[Cite as Harris v. Ross, 2011-Ohio-1075.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

 DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

JOHN B. HARRIS 

 Petitioner-Appellant 

-vsALANDA ROSS 

 

 Respondent-Appellee 

: JUDGES: 

: Julie A. Edwards, P.J. 

: W. Scott Gwin, J. 

: Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

: 

: Case No. 10-CAF-07-0057 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from Delaware County 

 Court of Common Pleas Case No. 

 09 DVH 03-149 

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 8, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Petitioner-Appellant For Respondent-Appellee 

ERIC W. BREHM ALANDA ROSS 

Brehm & Associates 762 Bovee Lane 

604 E. Rich Street, Suite 2100 Powell, Ohio 43065 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

 
[Cite as Harris v. Ross, 2011-Ohio-1075.]

Edwards, P.J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, John Harris, appeals from the June 24, 2010, Judgment 

Entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On March 26, 2009, appellant John Harris filed a petition for a domestic 

violence civil protection order against appellee Alanda Ross pursuant to R.C. 3113.31. 

On the same date, an ex parte civil protection order was granted. The order indicated 

that appellee was to immediately vacate the parties’ residence and also granted 

exclusive possession of the same to appellant. 

{¶3} Subsequently, a consent agreement and domestic violence civil protection 

order was filed on April 8, 2009. The same granted appellant exclusive possession of 

the residence “contingent upon [appellant’s] securing [appellee’s] release from 

mortgage within 90 days.” 

{¶4} On August 11, 2009, appellee filed a Motion for Relief from Protection 

Order. Appellee, in her motion, indicated that appellant had not made any attempts to 

release her from liability on the mortgage. Appellee, in her motion, stated, in relevant 

part, as follows: “The order states exclusive rights can only be maintained if the terms 

are upheld which [appellant] did not do so. I am asking the court to grant me the same 

time frame as [appellant] securing me exclusive rights to the property or relief from the 

order of protection to return to my residence.” A hearing on such motion was scheduled 

for September 14, 2009. 

{¶5} On September 2, 2009, appellee filed a Motion for a Temporary 

Restraining Order against appellant. 
Delaware County App. Case No. 10-CAF-07-0057 3 

{¶6} A hearing before a Magistrate was held on September 14, 2009. The 

Magistrate, in his September 18, 2009 Order, stated, in relevant part, as follows: 

{¶7} “John B. Harris [appellant] states that he could not secure the refinancing 

because on March 27, 2009, Alanda [appellee] quit claimed her interest in the real 

estate to Sonda Crawford. Alanda states that Sonda Crawford quit claimed the 

residence back to Alanda on April 24, 2009. John states that the quit-claim back was 

forged by Alanda with a power of attorney. Alanda states that she needs possession of 

the residence because she and her 2 children live in Marion at Turning Point and drive 

every day so that the children can attend school in Olentangy School District. John 

states that since the civil protection order was issued, Alanda has entered the residence 

and broke the windows and that Alanda has called John in violation of the restraining 

orders especially when John was in the police station. Alanda states that she has 

received an offer to buy the residence and all that John has to do is go down to the 

realtor and sign the acceptance. John states that the realtor is an old boyfriend of 

Alanda.” 

{¶8} The Magistrate set the matter for further hearing on October 29, 2009 and 

stated that, if appellant could not prove his ability to refinance, the court would order the 

residence sold and/or vacate the award of exclusive occupancy to appellant and/or 

grant appellee exclusive occupancy. The Magistrate ordered appellee to bring proof of 

the possible sale to the hearing. The hearing was later continued to May 28, 2010. 

{¶9} Following a hearing held on May 28, 2010, the Magistrate, in a Decision 

filed on June 1, 2010, recommended that appellant be ordered to vacate the residence 

on or before June 11, 2010 and that exclusive possession of the same be granted to 
Delaware County App. Case No. 10-CAF-07-0057 4 

appellee effective June 11, 2010. The Magistrate, in his Decision, noted that appellant 

had not secured appellee’s release from the mortgage despite having being ordered to 

do so within 90 days after April 8, 2009. 

{¶10} On June 11, 2010, appellant filed a Motion to Stay the Magistrate’s 

Decision. Such motion was denied. On June 16, 2010, appellant filed objections to the 

Magistrate’s Decision. As memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on June 24, 2010, the 

trial court found that there was no error of law or other defect on the face of the 

Magistrate’s Decision and adopted the same. 

{¶11} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal: 

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR BY ORDERING PETITIONERAPPELLANT TO VACATE HIS RESIDENCE. 

{¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR BY GRANTING RESPONDENTAPPELLEE’S REQUEST, WHEN RESPONDENT-APPELLEE HAD UNCLEAN 

HANDS.1

” 

I 

{¶14} Appellant, in his first assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred 

by ordering him to vacate the residence. Appellant specifically argues, in part, that the 

trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by affecting title to the subject real estate via a Civil 

Protection Order. 

{¶15} R.C. 3113.31 states, in relevant part, as follows: “(E)(1) After an ex parte 

or full hearing, the court may grant any protection order, with or without bond, or 

approve any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of domestic violence against 

the family or household members. The order or agreement may:... 

 

1

 ‘This error is being argued in the alternative.’ 
Delaware County App. Case No. 10-CAF-07-0057 5 

{¶16} “(b) Grant possession of the residence or household to the petitioner or 

other family or household member, to the exclusion of the respondent, by evicting the 

respondent, when the residence or household is owned or leased solely by the 

petitioner or other family or household member, or by ordering the respondent to vacate 

the premises, when the residence or household is jointly owned or leased by the 

respondent, and the petitioner or other family or household member;.”... 

{¶17} “(5) No protection order issued or consent agreement approved under this 

section shall in any manner affect title to any real property.” (Emphasis added). 

{¶18} In the case sub judice, the consent agreement filed on April 8, 2009, 

provided that appellee would vacate the property on the condition that appellant 

refinance the house within 90 days. The purpose of refinancing would be to remove 

appellee’s name from the mortgage and/or note. This would inevitably affect title to the 

real property, because no lending institution would permit appellant to assume the entire 

obligation for the note, and pledge the subject property as security for the same, if 

appellant were not the sole owner of such property. Moreover, the trial court, in its June 

24, 2010, Judgment Entry, awarded exclusive possession of the residence to appellee 

because appellant was unable to refinance the residence. By doing so, the trial court 

sanctioned appellant for violation of the portion of the consent agreement which the trial 

court had no authority to issue because such order violated R.C. 3113.31(E)(5) and 

affected title to property. 

{¶19} Appellant’s first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained. 
Delaware County App. Case No. 10-CAF-07-0057 6 

II 

{¶20} Appellant, in his second assignment of error, argues that the trial court 

erred by granting appellee’s request when appellee had unclean hands. 

{¶21} Based on our disposition of appellant’s first assignment of error, 

appellant’s second assignment of error is moot. 

{¶22} Accordingly, the judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common 

Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

By: Edwards, P.J. 

Gwin, J. and 

Farmer, J. concur 

______________________________ 

______________________________ 

______________________________ 

 JUDGES 

JAE/d1130 
[Cite as Harris v. Ross, 2011-Ohio-1075.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

JOHN B. HARRIS : 

 : 

 Petitioner-Appellant : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

ALANDA ROSS : 

 : 

 Respondent-Appellee : CASE NO. 10-CAF-07-0057 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the 

judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and this matter is 

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs assessed to appellee. 

 _________________________________ 

 _________________________________ 

 _________________________________ 

 JUDGES