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[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 814 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 814

 To promote security partnership with Ukraine, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

               March 17 (legislative day, March 16), 2021

  Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Portman, Mr. Murphy, Mr. 
 Barrasso, and Mrs. Shaheen) introduced the following bill; which was 
     read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To promote security partnership with Ukraine, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ukraine Security Partnership Act of 
2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Throughout its history, Ukraine has experienced several 
        long periods of occupation.
            (2) Between 1919 and 1991, Ukraine was brutally ruled by 
        the Soviet Union, whose policy of agricultural collectivization 
        caused the Holodomor of 1932-1933, a man-made famine that 
        resulted in the death of at least 3,000,000 Ukrainians by 
        starvation.
            (3) During the Nazi occupation of Ukraine accompanying 
        World War II--
                    (A) approximately 3,500,000 Ukrainian civilians and 
                3,000,000 soldiers were killed; and
                    (B) approximately 1,500,000 Jews were massacred.
            (4) Ukraine declared its independence from Moscow in 1991, 
        after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
            (5) In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the Russian 
        Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged 
        to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing 
        borders of Ukraine'' and ``refrain from the threat or use of 
        force against the territorial integrity or political 
        independence of Ukraine'' in exchange for Ukraine's surrender 
        of its nuclear arsenal.
            (6) From November 2004 through January 2005, thousands of 
        Ukrainians took to the streets to peacefully protest electoral 
        fraud and widespread corruption by the ruling elite in the 2004 
        Presidential election, successfully triggering a re-vote, in 
        what became known as the Orange Revolution.
            (7) During Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity, or 
        Euromaidan, the pro-Russian government of President Viktor 
        Yanukovych was forced to resign after thousands of Ukrainians 
        peacefully protested Yanukovych's decision to reject a closer 
        relationship with the European Union and his continued systemic 
        corruption, and over 100 of those protestors were killed by 
        violent government suppression.
            (8) Fearful of Ukraine's strengthened pro-Western 
        orientation after the Revolution of Dignity, the Government of 
        the Russian Federation, in violation of international law and 
        in contravention of its commitments in the Budapest 
        Memorandum--
                    (A) sent undisclosed military personnel into 
                Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea in February 
                2014 and has illegally occupied the Crimean Peninsula 
                for the past six years;
                    (B) sent covert, unmarked military personnel into 
                the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in April 
                2014, instigating and supporting a still-ongoing 
                conflict that has cost nearly 14,000 lives; and
                    (C) provided the Buk missile system used by those 
                Russia-backed forces to shoot down Malaysian Airlines 
                Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014, killing 
                all 298 passengers and crew on board.
            (9) Under Russian control, Crimean authorities have 
        kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured Crimean Tatars, opposition 
        figures, activists, and other minority populations, and have 
        persecuted religious minorities by pressing false charges of 
        terrorism and deregistering religious centers.
            (10) In September 2014, in an attempt to stop the fighting 
        that the Russian Federation had initiated in eastern Ukraine, 
        France, Germany, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the 
        Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), and Russia-
        backed forces from eastern Ukraine signed the Minsk Protocol.
            (11) In February 2015, after the failure of the initial 
        Minsk Protocol, the Russian Federation committed to the Minsk 
        II Agreement, the roadmap for resolving the conflict in eastern 
        Ukraine, signed by the Governments of Ukraine, Russia, France, 
        and Germany.
            (12) Despite these agreements, the Government of the 
        Russian Federation continues to violate Ukrainian sovereignty 
        through--
                    (A) manipulation of Ukraine's dependence on Russian 
                natural gas, including cutting off access in 2014, 
                which deprived Ukraine of its energy supply and transit 
                fees;
                    (B) espionage and clandestine assassinations on 
                Ukrainian territory;
                    (C) continuous cyber warfare against the Government 
                of Ukraine and Ukrainian businesses, such as the 
                NotPetya hack in 2017; and
                    (D) seizure of Ukrainian property and citizens, 
                including the November 2018 seizure in the Kerch Strait 
                of three Ukrainian naval vessels and 24 Ukrainian 
                officers on board those vessels.
            (13) In July 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 
        issued the Crimea Declaration and reiterated in February 2020 
        on the sixth anniversary of Russia's illegal occupation that 
        ``Crimea is Ukraine''.
            (14) On February 26, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden 
        confirmed that Crimea is Ukraine and the United States does not 
        and will never recognize Russia's purported annexation of the 
        peninsula.
            (15) Since April 2014, at least 4,100 Ukrainian soldiers 
        have died fighting for their country against the Russian 
        Federation and Russia-backed forces, while no less than 3,361 
        civilians have perished as a result of that fighting.
            (16) Despite Ukraine's tumultuous history and neighborhood, 
        in under 30 years it has risen from the collapse of the Soviet 
        Union to become a developing democracy, steadily working to 
        overcome its Soviet legacy of oppression, oligarchic control, 
        and corruption.
            (17) Running on a strong anti-corruption platform, 
        Volodymyr Zelensky won the 2019 presidential election with 73 
        percent of the vote, and his political party, Servant of the 
        People, won a parliamentary majority in the Ukrainian 
        parliament.
            (18) The OSCE confirmed the 2019 elections were 
        ``competitive and fundamental freedoms were generally 
        respected''.
            (19) Since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has made 
        difficult and substantial reforms in an effort to address 
        corruption and more closely align with the West, such as 
        slimming and decentralizing its bureaucracy, removing immunity 
        from prosecution for Members of Parliament, reforming its gas, 
        pension, and procurement systems, and working to adapt its 
        military to the standards of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization (NATO).
            (20) Despite progress in reforming many areas of Ukrainian 
        governance, serious issues still remain, particularly in the 
        areas of corruption and rule of law.
            (21) The United States Government has consistently 
        supported Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight against 
        Russia-backed forces by assisting its governance reform 
        efforts, maintaining robust and coordinated sanctions against 
        the Russian Federation alongside the European Union, and 
        providing the Ukrainian military with training and equipment, 
        including lethal defensive weaponry.
            (22) In addition to the United States, the European Union, 
        European countries, and Canada have provided substantial 
        diplomatic, monetary, and military support for Ukraine's 
        democratic transition and its fight against Russia-backed 
        forces in eastern Ukraine, and also have implemented and 
        maintained robust sanctions regimes against the Russian 
        Federation for its illegal occupation of Crimea and its active 
        destabilization of Ukraine.
            (23) the Government of Ukraine has steadfastly supported 
        the United States and European allies by deploying troops to 
        Iraq, Afghanistan, and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), allowing 
        United States military planes to refuel on Ukrainian soil, and 
        trading billions of dollars' worth of goods and services with 
        the United States.
            (24) NATO has recently decided to include Ukraine in its 
        Enhanced Opportunities Partnership in recognition of Ukraine's 
        contributions to NATO missions and efforts to reform its 
        military in line with NATO standards.
            (25) Since the Russian Federation's 2014 invasion of 
        Ukraine, the United States Congress has demonstrated its 
        support for Ukraine through the passage of legislation, 
        including the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, 
        Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 
        (Public Law 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), the Ukraine 
        Freedom Support Act (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et 
        seq.), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative established 
        under section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068), the 
        Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public 
        Law 115-44), and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 
        2019 (Public Law 116-92, title LXXV), and the United States 
        Congress continues to demonstrate strong support for assisting 
        Ukraine in defending itself and deterring Russia.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) Ukraine stands as a bulwark against the malign 
        influence of the Russian Federation in Europe, and robust 
        United States support for Ukraine is vital to United States 
        national security and demonstrates the commitment of the United 
        States to upholding a free and open international order;
            (2) since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the Government 
        and people of Ukraine have made significant strides towards 
        improved governance, rule of law, anti-corruption measures, and 
        economic reforms;
            (3) Ukraine's long-term viability is directly connected to 
        its efforts to reduce corruption and build strong democratic 
        institutions that are able to defend against internal and 
        external corrupt actors;
            (4) the efforts and sacrifices of Ukrainian citizens to 
        determine their own fate after centuries of oppression, through 
        democratic representation and governance reforms, is evidence 
        of that country's dedication to a free, independent, and 
        democratic future;
            (5) Ukraine has proven itself to be a valuable security 
        partner of the United States, not simply a recipient of 
        assistance;
            (6) it is in the national security interests of the United 
        States to continue and deepen its security partnership with 
        Ukraine, including through the provision of both lethal and 
        non-lethal assistance;
            (7) the United States should continue to place policy-based 
        conditions on Ukraine's receipt of financial and military 
        assistance, as that mechanism has proven effective in 
        incentivizing reforms in Ukraine;
            (8) the United States should use its voice and vote at NATO 
        to encourage the adoption of a policy by the Alliance that all 
        of its member states will refuse to recognize the illegal 
        attempted annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation;
            (9) the United States should continue to bolster the 
        capacity of the Ukrainian Navy as it strives to fulfill the 
        goals it set out in its ``Strategy of the Naval Forces of the 
        Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035'';
            (10) the military-focused technical, training, maintenance, 
        and logistical assistance provided by the United States to 
        Ukraine is as essential as the military hardware provided to 
        the country;
            (11) all security assistance provided to Ukraine should 
        continue to be subject to rigorous vetting requirements under 
        section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
        2378d) and security cooperation under section 362 of title 10, 
        United States Code, including assistance provided to units in 
        the National Guard of Ukraine as well as all units falling 
        under the authority of the Ministry of Defense;
            (12) the Office of Defense Cooperation at the United States 
        Embassy in Ukraine should be fully staffed with officers who 
        serve three-year terms in order to administer the security 
        assistance being provided to the country;
            (13) the Secretary of Defense should conduct an assessment 
        of the staffing resources of the Office of Defense Cooperation 
        and strongly consider providing additional staff to the Office 
        of Defense Cooperation in Ukraine;
            (14) the enduring partnership between the United States and 
        Ukraine, including bipartisan support for a sovereign, 
        democratic, and whole Ukraine through political, monetary, and 
        military assistance, remains strong and must continue to be 
        reaffirmed; and
            (15) the United States should continue to strongly support 
        Ukraine's ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic community of 
        democracies.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to refuse to recognize the attempted annexation of 
        Crimea by the Russian Federation, an action that was taken in 
        contravention of international law;
            (2) to utilize existing sanctions and other authorities to 
        deter malign actions by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, 
        including the mandates and authorities codified by the 
        Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public 
        Law 115-44);
            (3) to work with our European allies to coordinate 
        strategies to curtail Russian malign influence in Ukraine; and
            (4) to support democratic, economic, and anti-corruption 
        reforms in Ukraine and the country's integration into Euro-
        Atlantic institutions.

SEC. 5. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report with a strategy on how 
the United States will work to diplomatically support Ukraine during 
fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A description of how relevant departments and agencies 
        of the United States Government will work together to 
        collectively support efforts by the Government of Ukraine to 
        deter Russian aggression in the form of military incursions, 
        cyber attacks, the coercive use of energy resources, use of 
        passportization, and efforts to corrupt the Ukrainian political 
        and economic systems.
            (2) A description of the United States current efforts and 
        strategy to support Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives when they 
        align with United States interests.
            (3) A strategy on how the United States will use its voice 
        and vote at the United Nations, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, 
        and other relevant international bodies to support Ukraine and 
        its reform efforts.
            (4) A strategy on how the United States will assist Ukraine 
        in bolstering its diplomatic, economic, energy, and maritime 
        relationships with key Black Sea countries, including Bulgaria, 
        Romania, Turkey, and Georgia.
            (5) A strategy on how the United States will engage with 
        Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia to advance the Normandy 
        Format and Minsk Agreements.
            (6) A strategy on how the United States will work with 
        allies to continue to engage Ukraine to ensure meaningful 
        progress on democratic, economic, and anti-corruption reforms.
    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 6. UNITED STATES-EUROPE WORKING GROUP ON UKRAINE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State should seek to establish a 
United States-Europe Working Group on Ukraine.
    (b) Representation.--The United States-Europe Working Group on 
Ukraine should include high-level representatives from the European 
Union, its institutions, and relevant European governments, as 
appropriate, to jointly prioritize, evaluate and coordinate economic 
and policy reform assistance and support for Ukraine.
    (c) Termination.--The authorities authorized under this section 
shall terminate on September 30 of the fifth fiscal year beginning 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 7. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR UKRAINE.

    (a) Establishment.--The President should appoint, by and with the 
consent of the Senate, a Special Envoy for Ukraine, who should report 
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia.
    (b) Rank.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine shall have the rank and 
status of ambassador.
    (c) Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine should--
            (1) serve as the United States liaison to the Normandy 
        Format, tasked with leading the peace process between Ukraine 
        and the Russian Federation;
            (2) facilitate diplomatic outreach to and dialogue with 
        countries in the Black Sea region that, like Ukraine, are faced 
        with the impact of Russia's growing militarization of the Sea;
            (3) coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission in 
        Ukraine;
            (4) coordinate with the United States-Europe Working Group 
        on Ukraine established pursuant to section 6;
            (5) coordinate with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to 
        Ukraine; and
            (6) provide the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives regular updates and briefings on the status of 
        peace negotiations.
    (d) Termination.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine position authorized 
under subsection (a) shall terminate 5 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 8. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of State for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2026 $300,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
assistance to Ukraine to assist the country in meeting its defense 
needs.
    (b) Availability of Funds.--
            (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a), 
        not more than $150,000,000 shall be made available until the 
        Secretary of State makes the certification described in 
        paragraph (2) for such fiscal year, including a detailed 
        explanation justifying the certification with respect to each 
        of the categories listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of 
        such paragraph. The certification shall be submitted to the 
        appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form, but 
        may contain a classified annex.
            (2) Certification.--The certification described in this 
        paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government 
        of Ukraine has taken actions to--
                    (A) make defense institutional reforms, in 
                accordance with NATO standards;
                    (B) further strengthen civilian control of the 
                military;
                    (C) reform its state-owned arms production sector;
                    (D) increase transparency and accountability in 
                defense procurement;
                    (E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to exercise 
                oversight of the Ministry of Defense and military 
                forces; and
                    (F) promote respect for the observation of human 
                rights as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M 
                of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) 
                within the security forces of Ukraine.
    (c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before providing 
assistance or support under pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary 
of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
notification containing the following:
            (1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to 
        be provided, including--
                    (A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
                    (B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
                    (C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery 
                of such assistance or support.
            (2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary 
        considers appropriate.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that assistance 
provided under this section should--
            (1) prioritize the procurement of vessels for the Ukrainian 
        Navy and other articles that bolster the capacity of the 
        Ukrainian Navy to counter Russian maritime aggression and 
        maintain the freedom of innocent passage throughout the Black 
        Sea; and
            (2) ensure adequate planning for maintenance for any 
        equipment provided.
    (e) Authority To Provide Lethal Assistance.--The Secretary of State 
is authorized to provide lethal assistance under this section, 
including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and 
ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, anti-tank weapons 
systems, anti-ship weapons systems, anti-aircraft weapons systems, and 
small arms and ammunition.
    (f) Transfer Authority.--The Secretary of Defense may transfer 
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under 
section 333 of title 10, United States Code, to the Department of State 
to be made available for Foreign Military Finance assistance to 
Ukraine.

SEC. 9. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER PROGRAM.

    During fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the delivery of excess 
defense articles to Ukraine shall be given the same priority as that 
given other countries and regions under section 516(c)(2) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FROM ALLIES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a classified strategy on how the United States will 
encourage third countries to donate excess defense equipment to 
Ukraine.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A listing of all friendly and allied nations that have 
        excess defense material that may be compatible with the needs 
        and systems utilized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
            (2) A description of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by 
        the United States Government to encourage allied nations to 
        donate their excess defense articles to Ukraine on an expedited 
        basis.

SEC. 11. IMET COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State $4,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2026 for International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) assistance for Ukraine. The assistance shall be made 
available for the following purposes:
            (1) Training of future leaders.
            (2) Fostering a better understanding of the United States.
            (3) Establishing a rapport between the United States Armed 
        Forces and Ukraine's military to build partnerships for the 
        future.
            (4) Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for 
        joint operations.
            (5) Focusing on professional military education, civilian 
        control of the military, and human rights.
    (b) Availability of Funds.--
            (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a), 
        not more than $3,000,000 may be made available until the 
        Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Defense, makes the certification described in paragraph (2) to 
        the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, 
        including a detailed explanation justifying the certification 
        with respect to each of the categories listed in subparagraphs 
        (A) through (G) of such paragraph. The certification shall be 
        submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in 
        unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
            (2) Certification.--The certification described in this 
        paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government 
        of Ukraine has taken actions to--
                    (A) make defense institutional reforms, in 
                accordance with NATO standards;
                    (B) further strengthen civilian control of the 
                military;
                    (C) reform its state-owned arms production sector;
                    (D) increase transparency and accountability in 
                defense procurement;
                    (E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to exercise 
                oversight of the Ministry of Defense and military 
                forces; and
                    (F) promote respect for the observation of human 
                rights as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M 
                of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) 
                within the security forces of Ukraine.
    (c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before providing 
assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of 
State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a 
notification containing the following elements:
            (1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to 
        be provided, including--
                    (A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
                    (B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
                    (C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery 
                of such assistance or support.
            (2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary 
        considers appropriate.

SEC. 12. STRATEGY ON IMET PROGRAMMING IN UKRAINE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United States IMET 
program, encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders to 
participate in the training, and promote successful graduates to 
positions of prominence in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
    (b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a strategy for the implementation 
of the IMET program in Ukraine authorized under section 11.
    (c) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation with the 
        Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 
        for how the IMET program will be used by the United States 
        Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel program 
        graduates to positions of prominence in support of the 
        Ukrainian military's reform efforts in line with NATO 
        standards.
            (2) An assessment of the education and training 
        requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear 
        recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by 
        the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of education 
        or training.
            (3) An accounting of the current combat requirements of the 
        Ukrainian military and an assessment of the viability of 
        alternative mobile training teams, distributed learning, and 
        other flexible solutions to reach such students.
            (4) An identification of opportunities to influence the 
        next generation of leaders through attendance at United States 
        staff and war colleges, junior leader development programs, and 
        technical schools.
    (d) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 13. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) as appropriate, the United States Government should 
        provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of defense 
        articles, defense services, and design and construction 
        services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further 
        development of Ukraine's military forces; and
            (2) such loans should be considered an additive security 
        assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign Military 
        Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security Assistance 
        Initiative programming.

SEC. 14. STRATEGY TO PROTECT UKRAINE'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY FROM STRATEGIC 
              COMPETITORS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should work with the Government of Ukraine to ensure strategic 
assets and companies in Ukraine's defense industry are not subject to 
foreign ownership, control, or undue influence by strategic competitors 
to the United States, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC).
    (b) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the appropriate 
        committees of Congress a strategy to support Ukraine in 
        protecting its defense industry from predatory investments.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                    (A) A description of the efforts by strategic 
                competitors, such as the PRC, to acquire strategic 
                assets and companies in Ukraine's defense industry in a 
                predatory manner and the national security implications 
                for Ukraine, the United States, and other NATO allies 
                and partners.
                    (B) A description of vulnerable strategic assets 
                and companies in Ukraine's defense industry that would 
                benefit from foreign investments and joint ventures.
                    (C) A description of the reforms to Ukraine's 
                defense industry and export controls that are necessary 
                to incentivize Western investments in them.
                    (D) A strategy to promote, as appropriate, United 
                States direct investment in and joint ventures with 
                strategic companies in Ukraine's defense industry to 
                provide an alternative to PRC investments, and to 
                engage like-minded allies and partners on these 
                efforts.
            (3) Form.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in classified form.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 15. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
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