UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

Case No.: 1:20-cv-23287-DPG 

LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, et al., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 1 of 25
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1

BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................2

A. Title III of the Helms-Burton Act ............................................................................2

B. The Complaint .........................................................................................................4

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................5

I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING BECAUSE THIS LAWSUIT 

DOES NOT SEEK TO REMEDY ANY CONCRETE INJURY CAUSED BY 

DEFENDANTS ...................................................................................................................5

II. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A TITLE III CLAIM ........................................9

A. Because the Only Alleged Trafficking Occurred in 2010, It Is Apparent 

from the Face of the Complaint that the Claim Is Barred by the Statute of 

Repose ....................................................................................................................10

B. The Complaint Does Not Plead the “Trafficking” Element of a Title III 

Claim Because the Alleged Conduct Was Performed by Cuban Companies ........12

C. The Complaint Does Not Plead that Defendants Have Knowingly and 

Intentionally Trafficked in Confiscated Property to Which a United States 

National Owns a Claim ..........................................................................................13

D. The Complaint Does Not Plead the Ownership Element of a Title III 

Claim ......................................................................................................................15

1. The Complaint does not allege that the RRHSC Property was 

confiscated from a United States national .................................................15

2. The Complaint also does not plead that Plaintiffs now own the 

claim they assert through this lawsuit ........................................................17

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................18

REQUEST FOR HEARING ..........................................................................................................19

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 2 of 25
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

Cases 

Aaron Priv. Clinic Mgmt. LLC v. Berry, 

 912 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................5

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .......................................................................................................9, 10, 18

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................................................................................................9, 10, 13

Bouton v. Ocean Props., Ltd., 

 201 F. Supp. 3d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2016) ....................................................................................10

Brown v. Gadsden Reg’l Med. Ctr. LLC, 

 748 F. App’x 930 (11th Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................................10

Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 

 942 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................8 

Crowder v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 

 963 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2020) ...............................................................................................11 

Extraordinary Title Servs., LLC v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 

1 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) ..............................................................................................7

Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 

 141 S. Ct. 703 (2021) .........................................................................................................16, 17

Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 

 No. 1:19-cv-21725-JLK, 2020 WL 4590825 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2020), appeal 

docketed, No. 20-12960 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2020) ...................................................................15

Garcia-Bengochea v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd., 

 No. 1:19-cv-23593-JLK, 2020 WL 5028209 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2020) .................................13 

Garcia-Bengochea v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 

No. 1:19-cv-23592-JLK, 2020 WL 6081658 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2020), appeal docketed, 

 No. 20-14251 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 2020)..................................................................................15 

Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., 

 No. 4:20-cv-482-A, 2020 WL 4464665 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020), appeal 

docketed, No. 20-10903 (5th Cir. Sept. 2, 2020) ............................................................. passim

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 3 of 25
iii

Glen v. Club Méditerranée S.A., 

 365 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2005), aff’d, 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006).........................6 

Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 

 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006) ....................................................................................... passim 

Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

No. 19-cv-23988, 2020 WL 1169125 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2020) ......................................13, 15

Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

 No. 20-12113, 2021 WL 510234 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2021) ..............................................15, 18 

Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruise Lines Inc., 

 750 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2013) ...............................................................................................10 

Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., 

 No. 19-cv-21724, 2020 WL 5517590, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2020) .............................................7 

Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 

 No. 19-cv-23591, 2020 WL 5217218 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2020) ..........................................7, 13

In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 

 No. 98-J-2634-S, 2000 WL 34211319 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 2000) ............................................9

In re Shek, 

 947 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................................14

Krys v. Pigott, 

 749 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2014).....................................................................................................13

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ...................................................................................................................5 

McCullough v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 

 623 F. App’x 980 (11th Cir. 2015) ..........................................................................................10

McCullough v. Finley, 

 907 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2018) ....................................................................................... passim

Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 

 979 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) ...............................................................................6, 7 

Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 

 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d sub nom., Odebrecht Constr., Inc. 

 v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013)...................................2, 16 

Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 

 297 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2002) ...............................................................................................11 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 4 of 25
iv

Parrish v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 

 No. 3:04-cv-00986-TJC-HTS, 2005 WL 1500894 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2005) .........................9

Salcedo v. Hanna, 

 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................7

Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 

 426 U.S. 26 (1976) .....................................................................................................................8 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ...........................................................................................................5, 6 

Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 

 140 S. Ct. 1615 (2020) ...............................................................................................................9

Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 

 964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020) .......................................................................................5, 6, 7, 8 

Trump v. Hawai’i, 

 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) ...............................................................................................................8 

United States v. Amodeo, 

 916 F.3d 967 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 526 (2019) .................................................17

United States v. Belmont, 

 301 U.S. 324 (1937) ...........................................................................................................16, 17

Universal City Studios v. Nissim Corp., 

 Nos. 14-cv-81344-KAM, 14-cv-81349-KAM, 14-cv-81350-KAM, 

 2015 WL 1124704 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2015) ....................................................................10, 13

Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 

 941 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2828 (2020) ..................................8, 9 

Statutes 

22 U.S.C. § 6023(10) .................................................................................................................3, 12 

22 U.S.C. § 6023(13) ............................................................................................................. passim 

22 U.S.C. § 6023(15) .....................................................................................................................15 

22 U.S.C. § 6081(1) .......................................................................................................................17 

22 U.S.C. § 6081(2) ...................................................................................................................8, 16 

22 U.S.C. § 6081(6)(B) ..................................................................................................................16 

22 U.S.C. § 6081(8) .......................................................................................................................17 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 5 of 25
v

22 U.S.C. § 6081(9) .......................................................................................................................17 

22 U.S.C. § 6081(11) .................................................................................................................3, 16 

22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A) .................................................................................................3, 8, 9, 17 

22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(B) ...............................................................................................................3 

22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3)(B) ...............................................................................................................3 

22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3)(C) ...........................................................................................................3, 8 

22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B) .........................................................................................................3, 17 

22 U.S.C. § 6084 ........................................................................................................................3, 10 

22 U.S.C. § 6085(a) .........................................................................................................................3 

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ........................................................................................................................13 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)....................................................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................1, 9 

Other Authorities 

United States Dep’t of State, Legal Considerations Regarding Title III of the 

Libertad Bill, 141 Cong. Rec. S15106 (Oct. 12, 1995) .............................................................9 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 6 of 25
Defendant Imperial Brands plc (“Imperial”), and Defendants WPP plc (“WPP”), Young 

& Rubicam LLC (“Y&R”), and BCW LLC a/k/a Burson Cohn & Wolfe LLC (“BCW”) 

(collectively, “WPP Defendants”), submit this memorandum of law in support of their motion, 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), to dismiss the Complaint dated 

August 6, 2020. 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

Plaintiffs sue under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–85, seeking to 

recover the value of real property in Havana, Cuba that the Cuban Government allegedly 

confiscated in 1961. They seek that recovery, not from the Cuban Government, but rather from a 

British company, Imperial, on the basis that Imperial allegedly used the property in 2010 to 

manufacture, sell, market, and distribute hand-rolled Cuban cigars. Plaintiffs also seek recovery 

from the WPP Defendants on the grounds that they were allegedly hired to market Cuban cigars. 

Using the statutory terminology, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “trafficked” in the confiscated 

real property. Under Title III, Plaintiffs claim, Defendants must pay them three-times the value 

of the property in 1961, plus six decades of compound interest. This claim fails as a matter of 

law, and it should therefore be dismissed at the outset. 

In the separate motions being filed simultaneously herewith, Defendants show that 

dismissal is required because the Complaint pleads no basis for the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction by this Court. To the contrary, federal due process precludes the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction based on allegations of overseas conduct that is unconnected to the claim asserted in 

this lawsuit. For similar reasons, Congress lacks legislative jurisdiction to apply Title III to 

Defendants’ non-U.S. alleged business activities. 

In this submission, Defendants demonstrate that the Complaint should be dismissed on 

two bases. First, Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Congress is powerless to authorize suit in the 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 7 of 25
2 

absence of concrete harm caused by the defendant. Title III cannot therefore impose liability on 

Defendants based on their alleged use of or benefiting from real property in which Plaintiffs have 

no ownership interest. Nor can Title III require Defendants to remedy harm caused—not by 

Imperial’s alleged use of the real property or by the WPP Defendants’ marketing work—but by 

the Cuban Government’s alleged confiscation of it decades earlier. 

Second, the Complaint fails to state a Title III claim. It is apparent from the face of the 

Complaint that the claim is barred by the statute of repose, because the only alleged trafficking 

took place in or prior to 2010, well outside the two-year period preceding the filing of this case. 

And the Complaint fails to plausibly plead several essential elements of a Title III claim, 

including that Defendants knowingly and intentionally trafficked in property to which a United 

States national owns a claim, or, indeed, that Plaintiffs actually own the claim they purport to 

assert through this lawsuit. 

BACKGROUND

A. Title III of the Helms-Burton Act 

Congress enacted Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–85, for the 

purpose of deterring foreign investment in and business with Cuba. Glen v. Club Méditerranée, 

S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006). To that end, Title III purports to create a new 

“statutory right of action against any person or entity who traffics property confiscated by the 

Cuban government from any American citizen or company.” Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, 

876 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d sub nom., Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, 

Florida Dept. of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013). 

The Cuban Government’s acts of confiscation “divested” the former owners “of their 

ownership of the property.” Glen, 450 F.3d at 1254–55. Title III does not invalidate those 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 8 of 25
3 

confiscations or restore the former owners’ property rights. See id. at 1255. Rather, Title III 

grants a “new statutory remedy,” to “‘United States nationals who were the victims of these 

confiscations,’” against those who traffic in the confiscated property. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. 

§ 6081(11)); see also 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A). 

The Title III statutory remedy is untethered to any harm caused or benefit derived by the 

alleged “trafficker.” Rather, Title III purports to make the defendant trafficker liable for threetimes the greater of (a) the property’s value when the Cuban Government confiscated it, plus 

compound interest running from the date of confiscation, or (b) the property’s present fairmarket value. Id. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(III), (1)(B), (3)(B), (3)(C)(ii). 

For liability to attach under Title III, the plaintiff must have “acquire[d] ownership of the 

claim before March 12, 1996,” id. § 6082(a)(4)(B), and the defendant must “traffic[]” in the 

confiscated property after November 1, 1996, id. §§ 6082(a)(1)(A), 6085(a). A Title III claim 

“may not be brought more than 2 years after the trafficking giving rise to the action has ceased to 

occur.” Id. § 6084. 

Trafficking consists of “knowingly and intentionally” committing certain acts with 

respect to confiscated property without the authorization of a United States national who holds a 

claim to the property. Id. § 6023(13)(A). The proscribed actions include possessing or using 

confiscated property, engaging in commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from 

confiscated property, and causing, directing, participating in, and profiting from trafficking 

committed by another person. Id. Trafficking does not include “transactions and uses of property 

by a person who is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba,” unless that person is an 

official of the Cuban Government. Id. § 6023(10), (13)(B)(iv). 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 9 of 25
4 

B. The Complaint1

Plaintiffs assert a Title III claim concerning real property in Havana, Cuba (the “RRHSC 

Property”) that the Cuban Government allegedly confiscated from a limited partnership, Ramón 

Rodriguez e Hijos Sociedad en Comandita (“RRHSC”) in 1961. [DE 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 3, 7, 40–

41, 62]. Plaintiffs allege that a Cuban company, defendant Corporación Habanos, S.A. 

(“Habanos”), and/or the Cuban tobacco company, Tabacuba, have “trafficked” in the RRHSC 

Property within the meaning of Title III by using it to manufacture, sell, market, and distribute 

hand-rolled Cuban cigars. Id. ¶¶ 6–7, 20, 25–26, 45–46. 

Plaintiffs further allege that, between 2007 and 2020, Imperial—a company incorporated 

and with its principal place of business in the United Kingdom—held an indirect fifty percent 

ownership interest in Habanos, id. ¶¶ 5, 19, 44, 51, with the other fifty percent owned directly or 

indirectly by Tabacuba, id. ¶ 20. By virtue of Imperial’s interest in Habanos, Plaintiffs assert that 

Imperial, too, engaged in trafficking within the meaning of Title III. Id. ¶¶ 6–7, 20, 26, 48. 

WPP—a company incorporated in the Bailiwick of Jersey and with its principal place of 

business in London—is allegedly involved in the trafficking solely through its corporate 

ownership of Y&R and BCW, which are two subsidiaries headquartered outside of Florida that 

Plaintiffs mistakenly2 claim were hired by Habanos to publicize Habanos products and to 

establish “portals” on Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram for the marketing of those products.3Id.

1 The Complaint’s non-conclusory factual allegations are assumed to be true for purposes 

of this motion only. McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018). 

2

 Plaintiffs’ mistaken claim that WPP’s two U.S.-based subsidiaries were in any way 

involved in the marketing of Habanos products is addressed in the WPP Defendants’ separate 

motion to dismiss. 

3

 The Complaint accuses Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram of also unlawfully “trafficking” 

in the RRHSC Property, Compl. ¶¶ 27–29, 48, but these companies are not defendants here. 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 10 of 25
5 

¶¶ 8–10, 27, 32, 48. The Complaint does not allege that any of the WPP Defendants owned, 

leased, controlled, or made direct use of the RRHSC Property. 

Plaintiffs assert that they own a Title III claim arising from the alleged trafficking of the 

RRHSC Property. Id. ¶¶ 4, 33, 55, 62. However, the Complaint alleges no facts supporting that 

contention. Plaintiffs assert that they are the “heirs and successors” of the late Ramón Rodriguez 

Gutiérrez. Id. ¶¶ 1, 14–18. But the Complaint contains no facts connecting Gutiérrez to RRHSC, 

the entity that allegedly owned the RRHSC Property when it was confiscated, and nothing 

explaining why Gutiérrez’s heirs and successors would own a Title III claim pertaining to 

property that Gutiérrez is not himself alleged to have owned. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs demand that they be awarded the greater of 

(a) three-times the value of the RRHSC Property in 1961, when the Cuban Government 

confiscated it, plus compound interest running from that date, or (b) three-times the RRHSC 

Property’s present value. Id. ¶ 63. 

ARGUMENT 

I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING BECAUSE THIS LAWSUIT 

DOES NOT SEEK TO REMEDY ANY CONCRETE INJURY CAUSED BY 

DEFENDANTS 

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “‘clearly allege facts demonstrating 

each element’” of Article III standing. Aaron Priv. Clinic Mgmt. LLC v. Berry, 912 F.3d 1330, 

1336 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). The 

“‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements: [1] the plaintiff 

must have suffered an injury in fact, [2] the defendant must have caused that injury, and [3] a 

favorable decision must be likely to redress it.” Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 

990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 11 of 25
6 

Here, Plaintiffs cannot plead the injury-in-fact or causation elements of Article III standing 

because this lawsuit does not seek to remedy any concrete harm caused by Defendants. 

Congress has no “blanket power to authorize suit in the absence of harm.” Muransky v. 

Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 925 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Therefore, a federal 

statutory claim must be dismissed unless—independent of the statute—the plaintiff can allege a 

“concrete” injury, i.e., an injury that is “de facto,” meaning “real, and not abstract.” Trichell, 964 

F.3d at 996 (quoting Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548). To determine whether a statutory claim is 

supported by the requisite concrete injury, a court “must look to both history and the judgment of 

Congress.” Trichell, 964 F.3d at 997 (citing Spokeo, Inc. 136 S. Ct. at 1549). Here, Plaintiffs 

allege no concrete injury independent of their statutory claim, so they lack standing. 

Taking the “history” inquiry first, the Title III cause of action does not bear a “‘close 

relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in 

English or American courts.’” Trichell, 964 F.3d at 997 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. 136 S. Ct. at 

1549). The “new statutory remedy” under Title III arises from a defendant’s exploitation of 

property that the Cuban Government previously confiscated from the plaintiffs or their 

predecessors. Glen v. Club Méditerranée, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2006). But by 

virtue of that very confiscation, a Title III plaintiff has no ownership interest in the property. Id. 

at 1254–55; see also supra at 2–3. Therefore, the Complaint correctly does not allege that 

Plaintiffs own the RRHSC Property. Compl. ¶ 4 & n.6. As another court in this District has 

noted, Title III claimants “may own a claim for compensation under U.S. law, but they do not 

own the expropriated land itself.” Glen v. Club Méditerranée S.A., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269–

71 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (emphases in original), aff’d, 450 F.3d 1251. 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 12 of 25
7 

There is no close common-law analogue to such a claim. The nearest candidate—

trespass—is not closely analogous, because it requires that the plaintiff have an ownership 

interest in the property. Glen, 450 F.3d at 1254–55 & n.1.4 As the Eleventh Circuit recently held, 

a federal statutory claim is not closely related to a common-law trespass claim when—as here—

the plaintiff “allege[s] no invasion of any interest in real property.” Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 

1162, 1171 (11th Cir. 2019).5 For that reason, as the court held in Glen v. American Airlines, 

Inc., a Title III plaintiff cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact element of Article III standing. No. 4:20-

cv-482-A, 2020 WL 4464665, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-10903 

(5th Cir. Sept. 2, 2020).6

The “judgment of Congress” inquiry, too, confirms that there is no concrete injury here, 

because—as in Trichell—the Title III statutory remedy is untethered to any damage caused by 

Defendants’ alleged trafficking. Trichell, 964 F.3d at 999–1000. Consistent with the legislative 

intention to remedy “[t]he wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging to United States 

4

 For the same reason, Title III is not closely related to a common-law unjust enrichment 

claim. Like trespass, an unjust enrichment claim based on the improper use of property requires 

that the plaintiff have an ownership interest in the property. Glen, 450 F.3d at 1254–55 & n.1; 

see also Extraordinary Title Servs., LLC v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 1 So. 3d 400, 404 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2009) (unjust enrichment claim requires that the plaintiff “conferred a direct benefit upon” 

the defendant).

5

See also Muransky, 979 F.3d at 931–32 (federal statutory claim did not require a 

confidential relationship between the parties, and therefore was not closely related to common 

law breach of confidence claim); Trichell, 964 F.3d at 997–98 (federal statutory claim did not 

require proof of justifiable reliance or actual damages, and therefore was not closely related to a 

common law misrepresentation claim).

6

 Failing to recognize that Title III plaintiffs have no ownership interest in confiscated 

property, two judges in this District have incorrectly held that Title III plaintiffs in cases before 

them had pleaded Article III standing by virtue of the defendants’ alleged exploitation of such 

property. Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-21724, 2020 WL 5517590, at *6–

11 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2020) (Bloom, J.); Havana Docks Corp. v. Norwegian Cruise Line 

Holdings, Ltd., No. 19-cv-23591, 2020 WL 5217218, at *5–9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2020) (Bloom, 

J.); Order at 16–18, Cueto v. Pernod Ricard, No. 1:20-cv-20157-KMW (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 

2020), ECF No. 55 (Williams, J.). 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 13 of 25
8 

nationals by the Cuban Government,” 22 U.S.C. § 6081(2) (emphasis added), the Title III 

remedy is calculated by reference to the value of the RRHSC Property the Cuban Government

confiscated six decades ago, Compl. ¶¶ 62–64; see 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i), (3)(C). 

As in Trichell, Plaintiffs lack standing because the Title III statutory remedy—threetimes the value of the RRHSC Property—bears no relationship to the defendant’s alleged 

misconduct, consisting here of Imperial’s alleged use of the RRHSC Property to manufacture, 

market, sell, and distribute cigars and the WPP Defendants’ alleged marketing activities. Vividly 

illustrating the disjunction, Plaintiffs allege that Imperial began trafficking in the RRHSC 

Property no earlier than 2007, Compl. ¶¶ 5, 30–31, 62, and that the WPP Defendants’ trafficking 

did not begin until 2010, id. ¶¶ 9–10, 31, 49, 62. Yet Plaintiffs seek compound interest dating 

back to 1961, when the Cuban Government allegedly confiscated the RRHSC Property. Id. ¶¶ 3, 

63. Plaintiffs lack standing because Title III does not remedy any concrete injury caused by 

Defendants’ alleged conduct. Trichell, 964 F.3d at 999–1000. 

For the same reason, Plaintiffs do not satisfy the causation element of Article III standing. 

To satisfy that element, plaintiffs “must allege that their injuries are ‘connect[ed] with the 

conduct of which [they] complain.’” Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1125 (11th 

Cir. 2019) (brackets in original), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2828 (2020) (quoting Trump v. Hawai’i, 

138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018)). The causation element is not satisfied when—as here—the injury 

that is sought to be remedied was caused, not by the defendant, but rather by “‘the independent 

action of some third party not before the court,’” Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 

1271 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 

The relief sought through this lawsuit—the value of the RRHSC Property—seeks to remedy the 

injury the Cuban Government caused through its 1961 confiscation. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 63. Here, as in 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 14 of 25
9 

Wilding, it is particularly clear that Article III standing is lacking, because Defendants cannot 

have caused an injury that was suffered more than four decades before their alleged conduct 

began. See Wilding, 941 F.3d at 1126. 

Finally, Plaintiffs do not plead that Defendants’ alleged trafficking has caused them any 

other injury. As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, the Cuban Government’s confiscation left 

its prior owners with a “‘claim to such property.’” Glen, 450 F.3d at 1255 (quoting 22 U.S.C. 

§ 6082(a)(1)(A)). Whoever now owns that claim against the Cuban Government (Plaintiffs have 

not adequately pleaded that they do, infra at 15–18), there is no allegation that Imperial’s alleged 

use of the RRHSC Property or the WPP Defendants’ alleged marketing activities have impaired 

the claim’s value. As the State Department informed Congress, the use of property that the 

Cuban Government previously confiscated “cannot affect Cuba’s legal obligation to compensate 

U.S. claimants for their losses.” United States Dep’t of State, Legal Considerations Regarding 

Title III of the Libertad Bill, 141 Cong. Rec. S15106, S15106 (Oct. 12, 1995).7 Plaintiffs lack 

standing when—as here—their interests are unaffected by the defendants’ alleged conduct. Thole 

v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1619 (2020). 

II. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A TITLE III CLAIM 

To avoid dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint’s nonconclusory factual allegations must be “‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level.’” McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). It is not enough to allege facts that are “‘merely consistent 

7

 The Court may take judicial notice of the legislative history of Title III as revealed by the 

congressional record. Parrish v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:04-cv-00986-TJC-HTS, 

2005 WL 1500894, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2005) (taking judicial notice of legislative 

history of state statute); In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 98-J-2634-S, 2000 WL 

34211319, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 2000) (taking judicial notice of congressional record). 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 15 of 25
10 

with’ a defendant’s liability.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 557). Rather, “[t]o state a plausible claim,” the complaint must affirmatively allege facts 

that “‘allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.’” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1335 (brackets in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678). 

A. Because the Only Alleged Trafficking Occurred in 2010, It Is Apparent from 

the Face of the Complaint that the Claim Is Barred by the Statute of Repose 

A Title III claim “may not be brought more than 2 years after the trafficking giving rise 

to the action has ceased to occur.” 22 U.S.C. § 6084. Here, the alleged trafficking consists of use 

of the RRHSC Property to manufacture, sell, market, and distribute Habanos products. Compl. 

¶¶ 7, 55–56. However, the sole factual allegation on that topic—that Habanos was using the 

RRHSC Property in February 2010—predates the August 2020 filing of this action by more than 

a decade. Compl. ¶ 46. Accordingly, dismissal is required because “it is apparent from the face 

of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.” Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruise Lines Inc., 750 

F.3d 1195, 1997 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs cannot circumvent Section 6084 by asserting upon “information and belief” that 

Habanos has continually used the RRHSC Property since 2010. Compl. ¶ 45. Such unadorned 

“information-and-belief” allegations are not credited on a motion to dismiss. See Bouton v. 

Ocean Props., Ltd., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1347–48 (S.D. Fla. 2016); Universal City Studios v. 

Nissim Corp., Nos. 14-cv-81344-KAM, 14-cv-81349-KAM, 14-cv-81350-KAM, 2015 WL 

1124704, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2015).8 Moreover, the only proffered support for that 

8

See also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551, 551–52, 557 (affirming dismissal of complaint based 

on factually unsupported “information-and-belief” allegations); Brown v. Gadsden Reg’l Med. 

Ctr. LLC, 748 F. App’x 930, 934 (11th Cir. 2018) (same); McCullough v. Bd. of Regents of the 

Univ. Sys. of Ga., 623 F. App’x 980, 983 (11th Cir. 2015) (same)

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 16 of 25
11 

assertion—photographs of the RRHSC Property from two websites, Compl. ¶¶ 45–46 & Exs. 6–

7—reveals the assertion to be unsupported and implausible.9 Although Plaintiffs do not 

acknowledge this to the Court, the websites—accessible through the hyperlinks included in 

Exhibits 6 and 7 to the Complaint—are clear that the photographs in Exhibit 6 were taken in 

February 2009. The photograph in Exhibit 7 is undated, but it obviously must pre-date the 

January 2013 blog entry in which it was published. Plaintiffs’ speculative, unsupported 

contention that whatever use was being made of the RRHSC Property in the early years of the 

last decade continued beyond August 2018, two years before this action was filed, represents 

precisely the kind of “unwarranted deduction[] of fact[]” that must be disregarded on a motion to 

dismiss. Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Further, it is irrelevant that Habanos allegedly retained agents including the WPP 

Defendants to promote Cuban cigars as recently as February 2020, Compl. ¶¶ 10, 31, 48–49, 

given Plaintiffs’ inability to allege that Habanos has used the RRHSC Property to manufacture, 

market, sell, or distribute cigars at any time since the early part of the last decade. For the same 

reason, the allegation that Imperial disposed of its indirect interest in Habanos in 2020, Compl. 

¶ 51, fails to plead trafficking in the Property. The Complaint establishes no connection between 

the RRHSC Property and any actionable, post-August 2018 conduct. 

Finally, the Court should disregard the conclusory assertion, Compl. ¶ 59, that 

Defendants, “with the possible exception of Y&R,” “continued to traffic in the confiscated 

RRHSC Property” after Plaintiffs sent their pre-suit notice. McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 

(conclusory allegations must be disregarded); see also Glen v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-

cv-482-A, 2020 WL 4464665, at *6 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020) (“American Airlines”) 

9 Crowder v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 963 F.3d 1197, 1202 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Exhibits 

attached to the complaint are treated as part of the complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.”). 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 17 of 25
12 

(disregarding conclusory allegation that Title III defendant continued trafficking after receipt of a 

pre-suit notice), appeal docketed, No. 20-10903 (5th Cir. Sept. 2, 2020). 

B. The Complaint Does Not Plead the “Trafficking” Element of a Title III 

Claim Because the Alleged Conduct Was Performed by Cuban Companies 

“Trafficking” in confiscated property, as that term is defined in 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13), is 

an essential element of a Title III claim, 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a). The Complaint’s allegations make 

clear that Plaintiffs cannot plead the trafficking element. 

The Complaint posits that, due to its historical indirect fifty percent ownership interest in 

Defendant Habanos, Imperial should be held liable for trafficking allegedly committed by 

Habanos and/or by Habanos’s other, Cuban shareholder, Tabacuba. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 20, 26, 30, 

44–46, 48, 52, 55. The WPP Defendants’ liability, too, flows entirely from the alleged trafficking 

by Habanos and/or Tabacuba. See id. ¶¶ 31–32, 48–50, 56 (alleging WPP Defendants acted as 

“agents” by marketing products made, stored, or distributed from the RRHSC Property). 

However, trafficking does not include “transactions and uses of property by a person who 

is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba, and who is not an official of the Cuban 

Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.” 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iv). According to the 

Complaint, Habanos is “a Cuban joint venture corporation,” id. ¶ 20, and Tabacuba is “the 

Cuban tobacco monopoly company,” id. ¶ 6.10 Therefore, Habanos and Tabacuba’s alleged 

conduct does not constitute trafficking for which Imperial or the WPP Defendants could be 

liable. 

10

 There is and could be no allegation that either Habanos or Tabacuba is “an official of the 

Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba,” 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iv), which 

means “any member of the Council of Ministers, Council of State, central committee of the 

Communist Party of Cuba, or the Politburo of Cuba, or their equivalents,” id. § 6023(10).

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 18 of 25
13 

C. The Complaint Does Not Plead that Defendants Have Knowingly and 

Intentionally Trafficked in Confiscated Property to Which a United States 

National Owns a Claim 

The trafficking element of a Title III claim consists of “knowingly and intentionally” 

transacting in confiscated property without the authorization of any United States national who 

holds a claim to the property. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13). To plead that element, a complaint must 

allege that the defendant “kn[e]w that the property was confiscated by the Cuban government” 

and “intend[ed]” to traffic in confiscated property. American Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *5–

6 (citing Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-cv-23988, 2020 WL 1169125, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 

Mar. 11, 2020)). 

Here, as in American Airlines and in Gonzalez, the Complaint alleges no such facts. It 

parrots the statutory “knowingly and intentionally” language as to Imperial, see, e.g., Compl. 

¶¶ 47, 55, but such a “‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’” pleads no 

plausible claim, McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).11 Plaintiffs 

also are not assisted by their rhetorical assertion—devoid of factual support—that Imperial 

“knew” that Habanos “acquired its interest in and control over the Cuban tobacco industry and 

the RRHSC Property by ‘nationalizing’ assets when the rightful owners of the property fled the 

brutal Castro dictatorship.” Compl. ¶ 44. As the court held in American Airlines, it is not 

sufficient to allege in this way that it is common knowledge that the Castro regime confiscated 

11

 Knowledge may be “averred generally,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), but “plaintiffs must still 

plead the events which they claim give rise to an inference of knowledge.” Krys v. Pigott, 749 

F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Universal City 

Studios, 2015 WL 1124704, at *4–6. 

Because the RRHSC Property is not the subject of a claim certified by the Foreign 

Claims Settlement Commission, Compl. ¶ 42, this case is different from others in which courts 

have ruled that the “knowingly and intentionally” element was sufficiently pleaded because 

publicly available Commission awards reflected confiscation from a U.S. national. See Havana 

Docks. Corp., 2020 WL 5217218, at *3; Garcia-Bengochea v. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings 

Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23593-JLK, 2020 WL 5028209, at *1–2 & n.1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2020). 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 19 of 25
14 

all property in Cuba. American Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *6. If that allegation were 

sufficient, Title III’s “knowingly and intentionally” element would be superfluous. Id.; see also 

In re Shek, 947 F.3d 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing the surplusage canon of statutory 

construction). 

The Complaint’s mischaracterization of an Imperial securities filing similarly falls far 

short of alleging that Imperial knew in 2007 that Habanos’s “business was based on trafficking 

in property confiscated by the Cuban government,” Compl. ¶ 30 & Ex. 4. That filing says only 

that Imperial “seek[s] to comply fully with international sanctions to the extent they are 

applicable to us,” Compl. Ex. 4 at 3 of 5, and that, accordingly, employees of certain nationalities 

might be unable to participate in operations in sanctioned countries, such as Syria, Iran, and 

Cuba, id. It says nothing whatsoever about Habanos’s business being “based on” confiscated 

property; much less does it show that Imperial knew that the RRHSC Property specifically was 

confiscated and nonetheless intentionally trafficked in it. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13). 

With respect to the WPP Defendants, Plaintiffs do not even offer formulaic allegations of 

knowledge. Plaintiffs do not allege that any WPP Defendant was aware that any products they 

allegedly marketed were made, stored in, or distributed from a property nationalized by the 

Cuban Government. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that WPP Defendants knew any use of the RRHSC 

Property occurred without the authorization of the Rodriguez family. Rather, Plaintiffs contend 

only that the WPP Defendants—as well as non-defendants Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram—

“knowingly and intentionally” “act as agents” for Imperial, Habanos, and Tabacuba. Id. ¶¶ 48, 

50. Such allegations plainly do not meet the statutory requirement that trafficking be knowing 

and intentional. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13). 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 20 of 25
15 

Finally, the Complaint does not allege that Imperial or the WPP Defendants knew that a 

United States national held a claim to the RRHSC Property. Plaintiffs therefore fail to plead that 

any Defendant knowingly and intentionally failed to secure the required “authorization” of such 

U.S. national. Id. As the court observed in Gonzalez, a defendant’s knowledge that goods are 

produced in Cuba “does not demonstrate that the Defendants knew the property was confiscated 

by the Cuban government nor that it was owned by a United States citizen.” Gonzalez, 2020 WL 

1169125, at *2 (emphasis added). 

D. The Complaint Does Not Plead the Ownership Element of a Title III Claim 

The Complaint fails in several independently dispositive ways to plead that Plaintiffs 

actually own the claim that they purport to assert here. The Complaint should therefore be 

dismissed, as several other Title III actions have been dismissed under similar circumstances. See 

Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-12113, 2021 WL 510234, at *1–2 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 

2021); Garcia-Bengochea v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-23592-JLK, 2020 WL 

6081658, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-14251 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 

2020).12

1. The Complaint does not allege that the RRHSC Property was 

confiscated from a United States national 

The Complaint alleges that a limited partnership, RRHSC, owned the RRHSC Property at 

the time it was confiscated. Compl. ¶¶ 40–41. Yet it does not allege that the limited partnership 

was a United States national. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(15) (legal entity is a United States national if 

it is incorporated in or has its principal place of business in the United States). Nor does the 

12

 See also Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-21725-JLK, 2020 WL 

4590825, at *1, 4 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-12960 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 

2020); American Airlines, 2020 WL 4464665, at *3–4.

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 21 of 25
16 

Complaint allege that a United States national owned the limited partnership when it, too, was 

confiscated. Compl. ¶ 41. 

Plaintiffs’ failure to plead that the immediate victim of the alleged confiscation was a 

United States national, and not a Cuban national—information that should be readily available to 

them—is significant. Any taking by Cuba of property belonging to its own nationals implicates 

the domestic takings rule. With “deep roots not only in international law but also in United States 

foreign policy,” the domestic takings rule provides that “‘[w]hat another country has done in the 

way of taking over property of its nationals . . . is not a matter for judicial consideration here.’” 

Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, 709–11 (2021) (ellipsis in original) 

(quoting United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937)). Therefore, the Supreme Court 

recently held Germany immune from claims arising from expropriations the Nazi regime 

committed against German nationals because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not 

“purport[] to alter” the domestic takings rule. Id. at 711. Title III equally evinces no 

Congressional intention to abrogate the domestic takings rule by authorizing U.S. courts to 

adjudicate claims arising from takings the Cuban Government committed against its own 

nationals. To the contrary, Title III expressly is concerned with the Cuban Government’s 

“wrongful confiscation of property belonging to United States nationals,” 22 U.S.C. § 6081(2), 

and with the “claims of United States nationals who had property wrongfully confiscated,” id. 

§ 6081(6)(B). Title III therefore purports to create a remedy for “United States nationals who 

were the victims of these confiscations.” Id. § 6081(11); see also Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. 

Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d sub nom., Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. 

Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013). (Title III “creates a statutory 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 22 of 25
17 

right of action against any person or entity who traffics property confiscated by the Cuban 

government from any American citizen or company”).13

2. The Complaint also does not plead that Plaintiffs now own the claim 

they assert through this lawsuit 

Title III confers a cause of action on a “United States national who owns the claim to” 

property that was confiscated by the Cuban government before March 12, 1996, provided “such 

national acquires ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996.” 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a)(1)(A), 

(4)(B). The Complaint does not plead compliance with the statutory ownership requirement. 

First, the Complaint asserts that the Plaintiffs inherited their claim directly or indirectly 

from their ancestor, Ramón Rodriguez Gutiérrez, Compl. ¶¶ 14–18, but such assertions are 

irrelevant in the absence of any allegation that Gutiérrez himself owned the claim. The 

Complaint does not explain why Gutiérrez or his descendants would own a claim arising from 

the alleged confiscation of the RRHSC Property from RRHSC. Id. ¶¶ 1, 40; see United States v. 

Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 973 (11th Cir.) (“One who has no interest of his own at stake always 

lacks standing.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 526 (2019). The Complaint 

conspicuously lacks any description of Gutiérrez’s relationship with RRHSC. Moreover, even if 

Gutiérrez owned the claim, several of the Plaintiffs merely assert without any supporting facts 

that they acquired their interests “by operation of law.” Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18.14 Such “labels and 

13

 Corroborating its exclusive focus on property expropriated from United States nationals, 

Congress enacted Title III in reliance on: (a) the property rights guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution, 22 U.S.C. § 6081(1), which are inapplicable to a foreign national’s overseas 

property, Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332, and (b) international law, 22 U.S.C. § 6081(8), (9), which 

similarly is unconcerned with “what a country does to property belonging to its own citizens 

within its own borders,” Philipp, 141 S. Ct. at 709. 

14

 The unexplained assertion that Raul Lorenzo Rodriguez, Francisco Ramon Rodriguez, 

and Christina Conroy inherited half of their claims “by operation of law,” Compl. ¶ 18, illustrates 

the mischief of the Complaint’s conclusory assertions of ownership. No facts are offered to 

explain the perplexing notion that half of the claim that belonged to Raul Bernardo Lupo 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 23 of 25
18 

conclusions” should be disregarded “because their conclusory nature ‘disentitles them to the 

presumption of truth.’” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). 

Second, the claims of several Plaintiffs should be dismissed for the additional reason that 

the Complaint concedes that they acquired their claims after the March 12, 1996 statutory cutoff 

date. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff Alfredo Ramon Forns inherited his claim in 2013 

(Compl. ¶ 16) and Plaintiffs Raul Lorenzo Rodriguez, Francisco Ramon Rodriguez, and 

Christina Conroy inherited their claims, at least in part, in 2019 (id. ¶ 18). The Eleventh Circuit 

has held that a Title III claim must be dismissed when—as here—the Complaint shows that the 

plaintiff “did not possess a claim to confiscated property until twenty years after the HelmsBurton Act’s cutoff date.” Gonzalez, 2021 WL 510234, at *1–2; see also American Airlines, 

2020 WL 4464665, at *3–4 (dismissing Title III claim that plaintiff allegedly inherited after 

March 1996). 

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Complaint, and grant such 

other and further relief as the Court may consider appropriate. 

Rodriguez bypassed his widow and passed directly to his sons and granddaughter, Plaintiffs Raul 

Lorenzo Rodriguez, Francisco Ramon Rodriguez, and Christina Conroy, when he died in 1986. 

Id. 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 24 of 25
19 

REQUEST FOR HEARING 

The Complaint raises novel issues. The first action under Title III of the Helms-Burton 

Act was filed in May 2019, and there is limited decisional law construing Title III. For this 

reason, Defendants request that the Court hold oral argument on this motion. Defendants 

estimate thirty minutes will be required for oral argument. 

Dated: February 26, 2021 

/s/ Mark F. Raymond 

NELSON MULLINS BROAD AND 

CASSEL 

Mark F. Raymond 

Mark.Raymond@nelsonmullins.com 

Jonathan Etra 

jonathan.etra@nelsonmullins.com 

2 South Biscayne Blvd. 21st Floor 

Miami, FL 33131 

Telephone: 305-373-9400 

ALLEN & OVERY LLP 

Andrew Rhys Davies (admitted pro hac vice) 

andrewrhys.davies@allenovery.com 

Justin L. Ormand (admitted pro hac vice) 

justin.ormand@allenovery.com 

1221 Avenue of the Americas 

New York, NY 10020 

Telephone: 212-610-6300 

Attorneys for Defendant Imperial Brands plc 

/s/ Naim S. Surgeon 

AKERMAN LLP 

Naim S. Surgeon 

Florida Bar No. 101682 

naim.surgeon@akerman.com 

Pedro Freyre 

Florida Bar No. 192140 

pedro.freyre@akerman.com 

3 Brickell City Centre 

98 Southeast 7th St., Suite 1100 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone: 305-982-5507 

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND 

DORR LLP 

Christopher Davies (admitted pro hac vice) 

christopher.davies@wilmerhale.com 

Jessica Lutkenhaus (admitted pro hac vice) 

jessica.lutkenhaus@wilmerhale.com 

Ashley McLaughlin Leen (pro hac vice pending) 

ashley.leen@wilmerhale.com 

1875 Pennsylvania Ave NW 

Washington, DC 20006 

Telephone: (202) 663-6000 

Attorneys for Defendants WPP PLC, Young & 

Rubicam LLC, and BCW LLC, a/k/a Burson 

Cohn & Wolfe LLC

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2021 Page 25 of 25