OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

January 15, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING 

COMMAND – IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI–NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND – IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, U.S. 

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND THE 

ENVIRONMENT 

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY 

SUBJECT: Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Reconstruction of Taji Military Base and 

Baghdad Recruiting Center (SIGIR-08-004) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit in 

accordance with its statutory responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, 

which requires the independent and objective conduct of audits relating to programs and 

operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund. The law also requires that we provide for the independent and objective 

leadership and coordination of and recommendations on policies designed to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations and to 

prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. 

We considered comments from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq when 

preparing the final report. The comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and a 

copy is included in the Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Glenn Furbish (703-428-1058)/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. 

 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 1

Background 1 

Objectives 2 

Scope and Methodology 2 

Construction Outcome and Cost 4 

Original Task-Order Requirements 4 

Cost and Scope Changes 5 

Construction Outcome 8 

Construction Sites 9 

Factors Impacting Cost 14 

Security Concerns Limit Subcontractor-Personnel Attendance 15 

Contract Administration and Oversight 17

Subcontracting 17 

Views on Oversight and Contractor Performance 20 

Contractor Accounting and Billing Systems Controls 20 

Task-Order Closeout 22 

Conclusion, Recommendation, and Lessons Learned 24

Conclusions 24 

Recommendation 24 

Management Comments 25 

Lessons Learned 25 

Related Reports 26

Appendices 

A. Projects Completed at the Taji Military Base 27 

B. Acronyms 30 

C. Audit Team Members 31 

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Cost Associated with Task Order 6 

Table 2: Use of Subcontractors 18 

Table 3: Extent of Subcontract Competition 19 

Figure 1: Locations of Projects 6 

Figure 2: Roof of Bombed Baghdad Recruiting Station 7 

Figure 3: Average Weekly Subcontractor Personnel Attendance 15 

Management Comments 

Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq 32 
Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Reconstruction of Taji 

Military Base and Baghdad Recruiting Center 

SIGIR-08-004 January 15, 2008

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

A December 2006 amendment to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s 

(SIGIR) enabling legislation requires that, prior to its termination, SIGIR prepare a final forensic 

audit report on funds made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. To help meet 

this requirement, SIGIR is undertaking a series of focused audits examining major Iraq 

reconstruction contracts. The objective of these audits is to examine contract outcome, cost, and 

management oversight, emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

This report, another in the series, examines reconstruction work contracted for by the U.S. 

Government and performed by Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group, Inc. (Parsons) of 

Pasadena, California. It complements other SIGIR audit work related to Iraq reconstruction done 

by Parsons and other contractors. In some cases, including this one, contractors have completed 

their work and been paid. Future reports will address other Iraq reconstruction projects. 

In January 2004, at the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Air Force Center for 

Environmental Excellence—now known as the Air Force Center for Engineering and the 

Environment (AFCEE)—awarded a cost-plus fixed-fee task order under an existing contract to 

Parsons. Under the task order, Parsons was to renovate and replace facilities and provide 

infrastructure repairs at the Taji Military Base, and the recruiting stations in Hillah, Kirkuk, and 

Ba’quba. It was also to construct a logistical support facility at the Kirkush Military Training 

Base. 

Subsequent modifications to the task order altered the scope of work. They eliminated the 

requirements to renovate the three recruiting stations, and the logistical support facility at the 

Kirkush base. Modifications also increased the scope of work at the Taji Military Base and 

added a requirement to renovate the Baghdad Recruiting Center, which had recently been 

bombed. As a result, the final scope of work consisted of rebuilding the Taji base and the 

Baghdad center. 

Results in Brief 

Between May and June 2004, Parsons and its subcontractors largely completed facility 

construction and repair work at the Taji Military Base (costing about $36.5 million) and the 

renovation of the Baghdad Recruiting Center (costing about $922,000). The government 

expressed satisfaction with the overall project and particularly the work of AFCEE. The cost of 

these two projects was about $11.1 million more than estimated for the original five projects; the 

increase, according to AFCEE, was caused by several factors, including changes in the scope of 

work and security issues. 

i
Information obtained by SIGIR indicates that there were significant limitations to full and open 

competition in awarding subcontracts. The absence of such competition can make the 

government vulnerable to inflated subcontract prices. 

Government oversight was also a concern, and at the time of construction, Parsons had contractbilling system weaknesses that increased the risk of erroneous billings (these deficiencies have 

since been corrected). In addition, although construction work has been completed, the task 

order remains open because of inventory discrepancies, leaving the government vulnerable to 

undetected loss or theft. The value of the total inventory is about $859,000. 

Construction Outcome and Cost 

Work under the task order was completed to the government’s general satisfaction. By May 

2004, Parsons and its subcontractors finished reconstruction of the Baghdad Recruiting Center, 

and by June 2004, reconstruction of the Taji Military Base was largely completed as well. 

Although the total cost of this competitively-awarded task order was originally estimated at 

$26.3 million, actual cost rose by $11.1 million, or approximately 42%, to $37.4 million. 

Reconstruction of the Taji base used $36.5 million of these funds. Initially, Parsons was to 

perform work at five sites, but subsequent modifications reduced the number of sites to two and 

made other scope changes. As a result, the final project consisted of rebuilding Taji and the 

Baghdad center. The map below shows the planned and actual construction locations. 

According to Parsons and AFCEE officials, a number of factors caused cost increases during 

execution of the task order, including: 

ii
• task-order scope changes 

• late delivery of subcontractor materials and equipment 

• changes in work priority 

• difficulty in getting Iraqis on and off the base 

• the deteriorating security situation on the ground 

• security travel restrictions (lockdowns) 

Contract Administration and Oversight 

Information obtained by SIGIR indicates that there were significant limitations to full and open 

competition in awarding subcontracts, which account for almost three-quarters of the cost of 

reconstruction. These conditions created risks, especially to ensuring fair and reasonable 

subcontract prices. Parsons officials acknowledge that limited competition was prevalent and 

due to several factors: the lack of means, such as newspapers, radio, the Internet, or common 

mail service for distributing solicitations to a large supplier base; the inability for subcontractors 

to assume additional workload; and the inability of many potential subcontractors to prepare 

proposals. Also, as a result of the dangers of working in Bagdad and at Taji and the urgent need 

to begin construction quickly, Parsons said that using suppliers known to the company was 

essential to ensuring that it would be capable of performing the work. 

Given the operational environment in Iraq at the time, according to an AFCEE contracting 

official, Parsons’ performance under this task order was for the most part satisfactory. AFCEE’s 

performance was considered very positive by the commander of the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq. However, Parsons reportedly did not properly manage one if its 

subcontractors, resulting in a poorly constructed water-storage tank. In addition, government 

quality-assurance oversight was a concern. As a result, AFCEE subsequently contracted with a 

private firm specializing in quality assurance. An AFCEE official commented that, “A 

Professional set of QA [Quality Assurance] personnel helps ensure project success. Using 

augmentees and untrained personnel to provide construction oversight is a recipe for disaster.” 

The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) examined Parsons’ contract-billing system as of 

April 2004 and concluded that it was inadequate. After construction was completed and 

payments were made, Parsons corrected its deficiencies to DCAA’s satisfaction. Construction 

work on this task order was, for the most part, completed by mid-2004. However, the task order 

remains open because accountability for inventory valued at about $859,000 has not been 

transferred to the government. Delays in reconciling inventory-record discrepancies and 

transferring property accountability to the government leave inventory vulnerable to undetected 

loss or theft. This inventory includes such items as bulletproof vests, cameras, radios, 

televisions, and trailers. 

Recommendation 

SIGIR recommends that the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq direct AFCEE to 

work with Parsons, DCAA, and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMA), to 

iii
establish milestones and timeframes to reconcile inventory-record discrepancies and close the 

task order. 

Management Comments 

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq concurred with SIGIR’s 

recommendation. It directed AFCEE to work with Parsons, the DCAA, and the DCMA to 

establish milestones and timeframes to reconcile inventory-record discrepancies and close the 

task order. It established an estimated completion date of March 15, 2008. 

Lessons Learned 

Because work under the task order has been completed and the contractor paid, SIGIR also 

identified lessons learned that may be applicable to future contract-management strategies in 

environments like those experienced during Iraq reconstruction. These practices are vital to 

reducing the opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse: 

• using existing contracts to speed up task-order execution 

• increasing competition for subcontracts 

• providing sufficient and competent quality-assurance staff 

• implementing procedures to account for government-furnished equipment 

• accomplishing pre-construction planning 

iv
Introduction 

A December 2006 amendment to its enabling legislation requires the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) to prepare a final forensic audit report on funds made available 

to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). To help meet this requirement prior to its 

termination, SIGIR is undertaking a series of focused audits examining major Iraq reconstruction 

contracts. The objective of these audits is to examine contract outcome, cost and contract 

management oversight, emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

This report, another in the series, examines reconstruction work contracted for by the U.S. 

Government and performed by Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group, Inc. (Parsons) of 

Pasadena, California. It complements other SIGIR audit work related to Iraq reconstruction done 

by Parsons and other contractors. In some cases, including this one, contractors have completed 

their work and been paid. Future reports will discuss other work performed by Parsons and other 

contractors in Iraq. 

Background 

In November 2003, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE)1 

awarded Parsons a contract (FA8903-04-D-8675) for environmental remediation and 

construction services. This was one of 27 Worldwide Environmental Restoration and 

Construction (WERC) contracts designed to offer a range of construction and engineering 

services to meet Air Force requirements worldwide. The projects were primarily environmental 

in nature, but also included engineering services, such as construction projects. WERC also 

offered demolition, repair, emergency-response, and operation and maintenance services for both 

environmental and traditional engineering activities. 

The initial budget limit for WERC was $4 billion, but could be increased to $10 billion. The 27 

contracts were awarded in November and December 2003. Work was to be accomplished 

through individual task orders against the contracts. 

In January 2004, at the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),2 AFCEE issued 

Parsons’ task order 0001 against the contract, a cost-plus fixed-fee order with an estimated cost 

of $26.3 million. The order identified five construction projects in Iraq, with renovation of the 

Taji Military Base the largest of them. While Parsons subsequently received numerous task 

orders to perform work under this contract, it received only one for Iraq. Under the terms of the 

order, work was to be completed by January 15, 2005, with funding provided through the IRRF. 

The order was modified in April 2004 deleting the original sites except the Taji Military Base 

and adding the reconstruction of the Baghdad Recruiting Center. 

Four principal government organizations were involved in administering and overseeing 

execution of the task order: AFCEE, the contracting authority; the Defense Contract 

 

1

 Until June 1, 2007, the organization was called the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence. 

2

 In June 2004, the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq assumed responsibility for building the 

capability of Iraqi Security Forces and institutions. 

1
Management Agency (DCMA), the task order administrator; the Defense Contract Audit Agency 

(DCAA), the authorized representative of the contracting officer for examining contractor 

invoices; and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD), responsible for 

construction quality assurance. 

Objectives 

SIGIR’s audit objectives are to (1) determine task-order outcome and related cost; and (2) review 

task-order management oversight emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, 

and abuse. 

Scope and Methodology 

To accomplish these objectives, SIGIR visited, held discussions with officials of, and/or 

reviewed data from: 

• Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group, Pasadena, Calif. 

• The Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, Brooks City Base, San 

Antonio. 

• Defense Contract Management Agency, Carson, Calif. 

• Defense Contract Audit Agency, San Gabriel Valley Branch Office, West Covina, 

Calif. 

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, Baghdad. 

SIGIR obtained and reviewed relevant contract, financial, and other information from these 

organizations relating to the pre-award, award, cost, oversight, and performance under the task 

order. This information included: the basic contract, task order, contract modifications, and 

scope of work changes; invoices submitted by Parsons for work under the order; progress reports 

on the work being performed; quality assurance reports prepared by GRD; Contract Fund Status 

Reports; subcontracting under the order and subcontractor performance; and photographs of the 

sites before and after reconstruction. 

SIGIR also reviewed relevant portions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation; DCAA procedures 

for invoice review; and DCAA and prior SIGIR reports related to the Parsons contract. 

SIGIR conducted its review from May to October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 

auditing standards. Although we obtained and analyzed financial and other computerized 

information, we did not examine the validity of the electronic systems that produced the 

information. However, SIGIR reviewed the work of others related to the accuracy of data 

generated by these systems, and noted any concerns in this report. 

With respect to the accuracy of Parsons’ invoices, SIGIR relied on DCAA reviews of company 

invoices and its reviews of the company’s accounting and billing systems to determine the risks 

for fraud, waste, and abuse. Also, because construction work had long been completed, SIGIR 

could neither monitor construction progress nor observe the condition of the construction 

2
projects at the time of completion. Rather, we relied on available quality-assurance reports and 

photographs in the contract files and held discussions with oversight managers. 

To assess the adequacy and implementation of task-order management controls, SIGIR reviewed 

contract and agency oversight requirements, discussed the implementation of these requirements 

with responsible officials, and examined contract files. As SIGIR accomplished its work, it 

focused on issues that could create risks of fraud, waste, and abuse and on uncovering any 

indications of such conditions. 

3
Construction Outcome and Cost 

The task order was modified significantly by the CPA to change the scope of work and the cost. 

As a result, the final project consisted of rebuilding Taji and the Baghdad center at a total cost of 

$37.4 million. Work under the task order was completed to the government’s general 

satisfaction. By May 2004, Parsons and its subcontractors had finished reconstruction of the 

Baghdad Recruiting Center, and by June 2004, reconstruction of the Taji Military Base was 

largely completed as well. 

Although the total cost of this competitively awarded task order was originally estimated at 

$26.3 million, actual cost rose by $11.1 million, or approximately 42 percent, to $37.4 million. 

Reconstruction of the Taji base used $36.5 million of these funds. Initially, Parsons was to 

perform work at five sites, but subsequent modifications reduced the number of sites to two. 

Modifications also increased the scope of work at Taji and added a requirement to renovate the 

Baghdad center, which had been bombed in February 2004. 

Original Task-Order Requirements 

Under the January 2004 task order, Parsons was to renovate and replace facilities and provide 

infrastructure repairs at the Taji Military Base, and recruiting stations in Hillah, Kirkuk and 

Ba’quba, as well as construct a logistical support facility at the Kirkush Training Base. 

Specifically, the original task order required Parsons to do these five projects: 

Taji Military Base: Renovate Battalion 4 area, Battalion 5 area, the Garrison area, and renovate 

and rebuild the Central Medical Clinic. Work was to make the buildings suitable for occupancy 

by painting and installing the following: light fixtures, ceiling fans, air-conditioning units, 

electrical outlets with panel boxes, sinks, urinals, toilets, showers, kitchen sink units, doors, 

windows, and floor tiles. Parsons was to renovate the wastewater treatment plant, install sewage 

distribution lines, and excavate the lagoon. Work also included installing streetlights with 

connections to the existing electrical power grid, a water treatment system, and a wastewater 

collection system. 

Hillah Recruiting Station: Renovate the existing buildings and landscape the surrounding area. 

The existing buildings had been stripped of all doors, windows, electrical components, 

mechanical systems, and plumbing fixtures. Suspended ceilings had also been removed, and the 

southern end of the main building had bomb damage. The main building required the renovation 

and upgrade of all rooms into living areas, recruiter and community bathrooms, classrooms, a 

reception area, an identification room, and interview rooms. The station also needed a general 

office, medical screening room and office, security-holding and recruit-sleeping areas. The 

separate shower and latrine building also required renovation or replacement of all facilities and 

fixtures. 

Kirkuk Recruiting Station: Renovate the existing buildings and landscape the surrounding 

area. The former had been stripped of doors, windows, electrical components, mechanical 

systems, and plumbing fixtures. Suspended ceilings had been removed. The main building 

required the renovation and upgrade of all rooms into living areas, recruiter and community 

4
bathrooms, classrooms, a reception area, an identification room, and interview rooms. The 

station also needed a general office, medical screening room, medical office, and securityholding and recruit-sleeping areas. The shower latrine rooms required renovation or the 

replacement of all plumbing and fixtures. The existing parking building was to be renovated. 

Ba’quba Recruiting Station: Renovate the existing buildings and landscape the surrounding 

area. The former had been stripped of doors, windows, electrical components, mechanical 

systems, and plumbing fixtures. Suspended ceilings had been removed. The work necessary to 

make the buildings suitable for occupancy included installation or repair of the following: light 

fixtures, ceiling fans, air-conditioning units, heaters, electrical outlets with panel boxes, interior 

electric distribution, sinks, showers, toilets, plumbing, doors, and windows (with hardware). The 

work also included patching, repair, and painting of walls and ceilings; installation of floor, wall 

tiles and handrails; and repair of the potable water, sanitary sewer, electrical generation, and 

supply systems. 

Kirkush Military Training Base: Establish a warehousing and maintenance capability to 

support New Iraqi Army units. This facility was meant to store commodities, including 

petroleum, oil, lubricants, and munitions, as well as perishable and other hazardous materials. 

The facility was to consist of specialty and general buildings located at safe distances from each 

other, with storage of up to 90 days of all types of supplies, including sufficient bulk fuel and 

ammunition for a brigade-strength force. In addition, the facility was to be capable of supporting 

operational and intermediate maintenance requirements of such a force, including maintenance 

of both tactical and non-tactical vehicles. 

Cost and Scope Changes 

During the execution of the task order, 11 modifications altered the scope of work, increasing the 

cost from $26.3 million to $37.4 million, as shown in Table 1. In the final analysis, Parsons 

completed the reconstruction of an expanded-scope Taji Military Base and the rebuilding of the 

Baghdad Recruiting Center. Figure 1 shows the locations of the projects in the original and final 

task orders, after modifications. Table 1 shows the cost impact of each modification. 

5
Figure 1 - Locations of Projects 

Source: SIGIR 

Table 1—Cost Associated with Task Order (in millions)

Cost Fixed Fee Insurance Total

Task Order $23.90 2.4 0 $26.30

Mod 1 0 0 0 0

Mod 2 4.40 0.4 0 4.80

Mod 3 2.40 0.2 0.1 2.70

Mod 4 0 0 0 0

Mod 5 0.10 0 0 0.10

Mod 6 0 0 0 0

Mod 7 3.10 0.2 0.1 3.40

Mod 8 0 0 0 0

Mod 9 0 0 0 0

Mod 10 0 0 0 0

Mod 11 0.20 0 0 0.20

Total $34.00 3.3 0.1 $37.40

Source: Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

6
Parsons provided SIGIR with information showing that the cost to the U.S. Government to 

renovate the Taji Military Base was $36,504,866 and to renovate Baghdad Recruiting Center, 

$922,461. 

The specific changes made by each modification, including their impact on cost and schedule, 

are discussed below. As shown in Table 1, modifications 2, 3, and 7 had the greatest impact of 

task order cost. 

Modification 01: Administrative in nature with no cost impact. In March 2004, the task order 

was modified to make clear that all utility infrastructure work and associated cost included in the 

statement of work referred to temporary utility systems. The modification changed the task 

order to substitute “temporary utility or infrastructure work” for “permanent utility or 

infrastructure work.” 

Modification 02: Significant impact on both cost and scope. In April 2004, the task order was 

modified to change the statement of work and increase the cost by $4.8 million, from $26.3 

million to $31.1 million. The modification deleted the requirement to build the logistics facilities 

at Kirkuk Military Base and the recruiting stations at Kirkuk, Ba’quba, and Hillah; added a 

requirement for permanent utilities, including a new water treatment plant and associated water 

supply and distribution systems, and a sewage collection system at the Taji Military Base; and 

added a requirement to excavate and remove sludge from an existing sewage lagoon; install 

kitchen equipment for two dining facilities, and rehabilitate the Baghdad Recruiting Center, 

which was bombed in February 2004 (see Figure 2). 

Figure 2 – Roof of Bombed Baghdad Recruiting Station 

Modification 03: Significant cost and scope impacts. In May 2004, the task order was modified 

to change the statement of work and increase the cost by $2.7 million. The modification added 

the requirement to restore the existing Taji wastewater treatment plant and two pumping stations 

7
to full operation, including tie-ins, and also added security forces to control subcontractor 

employees’ access to the Taji Military Base through the designated worker-entry gate upon 

termination of the existing gate-security contract. 

Modification 04: Administrative in nature with no affect on cost or scope. The modification 

occurred in June 2004 to correct an administrative error relating to a funding citation. 

Modification 05: Minor impact on cost and scope. In September 2004, the task was modified 

to incorporate a new statement of work and increase the construction cost by $63,636 and the 

fees by $6,364. The modification added a requirement for minefield clearance and unexplodedordnance disposal to facilitate construction along a portion of the Taji base perimeter.

Modification 06: Minor impact on cost, scope and schedule. This modification, in February 

2005, changed the statement of work and increased the construction cost by $6,798 and the fees 

by $680. It also extended the period of performance. The modification added a requirement to 

repair a broken underground water line serving the new water treatment plant at the Taji base. 

Modification 07: Significant impact on cost and schedule. This modification was issued in 

April 2005. It increased the construction cost by $3.1 million and the fees by about $219,000 to 

cover Parsons’ cost for labor, subcontracts, and other direct costs. It also extended the period of 

contract performance by five months, from April 30 to September 30, 2005. 

Modification 08: This modification had an impact on schedule. Modification 08 was issued in 

September 2005 and extended the period of performance from September 30 to December 15, 

2005. There was no change in cost. 

Modification 09: This modification had an impact on schedule. Modification 09 was issued in 

December 2005 and extended the period of performance from December 15, 2005 to January 31, 

2006, and also provided for the contractor to complete the water storage-tank repair and perform 

closeout. There was no change in cost. 

Modification 10: A sizable impact on schedule. Modification 10 was issued on January 31, 

2006, and extended the period of performance from January 31 to April 30, 2006. There was no 

increase in construction cost or fees. 

Modification 11: Increased cost but not scope or schedule. The modification increased the cost 

by $174,507, resulting from an indirect rate adjustment. Provisional Parsons’ indirect- rate 

revisions were accepted by DCAA in September 2005, causing an increase in the company’s 

incurred cost. They had not been captured in prior billings, nor had the billings been 

subsequently adjusted. 

Construction Outcome 

By early-June 2004, Parsons reported completing most of its work on the reconstruction of the 

Taji Military Base, and the work was accepted by the government. This included reconstruction 

of the garrison headquarters, and the 4th and 5th Battalion areas and the Central Medical Clinic. 

8
By December 2004, it had also completed reconstruction of the Taji base sewer system, and the 

work was accepted by the government.3

Parsons had completed most of its work by the end of 2004, but it requested a time extension to 

complete the new water plant. Although originally scheduled to be completed prior to December 

2004, construction of the plant by a joint-venture subcontractor significantly lagged behind 

schedule. The completed plant was offered to the government for transfer and acceptance in late 

June 2005, following commissioning, operational testing, and operator training. When 

completed, the water storage tank that was part of the plant leaked, and the government would 

not accept it. Subcontractor attempts to correct the leak, during August-December 2005, were 

unsuccessful. Parsons subsequently terminated the subcontractor for poor performance and 

obtained a replacement firm. The tank was taken apart and re-assembled, and a leak-free water 

storage tank was transferred to the government in June 2006. 

Regarding the Baghdad Recruiting Center, Parsons completed its reconstruction work in May 

2004, and the work was accepted by the government. Parsons reconstructed the center’s 

administration building, bachelors’ officer quarters, vehicle-access lane, force-protection gate, 

five guard towers, perimeter-protection walls, and electrical power generator with fuel supply. 

Construction Sites 

The following photographs show the results of Parsons’ efforts at the Taji Military Base and the 

Baghdad Recruiting Center. 

 

3

 Appendix A shows a list of projects completed at the Taji Military Base and the date of their acceptance by the 

government. 

9
TAJI MILITARY BASE 

Renovated Garrison Headquarters 

Renovated Administrative Office Building 

10
Barracks Before Reconstruction Reconstructed Barracks 

Garrison Headquarters Kitchen Garrison Headquarters Kitchen 

Before Reconstruction After Reconstruction 

11
Wastewater-Treatment Plant Wastewater–Treatment Plant 

Aerator Rehabilitation Underway Aerator in Operation 

Office Building in Battalion Area Office Building in Battalion Area 

Before Reconstruction After Reconstruction 

12
BAGHDAD RECRUITING CENTER 

Bomb-Damaged Building 

Completed Baghdad Recruiting Center 

13
Factors Impacting Cost 

According to Parsons’ and AFCEE officials, a number of factors caused cost increases during 

execution of the task order. SIGIR’s prior work indicates that the conditions described below 

were consistent with the environment in Iraq at the time. Among the factors: 

• task-order scope of construction changes 

• late delivery of subcontractor materials and equipment—for example, some convoy 

deliveries went through Turkey and were delayed at the border. This was the case 

with the water treatment plant equipment. In one case, deliveries were delayed three 

to four weeks because the driver was shot and killed. 

• changes in work priorities 

• difficulty in getting Iraqis on and off the base due to security checks, which 

sometimes affected work by two to three hours a day 

• the deteriorating security situation, including threats, which resulted in fewer 

subcontractor personnel coming to work 

• security travel restrictions (lockdowns), which reduced the number of subcontract 

personnel who could come to work. 

SIGIR’s review of Parsons’ daily progress reports on renovation of the Baghdad Recruiting 

Center provides insight into the operational challenges faced by contractors operating in Iraq 

during early 2004. The following are entries from the daily reports: 

• March 25: An Iraqi political party presently illegally occupies the Administration 

Building. We cannot make an assessment or begin work until the Party moves out. 

• Also March 25: The three buildings identified for demolition are presently occupied 

by squatters, as are the surrounding buildings, inside and outside the new North Wall. 

We cannot proceed until they are moved. 

• April 3: The political party stopped our work in the compound this morning. It took 

the rest of the day to find out that they want us to stop wall construction for three days 

as they move furniture and equipment out of the building. 

• April 6: The political party is starting to move. To date, we have lost ten days with 

the delays involved with the Party. 

• April 7: The installation of the last of the concrete barriers went slower than desired. 

The owner of the welding shop had been threatened and quit assembling the barriers. 

The subcontractor had to find another shop to fabricate the last concrete barriers, 

costing the project three days. 

• April 9: The theft and damage to the Administration building is breathtaking. There 

are no doors, no windows, no electrical system, no water system, and no functioning 

sewer. There are no toilets, no sinks, no air conditioners, no electrical panels, and no 

generator. Even the handrails at the stairs were stolen. Furniture was thrown out 

third story windows; trash and filth are everywhere. The building is a vacant shell. 

14
• April 14: The squatters in the village are moving out. They are also stealing 

everything including the kitchen sink. It got very tense this afternoon when the Iraqi 

Police opened fire (we later found out, in the air) with automatic weapons to scare the 

squatters out. 

• April 18: An Iraqi contractor was using a large crane and flatbed truck to steal 6-ton 

Texas barriers that were to be used for the North wall. Ten barriers, valued at $7,500 

were taken off the truck and returned to stock. Nine barriers worth $6,850 are now 

part of the street barrier. Four barriers worth $3,000 are missing. 

• April 22: The Statement of Work specified that two of the four water reservoirs on 

the roof needed to be replaced. All four reservoirs are now missing. Replacement of 

two water reservoirs is in the original quote. 

• April 25: The nine Texas barriers are taking on a perverse life of their own. The 

Army thwarted the plan for the 6 a.m. recovery of the barriers. The Army guard 

detail stopped the loading operation because they didn’t know about the work. The 

guard team briefed on the work plan went off duty at 9 p.m., and did not tell the allnight crew about the plan. 

• April 26: Recovery of the nine Texas barriers did not take place this morning as 

planned. I was told the crane operator feared for his safety. We have changed crane 

companies and scheduled the recovery for tomorrow morning. 

Security Concerns Limit Subcontractor-Personnel Attendance

According to Parsons’ officials, there were problems with subcontractors and/or their workers 

not showing up for work due to increasing terrorist attacks. Figure 3 from Parsons’ activity 

reports indicates the variability in average weekly subcontractor-personnel attendance at the Taji 

Military Base. 

Figure 3—Average Weekly Subcontractor Personnel Attendance 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Week

Average Attendance

Source: Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group activity reports. 

15
Examples of factors causing reduced subcontractor attendance included in Parsons’ 2004 activity 

reports for the Taji base: 

• June 20 (week 7): The labor force averaged 55 workers each day. The contractor has 

been slow to complete installation of dining facilities equipment and has not 

responded positively to efforts to extend workdays. 

• June 27 (week 8): Insurgents attacked with small arms fire along the east perimeter 

of the base on the evening of June 24. In addition, two rockets hit the base west of 

the work area. Two days earlier, a security incident along the road outside the East 

Gate 25 restricted access to the base and reduced the workforce to 36 subcontractor 

laborers. 

• August 15 (week 14): The workforce averaged 67 subcontractor workers per day--

smaller than in recent weeks--due to an increase in the frequency and intensity of 

security incidents at the base. 

• August 29 (week 16): The daily workforce average dropped to 51 per day. The low 

worker count is a direct result of numerous security incidents, including multiple 

killings of workers outside the East Gate. 

• September 5 (week 17): The workforce averaged 61 per day, again, a direct result of 

numerous security incidents, including multiple killings of base contract workers by 

insurgents outside the East (worker) Gate. With few exceptions, construction is at a 

virtual halt. 

16
Contract Administration and Oversight 

Information obtained by SIGIR indicates that there were significant limitations to full and open 

competition in awarding subcontracts, which comprised almost three-quarters of the cost of 

reconstruction. According to Parsons officials, limited competition was prevalent and due to 

several factors: the lack of means--newspapers, radio, the Internet, common mail service, etc.--

for distributing solicitations to a large supplier base; subcontractors’ lack of capacity to assume 

additional workloads; and the inability of many potential subcontractors to prepare proposals. 

Also, according to Parsons, as a result of the dangers of working in Bagdad and at Taji and of the 

urgent need to begin construction quickly, limited sourcing was imperative so as to utilize 

suppliers known by the company to be capable of performing the work. 

Given the operational environment in Iraq at the time, Parsons’ performance under this task 

order was for the most part satisfactory, according to an AFCEE contracting official. AFCEE’s 

own performance was considered very positive by the Commanding General, Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq. However, in one instance, Parsons reportedly did not 

provide sufficient oversight of one if its subcontractors, resulting in a poorly constructed waterstorage tank. In addition, an AFCEE contracting official considered government qualityassurance oversight a concern. As a result, AFCEE subsequently contracted with a private firm 

specializing in quality assurance. 

In examining Parsons’ contract-billing system as of April 2004, DCAA concluded that it was 

inadequate. After construction was completed and payments made, Parsons corrected its 

deficiencies to DCAA’s satisfaction. Construction work on this task order was, for the most part, 

completed by mid-2004; yet the task order remains open because of delays in reconciling 

inventory-record discrepancies and transferring property accountability to the government. 

Subcontracting 

Parsons officials stated that their company served primarily as a construction manager over 18 

subcontractors, of which 10 were Iraqi companies and one was Iraqi/Turkish. 

According to Parsons’ records, it subcontracted about $27.5 million--about 73 percent of the 

total contract value--under its task order for planning, engineering, design, construction, and 

logistics support services. Most of the subcontracts were firm fixed price and, as shown in Table 

2, given to Iraqi firms. In addition, Parsons says it made other necessary procurements and 

purchases from subcontractors totaling $1,419,160. 

17
Table 2—Use of Subcontractors 

SUBCONTRACTOR NATIONALITY 

NUMBER AND TYPES OF 

SUBCONTRACTS 

VALUE OF 

SUBCONTRACTS

Subcontractor A Iraqi 8 – Firm Fixed Price $9,850,123

Subcontractor B Iraqi 3 – Firm Fixed Price 7,806,407

Subcontractor C Iraqi 1 – Firm Fixed Price 4,450,000

Subcontractor D Turkish 4 – Firm Fixed Price 1,683,560

Subcontractor E British 3 – Basic Ordering Agreement 1,490,885

Subcontractor F British 1 – Basic Ordering Agreement 708,437

Subcontractor G Iraqi/Turkish 1 – Firm Fixed Price 589,748

Subcontractor H Turkish 1 – Firm Fixed Price 393,000

Subcontractor I Iraqi 1 – Firm Fixed Price 150,018

Subcontractor J American 1 – Firm Fixed Price 102,998

Subcontractor K American 1 – Firm Fixed Price 55,000

Subcontractor L Iraqi 1 – Firm Fixed Price 49,000

Subcontractor M Iraqi 1 – Firm Fixed Price 34,363

Subcontractor N Iraqi 1 – Firm Fixed Price 20,965

Subcontractor O Iraqi 1 – Firm Fixed Price 19,886

Subcontractor P American 1 – Basic Ordering Agreement 19,199

Subcontractor Q Iraqi 1 – Firm Fixed Price 7,560

Subcontractor R Iraqi 1 – Firm Fixed Price 6,478

Total 32 $27,437,627

Source: Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group

According to information provided by Parsons, many of its subcontracts were obtained under 

what was termed “limited source” competition. Difficulty in obtaining competitive bids for 

projects stemmed from the following problems: the unique working environment associated with 

being in a war zone, which led to the inability to distribute solicitations to a large supplier base, 

e.g., newspapers, radio, the Internet, and postal mail; the immensity of the task of rebuilding the 

country; and a supplier base that was both inadequate and incapable of providing services 

because contractors did not have the capacity to assume additional workloads. 

Compounding this limitation of available qualified suppliers, Parsons found that many potential 

contractors did not understand how to prepare contract proposals. Furthermore, due to the inherit 

dangers associated with work in Baghdad and on the Taji base, and the need to comply with 

AFCEE’s urgent and compelling needs requirements, limited sourcing was imperative so as to 

utilize suppliers Parsons knew were capable of performing the work. For example, in awarding 

two subcontracts, according to Parsons, AFCEE requested it to respond the next day. 

18
Limited sourcing was also utilized in non-urgent situations. For example, to repair a leaking 

water tank at the Taji base, Parsons turned to a subcontractor that was already mobilized on site 

and had expertise in water plant operations and maintenance. In doing so, the company said it 

averted substantial duplication of cost to the government—a cost probably not recoverable 

through competition—and precluded a delay in fulfilling client requirements and a negative 

impact on operational needs. 

Table 3—Extent of Subcontract Competition

SUBCONTRACTOR 

AWARD 

AMOUNT 

EXTENT OF 

COMPETITION JUSTIFICATION 

Subcontractor A $260,000 Limited Not documented 

Subcontractor B 6,824,000 5 sources 

Subcontractor C 40,000 Limited Lack of travel services in remote area 

Subcontractor D 72,000 Limited Unusual and compelling urgency 

Subcontractor E 743,150 5 sources 

Subcontractor F 6,960,000 5 sources 

Subcontractor G 4,415,900 13 sources 

Subcontractor H 1,176,000 8 sources 

Subcontractor I 162,718 Limited Amendment of original contract 

Subcontractor J 261,250 Limited Unusual and compelling urgency 

Subcontractor K 251,500 Limited Unusual and compelling urgency 

Subcontractor L 64,376 Limited Lack of travel services in remote area 

Subcontractor M 4,450,000 Limited Security issues - Iraq and the Taji 

base 

Subcontractor N 140,000 3 sources 

Subcontractor O 168,858 Limited Continuation of rental procurement 

(no documentation for original 

procurement) 

Subcontractor P 1,924,000 8 sources 

Subcontractor Q 42,500 Limited Amendment to basic water-treatment 

plant contract 

Subcontractor R 29,300 Limited Emergency evacuation tent 

Subcontractor S 133,920 5 sources 

Subcontractor T 300,000 3 sources 

Source: Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group 

According to the AFCEE contracting officer, Parsons effectively executed its subcontract plan; 

that is, the extensive subcontracting under this task order was consistent with the AFCEE 

contracting model. 

19
Views on Oversight and Contractor Performance 

AFCEE performance in Iraq was considered very positive by General Petraeus, the then 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. In September 2004, 

he stated that: 

“The AFCEE team, which, as you know, came into Iraq to execute work 

early in the reconstruction process so that we could generate Iraqi Armed 

Forces as quickly as possible, has contributed significantly to our ability to 

establish a new Iraqi Army. Without AFCEE intervention at a critical 

time, we would not have been able to generate the forces as soon as we 

have. AFCEE’s role in this endeavor is a success story.” 

He requested that AFCEE expand and continue its presence in Iraq for two years. He noted that 

in the Iraq environment the contract-execution requirements were very fluid, requiring AFCEE’s 

embedded presence for success. 

On the other hand, the AFCEE project manager stated that quality assurance was not up to the 

proper level. He noted the high turnover of quality assurance personnel with the requisite 

experience. In this regard, he commented that: 

“A Professional set of QA [Quality Assurance] personnel helps ensures 

project success. Using augmentees and untrained personnel to provide 

construction oversight is a recipe for disaster.” 

This, he added, is one reason that AFCEE subsequently contracted with a private company that 

had experienced personnel to perform quality assurance. 

Parsons’ performance under this task order was generally satisfactory, according to the AFCEE 

Procurement Contracting Officer. However, there was one instance where Parsons’ performed 

less than acceptably. Parsons reportedly did not properly manage a subcontractor, resulting in a 

poorly constructed water-storage tank. 

According to a DCMA official, its contract administration duties could have been better 

performed had the duties been assigned to the DCMA International Division rather than the 

DCMA Carson, California office. Evidence of physical completion and timely government 

acceptance of work performed by Parsons could have been more easily accomplished by the 

DCMA Iraq team. Once government acceptance of the work is accomplished, the contract can 

be prepared for administrative contract closeout by the CONUS DCMA office. 

Contractor-Accounting and Billing-Systems Controls 

Accounting System: Parsons maintains a job cost-accounting system in which project codes are 

assigned to individual contracts and subcontracts. The system is controlled by and reconcilable 

to the general ledger. 

20
In August 2006, DCAA examined Parsons’ accounting-control environment and overall 

accounting-system controls as of mid-July to assure that its accounting system and related 

internal controls: 

• complied with applicable laws and regulations 

• were effective 

• were operating properly 

Parsons’ control environment, overall accounting system, and related internal-control policies 

and procedures, DCAA concluded, were adequate. 

Billing System: DCAA examined the status of Parsons’ billing system as of April 2004 and 

found the system inadequate. A subsequent September 2006 review concluded the problem had 

been corrected. 

The review assesses whether the method of billing controls provides reasonable billed costs; 

complies with applicable laws and the system’s internal-control requirements, regulations, and 

contract terms. Parsons’ finance department is responsible for the company’s billing system. 

Parsons invoices its clients on a regular basis, usually at two-week intervals. Its invoices are 

based on the direct cost recorded in Parsons’ Resource and Information System. 

The 2004 review disclosed four significant deficiencies that resulted in inconsistent, overstated, 

or otherwise-inaccurate cost data and billings. Specifically, DCAA concluded that Parsons: 

• had not included adequate or complete contract-brief procedures to reflect unique 

contractual requirements. 

• lacked adequate procedures and controls to monitor and ensure prompt adjustments of 

billing indirect cost rates to prevent overpayments or underpayments. 

• lacked written policies and procedures that address 13 billing functions or processes 

surveyed. 

• did not consistently follow written billing policies and procedures. 

As a result, DCAA recommend to the DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) that 

Parsons’ billing system be disapproved, and in August 2004, the ACO informed Parsons of the 

disapproval. Although Parsons disagreed with the conclusion, it agreed to improve its system. 

According to DCMA, the initial determination of inadequacy allows the contractor to respond 

formally to the deficiencies identified in the audit report and to provide a corrective-action 

milestone plan for regaining an adequate status. At the ACO’s request, generally within a year 

after the initial findings, DCAA will perform a comprehensive follow-up audit to determine 

whether the contractor has corrected the deficiencies. Based on the results, a final determination 

of the contractor’s system will be made. A determination that a contractor’s system was 

inadequate could result in denial of future contract awards. In addition, a disapproved billing 

system could bring an increased number and frequency of DCAA pre- and post-pay voucher 

reviews of existing contracts. 

21
Subsequently, in December 2005, DCMA informed Parsons that it would re-examine its decision 

to disapprove the billing system if DCAA did not issue an updated report by March 31, 2006. 

Two weeks after that deadline, DCMA informed Parsons that since an updated DCAA billingsystems report was not expected until later in the year and since the earlier report does not reflect 

the current status of Parsons’ billing system, DCMA was reversing its previous disapproval. 

In September 2006, DCAA concluded that Parsons had corrected previously reported 

deficiencies and that the company’s billing system and related internal-control policies and 

procedures were adequate. 

Task-Order Closeout 

The task order remains open because of questions about the accuracy of government property 

inventory records. Delays in reconciling inventory record discrepancies and transferring 

property accountability to the U.S. Government leaves inventory vulnerable to undetected loss or 

theft. Parsons officials stated that a joint physical-inventory review and inspection of all 

government property was scheduled for May-June 2005 at the Taji Military Base; it was to be 

performed by a Parsons’ property representative and a designated AFCEE representative. The 

review and inspection were not completed, apparently due to scheduling conflicts. Over the next 

several months, completion of property-transfer documentation was adversely impacted by 

personnel reassignments and availability, work and rest-and-recuperation schedules, Parsons’ 

demobilization at the Taji base, and inventory questions. 

In August 2005, Parsons provided an inventory of property available for transfer to the U.S. 

Government, including documentation of property hand-receipted to another contractor 

performing reconstruction work at the Taji base. The amount of government property reported 

by Parsons was about $859,000 and includes such items as bulletproof vests, cameras, radios, 

televisions, and trailers. However, the final property-transfer documents were incomplete in that 

they did not indicate disposition of all property available for transfer to the U.S. Government in 

May-June 2005. Parsons has requested, but not received from the U.S. Government, a release of 

responsibility and liability for property lost, damaged, or destroyed while accomplishing the task 

order. 

At the time of the property transfer, procedures guiding asset recognition, as well as property 

transfer for task orders such as Parsons’ Taji project, had not yet been published. (The AFCEE 

publication entitled Government Furnished Property & Contractor Acquired Property 

Accountability Procedures in Iraq appeared in December of that year.) 

In September 2007, according to Parsons, AFCEE assigned a new official to resolve questions 

about the accuracy and completeness of the government property-transfer documents for 

Parsons’ Taji work order. That individual has contacted the Parsons’ project manager and is 

working with the company to resolve this issue. Parsons advised that it provided the AFCEE 

official with background on this issue and relevant documents related to the full inventory of 

government property transferred and items lost, damaged or destroyed. 

DCMA advised that its data base does not indicate that Parsons completed the work or that the 

government accepted it. The reason given is that DCMA has not received from Parsons a 

22
receiving report indicating completed work. After SIGIR brought this to Parsons’ attention, the 

company submitted the required information to DCMA. The latter advised that it has received 

the required information and has provided the information to AFCEE for review and processing. 

23
Conclusions, Recommendation, and Lessons Learned

Conclusions 

Work under the modified task order was completed to the government’s general satisfaction. By 

May 2004, Parsons and its subcontractors completed the reconstruction work on the Baghdad 

center, and by June 2004, reconstruction of the Taji base was mostly completed as well. 

Although the total cost of this competitively awarded task order was originally estimated at 

$26.3 million, actual cost rose by $11.1 million, or approximately 42 percent, to $37.4 million. 

Cost increases were primarily due to security issues and changes in the scope of work. 

Contract management and oversight controls were constrained by the difficult security 

environment on the ground and the government’s desire to accelerate construction. These 

conditions created risks, especially related to ensuring effective competition for subcontracts. 

SIGIR noted that nearly three-quarters of the work went to subcontractors, primarily Iraqi 

companies. Effective competition was reportedly limited in part by an inability to distribute 

solicitations. In addition, subcontractors lacked the capacity to assume additional workloads. 

And, according to Parsons, many potential contractors did not understand how to prepare 

proposals. 

According to an AFCEE official, given the operational environment in Iraq at the time, Parsons’ 

performance under this task order was, for the most part, satisfactory. Performance by AFCEE 

itself was considered very positive by the commander of the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq. However, Parsons reportedly did not properly manage one if its subcontractors, 

resulting in a poorly constructed water-storage tank. In addition, concerns were raised about the 

quality of government construction oversight. Furthermore, during a portion of the period of 

contract performance, Parsons had an inadequate contract billing system, which increased the 

government’s vulnerability to improper billings. Billing system deficiencies have since been 

corrected. 

Although construction work on this task order was mostly completed by mid-2004, the task order 

remains open. Inventory accuracy and accountability issues have not been resolved in a timely 

manner. This situation leaves the inventory vulnerable to undetected theft of loss. This 

inventory includes such items as bulletproof vests, cameras, radios, televisions, and trailers. 

DCMA states that it had not received from Parsons a receiving report indicating the work was 

complete. SIGIR brought this matter to Parsons’ attention and, according to DCMA, the 

company stated it has now submitted the required paper work. 

Recommendation 

SIGIR recommends that the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq direct AFCEE to 

work with Parsons, DCAA, and DCMC to establish milestones and timeframes to reconcile 

inventory record discrepancies and close the task order. 

24
Management Comments

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq concurred with our recommendation. It 

directed AFCEE to work with Parsons, the DCAA, and the DCMA to establish milestones and 

timeframes to reconcile inventory-record discrepancies and close the task order. It established an 

estimated completion date of March 15, 2008. 

Lessons Learned 

Since work under the contract has been completed and the contractor paid, SIGIR also identified 

lessons learned that may improve future contract management strategies in environments like 

those experienced during Iraq reconstruction. These lessons, vital to reducing the opportunities 

for fraud, waste, and abuse, are: 

• The use of existing contracts can be an effective means to achieve quick task-order 

execution. 

• In a war zone, the immediate protection of existing facilities and equipment is vital to 

avoid extensive vandalism and property destruction, which significantly increase 

reconstruction cost and result in the waste of scarce resources. 

• Sufficient, competent quality-assurance staff is needed for effective contract 

execution and prime contractor oversight of subcontractors and to prevent fraud, 

waste, and abuse. 

• Procedures need to be in place at the beginning of the reconstruction effort to allow 

proper accountability of government-furnished equipment and to facilitate contract or 

task-order closeout. 

• Comprehensive construction planning and design is necessary to prevent numerous 

subsequent sole-source contract modifications which, without competition, may 

increase contract cost. 

• Contract administration personnel, assigned to an organization physically located 

where the work is being performed, facilitates contract-administration oversight. 

• In a post-conflict environment, the availability of capable local contractors can be 

limited. As large amounts of reconstruction funding are expended rapidly in a 

defined area, the absorptive local capacity is quickly reached, resulting in an 

increased risk of contract abuse, particularly at the subcontract level. 

25
Related Reports 

The following reports are related to this assignment: 

Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Spending Under Its Contract for the Iraqi Police 

Training Program, SIGIR-07-016, October 23, 2007. 

Review of Bechtel’s Spending Under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction Contract, SIGIR-07-009, 

July 24, 2007. 

Review of the Medical Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers Associated 

with Parsons Global Services, Inc., Contract Number W914NS-04-D-0006, SIGIR-06-25, July 

28, 2006. 

Interim Audit Report on the Review of the Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare 

Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Contract Number W914NS-04-D-0006, 

SIGIR-06-16, April 4, 2006. 

Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects, SIGIR-06-011, April 29, 

2006.

Task Orders Awarded by the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in Support of the 

Coalition Provisional Authority, SIGIR-04-004, July 28, 2004. 

Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts, SIGIR-04-005, July 23, 2004. 

Audit Report on Fiscal Year 2003 Forward Pricing Direct Labor Rates, Parsons Infrastructure 

& Technology Group, Inc., Defense Contract Audit Agency Audit Report No. 4901-

2003D23000010, April 9, 2003. 

26
Appendix A—Projects Completed at the Taji Military 

Base 

Taji Garrison Headquarters 

Description Final Status 

Barracks for Battalion (200) Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Officer/Non-Commissioned 

Officer Billets 

Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Classroom Space Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Motor Pool Space Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Maintenance Space Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Dining Facility Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Arms Room Complete. Government acceptance April 28, 2004 

Barbershop, Post Exchange, 

Canteen, Restaurant 

Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Bank Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Post Office Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Fencing Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Manpower, Welfare, 

Recreation and Parade Fields 

Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Central Medical Clinic Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Ammunition Supply Point Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Garrison Headquarters Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Source: Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group 

27
Taji 4th Battalion Area 

Description Final Status 

Battalion and Company 

Headquarters 

Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Enlisted Personnel Barracks Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Personnel Barracks Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Personnel Barracks Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Personnel Barracks Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Personnel Barracks Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Personnel Barracks Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Bathrooms (new 

construction) 

Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Bathrooms (new 

construction) 

Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Bathrooms (new 

construction) 

Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Enlisted Bathrooms (new 

construction) 

Complete. Government acceptance April 22, 2004 

Non-Commissioned Officer 

Barracks 

Complete. Government acceptance May 8, 2004 

Non-Commissioned Officer 

Barracks 

Complete. Government acceptance April 17, 2004 

Non-Commissioned Officer 

Barracks 

Complete. Government acceptance April 17, 2004 

Non-Commissioned Officer 

Bathrooms 

Complete. Government acceptance April 17, 2004 

Non-Commissioned Officer 

Bathrooms 

Complete. Government acceptance April 17, 2004 

Classroom Space Complete. Government acceptance April 30, 2004 and June 6, 2004 

Motor Pool Space Complete. Government acceptance April 30, 2004 and June 6, 2004 

(Covered parking for 100 vehicles) 

Dining Facility Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Aid Station Complete. Government acceptance April 23,2004 

PX/Commissary Vending Area Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Arms Rooms Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Company Supply Complete. Government acceptance May 5, 2004 

Barbershop Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Fencing Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Manpower, Welfare, Recreation 

and Parade Fields 

Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Source: Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group 

28
Taji 5th Battalion Area 

Description Final Status 

Battalion and Company Complete. Government acceptance April 30, 2004 Headquarters 

Complete. Government acceptance various dates April 15 –25, 

2004 

Barracks For Battalion 

Complete. Government acceptance various dates April 15 –25, 

2004 

Officer/Non-Commissioned Officer 

Billets 

Classroom Space Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Motor Pool Space Complete. Government acceptance various dates from April 

30-June 6, 2004 (covered park for 100 vehicles) 

Dining Facility Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Aid Station Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Post Exchange/Commissary Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 Vending Area 

Complete. Government acceptance April 28, 2004 (Garrison 

Headquarters) 

Arms Rooms 

Company Supply Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Barbershop Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Fencing Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 

Manpower, Welfare, Recreation Complete. Government acceptance June 6, 2004 and Parade Fields 

Source: Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group 

Taji Utilities 

Description Final Status 

Complete. Government accepted restored wastewater treatment facility 

December 7, 2004 and permanent sewage-collection system December 

17, 2004 

Sewer System 

Complete. Government accepted distribution system June 6, 2004 and 

generators June 12, 2004 Electrical System 

Complete. Government accepted new water- treatment plant February 

17, 2006, and the corrected construction deficiency completed by 

Parsons and its subcontractor (leaking water storage tank) June 30, 

2006 

Water System 

Source: Parsons Infrastructure & Technology Group 

29
Appendix B—Acronyms 

ACO Administrative Contracting Officer 

AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

DOD Department of Defense 

GRD Gulf Region Division 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

PCO Procurement Contracting Officer 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

WERC Worldwide Environmental Restoration and Construction 

30
Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to the report include: 

J. David Childress 

Barry Holman 

Robert L. Pelletier 

James B. Pollard 

Charles W. Thompson 

Roger M. Williams 

31
Management Comments 

Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq 

32
33
SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine Belisle 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

34