Report to the Subcommittee on 

Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

August 2005 DEFENSE LOGISTICS

DOD Has Begun to 

Improve Supply 

Distribution 

Operations, but 

Further Actions Are 

Needed to Sustain 

These Efforts 

GAO-05-775 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William Solis, 

(202) 512-8365, solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-775, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Readiness, House 

Committee on Armed Services 

August 2005

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply 

Distribution Operations, but Further 

Actions Are Needed to Sustain These 

Efforts 

Although DOD has made progress in addressing supply distribution 

problems, the department’s ability to make coordinated, systemic 

improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the 

distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has 

accountability and authority for making such improvements and because the 

current strategy to transform logistics does not provide a clear vision to 

guide and synchronize future distribution improvement efforts. The U.S. 

Transportation Command developed a draft directive to define the DPO role, 

but no directive has been approved or issued almost 2 years later because of 

disagreement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) concerning 

the Secretary’s intent in designating the DPO. Whereas the Command 

asserted that the Secretary intended for the DPO to have broad authority to 

direct changes to the distribution system, OSD took the position that the 

Defense Logistics Executive—the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics)—was the accountable entity and that the DPO 

was to act as an advisor. As a result of this disagreement, accountability and 

authority for improving the distribution system remain unclear. In addition, 

the DPO’s roles and responsibilities may overlap with those of other 

organizations that are involved in deployment and distribution. In recent 

testimony on DOD’s business transformation efforts, GAO has stated that 

DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for performance to specific 

organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish 

goals. Furthermore, DOD’s current strategy to transform logistics lacks 

elements of an effective strategic plan, including specific performance goals, 

programs, milestones, and resources needed for achieving distribution 

objectives. Because of the problems in DOD’s organizational structure and 

current strategy, DOD faces challenges in taking a coordinated and systemic 

approach to improving the distribution system. Until these issues are 

resolved, DOD has little assurance that warfighters in future conflicts will 

have more effective and timely logistics support. 

Two of DOD’s five distribution initiatives GAO reviewed have been 

successful enough to warrant application to future operations, but the future 

of the other three is less certain because they lack funding or other support. 

Two promising initiatives that have been implemented are, first, the 

establishment of a deployment and distribution operations center in Kuwait 

to coordinate the arrival of supplies and, second, the consolidation of air 

shipments to Iraq that do not require sorting and repacking when they arrive 

in theater. The other three initiatives GAO reviewed are facing challenges to 

their implementation that raise concerns about when they will be completed. 

For example, the Army has not fully funded two new communications and 

tracking systems to better connect logisticians on the battlefield, and thus 

has placed their fielding schedules into question. The delay increases the 

risk that some future deploying units will lack a capability to effectively 

submit and monitor their supply requisitions. 

Problems in the supply distribution 

system dating back to the Persian 

Gulf War have impeded the ability 

of the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to provide effective and 

timely logistics support to the 

warfighter. DOD has taken actions 

to improve the distribution system 

by assigning new organizational 

responsibilities, including 

designating U.S. Transportation 

Command as the “Distribution 

Process Owner” (DPO); issuing a 

new logistics transformation 

strategy; and undertaking specific 

improvement initiatives. GAO’s 

objectives were to (1) assess 

DOD’s organizational structure and 

transformation strategy to improve 

the distribution system and (2) 

determine the status of, and 

timelines for completing, specific 

DOD distribution initiatives. 

What GAO Recommends

To enhance DOD’s ability to 

improve the supply distribution 

system, GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense (1) clarify the 

responsibilities, accountability, and 

authority between the DPO and 

Defense Logistics Executive; 

(2) issue a directive to institute 

these clarifications; (3) direct that 

improvements be made in DOD’s 

logistics transformation strategy; 

and (4) address underfunding of 

new communications and tracking 

systems. DOD disagreed with the 

first two recommendations and 

agreed with the latter two. 
Page i GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 5 

Accountability and Authority for Improving the Distribution 

System Remain Unclear 12 

Two Initiatives Have Shown Promise, but the Future of Three 

Other Initiatives Is Less Certain 17 

Conclusions 27 

Recommendations for Executive Action 28 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28 

Scope and Methodology 30 

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 33 

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36 

Table 

Table 1: Distribution Problems During Operation Desert 

Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom 6 

Figures 

Figure 1: Very Small Aperture Terminal 21 

Figure 2: Mobile Tracking System 23 

Contents 

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Page 1 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

August 11, 2005 

The Honorable Joel Hefley 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Long-standing problems in the supply distribution system have impeded 

the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide effective and 

timely logistics support to the warfighter. These problems have included 

an insufficient capability to support combat forces during the early stages 

of a conflict, limited communications, a shortage of trucks and other 

transportation equipment, difficulties in distributing supplies within the 

theater of operations, limited visibility of assets within the distribution 

system, and problems with managing shipping priorities. Such problems 

occurred during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and DOD after 

action reports, as well as studies by our office and other organizations, 

have documented similar supply distribution problems during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. Most recently, in April 2005, we reported that a lack of 

asset visibility was a problem in Iraq that affected supply distribution and 

the readiness of forces.1

 In addition, since 1990 we have identified supply 

chain and inventory management, including distribution, as one of DOD’s 

high-risk areas. 

DOD has recently taken actions aimed at addressing supply distribution 

problems. In September 2003, the Secretary of Defense designated new 

organizational responsibilities in the logistics area, including designating 

U.S. Transportation Command as the “Distribution Process Owner” (DPO) 

to improve the efficiency and interoperability of the distribution system. 

 1

 GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

DOD also issued a new strategy in December 2004 for its logistics 

transformation efforts. Meanwhile, DOD components have undertaken a 

number of specific initiatives to address supply distribution problems. 

In response to your request, we reviewed the progress DOD is making 

toward achieving logistics improvement efforts for supply distribution. 

Specifically, we (1) assessed DOD’s organizational structure and 

transformation strategy to improve the distribution system and 

(2) determined the status of specific DOD distribution initiatives, including 

timelines for completing them. 

To assess DOD’s organizational structure and transformation strategy, we 

analyzed U.S. Transportation Command’s progress in implementing its 

DPO responsibilities, including efforts to define the role of the DPO in 

response to the Secretary’s 2003 memorandum. We also analyzed DOD’s 

logistics transformation strategy to determine the extent to which it 

provides a framework for guiding and synchronizing distribution 

improvement efforts. To determine the status of specific DOD initiatives, 

we selected five initiatives that were highlighted as major ongoing efforts 

by representatives of U.S. Transportation Command and the Army in 

March 2004 testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services. 

We focused on these two DOD components because of the key roles they 

have had in supply distribution operations in Iraq. The two U.S. 

Transportation Command initiatives we reviewed were (1) establishing a 

deployment and distribution operations center to coordinate the arrival of 

supplies in theater and (2) improving the interoperability of information 

technology systems supporting the distribution system.2

 The three Army 

initiatives we reviewed were (1) consolidating air cargo pallets for 

shipment to a single supply support activity—called “pure packing,” 

(2) acquiring two communications and tracking systems to better connect 

logisticians on the battlefield, and (3) creating command and control units 

that are trained and equipped to rapidly receive military forces into a 

theater of operations and provide initial logistics support, which the Army 

refers to as a “theater opening” capability. In addition to these five 

initiatives, other distribution improvement programs are continuing within 

the department. Several of these programs have been included in a plan 

DOD has recently developed, in coordination with the Office of 

Management and Budget, to address the DOD High-Risk Area of supply 

 2

 The term “interoperability” refers to the ability of different systems to communicate 

effectively, including sharing information. 
Page 3 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

chain management.3 For the five initiatives in our review, we obtained 

information on their purpose and funding, as well as their fielding 

schedule where appropriate. We discussed the specific initiatives and 

issues concerning supply distribution with officials from U.S. 

Transportation Command, the Army, the Office of the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness), and the Joint 

Staff. We visited the U.S. Central Command area of operations to obtain a 

first-hand view of distribution problems in the theater and how solutions 

were being implemented to correct them. Because some of the initiatives 

have been implemented for only a short time, we obtained limited data on 

the effectiveness of initiatives that have been implemented, and we did not 

independently validate these data. We determined that the data used were 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We performed our work from July 

2004 through June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. The scope and methodology section 

contains more detailed information on the work we performed. 

Although DOD has made progress in addressing supply distribution 

problems, the department’s ability to make coordinated, systemic 

improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the 

distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has 

accountability and authority for making such improvements and because 

the current logistics transformation strategy does not provide a clear 

vision to guide and synchronize future distribution improvement efforts. 

When the Secretary of Defense designated U.S. Transportation Command 

as DPO, he directed the Command to develop a directive within 30 days to 

define the DPO role. Although the Command developed a draft directive, it 

has not been approved or issued almost 2 years later because of 

disagreement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

concerning the Secretary’s intent in designating the DPO. Whereas the 

Command asserted that the Secretary intended for the DPO to have broad 

authority to direct changes to the distribution system, OSD took the 

position that the Defense Logistics Executive—the Under Secretary of 

 3

 The distribution-related programs in DOD’s plan include Radio Frequency Identification, 

Item Unique Identification, Joint Regional Inventory Materiel Management, War Reserve 

Materiel Improvements, Joint Theater Logistics, Deployment and Distribution Operations 

Center, Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative, and Business Management 

Modernization Program. We plan to issue a report soon on DOD’s program to track 

supplies by using radio frequency identification tags. We have also undertaken a review of 

the Army’s shortage of armored trucks during Operation Iraqi Freedom and will report on 

this issue separately. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)—was the accountable 

entity and that the DPO’s intended role was to act as an advisor. As a 

result of this disagreement, accountability and authority for improving the 

distribution system remain unclear. In addition, the DPO’s roles and 

responsibilities may overlap with those of other organizations that are 

involved in deployment and distribution. In recent testimony on DOD’s 

business transformation efforts, we stated that DOD has not routinely 

assigned accountability for performance to specific organizations or 

individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish goals. 

Furthermore, DOD’s current strategy to transform logistics stymies the 

department’s ability to improve distribution because it does not provide 

clear direction to guide and synchronize improvement initiatives based on 

a common vision of a future distribution system. For example, the strategy 

lacks guidance on specific performance goals, programs, milestones, and 

resources needed for achieving stated objectives. DOD officials have 

acknowledged the shortcomings of the current strategy and are working to 

develop a more detailed roadmap to guide improvement efforts. Because 

of the problems in DOD’s organizational structure and current strategy, 

DOD faces challenges in taking a coordinated and systemic approach to 

improving the distribution system. As a result, DOD has little assurance 

that warfighters in future conflicts will have more effective and timely 

logistics support. 

Two of the five DOD distribution initiatives we reviewed have been 

successful enough to warrant application to future operations, but the 

future of the other three is less certain because they lack funding or other 

support. Two promising initiatives that have been implemented are, first, 

the establishment in January 2004 of a deployment and distribution 

operations center in Kuwait to coordinate the arrival of supplies and, 

second, the use of pure packing for air shipments to Iraq, an effort the 

Army began in response to a January 2004 request from U.S. Central 

Command. According to DOD, both these initiatives helped improve the 

flow of supplies into and around the theater of operations for Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. On the basis of the success of these initiatives, 

U.S. Transportation Command is working with other regional combatant 

commands to establish a deployment and distribution operations center 

within their organizations, and the Army is incorporating its pure packing 

initiative into its regulations for Army-wide application. The other three 

initiatives we reviewed are facing challenges to their implementation that 

raise concerns about when they will be completed. The Army has not fully 

funded two new communications and tracking systems to better connect 

logisticians on the battlefield, and thus has placed their fielding schedules 

into question. The delay increases the risk that some future deploying 
Page 5 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

units will lack a capability to effectively submit and monitor their supply 

requisitions. In addition, the Army is making progress toward developing a 

theater opening capability, but it is uncertain whether this capability will 

be deployed at the same time as combat forces in future conflicts. Finally, 

U.S. Transportation Command is facing challenges in improving the 

interoperability of information technology supporting the distribution 

system, an effort the Command has undertaken in its role as DPO. The 

Command was delayed in receiving funding to begin this initiative and will 

miss a deadline for developing a transition plan to guide future 

information technology investments. Moreover, the Command has not 

been able to gain agreement from other DOD components on which of 

their existing information technology systems should be included in this 

effort to improve interoperability. 

This report contains four recommendations aimed at enhancing DOD’s 

ability to take a coordinated and systemic approach to improving the 

distribution system, including clarifying the scope of responsibilities, 

accountability, and authority between the DPO and the Defense Logistics 

Executive. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD did not concur 

with our recommendations that the Secretary of Defense clarify the scope 

of responsibilities, accountability, and authority between the DPO and the 

Defense Logistics Executive; and that he issue a directive reflecting these 

clarifications. DOD concurred with our recommendations to include 

improvements to the Logistics Transformation Strategy in its Focused 

Logistics Roadmap, and to determine whether sufficient funding priority 

has been given to the acquisition of the Very Small Aperture Terminal and 

the Mobile Tracking System. The department’s written comments are 

reprinted in appendix I, and our evaluation of them appears in the Agency 

Comments and Our Evaluation section of this report. 

Distribution is part of the process and activities for managing the supply 

chain that include purchasing, producing, and delivering products and 

services to the warfighter during contingency operations consistent with 

the National Military Strategy. According to joint doctrine, distribution is 

the process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to deliver 

the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the 

combatant commander in an area of operations. 

The distribution system has two distinct segments: strategic-national and 

theater. The strategic-national segment consists of moving supplies from 

points outside a theater of military operations into the theater. The 

military services and the Defense Logistics Agency manage supplies and 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

provide for asset visibility. U.S. Transportation Command provides 

transportation support, primarily strategic airlift and sealift, as well as intransit asset visibility. The theater segment consists of distribution that 

occurs within a theater of military operations. Theater distribution is the 

responsibility of the geographic combatant command, such as U.S. Central 

Command. The combatant commander will generally designate one 

military service to act as the theater lead service to oversee logistics 

support to all of the service components and to the theater. During 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Central Command designated the Army as 

the theater’s lead service for logistics support. 

Long-standing problems in DOD’s distribution system have continued to 

impede its ability to provide effective and timely logistics support to the 

warfighter during recent operations. Such problems occurred during 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991, and DOD after action 

reports, as well as studies by our office and other organizations, have 

documented similar supply distribution problems during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, as shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Distribution Problems During Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Operation Desert Shield/Storm—1991 Operation Iraqi Freedom—2003 

Logistics Force Reception

The deployment of combat forces to the theater of operations in 

advance of support units created logistical support difficulties. The 

military’s decisions to “push” enormous amounts of equipment to 

the theater and to deploy combat units before support units in the 

first 3 months of the campaign contributed to the Army’s and 

Marine Corps’ problem of limited capability to store and retrieve 

equipment and supplies during the initial stages of Operation 

Desert Storm. A small cadre of logisticians was established to 

receive incoming equipment, supplies, and personnel; support the 

combat units that were deployed; and build a logistics infrastructure 

in an austere environment. 

DOD’s priority was for combat forces to move into the theater 

first. A study suggested that distribution assets were either 

deleted from the deployment plan or shifted back in the 

deployment timeline. As a result, logistics personnel could not 

effectively support the increasing numbers of combat troops 

moving into theater. A shortage of support personnel in theater 

prior to and during the arrival of combat forces was reported, and 

those who arrived were often untrained or not skilled in the duties 

they were asked to perform. The shortage resulted in delays in 

the processing (receipt, sorting, and forwarding) of supplies, and 

backlogs. Contractors performing distribution functions had 

become overwhelmed and a joint contractor military organization 

quickly evolved. As two divisions entered the theater, the need 

for a Theater Distribution Center became apparent and an area 

in the desert was designated as a storage and cross-dock area. 

Limited Communications

The distance of the supply routes created communications 

problems within the logistical system because Army officials had 

difficulty communicating using their equipment, which was 

designed for much shorter ranges. Military doctrine called for units 

to be equipped to operate up to 90 miles from main supply bases. 

However, the Army supported military and logistics bases over 600 

miles from its main supply bases. 

A number of factors limited communications between the various 

logistics systems, including distances being too great for supply 

activities to effectively transmit data by radio, a lack of bandwidth 

in the theater to satisfy all systems users, systems that were 

incompatible with each other, and units lacking the necessary 

equipment or being delayed in connecting to the supply system. 

Long-standing Problems in 

DOD’s Distribution System 
Page 7 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Operation Desert Shield/Storm—1991 Operation Iraqi Freedom—2003 

Shortage of Ground Transportation Assets

Although the Army was the designated theater manager for surface 

transportation, it could not fulfill that role because it lacked the 

transportation assets to meet its own requirements. The Army 

experienced shortages of surface transportation assets such as 

heavy-equipment transports, tractor trailers, and material-handling 

equipment, which limited the services’ ability to transport 

equipment and supplies. When parts requisitions were filled, 

transportation problems often slowed efforts to get parts to combat 

units. Many of the available trucks were inadequate and unreliable. 

More than half of the heavy transportation assets were either 

contracted commercial trucks or trucks provided by other nations. 

Despite the deployment of 72 percent of its truck companies in 

support of 25 percent of its combat divisions, the Army still relied 

on host nation support trucks to meet requirements. 

The lack of adequate ground transportation, especially cargo 

trucks, contributed significantly to distribution problems. The 

377th Theater Support Command, responsible for logistics 

support in Kuwait, needed 930 light/medium and medium trucks 

but had only 515 trucks on hand when combat began, creating a 

strain on materiel movement. Available transportation assets 

could not meet the Marine Corps’ and the 3rd Infantry Division’s 

capacity requirements. High-priority items such as food did not 

always move as intended. Contractors responsible for moving 

meals ready-to-eat from ports to the Theater Distribution Center 

at times had only 50 of the 80 trucks needed. At one time 1.4 

million meals ready-to-eat were stored at a port in theater, 

awaiting transport to customers. 

In Theater Distribution Difficulties

Units experienced a shortage of critical spare parts and had to strip 

parts from inoperable equipment and trade for parts with other 

units. Army units, for example, experienced difficulties in obtaining 

spare and repair parts for their Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 

Abrams tanks. Parts were generally available in Saudi Arabia at the 

theater level, but their distribution to combat units was inadequate. 

Mechanics and logistics personnel in combat units had to work 

around the formal parts distribution system and “scrounge” for 

needed parts. Documentation on containers packed at U.S. depots 

did not include adequate descriptions of container contents. 

Transportation and supply personnel in Southwest Asia had to 

open the containers to determine their contents and destination. 

Containers began stacking up in the ports because the 

transportation system could not move them out of the port areas 

quickly. Materiel designated for specific units often never reached 

them because no procedures were established to document the 

arrival of incoming supplies, and the units, in most cases, were not 

notified when materiel they requisitioned arrived. The rapid 

redeployment of units resulted in similar container problems, with 

the majority of containers being opened at U.S. ports to identify the 

contents and destination. 

The lack of repair parts delivery resulted in a loss of trust and 

confidence in logistics systems and processes, and units were 

forced to improvise. At times there were shortages of some 

spares or repair parts needed by deployed forces. Personnel 

noted shortages of items such as tires, tank track, helicopter 

spare parts, and radio batteries. As a result, units resorted to 

cannibalizing vehicles or circumventing normal supply channels 

to keep equipment in ready condition. Early in the operation, 

inefficient packaging and palletizing of air shipments created 

supply backlogs in Kuwait. These backlogs delayed the delivery 

of supplies shipped by air to units in Iraq, which included 

armored vehicle track shoes, body armor, and tires. Once in 

theater, mixed shipments had to be manually opened, sorted, 

and re-palletized at theater distribution points, causing additional 

delays. Some mixed shipments were not marked with all the 

intended destinations so the contents of the shipments had to be 

examined. By the fall of 2003, 30 percent of the pallets arriving at 

the Theater Distribution Center still had to be reconfigured in 

some way. DOD could potentially pay millions of dollars for late 

fees on leased containers or on the replacement of DOD-owned 

containers due to distribution backlogs or losses. 
Page 8 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Operation Desert Shield/Storm—1991 Operation Iraqi Freedom—2003 

Limited Asset Visibility

The Army did not have visibility of repair parts at the unit level and 

could not readily redistribute parts among units. Army officials did 

not have visibility of on-hand stocks at the unit and division levels, 

and they were operating in a vacuum deciding how much of an 

item to order. Army and Marine Corps officials at seaports 

generally knew when a ship was to arrive but had only a general 

idea about the type of cargo it was carrying. Incomplete manifests, 

mislabeled containers, or generic cargo descriptions were not 

uncommon for ships. Officials at an airport usually did not know the 

contents of incoming shipments until the unloading was complete, 

and air shipments also suffered from inaccurate manifests and 

mislabeled pallets. Army officials of a support command did not 

have an in-transit system for tracking cargo after it was shipped, 

and they had to keep personnel at the ports to determine the 

contents and destination of incoming cargo. 

The lack of in-transit visibility over supplies impeded distribution. 

Because of incomplete radio frequency identification tags on 

incoming shipments, logistics personnel had to spend time 

opening and sorting the shipments, significantly increasing 

processing time. According to U.S. Central Command, about 

1,500 Small Arms Protective Inserts plates for body armor were 

lost and 17 containers of meals ready-to-eat were left at a supply 

base in Iraq for over a week because no one at the base knew 

they were there. Marine Corps officials became frustrated with 

their inability to “see” supplies moving towards them and lost 

trust and confidence in the logistics system and processes. 

Logistics systems used to order, track, and account for supplies 

were not well integrated and could not provide the essential 

information to effectively manage theater distribution. 

Misuse of Shipment Prioritization

In the initial phase of Desert Shield, Defense Logistics Agency 

officials were overwhelmed with high-priority requisitions for the 

items they managed, and until they received distribution guidance 

from theater managers, they issued items on a first-come firstserve basis. DOD officials in the theater confirmed the use of the 

high-priority code for most requisitions made in country. 

DOD’s lack of an effective process for prioritizing cargo for 

delivery precluded the effective use of scarce theater 

transportation assets. The Joint Movement Center, which was 

responsible for validating and prioritizing movements in the 

theater, did not have the required resources, processes, and 

tools to perform this function and did not attempt to manage truck 

movements. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD lessons learned studies and prior GAO reports. 

The Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated September 16, 2003, 

designated the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, as DPO and 

directed the Command to (1) improve the overall efficiency and 

interoperability of distribution-related activities—deployment, 

sustainment, and redeployment support—during peace and war; and 

(2) serve as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the 

strategic distribution system. The Secretary’s memorandum also 

designated the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) as the Defense Logistics Executive. The memorandum states 

that the Defense Logistics Executive shall have the authority to make 

changes necessary to integrate the global supply chain and, in 

coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepare any 

directives, instructions, and decision memos; and suggest legislative 

changes. After this memorandum was issued, U.S. Transportation 

Command established a DPO management structure consisting of an 

Executive Board, a Distribution Transformation Task Force, a steering 

group, and working groups to oversee and manage the DPO’s 

improvement initiatives. This management structure includes 

representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the 

military services, and the Defense Logistics Agency. 

DOD’s Changes in 

Organizational 

Responsibilities and 

Transformation Strategy 
Page 9 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

In December 2004, DOD issued its Logistics Transformation Strategy. The 

strategy was developed at the direction of the department’s fiscal year 

2006 Strategic Planning Guidance. The guidance directed the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to reconcile 

three logistics concepts—force-centric logistics enterprise, sense and 

respond logistics, and focused logistics—into a coherent transformation 

strategy. Force-centric logistics enterprise is OSD’s midterm concept 

(2005-2010) for enhancing support to the warfighter, and it encompasses 

six initiatives.4

 Sense and respond logistics is a future logistics concept 

developed by the department’s Office of Force Transformation that 

envisions a networked logistics system that would provide joint strategic 

and tactical operations with predictive, precise, and agile support. 

Focused logistics is a concept for force transformation developed by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff that identifies logistics challenges and capabilities 

needed to meet the challenges. In December 2003, the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council approved the Focused Logistics Joint Functional 

Concept, one in a “family” of joint operating, functional, and integrating 

concepts that collectively depict how transformed forces will operate in 

the future.5

In March 2004 testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House 

Armed Services Committee, senior officials of U.S. Transportation 

Command and the Army highlighted continuing initiatives aimed at 

addressing supply distribution problems.6

 One initiative highlighted by 

U.S. Transportation Command was the establishment of a deployment and 

distribution operations center to assist U.S. Central Command with 

distribution. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanders at the senior 

 4

 These six initiatives are (1) depot maintenance partnership, (2) condition-based 

maintenance plus, (3) total life cycle systems management, (4) end-to-end distribution, 

(5) executive agents, and (6) enterprise integration. 

5

 As approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Focused Logistics Joint 

Functional Concept defines seven capabilities needed to effectively project and sustain 

military forces: (1) joint deployment/rapid distribution, (2) agile sustainment, 

(3) operational engineering, (4) multinational logistics, (5) force health protection, 

(6) information fusion, and (7) joint theater logistics management. 

6

 Testimony of Major General Robert Dail, Director of Operations, U.S. Transportation 

Command, and Lieutenant General Claude V. Christianson, Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics, United States Army, before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed 

Services Committee on March 30, 2004. Major General Dail was subsequently promoted to 

lieutenant general and assigned to the position of Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation 

Command. 

Recent U.S. Transportation 

Command and Army 

Initiatives to Address 

Supply Distribution 

Problems 
Page 10 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

levels were not able to prioritize their needs and make decisions in the 

early stages of the distribution process because they did not know what 

was being shipped to them. The result was an overburdened and 

overtasked transportation and distribution system. The operations center 

was established at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, in January 2004 and placed 

under the tactical control of the Commander, U.S. Central Command. Its 

mission was to help coordinate the movement of materiel and forces into 

the theater of operations by confirming the combatant commander’s 

deployment and distribution priorities; validating and monitoring theater 

air and surface transportation requirements; providing asset visibility; 

setting the conditions for the return of materiel from the theater; and 

synchronizing the forces, equipment, and supplies arriving in theater with 

critical theater lift and theater infrastructure limitations. The operations 

center acquired a workforce of approximately 60 personnel provided by 

U.S. Transportation Command and other DOD components. 

A second initiative highlighted by U.S. Transportation Command was 

improving the interoperability of the information technology systems 

supporting distribution. In his testimony, the senior U.S. Transportation 

Command official noted that there were more than 200 information 

technology systems supporting distribution and that the lack of 

interoperability among these systems during Operation Iraqi Freedom had 

contributed to problems such as poor asset visibility. Improved 

interoperability, he stated, would provide the warfighter greater reliability 

and predictability for sustainment supplies. In July 2004, OSD’s Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness and the 

Joint Staff’s Director for Logistics designated U.S. Transportation 

Command, as DPO, to be the office with primary responsibility for 

overseeing departmentwide efforts to improve information technology 

support for distribution, including sustainment and force movement. The 

term used to describe this role is “portfolio management.” Specifically, the 

Command was assigned to (1) develop a process for managing its portfolio 

of information technology systems by August 2004; (2) identify potential 

returns, goals, outcomes, and draft performance requirements by the end 
Page 11 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

of 2004; and (3) develop an information technology transition plan by the 

end of 2005 to guide information technology investments.7

In the March 2004 testimony, the Army official identified four focus areas 

for the service’s initiatives to improve logistics support, including supply 

distribution. The four focus areas were connecting Army logisticians, 

improving force reception, modernizing theater distribution, and 

integrating the supply chain. Following are the Army initiatives we 

reviewed under three of these four focus areas.8

• To connect logisticians, the Army stated that it would acquire two 

systems: the Very Small Aperture Terminal, a compact satellite to replace 

line-of-sight communications to send and monitor requisitions for supplies 

from the battlefield; and the Mobile Tracking System, a satellite-based, 

two-way text messaging system installed in trucks to provide position 

locations and allow truck drivers to communicate with a dispatcher. 

According to the Army, these systems will improve logisticians’ visibility 

of the status of their supply requisitions. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

logisticians lost confidence in the supply system because their ability to 

monitor requisitions was impaired by a lack of reliable communications. 

 7

 As directed by section 332 of the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, 

DOD is changing its approach to business system modernization. The Secretary of Defense 

is required under the authorization act to develop an enterprise architecture for defense 

business systems not later than September 30, 2005. Beginning October 1, 2005, business 

systems modernization investments over $1 million are to be certified as being in 

compliance with the enterprise architecture. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics) is the certifying authority for the Weapon System Lifecycle 

Management and Materiel Supply and Services business mission areas, including the 

portfolio of distribution systems. The Defense Business Systems Management Committee 

also must approve the certification. 

8

 Under its fourth focus area—integrating the supply chain—the Army stated that it would 

develop integrated processes and an information systems architecture through the 

integration of three capabilities—the Logistics Modernization Program, the Global Combat 

Service Support-Army, and Product Life Cycle Management Plus—into its Single Army 

Logistics Enterprise. While the outcome of this enterprise initiative will have an impact on 

distribution, its purpose within the context of this focus area is on incorporating certain 

standardized business practices such as performance-based agreements. Therefore, we 

have excluded this enterprise initiative from our review. As part of our ongoing work on 

DOD business systems modernization, we have reviewed aspects of this enterprise 

initiative. See GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Continue to Be 

Invested with Inadequate Management Oversight and Accountability, GAO-04-615

(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2004) and DOD Business Systems Modernization: Limited 

Progress in Development of Business Enterprise Architecture and Oversight of 

Information Technology Investments, GAO-04-731R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004). 
Page 12 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

• To improve force reception, the Army stated that it would develop a 

“theater opening” capability—a headquarters deployed at the same time as 

combat forces to provide a single command-and-control element focused 

on joint force generation and sustainment—to rapidly receive military 

forces into a theater of operations and accomplish such tasks as 

maintaining real-time visibility of personnel and equipment en route to the 

theater; execute joint reception, staging, and onward movement 

operations, including the care and feeding of the forces and force 

protection; and serve as a joint theater logistics headquarters when 

augmented with additional capabilities. During the onset of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, the Army did not have a logistics organization designed, 

trained, and equipped to receive forces in the theater. As a result, critical 

force reception capabilities were often missing, and combat units were 

tasked to receive forces, provide logistics support, and move elements into 

assembly areas. 

• To modernize theater distribution, the Army stated that it would require 

pure packing (also called pure palleting), which is the consolidation of air 

cargo pallets for shipment to a single supply support activity, streamlining 

the theater distribution process. Pure pallets contain materiel destined 

solely for a single organization and do not require sorting and repackaging 

at interim distribution nodes. During the early stages of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, mixed pallets had to be unpacked, sorted, and repacked in the 

theater of operations before they were shipped forward, which lengthened 

the delivery time. 

Although the Secretary of Defense’s 2003 memorandum designated new 

organizational responsibilities in the logistics area, accountability and 

authority for improving the distribution system remain unclear. The 

Secretary’s intent in designating U.S. Transportation Command as DPO 

has been a point of dispute between the Command and OSD, and almost 

2 years later no directive has been issued to define the DPO’s role. In 

addition, the DPO’s roles and responsibilities may overlap with those of 

other organizations that are involved in deployment and distribution. 

Moreover, DOD’s current strategy to transform logistics lacks elements of 

an effective strategic plan and does not provide clear direction to guide 

and synchronize distribution improvement initiatives based on a common 

vision of an end-to-end distribution system for future military operations. 

With no single entity accountable for optimizing the distribution system’s 

overall efficiency and interoperability and without an effective 

transformation strategy to guide and synchronize improvement efforts 

toward a common vision of a future distribution system, efforts by DOD 

components to improve the distribution system will likely remain 

fragmented and limited in scope rather than coordinated and systemic. 

Accountability and 

Authority for 

Improving the 

Distribution System 

Remain Unclear 
Page 13 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Although U.S. Transportation Command has initiated actions to implement 

its DPO responsibilities and has made progress addressing supply 

distribution problems, it has been unable to reach agreement with OSD on 

the intent of the Secretary of Defense’s DPO designation. As a result, 

accountability and authority for improving the distribution system remain 

unclear. The Secretary of Defense’s memorandum, in designating U.S. 

Transportation Command as DPO, directed the DPO to draft a directive to 

define the DPO’s authority, accountability, resources, and responsibility to 

improve distribution, and to submit this draft directive within 30 days of 

the date of the Secretary’s memo. As directed by the Secretary, U.S. 

Transportation Command drafted a directive. The draft directive states 

that the DPO serves as the single entity to direct and supervise execution 

of the global distribution system on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. 

Subject to the direction and control of the Secretary and the Defense 

Logistics Executive, such directive authority includes promulgating and 

disseminating directives, regulations, instructions, and decision 

memorandums and taking other actions, as appropriate, to carry out DPO 

responsibilities, the draft directive states. 

OSD officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics) and the Office of General Counsel reviewed the 

draft directive and determined that it asked for DPO authorities that 

conflicted with the services’ statutory authorities to supply and support 

their forces, and with the regional combatant commanders’ statutory 

authorities to direct theater distribution within their areas of 

responsibility. During an interview, a representative from the OSD General 

Counsel’s office stated that the draft directive would have required 

statutory changes and that the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum did 

not clearly call for such sweeping changes. 

OSD then prepared its own version of the DPO directive, placing the DPO 

in an advisory role to the Defense Logistics Executive, with responsibility 

for studying the distribution system and making recommendations to the 

Defense Logistics Executive on how to improve the efficiency of the 

system. Under OSD’s revised directive, the Defense Logistics Executive 

rather than the DPO would be accountable for improving the distribution 

system. 

U.S. Transportation Command disagreed with the OSD-revised directive, 

contending that it did not implement the Secretary of Defense’s 

designation of the DPO as the single entity to direct and supervise the 

execution of the distribution system. In a July 2004 letter to the Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Intent of the Secretary of 

Defense in Designating the 

DPO Is in Dispute 
Page 14 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Logistics), the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, wrote that the 

OSD-revised directive (1) diluted the authority originally vested by the 

Secretary of Defense in the DPO; (2) did not vest the DPO with sufficient 

authority to make enduring factory-to-foxhole distribution improvements; 

and (3) could inhibit services, commands, and other distribution 

stakeholders in fully cooperating with the DPO’s efforts to drive necessary 

changes. U.S. Transportation Command and OSD continued to work 

collaboratively until the end of calendar year 2004 to get the draft directive 

back on track but subsequently decided not to continue pursuing a DPO 

directive. OSD issued guidance defining the role of the Defense Logistics 

Executive. The instruction, which does not mention the DPO, states that 

the Defense Logistics Executive shall monitor distribution process 

improvements to ensure consistency with the requirements of the defense 

logistics and global supply chain management system. 

We have previously reported that key practices for successful 

transformation include leadership that sets the direction of transformation 

and assigns accountability for results, and the use of crosscutting 

implementation teams, which can provide the day-to-day management 

needed for success.9

 In recent testimonies on DOD’s business 

transformation, we underscored the importance of these elements and 

stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for performance 

to specific organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to 

accomplish goals.10 In March 2005, DOD characterized the DPO as the 

department’s single entity to revolutionize the distribution system, 

working with services and combatant commanders in synchronizing the 

distribution of personnel and equipment from factory to foxhole. 

 9

 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003) and 

Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are 

Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004). 

10 GAO, Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and Implement a 

Framework for Successful Financial and Business Management Transformation, 

GAO-04-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004), DOD’S High Risk Areas: Successful 

Business Transformation Requires Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership, 

GAO-05-520T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2005), and Defense Management: Key Elements 

Needed to Successfully Transform DOD Business Operations, GAO-05-629T (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005). 
Page 15 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

The many designations of logistics responsibility that DOD has executed in 

the past few years, coupled with existing conflicts in joint doctrine 

regarding who is responsible for synchronizing theater distribution, may 

have created overlaps in roles and responsibility. Specifically, the DPO’s 

roles and responsibilities may overlap with those of U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, which has been designated as the Joint Deployment Process 

Owner, and with those of the Defense Logistics Agency, which is the 

Executive Agent for the supply chain management of certain classes of 

supply. In a prior report, we have noted existing conflicts in joint doctrine 

regarding responsibility for theater distribution. 

The Secretary of Defense, in a 1998 memorandum, designated the Joint 

Forces Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner. The principal 

role and focus of the Joint Deployment Process Owner is to (1) maintain 

overall effectiveness while improving the joint deployment and 

redeployment processes so that all supported joint force commanders and 

supporting DOD components can execute them more effectively and 

efficiently and (2) resolve joint deployment and redeployment process 

problems that span functional and organizational boundaries. The DPO, 

however, was explicitly directed by the Secretary of Defense to improve 

the overall efficiency and interoperability of deployment, sustainment, and 

redeployment support. 

In 2004, the Defense Logistics Agency became Executive Agent for bulk 

petroleum, subsistence (food and water), and medical items.11 By the end 

of 2005, the Defense Logistics Agency is also expected to become the 

Executive Agent for clothing and individual equipment as well as for 

construction materials. Executive agent is a governance structure used 

within DOD to ensure collaboration and cooperation among DOD 

components. The Defense Logistics Agency’s role as Executive Agent 

includes distribution responsibilities that may overlap with those of the 

DPO. For example, as Executive Agent for bulk petroleum, the Defense 

Logistics Agency is responsible for end-to-end distribution, to include 

establishing equipment standards and interoperability requirements in 

collaboration with the military services and the combatant commands. As 

Executive Agent for subsistence, it is responsible for, among other things, 

distributing subsistence products throughout the supply chain and 

 11 DOD Directive 5101.8, DOD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Bulk Petroleum, August 11, 

2004; DOD Directive 5101.9, DOD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Medical Materiel, 

August 23, 2004; DOD Directive 5101.10, DOD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Subsistence, 

September 27, 2004. 

DPO Roles and 

Responsibilities May 

Overlap With Those of 

Other Organizations in the 

Distribution System 

Joint Deployment Process 

Owner 

Executive Agent for Supply 

Classes 
Page 16 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

delivering items to locations as mutually agreed to with the military 

services and the combatant commands. As Executive Agent for medical 

items, it is responsible for managing the distribution of surge and 

sustainment materiel from commercial sources to the theater of 

operations, and establishing in-theater operational relationships to ensure 

distribution of medical items to support tactical situations. 

We have previously reported that conflicting doctrine impeded the 

establishment of a distribution system capable of delivering supplies to the 

warfighter smoothly and on time.12 Currently, joint doctrine 

institutionalizes separate management of sections of the distribution 

system by placing responsibility for logistics support outside the theater 

with the individual services and the U.S. Transportation Command. 

However, it also requires the theater commander to synchronize all 

aspects of logistics necessary to support the mission. This conflicting 

doctrine is contrary to DOD’s principle of centralized management for 

theater distribution. An SAIC study also reports that joint doctrine does 

not contain any specific or prescriptive guidance on how the combatant 

commander might ensure a seamless distribution process.13 We 

recommended in our April 2005 report that the Secretary of Defense revise 

current joint logistics doctrine to clearly state, consistent with policy, who 

has responsibility and authority for synchronizing the distribution of 

supplies from the United States to deployed units during operations. While 

DOD agreed with the intent of this recommendation, it did not commit to 

taking any specific actions. 

Although DOD’s current strategy to transform logistics provides a 

crosswalk of the department’s various logistics concepts and initiatives 

back to the approved Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, the 

strategy does not provide clear direction to guide and synchronize efforts 

to improve the distribution system across the department. For example, it 

lacks information on specific performance goals, programs, milestones, 

and resources to achieve focused logistics capabilities. OSD and Joint 

Staff officials agreed that the document does not provide elements 

essential for an effective strategic plan. U.S. Transportation Command 

officials also noted that the current strategy does not address joint 

 12 GAO-05-275, p. 39. 

13 SAIC, Objective Assessment of Logistics in Iraq, Contract No. GS-10F-009IL, 

Task Order 73510 (March 2004), Chapter 6. 

Conflicting Theater Doctrine 

Logistics Transformation 

Strategy Is Lacking Key 

Elements to Guide and 

Synchronize 

Improvements to the 

Distribution System 
Page 17 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

logistics governance, roles and responsibilities, and accountability to 

guide the DPO’s efforts to improve the overall efficiency and 

interoperability of the distribution system. 

According to OSD officials, shortcomings in the Logistics Transformation 

Strategy will be addressed in a follow-on document called the Focused 

Logistics Roadmap. However, according to OSD officials, the contractor 

initially assigned the task of developing the roadmap did not perform well, 

and there have been difficulties in obtaining performance metrics and 

budget data from DOD components on their logistics initiatives. OSD 

missed its February 2005 target date for issuing the roadmap. This effort 

was restarted in March 2005. OSD hired a new contractor, and the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) issued new 

guidance to the DOD components directing them to provide data needed 

to complete the analysis. OSD officials estimated they would publish the 

roadmap by August 2005. 

Two of DOD’s five initiatives we reviewed have been successful enough to 

warrant application to future operations, but the future of the other three 

are less certain because they lack funding or other support. Two 

promising initiatives that have been implemented are the establishment of 

a deployment and distribution operations center in Kuwait and the use of 

pure packing for air shipments to Iraq. According to DOD, both these 

initiatives helped improve the flow of supplies into and around the theater 

of operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom. On the basis of the success of 

these initiatives, U.S. Transportation Command is working with other 

regional combatant commands to establish a deployment and distribution 

operations center within their organizations, and the Army is 

incorporating its pure packing initiative into its regulations for application 

Army-wide. The other three initiatives we reviewed are facing challenges 

to their implementation that raise concerns about when they will be 

completed. The Army has not fully funded two new communications and 

tracking systems to better connect logisticians on the battlefield, placing 

their fielding schedules into question. The delay increases the risk that 

some future deploying units will lack a capability to effectively submit and 

monitor their supply requisitions. In addition, the Army is making progress 

toward developing a theater opening capability, but it is uncertain whether 

this capability will be deployed at the same time as combat forces in future 

conflicts. Finally, U.S. Transportation Command is facing challenges in 

improving the interoperability of information technology supporting the 

distribution system. 

Two Initiatives Have 

Shown Promise, but 

the Future of Three 

Other Initiatives Is 

Less Certain 
Page 18 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

On the basis of the success of the deployment and distribution operations 

center in Kuwait, U.S. Transportation Command is leading an effort to 

rewrite military doctrine to establish a similar organization within each of 

the regional combatant commands. According to U.S. Transportation 

Command, the operations center in Kuwait succeeded at 

• shifting use of airlift to sealift to reduce costly airlift requirements and to 

free up airlift capacity; 

• moving units from point of origin to final destination rather than through 

intermediate locations with time-consuming layovers (a concept referred 

to as “single ticket”); 

• testing satellite tracking of containers and trucks; and 

• improving distribution management, including the use of pure pallets and 

containers, developing a container management plan, and improving the 

retrograde of Army materiel. 

U.S. Transportation Command reported that the deployment and 

distribution operations center in Kuwait produced cost avoidance of $360 

million from January 2004 through March 2005. We did not independently 

verify these cost data. According to the Command’s data, about $312 

million, or 87 percent, of the cost avoidance was attributed to shifting the 

mode of strategic transportation from airlift to sealift in conjunction with 

U.S. Central Command’s shipping priorities. 

According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, the effectiveness of 

the operations center in Kuwait and favorable reports following 

subsequent tests of the concept in Korea and the U.S. Pacific Command 

have prompted other regional combatant commanders to request the same 

capability. The U.S. Transportation Command is working with the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command to incorporate the deployment and distribution 

operations center into joint doctrine as a regional combatant command 

organization.14 At the time of our review, this effort was in the early stages. 

As the deployment and distribution operations center is currently 

envisioned, the regional combatant command would provide a core staff 

from its own workforce, and this core staff would be augmented with 

personnel from other military organizations as the intensity of military 

operations increased. The number of core staff has not been determined, 

but it could range from 10 in U.S. Southern Command to perhaps 20 in U.S. 

European Command and U.S. Pacific Command, according to U.S 

 14 U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for developing joint force doctrine. 

Deployment and 

Distribution Operations 

Center 
Page 19 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Transportation Command officials. The regional combatant command 

would be responsible for acquiring a core workforce with the right skill 

mix and for providing them with the equipment and the necessary training. 

In January 2004, U.S. Central Command requested that all air shipments 

entering its area of responsibility be pure packed. The Army and Defense 

Logistics Agency worked to implement pure packing at Defense 

Distribution Center Depots in the United States, and in April 2004, the 

Army issued a message to establish pure packing as a servicewide policy. 

Army officials said they plan to amend service regulations to reflect this 

policy change. The switchover to pure packing increased the time required 

to build pallets at the Defense Distribution Center Depots but reduced the 

workload in the theater of operations and reduced the overall delivery 

time to the warfighter. According to an Army official, pure packing 

contributed to a decrease in requisition wait time for most shipments from 

over 40 days in October 2003 to consistently below 25 days since February 

2005.15 We did not independently verify these requisition wait time data. 

Requisition wait time is the amount of time spent from when a logistician 

in the battlefield orders an item from the supply system until the item is 

received. According to this official, the Army set a requisition wait-time 

goal of 20 days or less for all Army cargo moving by air pallet to Iraq 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom sustainment operations. To meet the more 

complex and labor-intensive requirements associated with pure packing 

and, concurrently, to address the surge of work at its distribution centers, 

the Defense Logistics Agency hired an additional 800 employees, added 

shifts, redistributed workloads, and authorized increased overtime. To 

absorb these costs, the Defense Logistics Agency increased its overhead 

and surcharges to the Army. Neither the Defense Logistics Agency nor the 

Army could provide information on the total cost of implementing pure 

packing. 

Very Small Aperture Terminal: The Army has identified a requirement 

for 775 Very Small Aperture Terminals. (See fig. 1.) Although the systems 

will be fielded primarily to active brigades, each National Guard and 

Reserve brigade will receive one system and then receive additional 

 15 One exception to this continual decrease was the acceleration of hostilities from May to 

August 2004 that resulted in an upward increase in requisition wait time for most 

shipments to almost 40 days. 

Pure Packing 

Acquisition of Systems to 

Connect the Logistician 
Page 20 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

systems at Army training centers prior to deployment at the same level as 

the active units. Upon returning from their deployment, Guard and 

Reserve units will turn in the additional systems. Fielding began in July 

2004 and will continue through fiscal year 2007. Seven units have been 

fully fielded with 106 systems and four units have been partially fielded 

with 64 systems as of June 2005. The unit cost is $75,000, and the total 

funding requirement for the 775 systems is $256.6 million through fiscal 

year 2011. However, funding data provided by the Very Small Aperture 

Terminal program office show that the program is underfunded by a total 

of $21.4 million for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, or 24 percent of the $90.3 

million in total funding requirements for these 2 years, placing the fielding 

schedule in question. Program officials said the current funding level 

would delay fielding the systems. They noted that the unfunded 

requirements have been prioritized and included in the Army’s budgeting 

for its modularity efforts. According to a program official, additional funds 

from fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriations may be provided to 

reduce the shortfall. In addition, according to an Army official, logisticians 

are concerned about the future of the system in light of the Army’s 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) system currently under 

development. Win-T is the Army’s future high-speed, high-capacity 

communications network, which will link Army units with higher levels of 

command and provide video, data, imagery, and voice services. The Army 

is scheduled to have initial capability on the system in 2010. The Win-T 

system would duplicate many of the functions of the Very Small Aperture 

Terminal and could potentially result in reduced funding for this system, 

this official said. 
Page 21 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Figure 1: Very Small Aperture Terminal 

Mobile Tracking System: Although the Army originally identified a total 

requirement for 47,000 Mobile Tracking Systems, the Army now plans to 

acquire 18,629 systems to meet basic needs, which the Army refers to as a 

“good enough” fielding authorization. (See fig. 2.) According to a May 2004 

memorandum signed by the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

fielding the Mobile Tracking System at the “good enough” level can be 

done with an acceptable level of risk. The memo did not define 

“acceptable level of risk,” but it added that to mitigate risk, the Army 

would develop a capability to move the systems between vehicles rather 

than permanently mounting the systems. Requirements for active and 

reserve forces are the same, with priority fielding to units deploying to 

Iraq. The fielding schedule calls for all active and reserve components to 

be fielded in 3 years. The system would be installed on one of every two 

military police vehicles; one of every five trucks; all ground ambulances; 

all movement control/dispatchers; and all command and control elements 

Source: Very Small Aperture Terminal Program Office.

A soldier with the 3rd Infantry Division performs maintenance on a Very Small Aperture Terminal at the 

National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.
Page 22 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

of a logistics unit. The Mobile Tracking System program has fielded 7,500 

systems to 14 major units as of June 2005. Each unit costs an estimated 

$17,000 for the original version and $21,000 for an enhanced version that 

includes the capability to read radio frequency identification tags placed 

on in-transit cargo, an enhanced Global Positioning System, and a panic 

button. The total funding requirement at the “good enough” level is $455.2 

million through fiscal year 2011. However, funding data provided by the 

program office show the program is underfunded by a total of $39 million 

for fiscal years 2005 and 2005, or 35 percent of the $110.3 million in total 

requirements for these 2 years, placing the fielding schedule in question. 

Program officials said some authorized units would not be receiving 

systems at the current funding level. According to a program official, 

additional funds from fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriations may be 

provided to reduce the shortfall. 
Page 23 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Figure 2: Mobile Tracking System 

Although the Army is making progress developing a theater opening 

capability, it is uncertain whether this capability, when fully developed, 

will be deployed at the same time as combat forces in future conflicts. 

Theater Opening 

Capability 

Source: Top photo: Fort Lewis, Washington; bottom photo: Comtech Mobile Datacom Corp.

Top photo: A soldier uses the Mobile Tracking System mounted in a vehicle. Bottom photo: Components 

of the Mobile Tracking System, displayed left to right on the hood of the vehicle, include a cover for the 

transceiver, a global positioning system, a printer, a transceiver, a laptop, and a transit case.
Page 24 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

During the early stages of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD’s priority was to deploy combat forces 

prior to logistics support, resulting in theater distribution problems. In 

addition, we noted that most of the units the Army is converting to provide 

this capability are in the reserve component, raising questions about 

whether these units could be mobilized quickly enough to be deployed in 

the early deployment stages. Army plans call for converting seven existing 

transportation units that would be trained and equipped to provide a 

theater opening capability, with the first units to begin conversion in 

September 2006. Of these seven units, four are in the Army Reserve, one is 

in the National Guard, and two are active component units. 

The U.S. Transportation Command has met the time frames set by OSD 

and the Joint Staff for (1) developing a process to manage the group of 

information technology systems supporting distribution and (2) identifying 

potential returns, goals, outcomes, and draft performance requirements. In 

August 2004, the Command issued its Distribution Portfolio Management 

Process setting out the roles, processes, and information needed to 

determine and adjust the set of distribution and force movement systems 

to support the Logistics Domain.16 It also provided an estimate of the 

resources—24 government personnel and fiscal year 2005 funding of 

$11.93 million for contractor personnel, office space, travel, and 

consultants—it needed to accomplish the portfolio management taskings 

and timelines established by OSD and the Joint Staff. In December 2004, 

U.S. Transportation Command identified the potential returns, goals, and 

outcomes for portfolio management and drafted performance 

requirements for the portfolio. In March 2005, U.S. Transportation 

Command published an overview of the joint distribution architecture that 

provided a blueprint for future distribution information technology 

systems that are interoperable and enable an end-to-end distribution 

capability. 

 16 On May 12, 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) realigned his offices to better support business transformation and in doing so he 

consolidated the Logistics Domain and Acquisition Domain into a single directorate—

Supply Chain Systems Transformation Directorate. The new directorate is responsible for 

aligning business capabilities to DOD goals, allocating resources, and overseeing policy in 

support of two newly created business mission areas—Weapon System Lifecycle 

Management and Materiel Supply and Service Management. U.S. Transportation Command 

officials believe that the portfolio of distribution systems previously within the Logistics 

Domain now lies within both of the two new business mission areas. 

Interoperable Information 

Technology 
Page 25 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Although U.S. Transportation Command has met the milestones for these 

two tasks, it has been delayed in issuing a transition plan to guide DOD’s 

investment strategy for these systems. The transition plan was initially due 

by the end of calendar year 2005, but the Command’s latest estimate for 

completion is June 2006. Command officials cited delays in receiving fiscal 

year 2005 funding for this effort as a reason for slipping the delivery date 

for the information technology transition plan. According to U.S. 

Transportation Command officials, they requested funding from OSD for 

DPO activities in August 2004, but did not receive funding approval until 

February 2005. In addition, the Command’s ability to execute an effective 

information technology transition plan by June 2006 depends on 

(1) gaining agreement from DOD components on which information 

technology systems should be included in the distribution portfolio, 

(2) obtaining from DOD components the technical information on the 

systems and data bases in the distribution portfolio, and (3) completing an 

end-to-end supply chain analysis, which requires input from the Defense 

Logistics Agency and Joint Forces Command. 

U.S. Transportation Command has been unable to gain agreement from 

DOD components that own and fund information technology systems on 

which systems should be in the distribution portfolio. The Command, in 

conjunction with OSD, identified approximately 500 information 

technology systems DOD-wide that they believe belong in the distribution 

portfolio. According to Command officials, DOD components have agreed 

with the selection of about 80 of the systems thus far, and discussions are 

continuing regarding other systems. Of the approximately 500 systems 

identified, 128 belonged to the Defense Logistics Agency. However, 

Defense Logistics Agency officials told us that that they believe only 2 of 

these 128 systems belong in the distribution portfolio, and that the others 

are (1) not information systems, (2) not within the scope of the 

distribution portfolio, or (3) being absorbed into the agency’s business 

system modernization efforts, also referred to as enterprise resource 

planning. According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, the 

Defense Logistics Agency and the services do not agree that enterprise 

systems belong in the DPO’s distribution portfolio, but rather that they 

should remain exclusively within their respective agency or service 

portfolios. Command officials noted that the enterprise systems will 

eventually consolidate numerous legacy logistics systems, many of which 

have distribution-related activities. 

We have previously reported that DOD lacks effective management 

oversight, control, and accountability over its business system investments 

and that the manner in which business system funding is controlled 

Identifying Systems to Be 

Included in the Distribution 

Portfolio 
Page 26 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

hampers the development and implementation of broad-based, integrated 

business system solutions to address DOD-wide problems.17 Each military 

service and defense agency receives its own funding and is largely 

autonomous in deciding how to spend these funds, thereby enabling 

multiple system approaches to common problems. To improve 

management oversight, we have recommended that Congress consider 

appropriating funds to operate, maintain, and modernize DOD’s business 

systems to domain leaders rather than the military services and defense 

agencies. DOD disagreed with this recommendation, noting that the 

portfolio management process, including investment review boards, would 

provide appropriate control and accountability over business system 

investments. While the establishment of investment review boards is 

consistent with our previous recommendations, we continue to believe 

that appropriating funds for DOD business systems to the domains will 

significantly improve accountability over business system investments. 

If U.S. Transportation Command can reach agreement with the DOD 

components on which information technology system should belong in the 

distribution portfolio, it will still have to collect and analyze a substantial 

amount of technical data on the individual systems and the data bases they 

manage in order to complete its information technology analysis and 

develop its transition plan by June 2006. According to U.S. Transportation 

Command officials, if they do not have the technical information on these 

systems and data bases by September 2005, it will be difficult to complete 

the information technology transition plan by June 2006 and execute its 

responsibilities for portfolio management. 

This end-to-end supply chain analysis is aimed at identifying gaps that 

need to be bridged and areas where systems need to be made 

interoperable. This analysis is being performed by U.S. Transportation 

Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, and Joint Forces Command, 

with each organization responsible for separate components of the 

analysis. According to U.S. Transportation Command’s timeline, the 

supply chain analysis must be completed by September 2005 to allow it 

time to complete its overall analysis by February 2006 and develop its 

investment technology transition plan by the new June 2006 target date. 

Based on information provided by the DPO, however, it is uncertain 

whether the supply chain analysis will be completed by September 2005 

 17 GAO-04-615. 

Obtaining Technical Data on 

Systems and Data Bases 

Completing an End-to-End 

Supply Chain Analysis 
Page 27 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

due to the multiple organizations involved and issues concerning 

coordination and funding of the separate analysis efforts. 

A lack of clear accountability and authority for improving the distribution 

system presents a significant challenge to DOD in its efforts to correct 

long-standing problems that date back at least to the Persian Gulf War. 

The Secretary of Defense’s decision in 2003 to designate U.S. 

Transportation Command as the DPO appeared to signal that the 

department would take a more coordinated and systemic approach to 

address supply distribution problems. Moreover, as recently as March 

2005, DOD characterized the DPO as the department’s single entity to 

revolutionize the distribution system, working with services and 

combatant commanders in synchronizing the distribution of personnel and 

equipment from factory to foxhole. However, DOD’s ability to make 

coordinated, systemic improvements that cut across the multiple 

organizations involved in distribution is stymied because of problems in 

clarifying who has accountability and authority for improving the 

distribution system. U.S. Transportation Command has asserted that the 

DPO is the single accountable entity, whereas OSD has taken the position 

that the Defense Logistics Executive is the accountable entity and the DPO 

has an advisory role. The issue of accountability is further confused by 

OSD guidance that is silent on the role of the DPO and states that the role 

of the Defense Logistics Executive is to “monitor” improvements in the 

distribution system. In addition, the Defense Logistics Agency is 

responsible for distribution functions in its role as executive agent for 

specified supply classes, and Joint Forces Command is responsible for 

resolving deployment and redeployment process problems in its role as 

the Joint Deployment Process Owner. In both cases, these roles and 

responsibilities may overlap with those of the DPO. Another underlying 

problem that stymies DOD’s ability to improve distribution is the lack of 

an effective logistics transformation strategy to guide and synchronize 

improvement efforts toward a common vision of a future distribution 

system. Until DOD defines which single entity has accountability and 

authority for improving the distribution system and develops an effective 

transformation strategy, DOD will face challenges in taking a coordinated 

and systemic approach to improving distribution and may experience 

continued problems in providing timely and effective logistics support to 

the warfighter. 

Recognizing shortfalls in the distribution process, U.S. Transportation 

Command and the Army have embarked upon some promising and 

potential solutions to these issues. However, the Army has not fully funded 

Conclusions 
Page 28 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

its requirements for communications and tracking systems. The delay 

increases the risk that some future deploying units will lack a capability to 

effectively submit and monitor their supply requisitions. 

To enhance DOD’s ability to take a more coordinated and systemic 

approach to improving the supply distribution system, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: 

• Clarify the scope of responsibilities, accountability, and authority between 

the DPO and the Defense Logistics Executive as well as the roles and 

responsibilities between the DPO, the Defense Logistics Agency, and Joint 

Forces Command. 

• Issue a directive instituting these decisions and make other related 

changes, as appropriate, in policy and doctrine. 

• Improve the Logistics Transformation Strategy by directing the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to include 

specific performance goals, programs, milestones, and resources to 

achieve focused logistics capabilities in the Focused Logistics Roadmap. 

To address the current underfunding of the Very Small Aperture Terminal 

and the Mobile Tracking System, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to determine whether sufficient 

funding priority has been be given to the acquisition of these systems and, 

if not, to take appropriate corrective action. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Acting Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness) did not concur 

with the first two recommendations and concurred with the last two 

recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix I. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendations that the Secretary of 

Defense clarify the scope of responsibilities, accountability, and authority 

between the DPO and the Defense Logistics Executive, as well as the roles 

and responsibilities between the DPO, the Defense Logistics Agency, and 

Joint Forces Command; and that he issue a directive instituting these 

decisions and make other related changes, as appropriate, in policy and 

doctrine. DOD stated that it is confident that the responsibilities, 

accountability, and authority of the DPO exercised under the Defense 

Logistics Executive’s guidance are clear to the DPO, the Defense Logistics 

Agency in its Executive Agent roles, and Joint Forces Command in its 

Joint Deployment Process Owner role. The department stated that it did 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 29 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

not issue the U.S. Transportation Command’s proposed DPO directive 

because its Office of General Counsel found that the proposed directive’s 

definition of the DPO’s responsibilities, accountability, and authority was 

inconsistent with the statutory roles and responsibilities of the secretaries 

of the military departments. The department also stated that the DPO has 

not been “stymied” by the lack of a directive—rather, that the DPO, 

working cooperatively with the Joint Logistics Community, has made 

significant progress in its DPO role. 

While the department has issued directives and instructions defining 

responsibilities for the Defense Logistics Executive, the Defense Logistics 

Agency in its Executive Agent role, and the Joint Forces Command as the 

Joint Deployment Process Owner, it has not issued a directive on the 

DPO—despite the Secretary of Defense’s stated interest in defining the 

DPO’s authority, accountability, resources, and responsibility to improve 

distribution—in part because such a directive would be inconsistent with 

the statutory roles and responsibilities of the secretaries of the military 

departments. Although we did not evaluate the potential need for changes 

in statutory roles and responsibilities with respect to the distribution 

system, such changes may be appropriate once DOD has defined 

organizational responsibilities, accountability, and authority needed to 

enhance the department’s ability to take a more coordinated and systemic 

approach to improving the supply distribution system. The department 

stated that it is confident that the scope of responsibilities, accountability, 

and authority of the DPO are clear, yet it did not address the specific 

overlaps of distribution responsibilities in its policy and doctrine that we 

identified. As pointed out in this report, we have identified supply chain 

management as a high-risk area, in part because of problems in the 

distribution process, and we have identified the lack of a comprehensive, 

integrated approach to addressing those problems. The department has 

characterized the DPO as its single entity in charge of revolutionizing the 

distribution system by working with the services and combatant 

commanders to synchronize the distribution of personnel and equipment 

from factory to foxhole. However, we believe that unless the department 

(1) clarifies the scope of responsibilities, accountability, and authority 

between the DPO and the Defense Logistics Executive, as well as the roles 

and responsibilities between the DPO, the Defense Logistics Agency, and 

Joint Forces Command; and (2) implements our prior (April 2005) 

recommendation to clearly state, consistent with policy, who has 

responsibility and authority for synchronizing the distribution of supplies 

from the United States to deployed units during operations, its wellintended efforts may not effectively address the department’s longstanding problems in distribution. 
Page 30 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Regarding the department’s statement that the DPO has not been stymied 

by the lack of a directive, we agree that progress has been made by the 

DPO and other DOD entities in addressing supply distribution problems, 

and our report identifies promising initiatives. We have modified our 

report to clarify that DOD is stymied in its ability to make coordinated, 

systemic improvements cutting across the multiple organizations involved 

in the distribution system. We also note that DOD initiatives such as the 

deployment and distribution operations center were developed as 

improvised solutions to logistics problems reported during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. As of the time of our review, these solutions have not been 

instituted into policy or doctrine. Notwithstanding the progress made to 

date in addressing supply distribution problems, we continue to believe 

that DOD needs to take an institutional approach in order to avoid 

ambiguity about the DPO’s roles and responsibilities in the future and to 

address the department’s long-standing supply distribution problems in a 

coordinated and systemic fashion. A directive, along with appropriate 

changes in policy and doctrine, can provide the organizational and policy 

structure necessary for an institutional approach. 

With regard to our recommendation to improve the logistics 

transformation strategy to include specific performance goals, programs, 

milestones, and resources to achieve focused logistics capabilities in the 

Focused Logistics Roadmap, DOD concurred that improvements are 

necessary in DOD’s Logistics Transformation Strategy and stated that it 

would include these elements in the roadmap in order to achieve the 

focused logistics capabilities. 

Regarding our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to direct the 

Secretary of the Army to determine whether sufficient funding priority has 

been given to the acquisition of the Very Small Aperture Terminal and the 

Mobile Tracking System, and if not, to take corrective action, DOD 

concurred and stated that the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics) will direct the Secretary of the Army to 

determine whether sufficient funding priority has been given to the 

acquisition of these systems. 

To assess DOD’s organizational structure and transformation strategy to 

improve the distribution system, we obtained information on the progress 

made by U.S. Transportation Command in implementing its role as the 

DPO. We discussed the accountability, authority, role, and other issues 

pertaining to the DPO with U.S. Transportation Command officials and 

reviewed a draft directive and other documents related to the DPO. We 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 31 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

also discussed DPO implementation with officials from the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), with 

the Joint Staff, and with the OSD Office of General Counsel. We met with 

the U.S. Joint Forces Command on its role as the Joint Deployment 

Process Owner and the Defense Logistics Agency on its role as the 

Executive Agent for certain classes of supply. We examined DOD’s overall 

efforts to institute a long-term logistics strategy by reviewing DOD’s 

December 2004 Logistics Transformation Strategy, monitoring the 

impending release of the Focused Logistics Roadmap, and interviewing 

officials from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Logistics and Materiel Readiness) to obtain their perspective on problems 

and solutions that were taking place agencywide. We also met with 

officials from the OSD Office of Force Transformation, Army Logistics 

Transformation Agency, the Navy, and Air Force, and the Marine Corps. 

To identify the status of initiatives that DOD is taking to address supply 

distribution issues, we focused on five initiatives that were highlighted in 

testimony by representatives from the U.S. Transportation Command and 

the Army before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services 

Committee, in March 2004. Although other DOD components have 

important roles in the distribution system, we decided to focus on the 

initiatives of these two organizations because of the key roles these 

organizations have had in the supply distribution system for Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. We obtained information from the U.S. Transportation 

Command and the Army on the status of the five initiatives, including their 

purpose, funding, and fielding schedule where appropriate. Because some 

of the initiatives have been implemented for only a short time, we obtained 

limited data on their effectiveness, and we did not independently validate 

these data. We conducted interviews with officials from U.S. 

Transportation Command and from the Army’s G-4 logistics directorate, 

the Army Materiel Command, the 3rd Infantry Division, the Combined 

Arms Support Command, and program offices responsible for the Very 

Small Aperture Terminal and the Mobile Tracking System. We also 

obtained pertinent information on supply distribution issues and initiatives 

from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics), including the Office of the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness); the Joint Staff 

logistics directorate; and the Defense Logistics Agency. We visited the U.S. 

Central Command area of operations to obtain a firsthand view of 

distribution problems in the theater and how solutions were being 

implemented to correct them. We reviewed prior GAO reports, DOD after 

action reports, and studies by other organizations concerning supply 
Page 32 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

distribution issues that occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom and past 

military operations going back to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, and it will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions on the matters 

discussed in this letter, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or 

solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations 

and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff 

who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Comments From the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

Appendix I: Comments From the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix I: Comments From the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 
Appendix I: Comments From the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 36 GAO-05-775 Supply Distribution Operations 

William Solis, (202) 512-8365 

In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Gosling, Assistant 

Director; David Epstein; Larry Junek; Paulina Reaves; and Cheryl 

Weissman made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350560) 
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