NO. 85-440 INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1986

INTHE MATTER OF C.P., Youth inNeed of Care.

APPEAL FROM: DistrictCourt of theZighth JudicialDistrict, In and fortheCounty of Cascade, The Honorable JoelG. Roth, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For A.ppellant: Cascade Law Clinic; Paula Jampsa, Great Fails, Nontana.
For P.espondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Dorothy NcCarter, Asst. Atty. General, Helena Patrick L. Paul, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana; Barbara Bell, Deputy County Attorney

Filed: Submitted on Briefs: Jan. 23, 1986 Decided: April 24, 1986

/"- 

# cu $?,

ClerkMr. Justice Justice I,. C. Gulbrandson, delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appellant,C.P.'s mother,appeals froma CascadeCounty Youth Court order awarding permanent custody of C.I?. to SocialRehabilitation Services (SRS). She contends that this final order should have included a provision for an "open" adoption under an agreement between appellant, SRS and the county attorney. We affirm. InMay 1983, the CascadeCounty Attorney's Office filed
a petition for temporary custody and temporary investigative authority alleging C.P. was abused, neglected and dependent within the meaning of 85 43-3-101 and -102, MCA. The supporting affidavit alleged that appellant sexually abused C.P. The District Court granted the temporary custody request and ordered that visitation between appellant and C.P. was to be supervised, that both appellant and C.P. should receive psychological evaluations and that they complete any treatment recommended as a result of the evaluations. On the basis of the evaluations, the county attorney's office fil-edfor temporary custody of C.P. for one yearwith SRS and requested a treatment plan for appellant. In November 1983, after a hearing,the DistrictCourt concluded that (1) C.P. should continue to reside in foster care with his aunt, appellant's sister, and he was doing well in psychotherapy, (2) appellant continued to deny any sexual abuse of her son by herself, (3) psychological evaluations and counselling of C.P. revealed that he was hypersexual and had been sexually abused, and (4) in the opinion of the psychologist, appellantcommitted the sexualabuse.About two and one-half months later, appel-lantasked the District Court to modify this order and allow C.P. to return to her custody. She argued that sheand C.P. had made progress in counselling and continued separation would only further weaken their relationship. After two hearings, the District Court denied this request. SF.S continued to have legal custody, C.P. 's aunt continued to have physical custody,and visitation between C.P. and appellant continued tobe supervised. About six months later, in September 1984, the county attorney's office filed for permanent custody to be awarded to SRSwith the right to consent to an adoption of C.P. The petition alleged appellant failed. to complete her court ordered treatment plan, did not maintain contact with her social worker and that the conditions making her an unfit parent were unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time. Thehearing on this petition began on January 21, 1985 and was continued to and completed on February 7, 1985. Appellant, C.P. and C.P. 's father were present and representedby counsel during the proceedings. The District Court found that appellant (1) lacked a stable home environment, (2) lacked a stable job situation, (3) denied any involvement in the sexual abuse of her son, (4) made no gains in her parenting skills, (5) refused to release medical information needed to set up a treatment plan for herself, and (6) failed to complete her treatment plan and her alcohol abuse program. The District Court also noted C.P.'s fatherhad not contactedC.P. for three years and paid
no child support although,at times,he was capableofdoing
SO. The order, filed July 2, 1985, terminated the appellant's and the father" parental rights and awardedpermanent custody to SRSwith the right to consent to C.P. Is adoptionby theaunt whowas his foster mother. Prior to the entry of this final order, appellant's attorney, the social worker and a representative of the Cascade County Attorney's Office discussed including visitation rights for appellant in the order in the event SRS placed C.P. for adoption. The date or dates of discussion
are not clear and the record contains no indication that the parties informed the District Court of the discussions or reached any agreementon this issue. On appeal, appellant presents one issue: Whether the final order for permanent custody should have included a provision for an "open" adoption allowing her to have visitation rights with C.P. The findings of a district court in an abuse and neglect caseenjoy apresumptionof correctnessand "will not be disturbed unless there is amistake of law or a finding of Eact not supported by credible evidence that would amount to
a clear abuse of discretion

# ..." (Citationomitted.) In Re Gore (1977), 174 Mont. 321, 325, 570 P.2d 1110, 1112. When a district court considers terminating parental rights, it must find clear and convincing evidence of abuse before such rights can be terminated. In Re T.J.D. (Mont. 19801, 615 P.2d 212, 213, 37 St.Rep. 1385, 1386. Appellant here does not contend that the District Court erred in terminating her parental rights, only that she should have retained visitation rights if SRSplaces the child foradoption. Montana statutes governing termination of parental rights are clear and explicit. Section 41-3-611, MCA, states:(1) An order for the termina.tionof the parent-child legal relationship divests the child and the parents of 

### - all legal rights, powers, immunities, duties and obligations with respect to each other as provided in Title 40, chapter 6,part 2, except the right of the child to inherit fromtheparent.
(3) After the termination of a parent-child legal relationship, the formerparent is neither entitled to any notice ofproceedings for the adoptionof the child nor has any right to object to 

### -- - the adoption 

### - or 

### - to participate 

### -- in any otherplacement proceedings held pursuant to 41-3-609. [Emphasisadded.] Section 40-8-125,MCA, states: El) After the final decree of adoption is entered, the relation of parent and child and all the rights, duties, and other legal consequences of the na.tura1 relation of child and parent shall thereafter exist between such adopted child and the adoptive parents. 

# . . 12) After a final decree of adoption is entered,thenaturalparents

# ..

# .of the adopted child

# . .. shallbe relievedof all parental responsibilitTes 

### -- for saz 

### - child and have 

## no rights over such adoptedPchild. 

# .. [Emphasis added.] This language is clear. When parental rights are terminated, the natural parent no longer has

### any rights over the child. This includes visitation rights. Appellant cites no authority to support her contention and this Court finds
none. Even if the statutes provided for such a retention of visitation rights, the record in this case contains 

### - no evidence to support such a finding. No one presented an agreementon suchvisitation to the DistrictCourt and no one testified concerning whether an "open" adoption would serve thephysical, mental and emotional needs of C.P. There is no question that appellant disputed SRS obtaining permanentcustody. Thus,there is no question ofwhether she agreed to their custody in exchange forvisitation rights. The record contains no facts which would support the District Court's inclusion of visitation rights for appellant in the event C.P. isadopted. Appellant has new counsel representing her on appeal. This counsel appended a letter written by appellant's prior counsel to the deputy county attorney involved in the discussion. The letter is not part of the record and itwillnot be considered on appeal. We hold that the final order for permanent custody correctly contained no provision for an "open"adoption. The orderof the DistrictCourt is 

# /Justice

We Concur: /

Chief Justice