Volume 1 Issue 3 | October 2008

Public Safety

Geography

A Quarterly Bulletin of Applied Geography for the Study of Crime & Public Safety

Foreclosures and Crime: 

A Geographical Perspective

Ronald E. Wilson

Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety Program and Data Resources

National Institute of Justice

Derek J. Paulsen

Department of Criminal Justice

Eastern Kentucky University

Crime changes with urban development patterns. Opportunities for crime emerge, disappear, or move as the urban landscape changes. The current housing foreclosure 

crisis is a pattern that has the potential to form a new geography. Current home foreclosures 

are not randomly scattered across a metropolitan area nor do they occur solely in 

neighborhoods that are already crime-prone and depressed. Rather, they are often clustered 

in middle-class or revitalized neighborhoods that were fueled by the housing boom of the 

last decade and not in socially disorganized or otherwise destitute neighborhoods. 

Although neighborhood decline is normally a long, slow process occurring over a 

generation, the foreclosure crisis is expediting this decline, bringing with it the traditional 

outcomes of theft, drugs, vandalism, vagrancy, prostitution, and arson. Residents still 

living in these abandoned neighborhoods face an increasing risk of burglary and robbery. 

As neighborhoods fall further into disrepair, these crimes are only the immediate impact. 

Long-term trends could undo the significant progress that many metropolitan areas have 

made in the last few decades in both neighborhood quality of life and economic progress. 

As other changes occur throughout a metropolitan area, those forces take advantage of 

clusters of abandoned houses. They change the urban fabric fundamentally—and usually 

not for the better. A new set of socially disorganized neighborhoods is instantly created just 

as others have been revitalized. Yet the geographic distribution of these rapidly declining 

areas is more dispersed than traditional patterns of crime and social disorganization, 

and may affect suburban areas as much as the inner city. This geographic shift can create 

disorganized neighborhoods and increase crime. It has an impact on city-level crime 

patterns, housing and land use patterns, public transportation, police practices, and other 

public policy issues.

What are the long-term outcomes from this trend? Will there be large-scale changes in 

future crime trends? Will adjacent neighborhoods decline to create suburban ghetto areas? 

What will the impact be on children growing up in these rapidly declining foreclosure 

neighborhoods? Will they be more likely to suffer academically and socially as they are 

forced to move from their established social fabric? Will abandoned neighborhoods be 

replenished with new residents anytime soon? When they are replenished, what sorts of 

demographic and social changes will the new residents bring? 

Contents

1 Foreclosures and Crime: 

A Geographical Perspective 

2 Assessing the Impact of 

Home Foreclosures in 

Charlotte Neighborhoods

5 Using Maps of Home 

Foreclosures to Understand 

National and Local Problems

9 Breaking New Windows—

Examining the Subprime 

Mortgage Crisis Using the 

Broken Windows Theory

11 The National Neighborhood 

Indicators Partnership—

Creating Positive Change for 

Depressed Neighborhoods

12 Technical Tips

14 A New Model for 

Institutionalizing Problem 

Analysis in Police Agencies

17 Book Review

17 News Briefs

19 Crime News Events
22

G&PS | October 2008

Once a neighborhood falls into disarray it 

takes years and a lot of investment in time, 

money, and care to turn it around. Given this 

potentially bleak outcome, research and policy 

discussions are essential for stemming the tide 

of the foreclosure problem and planning ways 

to rebuild in its wake.

The emerging trend between foreclosures 

and crime has been well-documented in the 

news media; however, only one peer-reviewed 

study to date makes a statistical connection 

between the two.1 Researchers will need to 

work in conjunction with practitioners and 

policymakers to solve the problem. 

The process by which home foreclosures lead 

to crime must be analyzed in the context of 

other trends and changes in a metropolitan 

area. In particular, analysts must strive to 

determine how demographic, ecological, and 

economic processes affect urban structures 

during this crisis. Understanding current trends 

and developing solutions will require applying 

geographic principles and using geographic 

visualization and analysis to paint a full picture 

of the problem.

In this issue of Geography and Public Safety, 

Michael Bess of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Police Department describes a study his 

department conducted to examine foreclosures 

and their consequences in the Charlotte area. 

Erin Dalton, of the Department of Human 

Services in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, discusses 

how geographic information systems can be 

used to advise policy decisions related to the 

foreclosure crisis. 

Several news stories in this issue provide an 

overview of how the foreclosure crisis has 

brought on problems in many cities across the 

nation. These stories highlight the difficulties 

that city governments have faced rebuilding 

neighborhoods in the wake of financial crises 

and describe the negative results of predatory 

lending.

The issue also uses the broken windows theory 

to demonstrate that cities experiencing blight 

and disorder as a result of foreclosures should 

react quickly, before the problem escalates. 

An article by Louis Tuthill of the National 

Institute of Justice describes the basics of 

what this theory entails, and a technical piece 

by Phil Mielke of the Redlands (California) 

Police Department demonstrates how to use 

geographic information systems to invigorate 

efforts to remove blight and graffiti in a city. 

Finally, Kurt Smith of the San Diego Sheriff’s 

Department provides a practitioners’ review 

of a new book that examines the theories of 

broken windows and collective efficacy from 

the vantage point of hardcore criminals. 

Notes

1

Immergluck, D. and G. Smith, “The Impact of 

Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosure on Neighborhood 

Crime,” Housing Studies 21(6)(2006):851–866.

Residents in Charlotte are concerned with the high numbers of residential 

foreclosures. Although Charlotte is home to 

the Bank of America and several other major 

national banks, the city’s status as a major 

banking center has not helped shield the area 

from the nationwide foreclosure crisis. 

To better understand the crime and disorder 

that Charlotte is experiencing as a result of 

these foreclosures, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Police Department (CMPD) used applied 

geography. It combined a biannual qualityof-life study of neighborhoods with a 

homeownership and sales study commissioned 

by the local newspaper to assess the city’s 

foreclosure crisis, and used the department’s 

web-based mapping system to visualize the 

data. This allowed the department to develop 

a plan to avoid future foreclosures and support 

the local communities.

Assessing the Impact of Home 

Foreclosures in Charlotte Neighborhoods

Michael Bess

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department

Charlotte, North Carolina
3

The Problem

Late in 2005, an officer working in 

CMPD’s suburban North Division 

observed that some of his assigned 

neighborhoods were changing. He began 

to notice more houses becoming vacant, 

many of which were becoming hangouts 

for juveniles. He saw increased juvenile 

delinquency, curfew violations, and 

vandalism. As he shared his observations, 

he learned that other officers in other 

neighborhoods were noticing similar 

occurrences.

The North Division made this 

emerging problem a priority and began 

checking all of its neighborhoods for 

similar activity patterns. The division 

commander concluded that a number of 

newer neighborhoods had an alarming 

number of houses that were boarded up, 

broken streetlights, and junk and trash 

accumulating on the sidewalks. Entire 

neighborhoods were beginning to show 

signs of disorder and blight and began 

to resemble former inner-city slums. The 

houses in these neighborhoods were empty 

because their owners had moved out as a 

result of foreclosure.

Studying Charlotte 

Foreclosures 

The CMPD used several data sources to 

study the effects of residential foreclosures 

on Charlotte Neighborhoods:

Quality-of-life study. Every 2 years 

Charlotte’s Neighborhood Development 

Department commissions a study that 

evaluates the quality of life in 173 

neighborhoods. The study covers the entire 

city and surrounding territories. It measures 

quality of life using 20 social, physical, 

crime, and economic indicators,1 and uses 

the resulting data to categorize each area 

as stable, transitioning, or challenged.2 A 

secondary score indicates if the area’s quality 

of life is increasing, decreasing, or not 

changing. The CMPD regularly uses the 

quality-of-life study to help understand why 

certain neighborhoods experience crime and 

disorder.

The Charlotte Observer’s study. The 

local newspaper, The Charlotte Observer, 

conducted an investigation into home 

sales and lending practices by a number of 

builders and mortgage companies in the 

area. Staff assembled ownership and sales 

information extracted from county public 

property records. The CMPD and The 

Charlotte Observer agreed to partner and 

participate in an investigative series on the 

foreclosure crisis.

The CMPD’s web-based mapping 

system. Charlotte police officers use a 

custom web-based mapping system in their 

daily work to monitor levels of disorder and 

decide where to apply their enforcement 

and problem-solving skills. This system 

covers nearly 2,000 residential and 400 

commercial neighborhoods. 

Analyzing the Data 

An exploratory data analysis found that 

between 2003 and 2007, more than 8,700 

homes were foreclosed in CharlotteMecklenburg. After mapping foreclosure 

locations, a visual examination suggested 

that the foreclosures occurred most often 

in a portion of the county referred to as 

the Brookshire Corridor, which runs to the 

north and west from downtown (see Figure 

1).3 Clusters of foreclosures were located in 

neighborhoods built within the past 5 to 7 

years—many of the same neighborhoods 

where officers in the North Division observed 

increases in blight, crime, and disorder.

These high-foreclosure neighborhoods 

shared an additional characteristic: The 

market value of the houses in these 

neighborhoods was between $90,000 and 

$150,000. This price range was just below 

the average price for houses in the area, and 

is considered “affordable housing.”

To test if all neighborhoods in this price 

range were experiencing a similar rate 

of foreclosure, the CMPD examined all 

other areas with “affordable housing” and 

found 13 neighborhoods that had the 

most significant clusters of foreclosure. 

As a comparison group for further 

analysis, the CMPD identified another 12 

neighborhoods within the same price range 

that have not had the same magnitude of 

foreclosures.4 

The neighborhoods studied contained 5,355 

housing units—54 percent of these units 

were part of the high-foreclosure group 

and 46 percent were in the low group. 

Six hundred and forty-seven homes were 

foreclosed; 96 percent of those foreclosures 

came from the high-foreclosure group 

(which constituted almost a fourth of the 

units in the group). 

Foreclosed homes are often rentals. These 

neighborhoods are becoming primarily 

renter-occupied communities. One out of 

every four homes in high-foreclosure areas 

of neighborhoods is a rental property. This 

makes it difficult to organize residents and 

create strong neighborhood associations.

Foreclosures lead to higher crime rates. The 

CMPD analyzed rates of violent crime, 

property crime, and 911 service calls in all 

neighborhoods in the study from 2003 to 

2006. It found the following:

 Violent crime rose consistently 

during the 5-year period in the 

high-foreclosure neighborhoods, but 

remained significantly lower in the lowforeclosure neighborhoods, except in 

2004 (see Figure 2).

 Property crime and related service calls 

spiked in 2004, fell sharply in 2005, 

and rose slightly in 2006, following a 

pattern similar to violent crime rates in 

low-foreclosure neighborhoods. This 

Figure 1. Foreclosure Clusters in Charlotte 

Neighborhoods. ©Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Police Department
44

G&PS | October 2008

seems to correspond to a quick increase in 

housing units that year. A number of these 

neighborhoods were built in 2004, and 

many homes experienced appliance and 

building material thefts.

Some of the differences in the crime statistics 

observed may be due to when the houses were 

built. The high-foreclosure neighborhoods were 

built predominantly between 1999 and 2003 

and the low-foreclosure neighborhoods from 

2003 to 2006; therefore, the low-foreclosure 

group might simply be at an earlier stage of 

the foreclosure process, and may have not yet 

experienced the subsequent impact on crime 

and disorder. 

How the CMPD Has Responded 

to the Crisis

The data gathered supply the CMPD with 

information that will help it provide timely 

intervention and stabilize neighborhoods with 

high foreclosure rates. The CMPD partners 

with Charlotte’s Neighborhood Development 

Department and others to reverse the decay 

and disorder these neighborhoods have 

experienced. 

Neighborhood Development and the CMPD 

are actively engaged in neighborhood 

preservation activities in the high-foreclosure 

neighborhoods. These activities help stop the 

threat of crime and disorder, link property 

owners with financial counseling, and provide 

general foreclosure-prevention assistance. 

Other services have been provided by public, 

private, and nonprofit groups. For example, 

a private property management company 

has stepped in to provide free management 

services to one of the affected neighborhoods’ 

homeowners’ association. The association had 

completely collapsed and hadn’t been able to 

collect dues to maintain common community 

areas for more than a year. In another case, a 

landscaping contractor replaced landscaping 

in a troubled community. And Charlotte has 

created a foreclosure resource web site5

 to help 

people with problem loans avoid foreclosure. 

Conclusion 

This study serves as an example of how 

applied geography can be leveraged to 

understand neighborhood problems. Data 

exploration, coupled with observations from 

field personnel, allowed the police to visualize 

and understand the actual foreclosure 

problem. Without the understanding 

provided by the applied geography, the 

problem might have been misinterpreted as 

a crime-and-disorder problem. By using data 

and geography, the officers could see that this 

was a neighborhood decay issue related to 

Figure 2. Violent Crime Incidents per 100 Houses, 2003–2006. © CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department.
5

foreclosures. The resulting awareness led to 

partnerships with The Charlotte Observer to 

help get the story in front of the public.

The CMPD is currently working to enhance 

its ability to monitor neighborhood data, 

looking for indicators of foreclosure and 

related disorder. This will enable it to warn 

officers earlier, so that neighborhoods can 

receive help before they deteriorate.

Notes 

1

Quality-of-life scores are derived by examining four 

dimensions of variables. The dimensions include: 

1. Social. Average kindergarten test score, high 

school dropout rate, percentage of births 

versus the percentage of adolescents. 

2. Physical. Percentage of homeowners, 

percentage of people with access to public 

transportation, pedestrian friendliness index. 

3. Criminal. Violent crime rate, juvenile arrest 

rate, property crime rate. 

4. Economic Percentage change in housing 

values, percentage change in income, 

percentage of residents who receive food 

stamps.

2

Social, physical, criminal, and economic variables 

are used to label each area as stable, transitioning, 

or challenged:

 Stable. An area has few neighborhood-scale 

problems and high scores on quality-of-life 

categories.

 Transitioning. An area has average overall 

scores and weakness in one or more of the 

quality-of-life categories, signaling a change in 

a neighborhood’s quality-of-life. 

 Challenged. An area has low or moderate 

scores on quality of life dimensions, and is 

considered “at risk” in multiple categories.

3

This was confirmed using density calculation 

methods available in NIJ’s CrimeStat and other 

spatial analysis software.

4

Interestingly, none of the study’s neighborhoods 

was ranked as “challenged” in the quality-of-life 

study. One neighborhood in the high-foreclosure 

group was shown as trending upward, and the rest 

were not changing. The low-foreclosure group had 

exactly the same scoring pattern; all scored as not 

changing except one, which was trending upward. 

Additionally, 8 of the 13 neighborhoods 

experiencing high foreclosure rates fall into the 

category of transitioning as defined by the qualityof-life study. The other five are classified as stable. 

The other comparison neighborhoods are split 

equally—six are considered transitioning and six 

are stable. The study will be updated in 2008, and 

foreclosures may affect the quality-of-life ratings.

5

Find out more about the Charlotte Foreclosure 

Resource Center at: www.charmeck org/

Departments/Neighborhood+Dev/Provide+Afforda

ble+HousingForeclosure+Resource+Center.htm. 

The mortgage foreclosure crisis has affected millions of Americans 

directly, but uncounted members of their 

communities have also felt the impact of 

foreclosures through depressed property 

values or criminal activity that follows from 

vacant housing. In 2007 alone, there were 

2.2 million foreclosures nationwide, up 

75 percent from 2006;1

 and a 2001 study 

by Temple University concluded that an 

abandoned house on a block reduced the 

value of other properties on the block by an 

average of $6,720.2

The crisis has been noted by national 

leaders. In his September 2007 testimony 

before the House Committee on Financial 

Services, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 

Bernanke said, “The consequences of default 

may be severe for homeowners, who face 

the possibility of foreclosure, the loss of 

accumulated home equity, and reduced 

access to credit. In addition, clusters of 

foreclosures can lead to declines in the 

values of nearby properties and do great 

damage to neighborhoods.”3

Despite the significant media focus on 

foreclosures in middle- and upper-income 

communities, low- and moderate-income 

communities are likely to bear most of 

the burden of this crisis because they are 

disproportionately exposed to foreclosures 

and are the least equipped to respond. 

This article will discuss local communities’ 

capacity to use geographic information 

systems (GIS) to influence crime control 

and other emerging problems and to 

advise policy-making around these 

pressing social issues.

How Foreclosures Can Lead 

to Crime 

News reports suggest that communities 

with high densities of mortgage 

foreclosures become communities with 

high densities of vacant houses, which 

attract squatters, looters, drug dealers, 

prostitutes, and arsonists. In Ohio, Mark 

Wiseman of the Cleveland-based Cuyahoga 

County Foreclosure Prevention Program 

observed that once owners move out of 

foreclosed homes, looters steal whatever 

they can (including appliances, copper 

piping, and wire) and squatters move in 

to escape the weather, often setting indoor 

fires that get out of control.4

Much more research is needed to describe 

and specify the relationships among 

Using Maps of Home Foreclosures 

to Understand National and Local Problems 

Erin Dalton, Robert Gradeck, and 

Anthony Mercaldo

Allegheny County Department of Human Services

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
66

G&PS | October 2008

mortgage foreclosures, vacant housing, and 

crime. Research conducted by Immergluck 

and Smith in Chicago showed that a 1 percent 

increase in the foreclosure rate led to a 2.3 

percent increase in crime rates.5 Furthermore, 

decades of research show that vacant housing 

increases crime. Researchers in Austin, Texas, 

examined abandoned residential buildings in 

a low-income neighborhood and found that 

these sites attracted crime—83 percent showed 

evidence of illegal activities such as prostitution 

and drug use.6 This study further revealed that 

blocks with vacant buildings had three times as 

many drug calls to police and twice the calls for 

theft and violence compared to blocks that had 

no vacant buildings. 

Local Data Can Be Used to 

Affect Policy 

For nearly 3 decades, national groups 

have been helping local organizations, 

particularly in low-income communities, 

amass and utilize quantitative information 

to provide programming that better serves 

their constituencies. Their use of GIS 

to understand community problems is 

becoming increasingly common. The National 

Neighborhood Indicators Project (NNIP),7

for example, connects the Urban Institute8 

with local partners in 29 cities, helping to 

drive community change using neighborhood 

information systems. Similarly, the Local 

Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) 

has 30 urban offices that provide capacitybuilding support to community organizations 

that wish to develop and build information 

stores. LISC offers economic support, 

educational opportunities, and information, 

helping community organizations use data 

more effectively in their work in distressed 

communities.9 Another national coalition, 

Social Compact, uses GIS to examine 

economic variables in different neighborhoods 

and create investment opportunities in 

struggling communities. These programs have 

begun to yield promising results. 

Today, hundreds of communities are building 

the information they need to address 

community challenges. Some uncover 

opportunities by becoming affiliated sites 

and recognized partners, and others embrace 

the principles set forth by these leading 

organizations. Most sites have amassed 

significant data stores. A recent inventory of 

NNIP site data finds that the communities 

collect demographic, crime, youth, health, 

housing, land use, and economic information. 

Many of these organizations have expanded 

their data collections to include information 

that furthers their understanding of mortgage 

foreclosures. The Pittsburgh Neighborhood and 

Community Information System (PNCIS) has 

compiled a wealth of data to identify possible 

indicators of foreclosures and vacancy.10 The 

system has information on tax delinquency, 

vacancy, building code violations, and more. 

In addition, it has collected detailed crimeincident data, allowing researchers to see 

how specific neighborhoods are affected by 

foreclosures. 

Similarly, the University of Memphis’s Center 

for Community Building and Neighborhood 

Action has completed ZIP Code mapping 

and analysis on foreclosure data from 2000 to 

2007. It has incorporated Census and Home 

Mortgage Disclosure Act11 data and plans to 

add data from the Internal Revenue Service and 

Social Compact’s inner-city market analyses, 

known as DrillDowns.12

This sort of community-level information is 

critical because national data sources often do 

not adequately represent low- and middleincome communities. G. Thomas Kingsley, 

the director of NNIP, testified before a 

joint House hearing in May 2008. He said, 

“Housing markets are complicated, and how 

neighborhood spillover effects are likely to work 

Figure 1. The Arlington Neighborhood of 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. This figure shows 

address-level data on home foreclosures. 

© Allegheny County Deptarment of Human 

Services
7

themselves out in different metropolitan 

settings is certainly not well understood 

at this point. Richer data sets than those 

available nationally (including data on the 

capacities of local service providers) need to 

be assembled and examined.”13

Furthermore, national data on home 

foreclosures may not be useful unless they are:

 Combined with local data (from code 

enforcement, police, housing, etc.).

 Directed at specific audiences. Data 

should be organized by council 

district for an audience of city council 

members, by beat for police officers, or 

by street for community groups. 

Maps are crucial to presenting this 

information in a usable way. Mortgage 

foreclosure maps are being produced at 

every geographic scale (see Figure 1 for an 

example of a neighborhood-level map.) 

They help groups target their community 

outreach efforts. 

Although amassing community-level data 

is a significant accomplishment and a 

necessary first step toward understanding 

mortgage foreclosure trends, it is not 

sufficient to effect change. Any data-driven 

approach to the mortgage foreclosure 

crisis must be supplemented with strong 

community partnerships among housing 

counseling agencies, financial institutions, 

and government agencies. Nonetheless, 

these data can help communities improve 

their neighborhoods and influence policy. 

Using GIS to Inform 

Mortgage Foreclosure 

Policy and Practice 

Geographic analysis can be used to 

craft, implement, and monitor policy 

interventions throughout the nation. 

Examples of successful uses of GIS to 

inform policy and practice are discussed 

below.

The Neighborhood Stabilization Act of 

2008. Representatives from NNIP, LISC, 

and Social Compact took center stage at a 

May 2008 hearing on the Neighborhood 

Stabilization Act of 2008 (H.R. 5818),14

presenting their analyses on the legislation’s 

impact. The act would make housing 

stimulus grants and loans available to 

qualified states, urban counties, and cities 

through the Department of Housing and 

Urban Development. 

The witnesses used maps of foreclosures, 

vacancies, and problem properties to make 

the case that foreclosures affect not just 

homeowners but also neighbors and the 

surrounding community. They discussed 

the importance of using relevant, accurate 

data and taking individual community 

characteristics into account when creating 

a formula that governs foreclosure aid 

allocations. 

Cleveland’s early warning system.

At Case Western University, the Center 

for Urban Poverty and Community 

Development is using GIS to develop a 

foreclosure “early warning system” for 

Cleveland (see Figure 2). The system 

will identify variables that may indicate 

foreclosure, including tax delinquency, low 

water usage, and vacancy. Armed with this 

information, community development 

groups and local government can target their 

efforts to prevent foreclosure.15

Boston’s coordinated intervention 

efforts. The City of Boston’s foreclosure 

intervention team uses GIS to coordinate 

the activities of agencies, including 

the police, inspection services, and 

neighborhood development groups. The 

team focuses intervention efforts on streets 

with high foreclosure activity. 

The Association of Community 

Organizations for Reform Now 

(ACORN). ACORN helps ensure social and 

economic justice in low- and moderateincome communities nationwide. The 

organization uses GIS to prepare papers on 

the costs of foreclosures, tailored to nearly 

100 metropolitan areas, for homeowners, 

their neighbors, lenders, investors, and 

local governments. Additionally, it uses 

GIS to map census tracts that have a high 

number of subprime loans and estimated 

future foreclosures. This helps stakeholders 

target outreach and advocacy efforts. 

ACORN’s papers are being used to create 

policy recommendations on key issues 

like foreclosure prevention, affordable 

housing, municipal maintenance for vacant 

properties, and lending regulation. 

Figure 2. Sample Map Used by Case Western University to Develop an Early-Warning 

System for Cleveland, Ohio, Neighborhoods. © Allegheny County Department of 

Human Services
88

G&PS | October 2008

Law enforcement use GIS maps to target 

foreclosed homes. In Virginia’s Loudoun 

and Fairfax Counties, law enforcement officers 

are “targeting vacant houses on regular patrols, 

using maps of foreclosed properties as guides, 

while working with community watch groups 

to identify trouble spots.”17 

Conclusion 

The use of GIS to identify and address 

major public policy issues has increased 

significantly in the last decade. Today, 

communities throughout the country have 

data repositories, new data sets, and analysis 

to help them respond to critical problems. 

Many communities display this information 

on the Internet so that police departments 

and citizens alike can use the information to 

respond. Easily accessible maps bring diverse 

parties together to create community-wide 

solutions. 

Policymakers have recognized the need 

for information, and many state and local 

governments now require the private sector 

to provide critical data to regulatory agencies 

for mapping. They have also engaged key 

community stakeholders who provide maps and 

analysis.

The use of GIS to target home foreclosureprevention efforts demonstrates how well GIS 

can be employed to understand and respond to 

community problems.

Notes 

1

“U.S. Foreclosures Rise in December: Reach 2.2 mln 

in 2007.” Forbes. January 29. 2008. www.forbes.com/

markets/feeds/afx/2008/01/29/afx4584956.html.

2

Temple University Center for Public Policy and 

Eastern Pennsylvania Organizing Project. Blight 

Free Philadelphia: A Public-Private Strategy to Create 

and Enhance Neighborhood Value. Philadelphia 

Pennsylvania: Temple University, 2001.

3

Bernake, Ben S. Statement to the House Committee 

on Financial Services. Subprime Mortgage Lending 

and Mitigating Foreclosures, Hearing, September 20, 

2007. www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/

bernanke20070920a.htm.

4

Christie, Les. “Crime Scene: Foreclosure.” 

CNNMoney.com. November 19 2007. 

www.consumer-action.org/press/articles/crime_

scene_foreclosure.

5

Immergluck, Dan, and Geoff Smith, “The Impact of 

Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood 

Crime,” Housing Studies 21(2006):855–866.

6

Spelman, William, “Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for 

Crime?” Journal of Criminal Justice 21(1993):481–495.

7

The National Neighborhood Indicators Partnership 

(NNIP) is a collaborative effort of the Urban Institute 

and local partners to further the development and use 

of neighborhood-level information systems in local 

policy-making and community building. For more 

information, see www2.urban.org/nnip/about.html.

8

The Urban Institute is a nonpartisan economic and 

social policy research organization that gathers data, 

conducts research, evaluates programs, offers technical 

assistance, and educates Americans on social and 

economic issues. For more information, see 

www.urban.org/about/index.cfm.

9

For more information about the Local Initiatives 

Support Corporation (LISC), see www.lisc.org/section/

aboutus.

10For more information, see “Pittsburgh Neighborhood 

and Community Information Systems.” www.pghnis.

pitt.edu.

11The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) was 

enacted by Congress in 1975 and implemented by 

the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation C. It requires 

lending institutions to report public loan data. For 

more information, see www.ffiec.gov/hmda.

12For more information about Social Compact’s 

DrillDowns, see www.socialcompact.org/market.htm.

13Kingsley, G. Thomas. Statement to the House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s 

Domestic Policy Subcommittee and the House 

Committee on Financial Services’ Subcommittee on 

Housing and Community Opportunity. Targeting 

Federal Aid to Neighborhoods Distressed by the Subprime 

Mortgage Crisis, Hearing, May 22, 2008. Available 

on the web at: www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/

financialsvcs_dem/kingsley052208.pdf; Accessed: 

7/14/2008.

14For more information on the Neighborhood 

Stabilization Act of 2008, see thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/

bdquery/z?d110:h.r.05818:. 

15For more information, see blog.case.edu/

msass/2007/09/24/poverty_center_presentation_

at_2007_national_vacant_properties_campaign_

conference.html#more.

16Foreclosure Exposure 2: The Cost to our Cities 

and Neighborhoods, Association of Community 

Organizations for Reform Now. October 19, 

2007. www.acorn.org/index.php?id=8618&tx_

ttnews[swords]=Foreclosure%20Exposure%20

2%3A%20The%20Cost%20to%20our%20

Cities%20and%20Neighborhoods&tx_ttnews[tt_

news]=21695&tx_ttnews[backPid]=8016&cHash=cb

ac8e4963.

17Mummolo, Jonathan, and Bill Brubaker. “As 

Foreclosed Homes Empty, Crime Arrives..” The 

Washington Post. April 27, 2008. www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/26AR2008042

601288.html.
9

The subprime mortgage crisis1

 has had 

a large impact on the economy of 

the United States and the world. These 

economic and residential changes will lead 

to increases in crime at the local level. 

The crime and justice community needs 

to understand what kind of crime changes 

may occur in order to create programs and 

policies to counter these new sorts of crimes. 

The broken windows theory has had one of 

the largest public policy impacts on issues 

involving location and crime. 

This article briefly reviews the broken 

windows theory, empirical research that 

examines the application of the theory, 

and the counterarguments from alternative 

theoretical positions. It then discusses how 

criminological theories of place and crime 

can be applied to the current housing crisis, 

and the effects that the crisis may have in 

the extended future. 

Broken Windows 

Theory and Research 

In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. 

Kelling created the broken windows theory 

when they wrote Broken Windows: The 

Police and Neighborhood Safety. The premise 

of their theory is that neighborhood 

physical and social disorder is a precursor 

to serious crime. Wilson and Kelling argue 

that physical signs of disorder (such as 

broken windows, graffiti, or abandoned 

buildings) and social signs of disorder 

(such as homelessness or panhandlers) give 

rise to apathy and fear among residents. 

When residents experience fear and apathy, 

they become unwilling to work together to 

improve their neighborhood. Wilson and 

Kelling, therefore, contend that to avoid 

serious crimes, law enforcement should 

police these minor crimes and disorder 

(Wilson and Kelling, 1982).

During the last 20 years, the broken 

windows theory has had a significant 

effect on public policy regarding place 

and crime. One reason for this success has 

been the support of current Los Angeles 

Police Chief (and former New York Police 

Commissioner) William Bratton. 

Bratton has maintained that the 

implementation of innovations derived 

from the broken windows theory allowed 

for the decrease in crime in both New York 

and Los Angeles. These innovations include 

broken windows policing, hot spot policing, 

CompStat, and zero-tolerance policing. 

Research evaluating the impact of these 

innovations and public policy changes has 

shown mixed results (Messner et al., 2007). 

Opposing Theories 

Some researchers argue that physical and 

social disorder are the result of criminal 

behavior rather than the cause, and 

that crime arises because of community 

residents’ inability to assert informal 

social controls within their neighborhood. 

This theoretical model, better known as 

collective efficacy, suggests that increases 

in crime arise out of weak social ties and 

the unwillingness of residents to act for the 

social good of the community (Sampson 

and Raudenbush, 1999).

Another line of research argues that 

even socially and physically disorganized 

neighborhoods have informal social 

controls, business, and community 

cohesion—although these factors exist as 

a part of the illicit activity and violence 

in the community (Venkatesh, 2006). 

This criminal behavior occurs as a result 

of the interaction of social conditions 

(such as poverty, single-parent households, 

or residential instability), informal 

organizations (such as gangs or mafia), and 

illegal activities (such as prostitution or 

drug sales) that maintain social order and 

stimulate the local economy.

Using the Theories to Combat 

Crime and Social Disorder 

Public and policing policies resulting 

from the broken windows theory are not a 

panacea for crime and social disorder. Such 

policies are more effective when residents 

work to strengthen their community 

through local involvement in politics; 

schools; their neighborhood; and programs 

such as neighborhood watch, the parentteacher association, and service-based clubs 

(Sharon et al., 2004). 

But efforts to create public policy, policing 

policy, and intervention need coordinating 

with efforts to build community strengths. 

Community strength-building efforts may 

include improving community cohesion, 

enhancing local economies, providing 

evidence-based intervention and prevention 

programs, and reducing physical disorder. 

Strengthening communities can support 

police efforts and provide law enforcement 

with additional resources.

The Broken Windows Theory 

as Applied to the Subprime 

Loan Crisis 

Economists are still debating the factors 

that led to the recent subprime mortgage 

crisis, global financial crisis, and bursting 

of the U.S. housing bubble.2 Nearly 1.3 

million houses were subject to foreclosure 

in 2007, and banks around the world 

have lost $391 billion (Bernanke, 2008). 

Subprime mortgages were often given to 

higher risk customers who did not have 

the credit track record to receive prime 

loans. A risky track record might include 

customers with low incomes, a short job 

history, or low credit scores. Such loans 

Breaking New Windows—Examining the Subprime 

Mortgage Crisis Using the Broken Windows Theory 

By Louis Tuthill

National Institute of Justice

Washington, D.C.
1010

G&PS | October 2008

disproportionately occurred in neighborhoods 

with high levels of poverty and ethnic 

diversity (Squires, 2004). These low-income 

neighborhoods will be hardest hit from this 

economic crisis. 

The current economic crisis has had quite a few 

effects at the local level:

 Resources for law enforcement, afterschool programs, intervention and 

prevention programs, and other supports 

that mitigate criminal behavior will be 

reduced. 

 Residents will leave economically 

disadvantaged communities and homes in 

these communities will foreclose. These 

residential changes will weaken social ties 

within the community. 

 After residents leave the community, 

service-based businesses in the community 

will close. This can also be followed 

by bank decisions to stop investing in 

neighborhoods that are seen as too risky 

(Li et al., 2001). These changes create 

a negative feedback loop—the decrease 

in businesses and bank investments will 

further reduce the resources for programs 

that mitigate crime. 

The new neighborhoods that form in times of 

economic distress will have weakened social 

ties, lack the resources to address the social and 

physical disorder, and become enclaves where 

illicit forms of economy and organization could 

prosper. 

Recent research examining the link between 

housing foreclosures and increased crime has 

shown a positive correlation between the two, 

but more research is needed (Immergluck and 

Smith, 2006). Crime-reduction efforts must 

address this economic crisis at the local level 

and work to alleviate the community problems 

that it has created. The effects of this crisis 

will have a much larger impact on community 

resources as time passes.

References

Bernanke, B.S. The Economic Outlook. Report for 

the House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 2008.

Immergluck, D. and G. Smith,” The Impact of SingleFamily Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood 

Crime,” Housing Studies. 21(6)(2006):851–866

Lahart, J. “Egg Cracks Differ in Housing, Finance 

Shells.” The Wall Street Journal, December 24, 2007. 

online.wsj.com/article/SB119845906460548071.

html?mod=googlenews_wsj.

Li, W., Y. Zhou, M. Chee, and G. Dymski, “Banking 

on Social Capital in the Era of Globalization: Chinese 

Ethnobanks in Los Angeles,” Environment and Planning

33(11) (2001):1923–1948. 

Messner, S.F., S. Galea, K.J. Tardiff, M. Tracy, A. 

Bucciarelli, T. Markham-Piper, V. Frye, and D. Vlahov, 

“Policing, Drugs, and the Homicide Decline in New 

York City in the 1990s,” Criminology 45(2)(2007): 

385–414. 

Mihalic, S., A. Fagan, K. Irwin, D. Ballard, and D. 

Elliott. Blueprints for Violence Prevention. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile 

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2004. NCJ 

204274.

Sampson, R.J. and S. Raudenbush, “Systematic Social 

Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder 

in Urban Neighborhoods,” American Journal of Sociology

105(3)(1999):603–651.

Squires, Gregory D. Why the Poor Pay More: How to 

Stop Predatory Lending. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 

Publishers, 2004.

Venkatesh, S.A. Off the Books: The Underground 

Economy of the Urban Poor. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 

Harvard University Press, 2006.

Wilson, J.Q. and G. L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: 

The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” Atlantic Monthly

249 (March 1982). www.theatlantic.com/doc/198203/

broken-windows.

Notes

1

In 2006, an economic crisis began that was caused by 

global investors’ inability to move their assets because 

of an increased home foreclosure rate in the United 

States. This triggered a global economic crisis in 2007, 

which made it more difficult for Americans to refinance 

their homes. This global economic crisis is known as 

the subprime mortgage crisis.

2

Many factors led to the subprime mortgage crisis, 

including borrowers taking loans they were not capable 

of paying, lenders lending to high-risk borrowers, a 

downturn in the housing market, and government 

policies that may have forced lenders to make higher 

risk loans.
11

The subprime mortgage crisis and the effect it has had on the nation 

can not be understated. High numbers 

of home foreclosures affect both the 

people directly displaced and residents 

in surrounding neighborhoods because 

they debase the property values of the 

homes in neighboring areas. Furthermore, 

home foreclosures have been associated 

with increased rates of crime and public 

disorder. 

Policymakers and analysts nationwide are 

currently trying to measure the effects of 

the foreclosure crisis and decide how to 

distribute resources properly. The National 

Neighborhood Indicators Partnership 

(NNIP) has been forthcoming in assisting 

with this task. The NNIP was created 

to assist policymakers and researchers 

in solving problems, helping distressed 

neighborhoods like those affected by the 

foreclosure dilemma.

On May 21–22, 2008, three NNIP 

representatives testified in congressional 

hearings about the effects of subprime 

lending at the neighborhood level. The 

representatives discussed the new federal 

legislation, H.R. 5818, which will 

create loans and grants for states to help 

them buy back foreclosed housing. The 

representatives focused on how foreclosure 

affects surrounding neighborhoods and 

what other solutions might be employed to 

resolve the crisis.

NNIP partner Phyllis Betts testified at 

the first hearing, which focused on the 

debilitating effect the foreclosure dilemma 

has on local neighborhoods and how it 

causes blight to spread. Her testimony 

supported H.R. 5818, referencing 

foreclosure problems in Memphis and 

Shelby County, Tennessee. In particular, 

she addressed the 61,590 foreclosures that 

occurred in the county between 2000 and 

2007, which accounted for 25 percent of 

the county’s single-family residences. 

Another NNIP partner, Vicky Been, 

testified at the same hearing. Her 

research, which focused on the effects 

that foreclosures have on the value of 

neighboring properties in New York, 

showed that properties in the vicinity of 

foreclosures have significantly lowered 

values, accompanied by an increase in 

crime and neighborhood blight. 

Tom Kingsley, director of the NNIP, 

testified at the second hearing, which 

focused on recognizing and allocating 

federal aid to the neighborhoods most 

affected by the subprime mortgage crisis. 

He spoke about how the funding formula1

should be based on certain indicators, 

datasets, and principles.2

The current national foreclosure crisis may 

seem dire, but the work and data that the 

NNIP produces are steps toward a solution. 

The NNIP’s partners help to quantitatively 

measure the effects that subprime lending 

has on cities at the local and neighborhood 

levels and describe how this affects a city 

as a whole. Their research has the power to 

influence policy change and help alleviate 

the negative effects of foreclosures. 

Notes

1 The funding formula (a part of H.R. 5818) 

calculates a state’s outstanding loan and grant 

allocations based on the state’s number of 90-day 

delinquent subprime loans and foreclosures.

2

The full testimonies of the NNIP partners and 

staff can be found on the web at www2.urban.org/

nnip/subprime.html.

3

Indicator projects are local data systems created 

and maintained by each partnership. These 

systems track and record indications of changing 

neighborhood conditions in a city. 

The National Neighborhood Indicators 

Partnership—Creating Positive Change 

for Depressed Neighborhoods

Timothy Brown

National Institute of Justice

Washington, D.C.

About the National NeighborhoodIndicators Partnership (NNIP) 

The NNIP is a collective effort formed in 1995 by the Urban Institute. The 

partnership’s goal was to help develop and implement neighborhood information 

systems in different urban centers across the nation. Today, the NNIP works 

on 26 indicator projects3 in cities around the nation. These projects provide 

policymakers with access to uniform and practical neighborhood-level 

information that they can use to support positive change and policy development. 

Moreover, this information can be used to improve the state of depressed urban 

neighborhoods and communities. 

The NNIP supports local community leaders in performing their own analyses, 

and encourages the presentation and use of local data. Using local data allows 

leaders to allocate resources in the most efficient and effective manner.
1212

G&PS | October 2008

When New York City police began targeting graffiti crews and turnstile 

jumpers instead of the city’s rampant violence 

and crack use, many critics objected. But when 

their strategy gave way to success, police began 

seriously considering broken windows policing 

as an excellent crime-reduction policy. Today, 

police can use geographic information system 

tools to reduce blight and graffiti in a city and 

enhance broken windows policing strategies. 

Broken windows policing is a theory 

developed by George Kelling and James 

Wilson. It suggests that if minor crimes and 

disorders are targeted, major crime will be 

prevented. In other words, an environmental 

context sets norms of acceptable behavior—if 

one window is broken, vandals will think that 

breaking windows is an acceptable behavior. 

Journalist Malcolm Gladwell highlights 

these ideas in his book, The Tipping Point, 

illustrating that many relatively benign factors 

can combine to produce a “tip” in forces at 

play. Criminal behavior or public disorder 

grows exponentially rather than following 

a straight linear path; thus, targeting small 

crimes and blight can have an outstanding 

effect on city crime prevention. 

Crime analysts can respond to blight and 

graffiti issues within a city in many different 

ways. Maps using different data sources help 

analysts consider the environmental factors at 

play and make crime prevention a major factor 

in a city’s planning and development. When 

creating a plan for citywide crime prevention, 

geographic information system (GIS) 

analysts must combine officers’ observations 

of neighborhood crime and disorder with 

external data and policing initiatives. 

Riverside’s Graffiti Abatement 

Partnership

Many forces can lead to a breakdown of 

the social fabric of neighborhoods and 

commercial establishments. Vandalism 

and graffiti are primary indicators of this 

kind of degradation; however, these crimes 

often go unreported. Crime analysts using 

graffiti and vandalism reports to support a 

picture of the city’s overall problem find the 

public’s reluctance to report minor crimes 

challenging. Public relations efforts can 

help people learn why and how they should 

report such crimes. Cities need this kind of 

proactive effort to document and clean public 

and private property.

This notion of proactively combating graffiti 

made the community of Riverside, California, 

consider how the public works and police 

departments could work together effectively to 

create an information technology project that 

would serve both their needs:

 The public works department needed to 

document the location, time, materials, 

and equipment associated with graffiti 

cleanup. They needed to keep track of 

work done in the field and supervise their 

field workers. 

 The police department needed to 

analyze data and track individuals’ and 

crews’ tags1

 in an attempt in court to tie 

individuals or tagging crews to other acts 

of vandalism.

 As a result of its partnership with the 

public works department, the police 

department could use the costs tracked 

by the public works department to assess 

damages in the offenders’ trials.2

Riverside’s System 

The Riverside system can best be discussed 

in relation to its components. This article 

examines Riverside’s field equipment, server 

architecture, and software application design. 

Field equipment. Riverside cleans up graffiti 

either proactively or using a work order 

system. Each cleanup crew member has a 

combination Ricoh GPS-enabled camera with 

a customized entry screen. The GPS-enabled 

camera stores location data in the image tag. 

TECHINCAL TIPS

Using Geographic Information Systems 

to Support Broken Windows Policing

Philip Mielke

Redlands Police Department

Redlands, California
13

Ten to twelve crew members work in the 

field each day, and the camera and crew 

members’ IDs are specific to each picture 

and camera. The crew member arrives on 

the scene and takes multiple pictures of the 

graffiti incident. The crew member proceeds 

to clean or cover up the graffiti. A camera 

records the method and duration of the 

cleaning. For jobs larger than a permanent 

marker tag,3 different crew members arrive 

with appropriate equipment (such as a 

pressure washer, sandblaster, or paint). 

An image tag stores date, time, latitude, 

longitude, crew ID, time spent, cleanup 

type, and work order number. 

Crew members spend 50 percent of their 

time recording and cleaning proactively. 

They walk down targeted streets and 

systematically capture data and clean up 

graffiti on public and private property. This 

method allows them to capture data in areas 

that are not typically reported. Moreover, 

proactively cleaning graffiti by targeted 

streets reduces travel costs and is more 

efficient. Approximately 64,000 graffiti 

incidents have been captured and cleaned 

up in the 9 months that the program has 

been in place. 

Server architecture. The server 

architecture is split into six components to 

allow the police department to maintain 

security. These components include the 

following:

1. A public works ArcSDE (Spatial Data 

Engine) database that stores spatial 

information linked to graffiti images 

so that an analyst can review image 

information on a map.

2. A mirrored police ArcSDE database 

that stores feature classes,4 making them 

accessible from the firewall-protected 

police network.

3. A public works Oracle server, with 

data that list work time, cost, and 

equipment used in cleanup. These data 

are joined to spatial information so that 

users can review the data by location.

4. A police Oracle database that houses 

police-specific data (such as moniker or 

tag crew) and joins these data to feature 

classes. 

5. An application server for the ArcGIS 

Server, for reporting and editing.

6. An application server for the SQL 

Server 2005, for reporting and editing. 

When crew members return at the end of 

the day, crew managers retrieve the data 

from their instruments. Analysts process 

images, gjving each tag spatial attributes, 

and adding them into an ArcSDE feature 

class. Each feature class entry references 

image files, which allows analysts to link 

them to different Internet applications. 

Once the imagery and data are processed, 

the public works department tallies costs 

for each crew member, noting the time 

and type of cleanup required. Proactive 

and work-order-generated graffiti cleanups 

are collected and summed, and tools help 

analysts edit material, equipment, and labor 

costs. 

SQL Server 2005 customized intranet 

reports also provide the public works 

department with statistics of daily operating 

costs and individual crew member 

productivity. An ArcGIS Server intranet 

application maps the cleanup locations 

and allows analysts to query locations to 

learn the date and extent of each cleanup. 

Analysts report that geocoding or zooming 

into specific locales is intuitive. A “map tips” 

tool brings the graffiti image and pertinent 

data to the screen for review. 

Software application design. The 

Riverside Police Department uses the 

mirrored ArcSDE database, which stores 

spatial data. It combines this database with 

an Oracle database that stores data about 

each collected graffiti instance. 

One full-time graffiti analyst enters moniker 

(i.e., tag) information into a customized 

interface. This information often can be 

connected with related incidents and these 

data can be entered into a separate field. If 

an analyst cannot connect the moniker with 

other tags, he or she can search and review 

possible previous tags by text and image. 

Additionally, proactive cleanup and data 

collection allows analysts to cluster sections 

geographically, which often helps them link 

individuals’ tags or tags created by the same 

crew of offenders. Since a majority of crews 

claim geographic origin in their tag (such 

as Eden Street or 14th Street), analysts can 

review the migration of tag crew activity. 

Figure 1. The ArcGIS Server Application allows police to review graffiti locations.

Users can query moniker information, tagging crews, and dates. © Philip Mielke.
1414

G&PS | October 2008

The ArcGIS Server, an internet mapping 

application, allows police analysts to search data 

by date, case number, moniker, crew name, or 

address.

Conclusion

To eliminate graffiti and blight effectively, 

crime analysis units must partner with their 

city’s or region’s GIS department and/or 

public works department to develop a datasharing relationship. Cities maintain a wealth 

of data that allow them to better understand 

the geographic circumstances behind many 

crime problems. These partnerships can help 

defray costs of GIS data, software, and project 

development. In return, crime analysis data 

helps city officials realign and assess the city’s 

priorities. This, helps them find efficient and 

cost-effective ways to target graffiti and blight 

and reduce citywide crime.

Notes 

1

Individuals or crews who create graffiti often deface an 

area by painting their “tag,” meaning their nickname or 

moniker, on public property. Each tag is unique, and 

by identifying and connecting similar tags, police can 

link incidents committed by the same person or crew.

2

The police department kept monikers and data 

pertaining to their crime reports in a separate system 

that is secure by Department of Justice standards. 

3

Often, individuals write their tags on public property 

in permanent marker. This kind of tagging is the most 

common type observed.

4

A feature class is a point, line, or polygon layer that is 

added to a geographic map. Collections of points can 

link to images of graffiti.

A New Model for 

Institutionalizing 

Problem Analysis in 

Police Agencies 

Dr. Rachel Boba

Assistant Professor

Criminology and Criminal Justice Department

Florida Atlantic University

Port St. Lucie, Florida

Nicole J. Scalisi

Research Analyst

United Stated Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Washington, D.C.

Introduction

A Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office)-funded project in 

2003, “Institutionalizing Problem Analysis: 

Case Studies of Problem Analysis in Five Police 

Agencies,” worked to institutionalize problem 

analysis in five research sites (Weisel et al., 

2008). One of these agencies, the Port St. 

Lucie (Florida) Police Department (PSLPD), 

implemented the “Integrated Model of Problem 

Solving, Analysis, and Accountability.” The 

integrated model reconsiders how to define 

and analyze problems and how problemsolving accountability should be distributed 

throughout the entire police organization. 

The model has shown initial success during 

the last 4 years, so in 2007, the COPS Office 

provided additional funding to lead researcher 

Rachel Boba to do the following:

 Complete a thorough evaluation of the 

model’s development and impact on crime

 Bring problem-solving scholars and 

practitioners together to review the 

evaluation findings and identify best 

practices and considerations of the model’s 

implementation

 Develop a guidebook based on the 

evaluation and forum results.

 Create problem-solving literature to 

facilitate other agencies’ learning about and 

implementing the model

 Develop training curricula and product 

examples that law enforcement agencies 

can use to implement this model within 

their own organizations. 

As part of this project, in May 2008 the COPS 

Office hosted a focus group of practitioners 

(crime analysts and sworn commanders) at 

Florida Atlantic University. Dr. Boba facilitated 
15

a session in which participants discussed the 

pros and cons of implementing the model 

in different agencies. This article is a brief 

summary of the model and the comments 

and suggestions made at the forum.

Boba’s Integrated Model 

The integrated model developed by Dr. 

Boba (see Boba and Crank, 2008, for the 

complete description) seeks to develop 

structures and practices within a police 

agency to institutionalize1 problem solving, 

problem analysis, and accountability. 

It overcomes the barriers of earlier 

models, such as the inadequate definition 

of a “problem,”2 the use of weak and 

underdeveloped problem analysis, and a 

lack of accountability for problem solving 

at all levels (Scott, 2000; Goldstein, 2003; 

Braga and Weisburd, 2006). 

The model allows for a varied and integrated 

response at all levels of problem solving—

from small, incident-centered activity 

to broad patterns of routine behavior. 

Problems are assigned to specific levels 

within the police organization according 

to their complexity. Problem-solving 

responsibility is distributed across the rank 

structure, instead of being assigned to line 

officers.3

 Problems that require more work 

(or activity) to solve must be analyzed by 

officers with more resources available to 

them. 

The model provides direction for 

appropriate officer supervision during 

problem-solving efforts. It employs the 

command structure of a traditional police 

organization; for example, sergeants 

monitor officers’ problem solving and 

lieutenants monitor sergeants’ problem 

solving. This ensures that managers and 

commanders are involved in the problemsolving effort. Figure 1 illustrates how 

higher ranking officers must be involved and 

held accountable as problems increase in 

complexity. 

The model calls for regular meetings to 

facilitate accountability and respond 

to incidents in a timely fashion. For 

example, incidents occur hourly and daily, 

so supervisors must meet with officers 

out on the road and have daily meetings 

or briefings to ensure that officers are 

addressing those incidents effectively. But 

some problems develop during the course of 

several months, so accountability meetings 

can be held monthly and may be carried out 

by midlevel and command officers. 

In sum, the problem-solving process 

allows officers to address problems of 

different complexity at each organizational 

level. By separating and distinguishing 

the levels of activity required to solve a 

problem, problem solving depends on 

different analyses and responses, and 

thus accountability must be facilitated by 

different personnel within the agency. 

Focus Group 

Recommendations 

The focus group reviewed the 

implementation and maintenance of the 

integrated model in the PSLPD. They asked 

participants to offer feedback on the model 

and provide suggestions for how the model 

might be implemented in other agencies.4

The following is a list of some of the key 

comments and suggestions that came out of 

the 2-day meeting: 

 The continuity of leadership and the 

readiness of an organization to embrace 

change (such as the implementation 

of the integrated model) are important 

when trying to modify police culture 

and current police practices. 

 The model can adapt to a variety of 

different types and sizes of agencies, 

and the participants felt it could be 

implemented in their agencies. Large 

departments with high crime rates, 

however, may have a difficult time 

implementing the model in its entirety, 

Figure 1. Accountability for Problem 

Solving. Higher ranking officers must 

be involved and held accountable as a 

problem’s level of complexity (and the 

corresponding work required to solve the 

problem) increases.

Figure 2. Focus group participants pictured here include the following: (back row, left to 

right) Captain Frank Amandro, Major Tom Ryan, Glenn Duncan, Dr. Rachel Boba, Melissa 

Bauldauff; (middle row, left to right) Mike Humphrey, Nicole Scalisi, Michelle Chitolie, 

Cheryl Davis; (front row, left to right) April Lewis, Erika Jackson, Lt. Roberto Santos.
1616

G&PS | October 2008

so the department might be better able to 

focus its efforts on adopting a piece of the 

model.

 The model helps to overcome the 

communication barriers among 

different divisions (e.g., patrol, criminal 

investigations) within a police agency by 

providing specific guidelines for problem 

solving, analysis, and responses. 

 The support for the model must come 

from the agency’s chief and from 

supervisors who can facilitate personnel 

under their command and hold them 

accountable.

 Standard crime analysis products must 

be developed. The problem-solving and 

accountability model should be based on 

the use of these products. These products 

may share qualities across police agencies, 

but can be tailored to suit each agency’s 

needs. They must be standardized, so that 

problem solving and accountability can be 

conducted routinely. 

 Training is the key to success. All levels of 

the agency need training on how to use 

the model and on the concepts that helped 

create it (such as crime opportunity theory, 

problem solving, and crime analysis.) 

The members of the focus group also 

made recommendations for the guidebook 

and training that will be produced. These 

recommendations will make the materials 

relevant to various types and sizes of 

organizations. The guidebook and training 

will contain examples of analysis products, 

problem-solving responses, and mechanisms of 

accountability. It will also contain an extensive 

literature review and the recommendations 

from a focus group of police researchers 

(available in 2009.) 

References

Boba, R., and J. Crank, “Institutionalizing ProblemOriented Policing: Rethinking Problem Identification, 

Analysis, and Accountability,” Police Practice and 

Research 9(5)(2008): 

Braga, A. and D.L. Weisburd, “Problem-Oriented 

Policing: The Disconnect Between Principles and 

Practice,” in Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspective,.

ed. D.L. Weisburd and A. Braga, Cambridge, U.K.: 

Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Clarke, R,V. and J. Eck. Crime Analysis for Problem 

Solvers: In 60 Small Steps. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 2005. 

Cordner, G. and E.P. Biebel, “Problem-Oriented 

Policing in Practice,” Criminology & Public Policy

4(2005):155–181. 

Goldstein, H. Problem-Oriented Policing. New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1990.

Goldstein, H. “On Further Developing ProblemOriented Policing: The Most Critical Need, the Major 

Impediments, and a Proposal,” in Problem-Oriented 

Policing: From Innovation to Mainstream. Monsey, New 

York: Criminal Justice Press, 2003.

Scott, M. Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 

First 20 Years. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 

of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, 2000. 

Weisel, D.L., R. Boba, J.R. Brunet, J.E. Eck, R.S. 

Sampson, and M.S. Scott. Enhancing Community 

Policing by Institutionalizing Problem Analysis: A 

Descriptive Evaluation of Implementation in Five Police 

Agencies. Final Report, Washington, D.C.: Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2007.

Notes

1

To institutionalize means to establish as normal or to 

make something a customary and accepted part of the 

organization.

2

The inadequacies of problem definition (that 

have emerged from practice) lie in how to view 

the relationship between incidents and problems. 

Conceptual definitions (Clarke and Eck, 2005; 

Goldstein, 1990), unfortunately, have been difficult to 

apply in practice. Problems are typically under-specified 

and defined much too narrowly. When officers are 

assigned to address problems, they are invariably asked 

to do so as part of their regular patrol or investigative 

duties. Officers often say that they have difficulty 

balancing problem solving with answering calls and 

investigating cases (Cordner and Biebel, 2005). This 

point is underscored by Scott (2000, p. 13), “Linelevel officers lack the requisite resources in most 

instances to conduct the sort of analysis and effect the 

sort of responses necessary to bring about substantial 

improvements in community-wide problems.”

3

For example, larger scaled problems require a strategic 

response at the middle and upper ranks in the 

organization, where budget and strategy are integrated 

for long-term planning.

4

The focus group included crime analysts and police 

commanders from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

Department in North Carolina, the Fairfax County 

Police Department in Virginia, the Gainesville 

Police Department in Florida, the Fort Pierce Police 

Department in Florida, and the Port St. Lucie Police 

Department in Florida.
17

BOOK REVIEW

The nationwide crisis in home foreclosures has police on their toes. 

As foreclosure rates skyrocket, residents 

move out of neighborhoods and crime 

moves in.

The latest nationwide homeowner vacancy 

rate rose to a record high in 2007, a 

number unparalleled since the Federal 

Government began tracking such vacancies 

in the 1960s. The crisis has hit many 

communities hard; one home in every 196 

is foreclosed. For each percentage point 

that this rate increases, neighborhood 

violent crime correspondingly rises 

2.33 percent. And although foreclosure 

crises in the past have commonly 

occurred in inner-city or low-income 

neighborhoods, current foreclosures have 

also affected surburban, middle-income 

neighborhoods—instigating a need for 

extensive police patrols.

When a neighborhood experiences 

numerous foreclosures, thefts often occur. 

Burglars loot abandoned houses, taking 

electrical appliances and copper wiring or 

scrap metal. Sometimes, squatters begin 

living in the houses and, in a few cases, 

homes have turned into drug farms. A 

real estate agent in Elk Grove, California, 

described the momentum of the crisis as 

“...descending into a feeling of chaos.”

To deter crime, police must work extra 

patrols and cities must invest large 

amounts of money in cleanup. But many 

departments have not received budget 

increases or extra staff, and cities often 

cannot fund the vast amount of cleanup 

needed. Neighborhood revitalization 

efforts must be made to clean up unkempt 

High Rates of Foreclosures 

Lead to Crime Increases Nationwide

Ariel Whitworth

National Criminal Justice Reference Service

NEWS BRIEFS

Pockets of Crime: 

Broken Windows, 

Collective Efficacy, 

and the Criminal 

Point of View 

Kurt Smith

San Diego Sheriff’s Department

San Diego, California

Peter K.B. St. Jean’s latest book, Pockets of Crime, examines the theories of 

broken windows and collective efficacy, 

looking at them through the eyes of some 

hardcore crooks on the streets of Chicago’s 

Grand Boulevard neighborhood. He unites 

police data, a street-level survey, and his 

own observations to test these theories’ 

strengths and show how they interrelate 

when applied to crimes like narcotics, 

robbery, and battery. St. Jean’s innovative 

analysis challenges crook and resident alike, 

moving beyond tables and maps to provide 

a refreshing look at criminal motivation. 

Working forward from existing research, 

St. Jean finds that physical disorder is 

more directly linked to crime when viewed 

through the eyes of a crook than when 

viewed through the eyes of residents. When 

planning criminal actions, crooks look for 

social disorder and low collective efficacy, 

attempting to minimize their risk of being 

caught. 

But does physical disorder yield crime on 

every block? No. Observations demonstrate 

a stronger interplay of social disorder 

and collective efficacy where the tapestry 

of development brings together certain 

businesses and behaviors that crooks see 

as both low risk and high opportunity. 

The mix of these factors and their relative 

proximity to one another, which St. Jean 

calls “ecological disadvantage,” holds the key 

to why crime occurs where it does. 

St. Jean explores the concept of ecological 

disadvantage through the eyes and words 

of an opportunistic street thug. The crook’s 

view enables the reader to understand why 

disorder or efficacy account for both “hot” 

and “cold” blocks of crime. 

This information holds implications for 

policymakers and police practitioners 

because crooks target areas with elements 

of disorder that indicate a lack of adequate 

government commitment, rather than areas 

where the residents are trying their best to 

maintain their homes and neighborhoods in 

the face of poverty. This critical component 

deserves further investigation.

Pockets of Crime begins strong and delivers 

throughout, finishing with comprehensive 

appendixes on relevant research. Through 

St. Jean’s street work, you’ll delve into 

the minds of some tough crooks, as they 

explain how broken windows and collective 

efficacy affect their lives. With chapters on 

hot spots; disorder; and a crook’s view of 

narcotics, robbery, and battery, this book is 

a must-read for any practitioner interested 

in applying broken windows and collective 

efficacy theories to daily practice.

Reference 

St. Jean, Peter K.B. Pockets of Crime: 

Broken Windows, Collective Efficacy, and the 

Criminal Point of View. Chicago: University 

of Chicago Press, 2007.
1818

G&PS | October 2008

and abandoned houses, so that they can be 

resold and neighborhoods do not experience 

crime. 

Although the Federal Government has offered 

to help cities identify sources of funding and 

will provide billions of dollars in block grants, 

many cities have begun to research creative 

investments to aid their response to the crisis. 

For instance, some have begun demolishing 

houses and selling lots to adjacent homeowners 

as added yard space. Others use the funds from 

reselling properties to pay for further cleanup. 

Federal assistance, and efforts such as these, 

may mean that cities can prevent criminal 

activity from developing in widespread areas.

For more information, see 

www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/

markettrends/20080208-simon.html and www.

signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20071113-

1045-vacanthomes-crime.html.

Foreclosure Crisis 

Creates Deficits in 

Local Economies

The mortgage foreclosure crisis has left 

numerous homeowners stranded in almost 

abandoned neighborhoods—unable to sell 

because of the resulting rapid decrease in 

property values. Their financial losses have a 

trickle-down effect, leading to local economic 

difficulties.

For cities, these same foreclosures decrease tax 

and sales revenues, increase homelessness, and 

increase demand for emergency housing and for 

city assistance to clean up abandoned houses. 

Unfortunately, lowered revenues leave many 

cities less able to respond to such needs. 

In Riverside, California, the foreclosure crisis 

has led to a $12 million deficit this year. 

The region’s economy is declining, and the 

government has been unable to fund needed 

positions and home revitalization efforts. 

Although the city has passed an ordinance 

that requires the upkeep of homes, financially 

stricken families are not supporting the local 

economy—plunging the city further into 

deficit.

For more information, see www.usatoday.com/

news/nation/2008-03-11-foreclosures_N.htm.

Predatory Lending: 

Cleveland’s Worst 

Nightmare

The murders of Cookie Thomas and Joe 

Krasucki should never have happened. They 

occurred because, when high numbers of 

houses in Cookie and Joe’s Cleveland, Ohio, 

neighborhood foreclosed, criminals moved in.

Cleveland has experienced high levels of 

foreclosures in the past few years. When owners 

move out, houses aren’t kept clean. Vandals 

strip them of valuable scrap materials and 

obscure the area with graffiti. And criminals 

begin to live or conduct business in the vacant 

houses. 

Why have so many people been forced to 

vacate? Because in the late 1990s, the Cleveland 

real estate industry indulged in predatory 

lending.

Predatory lending is a practice that often 

involves “no-money-down” or “no-questionsasked” lending. Lenders give money to clients 

with weak credit or no credit. When these new 

homeowners, predictably, cannot pay their bills, 

they are forced to vacate their houses. 

Cleveland passed antipredatory-lending laws 

in 2001 and 2002, but the response was too 

late. Home foreclosures currently overwhelm 

many neighborhoods in the city, and decreased 

spending—caused by a loss of tax revenues and 

the country’s current economic crisis—means 

that the city does not have the funds to help 

neighborhoods in need.

Cleveland isn’t the only city in a crunch. 

Numerous federal bills have attempted to 

provide solutions, such as restricting highpriced loans or prohibiting loans to buyers 

without proof that they can pay. But these bills 

aren’t enough; cities need financial assistance 

and emergency funds from the Federal 

Government. They cannot recover alone.

For more information, see www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2007/09/28/AR2007092801331.html.
19

Crime News Events

Dealing with crime problems in a local law enforcement agency sometimes means reaching out to other 

local agencies to come up with a solution. The events listed here are good opportunities to learn what 

mapping professionals and those in related areas are doing, get new ideas, and present your work. 

2008 National States Geographic Information 

Council (NSGIC) Annual Conference

September 7–11, 2008 in Keystone, Colorado

www.nsgic.org/events/2008_conference.cfm

NEMA 2008 Annual Conference

September 8–11, 2008 in Portland, Oregon

www.nemaweb.org/?2068

2008 California Crime and Intelligence Analysts 

Association (CCIAA) Annual Training Conference

September 23–26, 2008 in Pleasanton, California

www.baciaa.org/2008ConferencePage.htm

24th Annual New York State GIS Conference

October 5–7, 2008 in Liverpool, New York

www.esf.edu/nysgisconf

Urban and Regional Information Systems 

Association (URISA) 46th Annual Conference

October 7–10, 2008 in New Orleans, Louisiana

www.urisa.org/conferences/aboutannual

2008 IACA/FCIAA Conference

October 13–16, 2008 in St. Pete Beach, Florida

www.iaca.net/Conference2008.asp

Applied Geography Conference

October 15–-18, 2008 in Wilmington, Delaware

appliedgeog.binghamton.edu

2008 ESRI Homeland Security GIS Summit

October 20–23, 2008 in Scottsdale, Arizona

www.esri.com/events/homeland/index.html

ISCPP Crime Prevention Symposium

October 22–25, 2008 in Denver, Colorado

www.iscpp.org/Symposium2008.htm

Texas GIS Forum

October 27–31, 2008 in Austin, Texas

www.tnris.org/forum/default.aspx?id=494#links

10th Annual Technologies for Critical Incident 

Preparedness (TCIP) Conference and Exposition

October 29–31, 2008 in Chicago, Illinois

guest.cvent.com/EVENTS/Info/Summary.

aspx?e=b97398ef-b188-42f7-8a01-0ee5f1006962

2008 American Society of Criminology 

Annual Meeting

November 12–15, 2008 in St. Louis, Missouri

www.asc41.com/annualmeeting.htm

2009 North Carolina GIS Conference

February 19–20, 2009 in Raleigh, North Carolina

www.cgia.state.nc.us/Default.aspx?alias=www.cgia.

state.nc.us/ncgis2009

2009 National States Geographic Information 

Council (NSGIC) Mid-Year Conference

February 22–25, 2009 in Annapolis, Maryland

www.nsgic.org/events/future.cfm

NEMA 2009 Mid-Year Conference & 35th Anniversary 

Celebration

March 6–10, 2009 in Alexandria, Virginia

www.nemaweb.org/?2068

Association of American Geographers (AAG) 2009 

Annual Meeting

March 22–27, 2009 in Las Vegas, Nevada

www.aag.org/annualmeetings/2009/index.htm

Tenth Crime Mapping Research Conference

August 2009 in New Orleans, Louisiana

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the 

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov

COPS Editorial Staff 

Nicole Scalisi

Research Analyst

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Judith Beres

Editor

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Sandra Sharpe

Production

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

MAPS Editorial Staff 

Ron Wilson

Program Manager/Social Science Analyst 

National Institute of Justice

Timothy Brown

Research Associate (Contractor)

National Institute of Justice

Ariel Whitworth

Communications Editor

National Criminal Justice Reference Service

e09082170

Visit NIJ Online at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij