Number 55, November 1995

**NATO Enlargement:
*Sailing between Scylla and Charybdis*

by Hans Binnendijk**Conclusions
    The NATO enlargement process faces two dangers. The first is thatenlargement will proceed too fast. If we move too fast, enlargement could upset avery delicate political process underway in Russia.  This has been Europe's concernthis year. 
	The other danger is that if we slow the process too much, we will losemomentum and the process will stall. This may be Europe's concern next year.  
	NATO needs an enlargement plan that sails   deftly between this Scylla andCharybdis.****
**What Can We Learn from History?**

	History teaches us the importance of Central and Eastern Europe to worldpeace. Two World Wars and the Cold War were fought this century primarily over theterritory between Germany and Russia. 
	There have been four previous enlargements of NATO.  The lesson is thatpreviously countries either have joined in steps or with conditions.

- Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, but they became associate members beforebecoming full members.
- West Germany joined in 1955, but at first it joined indirectly via the Western Union.
- Spain joined in 1982 but it has not yet joined the integrated military command.
- East Germany joined in 1990 when it united with West Germany, but NATOdeployments in the former East Germany are initially limited.

	Recent history tells us that the U.S./NATO decision to enlarge was made inphases and without a clear consensus:

- l993 was a year of deliberation in the U.S. Government, mostly in the StateDepartment. Both State and the National Security Council were split internally on theissue. Momentum for enlargement was reversed temporarily by Russian events ofOctober l993. This cleared the way for Partnership for Peace (PFP) to become thecenterpiece for the January 1994 summit.
- 1994 was a year of decision. The January NATO summit in Brussels created thePFP and it opened the door for enlargement. Richard Holbrooke became AssistantSecretary of State and championed enlargement. President Clinton travelled toWarsaw that July and declared in a speech that enlargement was not a matter ofwhether, but when. The December 1994 Ministerial commissioned a NATO study onthe "why and how" of enlargement, and a sense of momentum was created.
- 1995 is the year of the Russian reaction. It actually started in November 1994 withPresident Boris Yeltsin's "Cold Peace" speech in Budapest which was followed byRussia's unwillingness to sign its Individual Partnership Program (IPP) and toimplement its cooperation plans with NATO. While the Russian reaction wasmodified at the May l995 Moscow summit and Noordwijk meeting, their oppositioncontinues. 

**Partnership for Peace a Success**

	In less than two years, PFP has become a true success. It is no longer seen bymost partners as a second best alternative to NATO membership, but as a practicalway to modernize their armed forces and to become more interoperable with NATOforces.
	Twenty-six new partner countries have joined PFP and they are beginning theprocess of self-differentiation. Sixteen have liaison officers at SHAPE's PartnershipCoordination Cell (PCC); and the PCC together with Russian liaison officersparticipated in planning for the Bosnia IFOR deployment. Fourteen countries areparticipating in the PFP Planning and Review Process which provides a high degree ofmilitary transparency. 
	The United States has committed $100 million to support PFP activities.Militarily, PFP countries have participated in numerous exercises and significantmilitary events. But PFP is still somewhat schizophrenic. Some see it as a prep schoolfor NATO--others see it as a lasting institution which will perform peacekeeping,humanitarian, and search and rescue functions.

**So Why Enlarge?**

	There are at least four reasons why NATO enlargement has emerged as U.S.policy. The reasons can be personified in four individuals.

- Vladimir Zhirinovsky represents the fear of a reversal in Russia.
- Vaclav Havel personifies the heroes of the revolutions of l989-90. They want NATOinsurance and believe enlargement will secure their reforms.
- Volker Ruehe, the German Minister of Defense, has made it clear that a stableCentral Europe is vital to German interests.
- Senator Richard Lugar, who coined the phrase "out of area or out of business",represents the views of many pro-NATO conservatives who are prepared to makeenlargement a l996 campaign issue.

	And now that enlargement has been promised, a reversal would undermineNATO's credibility in Central Europe.

**Impact of Enlargement on Russia**

	There is not much consensus in Russia today on anything, but there is aconsensus among the national security elite against enlargement. There were somemixed diplomatic signals early on which complicated the U.S. assessment. In the fall ofl993, for example, Yeltsin at first appeared to accept enlargement and then sent a letterto Western leaders strongly opposing it. Subsequently, Deputy Foreign Minister GeorgiMamedov was sent to negotiate conditions for enlargement, only to have his actionsdenounced by Yeltsin three months later.
	Russian analysts combine enlargement, the Conventional Forces in EuropeTreaty (CFE), and decision-making for Bosnia and see the mix as the beginning of anew world system which excludes or limits them. As a result, there is a new "Versaillessyndrome" in Russia which stresses that Russia did not lose the Cold War but now it isbeing humiliated like a vanquished power.
	Western analysts believe that the Visegrad states joining NATO should notconstitute a military threat to Russia. But if the Baltic states or Ukraine would join, mostRussian analysts would see Russia's vital interests threatened. Some Russian analystsare also worried about the further isolation of Kaliningrad and about the loss of armssales to the Visegrad states.
	Perhaps most important in the long run, many Russians believe that NATOenlargement would draw a new line in Europe which would create cultural andeconomic barriers that would be impossible to overcome.
	Public opinion in Russia is vague about enlargement. Polls show 49% seek aspecial relationship with NATO while 31% oppose the Visegrad states entering intoNATO. The majority doesn't know. But in the current election climate, no political leadercan support enlargement without being attacked by nationalists. So all politicians mustoppose enlargement for now.
	It is no secret that there is a move to oust Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. Theenlargement issue is one of several being used by the national security elite to ousthim because of the mixed signals his ministry sent.
	Russian planners think they can reverse enlargement by concentrating theirarguments on Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and the U.S. Congress. Theirapproach is "more in sorrow than in anger"; their first effort is to postpone the decisionand they have had some success.
	Russian observers say that if NATO enlarges, Russia may abandon START II,the CFE Treaty, and even the INF Treaty.  They will further strengthen ties among theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and they may even develop closerrelations with  rogue states like Iran and Libya.
	The political framework for enhanced NATO-Russian relations thus far is a bare-bones effort to institutionalize security cooperation and establish better mutual politicalconsultations. More progress needs to be made in this important effort.  The progressmade in negotiating the Bosnia peace agreement and in integrating Russian troops intothe IFOR, however, should lead to closer NATO-Russian relations.
	To avoid a major break with Russia, NATO must take Russia's vital interests intoaccount without giving them a veto over NATO enlargement. This meansinstitutionalizing the "no surprises" pledge and not extending early membership to theBaltic States or Ukraine. Even the candidate states agree that the decision on "who andwhen" should not be made before next summer. With a delay and development ofstronger NATO-Russian relations, NATO hopes it can manage a modest enlargementby 2000.

**Impact on Eastern Europe**

	There is an arc of countries from Tallinn to Tirana that will not be NATOmembers for the foreseeable future.

- Extending a true Article 5 commitment to the Baltic states or Ukraine now wouldpresent a provocation to Russia and would be a NATO defense planner's nightmare.Excluding them from enlargement will complicate their security problems.
- Romania remains a potential candidate, but its pace of reform and residual ethnicproblems probably means they will not join in the next few years.
- Bulgaria since the 1994 elections seems to have reduced its interest in NATOcandidacy.
- Albania and Macedonia have major ethnic and border problems and need to makesignificant reforms.

	However, as NATO proceeds, it risks separating Central Europe from EasternEurope and creating a strategic vacuum in the East. States in this region are concernedbecause they will have no firm security framework, and they may have to deal with aRussia  which is more aggressive in response to enlargement.
	The West must design a better security framework for Eastern Europe beforeNATO enlarges. This could be a combination of regional security arrangements, astronger PFP with a significant political component, and bilateral efforts with countrieslike Ukraine.

**Impact on Central Europe**

	Not all of the Visegrad states may be ready to join NATO at the same time. Thel995 NATO study on enlargement concluded that decisions should be on a case bycase basis. While the NATO study makes clear that there are no fixed criteria, it doesprovide some guidelines, including that ethnic and border disputes need to be settled.Progress on democratic reform and civil-military relation will also be an importantfactor.
	The Czech Republic is the most eligible candidate of the former Warsaw Pactcountries. It has made constant progress on political and economic reforms, and it hasconsiderable economic resources. It has made progress in developing effective civiliancontrol over the military. It has downsized its armed forces to 65,000 and restructuredthem to accommodate NATO integration. While its armed forces still have severeproblems with readiness standards, they are doing better than the other Visegradstates. The Czech Republic has no serious problems with ethnic minorities nor is itthreatened militarily by anyone.  
	Despite the victory of post-Communist candidates in September l993 andNovember 1995, Poland still has the greatest political support in the United States forNATO entry. There has been confusion over whether the president or prime ministerhas authority over the military, which has contributed to significant civil-militaryproblems. Those problems may be ameliorated by the results of the recent presidentialelections. Poland is also a likely candidate for early NATO membership because of itslocation, its support in the United States and its considerable military capability.
	Hungary is also a good candidate for NATO membership but its candidacy stillfaces three sets of problems. First, unlike Poland and the Czech Republic, Hungary stillhas unsettled ethnic problems with its neighbors. Second, though it has made progress,it still has much to do to achieve adequate civilian control over its military. And third, ifAustria does not join, Hungary would not be contiguous with the rest of NATO. If thefirst two can be settled, the third can be overcome.
	Slovakia has perhaps the furthest to go of the four Visegrad states. It hassuffered from political instability since its independence in January 1993, and currentlyPrime Minister Vladimir Meciar and President Michal Kovac are in a power struggle.Slovakia is building many of its military institutions from scratch, and civil-militaryrelations require considerable improvement. Slovakia's hesitation in ratifying itsbilateral agreement with Hungary and its latest language laws do not bode well forSlovakia's candidacy.

**Impact on Western Europe

	Western Europe is somewhat divided on the enlargement issue, with NorthernEurope generally more interested than Southern Europe. A West European consensuscould form around the proposition that NATO enlargement should be tied to EUenlargement. But that may take too long for some in the United States and Germany.
	The three new EU member states would all have a credible claim to NATOmembership. But for now, Sweden and Finland have opted for PFP membership only.Austria also favors a similar arrangement, but efforts may be made to convince them tojoin in order to bring in Hungary.

**Impact on NATO

	The just completed NATO study focuses on enlarging in a way that strengthensrather than weakens NATO. New countries will join with the full rights and obligations ofother NATO members.  A major element in choosing new candidates will bemaintaining the viability of the current consensus decision-making process.
	The study stresses that NATO does not want to import conflict by acceptingmembers that have not settled ethnic or border disputes.
	A minimum degree of military interoperability will be needed on the part ofcandidate countries so that NATO can operate smoothly. The extent of themodernization required has already generated a debate about the danger of extending"hollow commitments" which could cost NATO tens of billions of dollars to fix.
	The study also concludes that NATO has no a priori need for the forwarddeployment of either troops or nuclear weapons into any candidate country, but itreserves the right to do so. 
	Finally, in a compromise with the French, the study states that there is a"probability" that new members will join the integrated command.

**Impact in the United States**

	The enlargement issue has been debated in U.S. academic circles, with manyspecialists taking very cautious positions on enlargement. But the issue has not beendebated adequately in the U.S. Senate.
	There is bipartisan support for enlargement in the Senate--where 67 Senatorsmust support it--but it is shallow. Senator Lugar has been the strongest advocate ofenlargement. Senators Brown, Roth, Simon, and Murkowski have introduced anamendment to the FY96 foreign aid appropriations bill intended to strengthen theNATO participation provisions of existing law. Those provisions, passed last year,encouraged programs which would facilitate the transition to NATO membership for thefour Visegrad states. But the FY96 amendment was significantly weakened inconference with the House, demonstrating the lack of Congres-sional consensus on theissue.
	Others are very skeptical. Senator Sam Nunn, for example, has raised concernsabout its impact on Russia and has argued that we would have time to reconstitute ourcapability and expand NATO should Russian reform collapse. He suggests linkingNATO enlargement to EU enlargement unless a shift in Russian behavior requires anaccelerated pace.

**Recommendations**
- NATO needs to sail carefully between Scylla and Charydbis to avoid moving toofast or stalling.
- A decision on who should join should be delayed until after the Russianpresidential election, and probably until after the U.S. presidential election. 
- The December l995 Ministerial needs to demonstrate progress. Perhaps a specialhigh-level group should be established to recommend the "who and when" ofenlargement.
- The Senate should debate the issue fully early in 1997 before a final NATOdecision is made.
- The leading candidates are the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. The mostacceptable decision might be to take two candidates by the year 2000, probablythe Czech Republic and Poland. 
- NATO should not expand to include the Baltic states or Ukraine anytime soon.Romania and Bulgaria will probably have to wait.
- A more comprehensive set of security measures should be put into place forEastern European states before enlargement. This might include merging theNACC and the PFP, or using other means to strengthen the political role of PFP.Partners should meet regularly with the North Atlantic Council (NAC). TheWestern European Union could further strengthen the role of the WEU associatepartners.
- A stronger NATO-Russian relationship must be built without giving Russia a vetoover NATO affairs. For example, a permanent NATO liaison office that reportsdirectly to the Secretary General might be established in Moscow. These stepsneed to be put into place before new NATO members are  announced.

Dr. Hans Binnendijk is the director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.  Thispaper is based upon a November 27, 1995 lecture to the Netherlands AtlanticCommission. 
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