is imperative to take the time to address 

security throughout the lifecycle, from architecture to procurement to installation to maintenance to 

decommissioning. There are serious risks in deploying systems to production based on the assumption 

that they will be secured later. If there is insufficient time and resources to secure the system properly 

before deployment, it is unlikely that there will be sufficient time and resources later to address security. 

4.2.1 Senior Management Buy-in 

It is critical for the success of the ICS security program that senior management [30] buy into and 

participate in the ICS security program. Senior management needs to be at a level that encompasses both 

IT and ICS operations. 

4.2.2 Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team 

It is essential for a cross-functional cyber security team to share their varied domain knowledge and 

experience to evaluate and mitigate risk in the ICS. At a minimum, the cyber security team should consist 

of a member of the organization’s IT staff, a control engineer, a control system operator, security subject 

matter experts, and a member of the management staff. Security knowledge and skills should include 

network architecture and design, security processes and practices, and secure infrastructure design and 

operation. For continuity and completeness, the cyber security team should also include the control 

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system vendor and/or system integrator. The cyber security team should report directly to site 

management (e.g., facility superintendent) or the company’s CIO/CSO, who in turn, accepts complete 

responsibility and accountability for the cyber security of the ICS. Management level accountability will 

help ensure an ongoing commitment to cyber security efforts. 

While the control engineers will play a large role in securing the ICS, they will not be able to do so 

without collaboration and support from both the IT department and management. IT often has years of 

security experience, much of which is applicable to ICS. As the cultures of control engineering and IT 

are often significantly different and unknown to the other party, significant cross-cultural understanding 

and integration will be essential for the development of a collaborative security design and operation. 

4.2.3 Define Charter and Scope 

The cyber security team should establish the corporate policy that defines the guiding charter of the 

security organization and the roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities of system owners and users. The 

team should decide upon and document the objective of the security program, the business organizations 

affected, all the computer systems and networks involved, the budget and resources required, and the 

division of responsibilities. The scope can also address business, training, audit, legal, and regulatory 

requirements, as well as timetables and responsibilities. 

There may already be a program in place or being developed for the organization’s IT business systems. 

The team should identify which existing practices to leverage and which practices are specific to the 

control system. In the long run, it will be easier to get positive results if the team can share resources with 

others in the organization that have similar objectives. 

4.2.4 Define ICS Specific Security Policies and Procedures 

Policies and procedures are at the root of every successful security program and wherever possible, ICS 

specific security polices and procedures should be integrated with existing operational/management 

policies. The more transparent these policies are with all other procedures, the more likely they will be 

implemented at all levels. Policies and procedures help to ensure that security protection is both 

consistent and current to protect against evolving threats, and also help to educate. After the risks for the 

various systems are clearly understood, the cyber security team should examine existing security policies 

to see if they adequately address the risks to the ICS. If needed, existing policies should be revised or 

new policies created to address desktop and business systems as well as the ICS. Few organizations have 

the resources to harden the ICS against all possible threats; management should guide the development of 

the security policies that will set the security priorities and goals for the organization so that the risks 

posed by the threats are mitigated sufficiently. Procedures that support the policies need to be developed 

so that the policies are implemented fully and properly for the ICS. Security procedures should be 

documented, tested, and updated periodically in response to policy and technology changes. Consider 

developing ICS security policies and procedures based on the Homeland Security Advisory System 

Threat Level, deploying increasingly heightened security postures as the Threat Level increases. 

4.2.5 Define and Inventory ICS Systems and Networks Assets 

The cyber security team should identify the applications and computer systems within the ICS, as well as 

the networks within and interfacing to the ICS. The focus should be on systems rather than just devices, 

and should include PLCs, DCS, SCADA, and instrument-based systems that use a monitoring device such 

as an HMI. Assets that use a routable protocol or are dial-up accessible should be documented. As the 

team identifies the ICS assets, the information should be recorded in a standard format. The team should 

review and update the ICS asset list annually. 

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There are several commercial enterprise inventory tools that can identify and document all hardware and 

software resident on a network. Care must be taken before using these tools to identify ICS assets; teams 

should first conduct an assessment of how these tools work and what impact they might have on the 

connected control equipment. Tool evaluation may include testing in similar, non-production control 

system environments to ensure that the tools do not adversely impact the production systems. Impact 

could be due to the nature of the information or the volume of network traffic. While this impact may be 

acceptable in IT systems, it is not acceptable in an ICS. Additional information and guidance on scanning 

and inventory tools is provided in Section 4.2.6. 

4.2.6 Perform Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 

Because every organization has a limited set of resources, organizations should perform a risk assessment 

for the ICS systems and use its results to prioritize the ICS systems based on the potential impact to each 

system. The organization should then perform a detailed vulnerability assessment for the highest-priority 

systems and assessments for lower-priority systems as deemed prudent/as resources allow. The 

vulnerability assessment will help identify any weaknesses that may be present in the systems that could 

allow the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems and data to be adversely affected, along with 

the related cyber security risks and mitigation approaches to reduce the risks. 

Because of the potential for disruption to the devices, vulnerability scanners should be used with caution 

on production ICS networks [31]. A major concern is an accidental DoS to devices and networks. 

Vulnerability scanners often attempt to verify vulnerabilities by extensively probing and conducting a 

representative set of attacks against devices and networks. ICS were designed and built to control and 

automate real-world processes or equipment. Given the wrong instructions, they could perform incorrect 

actions, causing product loss, equipment damage, injury, or even deaths. 

The following examples [32] demonstrate the danger: 

 While a ping sweep was being performed on an active SCADA network that controlled 9-foot robotic 

arms, it was noticed that one arm became active and swung around 180 degrees. The controller for 

the arm was in standby mode before the ping sweep was initiated. 

 On an ICS network, a ping sweep was being performed to identify all hosts that were attached to the 

network, for inventory purposes, and it caused a system controlling the creation of integrated circuits 

in the fabrication plant to lock-up. This test resulted in the destruction of $50,000 worth of wafers. 

 A gas utility hired an IT security consulting organization to conduct penetration testing on its 

corporate IT network. The consulting organization carelessly ventured into a part of the network that 

was directly connected to the SCADA system. The penetration test locked up the SCADA system 

and the utility was not able to send gas through its pipelines for four hours. The outcome was the loss 

of service to its customer base for those four hours. 

Identifying the vulnerabilities within an ICS requires a different approach from that of a typical IT 

system. In most cases, devices on an IT system can be rebooted, restored, or replaced with little 

interruption of service to its customers. An ICS controls a physical process and therefore has real-world 

consequences associated with its actions. Some actions are time-critical, while others have a more 

relaxed timeframe. 

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When performing an inventory or vulnerability scan on a system or network segment, there are several 

steps that are generally performed. Each step is listed in Table 4-1, along with the usual IT action and 

alternate suggested actions that should be taken instead for an ICS, making the outcomes of any testing 

safer. These techniques may make the work somewhat more difficult, but should help to mitigate 

problems associated with active scanning. 

Table 4-1. Suggested Actions for ICS Vulnerability Assessments 

To Be Identified Usual IT Action Suggested ICS Actions 

Hosts, nodes, and 

networks 

Ping sweep (e.g., nmap) • Examine router configuration files or route tables 

• Perform physical verification (chasing wires) 

• Conduct passive network listening or use intrusion 

detection (e.g., snort) on the network 

• Specify a subset of IP addresses to be programmatically 

scanned 

Services Port scan (e.g., nmap) • Do local port verification (e.g., netstat) 

• Scan a duplicate, development, or test system on a nonproduction network 

Vulnerabilities 

within a service 

Vulnerability scan (e.g., 

nessus) 

• Perform local banner grabbing with version lookup in 

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) 

• Scan a duplicate, development, or test system on a nonproduction network 

The commonality among the suggested ICS actions is that they do not generate traffic on production 

operational networks or against production systems. These less intrusive methods can gather most, if not 

all, of the same information as more active methods, without the risk of causing a failure by testing. 

Another factor to consider when choosing ICS testing methods is that these systems have little spare 

capacity as compared to IT systems. ICS systems have much greater longevity than their IT counterparts, 

so their hardware is often well behind the state-of-the-art and can be easily overtaxed. Also, ICS systems 

usually run at slow speeds on legacy networks that can be overwhelmed by the volume of traffic 

generated during active testing. 

When any assessment of an ICS is being performed, ICS personnel must be aware that testing is 

occurring, and be prepared to immediately address any problems that arise. If manual control of the 

system is possible, personnel capable of performing manual control should be present during the security 

testing. Additionally, security auditors need to understand the ICS under test, the risk involved with the 

test, and the consequences associated with unintentional stimulus or DoS to the ICS. 

4.2.7 Define the Mitigation Controls 

Organizations should analyze the detailed risk assessment, identify the cost of mitigation for each risk, 

compare the cost with the risk of occurrence, and select those mitigation controls where cost is less than 

the potential risk. Because it is usually impractical or impossible to eliminate all risks, organizations 

should focus on mitigating risk with the greatest potential impact to the ICS and the process. 

The controls to mitigate a specific risk may vary among types of systems. For example, user 

authentication controls might be different for ICS than for corporate payroll systems and e-commerce 

systems. Organizations should document and communicate the selected controls, along with the 

procedures for using the controls. As the team identifies mitigation strategies, risks may be identified that 

can be mitigated by “quick fix” solutions—low-cost, high-value practices that can significantly reduce 

risk. Examples of these solutions are restricting Internet access and eliminating e-mail access on operator 

control stations or consoles. Organizations should identify, evaluate, and implement suitable quick fix 

solutions as soon as possible to reduce security risks and achieve rapid benefits. The Department of 

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Energy (DOE) has a “21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks” [33] document that 

could be used as a starting point to outline specific actions to increase the security of SCADA systems 

and other ICS. 

4.2.8 Provide Training and Raise Security Awareness 

Security awareness is a critical part of ICS incident prevention, particularly when it comes to social 

engineering threats. Social engineering is a technique used to manipulate individuals into giving away 

private information, such as passwords. This information can then be used to compromise otherwise 

secure systems. 

Implementing an ICS security program may bring changes to the way in which personnel access 

computer programs, applications, and the computer desktop itself. Organizations should design effective 

training and awareness programs and communication vehicles to help employees understand why new 

access and control methods are required, ideas they can use to reduce risks, and the impact on the 

organization if control methods are not incorporated. Training programs also demonstrate management’s 

commitment to, and the value of, a cyber security program. Feedback from staff exposed to this type of 

training can be a valuable source of input for refining the charter and scope of the security program. 

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5. Network Architecture 

When designing a network architecture for an ICS deployment, it is usually recommended to separate the 

ICS network from the corporate network. The nature of network traffic on these two networks is 

different: Internet access, FTP, e-mail, and remote access will typically be permitted on the corporate 

network but should not be allowed on the ICS network. Rigorous change control procedures for network 

equipment, configuration, and software changes may not be in place on the corporate network. If ICS 

network traffic is carried on the corporate network, it could be intercepted or be subjected to a DoS attack. 

By having separate networks, security and performance problems on the corporate network should not be 

able to affect the ICS network. 

Practical considerations often mean that a connection is required between the ICS and corporate 

networks. This connection is a significant security risk and careful consideration should be given to the 

design and implementation. If the networks must be connected, it is strongly recommended that only 

minimal (single if possible) connections be allowed and that the connection is through a firewall and a 

DMZ. A DMZ is a separate network segment that connects directly to the firewall. Servers containing 

the data from the ICS that needs to be accessed from the corporate network are put on this network 

segment. Only these systems should be accessible from the corporate network. With any external 

connections, the minimum access should be permitted through the firewall, including opening only the 

ports required for specific communication. The following sections describe the access required for 

specific node types. 

5.1 Firewalls 

Network firewalls are devices or systems that control the flow of network traffic between networks 

employing differing security postures. In most modern applications, firewalls and firewall environments 

are discussed in the context of Internet connectivity and the TCP/IP protocol suite. However, firewalls 

have applicability in network environments that do not include or require Internet connectivity. For 

example, many corporate networks employ firewalls to restrict connectivity to and from internal networks 

servicing more sensitive functions, such as the accounting or personnel departments. By employing 

firewalls to control connectivity to these areas, an organization can prevent unauthorized access to the 

respective systems and resources within the more sensitive areas. There are three general classes of 

firewalls: 

 Packet Filtering Firewalls. The most basic type of firewall is called a packet filter. Packet filter 

firewalls are essentially routing devices that include access control functionality for system addresses 

and communication sessions. The access control is governed by a set of directives collectively 

referred to as a rule set. In their most basic form, packet filters operate at layer 3 (network) of the 

Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. This type of firewall checks basic information in each 

packet, such as IP addresses, against a set of criteria before forwarding the packet. Depending on the 

packet and the criteria, the firewall can drop the packet, forward it, or send a message to the 

originator. The advantages of packet filtering firewalls include low cost and low impact on network 

performance, usually because only one or a few header fields in the packet are examined. 

 Stateful Inspection Firewalls. Stateful inspection firewalls are packet filters that incorporate added 

awareness of the OSI model data at layer 4. Stateful inspection firewalls filter packets at the network 

layer, determine whether session packets are legitimate, and evaluate the contents of packets at the 

transport layer (e.g., TCP, UDP) as well. Stateful inspection keeps track of active sessions and uses 

that information to determine if packets should be forwarded or blocked. It offers a high level of 

security and good performance, but it may be more expensive and complex to administer. Additional 

rule sets for ICS applications may be required. 

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 Application-Proxy Gateway Firewalls. This class of firewalls examines packets at the application 

layer and filters traffic based on specific application rules, such as specified applications (e.g., 

browsers) or protocols (e.g., FTP). It offers a high level of security, but could have overhead and 

delay impacts on network performance, which can be unacceptable in an ICS environment. 

NIST SP 800-41, Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy, provides general guidance for the 

selection of firewalls and the firewall policies. 

In an ICS environment, firewalls are most often deployed between the ICS network and the corporate 

network [34]. Properly configured, they can greatly restrict undesired access to and from control system 

host computers and controllers, thereby improving security. They can also potentially improve a control 

network’s responsiveness by removing non-essential traffic from the network. When designed, 

configured, and maintained properly, dedicated hardware firewalls can contribute significantly to 

increasing the security of today’s ICS environments. 

Firewalls provide several tools to enforce a security policy that cannot be accomplished locally on the 

current set of process control devices available in the market, including the ability to: 

 Block all communications with the exception of specifically enabled communications between 

devices on the unprotected LAN and protected ICS networks. Blocking is based on source and 

destination IP address pairs, services, and ports. Blocking can occur on both inbound and outbound 

packets, which is helpful in limiting high-risk communications such as e-mail. 

 Enforce secure authentication of all users seeking to gain access to the ICS network. There is 

flexibility to employ varying protection levels of authentication methods including simple passwords, 

complex passwords, two-factor authentication technologies, tokens, biometrics and smart cards. 

Select the particular method based upon the vulnerability of the ICS network to be protected, rather 

than using the method that is available at the device level. 

 Enforce destination authorization. Users can be restricted and allowed to reach only the nodes on the 

control network necessary for their job function. This reduces the potential of users intentionally or 

accidentally gaining access to and control of devices for which they are not authorized, but adds to 

the complexity for on-the-job-training or cross-training employees. 

 Record information flow for traffic monitoring, analysis, and intrusion detection. 

 Permit the ICS to implement operational policies appropriate to the ICS but that might not be 

appropriate in an IT network, such as prohibition of less secure communications like email, and 

permitted use of easy-to-remember usernames and group passwords. 

 Be designed with documented and minimal (single if possible) connections that permit the ICS 

network to be severed from the corporate network, should that decision be made, in times of serious 

cyber incidents. 

Other possible deployments include using either host-based firewalls or small standalone hardware 

firewalls in front of, or running on, individual control devices. Using firewalls on an individual device 

basis can create significant management overhead, especially in change management of firewall 

configurations. 

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There are several issues that must be addressed when deploying firewalls in ICS environments, 

particularly the following: 

 The possible addition of delay to control system communications 

 The lack of experience in the design of rule sets suitable for industrial applications. Firewalls used to 

protect control systems should be configured so they do not permit either incoming or outgoing traffic 

by default. The default configuration should only be modified when it is necessary to permit 

connections to or from trusted systems. 

Hardware firewalls require ongoing support, maintenance, and backup. Rule sets need to be reviewed to 

make sure that they are providing adequate protection in light of ever-changing security threats. System 

capabilities, such as available disk space, should be monitored to make sure that the firewall is performing 

its data collection tasks and can be depended upon in the event of a security violation. Real-time 

monitoring of firewalls and other security sensors is required to rapidly detect and initiate response to 

cyber incidents. 

5.2 Logically Separated Control Network 

The ICS network should, at a minimum, be logically separated from the corporate network on physically 

separate network devices. When enterprise connectivity is required: 

 There should be documented and minimal (single if possible) access points between the ICS network 

and the corporate network. Redundant (i.e., backup) access points, if present, must be documented. 

 A stateful firewall between the ICS network and corporate network should be configured to deny all 

traffic except that which is explicitly authorized. 

 The firewall rules should at a minimum provide source and destination filtering (i.e., filter on media 

access control [MAC] address), in addition to TCP and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port filtering 

and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) type and code filtering. 

An acceptable approach to enabling communication between an ICS network and a corporate network is 

to implement an intermediate DMZ network. The DMZ should be connected to the firewall such that 

specific (restricted) communication may occur between only the corporate network and the DMZ, and the 

ICS network and the DMZ. The corporate network and the ICS network should not communicate directly 

with each other. This approach is described in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5. Additional security may be 

obtained by implementing a VPN between the ICS and external networks. Sections 5.8.2 and 6.3.4.2

provide additional information on the use of VPNs. 

5.3 Network Segregation 

ICS networks and corporate networks can be segregated to enhance cyber security using different 

architectures. This section describes several possible architectures and explains the advantages and 

disadvantages of each. Please note that the intent of the diagrams in Section 5.3 is to show the placement 

of firewalls to segregate the network. Not all devices that would be typically found on the control 

network or corporate network are shown. Section 5.4 provides guidance on a recommended defense-indepth architecture. 

5.3.1 Dual-Homed Computer/Dual Network Interface Cards (NIC) 

Dual-homed computers can pass network traffic from one network to another. A computer without 

proper security controls could pose additional threats. To prevent this, no systems other than firewalls 

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should be configured as dual-homed to span both the control and corporate networks. All connections 

between the control network and the corporate network should be through a firewall. 

5.3.2 Firewall between Corporate Network and Control Network 

By introducing a simple two-port firewall between the corporate and control networks, as shown in Figure 

5-1, a significant security improvement can be achieved. Properly configured, a firewall significantly 

reduces the chance of a successful external attack on the control network. 

Unfortunately, two issues still remain with this design. First, if the data historian resides on the corporate 

network, the firewall must allow the data historian to communicate with the control devices on the control 

network. A packet originating from a malicious or incorrectly configured host on the corporate network 

(appearing to be the data historian) would be forwarded to individual PLCs/DCS. 

Figure 5-1. Firewall between Corporate Network and Control Network 

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If the data historian resides on the control network, a firewall rule must exist that allows all hosts from the 

enterprise to communicate with the historian. Typically, this communication occurs at the application 

layer as Structured Query Language (SQL) or HTTP requests. Flaws in the historian’s application layer 

code could result in a compromised historian. Once the historian is compromised, the remaining nodes 

on the control network are vulnerable to a worm propagating or an interactive attack. 

Another issue with having a simple firewall between the networks is that spoofed packets can be 

constructed that can affect the control network, potentially permitting covert data to be tunneled in 

allowed protocols. For example, if HTTP packets are allowed through the firewall, then Trojan horse 

software accidentally introduced on an HMI or control network laptop could be controlled by a remote 

entity and send data (such as captured passwords) to that entity, disguised as legitimate traffic. 

In summary, while this architecture is a significant improvement over a non-segregated network, it 

requires the use of firewall rules that allow direct communications between the corporate network and 

control network devices. This can result in possible security breaches if not very carefully designed and 

monitored [35]. 

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5.3.3 Firewall and Router between Corporate Network and Control Network 

A slightly more sophisticated design, shown in Figure 5-2, is the use of a router/firewall combination. 

The router sits in front of the firewall and offers basic packet filtering services, while the firewall handles 

the more complex issues using either stateful inspection or proxy techniques. This type of design is very 

popular in Internet-facing firewalls because it allows the faster router to handle the bulk of the incoming 

packets, especially in the case of DoS attacks, and reduces the load on the firewall. It also offers 

improved defense-in-depth since there are two different devices an adversary must bypass [35]. 

Figure 5-2. Firewall and Router between Corporate Network and Control Network 

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5.3.4 Firewall with DMZ between Corporate Network and Control Network 

A significant improvement is the use of firewalls with the ability to establish a DMZ between the 

corporate and control networks. Each DMZ holds one or more critical components, such as the data 

historian, the wireless access point, or remote and third party access systems. In effect, the use of a 

DMZ-capable firewall allows the creation of an intermediate network. 

Creating a DMZ requires that the firewall offer three or more interfaces, rather than the typical public and 

private interfaces. One of the interfaces is connected to the corporate network, the second to the control 

network, and the remaining interfaces to the shared or insecure devices such as the data historian server or 

wireless access points on the DMZ network. Figure 5-3 provides an example of this architecture. 

Figure 5-3. Firewall with DMZ between Corporate Network and Control Network 

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By placing corporate-accessible components in the DMZ, no direct communication paths are required 

from the corporate network to the control network; each path effectively ends in the DMZ. Most firewalls 

can allow for multiple DMZs, and can specify what type of traffic may be forwarded between zones. As 

Figure 5-3 shows, the firewall can block arbitrary packets from the corporate network from entering the 

control network, and can also regulate traffic from the other network zones including the control network. 

With well-planned rule sets, a clear separation can be maintained between the control network and other 

networks, with little or no traffic passing directly between the corporate and control networks. 

If a patch management server, an antivirus server, or other security server is to be used for the control 

network, it should be located directly on the DMZ. Both functions could reside on a single server. 

Having patch management and antivirus management dedicated to the control network allows for 

controlled and secure updates that can be tailored for the unique needs of the ICS environment. It may 

also be helpful if the antivirus product chosen for ICS protection is not the same as the antivirus product 

used for the corporate network. For example, if a malware incident occurs and one antivirus product 

cannot detect or stop the malware, it is somewhat likely that another product may have that capability. 

The primary security risk in this type of architecture is that if a computer in the DMZ is compromised, 

then it can be used to launch an attack against the control network via application traffic permitted from 

the DMZ to the control network. This risk can be greatly reduced if a concerted effort is made to harden 

and actively patch the servers in the DMZ and if the firewall rule set permits only connections between 

the control network and DMZ that are initiated by control network devices. Other concerns with this 

architecture are the added complexity and the potential increased cost of firewalls with several ports. For 

more critical systems, however, the improved security should more than offset these disadvantages [35]. 

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5.3.5 Paired Firewalls between Corporate Network and Control Network 

A variation on the firewall with DMZ solution is to use a pair of firewalls positioned between the 

corporate and ICS networks, as shown in Figure 5-4. Common servers such as the data historian are 

situated between the firewalls in a DMZ-like network zone sometimes referred to as a Manufacturing 

Execution System (MES) layer. As in the architectures described previously, the first firewall blocks 

arbitrary packets from proceeding to the control network or the shared historians. The second firewall 

can prevent unwanted traffic from a compromised server from entering the control network, and prevent 

control network traffic from impacting the shared servers. 

Figure 5-4. Paired Firewalls between Corporate Network and Control Network 

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If firewalls from two different manufacturers are used, then this solution may offer an advantage. It also 

allows the control group and the IT group to have clearly separated device responsibility since each can 

manage a firewall on its own, if the decision is made within the organization to do so. The primary 

disadvantage with two-firewall architectures is the increased cost and management complexity. For 

environments with stringent security requirements or the need for clear management separation, this 

architecture has some strong advantages. 

5.3.6 Network Segregation Summary 

In summary, non-firewall-based solutions will generally not provide suitable isolation between control 

networks and corporate networks. The two-zone solutions (no DMZ) are marginally acceptable but 

should be only be deployed with extreme care. The most secure, manageable, and scalable control 

network and corporate network segregation architectures are typically based on a system with at least 

three zones, incorporating one or more DMZs. 

5.4 Recommended Defense-in-Depth Architecture 

A single security product, technology or solution cannot adequately protect an ICS by itself. A multiple 

layer strategy involving two (or more) different overlapping security mechanisms, a technique also known 

as defense-in-depth, is desired so that the impact of a failure in any one mechanism is minimized. A 

defense-in-depth architecture strategy includes the use of firewalls, the creation of demilitarized zones, 

intrusion detection capabilities along with effective security policies, training programs and incident 

response mechanisms. In addition, an effective defense-in-depth strategy requires a thorough 

understanding of possible attack vectors on an ICS. These include: 

 Backdoors and holes in network perimeter 

 Vulnerabilities in common protocols 

 Attacks on field devices 

 Database attacks 

 Communications hijacking and ‘man-in-the-middle’ attacks 

Figure 5-5 shows an ICS defense-in-depth architecture strategy that has been developed by the DHS 

Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) Recommended Practices committee16 as described in the 

Control Systems Cyber Security: Defense in Depth Strategies [36] document. Additional supporting 

documents that cover specific issues and associated mitigations are also included on the site. This site will 

continue to evolve and grow as new recommended practices and related information are added. 

The Control Systems Cyber Security: Defense in Depth Strategies document provides guidance and 

direction for developing defense-in-depth architecture strategies for organizations that use control system 

networks while maintaining a multi-tier information architecture that requires: 

 Maintenance of various field devices, telemetry collection, and/or industrial-level process systems 

 Access to facilities via remote data link or modem 

 Public facing services for customer or corporate operations 

 

16 Information on the CSSP Recommended Practices is located at http://csrp.inl.gov/. 

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This strategy includes firewalls, the use of demilitarized zones and intrusion detection capabilities 

throughout the ICS architecture. The use of several demilitarized zones in Figure 5-5 provides the added 

capability to separate functionalities and access privileges and has proved to be very effective in 

protecting large architectures comprised of networks with different operational mandates. Intrusion 

detection deployments apply different rule-sets and signatures unique to each domain being monitored. 

Figure 5-5. CSSP Recommended Defense-In-Depth Architecture 

5.5 General Firewall Policies for ICS 

Once the defense-in-depth architecture is in place, the work of determining exactly what traffic should be 

allowed through the firewalls begins. Configuring the firewalls to deny all except for the traffic 

absolutely required for business needs is every organization’s basic premise, but the reality is much more 

difficult. Exactly what does “absolutely required for business” mean and what are the security impacts of 

allowing that traffic through? For example, many organizations considered allowing SQL traffic through 

the firewall as required for business for many data historian servers. Unfortunately, SQL was also the 

vector for the Slammer worm. Many important protocols used in the industrial world, such as HTTP, 

FTP, OPC/DCOM, EtherNet/IP, and MODBUS/TCP, have significant security vulnerabilities. 

The remaining material in this section summarizes some of the key points from the CPNI Good Practice 

Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process Control Networks [35] document. 

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When installing a single two-port firewall without a DMZ for shared servers (i.e., the architecture 

described in Section 5.3.2), particular care needs to be taken with the rule design. At a minimum, all rules 

should be stateful rules that are both IP address and port (application) specific. The address portion of the 

rules should restrict incoming traffic to a very small set of shared devices (e.g., the data historian) on the 

control network from a controlled set of addresses on the corporate network. Allowing any IP addresses 

on the corporate network to access servers inside the control network is not recommended. In addition, 

the allowed ports should be carefully restricted to relatively secure protocols such as Hypertext Transfer 

Protocol Secure (HTTPS). Allowing HTTP, FTP, or other unsecured protocols to cross the firewall is a 

security risk due to the potential for traffic sniffing and modification. Rules should be added to deny 

inbound communication with the control network. Rules should only allow devices internal to the control 

network the ability to establish connections outside the control network. 

On the other hand, if the DMZ architecture is being used, then it is possible to configure the system so 

that no traffic will go directly between the corporate network and the control network. With a few special 

exceptions (noted below), all traffic from either side can terminate at the servers in the DMZ. This allows 

more flexibility in the protocols allowed through the firewall. For example, MODBUS/TCP might be 

used to communicate from the PLCs to the data historian, while HTTP might be used for communication 

between the historian and enterprise clients. Both protocols are inherently insecure, yet in this case they 

can be used safely because neither actually crosses between the two networks. An extension to this 

concept is the idea of using “disjoint” protocols in all control network to corporate network 

communications. That is, if a protocol is allowed between the control network and DMZ, then it is 

explicitly not allowed between the DMZ and corporate network. This design greatly reduces the chance 

of a worm such as Slammer actually making its way into the control network, since the worm would have 

to use two different exploits over two different protocols. 

One area of considerable variation in practice is the control of outbound traffic from the control network, 

which could represent a significant risk if unmanaged. One example is Trojan horse software that uses 

HTTP tunneling to exploit poorly defined outbound rules. Thus, it is important that outbound rules be as 

stringent as inbound rules. Appendix A of ISA’s SP-99 Technical Report #2 [27] contains some example 

guidelines that help clarify this. A summary of these follows: 

 Inbound traffic to the control system should be blocked. Access to devices inside the control system 

should be through a DMZ. 

 Outbound traffic through the control network firewall should be limited to essential communications 

only. 

 All outbound traffic from the control network to the corporate network should be source and 

destination-restricted by service and port. 

In addition to these rules, the firewall should be configured with outbound filtering to stop forged IP 

packets from leaving the control network or the DMZ. In practice this is achieved by checking the source 

IP addresses of outgoing packets against the firewall’s respective network interface address. The intent is 

to prevent the control network from being the source of spoofed (i.e., forged) communications, which are 

often used in DoS attacks. Thus, the firewalls should be configured to forward IP packets only if those 

packets have a correct source IP address for the control network or DMZ networks. Finally, Internet 

access by devices on the control network should be strongly discouraged. 

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In summary, the following should be considered as recommended practice for general firewall rule sets: 

 The base rule set should be deny all, permit none. 

 Ports and services between the control network environment and the corporate network should be 

enabled and permissions granted on a specific case-by-case basis. There should be a documented 

business justification with risk analysis and a responsible person for each permitted incoming or 

outgoing data flow. 

 All “permit” rules should be both IP address and TCP/UDP port specific, and stateful if appropriate. 

 All rules should restrict traffic to a specific IP address or range of addresses. 

 Traffic should be prevented from transiting directly from the control network to the corporate 

network. All traffic should terminate in the DMZ. 

 Any protocol allowed between the control network and DMZ should explicitly NOT be allowed 

between the DMZ and corporate networks (and vice-versa). 

 All outbound traffic from the control network to the corporate network should be source and 

destination-restricted by service and port. 

 Outbound packets from the control network or DMZ should be allowed only if those packets have a 

correct source IP address that is assigned to the control network or DMZ devices. 

 Control network devices should not be allowed to access the Internet. 

 Control networks should not be directly connected to the Internet, even if protected via a firewall. 

 All firewall management traffic should be carried on either a separate, secured management network 

(e.g., out of band) or over an encrypted network with two-factor authentication. Traffic should also 

be restricted by IP address to specific management stations. 

These should only be considered as guidelines. A careful assessment of each control environment is 

required before implementing any firewall rule sets. 

5.6 Recommended Firewall Rules for Specific Services 

Beside the general rules described above, it is difficult to outline all-purpose rules for specific protocols. 

The needs and recommended practices vary significantly between industries for any given protocol and 

should be analyzed on an organization-by-organization basis. The Industrial Automation Open 

Networking Association (IAONA) offers a template for conducting such an analysis [37], assessing each 

of the protocols commonly found in industrial environments in terms of function, security risk, worst case 

impact, and suggested measures. Below are summarized some of the key points from the IAONA 

document, and suggested practices from the ISA TR2 Appendix A [27]. The reader is advised to consult 

these documents directly when developing rule sets. 

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5.6.1 Domain Name System (DNS) 

Domain Name System (DNS) is primarily used to translate between domain names and IP addresses. For 

example, a DNS could map a domain name such as control.com to an IP address such as 192.168.1.1. 

Most Internet services rely heavily on DNS, but its use on the control network is relatively rare at this 

time. In most cases there is little reason to allow DNS requests out of the control network to the corporate 

network and no reason to allow DNS requests into the control network. DNS requests from the control 

network to DMZ should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Local DNS or the use of host files is 

recommended. 

5.6.2 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 

HTTP is the protocol underlying Web browsing services on the Internet. Like DNS, it is critical to most 

Internet services. It is seeing increasing use on the plant floor as well as an all-purpose query tool. 

Unfortunately, it has little inherent security, and many HTTP applications have vulnerabilities that can be 

exploited. HTTP can be a transport mechanism for many manually performed attacks and automated 

worms. 

In general, HTTP should not be allowed to cross from the corporate to the control network. If it is, then 

HTTP proxies should be configured on the firewall to block all inbound scripts and Java applications. 

Incoming HTTP connections should not be allowed into the control network, as they pose significant 

security risks. If HTTP services into the control network are absolutely required, it is recommended that 

the more secure HTTPS be used instead and only to specific devices. 

5.6.3 FTP and Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) 

FTP and Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) are used for transferring files between devices. They are 

implemented on almost every platform including many SCADA systems, DCS, PLCs, and RTUs, since 

they are very well known and use minimum processing power. Unfortunately, neither protocol was 

created with security in mind; for FTP, the login password is not encrypted, and for TFTP, no login is 

required at all. Furthermore, some FTP implementations have a history of buffer overflow vulnerabilities. 

As a result, all TFTP communications should be blocked, while FTP communications should be allowed 

for outbound sessions only or if secured with additional token-based two-factor authentication and an 

encrypted tunnel. More secure protocols, such as Secure FTP (SFTP) or Secure Copy (SCP), should be 

employed whenever possible. 

5.6.4 Telnet 

The telnet protocol defines an interactive, text-based communications session between a client and a host. 

It is mainly used for remote login and simple control services to systems with limited resources or to 

systems with limited needs for security. It is a severe security risk because all telnet traffic, including 

passwords, is unencrypted, and it can allow a remote individual considerable control over a device. 

Inbound telnet sessions from the corporate to the control network should be prohibited unless secured 

with token-based two-factor authentication and an encrypted tunnel. Outbound telnet sessions should be 

allowed only over encrypted tunnels (e.g., VPN) to specific devices. 

5.6.5 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 

SMTP is the primary e-mail transfer protocol on the Internet. E-mail messages often contain malware, so 

inbound e-mail should not be allowed to any control network device. Outbound SMTP mail messages 

from the control network to the corporate network are acceptable to send alert messages. 

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5.6.6 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) 

SNMP is used to provide network management services between a central management console and 

network devices such as routers, printers, and PLCs. Although SNMP is an extremely useful service for 

maintaining a network, it is very weak in security. Versions 1 and 2 of SNMP use unencrypted 

passwords to both read and configure devices (including devices such as PLCs), and in many cases the 

passwords are well known and cannot be changed. Version 3 is considerably more secure but is still 

limited in use. SNMP V1 & V2 commands both to and from the control network should be prohibited 

unless it is over a separate, secured management network whereas SNMP V3 commands may be able to 

be sent to the ICS using the security features inherent to V3. 

5.6.7 Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) 

DCOM is the underlying protocol for both OLE for Process Control (OPC) and ProfiNet. It utilizes 

Microsoft’s Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service which, when not patched, has many vulnerabilities. 

These vulnerabilities were the basis for the Blaster worm exploits. In addition, OPC, which utilizes 

DCOM, dynamically opens a wide range of ports (1024 to 65535) that can be extremely difficult to filter 

at the firewall. This protocol should only be allowed between control network and DMZ networks and 

explicitly blocked between the DMZ and corporate network. Also, users are advised to restrict the port 

ranges used by making registry modifications on devices using DCOM. 

5.6.8 SCADA and Industrial Protocols 

SCADA and industrial protocols, such as MODBUS/TCP, EtherNet/IP, and DNP317, are critical for 

communications to most control devices. Unfortunately, these protocols were designed without security 

built in and do not typically require any authentication to remotely execute commands on a control 

device. These protocols should only be allowed within the control network and not allowed to cross into 

the corporate network. 

5.7 Network Address Translation (NAT) 

Network address translation (NAT) is a service where IP addresses used on one side of a network device 

can be mapped to a different set on the other side on an as-needed basis. It was originally designed for IP 

address reduction purposes so that an organization with a large number of devices that occasionally 

needed Internet access could get by with a smaller set of assigned Internet addresses. 

To do this, NAT relies on the premise that not every internal device is actively communicating with 

external hosts at a given moment. The firewall is configured to have a limited number of outwardly 

visible IP addresses. When an internal host seeks to communicate to an external host, the firewall remaps 

the internal IP address and port to one of the currently unused, more limited, public IP addresses, 

effectively concentrating outgoing traffic into fewer IP addresses. The firewall must track the state of 

each connection and how each private internal IP address and source port was remapped onto an 

outwardly visible IP address/port pair. When returning traffic reaches the firewall, the mapping is 

reversed and the packets forwarded to the proper internal host. 

For example, a control network device may need to establish a connection with an external, non-control 

network host (for instance, to send a critical alert e-mail). NAT allows the internal IP address of the 

initiating control network host to be replaced by the firewall; subsequent return traffic packets are 

 

17 The DNP User Group is currently performing work in conjunction with IEC 62351 to extend the DNP3 protocol to provide 

strong authentication. 

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remapped back to the internal IP address and sent to the appropriate control network device. More 

specifically, if the control network is assigned the private subnet 192.168.1.xxx and the Internet network 

expects the device to use the corporate assigned addresses in the range 192.6.yyy.zzz, then a NAT 

firewall will substitute (and track) a 192.6.yyy.zzz source address into every outbound IP packet 

generated by a control network device. 

Producer-consumer protocols, such as EtherNet/IP and Foundation Fieldbus, are particularly troublesome 

because NAT does not support the multicast-based traffic that these protocols need to offer their full 

services. 

In general, while NAT offers some distinct advantages, its impact on the actual industrial protocols and 

configuration should be assessed carefully before it is deployed. Furthermore, certain protocols are 

specifically broken by NAT because of the lack of direct addressing. For example, OPC requires special 

third-party tunneling software to work with NAT. 

5.8 Specific ICS Firewall Issues 

In addition to the issues with firewalls and ICS already discussed, there are some additional problems that 

need to be examined in more detail. The rest of this section discusses three specific areas of concern: the 

placement of data historians, remote access for ICS support, and multicast traffic. 

5.8.1 Data Historians 

The existence of shared control network/corporate network servers such as data historians and asset 

management servers can have a significant impact on firewall design and configuration. In three-zone 

systems the placement of these servers in a DMZ is relatively straightforward, but in two-zone designs the 

issues become complex. Placing the historian on the corporate side of the firewall means that a number 

of insecure protocols, such as MODBUS/TCP or DCOM, must be allowed through the firewall and that 

every control device reporting to the historian is exposed to the corporate side of the network. On the 

other hand, putting the historian on the control network side means other equally questionable protocols, 

such as HTTP or SQL, must be allowed through the firewall, and there is now a server accessible to 

nearly everyone in the organization sitting on the control network. 

In general, the best solution is to avoid two-zone systems (no DMZ) and use a three-zone design, placing 

the data collector in the control network and the historian component in the DMZ; however, even this can 

prove problematic in some situations. Heavy access from the large numbers of users on the corporate 

network to a historian in the DMZ may tax the firewall’s throughput capabilities. One potential solution 

is to install two servers: one on the control network to collect data from the control devices, and a second 

on the corporate network mirroring the first server and supporting client queries. The issue of how to 

time synchronize both historians will have to be addressed. This also requires a special hole to be put 

through the firewall to allow direct server-to-server communications, but if done correctly, this poses only 

minor risk. 

5.8.2 Remote Support Access 

Another issue for ICS firewall design is user and/or vendor remote access into the control network. Any 

users accessing the control network from remote networks should be required to authenticate using an 

appropriately strong mechanism such as token-based authentication. While it is possible for the controls 

group to set up their own remote access system with two-factor authentication on the DMZ, in most 

organizations it is typically more efficient to use existing systems set up by the IT department. In this 

case a connection through the firewall from the IT remote access server is needed. 

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Remote support personnel connecting over the Internet or via dialup modems should use an encrypted 

protocol, such as running a corporate VPN connection client, Citrix, or secure HTTP access, and 

authenticate using a strong mechanism, such as a token based two-factor authentication scheme, in order 

to connect to the general corporate network. Once connected, they should be required to authenticate a 

second time at the control network firewall using a strong mechanism, such as a token based two-factor 

authentication scheme, to gain access to the control network. For organizations that do not allow any 

control traffic to traverse the corporate network in the clear, this could require a cascading, or secondary 

tunneling solutions, to gain access to the control network, such as a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or 

Transport Layer Security (TLS) VPN inside an IPsec VPN. 

5.8.3 Multicast Traffic 

Most industrial producer-consumer (or publisher-subscriber) protocols operating over Ethernet, such as 

EtherNet/IP and Foundation Fieldbus HSE, are IP multicast-based. The first advantage of IP multicasting 

is network efficiency; by not repeating the data transmission to the multiple destinations, a significant 

reduction in network load can occur. The second advantage is that the sending host need not be 

concerned with knowing every IP address of every destination host listening for the broadcast 

information. The third, and perhaps most important for industrial control purposes, is that a single 

multicast message offers far better capabilities for time synchronization between multiple control devices 

than multiple unicast messages. 

If the source and destinations of a multicast packet are connected with no intervening routers or firewalls 

between them, the multicast transmission is relatively seamless. However, if the source and destinations 

are not on the same LAN, forwarding the multicast messages to a destination becomes more complicated. 

To solve the problem of multicast message routing, hosts need to join (or leave) a group by informing the 

multicast router on their network of the relevant group ID through the use of the Internet Group 

Management Protocol (IGMP). Multicast routers subsequently know of the members of multicast groups 

on their network and can decide whether or not to forward a received multicast message onto their 

network. A multicast routing protocol is also required. From a firewall administration perspective, 

monitoring and filtering IGMP traffic becomes another series of rule sets to manage, adding to the 

complexity of the firewall. 

Another firewall issue related to multicasting is the use of NAT. A firewall performing NAT that 

receives a multicast packet from an external host has no reverse mapping for which internal group ID 

should receive the data. If IGMP-aware, it could broadcast it to every group ID it knows about, since one 

of them will be correct, but this could cause serious issues if an unintended control packet were broadcast 

to a critical node. The safest action for the firewall to take is to drop the packet. Thus, multicasting is 

generally considered NAT-unfriendly. 

5.9 Single Points of Failure 

Single points of failure can exist at any level of the ANSI/ISO stack. An example is PLC control of 

safety interlocks. Since security is usually being added to the ICS environment, an evaluation should be 

done to identity potential failure points and a risk assessment done to evaluate each point’s exposure. 

Remediation methods can then be postulated and evaluated and a “risk versus reward” determination 

made and design and implementation done. 

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5.10 Redundancy and Fault Tolerance 

ICS components or networks that are classified as critical to the organization have high availability 

requirements. One method of achieving high availability is through the use of redundancy. Additionally, 

if a component fails, it should fail in a manner that does not generate unnecessary traffic on the ICS, or 

does not cause another problem elsewhere, such as a cascading event. 

The control system should have the ability to execute an appropriate fail-safe process upon the loss of 

communications with the ICS or the loss of the ICS itself. The organization should define what "loss of 

communications" means (e.g., 5 seconds, 5 minutes, etc. without communications). The organization 

should then, based on potential consequences, define the appropriate fail-safe process for their industry. 

Backups should be performed using the “backup-in-depth” approach, with layers of backups (e.g., local, 

facility, disaster) that are time-sequenced such that rapid recent local backups are available for immediate 

use and secure backups are available to recover from a massive security incident. A mixture of 

backup/restore approaches and storage methods should be used to ensure that backups are rigorously 

produced, securely stored, and appropriately accessible for restoration. 

5.11 Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 

A man-in-the-middle attack requires knowledge of the protocol being manipulated. The Address 

Resolution Protocol (ARP) man-in-the-middle attack is a popular method for an adversary to gain access 

to the network flow of information on a target system. This is performed by attacking the network ARP 

cache tables of the controller and the workstation machines. Using the compromised computer on the 

control network, the adversary poisons the ARP tables on each host and informs them that they must 

route all their traffic through a specific IP and hardware address (i.e., the adversary’s machine). By 

manipulating the ARP tables, the adversary can insert his machine between the two target machines 

and/or devices. 

The ARP man-in-the-middle attack works by initiating gratuitous ARP commands to confuse each host 

(i.e., ARP poisoning). These ARP commands cause each of the two target hosts to use the MAC address 

of the adversary as the address for the other target host. When a successful man-in-the-middle attack is 

performed, the hosts on each side of the attack are unaware that their network data is taking a different 

route through the adversary’s computer. 

Once an adversary has successfully inserted their machine into the information stream, they now have full 

control over the data communications and could carry out several types of attacks. One possible attack 

method is the replay attack. In its simplest form, captured data from the control/HMI is modified to 

instantiate activity when received by the device controller. Captured data reflecting normal operations in 

the ICS could be played back to the operator as required. This would cause the operator’s HMI to appear 

to be normal and the attack will go unobserved. During this replay attack the adversary could continue to 

send commands to the controller and/or field devices to cause an undesirable event while the operator is 

unaware of the true state of the system. 

Another attack that could be carried out with the man-in-the-middle attack is sending false messages to 

the operator, and could take the form of a false negative or a false positive. This may cause the operator to 

take an action, such as flipping a breaker, when it is not required, or it may cause the operator to think 

everything is fine and not take an action when an action is required. The adversary could send commands 

to the operator’s console indicating a system change, and when the operator follows normal procedures 

and attempts to correct the problem, the operator’s action could cause an undesirable event. There are 

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numerable variations of the modification and replay of control data which could impact the operations of 

the system. 

Protocol manipulation and the man-in-the-middle attack are among the most popular ways to manipulate 

insecure protocols, such as those found in control systems. However, there are mitigation techniques [38]

that can be applied to secure the systems through MAC address locking, static tables, encryption, and 

monitoring. 

MAC Address Locking - The ARP man-in-the-middle attack requires the adversary to be connected 

to the local network or have control of a local computer on the network. Port security, also called 

MAC address locking, is one method to secure the physical connection at the end of each port on a 

network switch. High-end corporate class network switches usually have some kind of option for 

MAC address locking. MAC address locking is very effective against a rogue individual looking to 

physically plug into the internal network. Without port security, any open network jack on the wall 

could be used as an avenue onto the corporate network. Port security locks a specific MAC address to 

a specific port on a managed switch. If the MAC address does not match, the communication link is 

disabled and the intruder will not be able to achieve his goal. Some of the more advanced switches 

have an auto resetting option, which will reset the security measure if the original MAC is returned to 

the port. 

Although port security is not attacker proof, it does add a layer of added security to the physical 

network. It also protects the local network from employees plugging un-patched and out-of-date 

systems onto the protected network. This reduces the number of target computers a remote adversary 

can access. These security measures not only protect against attacks from external networks but 

provide added physical protection as well. 

Static Tables – An ICS network that stays relatively static could attempt to implement statically 

coded ARP tables. Most operating systems have the capability to statically code all of the MAC 

addresses into the ARP table on each computer. Statically coding the ARP tables on each computer 

prevents the adversary from changing them by sending ARP reply packets to the victim computer. 

While this technique is not feasible on a large and/or dynamic corporate network, the limited number 

of hosts on an ICS network could be effectively protected this way. 

Encryption - As a longer term solution, systems should be designed to include encryption between 

devices in order to make it very difficult to reverse engineer protocols and forge packets on control 

system networks. Encrypting the communications between devices would make it nearly impossible 

to perform this attack. Protocols that provide strong authentication also provide resilience to man-inthe-middle attacks. 

Monitoring - Monitoring for ARP poisoning provides an added layer of defense. There are several 

programs available (e.g., ARPwatch) that can monitor for changing MAC addresses through the ARP 

packets. 

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6. ICS Security Controls 

Security controls are the management, operational, and technical controls (i.e., safeguards or 

countermeasures) prescribed for an informational system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 

availability of the system and its information. This section discusses the security controls specified in 

NIST SP 800-53, which was developed as part of the FISMA implementation project. See Appendix E 

for additional information regarding FISMA and the NIST-led implementation project. 

NIST SP 800-53 provides guidelines for selecting and specifying security controls for information 

systems in support of Federal government information systems. Security controls are organized into three 

classes; management, operational, and technical controls. Each class is broken into several families of 

controls; each control contains a definition of the control, supplemental guidance, and possible 

enhancements that will increase the strength of a basic control. 

NIST has initiated the Industrial Control System Security Project18 in cooperation with the public and 

private sector ICS community to develop specific guidance on the application of NIST documents, 

including the security controls in NIST SP 800-53 to ICS. To facilitate the understanding of this 

approach, an effort is underway to develop a series of ICS cyber security case histories using actual ICS 

cyber security incidents. These case histories examine the NIST SP 800-53 ICS controls that were 

violated or not implemented, and postulate the potential mitigations that may have occurred if the controls 

had been implemented. ICS specific recommendations and guidance, if available, is provided in an 

outlined box for each set of controls in this section. 

A single security product or technology cannot adequately protect an ICS. Securing an ICS is based on a 

combination of effective security policies and a properly configured set of security controls. An effective 

cyber security strategy for an ICS should apply defense-in-depth, a technique of layering security 

mechanisms so that the impact of a failure in any one mechanism is minimized. Use of such a strategy is 

explored within the security control discussions and their applications to ICS that follow. 

6.1 Management Controls 

Management controls are the security countermeasures for an ICS that focus on the management of risk 

and the management of information security. NIST SP 800-53 defines four families of controls within the 

Management controls class: 

 Risk Assessment (RA): the process of identifying risks to operations, assets, or individuals by 

determining the probability of occurrence, the resulting impact, and additional security controls that 

would mitigate this impact 

 Planning (PL): development and maintenance of a plan to address information system security by 

performing assessments, specifying and implementing security controls, assigning security levels, and 

responding to incidents 

 System and Services Acquisition (SA): allocation of resources for information system security to be 

maintained throughout the systems life cycle and the development of acquisition policies based on 

risk assessment results including requirements, design criteria, test procedures, and associated 

documentation 

 Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments (CA): assurance that the specified controls 

are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome. 

 

18 The Industrial Control System Security Project Web site is located at: http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/ics/index.html 

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These management controls are discussed in more detail in the sections to follow. ICS specific 

recommendations and guidance, if available, is provided in an outlined box for each section. 

6.1.1 Risk Assessment 

Risk is a function of the likelihood of a given threat source exploiting a potential vulnerability and the 

resulting impact of exploiting this vulnerability. Risk assessment is the process of identifying risks to an 

organization’s operations, assets, and individuals by determining the probability of occurrence that an 

identified threat will exploit an identified vulnerability and the resulting impact. An assessment includes 

an evaluation of security controls that can mitigate each threat and the costs associated with implementing 

them. A risk assessment must also compare the cost of security with the costs associated with an 

incident.

Achieving an acceptable level of risk is a process of reducing the probability of an incident that is 

accomplished by mitigating or eliminating vulnerabilities that can be exploited as well as consequences 

resulting from an incident. Prioritization of vulnerabilities must be based on cost and benefit with an 

objective to provide a business case for implementing at least a minimum set of control system security 

requirements to reduce risk to an acceptable level. A mistake often made during a risk assessment is to 

select technically interesting vulnerabilities without taking into account the level of risk associated with 

them. Vulnerabilities should be assessed and rated for risk before trying to select and implement security 

controls on them. 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Risk Assessment (RA) family provide policy 

and procedures to develop, distribute, and maintain a documented risk assessment policy that describes 

purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, and compliance as well as policy implementation procedures. An 

information system and associated data is categorized based on the security objectives and a range of risk 

levels. A risk assessment is performed to identify risks and the magnitude of harm that could result from 

the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of an information system 

and data. Also included in these controls are mechanisms for keeping risk assessments up-to-date and 

performing periodic testing and vulnerability assessments. 

In the FISMA Risk Framework shown in Figure E-1 in Appendix E, the risk assessment process is 

applied after the Security Categorization activity and baseline Security Control Selection activity. Risk 

assessment is performed in the Security Control Refinement activity to determine if the selected security 

controls need to be enhanced or expanded beyond the baseline security controls. NIST SP 800-30, Risk 

Management Guide for Information Technology Systems (currently under revision) provides a risk 

assessment methodology, which includes the following steps: 

1. System characterization – produces a picture of the information system environment, and 

delineation of system boundaries 

2. Threat identification – produces a threat statement containing a list of threat-sources that could 

exploit system vulnerabilities 

3. Vulnerability identification – produces a list of the system vulnerabilities that could be exercised 

by the potential threat sources 

4. Control analysis – produces a list of the planned controls used for the information system to 

mitigate the likelihood of a vulnerability being exercised and reduce the impact of such an 

adverse event. 

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5. Likelihood determination – produces a likelihood rating (High, Medium, or Low) that indicates 

the probability that a potential vulnerability may be exercised 

6. Impact analysis – produces a magnitude of impact (High, Medium, or Low) resulting from the 

exploitation of a vulnerability. 

7. Risk determination – produces measurement for risk based on a scale of high, medium, or low 

8. Control recommendations – produces recommendations of security controls and alternative 

solutions to mitigate risk 

9. Results documentation – produces a risk assessment report that describes the threats and 

vulnerabilities, measures the risk, and provides recommendations for control implementation. 

Supplemental guidance for the RA controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-30 provides guidance on conducting risk assessments and updates [19]. 

 NIST SP 800-40 provides guidance on handling security patches [40]. 

 NIST SP 800-42 provides guidance on network security testing [41]. 

 NIST SP 800-60 provides guidance on determining security categories for information types [24]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Organizations must consider the potential consequences resulting from an incident on an ICS. Welldefined policies and procedures lead to mitigation techniques designed to thwart incidents and manage 

the risk to eliminate or minimize the consequences. The potential degradation of the physical plant, 

economic status, or stakeholder/national confidence could justify mitigation. For an ICS, a very 

important aspect of the risk assessment is to determine the value of the data that is flowing from the 

control network to the corporate network. In instances where pricing decisions are determined from 

this data, the data could have a very high value. The fiscal justification for mitigation has to be derived 

by comparing the mitigation cost to the effects of the consequence. However, it is not possible to 

define a one-size-fits-all set of security requirements. A very high level of security may be achievable 

but undesirable in many situations because of the loss of functionality and other associated costs. A 

well-thought-out security implementation is a balance of risk versus cost. In some situations the risk 

may be safety, health, or environment-related rather than purely economic. The risk may result in an 

unrecoverable consequence rather than a temporary financial setback

6.1.2 Planning 

A security plan is a formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for an 

information system and describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those 

requirements. The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Planning (PL) family provide the 

basis for developing a security plan. These controls also address maintenance issues for periodically 

updating a security plan. A set of rules describes user responsibilities and expected behavior regarding 

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information system usage with provision for signed acknowledgement from users indicating that they 

have read, understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior before authorizing access to the 

information system. 

Supplemental guidance for the PL controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-18 provides guidance on preparing rules of behavior [17]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

A security plan for an ICS should build on appropriate existing IT security experience, programs, and 

practices. However, the critical differences between IT and ICS addressed in Section 3.1 will influence 

how security will be applied to the ICS. A forward-looking plan is needed to provide a method for 

continuous security improvements. Whenever a new system is being designed and installed, it is 

imperative to take the time to address security throughout the lifecycle, from architecture to 

procurement to installation to maintenance to decommissioning. ICS security is a rapidly evolving 

field requiring the security planning process to constantly explore emerging ICS security capabilities as 

well as new threats that are identified by organizations such as the US-CERT Control Systems Security 

Center (CSSC). 

6.1.3 System and Services Acquisition 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 System and Services Acquisition (SA) family 

provide the basis for developing policies and procedures for acquisition of resources required to 

adequately protect an information system. These acquisitions are based on security requirements and 

security specifications. As part of the acquisition procedures, an information system is managed using a 

system development life cycle methodology that includes information security considerations. As part of 

acquisition, adequate documentation must be maintained on the information system and constituent 

components. 

The SA family also addresses outsourced systems and the inclusion of adequate security controls by 

vendors as specified by the supported organization. Vendors are also responsible for configuration 

management and security testing for these outsourced information systems. 

Supplemental guidance for the SA controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-23 provides guidance on the acquisition and use of tested/evaluated information 

technology products [42]. 

 NIST SP 800-27 provides guidance on engineering principles for information system security [43]. 

 NIST SP 800-35 provides guidance on information technology security services [44]. 

 NIST SP 800-36 provides guidance on the selection of information security products [45]. 

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 NIST SP 800-64 provides guidance on security considerations in the system development life cycle 

[46]. 

 NIST SP 800-65 provides guidance on integrating security into the capital planning and investment 

control process [47]. 

 NIST SP 800-70 provides guidance on configuration settings for information technology products 

[25]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

In support of the acquisition of secured ICS, the Process Control Security Requirements Forum 

(PCSRF), an industry-based effort being lead by NIST, has documented a cohesive, cross-industry set 

of requirements for new ICS [48] with follow-up work addressing SCADA and subcomponent-level 

requirements. 

The SCADA and Control System Procurement Project [49] is also developing a procurement language 

for specifying security requirements when procuring new systems or maintaining existing systems. 

The security requirements of an organization outsourcing the management and control of all or some of 

its information systems, networks, and desktop environments should be addressed in a contract agreed 

between the parties. External suppliers that have an impact on the security of the organization must be 

held to the same security policies and procedures to maintain the overall level of ICS security. Security 

policies and procedures of second and third-tier suppliers should also be in compliance with corporate 

cyber security policies and procedures in the case that they impact ICS security. 

6.1.4 Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Certification, Accreditation, and Security 

Assessments (CA) family provide the basis for performing periodic assessments and providing 

certification of the security controls implemented in the information system to determine if the controls 

are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome to meet the system 

security requirements. A senior organizational official is responsible for accepting residual risk and 

authorizing system operation. These steps constitute accreditation. In addition, all security controls 

should be monitored on an ongoing basis. Monitoring activities include configuration management and 

control of information system components, security impact analysis of changes to the system, ongoing 

assessment of security controls, and status reporting. 

Supplemental guidance for the CA controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-26 and 800-53A provide guidance on security control assessments [18][22]. 

 NIST SP 800-37 provides guidance defining the information system boundary and security 

certification and accreditation of the information system [20]. 

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6.2 Operational Controls 

Operational controls are the security countermeasures for an ICS that are primarily implemented and 

executed by people as opposed to systems. NIST SP 800-53 defines nine families of controls within the 

Operational controls class: 

 Personnel Security (PS): policies and procedures for personnel position categorization, screening, 

transfer, penalty, and termination; also addresses third-party personnel security. 

 Physical and Environmental Protection (PE): policies and procedures addressing physical, 

transmission, and display access control as well as environmental controls for conditioning (e.g., 

temperature, humidity) and emergency provisions (e.g., shutdown, power, lighting, fire protection). 

 Contingency Planning (CP): policies and procedures designed to maintain or restore business 

operations, including computer operations, possibly at an alternate location, in the event of 

emergencies, system failures, or disaster. 

 Configuration Management (CM): policies and procedures for controlling modifications to 

hardware, firmware, software, and documentation to ensure the information system is protected 

against improper modifications prior to, during, and after system implementation. 

 Maintenance (MA): policies and procedures to manage all maintenance aspects of an information 

system. 

 System and Information Integrity (SI): policies and procedures to protect information systems and 

their data from design flaws and data modification using functionality verification, data integrity 

checking, intrusion detection, malicious code detection, and security alert and advisory controls. 

 Media Protection (MP): policies and procedures to ensure secure handling of media. Controls cover 

access, labeling, storage, transport, sanitization, destruction, and disposal. 

 Incident Response (IR): policies and procedures pertaining to incident response training, testing, 

handling, monitoring, reporting, and support services. 

 Awareness and Training (AT): policies and procedures to ensure that all information system users 

are given appropriate security training relative to their usage of the system and that accurate training 

records are maintained. 

These operational controls are discussed in more detail in the sections to follow. ICS specific 

recommendations and guidance, if available, is provided in an outlined box for each section. 

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6.2.1 Personnel Security 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Personnel Security (PS) family provide policies 

and procedures to reduce the risk of human error, theft, fraud, or other intentional or unintentional misuse 

of information systems. 

Supplemental guidance for the PS controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-35 provides guidance on information technology security services [44]. 

 NIST SP 800-73 provides guidance on interfaces for personal identity verification [50]. 

 NIST SP 800-76 provides guidance on biometrics for personal identity verification [51]. 

Personnel security measures are meant to reduce the possibility and risk of human error, theft, fraud, or 

other intentional or unintentional misuse of informational assets. There are three main aspects to 

personnel security: 

 Hiring Policies. This includes pre-employment screening such as background checks, the interview 

process, employment terms and conditions, complete job descriptions and detailing of duties, terms 

and condition of employment, and legal rights and responsibilities of employees or contractors. 

 Organization Policies and Practices. These include security policies, information classification, 

document and media maintenance and handling policies, user training, acceptable usage policies for 

organization assets, periodic employee performance reviews, appropriate background checks, and any 

other policies and actions that detail expected and required behavior of organization employees, 

contractors, and visitors. Organization policies to be enforced should be written down and readily 

available to all workers through an employee handbook, distributed as e-mail notices, located in a 

centralized resource area, or posted directly at a worker’s area of responsibility. 

 Terms and Conditions of Employment. This category includes job and position responsibilities, 

notification to employees of terminable offenses, disciplinary actions and punishments, and periodic 

employee performance reviews. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Positions should be categorized with a risk designation and screening criteria, and individuals filling a 

position should be screened against this criteria as well as complete an access agreement before being 

granted access to an information system. Personnel should be screened for the critical positions 

controlling and maintaining the ICS. 

6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Physical and Environmental (PE) family 

provide policy and procedures for all physical access to an information system including designated 

entry/exit points, transmission media, and display media. These include controls for monitoring physical 

access, maintaining logs, and handling visitors. This family also includes controls for the deployment and 

management of emergency protection controls such as emergency shutdown of the IT system, backup for 

power and lighting, controls for temperature and humidity, and protection against fire and water damage. 

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Supplemental guidance for the PE controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-46 provides guidance on security in telecommuting and broadband communications 

[52]. 

Physical security measures are designed to reduce the risk of accidental or deliberate loss or damage to 

plant assets and the surrounding environment. The assets being safeguarded may be physical assets such 

as tools and plant equipment, the environment, the surrounding community, and intellectual property, 

including proprietary data such as process settings and customer information. The deployment of 

physical security controls is often subject to environmental, safety, regulatory, legal, and other 

requirements that must be identified and addressed specific to a given environment. The subject of 

deploying physical security controls is vast and needs to be specific to the type of protection needed. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

The physical protection of the cyber components and data associated with the ICS must be addressed as 

part of the overall security of a plant. Security at many ICS facilities is closely tied to plant safety. A 

primary goal is to keep people out of hazardous situations without preventing them from doing their job 

or carrying out emergency procedures. 

Gaining physical access to a control room or control system components often implies gaining logical 

access to the process control system as well. Likewise, having logical access to systems such as main 

servers and control room computers allows an adversary to exercise control over the physical process. 

If computers are readily accessible, and they have removable media drives (e.g., floppy disks, compact 

discs, external hard drives) or USB ports, the drives can be fitted with locks or removed from the 

computers and USB ports disabled. Depending on security needs and risks, it might also be prudent to 

disable or physically protect power buttons to prevent unauthorized use. For maximum security, 

servers should be placed in locked areas and authentication mechanisms (such as keys) protected. 

Also, the network devices on the ICS network, including switches, routers, network jacks, servers, 

workstations, and controllers, should be located in a secured area that can only be accessed by 

authorized personnel. The secured area should also be compatible with the environmental requirements 

of the devices. 

A defense-in-depth solution to physical security should include the following attributes: 

 Protection of Physical Locations. Classic physical security considerations typically refer to a 

ringed architecture of layered security measures. Creating several physical barriers, both active and 

passive, around buildings, facilities, rooms, equipment, or other informational assets, establishes 

these physical security perimeters. Physical security controls meant to protect physical locations 

include fences, anti-vehicle ditches, earthen mounds, walls, reinforced barricades, gates, or other 

measures. Most organizations include this layered model by preventing access to the plant first by 

the use of fences, guard shacks, gates, and locked doors. 

 Access Control. Access control systems should ensure that only authorized people have access to 

controlled spaces. An access control system should be flexible. The need for access may be based 

on time (day vs. night shift), level of training, employment status, work assignment, plant status, 

and a myriad of other factors. A system must be able to verify that persons being granted access 

are who they say they are (usually using something the person has, such as an access card; 

something they know, such as a personal identification number (PIN); or something they are, using 

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a biometric device). Access control should be highly reliable, yet not interfere with the routine or 

emergency duties of plant personnel. Integration of access control into the process system allows a 

view into not only security access, but also physical and personnel asset tracking, dramatically 

accelerating response time in emergencies, helping to direct individuals to safe locations, and 

improving overall productivity. Within an area, access to network and computer cabinets should be 

limited to only those who have a need, such as network technicians and engineers, or computer 

maintenance staff. Equipment cabinets should be locked and wiring should be neat and within 

cabinets. Consider keeping all computers in secure racks and using peripheral extender technology 

to connect human-machine interfaces to the racked computers. 

Access Monitoring Systems. Access monitoring systems include still and video cameras, sensors, 

and various types of identification systems. Examples of these systems include cameras that 

monitor parking lots, convenience stores, or airline security. These devices do not specifically 

prevent access to a particular location; rather, they store and record either the physical presence or 

the lack of physical presence of individuals, vehicles, animals, or other physical entities. Adequate 

lighting should be provided based on the type of access monitoring device deployed. 

Access Limiting Systems. Access limiting systems may employ a combination of devices to 

physically control or prevent access to protected resources. Access limiting systems include both 

active and passive security devices such as fences, doors, safes, gates, and guards. They are often 

coupled with Identification and monitoring systems to provide role-based access for specific 

individuals or groups of individuals. 

 People and Asset Tracking. Locating people and vehicles in a large installation is important for 

safety reasons, and it is increasingly important for security reasons as well. Asset location 

technologies can be used to track the movements of people and vehicles within the plant, to ensure 

that they stay in authorized areas, to identify personnel needing assistance, and to support 

emergency response. 

 Environmental Factors. In addressing the security needs of the system and data, it is important to 

consider environmental factors. For example, if a site is dusty, systems should be placed in a 

filtered environment. This is particularly important if the dust is likely to be conductive or 

magnetic, as in the case of sites that process coal or iron. If vibration is likely to be a problem, 

systems should be mounted on rubber bushings to prevent disk crashes and wiring connection 

problems. In addition, the environments containing systems and media (e.g., backup tapes, floppy 

disks) should have stable temperature and humidity. An alarm to the process control system should 

be generated when environmental specifications such as temperature and humidity are exceeded. 

Environmental Control Systems. Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems for 

control rooms must support plant personnel during normal operation and emergency situations, 

which could include the release of toxic substances. Fire systems must be carefully designed to 

avoid causing more harm than good (e.g., to avoid mixing water with incompatible products). 

HVAC and fire systems have significantly increased roles in security that arise from the 

interdependence of process control and security. For example, fire prevention and HVAC systems 

that support industrial control computers need to be protected against cyber incidents. 

Power. Reliable power for the ICS is essential, so an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) should 

be provided. If the site has an emergency generator, the UPS battery life may only need to be a 

few seconds; however, if the site relies on external power, the UPS battery life may need to be 

hours. 

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6.2.2.1 Control Center/Control Room 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Providing physical security for the control center/control room is essential to reduce the potential of 

many threats. Control centers/control rooms frequently have consoles continuously logged onto the 

primary control server, where speed of response and continual view of the plant is of utmost 

importance. These areas will often contain the servers themselves, other critical computer nodes, and 

sometimes plant controllers. It is essential that access to these areas be limited to authorized users 

only, using authentication methods such as smart or magnetic identity cards or biometric devices. In 

extreme cases, it may be considered necessary to make the control center/control room blast-proof, or 

to provide an offsite emergency control center/control room so that control can be maintained if the 

primary control center/control room becomes uninhabitable. 

6.2.2.2 Portable Devices 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Computers and computerized devices used for ICS functions (such as PLC programming) should never 

be allowed to leave the ICS area. Laptops, portable engineering workstations and handhelds (e.g., 375 

HART communicator) should be tightly secured and should never be allowed to be used outside the 

ICS network. Antivirus and patch management should be kept current. 

6.2.2.3 Cabling 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Cabling design and implementation for the control network should be addressed in the cyber security 

plan. Unshielded twisted pair communications cable, while acceptable for the office environment, is 

generally not suitable for the plant environment due to its susceptibility to interference from magnetic 

fields, radio waves, temperature extremes, moisture, dust, and vibration. Industrial RJ-45 connectors 

should be used in place of other types of twisted pair connectors to provide protection against moisture, 

dust and vibration. Fiber-optic cable and coaxial cable are often better network cabling choices for the 

control network since they are immune to many of the typical environmental conditions including 

electrical and radio frequency interference found in an industrial control environment. Cable and 

connectors should be color-coded and labeled so that the ICS and IT networks are clearly delineated 

and the potential for an inadvertent cross-connect is reduced. Cable runs should be installed so that 

access is minimized (i.e., limited to authorized personnel only) and equipment should be installed in 

locked cabinets with adequate ventilation and air filtration. 

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6.2.3 Contingency Planning 

Contingency plans are designed to maintain or restore business operations, including computer 

operations, possibly at an alternate location, in the event of emergencies, system failures, or disaster. The 

security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Contingency Planning (CP) family provide policies 

and procedures to implement a contingency plan by specifying roles and responsibilities, assigning 

personnel and activities associated with restoring the information system after a disruption or failure. 

Along with planning, controls also exist for contingency training, testing, and plan update, and for backup 

information processing and storage sites. 

Supplemental guidance for the CP controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-34 provides guidance on contingency planning [53]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Contingency plans should cover the full range of failures or problems that could be caused by cyber 

incidents. Contingency plans should include procedures for restoring systems from known valid 

backups, separating systems from all non-essential interferences and connections that could permit 

cyber security intrusions, and alternatives to achieve necessary interfaces and coordination. Employees 

should be trained and familiar with the contents of the contingency plans. Contingency plans should be 

periodically reviewed with employees responsible for restoration of the ICS, and tested to ensure that 

they continue to meet their objectives. Organizations also have business continuity plans and disaster 

recovery plans that are closely related to contingency plans. Because business continuity and disaster 

recovery plans are particularly important for ICS, they are described in more detail in the sections to 

follow. 

. 

6.2.3.1 Business Continuity Planning 

Business continuity planning addresses the overall issue of maintaining or reestablishing production in the 

case of an interruption. These interruptions may take the form of a natural disaster (e.g., hurricane, 

tornado, earthquake, flood), an unintentional man-made event (e.g., accidental equipment damage, fire or 

explosion, operator error), an intentional man-made event (e.g., attack by bomb, firearm or vandalism, 

attacker or virus), or an equipment failure. From a potential outage perspective, this may involve typical 

time spans of days, weeks, or months to recover from a natural disaster, or minutes or hours to recover 

from a malware infection or a mechanical/electrical failure. Since there is often a separate discipline that 

deals with reliability and electrical/mechanical maintenance, some organizations choose to define 

business continuity in a way that excludes these sources of failure. Since business continuity also deals 

primarily with the long-term implications of production outages, some organizations also choose to place 

a minimum interruption limit on the risks to be considered. For the purposes of ICS cyber security, it is 

recommended that neither of these constraints be made. Long-term outages (disaster recovery) and shortterm outages (operational recovery) should both be considered. Because some of these potential 

interruptions involve man-made events, it is also important to work collaboratively with the physical 

security organization to understand the relative risks of these events and the physical security 

countermeasures that are in place to prevent them. It is also important for the physical security 

organization to understand which areas of a production site house data acquisition and control systems 

that might have higher-level risks. 

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Before creating a business continuity plan (BCP) to deal with potential outages, it is important to specify 

the recovery objectives for the various systems and subsystems involved based on typical business needs. 

There are two distinct types of objectives: system recovery and data recovery. System recovery involves 

the recovery of all communication links and processing capabilities, and it is usually specified in terms of 

a Recovery Time Objective (RTO). This is defined as the time required to recover all communication 

links and processing capabilities. Data recovery involves the recovery of data describing production or 

product conditions in the past and is usually specified in terms of a Recovery Point Objective (RPO). 

This is defined as the longest period of time for which an absence of data can be tolerated. 

Once the recovery objectives are defined, a list of potential interruptions should be created and the 

recovery procedure developed and described. For most of the smaller scale interruptions, repair and 

replace activities based on a critical spares inventory will prove adequate to meet the recovery objectives. 

When this is not true, contingency plans need to be developed. Due to the potential cost and importance 

of these contingency plans, they should be reviewed with the managers responsible for business 

continuity planning to verify that they are justified. Once the recovery procedures are documented, a 

schedule should be developed to test part or all of the recovery procedures. Particular attention must be 

paid to the verification of backups of system configuration data and product or production data. Not only 

should these be tested when they are produced, but the procedures followed for their storage should also 

be reviewed periodically to verify that the backups are kept in environmental conditions that will not 

render them unusable and that they are kept in a secure location, so they can be quickly obtained by 

authorized individuals when needed. 

6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

A disaster recovery plan (DRP) is essential to continued availability of the ICS. The DRP should 

include the following items: 

 Required response to events or conditions of varying duration and severity that would activate the 

recovery plan 

 Procedures for operating the ICS in manual mode with all external electronic connections severed 

until secure conditions can be restored 

 Roles and responsibilities of responders 

 Processes and procedures for the backup and secure storage of information 

 Complete and up-to-date logical network diagram 

 Personnel list for authorized physical and cyber access to the ICS 

 Communication procedure and list of personnel to contact in the case of an emergency including 

ICS vendors, network administrators, ICS support personnel, etc 

 Current configuration information for all components 

The plan should also indicate requirements for the timely replacement of components in the case of an 

emergency. If possible, replacements for hard-to-obtain critical components should be kept in 

inventory. 

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The security plan should define a comprehensive backup and restore policy. In formulating this policy, 

the following should be considered: 

 The speed at which data or the system must be restored. This requirement may justify the need for 

a redundant system, spare offline computer, or valid file system backups. 

 The frequency at which critical data and configurations are changing. This will dictate the 

frequency and completeness of backups. 

 The safe onsite and offsite storage of full and incremental backups 

 The safe storage of installation media, license keys, and configuration information 

 Identification of individuals responsible for performing, testing, storing, and restoring backups 

6.2.4 Configuration Management 

Configuration management policy and procedures are used to control modifications to hardware, 

firmware, software, and documentation to ensure the information system is protected against improper 

modifications prior to, during, and after system implementation. The security controls that fall within the 

NIST SP 800-53 Configuration Management (CM) family provide policy and procedures for establishing 

baseline controls for information systems. Controls are also specified for maintaining, monitoring, and 

documenting configuration control changes. There should be restricted access to configuration settings, 

and security settings of IT products should be set to the most restrictive mode consistent with ICS 

operational requirements. 

Supplemental guidance for the CM controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-70 provides guidance on configuration settings for IT products [25]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

A formal change management program should be established and procedures used to insure that all 

modifications to an ICS network meet the same security requirements as the original components 

identified in the asset evaluation and the associated risk assessment and mitigation plans. Risk 

assessment should be performed on all changes to the ICS network that could affect security, including 

configuration changes, the addition of network components, and installation of software. Changes to 

policies and procedures may also be required. The current ICS network configuration must always be 

known and documented. 

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6.2.5 Maintenance 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Maintenance (MA) family provide policy and 

procedure for performing routine and preventative maintenance on the components of an information 

system. This includes the usage of maintenance tools (both local and remote) and management of 

maintenance personnel. 

Supplemental guidance for the MA controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-63 provides guidance on electronic authentication for remote maintenance [54]. 

6.2.6 System and Information Integrity 

Maintaining system and information integrity assures that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted 

in an unauthorized and undetected manner. The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 

System and Information Integrity (SI) family provide policies and procedures for identifying, reporting, 

and correcting information system flaws. Controls exist for malicious code detection, spam and spyware 

protection, and intrusion detection, although they may not be appropriate for all ICS applications. Also 

provided are controls for receiving security alerts and advisories, and the verification of security functions 

on the information system. In addition, there are controls within this family to detect and protect against 

unauthorized changes to software and data, provide restrictions to data input and output, and check for the 

accuracy, completeness, and validity of data as well as handle error conditions, although they may not be 

appropriate for all ICS applications. 

Supplemental guidance for the SI controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-40 provides guidance on security patch installation [40]. 

 NIST SP 800-31 provides guidance on intrusion detection [55]. 

 NIST SP 800-94 provides guidance on Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) Systems [56]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Controls exist for malicious code detection, spam and spyware protection, and intrusion detection, 

although they may not be appropriate for all ICS applications. ICS specific recommendations and 

guidance for these controls are included in Sections 6.2.6.1 through 6.2.6.3. 

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6.2.6.1 Malicious Code Detection 

Antivirus products evaluate files on a computer’s storage devices against an inventory of known virus 

signature files. If one of the files on a computer matches the profile of a known virus, the virus is 

removed through a disinfection process (e.g., quarantine, deletion) so it cannot infect other local files or 

communicate across a network to infect other files. Antivirus software can be deployed on workstations, 

servers, firewalls and handheld devices. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Antivirus tools only function effectively when installed, configured, running full-time, and maintained 

properly against the state of known attack methods and payloads. While antivirus tools are common 

security practice in IT computer systems, their use with ICS may require adopting special practices 

including compatibility checks, change management issues, and performance impact metrics. These 

special practices should be utilized whenever new signatures or new versions of antivirus software are 

installed. 

Major ICS vendors recommend and even support the use of particular antivirus tools. In some cases, 

control system vendors may have performed regression testing across their product line for supported 

versions of a particular antivirus tool and also provide associated installation and configuration 

documentation. There is also an effort to develop a general set of guidelines and test procedures 

focused on ICS performance impacts to fill the gaps where ICS and antivirus vendor guidance is not 

available [57]. 

Generally: 

 Windows, Unix, Linux systems, etc. used as consoles, engineering workstations, data historians, 

HMIs and general purpose SCADA and backup servers can be secured just like commercial IT 

equipment: install push- or auto-updated antivirus and patch management software with updates 

distributed via an antivirus server and patch management server located inside the process control 

network and auto-updated from the IT network 

 Follow vendor recommendations on all other servers and computers (DCS, PLC, instruments) that 

have time-dependent code, modified or extended the operating system or any other change that 

makes it different from any standard PC that one could buy at an office supply or computer store. 

Expect the vendor to make periodic maintenance releases that include security patches. 

6.2.6.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention 

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitor events on a network, such as traffic patterns, or a system, such 

as log entries or file accesses, so that they can identify an intruder breaking into or attempting to break 

into a system [58]. IDS ensure that unusual activity such as new open ports, unusual traffic patterns, or 

changes to critical operating system files is brought to the attention of the appropriate security personnel. 

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The two most commonly used types of IDS are: 

 Network-Based IDS. These systems monitor network traffic and generate alarms when they identify 

traffic that they deem to be an attack. 

 Host-Based IDS. This software monitors one or more types of characteristics of a system, such as 

application log file entries, system configuration changes, and access to sensitive data on a system 

and responds with an alarm or countermeasure when a user attempts to breach security. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

An effective IDS deployment typically involves both host-based and network-based IDS. In the 

current ICS environment, network-based IDS are most often deployed between the control network and 

the corporate network in conjunction with a firewall; host-based IDS are most often deployed on the 

computers that use general-purpose OSs or applications such as HMIs, SCADA servers, and 

engineering workstations. Properly configured, an IDS can greatly enhance the security management 

team’s ability to detect attacks entering or leaving the system, thereby improving security. They can 

also potentially improve a control network’s efficiency by detecting non-essential traffic on the 

network. However, even when IDS are implemented, security staff can primarily recognize individual 

attacks, as opposed to organized patterns of attacks over time. Additionally, care should be given to 

not confuse unusual ICS activity, such as during transient conditions, as an attack. 

Current IDS and IPS products are effective in detecting and preventing well-known Internet attacks, 

but until recently they have not addressed ICS protocol attacks. IDS and IPS vendors are beginning to 

develop and incorporate attack signatures for various ICS protocols such as Modbus, DNP, and ICCP. 

[59] Appendix D provides some additional information on emerging IDS capabilities. 

6.2.6.3 Patch Management 

Patches are additional pieces of code that have been developed to address specific problems or flaws in 

existing software. Vulnerabilities are flaws that can be exploited, enabling unauthorized access to IT 

systems or enabling users to have access to greater privileges than authorized. 

A systematic approach to managing and using software patches can help organizations to improve the 

overall security of their IT systems in a cost-effective way. Organizations that actively manage and use 

software patches can reduce the chances that the vulnerabilities in their IT systems can be exploited; in 

addition, they can save time and money that might be spent in responding to vulnerability-related 

incidents. 

NIST SP 800-40 Version 2 provides guidance for organizational security managers who are responsible 

for designing and implementing security patch and vulnerability management programs and for testing 

the effectiveness of the programs in reducing vulnerabilities. The guidance is also useful to system 

administrators and operations personnel who are responsible for applying and testing patches and for 

deploying solutions to vulnerability problems. 

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ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Applying patches to OS components creates another situation where significant care should be 

exercised in the ICS environment. Patches should be adequately tested (e.g., off-line on a comparable 

ICS) to determine the acceptability of side effects. Regression testing is advised. It is not uncommon 

for patches to have an adverse effect on other software. A patch may remove a vulnerability, but it can 

also introduce a greater risk from a production or safety perspective. Patching the vulnerability may 

also change the way the OS or application works with control applications, causing the control 

application to lose some of its functionality. Another issue is that many ICS utilize older versions of 

operating systems that are no longer supported by the vendor. Consequently, available patches may not 

be applicable. Organizations should implement a systematic, accountable, and documented ICS patch 

management process for managing exposure to vulnerabilities. 

Once the decision is made to deploy a patch, there are other tools that automate this process from a 

centralized server and with confirmation that the patch has been deployed correctly. Consider 

separating the automated process for ICS patch management from the automated process for non-ICS 

applications. Patching should be scheduled to occur during planned ICS outages. 

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6.2.7 Media Protection 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Media Protection (MP) family provide policies 

and procedures for limiting the access to media to authorized users. Controls also exist for labeling media 

for distribution and handling requirements, as well as storage, transport, sanitization (removal of 

information from digital media), destruction, and disposal of the media. 

Supplemental guidance for the MP controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-88 provides guidance on appropriate sanitization equipment, techniques, and 

procedures [79]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Media assets include removable media and devices such as floppy disks, CDs, DVDs and USB 

memory sticks, as well as printed reports and documents. Physical security controls should address 

specific requirements for the safe and secure maintenance of these assets and provide specific guidance 

for transporting, handling, and erasing or destroying these assets. Security requirements could include 

safe storage from loss, fire, theft, unintentional distribution, or environmental damage. If an adversary 

gains access to backup media associated with an ICS, it could provide valuable data for launching an 

attack. Recovering an authentication file from the backups might allow an adversary to run password 

cracking tools and extract usable passwords. In addition, the backups typically contain machine names, 

IP addresses, software version numbers, usernames, and other data useful in planning an attack. 

The use of any unauthorized CDs, DVDs, floppy disks, USB memory sticks, or similar removable 

media on any node that is part of or connected to the ICS should not be permitted in order to prevent 

the introduction of malware or the inadvertent loss or theft of data. Where the system components use 

unmodified industry standard protocols, mechanized policy management software can be used to 

enforce media protection policy.

6.2.8 Incident Response 

An incident response plan is documentation of a predetermined set of instructions or procedures to detect, 

respond to, and limit consequences of incidents against an organization’s information systems. Response 

should be measured first and foremost against the “service being provided”, not just the system that was 

compromised. If an incident is discovered, there should be a quick risk assessment performed to evaluate 

the effect of both the attack and the options to respond. For example, one possible response option is to 

physically isolate the system under attack. However, this may have such a dire impact on the service that 

it is dismissed as not viable. 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Incident Response (IR) family provide policies 

and procedures for incident response monitoring, handling, and reporting. The handling of a security 

incident includes preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery. Controls 

also cover incident response training for personnel and testing the incident response capability for an 

information system. 

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Supplemental guidance for the IR controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-61 provides guidance on incident handling and reporting [60]. 

 NIST SP 800-83 provides guidance on malware incident prevention and handling [61]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Regardless of the steps taken to protect an ICS, it is always possible that it may be compromised by an 

intentional or unintentional incident. The following symptoms can arise from normal network 

problems, but when several symptoms start to appear, a pattern may indicate the ICS is under attack 

and may be worth investigating further. If the adversary is skilled, it may not be very obvious that an 

attack is underway. 

The symptoms of an incident could include any of the following: 

 Unusually heavy network traffic 

 Out of disk space or significantly reduced free disk space 

 Unusually high CPU usage 

 Creation of new user accounts 

 Attempted or actual use of administrator-level accounts 

 Locked-out accounts 

 Account in-use when the user is not at work 

 Cleared log files 

 Full log files with unusually large number of events 

 Antivirus or IDS alerts 

 Disabled antivirus software and other security controls 

 Unexpected patch changes 

 Machines connecting to outside IP addresses 

 Requests for information about the system (social engineering attempts) 

 Unexpected changes in configuration settings 

 Unexpected system shutdown. 

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To minimize the effects of these intrusions, it is necessary to plan a response. Incident response 

planning defines procedures to be followed when an intrusion occurs. NIST SP 800-61, Computer 

Security Incident Handling Guide, provides guidance on incident response planning, which might 

include the following items: 

 Classification of Incidents. The various types of ICS incidents should be identified and classified 

as to potential impact so that a proper response can be formulated for each potential incident. 

 Response Actions. There are several responses that can be taken in the event of an incident. 

These range from doing nothing to full system shutdown (although full shutdown of an ICS is a 

highly unlikely response). The response taken will depend on the type of incident and its effect on 

the ICS system and the physical process being controlled. A written plan documenting the types of 

incidents and the response to each type should be prepared. This will provide guidance during 

times when there might be confusion or stress due to the incident. This plan should include stepby-step actions to be taken by the various organizations. If there are reporting requirements, these 

should be noted as well as where the report should be made and phone numbers to reduce reporting 

confusion. 

 Recovery Actions. The results of the intrusion could be minor, or the intrusion could cause many 

problems in the ICS. Risk analysis should be conducted to determine the sensitivity of the physical 

system being controlled to failure modes in the ICS. In each case, step-by-step recovery actions 

should be documented so that the system can be returned to normal operations as quickly and 

safely as possible. 

During the preparation of the incident response plan, input should be obtained from the various 

stakeholders including operations, engineering, IT, system support vendors, management, organized 

labor, legal, and safety. These stakeholders should also review and approve the plan. 

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6.2.9 Awareness and Training 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Awareness and Training (AT) family provide 

policy and procedures for ensuring that all users of an information system are provided basic information 

system security awareness and training materials before authorization to access the system is granted. 

Personnel training must be monitored and documented. 

Supplemental guidance for the AT controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-16 provides guidance on security training requirements 

 NIST SP 800-50 provides guidance on security awareness training [62]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

For the ICS environment, this must include control system-specific information security awareness and 

training for specific ICS applications. In addition, an organization must identify, document, and train 

all personnel with significant ICS roles and responsibilities. Awareness and training must cover the 

physical process being controlled as well as the ICS. 

Security awareness is a critical part of ICS incident prevention, particularly when it comes to social 

engineering threats. Social engineering is a technique used to manipulate individuals into giving away 

private information, such as passwords. This information can then be used to compromise otherwise 

secure systems. 

Implementing an ICS security program may bring changes to the way in which personnel access 

computer programs, applications, and the computer desktop itself. Organizations should design 

effective training programs and communication vehicles to help employees understand why new access 

and control methods are required, ideas they can use to reduce risks, and the impact on the organization 

if control methods are not incorporated. Training programs also demonstrate management’s 

commitment to, and the value of, a cyber security program. Feedback from staff exposed to this type 

of training can be a valuable source of input for refining the charter and scope of the security program. 

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6.3 Technical Controls 

Technical controls are the security countermeasures for an ICS that are primarily implemented and 

executed by the system through mechanisms contained in the hardware, software, or firmware 

components of the system. As discussed in detail in the following subsections, NIST SP 800-53 defines 

four families of controls within the Technical controls class: 

 Identification and Authentication (IA): the process of verifying the identity of a user, process, or 

device, as a prerequisite for granting access to resources in an IT system. 

 Access Control (AC): the process of granting or denying specific requests for obtaining and using 

information and related information processing services for physical access to areas within the 

information system environment. 

 Audit and Accountability (AU): independent review and examination of records and activities to 

assess the adequacy of system controls, to ensure compliance with established policies and 

operational procedures, and to recommend necessary changes in controls, policies, or procedures. 

 System and Communications Protection (SC): mechanisms for protecting both system and data 

transmission components. 

These technical controls are discussed in more detail in the sections to follow. ICS specific 

recommendations and guidance, if available, is provided in an outlined box for each section. 

Additional ICS specific guidance pertaining to technical controls can be found in ISA TR99.00.01 [34]

and the EPRI report: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems Security Guide [63]. 

6.3.1 Identification and Authentication 

Authentication describes the process of positively identifying potential network users, hosts, applications, 

services, and resources using a combination of identification factors or credentials. The result of this 

authentication process then becomes the basis for permitting or denying further actions (e.g., when an 

automatic teller machine asks for a PIN). Based on the authentication determination, the system may or 

may not allow the potential user access to its resources. Authorization is the process of determining who 

and what should be allowed to have access to a particular resource; access control is the mechanism for 

enforcing authorization. Access control is described in Section 6.3.2. 

There are several possible factors for determining the authenticity of a person, device, or system, 

including something you know, something you have or something you are. For example, authentication 

could be based on something known (e.g., PIN number or password), something possessed (e.g., key, 

dongle, smart card), a biological characteristic such as a fingerprint or retinal signature, a location (e.g., 

Global Positioning System [GPS] location access), the time a request is made, or a combination of these 

attributes. In general, the more factors that are used in the authentication process, the more robust the 

process will be. When two or more factors are used, the process is known generically as multi-factor 

authentication. 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Identification and Authentication (IA) family 

provide policy and guidance for the identification and authentication of users of and devices within the 

information system. These include controls to manage identifiers and authenticators within each 

technology used (e.g., tokens, certificates, biometrics, passwords, key cards). 

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Supplemental guidance for the IA controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-63 provides guidance on remote electronic authentication [54]. 

 NIST SP 800-73 provides guidance on interfaces for personal identity verification [50]. 

 NIST SP 800-76 provides guidance on biometrics for personal identity verification [51]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Computer systems in ICS environments typically rely on traditional passwords for authentication. 

Control system suppliers often supply systems with default passwords. These passwords are factory set 

and are often easy to guess or are changed infrequently, which creates additional security risks. Also, 

protocols currently used in ICS environments generally have inadequate or no network service 

authentication. There are now several forms of authentication available in addition to traditional 

password techniques being used with ICS. Some of these, including password authentication, are 

presented in the following sections with discussions regarding their use with ICS. 

6.3.1.1 Password Authentication 

Password authentication technologies determine authenticity based on testing for something the device or 

human requesting access should know, such as a PIN number or password. Password authentication 

schemes are thought of as the simplest and most common forms of authentication. 

Password vulnerabilities can be reduced by using an active password checker that prohibits weak, 

recently used, or commonly used passwords. Another weakness is the ease of third-party eavesdropping. 

Passwords typed at a keypad or keyboard are easily observed or recorded, especially in areas where 

adversaries could plant tiny wireless cameras or keystroke loggers. Network service authentication often 

transmits passwords as plaintext (unencrypted), allowing any network capture tool to expose the 

passwords. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

One problem with passwords unique to the ICS environment is that a user’s ability to recall and enter a 

password may be impacted by the stress of the moment. During a major crisis when human 

intervention is critically required to control the process, an operator may panic and have difficulty 

remembering or entering the password and either be locked out completely or be delayed in responding 

to the event. Biometric identifiers may have similar drawbacks. It is recommended not to use 

password authorizations on these critical control systems but instead to use other compensating 

controls, such as rigorous physical security controls. 

Some ICS operating systems make setting secure passwords difficult, as the password size is very small 

and the system allows only group passwords at each level of access, not individual passwords. Some 

industrial (and Internet) protocols transmit passwords in plaintext, making them susceptible to 

interception. In cases where this practice cannot be avoided, it is important that users have different 

(and unrelated) passwords for use with encrypted and non-encrypted protocols. 

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The following are general recommendations and considerations with regards to the use of passwords. 

Specific recommendations are presented in ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 [27]. 

 The length, strength, and complexity of passwords should balance security and operational ease of 

access within the capabilities of the software and underlying OS. 

 Passwords should have appropriate length and complexity for the required security. In particular, 

they should not be able to be found in a dictionary or contain predictable sequences of numbers or 

letters. 

 Passwords should be used with care on operator interface devices such as control consoles on 

critical processes. Using passwords on these consoles could introduce potential safety issues if 

operators are locked out or delayed access during critical events. Physical security should 

supplement operator control consoles when password protection is not feasible. 

 The keeper of master passwords should be a trusted employee, available during emergencies. Any 

copies of the master passwords must be stored in a very secure location with limited access. 

 The passwords of privileged users (such as network technicians, electrical or electronics 

technicians and management, and network designers/operators) should be most secure and be 

changed frequently. Authority to change master passwords should be limited to trusted employees. 

A password audit record, especially for master passwords, should be maintained separately from 

the control system. 

 In environments with a high risk of interception or intrusion (such as remote operator interfaces in 

a facility that lacks local physical security access controls), organizations should consider 

supplementing password authentication with other forms of authentication such as 

challenge/response or two-factor authentication using biometric or physical tokens. 

 For user authentication purposes, password use is common and generally acceptable for users 

logging directly into a local device or computer. Passwords should not be sent across any network 

unless protected by some form of FIPS-approved encryption or salted cryptographic hash 

specifically designed to prevent replay attacks. It is assumed that the device used to enter a 

password is connected to the network in a secure manner. 

 For network service authentication purposes, passwords should be avoided if possible. There are 

more secure alternatives available, such as challenge/response or public key authentication. 

6.3.1.2 Challenge/response Authentication 

Challenge/response authentication requires that both the service requester and service provider know a 

“secret” code in advance. When service is requested, the service provider sends a random number or 

string as a challenge to the service requester. The service requester uses the secret code to generate a 

unique response for the service provider. If the response is as expected, it proves that the service 

requester has access to the “secret” without ever exposing the secret on the network.

Challenge/response authentication addresses the security vulnerabilities of traditional password 

authentication. When passwords (hashed or plain) are sent across a network, a portion of the actual 

“secret” itself is being sent. Authentication is performed by giving the secret to the remote device. 

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6.3.1.3 Physical Token Authentication 

Physical or token authentication is similar to password authentication, except that these technologies 

determine authenticity by testing for secret code or key produced by a device or token the person 

requesting access has in their possession, such as security tokens or smart cards. Increasingly, private 

keys are being embedded in physical devices such as USB dongles. Some tokens support single-factor 

authentication only, so that simply having possession of the token is sufficient to be authenticated. Others 

support two-factor authentication that requires knowledge of a PIN or password in addition to possessing 

the token. 

The primary vulnerability that token authentication addresses is easily duplicating a secret code or sharing 

it with others. It eliminates the all-too-common scenario of a password to a “secure” system being left on 

the wall next to a PC or operator station. The security token cannot be duplicated without special access 

to equipment and supplies. A second benefit is that the secret within a physical token can be very large, 

physically secure, and randomly generated. Because it is embedded in metal or silicon, it does not have 

the same risks that manually entered passwords do. If a security token is lost or stolen, the authorized 

user loses access, unlike traditional passwords that can be lost or stolen without notice. 

Common forms of physical/token authentication include: 

 Traditional physical lock and keys 

 Security cards (e.g., magnetic, smart chip, optical coding) 

 Radio frequency devices in the form of cards, key fobs, or mounted tags 

 Dongles with secure encryption keys that attach to the USB, serial, or parallel ports of computers 

 One-time authentication code generators (e.g., key fobs) 

For single-factor authentication, the largest weakness is that physically holding the token means access is 

granted (e.g., anyone finding a set of lost keys now has access to whatever they open). Physical/token 

authentication is more secure when combined with a second form of authentication, such as a memorized 

PIN used along with the token. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Two-factor authentication is an accepted good practice for access to ICS applications from outside the 

ICS firewall. 

Physical/token authentication has the potential for a strong role in ICS environments. An access card 

or other token can be an effective form of authentication for computer access, as long as the computer 

is in a secure area (e.g., once the operator has gained access to the room with appropriate secondary 

authentication, the card alone can be used to enable control actions). 

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6.3.1.4 Biometric Authentication 

Biometric authentication technologies determine authenticity by determining presumably unique 

biological characteristics of the human requesting access. Usable biometric features include finger 

minutiae, facial geometry, retinal and iris signatures, voice patterns, typing patterns, and hand geometry. 

Like physical tokens and smart cards, biometric authentication enhances software-only solutions, such as 

password authentication, by offering an additional authentication factor and removing the human element 

in memorizing complex secrets. In addition, since biometric characteristics are unique to a given 

individual, biometric authentication addresses the issues of lost or stolen physical tokens and smart cards. 

Noted issues with biometric authentication include: 

 Distinguishing a real object from a fake (e.g., how to distinguish a real human finger from a siliconrubber cast of one or a real human voice from a recorded one). 

 Generating type-I and type-II errors (the probability of rejecting a valid biometric image, and the 

probability of accepting an invalid biometric image, respectively). Biometric authentication devices 

should be configured to the lowest crossover between these two probabilities, also known as the 

crossover error rate. 

 Handling environmental factors such as temperature and humidity to which some biometric devices 

are sensitive. 

 Addressing industrial applications where employees may have on safety glasses and/or gloves and 

industrial chemicals may impact biometric scanners. 

 Retraining biometric scanners that occasionally “drift” over time. Human biometric traits may also 

shift over time, necessitating periodic scanner retraining. 

 Requiring face-to-face technical support and verification for device training, unlike a password that 

can be given over a phone or an access card that can be handed out by a receptionist. 

 Denying needed access to the control system because of a temporary inability of the sensing device to 

acknowledge a legitimate user. 

 Being socially acceptable. Users consider some biometric authentication devices more acceptable 

than others. For example, retinal scans may be considered very low on the scale of acceptability, 

while thumb print scanners may be considered high on the scale of acceptability. Users of biometric 

authentication devices will need to take social acceptability for their target group into consideration 

when selecting among various biometric authentication technologies. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Biometric devices make a useful secondary check versus other forms of authentication that can become 

lost or borrowed. Using biometric authentication in combination with token-based access control or 

badge-operated employee time clocks increases the security level. A possible application is in a control 

room that is environmentally controlled and physically secured [34]. 

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6.3.2 Access Control 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 Access Control (AC) family provide policies 

and procedures for specifying the use of system resources by only authorized users, programs, processes, 

or other systems. This family specifies controls for managing information system accounts, including 

establishment, activating, modifying, reviewing, disabling, and removing accounts. Controls cover access 

and flow enforcement issues such as separation of duties, least privilege, unsuccessful login attempts, 

system use notification, previous logon notification, concurrent session control, session lock, and session 

termination. There are also controls to address the use of portable and remote devices and personally 

owned information systems to access the information system as well as the use of remote access 

capabilities and the implementation of wireless technologies. 

Access can take several forms, including viewing, using, and altering specific data or device functions. 

Supplemental guidance for the AC controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-63 provides guidance on remote electronic authentication [54]. 

 NIST SP 800-48 provides guidance on wireless network security with particular emphasis on the 

IEEE 802.11b and Bluetooth standards [64]. 

 NIST SP 800-97 provides guidance on IEEE 802.11i wireless network security [65]. 

 FIPS 201 requirements for the personal identity verification of federal employees and contractors 

[66]. 

 NIST SP 800-96 provides guidance on PIV card to reader interoperability [67]. 

 NIST SP 800-73 provides guidance on interfaces for personal identity verification [50]. 

 NIST SP 800-76 provides guidance on biometrics for personal identity verification [51]. 

 NIST SP 800-78 provides guidance on cryptographic algorithms and key sizes for personal identity 

verification [68]. 

If the new federal Personal Identity Verification (PIV) is used as an identification token, the access 

control system should conform to the requirements of FIPS 201 and NIST SP 800-73 and employ either 

cryptographic verification or biometric verification. When token-based access control employs 

cryptographic verification, the access control system should conform to the requirements of NIST SP 

800-78. When token-based access control employs biometric verification, the access control system 

should conform to the requirements of NIST SP 800-76. 

Access control technologies are filter and blocking technologies designed to direct and regulate the flow 

of information between devices or systems once authorization has been determined. The following 

sections present several access control technologies and their use with ICS. 

6.3.2.1 Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 

RBAC is a technology that has the potential to reduce the complexity and cost of security administration 

in networks with large numbers of intelligent devices. Under RBAC, security administration is simplified 

through the use of roles, hierarchies, and constraints to organize user access levels. RBAC reduces costs 

within an organization because it accepts that employees change roles and responsibilities more 

frequently than the duties within roles and responsibilities. 

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ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

RBAC can be used to provide a uniform means to manage access to ICS devices while reducing the 

cost of maintaining individual device access levels and minimizing errors. RBAC should be used to 

restrict ICS user privileges to only those that are required to perform each person’s job (i.e., 

configuring each role based on the principle of least privilege). 

6.3.2.2 Web Servers 

Web and Internet technologies are being added to a wide variety of ICS products because they make 

information more accessible and products more user-friendly and easier to configure remotely. However, 

they may also add cyber risks and create new security vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

SCADA and historian software vendors typically provide Web servers as a product option so that users 

outside the control room can access ICS information. In many cases, software components such as 

ActiveX controls or Java applets must be installed or downloaded onto each client machine accessing 

the Web server. Some products, such as PLCs and other control devices, are available with embedded 

Web, FTP, and e-mail servers to make them easier to configure remotely and allow them to generate email notifications and reports when certain conditions occur. When feasible, use HTTPS rather than 

HTTP, use SFTP or SCP rather than FTP, block inbound FTP and e-mail traffic, etc. 

6.3.2.3 Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) 

VLANs divide physical networks into smaller logical networks to increase performance, improve 

manageability, and simplify network design. VLANs are achieved through configuration of Ethernet 

switches. Each VLAN consists of a single broadcast domain that isolates traffic from other VLANs. Just 

as replacing hubs with switches reduces collisions, using VLANs limits the broadcast traffic, as well as 

allowing logical subnets to span multiple physical locations. There are two categories of VLANs: 

 Static, often referred to as port-based, where switch ports are assigned to a VLAN so that it is 

transparent to the end user 

 Dynamic, where an end device negotiates VLAN characteristics with the switch or determines the 

VLAN based on the IP or hardware addresses. 

Although more than one IP subnet may coexist on the same VLAN, the general recommendation is to use 

a one-to-one relationship between subnets and VLANs. This practice requires the use of a router or 

multi-layer switch to join multiple VLANs. Many routers and firewalls support tagged frames so that a 

single physical interface can be used to route between multiple logical networks. 

VLANs are not typically deployed to address host or network vulnerabilities in the way that firewalls or 

IDS are deployed. However, when properly configured, VLANs do allow switches to enforce security 

policies and segregate traffic at the Ethernet layer. Properly segmented networks can also mitigate the 

risks of broadcast storms that may result from port scanning or worm activity. 

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Switches have been susceptible to attacks such as MAC spoofing, table overflows, and attacks against the 

spanning tree protocols, depending on the device and its configuration. VLAN hopping, the ability for an 

attack to inject frames to unauthorized ports, has been demonstrated using switch spoofing or doubleencapsulated frames. These attacks cannot be conducted remotely and require local physical access to the 

switch. A variety of features such as MAC address filtering, port-based authentication using IEEE 

802.1x, and specific vendor recommended practices can be used to mitigate these attacks, depending on 

the device and implementation. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

VLANs have been effectively deployed in ICS networks, with each automation cell assigned to a single 

VLAN to limit unnecessary traffic flooding and allow network devices on the same VLAN to span 

multiple switches [34]. 

6.3.2.4 Dial-up Modems 

ICS systems have stringent reliability and availability requirements. When there is a need to troubleshoot 

and repair, the technical resources may not be physically located at the control room or facility. 

Therefore, ICS often use modems to enable vendors, system integrators, or control engineers maintaining 

the system to dial in and diagnose, repair, configure, and perform maintenance on the network or 

component. While this allows easy access for authorized personnel, if the dial-up modems are not 

properly secured, they can also provide backdoor entries for unauthorized use. 

Dial-up often uses remote control software that gives the remote user powerful (administrative or root) 

access to the target system. Such software usually has security options that should be carefully reviewed 

and configured. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance

 Consider using callback systems when dial-up modems are installed in an ICS. This ensures that a 

dialer is an authorized user by having the modem establish the working connection based on the 

dialer’s information and a callback number stored in the ICS approved authorized user list. 

 Ensure that default passwords have been changed and strong passwords are in place for each 

modem. 

 Physically identify modems in use to the control room operators. 

 Configure remote control software to use unique user names and passwords, strong authentication, 

encryption if determined appropriate, and audit logs. Use of this software by remote users should 

be monitored on an almost real-time frequency. 

 If feasible, disconnect modems when not in use or consider automating this disconnection process 

by having modems disconnect after being on for a given amount of time. It should be noted that 

sometimes modem connections are part of the legal support service agreement with the vendor 

(e.g., 24x7 support with 15 minute response time). Personnel should to be aware that 

disconnecting/removing the modems may require that contracts be renegotiated. 

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6.3.2.5 Wireless 

The use of wireless within an ICS is a risk-based decision that has to be determined by the organization. 

Generally, wireless LANs should only be deployed where health, safety, environmental, and financial 

implications are low. NIST SP 800-48 and SP 800-97 provide guidance on wireless network security. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Wireless LANs 

 Prior to installation, a wireless survey should be performed to determine antenna location and 

strength to minimize exposure of the wireless network. The survey should take into account the 

fact that attackers can use powerful directional antennas, which extend the effective range of a 

wireless LAN beyond the expected standard range. Faraday cages and other methods are also 

available to minimize exposure of the wireless network outside of the designated areas. 

 Wireless users’ access should utilize IEEE 802.1x authentication using a secure authentication 

protocol (e.g., Extensible Authentication Protocol [EAP] with TLS [EAP-TLS]) that authenticates 

users via a user certificates or a Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) server. 

 The wireless access points and data servers for wireless worker devices should be located on an 

isolated network with documented and minimal (single if possible) connections to the ICS network. 

 Wireless access points should be configured to have a unique service set identifier (SSID), disable 

SSID broadcast, and enable MAC filtering at a minimum. 

 Wireless devices, if being utilized in a Microsoft Windows ICS network, should be configured into 

a separate organizational unit of the Windows domain. 

 Wireless device communications should be encrypted and integrity-protected. The encryption 

must not degrade the operational performance of the end device. Encryption at OSI Layer 2 

should be considered, rather than at Layer 3 to reduce encryption latency. The use of hardware 

accelerators to perform cryptographic functions should also be considered. 

For mesh networks, consider the use of broadcast key versus public key management implemented at 

OSI Layer 2 to maximize performance. Asymmetric cryptography should be used to perform 

administrative functions, and symmetric encryption should be used to secure each data stream as well 

as network control traffic. An adaptive routing protocol should be considered if the devices are to be 

used for wireless mobility. The convergence time of the network should be as fast as possible 

supporting rapid network recovery in the event of a failure or power loss. The use of a mesh network 

may provide fault tolerance thru alternate route selection and pre-emptive fail-over of the network. 

Wireless field networks 

The ISA-SP10019 Committee is working to establish standards, recommended practices, technical 

reports, and related information that will define procedures for implementing wireless systems in the 

automation and control environment with a focus on the field level (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4). Guidance is 

directed towards those responsible for the complete life cycle including the designing, implementing, 

on-going maintenance, scalability or managing manufacturing and control systems, and shall apply to 

users, system integrators, practitioners, and control systems manufacturers and vendors. 

 

19 Additional information on ISA-SP100 at: http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=1134&CommitteeID=6891

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6.3.3 Audit and Accountability 

An audit is an independent review and examination of records and activities to assess the adequacy of 

system controls, to ensure compliance with established policies and operational procedures, and to 

recommend necessary changes in controls, policies, or procedures. The security controls that fall within 

the NIST SP 800-53 Audit and Accountability (AU) family provide policies and procedures for 

generating audit records, their content, capacity, and retention requirements. The controls also provide 

safeguards to react to problems such as an audit failure or audit log capacity being reached. Audit data 

should be protected from modification and be designed with non-repudiation capability. 

Supplemental guidance for the AU controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-12 provides guidance on security policies and procedures [39]. 

 NIST SP 800-61 provides guidance on computer security incident handling and audit log retention 

[60]. 

 NIST SP 800-92 provides guidance on log management (including audit logs) [69]

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

It is necessary to determine that the system is performing as intended. Periodic audits of the ICS 

should be performed to validate the following items: 

 The security controls present during system validation testing (e.g., factory acceptance testing and 

site acceptance testing) are still installed and operating correctly in the production system. 

 The production system is free from security compromises and provides information on the nature 

and extent of compromises as feasible, should they occur. 

 The management of change program is being rigorously followed with an audit trail of reviews and 

approvals for all changes. 

The results from each periodic audit should be expressed in the form of performance against a set of 

predefined and appropriate metrics to display security performance and security trends. Security 

performance metrics should be sent to the appropriate stakeholders, along with a view of security 

performance trends. 

Traditionally, the primary basis for audit in IT systems has been recordkeeping. Using appropriate 

tools within an ICS environment requires extensive knowledge from an IT professional familiar with 

the ICS, critical production and safety implications for the facility. Many of the process control 

devices that are integrated into the ICS have been installed for many years and do not have the 

capability to provide the audit records described in this section. Therefore, the applicability of these 

more modern tools for auditing system and network activity is dependent upon the capabilities of the 

components in the ICS. 

The critical tasks in managing a network in an ICS environment are ensuring reliability and availability 

to support safe and efficient operation. In regulated industries, regulatory compliance can add 

complexity to security and authentication management, registry and installation integrity management, 

and all functions that can augment an installation and operational qualification exercise. Diligent use 

of auditing and log management tools can provide valuable assistance in maintaining and proving the 

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integrity of the ICS from installation through the system life cycle. The value of these tools in this 

environment can be calculated by the effort required to re-qualify or otherwise retest the ICS where the 

integrity due to attack, accident, or error is in question. The system should provide reliable, 

synchronized time stamps in support of the audit tools. 

Monitoring of sensors, logs, IDS, antivirus, patch management, policy management software, and other 

security mechanisms should be done on a real-time basis where feasible. A first-line monitoring 

service would receive alarms, do rapid initial problem determination and take action to alert 

appropriate facility personnel to intervene. 

System auditing utilities should be incorporated into new and existing ICS projects. These auditing 

utilities should be tested (e.g., off-line on a comparable ICS) before being deployed on an operational 

ICS. These tools can provide tangible records of evidence and system integrity. Additionally, active 

log management utilities may actually flag an attack or event in progress and provide location and 

tracing information to help respond to the incident [34]. 

There should be a method for tracing all console activities to a user, either manually (e.g., control room 

sign in) or automatic (e.g., login at the application and/or OS layer). Policies and procedures for what 

is logged, how the logs are stored (or printed), how they are protected, who has access to the logs and 

how/when are they reviewed should be developed. These policies and procedures will vary with the 

ICS application and platform. Legacy systems typically employ printer loggers, which are reviewed by 

administrative, operational, and security staff. Logs maintained by the ICS application may be stored 

at various locations and may or may not be encrypted. 

6.3.4 System and Communications Protection 

The security controls that fall within the NIST SP 800-53 System and Communications Protection (SC) 

family provide policy and procedures for protecting systems and data communications components. 

Supplemental guidance for the SC controls can be found in the following documents: 

 NIST SP 800-28 provides guidance on active content and mobile code [70]. 

 NIST SP 800-52 provides guidance on Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations [71]

 NIST SP 800-56 provides guidance on cryptographic key establishment [72]. 

 NIST SP 800-57 provides guidance on cryptographic key management [73]. 

 NIST SP 800-58 provides guidance on security considerations for VoIP technologies [74]. 

 NIST SP 800-63 provides guidance on remote electronic authentication [54]. 

 NIST SP 800-77 provides guidance on IPsec VPNs [75]. 

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6.3.4.1 Encryption 

Encryption is the cryptographic transformation of data (called plaintext) into a form (called ciphertext) 

that conceals the data’s original meaning to prevent it from being known or used. If the transformation is 

reversible, the corresponding reversal process is called decryption, which is a transformation that restores 

encrypted data to its original state [76]. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

Before deploying encryption, first determine if encryption is an appropriate solution for the specific 

ICS application, because authentication and integrity are generally the key security issues for ICS 

applications. Other cryptographic solutions such as cryptographic hashes should also be considered. 

The use of encryption within an ICS environment could introduce communications latency due to the 

additional time and computing resources required to encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate each message. 

For ICS, any latency induced from the use of encryption, or any other security technique, must not 

degrade the operational performance of the end device or system. Encryption at OSI Layer 2 should be 

considered, rather than at Layer 3 to reduce encryption latency. 

In addition, encrypted messages are often larger than unencrypted messages due to one or more of the 

following: 

 Additional checksums to reduce errors 

 Protocols to control the cryptography 

 Padding (for block ciphers) 

 Authentication procedures 

 Other required cryptographic processes. 

Cryptography also introduces key management issues. Sound security policies require periodic key 

changes. This process becomes more difficult as the geographic size of the ICS increases, with 

extensive SCADA systems being the most severe example. Because site visits to change keys can be 

costly and slow, it is useful to be able to change keys remotely. 

If cryptography is selected, the most effective safeguard is to use a complete cryptographic system 

approved by the NIST/ Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Cryptographic Module 

Validation Program (CMVP)20. Within this program standards are maintained to ensure that 

cryptographic systems were studied carefully for weaknesses by a wide range of experts, rather than 

being developed by a few engineers in a single organization. At a minimum, certification makes it 

probable that: 

 Some method (such as counter mode) will be used to ensure that the same message does not 

generate the same value each time 

 ICS messages are protected against replay and forging 

 Key management is secure throughout the life cycle of the key 

 

20 Information on the CMVP can be found on the CMVP web site http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/cmvp.htm 

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 The system is using an effective random number generator 

 The entire system has been implemented securely. 

Even then, the technology is only effective if it is an integral part of an effectively enforced information 

security policy. American Gas Association (AGA) report 12-1 [5] contains an example of such a 

security policy. While it is directed toward a natural gas SCADA system, many of its policy 

recommendations could apply to any ICS. 

For an ICS, encryption can be deployed as part of a comprehensive, enforced security policy. 

Organizations should select cryptographic protection based on a risk assessment and the identified 

value of the information being protected and ICS operating constraints. Specifically, a cryptographic 

key should be long enough so that guessing it or determining it through analysis takes more effort, 

time, and cost than the value of the protected asset. 

The encryption hardware should be protected from physical tampering and uncontrolled electronic 

connections. Assuming cryptography is the appropriate solution, organizations should select 

cryptographic protection with remote key management if the units being protected are so numerous or 

geographically dispersed that changing keys is difficult or expensive. [34]

6.3.4.2 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 

One method of encrypting communication data is through a VPN, which is a private network that 

operates as an overlay on a public infrastructure, so that the private network can function across a public 

network. The most common types of VPN technologies implemented today are: 

 Internet Protocol Security (IPsec). IPsec is a set of standards defined by IETF to govern the secure 

communications of data across public networks at the IP layer. IPsec is included in many current 

operating systems. The intent of the standards is to guarantee interoperability across vendor 

platforms; however, the reality is that the determination of interoperability of multi-vendor 

implementations depends on specific implementation testing conducted by the end-user organization. 

IPsec supports two encryption modes: transport and tunnel. Transport mode encrypts only the data 

portion (payload) of each packet, but leaves the header untouched. The more secure tunnel mode 

adds a new header to each packet and encrypts both the original header and the payload. On the 

receiving side, an IPsec-compliant device decrypts each packet. The protocol has been continually 

enhanced to address specific requirements, such as extensions to the protocol to address individual 

user authentication and NAT device transversal. These extensions are typically vendor-specific and 

can lead to interoperability issues primarily in host-to-security gateway environments. NIST SP 800-

77 provides guidance on IPsec VPNs. 

 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). SSL provides a secure channel between two machines that encrypts 

the contents of each packet. The IETF made slight modifications to the SSL version 3 protocol and 

created a new protocol called Transport Layer Security (TLS). The terms “SSL” and “TLS” are often 

used interchangeably, and this document generically uses the SSL terminology. SSL is most often 

recognized for securing HTTP traffic; this protocol implementation is known as HTTP Secure 

(HTTPS). However, SSL is not limited to HTTP traffic; it can be used to secure many different 

application layer programs. SSL-based VPN products have gained acceptance because of the market 

for “clientless” VPN products. These products use standard Web browsers as clients, which have 

built-in SSL support. The “clientless” term means that there is no need to install or configure third6-34
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party VPN “client” software on users’ systems. NIST SP 800-52 provides guidance on SSL 

configuration. 

 Secure Shell (SSH). SSH is a command interface and protocol for securely gaining access to a 

remote computer. It is widely used by network administrators to remotely control Web servers and 

other types of servers. The latest version, SSH2, is a proposed set of standards from the IETF. 

Typically, SSH is deployed as a secure alternative to a telnet application. SSH is included in most 

UNIX distributions, and is typically added to other platforms through a third-party package. 

ICS Specific Recommendations and Guidance 

VPNs are most often used in the ICS environment to provide secure access from an untrusted network 

to the ICS control network. Untrusted networks can range from the Internet to the corporate LAN. 

Properly configured, VPNs can greatly restrict access to and from control system host computers and 

controllers, thereby improving security. They can also potentially improve control network 

responsiveness by removing unauthorized non-essential traffic from the intermediary network. VPN 

devices used to protect control systems should be thoroughly tested to verify that the VPN technology 

is compatible with the application and implementation of the VPN devices does not unacceptably affect 

network traffic characteristics [34]. 

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Appendix A—Acronyms and Abbreviations 

Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in the Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security are 

defined below. 

AC Access Control 

AC Alternating Current 

ACL Access Control List 

AGA American Gas Association 

API American Petroleum Institute 

ARP Address Resolution Protocol 

BCP Business Continuity Plan 

CC Common Criteria 

CD Compact Disc 

CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol 

CIDX Chemical Industry Data Exchange 

CIGRE International Council on Large Electric Systems 

CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 

CIPC Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee 

CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program 

COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 

CPNI Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 

CPU Central Processing Unit 

CSE Communications Security Establishment 

CSRC Computer Security Resource Center 

CSSC Control System Security Center 

CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 

DCOM Distributed Component Object Model 

DCS Distributed Control System(s) 

DETL Distributed Energy Technology Laboratory 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DMZ Demilitarized Zone 

DNP Distributed Network Protocol 

DNS Domain Name System 

DOE Department of Energy 

DoS Denial of Service 

DRP Disaster Recovery Plan 

DVD Digital Video Disc 

EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol 

EMS Energy Management System 

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute 

ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards 

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act 

FTP File Transfer Protocol 

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GAO Government Accountability Office 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HMI Human-Machine Interface 

HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 

HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning 

I/O Input/Output 

I3P Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 

IAONA Industrial Automation Open Networking Association 

ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol 

ICS Industrial Control System(s) 

IDS Intrusion Detection System 

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 

IED Intelligent Electronic Device 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 

IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol 

INL Idaho National Laboratory 

IO Input/Output 

IP Internet Protocol 

IPS Intrusion Prevention System 

IPsec Internet Protocol Security 

ISA The Instrumentation Systems and Automation Society 

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

ISID Industrial Security Incident Database 

ISO International Organization for Standardization 

IT Information Technology 

ITL Information Technology Laboratory 

LAN Local Area Network 

MAC Media Access Control 

MES Manufacturing Execution System 

MIB Management Information Base 

MTU Master Terminal Unit (also Master Telemetry Unit) 

NAT Network Address Translation 

NCSD National Cyber Security Division 

NERC North American Electric Reliability Council 

NFS Network File System 

NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership 

NIC Network Interface Card 

NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 

NISCC National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NSTB National SCADA Testbed 

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OEA Office of Energy Assurance 

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturers 

OLE Object Linking and Embedding 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPC OLE for Process Control 

OS Operating System 

OSI Open Systems Interconnection 

PCN Process Control Network 

PCSF Process Control System Forum 

PCSRF Process Control Security Requirements Forum 

PDA Personal Digital Assistant 

PEAP Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol 

PIN Personal Identification Number 

PID Proportional – Integral - Derivative 

PIV Personal Identity Verification 

PLC Programmable Logic Controller 

PP Protection Profile 

PPP Point-to-Point Protocol 

R&D Research and Development 

RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service 

RBAC Role-Based Access Control 

RF Radio Frequency 

RFC Request for Comments 

RMA Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 

RPC Remote Procedure Call 

RPO Recovery Point Objective 

RTO Recovery Time Objective 

RTU Remote Terminal Unit (also Remote Telemetry Unit) 

SC Security Category 

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 

SCP Secure Copy 

SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol 

SIS Safety Instrumented System 

SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 

SNL Sandia National Laboratories 

SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol 

SP Special Publication 

SPP-ICS System Protection Profile for Industrial Control Systems 

SQL Structured Query Language 

SRP Salt River Project 

SSH Secure Shell 

SSID Service Set Identifier 

SSL Secure Sockets Layer 

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TCP Transmission Control Protocol 

TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 

TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol 

TLS Transport Layer Security 

UDP User Datagram Protocol 

UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply 

US-CERT United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

USB Universal Serial Bus 

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

VFD Variable Frequency Drive 

VLAN Virtual Local Area Network 

VPN Virtual Private Network 

WAN Wide Area Network 

XML Extensible Markup Language 

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Appendix B—Glossary of Terms 

Selected terms used in the Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security are defined below. Source 

References for certain definitions are listed at the end of this appendix. 

Synonymous with Variable Frequency Drive (VFD). [28] Alternating 

Current (AC) Drive 

Access Control List 

(ACL) 

A mechanism that implements access control for a system resource by 

enumerating the identities of the system entities that are permitted to access the 

resources. [1]

Accreditation The official management decision given by a senior agency official to authorize 

operation of an information system and to explicitly accept the risk to agency 

operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or 

individuals, based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of security 

controls. [11]

Actuator A pneumatic, hydraulic, or electrically powered device that supplies force and 

motion so as to position a valve’s closure member at or between the open or closed 

position. [22]

Alarm A device or function that signals the existence of an abnormal condition by 

making an audible or visible discrete change, or both, so as to attract attention to 

that condition. [20]

Antivirus Tools Software products and technology used to detect malicious code, prevent it from 

infecting a system, and remove malicious code that has infected the system. 

A computer responsible for hosting applications to user workstations. [28] Application Server 

Attack An attempt to gain unauthorized access to system services, resources, or 

information, or an attempt to compromise system integrity, availability, or 

confidentiality.[2]

Attackers Someone with a strong interest in computers, who enjoys learning about them and 

experimenting with them. [1]

Authentication Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a prerequisite to 

allowing access to resources in an information system. [11]

Authorization The right or a permission that is granted to a system entity to access a system 

resource. [1]

Backdoor An undocumented way of gaining access to a computer system. A backdoor is a 

potential security risk. 

Batch Process A process that leads to the production of finite quantities of material by subjecting 

quantities of input materials to an ordered set of processing activities over a finite 

time using one or more pieces of equipment.[24]

Broadcast Transmission to all devices in a network without any acknowledgment by the 

receivers. [18]

Buffer Overflow A condition at an interface under which more input can be placed into a buffer or 

data holding area than the capacity allocated, overwriting other information. 

Adversaries exploit such a condition to crash a system or to insert specially crafted 

code that allows them to gain control of the system. [6]

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Certification A comprehensive assessment of the management, operational, and technical 

security controls in an information system, made in support of security 

accreditation, to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented 

correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect 

to meeting the security requirements for the system.[9]

Clear Text Information that is not encrypted. 

Confidentiality Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including 

means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. [11]

Configuration (of a 

system or device) 

Step in system design; for example, selecting functional units, assigning their 

locations, and defining their interconnections. [17]

Configuration 

Control 

Process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware, software, and 

documentation to ensure the information system is protected against improper 

modifications before, during, and after system implementation.[2]

Continuous Process A process that operates on the basis of continuous flow, as opposed to batch, 

intermittent, or sequenced operations. 

A mathematical representation of the control action to be performed. [19] Control Algorithm 

Control Center An equipment structure or group of structures from which a process is measured, 

controlled, and/or monitored. [21]

Control Loop A combination of field devices and control functions arranged so that a control 

variable is compared to a set point and returns to the process in the form of a 

manipulated variable. 

Control Network Those networks of an enterprise typically connected to equipment that controls 

physical processes and that is time or safety critical. The control network can be 

subdivided into zones, and there can be multiple separate control networks within 

one enterprise and site. [13]

Control Server A server that hosts the supervisory control system, typically a commercially 

available application for DCS or SCADA system. [28]

Control System A system in which deliberate guidance or manipulation is used to achieve a 

prescribed value for a variable. Control systems include SCADA, DCS, PLCs and 

other types of industrial measurement and control systems. 

Controlled Variable The variable that the control system attempts to keep at the set point value. The 

set point may be constant or variable. [19]

Controller A device or program that operates automatically to regulate a controlled variable. 

[21]

Cycle Time The time, usually expressed in seconds, for a controller to complete one control 

loop where sensor signals are read into memory, control algorithms are executed, 

and corresponding control signals are transmitted to actuators that create changes 

the process resulting in new sensor signals. [19]

Database A repository of information that usually holds plantwide information including 

process data, recipes, personnel data, and financial data. [28]

Data Historian A centralized database supporting data analysis using statistical process control 

techniques. 

DC Servo Drive A type of drive that works specifically with servo motors. It transmits commands 

to the motor and receives feedback from the servo motor resolver or encoder. [28]

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Denial of Service 

(DoS) 

The prevention of authorized access to a system resource or the delaying of system 

operations and functions. [1]

Diagnostics Information concerning known failure modes and their characteristics. Such 

information can be used in troubleshooting and failure analysis to help pinpoint the 

cause of a failure and help define suitable corrective measures. [19]

Disaster Recovery 

Plan (DRP) 

A written plan for processing critical applications in the event of a major hardware 

or software failure or destruction of facilities. [8]

Discrete Process A type of process where a specified quantity of material moves as a unit (part or 

group of parts) between work stations and each unit maintains its unique identity. 

[19]

Distributed Control 

System (DCS) 

In a control system, refers to control achieved by intelligence that is distributed 

about the process to be controlled, rather than by a centrally located single unit. [19]

Distributed Plant A geographically distributed factory that is accessible through the Internet by an 

enterprise. [28]

Disturbance An undesired change in a variable being applied to a system that tends to adversely 

affect the value of a controlled variable.[21]

Domain Controller A server responsible for managing domain information, such as login 

identification and passwords. [28]

Encryption Cryptographic transformation of data (called “plaintext”) into a form (called 

“ciphertext”) that conceals the data’s original meaning to prevent it from being 

known or used. If the transformation is reversible, the corresponding reversal 

process is called “decryption”, which is a transformation that restores encrypted 

data to its original state. [1]

An organization that coordinates the operation of one or more processing sites. [24] Enterprise 

Enterprise 

Resource Planning 

(ERP) System 

A system that integrates enterprise-wide information including human resources, 

financials, manufacturing, and distribution as well as connects the organization to 

its customers and suppliers. 

Extensible Markup 

Language (XML) 

A specification for a generic syntax to mark data with simple, human-readable 

tags, enabling the definition, transmission, validation, and interpretation of data 

between applications and between organizations. 

Fault Tolerant Of a system, having the built-in capability to provide continued, correct execution 

of its assigned function in the presence of a hardware and/or software fault. 

Field Device Equipment that is connected to the field side on an ICS. Types of field devices 

include RTUs, PLCs, actuators, sensors, HMIs, and associated communications. 

Field Site A subsystem that is identified by physical, geographical, or logical segmentation 

within the ICS. A field site may contain RTUs, PLCs, actuators, sensors, HMIs, 

and associated communications. 

Fieldbus A digital, serial, multi-drop, two-way data bus or communication path or link 

between low-level industrial field equipment such as sensors, transducers, 

actuators, local controllers, and even control room devices. Use of fieldbus 

technologies eliminates the need of point-to-point wiring between the controller 

and each device. A protocol is used to define messages over the fieldbus network 

with each message identifying a particular sensor on the network. 

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File Transfer 

Protocol (FTP) 

FTP is an Internet standard for transferring files over the Internet. FTP programs 

and utilities are used to upload and download Web pages, graphics, and other files 

between local media and a remote server which allows FTP access. [15]

Firewall An inter-network gateway that restricts data communication traffic to and from 

one of the connected networks (the one said to be “inside” the firewall) and thus 

protects that network’s system resources against threats from the other network 

(the one that is said to be “outside” the firewall). [1]

Human-Machine 

Interface (HMI) 

The hardware or software through which an operator interacts with a controller. 

An HMI can range from a physical control panel with buttons and indicator lights 

to an industrial PC with a color graphics display running dedicated HMI software. 

[28]

Identification The process of verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, usually as a 

prerequisite for granting access to resources in an IT system. [10]

Incident An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, 

or availability of an information system or the information the system processes, 

stores, or transmits or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of 

security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies. Incidents may be 

intentional or unintentional. [4]

Input/Output (I/O) A general term for the equipment that is used to communicate with a computer as 

well as the data involved in the communications. [19]

Insider An entity inside the security perimeter that is authorized to access system 

resources but uses them in a way not approved by those who granted the 

authorization. [1]

Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes 

ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity. [11]

Intelligent 

Electronic Device 

(IED) 

Any device incorporating one or more processors with the capability to receive or 

send data/control from or to an external source (e.g., electronic multifunction 

meters, digital relays, controllers). [14]

Internet The single interconnected world-wide system of commercial, government, 

educational, and other computer networks that share the set of protocols specified 

by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the name and address spaces 

managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). 

[1]

Intrusion Detection 

System (IDS) 

A security service that monitors and analyzes network or system events for the 

purpose of finding, and providing real-time or near real-time warning of, attempts 

to access system resources in an unauthorized manner. [1]

Intrusion 

Prevention System 

(IPS) 

A system that can detect an intrusive activity and can also attempt to stop the 

activity, ideally before it reaches its targets. 

Jitter The time or phase difference between the data signal and the ideal clock. 

Key Logger A program designed to record which keys are pressed on a computer keyboard 

used to obtain passwords or encryption keys and thus bypass other security 

measures. 

Light Tower A device containing a series of indicator lights and an embedded controller used to 

indicate the state of a process based on an input signal. [28]

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Local Area 

Network (LAN) 

A group of computers and other devices dispersed over a relatively limited area 

and connected by a communications link that enables any device to interact with 

any other on the network. 

Machine Controller A control system/motion network that electronically synchronizes drives within a 

machine system instead of relying on synchronization via mechanical linkage. 

Maintenance Any act that either prevents the failure or malfunction of equipment or restores its 

operating capability. [19]

Malware Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have 

adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information 

system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host. 

Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples of malicious code 

(malware). [11]

Management 

Controls 

The security controls (i.e., safeguards or countermeasures) for an information 

system that focus on the management of risk and the management of information 

security.[5]

Manipulated 

Variable 

In a process that is intended to regulate some condition, a quantity or a condition 

that the control alters to initiate a change in the value of the regulated condition. 

[19]

Manufacturing 

Execution System 

(MES) 

A system that uses network computing to automate production control and process 

automation. By downloading recipes and work schedules and uploading 

production results, a MES bridges the gap between business and plant-floor or 

process-control systems. [28]

Master Terminal See SCADA Server. 

Unit (MTU) 

Modem A device used to convert serial digital data from a transmitting terminal to a signal 

suitable for transmission over a telephone channel to reconvert the transmitted 

signal to serial digital data for the receiving terminal. [28]

Motion Control 

Network 

The network supporting the control applications that move parts in industrial 

settings, including sequencing, speed control, point-to-point control, and 

incremental motion. [19]

Network Interface 

Card (NIC) 

A computer circuit board or card that is installed in a computer so that it can be 

connected to a network. 

Object Linking and 

Embedding (OLE) 

for Process Control 

(OPC) 

A set of open standards developed to promote interoperability between disparate 

field devices, automation/control, and business systems. 

Operating System An integrated collection of service routines for supervising the sequencing of 

programs by a computer. An operating system may perform the functions of 

input/output control, resource scheduling, and data management. It provides 

application programs with the fundamental commands for controlling the 

computer. [19]

Operational 

Controls 

The security controls (i.e., safeguards or countermeasures) for an information 

system that are primarily implemented and executed by people (as opposed to 

systems). [5]

Password A string of characters (letters, numbers, and other symbols) used to authenticate an 

identity or to verify access authorization. 

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Phishing Tricking individuals into disclosing sensitive personal information through 

deceptive computer-based means (e.g., internet web sites). 

Photo Eye A light sensitive sensor utilizing photoelectric control that converts a light signal 

into an electrical signal, ultimately producing a binary signal based on an 

interruption of a light beam. [28]

Port The entry or exit point from a computer for connecting communications or 

peripheral devices. [19]

Port Scanning Using a program to remotely determine which ports on a system are open (e.g., 

whether systems allow connections through those ports). [12]

A device used to control the pressure of a gas or liquid. [28] Pressure Regulator 

Pressure Sensor A sensor system that produces an electrical signal related to the pressure acting on 

it by its surrounding medium. [28] Pressure sensors can also use differential 

pressure to obtain level and flow measurements. 

A device that converts digital data to human-readable text on a paper medium.[28] Printer 

Process Controller A proprietary computer system, typically rack-mounted, that processes sensor 

input, executes control algorithms, and computes actuator outputs. [28]

Programmable 

Logic Controller 

(PLC) 

A solid-state control system that has a user-programmable memory for storing 

instructions for the purpose of implementing specific functions such as I/O control, 

logic, timing, counting, three mode (PID) control, communication, arithmetic, and 

data and file processing. [19] 

Protocol A set of rules (i.e., formats and procedures) to implement and control some type of 

association (e.g., communication) between systems. [1]

Protocol Analyzer A device or software application that enables the user to analyze the performance 

of network data so as to ensure that the network and its associated 

hardware/software are operating within network specifications. [19]

Proximity Sensor A non-contact sensor with the ability to detect the presence of a target within a 

specified range. [28]

Real-Time Pertaining to the performance of a computation during the actual time that the 

related physical process transpires so that the results of the computation can be 

used to guide the physical process. [28]

Redundant Control 

Server 

A backup to the control server that maintains the current state of the control server 

at all times. [28]

Relay An electromechanical device that completes or interrupts an electrical circuit by 

physically moving conductive contacts. The resultant motion can be coupled to 

another mechanism such as a valve or breaker. [19]

Remote Access Access by users (or information systems) communicating external to an 

information system security perimeter. [11]

Remote Diagnostics Diagnostics activities conducted by individuals communicating external to an 

information system security perimeter. 

Remote 

Maintenance 

Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating external to an 

information system security perimeter. 

Remote Terminal 

Unit (RTU) 

A computer with radio interfacing used in remote situations where 

communications via wire is unavailable. Usually used to communicate with 

remote field equipment. PLCs with radio communication capabilities are also 

used in place of RTUs. 

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Resource 

Starvation 

A condition where a computer process cannot be supported by available computer 

resources. Resource starvation can occur due to the lack of computer resources or 

the existence of multiple processes that are competing for the same computer 

resources. 

Risk The level of impact on agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or 

reputation), agency assets, or individuals resulting from the operation of an 

information system, given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that 

threat occurring.[7]

Risk Assessment The process of identifying risks to agency operations (including mission, 

functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals by determining the 

probability of occurrence, the resulting impact, and additional security controls 

that would mitigate this impact. Part of risk management, synonymous with risk 

analysis. Incorporates threat and vulnerability analyses.[7]

Risk Management The process of managing risks to agency operations (including mission, functions, 

image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals resulting from the operation of 

an information system. It includes risk assessment; cost-benefit analysis; the 

selection, implementation, and assessment of security controls; and the formal 

authorization to operate the system. The process considers effectiveness, 

efficiency, and constraints due to laws, directives, policies, or regulations.[7]

Router A computer that is a gateway between two networks at OSI layer 3 and that relays 

and directs data packets through that inter-network. The most common form of 

router operates on IP packets. [1]

Router Flapping A router that transmits routing updates alternately advertising a destination 

network first via one route, then via a different route. 

Safety 

Instrumented 

System (SIS) 

A system that is composed of sensors, logic solvers, and final control elements 

whose purpose is to take the process to a safe state when predetermined conditions 

are violated. Other terms commonly used include emergency shutdown system 

(ESS), safety shutdown system (SSD), and safety interlock system (SIS). [23]

The device that acts as the master in a SCADA system. [28] SCADA Server 

Security Audit Independent review and examination of a system’s records and activities to 

determine the adequacy of system controls, ensure compliance with established 

security policy and procedures, detect breaches in security services, and 

recommend any changes that are indicated for countermeasures. [16]

Security Controls The management, operational, and technical controls (i.e., safeguards or 

countermeasures) prescribed for an information system to protect the 

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.[3] 

Security Plan Formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for the 

information system and describes the security controls in place or planned for 

meeting those requirements. [11]

Security Policy Security policies define the objectives and constraints for the security program. 

Policies are created at several levels, ranging from organization or corporate policy 

to specific operational constraints (e.g., remote access). In general, policies 

provide answers to the questions “what” and “why” without dealing with “how.” 

Policies are normally stated in terms that are technology-independent. [13]

Sensor A device that produces a voltage or current output that is representative of some 

physical property being measured (e.g., speed, temperature, flow) [19]

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An actuated valve whose position is controlled using a servo actuator. [28] Servo Valve 

Set Point An input variable that sets the desired value of the controlled variable. This 

variable may be manually set, automatically set, or programmed. [19]

Simple Network 

Management 

Protocol (SNMP) 

A standard TCP/IP protocol for network management. Network administrators 

use SNMP to monitor and map network availability, performance, and error rates. 

To work with SNMP, network devices utilize a distributed data store called the 

Management Information Base (MIB). All SNMP-compliant devices contain a 

MIB which supplies the pertinent attributes of a device. Some attributes are fixed 

or “hard-coded” in the MIB, while others are dynamic values calculated by agent 

software running on the device. [15]

A controller that controls a very small process or a critical process. [28] Single Loop 

Controller 

Social Engineering An attempt to trick someone into revealing information (e.g., a password) that can 

be used to attack systems or networks. [12]

Solenoid Valve A valve actuated by an electric coil. A solenoid valve typically has two states: 

open and closed. [28]

Spyware Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed onto an information system to 

gather information on individuals or organizations without their knowledge; a type 

of malicious code. [11]

The use of statistical techniques to control the quality of a product or process. [19] Statistical Process 

Control (SPC) 

Steady State A characteristic of a condition, such as value, rate, periodicity, or amplitude, 

exhibiting only negligible change over an arbitrarily long period of time. [21]

Supervisory 

Control 

A term that is used to imply that the output of a controller or computer program is 

used as input to other controllers. [19]

Supervisory 

Control and Data 

Acquisition 

(SCADA) 

A generic name for a computerized system that is capable of gathering and 

processing data and applying operational controls over long distances. Typical 

uses include power transmission and distribution and pipeline systems. SCADA 

was designed for the unique communication challenges (e.g., delays, data 

integrity) posed by the various media that must be used, such as phone lines, 

microwave, and satellite. Usually shared rather than dedicated. [19]

Technical Controls The security controls (i.e., safeguards or countermeasures) for an information 

system that are primarily implemented and executed by the information system 

through mechanisms contained in the hardware, software, or firmware components 

of the system.[5]

Temperature 

Sensor 

A sensor system that produces an electrical signal related to its temperature and, as 

a consequence, senses the temperature of its surrounding medium. [28]

Threat Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact agency 

operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or 

individuals through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, 

disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service. [11]

Transmission 

Control Protocol 

(TCP) 

TCP is one of the main protocols in TCP/IP networks. Whereas the IP protocol 

deals only with packets, TCP enables two hosts to establish a connection and 

exchange streams of data. TCP guarantees delivery of data and also guarantees 

that packets will be delivered in the same order in which they were sent. [15]

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Trojan Horse A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also has a hidden 

and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms, sometimes by 

exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program. [1]

Unauthorized 

Access 

A person gains logical or physical access without permission to a network, system, 

application, data, or other resource. [12]

Valve An in-line device in a fluid-flow system that can interrupt flow, regulate the rate of 

flow, or divert flow to another branch of the system. [19]

Variable Frequency 

Drive (VFD) 

A type of drive that controls the speed, but not the precise position, of a non-servo, 

AC motor by varying the frequency of the electricity going to that motor. VFDs 

are typically used for applications where speed and power are important, but 

precise positioning is not. [28]

Virtual Private 

Network (VPN) 

A restricted-use, logical (i.e., artificial or simulated) computer network that is 

constructed from the system resources of a relatively public, physical (i.e., real) 

network (such as the Internet), often by using encryption (located at hosts or 

gateways), and often by tunneling links of the virtual network across the real 

network. [1]

Virus A hidden, self-replicating section of computer software, usually malicious logic, 

that propagates by infecting (i.e., inserting a copy of itself into and becoming part 

of) another program. A virus cannot run by itself; it requires that its host program 

be run to make the virus active. [1]

Virus Definitions Predefined signatures for known malware used by antivirus detection algorithms. 

Vulnerability Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, 

or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source. [11]

Wide Area 

Network (WAN) 

A physical or logical network that provides data communications to a larger 

number of independent users than are usually served by a local area network 

(LAN) and that is usually spread over a larger geographic area than that of a LAN. 

[15]

Wireless Device A device that can connect to a manufacturing system via radio or infrared waves to 

typically collect/monitor data, but also in cases to modify control set points. [28]

A computer used for tasks such as programming, engineering, and design. Workstation [28]

Worm A computer program that can run independently, can propagate a complete 

working version of itself onto other hosts on a network, and may consume 

computer resources destructively. [1]

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Source References for Glossary Definitions 

[1] RFC 2828, Internet Security Glossary, May 2000, http://rfc.net/rfc2828.html. 

[2] National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary, CNSS Instruction no. 4009, revised June 2006. 

[3] FIPS PUB 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information 

Systems, February 2004. 

[4] FIPS PUB 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information System, 

March 2006. 

[5] NIST SP 800-18 Revision 1, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems, 

February 2006. 

[6] NIST SP 800-28, Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code, October 2001. 

[7] NIST SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, July 2002. 

[8] NIST SP 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology Systems, June 2002. 

[9] NIST SP 800-37, Guide for Security Certification and Accreditation of Federal Information 

Systems, May 2004. 

[10] NIST SP 800-47, Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems, August 

2002. 

[11] NIST SP 800-53 Revision 1, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems, 

July 2006. 

[12] NIST SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, January 2004. 

[13] ISA SP99 Glossary. 

[14] AGA 12. 

[15] API 1164. 

[16] ISO/IEC 7498: Information processing systems – Open System Interconnection – Basic reference 

Model, Part 2: Security Architecture. 

[17] IEC/PAS 62409, Real-time Ethernet for Plant Automation, ed 1.0, (2005-06). 

[18] IEC/PAS 62410, Real-time Ethernet SERCOS III, ed. 1.0 (2005-08). 

[19] The Automation, Systems, and Instrumentation Dictionary, 4th Edition, ISA, 2003. 

[20] ANSI/ISA-5.1, 1979. 

[21] ANSI/ISA-51.1-1979 - (R1993) - Process Instrumentation Terminology. 

[22] ANSI/ISA-75.05.01, 2000. 

[23] ANSI/ISA-84.01, 1996. 

[24] ANSI/ISA-88.01-1995 - Batch Control Part 1: Models and Terminology. 

[25] Bailey, David, and Wright, Edwin, Practical SCADA for Industry, IDC Technologies, 2003. 

[26] Boyer, Stuart, SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, 2nd Edition, ISA, 1999. 

[27] Erickson, Kelvin, and Hedrick, John, Plant Wide Process Control, Wiley & Sons, 1999. 

[28] Falco, Joe, et al., IT Security for Industrial Control Systems, NIST IR 6859, 2003, 

http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/documents/falco/ITSecurityProcess.pdf.

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Appendix C—Current Activities in Industrial Control System Security 

This appendix contains abstracts of some of the many activities that are currently addressing ICS cyber 

security. Please be aware that organization descriptions and related information provided in this appendix 

has been drawn primarily from the listed organizations’ Web sites and from other reliable public sources, 

but has not been verified. Readers are encouraged to contact the organizations directly for the most up-todate and complete information. 

American Gas Association (AGA) Standard 12, “Cryptographic Protection of SCADA 

Communications” 

Standard 12 Documents: http://gtiservices.org/security/aga12_wkgdoc_homepg.shtml 

American Gas Association: http://www.aga.org/ 

The American Gas Association, representing 195 local energy utility organizations that deliver natural gas 

to more than 56 million homes, businesses, and industries throughout the United States, advocates the 

interests of its energy utility members and their customers, and provides information and services. The 

AGA 12 series of documents recommends practices designed to protect SCADA communications against 

cyber incidents. The recommended practices focus on ensuring the confidentiality of SCADA 

communications. The document series, “Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications”, when 

complete will consist of the following four documents: 

 AGA 12-1 Background, Policies and Test Plan 

 AGA 12-2 Retrofit Link Encryption for Asynchronous Serial Communications 

 AGA 12-3 Protection of Networked Systems 

 AGA 12-4 Protection Embedded in SCADA Components. 

The purpose of the AGA 12 series is to save SCADA system owners’ time and effort by recommending a 

comprehensive system designed specifically to protect SCADA communications using cryptography. 

The AGA 12 series may be applied to water, wastewater, and electric SCADA-based distribution systems 

because of their similarities with gas systems, however timing requirements may be different. 

Recommendations included in the series 12 documents may also apply to other ICS. Additional topics 

planned for future addendums in this series include key management, protection of data at rest, and 

security policies. 

American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 1164, “Pipeline SCADA Security” 

American Petroleum Institute: http://api-ec.api.org/

The American Petroleum Institute represents more than 400 members involved in all aspects of the oil 

and natural gas industry. API 1164 provides guidance to the operators of oil and gas liquid pipeline 

systems for managing SCADA system integrity and security. The guideline is specifically designed to 

provide operators with a description of industry practices in SCADA security, and to provide the 

framework needed to develop sound security practices within the operator’s individual organizations. It 

stresses the importance of operators understanding system vulnerability and risks when reviewing the 

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SCADA system for possible system improvements. API 1164 provides a means to improve the security 

of SCADA pipeline operations by: 

 Listing the processes used to identify and analyze the SCADA system’s susceptibility to incidents 

 Providing a comprehensive list of practices to harden the core architecture 

 Providing examples of industry recommended practices. 

The standard targets small to medium pipeline operators with limited IT security resources. The standard 

is applicable to most SCADA systems, not just oil and gas SCADA systems. The appendices of the 

document include a checklist for assessing a SCADA system and an example of a SCADA control system 

security plan. 

Center for Control System Security at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) 

http://www.sandia.gov/scada/

The Center for Control System Security is composed of several test bed facilities, which allow real-world 

critical infrastructure problems to be modeled, designed, simulated, verified, and validated. These labs 

are integrated into a research effort focusing on solving current control system security problems and 

developing next generation control systems. These facilities include the following: 

 Distributed Energy Technology Laboratory (DETL), which provides a platform to test the control 

of operational generation and load systems 

 Network Laboratory, which provides network visualization and wired and wireless network 

modeling 

 Cryptographic Research Facility, which supports research and development of encryption for 

applications in control system networks 

 Red Team Facility, which provides a suite of tools to attack and analyze control system 

vulnerabilities 

 Advanced Information Systems Lab, which is used to research intelligent technologies for 

development of the infrastructures of the future. 

Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program 

http://www.chemicalcybersecurity.com/

The Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program is a strategic program of the Chemical Information 

Technology Center (ChemITC) of the American Chemistry Council. The Chemical Sector Cyber 

Security Program focuses on risk management and reduction to minimize the potential impact of cyber 

attacks on business and manufacturing systems. 

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Chemical Industry Data Exchange (CIDX) 

http://www.cidx.org/

CIDX is a trade association and standards body whose mission is to improve the ease, speed, and cost of 

conducting business electronically between chemical organizations and their trading partners. A Cyber 

Security Initiative within CIDX was working to establish management practices, procedures, guidelines, 

and standards to support overall chemical sector cyber security. As of January 1, 2006, the CIDX Cyber 

Security Initiative was consolidated into the Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program (CSCSP) under the 

Chemical Information Technology Council (ChemITC). Previously chartered CIDX project teams have 

either transitioned to the Cyber Security Program or come to a close. The structure is largely the same (a 

steering team oversees the projects and liaisons in the program) and the sponsor is still the American 

Chemistry Council (ACC). 

DHS Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) 

http://www.uscert.gov/control_systems/

To reduce control systems vulnerabilities, the DHS National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) established 

the Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) and the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center 

(CSSC). The CSSP coordinates efforts among federal, state, and local governments, as well as control 

system owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system security within and across all critical 

infrastructure sectors by reducing cyber security vulnerabilities and risk. The US-CERT CSSC 

coordinates control system incident management, provides timely situational awareness information, and 

manages control system vulnerability and threat reduction activities.

The NCSD has established a strategy to guide the partnership between government and industry to 

improve the security posture of control systems within the nation's critical infrastructure. The strategy 

incorporates five highly integrated goals to address the issues associated with control systems security: 

 Facilitate the US-CERT capability to coordinate control system incident management, provide timely 

situational awareness information for control systems, and manage control system vulnerability and 

threat reduction activities. 

 Organize and coordinate national resources to create a center of excellence that provides a proactive 

environment for vulnerability reduction, security assessments, and risk analysis. 

 Enhance industry practices for securing control systems against cyber attacks by providing tools to 

assess the security posture of control system operating environments and recommending measures for 

mitigation of vulnerabilities. 

 Enhance control systems security awareness and promote a self-sustaining security culture within the 

control systems community through participation in working groups, standards development bodies, 

and user conferences to build cooperative and trusted relationships and enhance control systems 

security efforts. 

 Make strategic recommendations as to the development and testing of next-generation secure control 

systems and security products. 

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DHS CSSP Recommended Practices 

http://csrp.inl.gov/

The DHS Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) Recommended Practices site provides a current 

information resource to help industry understand and prepare for ongoing and emerging control systems 

cyber security issues, vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies. 

The CSSP works with the control systems community to ensure that recommended practices, which are 

made available, have been vetted by subject-matter experts in industry before being made publicly 

available in support of this program. 

Recommended practices are developed to help users reduce their exposure and susceptibility to 

cyber attacks. These recommendations are based on understanding the cyber threats, control 

systems vulnerabilities and attack paths, and control systems engineering. 

The initial practices recommended by the working group detail Defense in Depth and Mitigations for 

Control System Vulnerabilities of a secure architecture. More topics are slated for addition on a 

continuing basis. Additional supporting documents that cover specific issues and associated mitigations 

are also included on this site. This site will continue to evolve and grow as new recommended practices 

and related information are added. 

DHS Process Control Systems Forum (PCSF) 

https://www.pcsforum.org/ 

The purpose of the PCSF is to accelerate the design, development, and deployment of more secure new 

and legacy control systems. PCSF participants include international stakeholders from government; 

academia; industry users, owner/operators, and systems integrators; and the vendor community. The 

PCSF is an open, collaborative, voluntary forum that will leverage and unify the experience, capabilities, 

and contributions of these stakeholders through meetings, interest groups, and working groups, to develop 

and adopt common architectures, protocols, and practices. 

The PCSF is funded by the DHS Control Systems Security Program and managed by Noblis. It is not a 

standards body and is not intended to replace any existing activities in the SCADA and ICS security 

community. Rather, it will build upon the existing body of work and establish links with others in 

industry and government, to arrive at a common underlying architecture for process control systems that 

offers security, reliability, resiliency, and continuity in the face of disruptions and major incidents. The 

PCSF encourages the active participation of individuals interested in advancing security and reliability in 

process control systems. 

The PCSF is a forum for the control systems community that is uniquely positioned to: 

 Aggregate information about current organizations and their efforts, directions, and work products 

from across multiple sectors to increase visibility and reduce redundancy 

 Identify consensus cross-industry and cross-functional issues that require resolution, and determine a 

path and effort that is owned, traceable, and produces generally acceptable solutions 

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 Cross-connect decision-makers from industry, government, vendors, and academia in ways that 

promote increased understanding of requirements and opportunities for collaboration 

 Impact a broad portion of the control system community through procedures, methods, guidelines, 

recommended practices, and other resources, issued through organizations that participate in the 

PCSF. 

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

http://www.epri.com/ 

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is a nonprofit center for public interest energy and 

environmental research. EPRI brings together member organizations, the Institute's scientists and 

engineers, and other leading experts to work collaboratively on solutions to the challenges of electric 

power. These solutions span nearly every area of power generation, delivery, and use, including health, 

safety, and environment. EPRI's members represent over 90% of the electricity generated in the United 

States. 

EPRI has established the PowerSec initiative to evaluate current industry cyber incident readiness, 

identify gaps, and specify existing recommended practices. PowerSec will leverage and consolidate past 

and ongoing cyber security work sponsored by utilities, government and regulatory agencies, and others. 

The PowerSec initiative is initially focusing on electric utility SCADA systems and energy management 

systems (EMS). 

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 

http://www.ieee.org 

IEEE P1686 – Substation IED Cyber Security Standard. The standard will define the functions and 

features to be provided in substation intelligent electronic devices (IED) to accommodate critical 

infrastructure protection programs. The standard will address security regarding the access, operation, 

configuration, firmware revision, and data retrieval from an IED, including the substation RTU. 

Encryption for the secure transmission of data both within and external to the substation will not be part 

of this standard, because this is being addressed in other efforts. 

IEEE P1689 – Trial Use Standard for Cyber Security of Serial SCADA Links and IED Remote Access.

Using AGA 12 Part 1 as the starting point and adapting it to the needs of electric utilities, this trial use 

standard defines the general requirements to protect serial communications between master stations and 

remote terminal units from cyber incidents, and to strengthen authenticated remote access to maintenance 

ports in RTUs and other IEDs. This standard defines the requirements to retrofit existing 

communications in such a manner as to minimize the changes needed to existing equipment and software. 

The test plan defines specific tests and evaluations that should be performed to ensure that the cyber 

security mechanisms are working properly. 

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Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) 

https://www.thei3p.org/ 

The I3P is a consortium of leading national cyber security institutions, including academic research 

centers, government laboratories, and non-profit organizations. It was founded in September 2001 to help 

meet a well-documented need for improved research and development (R&D) to protect the nation's 

information infrastructure against catastrophic failures. The institute's main role is to coordinate a 

national cyber security R&D program and help build bridges between academia, industry, and 

government. The I3P continues to work toward identifying and addressing critical research problems in 

information infrastructure protection and opening information channels between researchers, 

policymakers, and infrastructure operators. Currently, the I3P does the following: 

 Fosters collaboration among academia, industry, and government on pressing cyber security problems 

 Develops, manages, and supports national-scale research projects 

 Provides research fellowship opportunities to qualified post-doctoral researchers, faculty, and 

research scientists 

 Hosts workshops, meetings, and events on cyber security and information infrastructure protection 

issues 

 Builds and supports a knowledge base as an online vehicle for sharing and distributing information to 

I3P members and others working on information security challenges. 

Membership in the I3P Consortium is at the institutional level; individuals are not eligible. Membership 

is open to not-for-profit research and academic institutions actively engaged in research and policy 

focused on cyber security and information infrastructure protection. 

I3P Process Control Systems Security Research Project 

http://www.thei3p.org/projects/pcs.html

The Process Control Systems Security Research Project is supported by the Institute for Information 

Infrastructure Protection (I3P). The project is focusing cyber security related research at some of the 

country’s top institutions on improving the robustness of the information infrastructure in the oil and gas 

sector. Eleven institutions from across the country have joined forces to develop new solutions and 

demonstrate their effectiveness to the oil and gas sector owners, operators, and vendors. 

The team is working to deliver prototype tools and increase knowledge to accomplish the following goals: 

 Increase the awareness of Process Control System (PCS) security risks 

 Develop programs to educate students and stakeholders on PCS security 

 Recommend mitigation strategies for operators and policymakers 

 Develop and prototype technology and tools for PCS security 

 Advance basic research in inherently secure PCS 

 Gain national recognition for the I3P as a leading center of research, knowledge, and expertise in PCS 

security 

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International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committees 65 and 57 

http://www.iec.ch/ 

IEC is a standards organization that prepares and publishes international standards for all electrical, 

electronic, and related technologies. These standards serve as a basis for creating national standards and 

as references for drafting international tenders and contracts. IEC’s members include manufacturers, 

providers, distributors, vendors, consumers, users, all levels of governmental agencies, professional 

societies, trade associations, and standards developers from over 60 countries. 

In 2004 the IEC Technical Sub-Committee 65C (Digital Communications), through its working group 

WG13 (Cyber Security), started to address security issues - within the IEC 61784 standard – for field 

buses and other industrial communication networks. Results of this work are outlined in part 4, entitled 

“Digital data communications for measurement and control – Profiles for secure communications in 

industrial networks”. 

TC65 WG10 is working to extend this field level communication to address security standards across 

common automation networking scenarios. The standard being drafted as a result of this work is IEC 

62443, entitled “Security for industrial process measurement and control – Network and system security”. 

It is based on a modular security architecture consisting of requirement sets. These modules are mapped 

into ICS component and network architecture. The resulting requirements can then be formulated for use 

as the basis for Requests for Proposals (RFP) for data communication standards, and security audits.

TC 57 is focused on Power Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange and is divided 

up into a series of working groups. Each working group is comprised of members of national standards 

committees from the countries that participate in the IEC. Each working group is responsible for the 

development of standards within its domain. The current working groups are: 

 WG 3: Telecontrol protocols 

 WG 7: Telecontrol protocols compatible with ISO Standards and ITU-T recommendations 

 WG 9: Distribution automation using distribution line carrier systems 

 WG 10: Power system IED communication and associated data models 

 WG 13: Energy management system application program interface 

 WG 14: System interfaces for distribution management 

 WG 15: Data and communication security 

 WG 16: Deregulated energy market communications 

 WG 17: Communications systems for distributed energy resources 

 WG 18: Hydroelectric power plants – communication for monitoring and control 

 WG 19: Interoperability within TC 57 in the long term 

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ISA-SP99 Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security Standards 

http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&CommitteeID=6821

The ISA-SP99 Committee is establishing standards, recommended practices, technical reports, and related 

information that will define procedures for implementing electronically secure industrial automation and 

control systems and security practices and assessing electronic security performance. Guidance is 

directed toward those responsible for designing, implementing, or managing industrial automation and 

control systems and shall also apply to users, system integrators, security practitioners, and control system 

manufacturers and vendors. 

The committee’s focus is to improve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of components or 

systems used for manufacturing or control and provide criteria for procuring and implementing secure 

control systems. Compliance with the committee’s guidance will improve manufacturing and control 

system electronic security, and will help identify vulnerabilities and address them, thereby reducing the 

risk of compromising confidential information or causing industrial automation control system 

degradation or failure. There are several planned standards in the ISA-99 series. Each will cover a 

specific aspect or subset of the subject of industrial automation and control systems security. They are: 

 ISA 99.00.01 Concepts, Models and Terminology: defines the basic concepts and terminology that 

form the basis for the remaining standards in the SP99 series so that all readers of the standard will 

operate on a common framework 

 ISA 99.00.02 Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security Program: 

provides a basic guidebook that an implementer of the SP99 standard can use to assemble a security 

program, without prescribing the details for every industry type 

 ISA 99.00.03 Operating an Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security Program: 

describes how to run a security program after it is designed and implemented 

 ISA 99.00.04 Specific Security Requirements for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: 

defines the characteristics of manufacturing and control systems that differentiate them from other IT 

systems from a security point of view. Based on these characteristics, it establishes the security 

requirements that are unique to this class of system. 

SP99's first efforts resulted in two Technical Reports that are now available from ISA as ANSI/ISATR99.00.01 - Application and Practices, and ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.02 - Integrating Electronic Security into 

the Manufacturing and Control Systems Environment. 

ISA-SP100 Wireless Systems for Automation 

http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=1134&CommitteeID=6891

The ISA-SP100 Committee will establish standards, recommended practices, technical reports, and 

related information that will define procedures for implementing wireless systems in the automation and 

control environment with a focus on the field level. Guidance is directed towards those responsible for 

the complete life cycle including the designing, implementing, on-going maintenance, scalability or 

managing manufacturing and control systems, and shall apply to users, system integrators, practitioners, 

and control systems manufacturers and vendors. 

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ISO 17799 Security Techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Management 

http://www.iso.org/

ISO 17799 provides guidelines and voluntary directions for information security management. It 

addresses topics in terms of policies and general good practices. The document specifically identifies 

itself as “a starting point for developing organization specific guidance”. It states that not all of the 

guidance and controls it contains may be applicable and that additional controls not contained may be 

required. It is not intended to give definitive details or “how-to’s”. Given such caveats, the document 

briefly addresses the following major topics: 

 Organizational security policy 

 Organizational security infrastructure 

 Asset classification and control 

 Personnel security 

 Physical and environmental security 

 Communications and operations management 

 Access control 

 Systems development and maintenance 

 Business continuity management 

 Compliance. 

ISO 17799 is transitioning to the new ISO 27000 series. In the near future ISO 17799 will become ISO 

27002. (http://www.27000.org/) 

ISO 27001 Information technology – Security techniques – Information security 

management systems – Requirements 

ISO 27001 provides a model for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, 

maintaining and improving an Information Security Management System. This standard adopts the 

“Plan-Do-Check-Act” model. This standard covers all types of organizations and specifies the 

requirements for an Information Security Management System within the context of the organization’s 

overall business risks. The normative control objectives and controls addressed by this standard include: 

 Security policy 

 Organization of information security 

 Asset management 

 Human resource security 

 Physical and environmental security 

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 Communications and operations management 

 Access control 

 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance 

 Information security incident management 

 Business continuity management 

 Compliance. 

International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) 

http://www.cigre.org/

The International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) is a nonprofit international association 

based in France. It has established several study committees to promote and facilitate the international 

exchange of knowledge in the electrical industry by identifying recommended practices and developing 

recommendations. Three of its study committees focus on control systems: 

 The objectives of the Substations Committee include the adoption of technological advances in 

equipment and systems to achieve increased reliability and availability. 

 The System Operation and Control Committee focuses on the technical capabilities needed for the 

secure and economical operation of existing power systems including control centers and operators. 

 The Information Systems and Telecommunication for Power Systems Committee monitors emerging 

technologies in the industry and evaluates their possible impact. In addition, it focuses on the security 

requirements of the information systems and services of control systems. 

LOGI2

C – Linking the Oil and Gas Industry to Improve Cyber Security 

http://www.hsarpacyber.com/logic.html

LOGI2C was a 12-month technology integration and demonstration project jointly supported by industry 

partners and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The project demonstrated an opportunity 

to reduce vulnerabilities of oil and gas process control environments by sensing, correlating and analyzing 

abnormal events to identify and prevent cyber security threats. 

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National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) 

http://www.inl.gov/scada/factsheets/d/nstb.pdf

The DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) seeks to improve the security and 

reliability of our Nation’s energy delivery systems. OE established the National SCADA Test Bed 

(NSTB) to help the energy sector and equipment vendors assess control system vulnerabilities and test the 

security of control systems hardware and software. Working in partnership with the energy sector, the 

National SCADA Test Bed seeks to: 

 Identify and mitigate existing vulnerabilities. 

 Facilitate development of security standards. 

 Serve as an independent entity to test SCADA systems and related control system technologies. 

 Identify and promote best cyber security practices. 

 Increase awareness of control systems security within the energy sector. 

 Develop advanced control system architectures and technologies that are more secure and robust. 

Partners in the NSTB include Idaho National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Argonne 

National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. 

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NIST 800 Series Security Guidelines 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html 

The NIST Special Publication 800 information technology series of documents reports on the NIST 

Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security, 

and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. Focus areas 

include cryptographic technology and applications, advanced authentication, public key infrastructure, 

internetworking security, criteria and assurance, and security management and support. In addition to this 

publication, NIST SP 800-82, the following is a listing of some additional 800 series documents that have 

significant relevance to the ICS security community. These as well as many others are available through 

the URL listed above. 

 NIST SP 800-18 Revision 1, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information 

Systems

 NIST SP 800-37, Guide for the Security Certification and Accreditation of Federal Information 

Systems

 NIST SP 800-40 Version 2, Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management Program

 NIST SP 800-41, Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy

 NIST SP 800-42, Guideline on Network Security Testing

 NIST SP 800-48, Wireless Network Security: 802.11, Bluetooth, and Handheld Devices

 NIST SP 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training 

Program

 NIST SP 800-53 Revision 1, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems

 NIST SP 800-53A, Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems 

 NIST SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide 

 NIST SP 800-63, Electronic Authentication Guideline

 NIST SP 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System Development Life Cycle

 NIST SP 800-70, Security Configuration Checklists Program for IT Products—Guidance for 

Checklists Users and Developers

 NIST SP 800-77, Guide to IPSec VPNs

 NIST SP 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling

 NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response

 NIST SP 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization

 NIST SP 800-92, Guide to Computer Security Log Management

 NIST SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)

 NIST SP 880-97, Guide to IEEE 802.11i: Robust Security Networks

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NIST Industrial Control System Security Project 

http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/ics/index.html

Because today’s ICS are often a combination of legacy systems, often with a planned life span of twenty 

to thirty years, or a hybrid of legacy systems augmented with newer hardware and software that are 

interconnected to other systems, it is often difficult or infeasible to apply some of the security controls 

contained in NIST SP 800-53. Recognizing this problem, NIST has initiated the Industrial Control 

System Security project in cooperation with the public and private sector ICS community to develop 

specific guidance on the application of NIST documents, including the security controls in NIST SP 800-

53 to ICS. To facilitate the understanding of applying NIST SP 800-53 to ICS, an effort is underway to 

develop a series of ICS cyber security case histories using actual ICS cyber security incidents. These case 

histories examine the NIST SP 800-53 ICS controls that were violated or not implemented, and postulate 

the potential mitigations that may have occurred if the controls had been implemented. 

NIST Industrial Control Security Testbed 

http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/

This is a laboratory scale testbed comprised of several implementations of typical industrial control and 

networking equipment as well as relevant sensors and actuators. This testbed is being used to develop 

performance metrics and tests that can be applied to industrial control security products to determine if 

particular time-sensitive requirements can be met. These performance metrics pertain to real-time 

requirements for data transfer, such as minimal delay and timing jitter, and are not considered in 

traditional IT networks. Work being performed on this testbed includes the development of metrics and 

tests to evaluate the performance of industrial networking equipment as well as the development of tests 

for evaluating the effects of security implementations on the operation of ICS.

North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 

http://www.nerc.com/ 

NERC’s mission is to improve the reliability and security of the bulk power system in North America. To 

achieve that, NERC develops and enforces reliability standards; monitors the bulk power system; assesses 

future adequacy; audits owners, operators, and users for preparedness; and educates and trains industry 

personnel. NERC is a self-regulatory organization that relies on the diverse and collective expertise of 

industry participants. As the Electric Reliability Organization, NERC is subject to audit by the U.S. 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and governmental authorities in Canada 

NERC has issued a set of cyber security standards to reduce the risk of compromise to electrical 

generation resources and high-voltage transmission systems above 35kV, also referred to as bulk electric 

systems. Bulk electric systems include Balancing Authorities, Reliability Coordinators, Interchange 

Authorities, Transmission Providers, Transmission Owners, Transmission Operators, Generation Owners, 

Generation Operators, and Load Serving Entities. The cyber security standards include audit measures 

and levels of non-compliance that can be tied to penalties. 

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The set of NERC Cyber Security Standards includes the following: 

 CIP-002 Critical Cyber Assets 

 CIP-003 Security Management Controls 

 CIP-004 Personnel and Training 

 CIP-005 Electronic Security 

 CIP-006 Physical Security 

 CIP-007 Systems Security Management 

 CIP-008 Incident Reporting and Response Planning 

 CIP-009 Recovery Planning. 

The standards can be downloaded at 

http://www.nerc.com/~filez/standards/Cyber-Security-Permanent.html. 

Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF) 

http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/ 

PCSRF was assembled to address the security requirements for industrial process control systems and 

components. NIST formed the Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF) in the spring of 

2001. The NIST-led PCSRF is a working group of users, vendors, and integrators in the process control 

industry, which is addressing the cyber security requirements for new industrial process control systems 

and components, including SCADA systems, DCS, PLCs, RTUs, and IEDs. Members of the PCSRF 

represent the critical infrastructures and related process industries, including oil and gas, water, electric 

power, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, metals and mining, and pulp and paper. There are currently over 700 

members from 32 countries in the PCSRF representing the government, academic, and private sectors.

The main goal of the PCSRF is to increase the security of industrial process control systems through the 

definition and application of a common set of information security requirements for these systems. 

PCSRF has adopted the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, also known 

as ISO/IEC 15408, to document the results of this effort in the form of protection profile (PP) security 

specifications. To date, the PCSRF has completed a baseline protection profile and is currently working 

to develop two PPs for the two major subsystems of a SCADA system, a Control Center PP and a Field 

Device PP. 

 System Protection Profile for Industrial Control Systems (SPP-ICS). This completed document 

is designed to present a cohesive, cross-industry, baseline set of security requirements for ICS. The 

SPP-ICS considers an entire system and addresses requirements for the entire system lifecycle. The 

SPP-ICS also acts as a starting point for more specific system protection profiles for a specific 

instance of an ICS, such as a DCS or a SCADA system, and for sub-systems such as control centers 

and field devices. 

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 SCADA Protection Profile. A SCADA PP is currently being developed using the SPP-ICC as a 

baseline to the effort. The SCADA PP is being developed as two individual PPs based on the two 

major subsystems of a SCADA system, a Control Center PP and a Field Device PP. 

SCADA and Control Systems Procurement Project 

http://www.cscic.state.ny.us/msisac/scada/

The SCADA Procurement Project, established in March 2006, is a joint effort among public and private 

sectors focused on development of common procurement language that can be used by everyone. The 

goal is for federal, state and local asset owners and regulators to come together using these procurement 

requirements and to maximize the collective buying power to help ensure that security is integrated into 

SCADA systems. 

US-CERT Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) 

http://www.uscert.gov/control_systems/

The Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) is a state-of-the-art analysis and testing facility that works 

to provide proactive means for securing the control systems that operate many of the nation’s critical 

infrastructures. It is managed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Department of Homeland 

Security's (DHS) National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and includes the participation of other DOE 

laboratories including Pacific Northwest, Los Alamos, Argonne, Sandia, and Savannah River. CSSC is 

tasked to identify technology gaps and operational security needs related to control system security and 

report these to DHS Science & Technology on areas of consideration for developmental efforts. 

The CSSC performs its work through industry outreach, assessment and analysis, vulnerability testing, 

and awareness and response modeling. INL works together with industry and vendor manufacturers to 

assess current vulnerabilities and develop tools to secure them. The testing facility consists of functioning 

control systems from national and international manufacturers, a multi-functional cyber security testbed 

that is capable of performing cyber incidents and mock scenarios on various control systems, and an 

operational green room used for training and emergency management response. Currently, the INL has 

working relationships established with over 30 utility organizations and equipment manufacturers. 

Awareness and response efforts provide continuous support to the United States Computer Emergency 

Readiness Team (US-CERT). All emergency requests related to control system security are forwarded to 

the US-CERT Support for Tier II response. 

The National SCADA Testbed (NSTB) program is funded by the Department of Energy, while the CSSC 

is funded by the Department of Homeland Security. Both programs use the same facilities and testbeds, 

and many of the same personnel. The NSTB program is focused on reducing vulnerabilities of the 

electrical sector, while the CSSC program is concerned with all of the critical infrastructures in the United 

States. 

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Appendix D—Emerging Security Capabilities 

This section provides an overview of security capabilities that are available to or being developed in 

support of the ICS community. There are several security products that are marketed specifically for ICS, 

while others are general IT security products that are being used with ICS. Many of the products 

available offer “single point solutions”, where a single security product offers multiple levels of 

protection. In addition to available products, this section also discusses some research and development 

work towards new products and technologies.

Encryption 

Encryption protects the confidentiality of data by encoding the data to ensure that only the intended 

recipient can decode it. There are some commercially available encryption products designed 

specifically for ICS applications, as well as general encryption products that support basic serial and 

Ethernet-based communications. 

In addition to these products, the ICS SCADA community is working to develop a standard for 

implementing the encryption of SCADA communications. The American Gas Association is working to 

develop a standard, AGA-12, Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications, to protect SCADA 

master-slave communication links from a variety of active and passive cyber attacks by developing a set 

of standards to secure serial communication links using encryption. The AGA effort is broken into four 

parts, with each addressing different aspects of SCADA communication protection: 

 AGA 12-1 summarizes cyber security policies, the background of the cyber security problem, and a 

procedure for testing cryptographic protection systems. 

 AGA 12-2 is a detailed technical specification for building interoperable cryptographic modules to 

protect SCADA communications for low-speed legacy SCADA systems and dial-up maintenance 

ports. 

 AGA 12-3 will describe how to protect high-speed SCADA communications over networked 

systems. 

 AGA 12-4 will describe how to build next-generation SCADA systems with embedded AGA 12 

compatible cryptography. 

Because of the long life of SCADA systems, a decision was made to focus initial efforts on the protection 

of legacy systems. This decision has led to the near completion of parts 1 and 2, while parts 3 and 4 are 

still in the planning stages. Currently, AGA 12-1 has passed balloting procedures and AGA 12-2 has 

undergone laboratory testing and is now being field-tested. There are also plans for a large-scale pilot test 

to further validate the standard. In addition, national laboratories are conducting performance and 

security tests on the protocol, and organizations are producing prototype encryption modules. Efforts are 

also underway to develop conformance test procedures to evaluate these new products. 

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Firewalls 

Firewalls are commonly used to segregate networks to protect and isolate ICS. These implementations 

use commercially available firewalls that are focused on Internet and corporate application layer protocols 

and are not equipped to handle ICS protocols. The ICS community is investigating the possibility of 

adding protocol awareness to filtering devices. Research was performed by an IT security vendor in 2003 

to develop a Modbus-based firewall: a netfilter/iptables extension that allows policy decisions to be made 

on Modbus/TCP header values just as traditional firewalls filter on TCP/UDP ports and IP addresses [77]. 

However, to date no commercial product has been released with a Modbus firewall capability. 

Intrusion Detection and Prevention 

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) are being deployed on ICS 

networks and components to detect well-known cyber attacks. Network IDS products monitor network 

traffic and use various detection methods, such as comparing portions of the traffic to signatures of 

known attacks. In contrast, host intrusion detection uses software loaded on a host computer, often with 

attack signatures, to monitor ongoing events and data on a computer system for possible exploits. IPS 

products take intrusion detection a step further by automatically acting on detected exploits to attempt to 

stop them [58]. 

The required task of a security team to constantly monitor, evaluate, and quickly respond to intrusion 

detection events is sometimes contracted to a managed security service provider (MSSP). MSSPs have 

correlation and analysis engines to process and reduce the vast amounts of events logged per day to a 

small subset that needs to be manually evaluated. There are also correlation and analysis engine products 

available to large organizations wanting to perform this function in-house. Security information and 

event management (SIEM) products are used in some organizations to monitor, analyze, and correlate 

events from IDS and IPS logs, as well as audit logs from other computer systems, applications, 

infrastructure equipment, and other hardware and software, to look for intrusion attempts. 

Current IDS and IPS products are effective in detecting and preventing many well-known Internet attacks, 

but until recently they have not addressed ICS protocol attacks. IDS and IPS vendors are beginning to 

develop and incorporate attack signatures for various ICS protocols such as Modbus, DNP, and ICCP. 

One cooperative effort within the ICS community is developing Snort rules for Modbus TCP, DNP3, and 

ICCP. Snort is an open source network intrusion detection and prevention system using a rule-driven 

language to perform signature, protocol, and anomaly-based inspections. The current rule sets, covering 

Modbus, DNP, and ICCP, are basic, and efforts are underway to expand them.. This same industry group 

is also defining a data dictionary of log entries from various ICS applications. The data dictionary helps 

cyber security monitoring products and services identify and understand the meaning of security events in 

ICS application logs using normalized events. The dictionary is still under development. Some 

commercial IDS and IPS vendors are also offering some ICS protocol signatures. [59]. 

As with any software added to an ICS component, the addition of host IDS or IPS software could affect 

system performance. IPSs are commonplace in today’s information security industry, but can be very 

resource intensive. These systems have the ability to automatically reconfigure systems if an intrusion 

attempt is identified. This automated and fast reaction is designed to prevent successful exploits; 

however, an automated tool such as this could be used by an adversary to adversely effect the operation 

on an ICS by shutting down segments of a network or server. False positives can also hinder ICS 

operation. 

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Malware/Antivirus Software 

Because early malware threats were primarily viruses, the software to detect and remove malware has 

historically been called “antivirus software”, even though it can detect many types of malware. Antivirus 

software is used to counter the threats of malware by evaluating files on a computer’s storage devices 

(some tools also detect malware in real-time at the network perimeter and/or on the user’s workstation) 

against an inventory of malware signature files. If one of the files on a computer matches the profile of 

known malware, the malware is removed through a disinfection process so it cannot infect other local 

files or communicate across a network to infect other files on other computers. There are also techniques 

available to identify unknown malware “in-the-wild” when a signature file is not yet available. 

Many end-users and vendors of ICS are recommending the use of COTS antivirus software with their 

systems and have even developed installation and configuration guidance based on their own laboratory 

testing. Some ICS vendors recommend the use of antivirus software with their products, but offer little to 

no guidance. Some end users and vendors are hesitant to use antivirus software due to fears that its use 

would cause ICS performance problems or even failure. NIST and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) 

are conducting a study and producing a report aimed at helping ICS owners/operators to deploy antivirus 

software and to minimize and assess performance impacts of workstation and server-based antivirus 

products. This study has assembled ICS-based antivirus knowledge and serves as a starting point or a 

secondary resource when installing, configuring, running, and maintaining antivirus software on an ICS 

[57]. In many cases, performance impacts can be reduced through configuration settings as well as 

antivirus scanning and maintenance scheduling outside of the antivirus software practices recommended 

for typical IT systems. . 

In summary, COTS antivirus software can be used successfully on most ICS components. However, 

special ICS specific considerations should be taken into account during the selection, installation, 

configuration, operational, and maintenance procedures. ICS end-users should consult with the ICS 

vendors regarding the use of antivirus software and can also use the output of the NIST and SNL study as 

supplemental information. 

Vulnerability and Penetration Testing Tools

There are many tools available for performing network vulnerability assessments and penetration tests for 

typical IT networks; however, the impacts these tools may have on the operation of an ICS should be 

carefully considered [78]. The additional traffic and exploits used during active vulnerability and 

penetration testing, combined with the limited resources of many ICS, have been known to cause ICS to 

malfunction. As guidance in this area, SNL has developed a preferred list of vulnerability and penetration 

testing techniques for ICS [78]. These are less intrusive methods, passive instead of active, to collect the 

majority of information that is often queried by automated vulnerability and penetration testing tools. 

These methods are intended to allow collection of the necessary vulnerability information without the risk 

of causing a failure while testing. 

ICS owners must make the individuals using vulnerability and penetration testing tools aware of the 

criticality of continuous operation and the risks involved with performing these tests on operational 

systems. It may be possible to mitigate these risks by performing tests on ICS components such as 

redundant servers or independent test systems in a laboratory setting. Laboratory tests can be used to 

screen out test procedures that might harm the operational system. Even with very good configuration 

management to assure that the test system is highly representative, tests on the actual system are likely to 

uncover flaws not represented in the laboratory. 

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Appendix E—Industrial Control Systems in the FISMA Paradigm 

In recognition of the importance of information security to the economic and national interests of the 

United States, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) [13] was established to 

require each Federal agency to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to provide 

information security for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of 

the agency. The NIST FISMA Implementation Project [14] was established in January 2003 to produce 

several key security standards and guidelines required by Congressional legislation including: 

 Standards to categorize information and information systems based on the objectives of providing 

appropriate levels of information security according to a range of risk levels 

 Guidelines recommending the types of information and information systems to be included in each 

category 

 Minimum information security requirements (i.e., management, operational, and technical controls) 

for information and information systems in each category. 

Key FISMA-related publications include Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 199, FIPS 

200, and NIST SPs 800-18, 800-30, 800-37, 800-53, 800-53A, 800-59 and 800-60. NIST has initiated the 

Industrial Control System Security project21 in cooperation with the public and private sector ICS 

community to develop specific guidance on the application of FISMA documents, including the security 

controls in NIST SP 800-53, to ICS. Below is a listing of NIST FIPS and SPs documenting these 

standards and guidelines.22

 FIPS Publication 199: Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and 

Information Systems contains standards to categorize information and information systems based on 

the objectives of providing appropriate levels of information security according to a range of risk 

levels [15]. The security categories are based on the potential impact on an organization should 

certain events occur which jeopardize the information and information systems needed by the 

organization to accomplish its assigned mission, protect its assets, fulfill its legal responsibilities, 

maintain its day-to-day functions, and protect individuals. Security categories are to be used in 

conjunction with vulnerability and threat information in assessing the risk to an organization resulting 

from the operation of its information systems. 

 FIPS Publication 200: Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 

Information Systems specifies minimum security requirements for information and information 

systems supporting the executive agencies of the Federal government and a risk-based process for 

selecting the security controls necessary to satisfy the minimum security requirements [16]. The 

document provides links to NIST SP 800-53 (Recommended Security Controls for Federal 

Information Systems), which recommends management, operational, and technical controls needed to 

protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all Federal information systems that are not 

national security systems. 

 NIST SP 800-18: Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Systems contains 

guidelines to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program that 

includes subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and 

systems or groups of information systems [17]. 

 

21 The Industrial Control System Security Project Web site is located at: http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/ics/index.html 22 All of these publications are available from the NIST Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC) Web site, located at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/. 

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 NIST SP 800-30: Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems has guidelines 

to develop an agency-wide information security program that includes periodic assessment of the risk 

and magnitude of the harm that could result from unauthorized access, use disclosure, disruption, 

modifications, or destruction of information and information systems [19]. 

 NIST SP 800-37: Guide for the Security Certification and Accreditation of Federal Information 

Systems provides guidance on conducting periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of 

information security policies, procedures, and practices (including management, operational, and 

technical security controls) [20]. 

 NIST SP 800-53: Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems provides 

guidelines for selecting and specifying security controls for information systems supporting the 

executive agencies of the Federal government [21]. The guidelines apply to all components of an 

information system that process, store, or transmit Federal information with the exception of systems 

designated as national security systems. A project is currently underway to provide guidance on the 

application of SP 800-53 in ICS, including the use of compensating controls to cover control that 

cannot technically be met in an ICS. 

 NIST SP 800-53A: Guide for Assessing Security Controls in Federal Information Systems

provides guidance for conducting periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information 

security policies, procedures, and practices (including management, operational, and technical 

security controls) [22]. 

 NIST SP 800-59: Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security 

System provides guidelines developed in conjunction with the Department of Defense, including the 

National Security Agency, for identifying an information system as a national security system [23]. 

 NIST SP 800-60: Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to 

Security Categories presents guidelines that recommend the types of information and information 

systems to be included in each security category defined in FIPS 199 [24]. 

 NIST SP 800-70: Security Configuration Checklists Program for IT Products: Guidance for 

Checklists Users and Developers discusses the development of security configuration checklists and 

option selections that minimize the security risks associated with commercial IT products used within 

the Federal government [25].

23

This set of documents provides security standards and guidelines that support an enterprise-wide risk 

management process. The documents are intended to be an integral part of a Federal agency’s overall 

information security program. Figure E-1 shows a diagram of this framework and the relevancy of 

supporting documents. 

 

23 More information on this program is available at http://checklists.nist.gov/. 

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Figure E-1. Risk Framework 

The following is a chronological listing of the Risk Framework activities, a description of each activity, 

and identification of supporting NIST documents. [26]

Security Categorization 

The first activity in the Risk Framework is to categorize the information and information system 

according to potential impact of loss. For each information type and information system under 

consideration, the three FISMA defined security objectives—confidentiality, integrity, and availability—

are associated with one of three levels of potential impact should there be a breach of security. It is 

important to remember that for an ICS, availability is generally the greatest concern. 

The generalized format for expressing the Security Category (SC) is:

SC information type or system = {(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, impact), (availability, impact)}, 

where the acceptable values for potential impact are LOW, MODERATE, or HIGH. 

The standards and guidance for this categorization process can be found in FIPS 199 and NIST SP 800-

60, respectively. NIST is in the process of updating NIST SP 800-60 to provide additional guidance on 

the categorization of ICS. 

FIPS 199 establishes security categories for both information and information systems. The security 

categories are based on the potential impact on an organization should certain events occur which 

jeopardize the information and information systems needed by the organization to accomplish its assigned 

mission, protect its assets, fulfill its legal responsibilities, maintain its day-to-day functions, and protect 

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individuals. Security categories are to be used in conjunction with vulnerability and threat information in 

assessing the risk to an organization. 

The security category of an information type can be associated with both user information and system 

information and can be applicable to information in either electronic or non-electronic form. It can also 

be used as input in considering the appropriate security category of an information system. Establishing 

an appropriate security category of an information type essentially requires determining the potential 

impact for each security objective associated with the particular information type. 

Determining the security category of an information system requires slightly more analysis and must 

consider the security categories of all information types resident on the information system. For an 

information system, the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives 

(confidentiality, integrity, availability) are the highest values (i.e., high water mark) from among those 

security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information 

system. 

The following example is taken from FIPS 199: 

A power plant contains a SCADA system controlling the distribution of electric power for a large military 

installation. The SCADA system contains both real-time sensor data and routine administrative 

information. The management at the power plant determines that: (i) for the sensor data being acquired 

by the SCADA system, there is no potential impact from a loss of confidentiality, a high potential impact 

from a loss of integrity, and a high potential impact from a loss of availability; and (ii) for the 

administrative information being processed by the system, there is a low potential impact from a loss of 

confidentiality, a low potential impact from a loss of integrity, and a low potential impact from a loss of 

availability. The resulting security categories, SC, of these information types are expressed as: 

SC sensor data = {(confidentiality, NA), (integrity, HIGH), (availability, HIGH)}, 

and 

SC administrative information = {(confidentiality, LOW), (integrity, LOW), (availability, LOW)}. 

The resulting security category of the information system is initially expressed as: 

SC SCADA system = {(confidentiality, LOW), (integrity, HIGH), (availability, HIGH)}, 

representing the high water mark or maximum potential impact values for each security objective from 

the information types resident on the SCADA system. The management at the power plant chooses to 

increase the potential impact from a loss of confidentiality from low to moderate, reflecting a more 

realistic view of the potential impact on the information system should there be a security breach due to 

the unauthorized disclosure of system-level information or processing functions. The final security 

category of the information system is expressed as: 

SC SCADA system = {(confidentiality, MODERATE), (integrity, HIGH), (availability, HIGH)}. 

FIPS 199 specifies that information systems be categorized as low-impact, moderate-impact, or highimpact for the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Possible definitions for 

low, moderate, and high levels of security based on impact for ICS based on ISA-TR99.00.02 [27] are 

provided in Table E-1. Possible definitions for ICS impact levels based on product produced, industry 

and security concerns are provided in Table E-2. 

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Table E-1. Possible Definitions for ICS Impact Levels Based on ISA-TR99.00.02 

Impact Category Low-Impact Moderate-Impact High-Impact 

Injury Cuts, bruises requiring 

first aid 

Requires hospitalization Loss of life or limb 

Financial Loss $1,000 $100,000 Millions 

Environmental Release Temporary damage Lasting damage Permanent damage, offsite damage 

Interruption of 

Production 

Minutes Days Weeks 

Public Image Temporary damage Lasting damage Permanent damage 

Table E-2. Possible Definitions for ICS Impact Levels Based on Product Produced, Industry and Security 

Concerns 

Category Low-Impact Moderate-Impact High-Impact 

Product Produced • Non-hazardous 

materials or products 

• Non-ingested 

consumer products 

• Some hazardous 

products or steps during 

production 

• High amount of 

proprietary information 

• Critical infrastructure 

(e.g., electricity) 

• Hazardous materials 

• Ingested products 

Industry Examples • Plastic injection 

molding 

• Warehouse 

applications 

• Automotive metal 

industries 

• Pulp and paper 

• Semiconductors 

• Utilities 

• Petrochemical 

• Food and beverage 

• Pharmaceutical 

Security Concerns • Protection against 

minor injuries 

• Ensuring uptime 

• Protection against 

moderate injuries 

• Ensuring uptime 

• Capital investment 

• Protection against major 

injuries/loss of life 

• Ensuring uptime 

• Capital investment 

• Trade secrets 

• Ensuring basic social 

services 

• Regulatory compliance 

Security Control Selection 

This framework activity includes the initial selection of minimum security controls planned or in place to 

protect the information system based on a set of requirements. FIPS PUB 200 documents a set of 

minimum-security requirements covering 17 security-related areas with regard to protecting the 

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Federal information systems and the information processed, 

stored, and transmitted by those systems. The security-related areas are: 

 Access Control (AC) 

 Awareness and Training (AT) 

 Audit and Accountability (AU) 

 Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments (CA) 

 Configuration Management (CM) 

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 Contingency Planning (CP) 

 Identification and Authentication (IA) 

 Incident Response (IR) 

 Maintenance (MA) 

 Media Protection (MP) 

 Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) 

 Planning (PL) 

 Personnel Security (PS) 

 Risk Assessment (RA) 

 System and Services Acquisition (SA) 

 System and Communications Protection (SC) 

 System and Information Integrity (SI). 

To aid in selecting controls to meet these requirements, NIST SP 800-53 provides fundamental concepts 

and a process for selection and specification of security controls for an information system. Security 

controls are organized into classes and families for ease of use in the selection and specification process. 

Each family name and unique control identifier corresponds to the above listing of minimum-security 

requirements. The families are divided among three classes: management, operational, and technical. 

Each security control within a family contains the following information: 

 Control – describes specific security related activities or actions to be carried out by the organization 

or the information system. The control selections often contain assignment and selection options for 

customizing a security control. 

 Supplemental Guidance – provides additional information related to a specific security control that 

should be considered when selecting and implementing security controls. 

 Control Enhancements – provides statements of security capability to add functionality to or increase 

the strength of a basic control. 

Security Control Refinement 

This activity performs a risk assessment to adjust minimum-security controls to local conditions, required 

threat coverage, and specific agency requirements. NIST SP 800-30 provides practical guidance for 

assessing and mitigating risks identified within information systems. The last section of Appendix E 

provides additional guidance on tailoring the minimum-security controls to address the specific 

requirements of ICS. 

Security Control Documentation 

This activity develops a system security plan that provides an overview of the security requirements for 

the information system and documents the security controls planned or in place. The system security plan 

also delineates responsibilities and expected behavior of all individuals who access the system. NIST SP 

800-18 provides a set of activities and concepts for developing an information system security plan. 

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Security Control Implementation 

This activity involves the implementation of security controls in new or legacy information systems. To 

help make this process consistent across the Federal government, NIST is currently working to develop 

security configuration checklists, which are documented sets of instructions for configuring products to 

pre-defined security baselines [28] (e.g., NIST SP 800-68, Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP 

Systems for IT Professionals: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist).

Security Control Assessment 

This activity determines the extent to which the security controls in the information system are effective 

in their application. NIST SP 800-53A provides guidance for assessing security controls initially selected 

from NIST SP 800-53 to ensure they are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the 

desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements of the system. To accomplish this, the 

document provides expectations based on assurance requirements defined in NIST SP 800-53 for 

characterizing the expectations of security assessments by FIPS 199 impact level. NIST SP 800-53A also 

supports: 

 FISMA annual assessments for major information systems 

 Security certifications as part of formal system certification and accreditation processes 

 Continuous monitoring of selected security controls 

 Preparation for an audit 

 Identification of resource needs to improve the system’s security posture 

 System Authorization: This activity results in a management decision to authorize the operation of an 

information system and to explicitly accept the risk to agency operations, agency assets, or 

individuals based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of security controls. NIST SP 800-37 

provides certification and accreditation guidance in support of this activity. 

 Security Control Monitoring: This activity continuously tracks changes to the information system 

that may affect security controls and assesses control effectiveness. NIST SP 800-37 provides 

guidance on continuous monitoring. 

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Guidance on the Application of Security Controls to ICS 

Because today’s ICS are often a combination of legacy systems, often with a planned life span of twenty 

to thirty years, or a hybrid of legacy systems augmented with newer hardware and software that are 

interconnected to other systems, it is often difficult or infeasible to apply some of the security controls 

contained in NIST SP 800-53. Recognizing this problem, NIST has initiated the Industrial Control 

System Security project24 in cooperation with the public and private sector ICS community to develop 

specific guidance on the application of the security controls in NIST SP 800-53 to ICS. This guidance 

includes an augmented version of the original Appendix E: Minimum Security Controls—Summary, and 

an augmented version of the original Appendix F: Security Control Catalog. Please visit the project 

website for the current releases of these documents. 

The original set of controls, enhancements, and supplemental guidance contained in the original 

Appendix F: Security Control Catalog remain unchanged in the ICS-augmented Appendix F.

While most controls in the original Appendix F of 800-53 are applicable to ICS as written, several 

controls did require ICS-specific interpretation and/or augmentation by adding one or more of the 

following to the control: 

 ICS Supplemental Guidance that provides additional guidance on how the control applies, or 

does not apply, in ICS environments 

 ICS Enhancements (one or more) that provide enhancement augmentations to the original 

control that may be required for some ICS 

 ICS Enhancement Supplemental Guidance that provides guidance on how the control 

enhancement applies, or does not apply, in ICS environments. 

To facilitate the understanding of applying NIST SP 800-53 to ICS, an effort is underway to develop a 

series of ICS cyber security case histories using actual ICS cyber security incidents. These case histories 

examine the NIST SP 800-53 ICS controls that were violated or not implemented, and postulate the 

potential mitigations that may have occurred if the controls had been implemented. Please visit the 

project website for the current releases of these documents. 

In addition, NIST recommends that ICS owners take advantage of the ability to tailor the initial baselines 

when it is not possible or feasible to implement specific security controls contained in the baselines. 

However, all tailoring activity should, as its primary goal, focus on meeting the intent of the original 

security controls whenever possible or feasible. In situations where the organization determines it is not 

feasible or advisable (e.g., adversely impacting performance, safety, reliability) to implement specific 

controls or control enhancements, the organization documents the rationale for not implementing the 

controls, documents appropriate compensating security controls in the System Security Plan, and 

implements these compensating controls. 

Section 6 of this document summarizes the controls identified in NIST SP 800-53, and provides initial 

guidance on how these security controls apply to ICS. Initial recommendations and guidance, if 

available, is provided in an outlined box for each section.

 

24 The Industrial Control System Security Project Web site is located at: http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/ics/index.html 

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Appendix F—References 

[1] Frazer, Roy, Process Measurement and Control – Introduction to Sensors, Communication 

Adjustment, and Control, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2001. 

[2] Falco, Joe, et al., IT Security for Industrial Control Systems, NIST IR 6859, 2003, 

http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/documents/falco/ITSecurityProcess.pdf. 

[3] Bailey, David, and Wright, Edwin, Practical SCADA for Industry, IDC Technologies, 2003. 

[4] Boyer, Stuart, SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, 2nd Edition, ISA, 1999. 

[5] AGA-12, Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications, Part 1: Background, Policies and 

Test Plan, September, 2005, http://www.gtiservices.org/security/AGA12_part1_draft6.pdf. 

[6] Erickson, Kelvin, and Hedrick, John, Plant Wide Process Control, Wiley & Sons, 1999. 

[7] Berge, Jonas, Fieldbuses for Process Control: Engineering, Operation, and Maintenance, ISA, 

2002. 

[8] Peerenboom, James, Infrastructure Interdependencies: Overview of Concepts and Terminology, 

Argonne National Laboratory, 

http://csdl2.computer.org/persagen/DLAbsToc.jsp?resourcePath=/dl/proceedings/&toc=comp/procee

dings/hicss/2007/2755/00/2755toc.xml&DOI=10.1109/HICSS.2007.78. 

[9] Rinaldi, et al., Identifying, Understanding, and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies, 

IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 2001, http://www.ce.cmu.edu/~hsm/im2004/readings/CIIRinaldi.pdf. 

[10] GAO-04-354, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control Systems, 

U.S. GAO, 2004, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04354.pdf. 

[11] Weiss, Joseph, “Current Status of Cyber Security of Control Systems”, Presentation to Georgia Tech 

Protective Relay Conference, May 8, 2003. 

[12] Keeney, Michelle et al., Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure 

Sectors, United States Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon Software Institute, 2005, 

http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/insidercross051105.pdf. 

[13] Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Section 301: Information Security, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/policies/FISMA-final.pdf. 

[14] Federal Information Security Management Act Implementation Project, http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/. 

[15] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication: FIPS 199, Standards for Security 

Categorization of Federal Information Systems, NIST, 2004, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips199/FIPS-PUB-199-final.pdf. 

[16] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication: FIPS 200, Minimum Security Requirements 

for Federal Information Systems, NIST, 2006, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips200/FIPS200-final-march.pdf.. 

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[17] Swanson, Marianne, et al., NIST SP 800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal 

Information Systems, Revision 1, 2006, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-18-

Rev1/sp800-18-Rev1-final.pdf. 

[18] Swanson, Marianne, NIST SP 800-26, Security Self-Assessment Guide for Information Technology 

Systems, 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-26/sp800-26.pdf.

[19] Stoneburner, Gary, et al., NIST SP 800-30, Risk Management for Information Technology Systems, 

2002, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf. 

[20] Ross, Ron, et al., NIST SP 800-37, Guide for the Security Certification and Accreditation of Federal 

Information Systems, 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37/SP800-37-final.pdf. 

[21] Ross, Ron, et al., NIST SP 800-53, Revision 1, Recommended Security Controls for Federal 

Information Systems, 2006, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-53-Rev1/800-53-rev1-

final-clean-sz.pdf. 

[22] Ross, Ron, et al., NIST SP 800-53A (Draft), Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal 

Information Systems, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-53A/SP-800-53A-tpd-final-sz.pdf. 

[23] Barker, William, NIST SP 800-59, Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National 

Security System, 2003, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-59/SP800-59.pdf. 

[24] Barker, William, NIST SP 800-60 Version 2.0, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and 

Information systems to Security Categories, 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-

60/SP800-60V1-final.pdf. 

[25] Souppaya, Murugiah, et al., NIST SP 800-70, Security Configuration Checklists Program for IT 

Products – Guidance for Checklists Users and Developers, 2005, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/checklists/docs/SP_800-70_20050526.pdf. 

[26] Bowen, Pauline, et al., NIST SP 800-100, Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, 

2006, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-100/SP800-100-Mar07-2007.pdf. 

[27] TR99.00.02: Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and Control Systems 

Environment, ISA, 2004. 

[28] NIST Security Configurations Checklists Program for IT Products, http://checklists.nist.gov/ 

[29] Stamp, Jason, et al., Common Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure Control Systems, Sandia 

National Laboratories, 2003, http://www.sandia.gov/iorta/docs/SAND2003-

1772C_Common_Vulnerabilities_CI_Control1.pdf. 

[30] SCADA Security - Advice for CEOs, IT Security Expert Advisory Group (ITSEAG), 

http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(930C12A9101F61D43493D44C70E84EAA)

~SCADA+Security.pdf/$file/SCADA+Security.pdf

[31] Franz, Matthew, Vulnerability Testing of Industrial Network Devices, Critical Infrastructure 

Assurance Group, Cisco Systems, 2003, http://www.scadasec.net/oldio/papers/franz-isa-devicetesting-oct03.pdf. 

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[32] Duggan, David, et al., Penetration Testing of Industrial Control Systems, Sandia National 

Laboratories, Report No SAND2005-2846P, 2005, 

http://www.sandia.gov/scada/documents/sand_2005_2846p.pdf. 

[33] 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks, Office of Energy Assurance, U.S. 

Department of Energy, http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/prepare/21stepsbooklet.pdf. 

[34] TR99.00.01: Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems, ISA, 2007, 

http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?Section=WG_TR_1_Technologies&Site=SP99,_Manufacturin

g_and_Control_Systems_Security1&Template=/ContentManagement/MSContentDisplay.cfm&Cont

entID=62720. 

[35] NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for SCADA and Process Control Networks, 

National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre, London, 2005, 

http://www.cpni.gov.uk/docs/re-20050223-00157.pdf. 

[36] Idaho National Laboratory, Control Systems Cyber Security: Defense in Depth Strategies, Homeland 

Security External Report # INL/EXT-06-11478, May 2006, 

http://csrp.inl.gov/Documents/Defense%20in%20Depth%20Strategies.pdf

[37] The IAONA Handbook for Network Security – Draft/RFC v0.4, Industrial Automation Open 

Networking Association (IAONA), Magdeburg, Germany, 2003. 

[38] Idaho National Laboratory, Common Control System Vulnerability, Homeland Security External 

Report # INL/EXT-05-00993, November 2005, www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/csvul1105.pdf

[39] NIST SP 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook, 1995, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-12/handbook.pdf. 

[40] Mell, Peter, et al., NIST SP 800-40 Version 2, Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management 

Program, 2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-40-Ver2/SP800-40v2.pdf. 

[41] Wack, John, et al., NIST SP 800-42, Guideline on Network Security Testing, 2003, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-42/NIST-SP800-42.pdf. 

[42] Roback, Edward, NIST SP 800-23, Guidelines to Federal Organizations on Security Assurance and 

Acquisition/ Use of Tested/Evaluated Products, 2000, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-

23/sp800-23.pdf. 

[43] Stoneburner, Gary, et al., NIST SP 800-27, Engineering Principles for Information Security (A 

Baseline for Achieving Security), Revision A, 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-

27A/SP800-27-RevA.pdf. 

[44] Grance, Tim, et al., NIST SP 800-35, Guide to Information Technology Security Services, 2003, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-35/NIST-SP800-35.pdf. 

[45] Grance, Tim, et al., NIST SP 800-36, Guide to Selecting Information Technology Security Products, 

2003, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-36/NIST-SP800-36.pdf. 

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[46] Grance, Tim, et al., NIST SP 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System 

Development Life Cycle, Revision 1, 2004, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-64/NISTSP800-64.pdf. 

[47] Hash, Joan, et al., NIST SP 800-65, Integrating IT Security into the Capital Planning and Investment 

Control Process, 2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-65/SP-800-65-Final.pdf. 

[48] System Protection Profile – Industrial Control Systems (SPP-ICS), NIST Internal Report, 

http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/SPP-ICSv1.0.pdf. 

[49] SCADA and Control Systems Procurement Project, http://www.cscic.state.ny.us/msisac/scada/. 

[50] Dray, James, et al., NIST SP 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification, 2006, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-73-1/sp800-73-1v7-April20-2006.pdf. 

[51] Wilson, Charles, et al., NIST SP 800-76, Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity 

Verification, 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-76-1/SP800-76-1_012407.pdf. 

[52] Kuhn, D. Richard, et al., NIST SP 800-46, Security for Telecommuting and Broadband 

Communications, 2002, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-46/sp800-46.pdf. 

[53] Swanson, Marianne, et al., NIST SP 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information 

Technology Systems, 2002, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-34/sp800-34.pdf. 

[54] Burr, William, et al., NIST SP 800-63, Electronic Authentication Guideline, 2006, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63V1_0_2.pdf. 

[55] Bace, Rebecca, and Mell, Peter, NIST SP 800-31, Intrusion Detection Systems, 2001, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-31/sp800-31.pdf. 

[56] Scarfone, Karen, and Mell, Peter, NIST SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention 

Systems (IDPS), 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-94/SP800-94.pdf 

[57] Falco, Joe, et al., Using Anti-virus Software on Industrial Control Systems: Integration Guidance 

and a Test Methodology for Assessing Performance Impacts, 2006, Draft Document, 

http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/AV_Guide_PCSF_Draft_Release_20060530.pdf

[58] Peterson, Dale, Intrusion Detection and Cyber Security Monitoring of SCADA and DCS Networks, 

ISA, 2004, 

http://whitepapers.techrepublic.com.com/whitepaper.aspx?&docid=126355&promo=100511. 

[59] Symantec Expands SCADA Protection for Electric Utilities, 

http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20050914_01 

[60] Grance, Tim, et al., NIST SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, 2004, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-61/sp800-61.pdf. 

[61] Mell, Peter, et al., NIST SP 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling, 2005, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-83/SP800-83.pdf. 

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[62] Wilson, Mark, and Hash, Joan, NIST SP 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security 

Awareness and Training Program, 2003, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-50/NISTSP800-50.pdf. 

[63] Mix, S., Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems Security Guide, EPRI, 2003. 

[64] Karygiannis, Tom, and Owens, Les, NIST SP 800-48, Wireless Network Security, 802.11, Bluetooth 

and Handheld Devices, 2002, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-48/NIST_SP_800-

48.pdf. 

[65] Frankel, Sheila, et al, NIST SP 800-97, Guide to IEEE 802.11i: Establishing Robust Security 

Networks, 2006, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-97/SP800-97.pdf

[66] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication: FIPS 201, Personal Identity Verification 

(PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, NIST, 2006, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips201-1/FIPS-201-1-chng1.pdf

[67] Dray, James, et al, NIST SP 800-96, PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines, 2006, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-96/SP800-96-091106.pdf 

[68] Polk, W., Timothy, et al, NIST SP 800-78, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal 

Identity Verification, 2007, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-78-1/SP-800-78-

1_final2.pdf

[69] Souppaya, Murugiah, Kent, Karen, NIST SP 800-92, Guide to Computer Security Log Management, 

2006, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-92/SP800-92.pdf 

[70] Jansen, Wayne, NIST SP 800-28, Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code, 2001, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-28/sp800-28.pdf. 

[71] Chernick, Michael, et al, NIST SP 800-52, Guidelines for the Selection and Use of Transport Layer 

Security (TLS) Implementations, 2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-52/SP800-

52.pdf 

[72] Barker, Elaine, et al., NIST SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment 

Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2007, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56A/SP800-56A_Revision1_Mar08-2007.pdf. 

[73] Baker, Elaine, et al., NIST SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, 2006, 

Part 1, General: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/SP800-57-Part1.pdf, 

Part 2, Best Practices: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/SP800-57-Part2.pdf. 

[74] Kuhn, D. Richard, et al., NIST SP 800-58, Security Recommendations for Voice Over IP Systems, 

2005, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-58/SP800-58-final.pdf. 

[75] Frankel, Sheila, et al, NIST SP 800-77, Guide to IPsec VPNs, 2005, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-77/sp800-77.pdf. 

[76] Internet Security Glossary: RFC 2828, http://rfc.net/rfc2828.html. 

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GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY (SECOND PUBLIC DRAFT)

[77] Franz, Matthew, and Pothamsetty, Venkat, ModbusFW Deep Packet Inspection for Industrial 

Ethernet, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Group, Cisco Systems, 2004, 

http://www.scadasec.net/oldio/papers/franz-niscc-modbusfw-may04.pdf. 

[78] Duggan, David, Penetration Testing of Industrial Control Systems, Report SAND2005-2846P, 

Sandia National Laboratories, 2005, http://www.sandia.gov/scada/documents/sand_2005_2846p.pdf. 

[79] Kissel, Richard, et al., NIST SP 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization, 2006, 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-88/NISTSP800-88_rev1.pdf. 

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