UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT BODISON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. NURSE PRACTIONER BOYD, Centennial Correctional Facility, Defendant - Appellee. No. 12-1049 (D.C. No. 1:11- CV-03126-LTB) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before MURPHY , EBEL and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Bodison appeal s the dismissal of his civil rights case. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND Bodison, an inmate in the Colorado Depa rtment of Corrections, filed a 42 U.S.C.

* After examining appellant = s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument wo uld not materially assi st the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a )(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34 .1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argu ment. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctri nes of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 8, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 § 1983 civil rights action challenging the conditions of his incarceration. 1 The district court granted Bodison’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which enabled Bodison to proceed without prepayment of the full $350 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(a). The district court then ordered Bodison, within thirty days, to have a partial initial filing fee of $29 sent to the court clerk “or show cause why he has no assets and no means by which to pay the designated initial pa rtial filing fee.” (R. at 27- 28.) The court further directed Bodison “to make the necessary arrangements to have one copy of th[e] [fee] order attached to the payment in the amount of the designated initial partial filing fee.” (Id. at 28.) The order warn ed Bodison that if he did not show cause or have the partial initial filing fe e sent to the clerk of the di strict court, the court would dismiss Bodison’s case with out further notice. Within the next thirty da ys, the court received from Bodison a copy of the court’s fee order, but no partial fee payment. The district court waited another thirty days, without receiving any further communication from Bodison, and then dismissed his “complaint and the action” without prejudi ce pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 2 (R. at

1 Bodison alleges that a prison doctor directed that Bodiso n’s prison meals be modified in light of his celiac disease and food alle rgies, but that a prison nurse practitioner, Defendant Boyd, later cancelled those modified meals, to the detriment of Bodison’s health.

2 Rule 41(b) provides, in pertin ent part, the following: “If th e plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these ru les or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the di smissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) . . . opera tes as an adjudication on the merits.”3 30-31.) Bodison challenges that dismissal here 3

. II. JURISDICTION Although the decision to dismiss a case without prejudi ce may not always be a final, appealable order, it is in this case because the district c ourt expressly dismissed Bodison’s action. See Moya v. Schollenb arger, 465 F.3d 444, 448-50 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Bergman v. Kiefer, 335 F. App’x 72 0, 721 & n.1 (10th Ci r. 2009); Vega v. Lappin, 332 F. App’x 520, 521-22 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2009). Therefore, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 12 91 to consider this appeal. III. ANALYSIS We review the district court’s decision to dismiss Bodison’s case for an abuse of discretion. See Brown v. Be ck, 203 F. App’x 907, 909 (1 0th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). The district court abuses its discretion if it commits legal error, relies on clearly erroneous facts, or applies the law to the fa cts irrationally. See House v. Utah, 129 F. App’x 432, 434 (10t h Cir. 2005) (unpublished). Bodison does not argue that the district court abused its discreti on in any of these ways. Instead, Bodison asserts that he had a r easonable excuse, one he apparently never asserted to the district court, for why th e court never received his initial partial fee payment: he requested that prison officials send the $29 initial partial filing fee to the court clerk, but prison officials failed to do so. Bodison supports his assertion with a copy of the prison form he completed reque sting a money order from prison officials in

3 We GRANT Bodison’s motion to proceed on appeal IFP, without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.4 the amount of the initial partial filing fee. Bu t, while Bodison may not have been able to control the actual disbursement of funds from his person account to the court clerk, he does not explain why he could not have checked, prior to the expirati on of the thirty-day period in which he had to pay the partial filin g fee and prior to the si xty days the district court waited before actually dismissing Bodis on’s case, to insure that prison officials actually disbursed those funds to the clerk cour t. The district cour t, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Bodison’s action. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the district court’s decision to dismiss Bodison’s case without prejudice was not an extreme sanction because he can remedy the dismissal by initiating a new actio n and either paying the full filing fee for that case up front or successfully applying for and procee ding IFP. See Brown, 244 F. App’x at 910- 11; Florence v. Decker, 153 F. App’x 478, 480 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). IV. CONCLUSION Because, for the foregoing reasons, the dist rict court did not ab use its discretion in dismissed Bodison’s case without prejudice, we AFFIRM that dismissal. Bodison is reminded that he must continue making partia l payments of the filing fee for this appeal until he pays the entire fee in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge