U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

REGULATO Y 

DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS 

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.43 

PLANT SECURITY FORCE DUTIES

A. INTRODUCTION 

Paragraph (aX3) of §73.50 of 10 CFR Part 73 

"Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," requires 

certain licensees to maintain and follow written security 

procedures that document the structure of the licensee's 

security organization and that detail those duties of 

guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for 

security required by 10 CFR Part 73. This guide 

provides criteria acceptable to the Regulatory staff 

relative to the organization of the plant security force 

and duties of guards, watchmen, and other individuals 

responsible for security. 

B. DISCUSSION 

In development of the plant security plan, the 

objective is to establish a security program compatible 

with health and safety considerations and compatible 

with efficient operation of the plant. An organized 

security force with a clearly designated chain of 

command is an effective means of implementing that 

program. Assignment of detailed responsibilities and 

duties addressing a variety of routine and emergency 

situations to each member of the security force will 

enable the security force to function effectively and 

provide the level of protection sought. 

1. Plant Security Organization 

In order to achieve an effective security organization, 

it is important to have clearly designated management 

responsibilities that follow a logical chain of command. 

Accordingly, charging an individual in upper manap- t 

ment with overall responsibility for security poibcy at 

the plant will facilitate establidument of an effective 

security organization. 

Reporting directly to the upper management 

individual who has overall security responsibility may be 

individuals responsible for implenmentation of specific 

portions of the plant security program. However, it is 

the facility guards and watchmen, along with individuals

January 1975

GUIDE

responsible for maintenance of security devices, who are 

the means by which the plant security plan is executed; 

therefore, detailed assignment of specific duties and 

responsibilities will assist the guards and watchmen in 

contributing to plant security. 

2. Security Force Duties: Guards and Watchmen 

The duties of facility guards and watchmen can be 

categorized generally as follows: 

a. Security tours and inspections, 

b. Access control and searches of personnel, pack

ages, and vehicles, 

c. Escort duties, 

d. Alarm system testing, 

e. Alarm station duties and recordkeeping, and 

f. Response to security incidents. 

Frequent security tours by guards and watchmen 

serve as a deterrent by providing high visibility of the 

plant security force. Moreover, such tours offer a means 

of continued inspection of security areas, physical 

barriers, and intrusion detection devices. 

Control of access is necessary to ensure that only 

duly authorized individuals and vehicles are permitted 

within protected areas, vital areas, and material access 

areas. 

Certain licenses are required by 10 CFR Part 73 to 

routinely search individuals, packages, and vehicles for 

explosives, firearms, and incendiary devices and for 

concealed special nuclear material. Such searches are 

most effective when performed by individuals spe

cifically assigned and trained for the task of searching. 

Guards and watchmen usually perform the searches 

required at entrance points into a protected area and at 

exit points from material access areas. 

Visitors, vendors, and other nonemployees are 

required to be escorted while within protected areas. 

Escort responsibility usually is taken by the employee 

being visited. However, vehicle drivers, certain packages, 

and, in some cases, individuals being taken into a plant 

my be escorted by members of the security force.

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Alarm systems and detection devices have to be 

tested frequently to verify that they are functioning 

properly. A member of the plant security organization is 

usually assigned supervision of such systems and devices. 

Nonetheless, it is the individual guards and watchmen 

who monitor, use, and respond to the detection 

equipment and alarm systems. Therefore, it will assist 

security if they are familiar with the alarm systems and 

they verify that detection equipment is functioning 

properly. Systems can be checked during the course of 

routine tours by guards o: watchmen. 

The keeping of access logs, visitor registration, 

records of security tours and inspections, and records of 

alarms and alarm testing is an essential element in an 

effective security program. Logs and records provide a 

necessary input to management review of plant security 

and can as well provide valuable information in the event 

of a security or safety incident. Logs and records ame 

usually maintained by individuals manning alarm 

stations and security area access points. 

The licensee's security organization should be capable 

of maintaining plant security during a variety of security 

incidents such as bomb threats, intrusion, attempted 

diversion or theft of SNM, attempted unauthorized 

transport of weapons or explosives into a security area, 

etc. Detailed statements of responsibilities and pro

cedures dictated by the type of incident will assist the 

plant security force in effectively coping with security 

incidents without undue risks to themselves or others. 

Of special concern are the specific actions and 

procedures related to the use of firearms by members of 

the plant security force. Special nuclear material and 

related facilities should not be looked upon as ordinary 

property since the theft of special nuclear material or 

sabotage of a nuclear facility would be inimical to the 

public health and safety and the common defense and 

security. Accordingly, members of the guard force 

should be prepared to use their firearms rather than 

permit the theft of special nuclear material or the 

sobotagp of a nuclear facility. As far as the Atomic 

Energy Commnison is aware, both acts would be 

felonies under Federal law. Theft and diversion anr 

felonies under Sections 57 and 220 of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§2077 

and 2272. Depending on the circumstances, sabotage is a 

felony under 18 U.S.C. § §2155 or 2156. Attempts and 

conspiracies to commit such acts are also felonies. 

C. REGULATORY POSITION 

A plaint security program that is structued as 

sugested below, and that charges guards and watchmen 

with the duties cited below would be acceptable to the 

Reulatory staff. 

I. emt Security Orxndos 

The plant security organization should be under the 

direction of an individual in upper management who has

the overall responsibility for the security of the plant. 

This includes development and maintenance'of the plant 

security plan, approval of detailed security procedures, 

the overall training and supervision of the guard force, 

and the installation, maintenance, and testing of alarm 

systems, detection equipment, and communication 

equipment. 

The plant security organization should incluce a 

security manager who is directly responsible for the 

preparation of detailed security procedures, for training 

and maintaining the security force, for security shift 

assignments, and for the maintenance of alarm systems, 

detection equipment, and communication systems. The 

security shift supervisors should report to the security 

manager, who in turn reports to the upper management 

individual who has the overall responsibility for plant 

security. 

In addition, the plant security organization should 

have a member responsible for inspections of security 

personnel and equipment, for security personnel 

qualification, and for planning and asessing of periodic 

security audits, including scheduled and unscheduled 

drills. This individual should be independent of the 

security manager and should report directly to the upper 

management individual who has overall security 

responsibility. 

During emergency situations that may require plant 

employees not normally employed in a security function 

to act as guards or watchmen, the security manager or 

security shift supervisor should have authority to assign 

such employees duties as appropriate. Any employees so 

designated should be properly trained and equipped as 

guards or as watchmen (we Regulatory Guide 5.20, 

"Training, Equipping, and Qualifying of Guards and 

Watchmen"). 

2. Secuity Force Data: Gush" aid Watcamne 

a. Security Tours wi hmpectiow Conducled by 

Guards dmi WatehmaL 

Security tours shhtild U planned so that no one 

area of the facility is toured Was frequently than once 

every four hours. Tours should be conducted in a 

random fashion and initiated at random times. 

To ensure rapid response to an alarm, at least one 

guard should be on tour at any time. Under most 

conditions, however, additional guards or watchmen 

should be an tour. 

The tours should be utilized to inspect various 

elements of security hardware. A guard or watchmen on 

a security tour should inspect fences, gates, locks, doors, 

and building walls for integrity and evidence of 

intrusion. In addition, perimeter liBhting and interior 

lighting should be checked for inoperative fixturs, and 

dear areas should be tInpected for items which could 

cover or held an Individua. Security faults observed on 

tours should be recorded and submtted to the on-duty 

security shift supervisor at the completion of each tour.

5.43.2
b. Access Control and Searching of Personnel, 

Packages, and Vehicles. 

Security personnel should execute the searches 

and should exercise access control as required by 

§ §73.50(c), 7 3.60(aX6), and 73.60(b) of 10 CFR Part 

73. Regulatory Guide 5.7, "Control of Personnel Access 

to Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access 

Areas," describes access control procedures acceptable 

to the Regulatory staff. The search of personnel can be 

conducted either by the use of detection equipment or by a hands-on search. 

If the search is accomplished by use of detection 

equipment, it should be conducted in accordance with 

Regulatory Guide 5.7. The search for weapons and 

explosives should be by use of a metal weapon detector 

and an explosive detector and should be conducted at 

entrance points into protected areas. The search for 

concealed SNM should be conducted at material access 

area exit points by means of an SNM detector and a 

metal detector which is capable of detecting metallic 

shielding material (e.g., lead).* 

If detection equipment is not routinely used for 

personnel searches, or is not functioning, a guard or 

watchman stationed at the search point should conduct 

a hands-on search in lieu of using detection equipment. 

The severity of the hands-on search should be in 

accordance with the potential threat. A routine hands-on 

search for firearms and explosives should be conducted 

in the manner of a frisk or pat-down, as inoffensively as 

possible. A more thorough search is called for when 

there is reason to believe that the individual is concealing 

weapons, explosives, or special nuclear material. In such 

cases, a standard police search f-r "oncealed weapons 

should be performed. 

If the search is a hands-on search or is conducted 

by us of hand-held detectors, the individual performing 

the search should not be armed while the search is 

conducted. A second guard or armed watchman should 

be present during the search. 

Individuals such as local law enforcement officials 

and AEC couriers who are responding to. a call for 

assistance or who are on site at the invitation of the 

licensee and who are required to be armed as part of 

their duties need not be searched or required to check 

their weapons upon entry into a protected area. 

Upon arrival of shipments into the protected area, 

a guard or watchman should check each package being 

delivered into the protected area for proper identifica

tion and authenticity or should sumnon an authorized 

individual to perform the check prior to removal of any 

packar from the loading dock or other point of 

delivery. In no cue should a packae be taken directly 

into a material access area or vital area without such 

Identification and verification. 

Prior to release of a package (including waste 

packages) form the material access area, a guard or 

*See Regulatory Guide 5.27, "Special Nuclear Material 

Doorway Monitors."

* watchman should check that package for concealed SNM 

unless exit is into a contiguous material access area. In 

most cases, verification by the guard or watchman of the 

authenticity of the signature of an individual who is 

authorized to release packages from the material access 

area on an intact tamper-indicating seal* of a sealed 

package or container constitutes sufficient search for 

SNM concealed within the package or container. 

Prior to each shipment from the facility or receipt 

of a shipment at the facility, a security individual should 

verify the absence of unidentified or unauthorized 

packages in the loading/unloading area, if such area is 

located within the protected area. 

Road vehicles should be maintained under visual 

surveillance at all times when within a material access 

area. All vehicles, including licensee forklift trucks and 

other such nonrcad vehicles, exiting from any material 

access area into a protected area should be searched by a 

guard or watchman for concealed SNM. A thorough 

visual search, including the cab and engine area, aided by 

a device capable of detecting SNM, should be performed 

on each vehicle being searched for concealed SNM. 

c. Escort Duties 

Only individuals specifically designated as "es

corts" by plant management should be allowed to act as 

escorts. Such designation need not be limited to 

members of the licensee security organization. A call-in 

procedure should be employed to notify the security 

shift supervisor of movement of individuals or vehicles 

under escort when such movement is between buildings 

and when the escort responsibility is changed from one 

escort to another. 

d. Alarm Testing 

(1) Perimeter Intrusion Alarms. Perimeter intru

sion alarm systems should be inspected for performance 

by a security individual according to the frequency and 

methods indicated in Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter 

Intnudon Alarm Systems." The testing need not be done 

in conjunction with a security patrol, but if so 

accomplished, only one or two segments of the system 

should be tested by any one guard or watchmian on tour 

per security tour to avoid the possibility of a real alarm 

-being masked by a test alarm. Any section of the alarm 

system being taken out of access modet or being placed 

in service following repair should be tested for proper 

operation by a security individual. 

(2) Interior Intrusion Alarms. A security indi

vidual should be present to test or observe the test of an 

*See Regulatory Guide 5.10, "Selection and Us of 

Presumre-Sensitive Seals on Containers for Onite Stoeqe of 

Special Nuclear Material," and Regulatory Guide 5.15, "Security 

Seals for the Protection and Control of Special Nucimar 

MateriaL" 

tAcoe mode means the condition that maintains the sstem 

sensitive to intrusion -but nhibits the audible (and in some cram visible) annunciation of an alarm.

5.43-3
interior intrusion alarm at the time the alarm is placed in 

or taken out of the access mode or is placed in service 

folI'owuig installation or repair The security individual 

may be a watchman whose (nonsecurity) work station is 

within the area protected. Observation of the test may 

be accomplished by closed-circuit television (CCTV) in 

Lieu of an attending guard or watchman. 

e. Alarm Station Duties 

The onsite central alarm station should be manned 

by the security shift supervisor. That individual should 

know the status of all alarm equipment. The primary 

function of the security shift supervisor should be to 

dispatch other security personnel to areas from which 

alarms have been received and to call for assistance from 

local law enforcement authorities (LLEA) if needed. In 

addition to the security shift supervisor, other security 

personnel may be stationed in the central alarm station. 

The individual(s) in the central alarm station should 

maintain communication with security personnel on 

tour to be advised immediately of any real or suspected 

breach of security. 

The individual(s) in the central alarm station also 

should observe (via CCTV) and control unattended 

access points. The security shift supervisor should have 

the authority to dispatch guards and watchmen to 

monitor areas where alarm systems temporarily are 

inoperative and to call for repair of such systems. 

An individual attending an alarm station other 

than the central alarm station need not be a member of 

the plant security force. However, if an alarm sounds, he 

immediately should contact the individual in the central 

alarm station to be apprised of the situation. If unable to 

do so, he should contact the LLEA and advise them of 

the situation. Thus, he should have the responsibility to 

call for assistance if he cannot contact the onsite central 

alarm station. 

The security shift supervisor in the central alam 

station should oversee the recordkeeping activities of 

the security force during his shift. He should personally 

log any alarm, unless this is done automatically, and 

should record the details of security force response to an 

alarm. The security manager should have overall 

responsibility for security force records. The individual 

observing unattended access points should record the. 

access data unless this is done automatically via key-card 

reader or other automated access device. The security 

shift supervisor also should oversee the testing of 

communication equipment. 

The central alarm station should serve as a 

command post during plant emergencies unless the 

station itself is threatened. Response by facility personnel and outside assistance should be coordinated 

through the central alarm station. 

f. Respome to Secrity Incidents 

The size of the onsite security force, the 

deployment of the security force, and the security force

procedures governing response should be such that the 

security organization is capable cf: 

(1) Preventing any successful theft or act of 

sabotage by one or two armed individuals or a group of 

unarmed people. 

(2) Delaying the attack of an armed group up to 

squad size sufficiently long to allow notification of and 

response by law enforcement authorities so that the 

attempted theft or sabotage is thwarted or stolen 

material is promptly recovered. 

(3) Defending itself in the event of a well-planned 

attack, executed in a disciplined and organized manner 

sufficiently well to communicate with law enforcement 

authorities to advise them of the attack and its scope 

and furnish information to be used as a basis for 

countermeasures and a properly escalated response by 

local, State or Federal counterforces either to prevent 

removal of the material or recover it or to initiate 

appropriate postsabotage action. 

In general, upon receipt of an alarm or other 

indication of a possible security threat two armed 

members of the licensee's security force should be 

dispatched to the area of the alarm. The individuals 

responding should assess the threat and apprise the 

security shift supervisor of the extent of the threat, if 

any. If a threat exists, the individuals responding should 

take no further action until assistance arrives from other 

members of the licensee security organization or from 

law enforcement authorities, if needed. There may, of 

course, be circumstances in which the responding 

individuals may need to take such action as self-defense 

or defense of another, prior to arrival of assistance. 

Observation of the protected area isolation zone and 

other security areas via CCTV in certain situations can 

alleviate the necessity for dispatching guards to the area 

of alarm and thus avoid exposing the responding guards 

to attack. 

Upon being advised of the existence and extent of 

a threat, the security shift supervisor should immediately 

notify law enforcement authorities and request appro priate action. The licensee security organization should 

take action including the use of force (to the extent 

poss'ble under the laws of the State in which the facility 

is located) appropriate to the threat as indicated above 

while awaiting arrival of law enforcement personnel. Above all, owing to the severe potential for harm to the 

public health and safety and threat to the common 

defense and security of the United States, the 

unauthorized removal of spedal nuclear material from 

the facility or sabotage to the facility should be 

prevented. Any standing orders or policies of the 

licensee which prohibit the use of deadly force regardless 

of circumstances or which limit the use of the authority 

provided by law to employ firearms would be viewed as 

contrary to the intention and purpose of the regulation 

requiring armed guards.

5.434
D. IMPLEMENTATION 

The purpose of this section is to provide information 

to applicants and licensees regarding the Regulatory 

staffs plans for utilizing this regulatory guide. 

This guide reflects current regulatory practice. 

Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant

proposes an alternative method for complying with 

specified portions of the Commission's .regulations, the 

method described herein will be used immediately in the 

evaluation of submittals in connection with special 

nuclear material license, operating license, or con

struction permit applications.

5.43-5