OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

October 23, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL 

NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

 

SUBJECT: Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Spending Under Its Contract for the 

Iraqi Police Training Program (SIGIR-07-016) 

This audit was to be the second in a series of focused financial reviews of the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR). On March 22, 2007, SIGIR announced the subject review to determine: 

(1) what the Government required under contract S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, (2) what the contractor 

provided, (3) how the money was spent, and (4) what contract oversight was provided. 

However, shortly after the work began, SIGIR learned that we could not fully accomplish those 

objectives. SIGIR was told by officials with the Department of State’s (DoS) Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the program execution office, that 

INL did not have the information needed to identify what DynCorp International, LLC 

(DynCorp) provided under the contract or how funds were spent. INL has a number of 

initiatives to improve its management and oversight of the contract and recoup funds 

inappropriately paid to DynCorp. Because of these problems and initiatives, SIGIR has 

temporarily suspended this work, but plans to follow up later on INL’s progress implementing 

the initiatives and addressing the serious contract management issues. In the interim, SIGIR is 

issuing this report to summarize the information we have gathered. 

Results 

Although training has been conducted and equipment provided under the contract, INL officials 

report that (1) invoices and supporting documents submitted by DynCorp were in disarray, but 

are being organized; (2) INL had not validated the accuracy of the invoices it received prior to 

October 2006, but since October, INL contracting officer’s representatives in Iraq have been 

validating all incoming invoices as time and conditions in Iraq allow; (3) INL personnel in Iraq 

and in Washington, D.C. are in the process of validating past invoices; and (4) INL lacks 

1
confidence that DoS accounting records accurately capture the purpose for most disbursements.1

As a result, INL does not know specifically what it received for most of the $1.2 billion in 

expenditures under its DynCorp contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program. INL’s prior lack 

of controls created an environment vulnerable to waste and fraud. 

INL’s contract administration problems are well documented. In July 2005, the DoS Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) reported the need for strengthened oversight of procurement and 

contract compliance.2

 In January 2007, SIGIR and the DoS OIG jointly reported on Task Order 

0338 of this contract.3 The report cited poor contract administration by INL and DoS’s 

contracting office.4

INL recognizes that the contract was poorly managed and that improvements are needed in its 

contract administration. The bureau has undertaken a number of improvement initiatives. For 

example, it is organizing contract files, increasing the number of contract management personnel 

in Iraq, increasing its headquarters staff, improving its oversight of property management, 

collecting for excess or erroneous charges, and improving its project oversight and business 

processes. SIGIR supports INL’s overdue efforts and recognizes that INL needs time to 

implement those initiatives. 

Because of the magnitude of the problems confronting INL and the number of actions planned to 

address them, SIGIR believes that the bureau needs to develop a coordinated, comprehensive 

corrective-action plan whose approval at the highest levels will demonstrate INL’s commitment 

to this effort and facilitate the tracking of progress in implementation. 

We requested comments from INL on a draft of this report. INL agreed with our overall findings 

and our recommendations. It provided additional information which clarified its progress on 

some initiatives. We have incorporated that information, as appropriate. 

Background 

INL’s mission is to develop policies and manage programs to combat international narcotics 

production and trafficking, combat international crime, and strengthen law enforcement and 

other rule of law institutional capabilities outside the United States. To that end, INL awarded 

contract S-LMAQM-04-C-0030 to DynCorp on February 18, 2004. The contract--for a base 

year and four one-year options--is now in its third option year.5

 It includes tasks in support of 

INL programs for Iraq and Afghanistan. This report focuses on the contract tasks for Iraq. 

Those tasks, among other things, required DynCorp to provide housing, food, security, facilities, 

training support systems, and a cadre of law enforcement personnel of various specialties to 

 

1

Invoices are bills submitted for payment. Disbursements are the payments. 2

United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Report on 

Inspection, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, (ISP-I-05-14, July 2005). 

3

Task order 0338 was issued in June 2004 to provide: training services for international police-liaison officers;

equipment; construction of a residential camp, on the Adnan Palace grounds in Baghdad, to house training 

personnel; and construction of five regional camps at selected locations around the country. 4

Joint report by SIGIR and the DoS IOG, Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-

C-0030, Task Order 0338, for the Iraqi Police Training Program Support,(SIGIR-06-029 and DoS-OIG-AUD/IQO07-20, January 30, 2007). 

5

The third option year runs from February 18, 2007 through February 17, 2008. 

2
support the Iraqi civilian police-training program. According to INL officials, as of August 23, 

2007, INL had obligated $1,338.1 million and had paid $1,217.8 million in pursuit of the Iraq 

program. Appendix A provides further details on the task orders, including obligations, 

expenditures, purpose, and status. 

INL Contract Management Issues 

During the initial year of the DynCorp contract, INL’s workload increased substantially without 

a commensurate increase in personnel. The result was poor contract management, a problem that 

continued until recently. As a result, INL cannot provide a detailed accounting of the $1.2 

billion expended under its DynCorp Iraqi police training program. The bureau’s contract 

management problems are well documented: 

• In July 2005, the DoS OIG reported that INL’s responsibilities and programs had 

increased substantially between 2003 and 2005 but that its staffing had not increased 

commensurate with its workload, creating a significant management challenge. “INL 

must strengthen its mechanisms for oversight of procurement and contract compliance,” 

the report stated, “particularly regarding the Iraq and Afghanistan programs.” 

Consequently, INL submitted a reorganization proposal--approved by DoS--to add 35 

fulltime domestic positions. According to the Inspector General’s report, however, the 

INL reorganization did not address the critical staffing requirements for overseas posts, 

including Iraq. 

• In a January 2007 report on Task Order 0338, SIGIR and the DoS OIG reported that poor 

contract administration by INL and the DoS Office of Acquisition Management, the 

contracting office, put millions of dollars at risk and resulted in unaccountable property. 

In commenting on the report, the Assistant Secretary of State, INL, identified steps the 

bureau had initiated to strengthen its contract and asset management as well as its intent 

to reconcile past payments made since the inception of INL contracts in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Jordan. 

• On April 25, 2007, the assistant secretary, in testimony on contracting for the Iraqi 

security forces, recognized problems with contract management and related measures to 

improve INL’s management and oversight capabilities.6

 She stated that “The urgency 

and scale of requirements in Iraq has often outstripped our staffing and oversight 

capabilities both domestically and in the field, particularly in the early stages. Security 

challenges have also impeded the ability of our staff to travel throughout Iraq.” The 

assistant secretary said that INL had recently obtained approval to increase its Baghdad 

staff, was expanding its Washington-based Iraq program staff, and had strengthened such 

internal controls as inventory oversight and performance reporting on property 

management. 

• In June 2007, shortly after SIGIR began its work on the subject review, we were told that 

INL’s review of DynCorp invoices had identified numerous issues. For example, INL 

officials said their review identified duplicate payments, the purchase of a $1.8 million x-

 

6

Testimony by Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, before the House Committee on Armed Services, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces, (April 25, 2007). 

3
ray scanner that was never used, and payments of $387,000 to house DynCorp officials in 

hotels in Iraq rather than in existing living facilities.7

 Also, INL discovered a problem 

with business class travel and asked DynCorp to review all such travel and provide all 

supporting documentation. Four weeks later, INL received a check for $108,000 and all 

historical and current invoices. The officials admitted that INL’s Iraq and headquarters 

personnel were insufficient to properly validate the invoices, ensure that DynCorp 

charges were accurately recorded in DoS accounting systems, and provide oversight of 

the company’s performance. As a result, INL officials concluded, they have no 

confidence that the Government has paid for only valid expenses under the contract or 

that the DoS accounting records accurately capture the purpose for which funds were 

disbursed. 

• In July 2007, the DoS OIG reported to INL on the results of a limited review to determine 

(1) the effectiveness of the bureau’s process for reviewing and approving invoices from 

DynCorp for the support of the Jordan International Police Training Center, (2) best 

practices for reviewing and approving invoices, and (3) whether invoices provided by 

DynCorp in FY 2005 for the support of the training center were adequately supported.8

 

The review, requested by INL, found that the bureau did not have an effective process in 

2005 for reviewing and approving DynCorp invoices. For example, INL approved 

payments without assurance that the work or services were completed satisfactorily. The 

review also found that invoices for the training center were not supported by complete 

and clear documentation that complied with federal regulations, DoS acquisition 

procedures, and contract requirements. For instance, DynCorp did not provide required 

data to support travel and housing charges, and documents submitted to support other 

expenses were also inadequate and presented in an unmanageable format. In response, 

INL provided the OIG with information on improvements the bureau has made and 

continues to make in its invoice review and approval process. 

Initiatives to Improve Contract Management 

As noted above, INL recognizes that it has poorly managed the DynCorp contract and that 

improvements are needed. The bureau has undertaken a number of initiatives to improve 

management, including reviewing and completing contract files, reviewing and reconciling 

invoices, recovering excess or erroneous payments, and accounting for costs and property. 

Following is a brief discussion of some contract management areas undergoing improvement and 

the status of initiatives in those areas as of September 2007. 

Contract files--INL was compiling contract files to include contracts, task orders, and other 

pertinent documents. According to bureau officials, INL has accumulated copies of the 

documents and they are being organized into binders. According to INL officials, this effort is 

just over 60 percent complete.

 

7

Just prior to the issuance of this report, INL informed SIGIR that these examples relate to Afghanistan. This 

information differs from that previously provided by INL during SIGIR’s review. Also, INL did not question the 

accuracy of this information in its comments dated October 9, 2007. 8

DoS OIG, Office of Audits, report, Independent Auditor’s Report on the Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures 

Related to Selected DynCorp Invoices, (AUD/FM-07-41, July 2007). 

4
Review and reconciliation of invoices:

• Increasing INL staff: INL was increasing the number of contract management personnel 

in Iraq from one to seven. Five were already in-country, and the remaining two were 

awaiting clearances to join them. Those individuals will review all new invoices and 

help reconcile earlier ones with supporting documents. In addition, the bureau was 

working to obtain 10 detailees from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and 

other agencies to assist INL staff in the U.S. with invoice reconciliation. Seven detailees 

had been accepted, and INL was in the process of selecting the three remaining 

applicants. Although the reconciliation effort began in April 2006, progress had been 

slow because of limited staff devoted to the effort. 

• Rejecting out-of-scope or unsupported work: INL was comparing invoices to DynCorp’s 

pricing proposal and rejecting invoices for work that appears to be out of scope or lacks 

documentary support. According to bureau officials, when an invoice is questioned, none 

of the bill is paid, and DynCorp has to resubmit documentation to support its claim. 

Collection for excess or erroneous charges: INL has negotiated a contract modification, dated 

October 16, 2006, that allows it to review invoices after they are paid and to request 

reimbursement for excess or erroneous charges. Although the modification is not retroactive, 

INL has issued demand letters for reimbursement of excess or erroneous charges paid before that 

date and has been successful in getting those funds reimbursed. 

Accounting for costs: INL had begun to inventory and review all invoices and supporting 

documents and to record charges in appropriate cost categories. According to INL officials, 

charges were not appropriately categorized principally because those processing the invoices did 

not take the time to do that or because the invoices were not clear or complete. As a result, INL 

cannot be certain that accounting records accurately capture the purpose for which funds were 

disbursed until its inventory and review are completed. When the additional invoice reviewers 

are on staff, the bureau estimates that contract accounting will be completed within 3 to 5 years. 

Property management: Between January and June 2006, INL directed DynCorp to improve its 

management of property. The direction was imparted in a series of letters in which INL 

documented defects in contract performance; the company responded by identifying corrective 

actions it was taking or planned to take. Subsequently, an INL senior management consultant 

reviewed DynCorp’s management of government property in Iraq between April 22 and May 12, 

2007, and found it still unacceptable and not meeting regulatory standards. DynCorp thereupon 

provided another corrective-action plan and, according to INL officials, has made improvements 

in such areas as revalidating property accountability, identifying excess property, and improving 

storage capability to ensure that the right amount of supplies and equipment are at the right 

locations to provide required logistical support. INL had DynCorp prepare an inventory of 

contractor-procured, government-owned equipment in Iraq. According to the bureau, the 

inventory contained 31,680 line items valued at $85.6 million. The contract management team 

in Iraq has requested a 100 percent audit of all contractor inventory records. That audit will 

include a review of weapons and weapons-support equipment. INL says its contract 

management members in Iraq have evaluated DynCorp’s system for accounting for weapons and 

found it to be adequate. According to INL officials, INL’s most recent review of DynCorp’s 

property management records found their accuracy had improved, however, DynCorp’s 

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notifications of lost weapons were not done in a timely manner. A remedy action plan has been 

implemented by DynCorp and the contract management team will continue to monitor 

DynCorp’s actions and report on progress. 

Project oversight and INL business processes: INL has hired two civil engineers to locally verify 

the implementation of INL construction projects and enforce U.S. quality standards in Iraq. INL 

is also hiring a logistics specialist in Washington to improve overall business processes and

logistics management, conduct cost-benefit analyses, and assist with reviews of contract 

performance. Moreover, the bureau, according to officials, is recruiting an industrial propertymanagement specialist to help draft specific requirements for INL contracts and task orders as 

well as to ensure that government property in contractors’ custody is managed in accordance 

with Government contract and Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements. INL expects the 

additional positions to significantly improve both contract specifications and contract property 

management. 

According to INL officials, it will take three to five years to complete a 100 percent review and 

reconciliation of the invoices and a validation of the property records. But the bureau is already 

beginning to see benefits from its initiatives. As of September 20, 2007, INL had identified 

savings from the initiatives in Iraq as follows: negotiated reductions in cost/price proposals - 

$113.7 million; rejected invoiced amounts - $1.1 million; and received refunds from DynCorp - 

$0.7 million. In addition, it had identified potential savings from invoiced amounts of $1.1 

million. 

According to INL officials, the initiatives will be part of a corrective plan INL is developing. 

However, the plan has been delayed because of the need to respond to high-priority 

Congressional requests. 

Conclusions 

INL’s prior lack of management and financial controls created an environment vulnerable to 

waste and fraud. The bureau has taken action and continues to take actions to improve its 

contract management in general and its management of the DynCorp contract in particular. 

Because INL (1) does not have complete and accurate information on what DynCorp provided 

and how the money was spent in Iraq under the DynCorp contract, and (2) has several initiatives 

underway or planned to improve its contract management, we believe it needs time to 

demonstrate its commitment to better contract management. Therefore, SIGIR is temporarily 

suspending its efforts and will notify the appropriate organizations when it decides to resume 

them. We also believe that to facilitate its efforts and guide its actions, INL needs a coordinated, 

comprehensive corrective-action plan that has the approval and support of senior INL 

management. 

Recommendations 

To improve contract management processes, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the 

Assistant Secretary, INL, to establish milestones for preparing and finalizing a comprehensive 

corrective-action plan that incorporates the various initiatives that are planned or underway as 

well as other needed actions INL may identify. The plan should, at a minimum, include 

6
milestones and required resources to accomplish each initiative. It should be approved by the 

Assistant Secretary and the approval process should include a commitment to provide the 

resources necessary to implement the plan. Lastly, a process should be established to assess the 

plan’s implementation and its impact on INL’s oversight of the DynCorp contract. Such a 

process should include progress briefings to the Assistant Secretary, INL. 

Management Comments 

We requested comments from INL on a draft of this report. INL agreed with our overall findings 

and our recommendations. It provided additional information which clarified its progress on 

some initiatives. We have incorporated that information, as appropriate. INL also provided 

information on its actions to implement the recommendations included in the DoS OIG and 

SIGIR joint report on task order 0338. A copy of those comments is included as Appendix D. 

Scope and Methodology 

We reviewed contract documents relating to the task orders for Iraq. We also reviewed prior 

reports concerning INL’s management of the DynCorp contract. We held detailed discussions 

with INL officials concerning their various efforts to improve INL’s management of the 

DynCorp contract, and reviewed INL-provided documents concerning the status of their various 

initiatives. We performed our audit work from May through September 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

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Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following prior reports: 

• Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task 

Order 0338, for the Iraqi Police Training Program Support, (SIGIR-06-029 and DoSOIG-AUD/IQO-07-20), January 30, 2007. 

• Independent Auditor’s Report on the Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures Related to 

Selected DynCorp Invoices, (DoS-IG-AUD/FM-07-41), July 2007. 

• Report of Inspection, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

(ISP-I-05-14), July 2005. 

- - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Mr. Glenn D. Furbish at (703-428-1058 / glenn.furbish@sigir.mil). For the 

report distribution, see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix C.

 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: See Distribution 

8
Appendix A—Task Order Summaries 

Task 

Order 

Obligations 

(In millions) 

Expenditures 

(In millions) Purpose Status 

0582 

Funds 

moved to 

task order 

1436 

Provide pre- and post-deployment support for 

12 U.S. judicial and criminal-justice experts in 

such areas as training, equipment, body 

armor, housing, meals, transportation, 

information technology, medical services, and 

security. The support could require the 

construction, repair, or refurbishment of 

facilities and buildings to support the judicial 

personnel. 

Combined 

with task 

order 1436. 

0765 $70.4 $70.4

Provide all labor, materials, supervision, tools, 

equipment, services, quality assurance, and 

other necessary items and services for the 

construction of the Jordan International Police 

Training Center in Amman. 

Complete 

A528 $52.6 $51.5

Provide operations and maintenance support 

for the Jordan International Police Training 

Center. Support includes program 

management, logistics, quality assurance, 

human resources, procurement, contracting, 

budget, finance, catering, payroll, and 

government relations. 

Complete 

2059 $47.2 $47.2

Provide funds to reimburse DynCorp for 

equipment, construction, supplies, materials, 

services, and other functions delivered during 

the period July 17 to October 22, 2004. 

DynCorp continued to perform essential 

services during this period, despite the fact the 

task order performance period had expired. 

The contracting officer determined that the 

company should be issued a task order under 

the contract to cover its performance during 

the period. 

Complete 

0338 $152.2 $151.9

Provide training services for international 

police-liaison officers, training support 

equipment, construction of five regional 

camps, and construction of a residential camp 

on the Adnan Palace grounds in Baghdad to 

house training personnel. 

Complete 

1436 $1,015.8 $896.9

Provide field support (lodging, food, fixed-site 

security, weapons, ballistic armor, and ballistic 

helmets) for personnel assigned to the Iraq 

police-development program in Baghdad. This 

task order is being recompeted. 

Ongoing 

Totals* $1,338.1 $1,217.8

*Totals may not add due to rounding. 

Source: INL provided the financial and task-order status information. We did not verify its accuracy. Task order purposes were 

taken from contract documents and confirmed by INL officials. 

9
Appendix B—Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State* 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for International 

Development 

 Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction 

 Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer, 

 Bureau of Resource Management 

 Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs* 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq* 

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office* 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International Security 

Affairs 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

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Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and Human 

Rights 

Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs 

and International Environmental Protection 

Subcommittee on Near East and South and Central Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal 

Services and International Security 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and 

the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 

*Recipient of draft audit report. 

11
Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared, and the audit conducted, under the direction of Glenn Furbish, Acting 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed include: 

Robert Pelletier 

Steven Sternlieb 

Roger M. Williams 

12
Management Comments 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs 

13
14
15
16
17
18
SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle 

Director for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

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