Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 204 / Friday, October 22, 2004 / Notices 62081

most significant, the revocation of his 

Texas state controlled substances 

registration. While the Respondent has 

presented some evidence that he is 

licensed to practice medicine in 

jurisdictions other than Texas, there is 

no evidence before the Deputy 

Administrator that the Respondent 

applied for, or has been granted 

reinstatement of his Texas controlled 

substance license, the state where he 

holds a DEA registration. 

DEA does not have statutory authority 

under the Controlled Substances Act to 

issue or maintain a registration if the 

applicant or registrant is without state 

authority to handle controlled 

substances in the state in which he 

conducts business. See 21 U.S.C. 

802(21), 823(f) and 824(a)(3). This 

prerequisite has been consistently 

upheld. See Kanwaljit S. Serai, M.D., 68 

FR 48943 (2003); Dominick A. Ricci, 

M.D., 58 FR 51104 (1993); Bobby Watts, 

M.D., 53 FR 11919 (1988). 

Here, it is clear that the Respondent’s 

state controlled substance license has 

been revoked and there is no 

information before the Deputy 

Administrator which points to the 

Department’s revocation order having 

been rescinded. As a result, the 

Respondent is not licensed to handle 

controlled substances in Texas, where 

he is registered with DEA, and therefore, 

he is not entitled to maintain that 

registration. 

In further support of his continued 

registration with DEA, Respondent 

argues that consideration should be 

given to his state licensure to practice 

medicine in jurisdictions other than 

Texas. However, as noted in Judge 

Bittner’s Opinion and Recommended 

Decision, DEA regulations require a 

separate registration ‘‘for each principal 

place of business or professional 

practice * * * where controlled 

substances are manufactured, 

distributed, imported, exported, or 

dispensed by a person.’’ Therefore, the 

Respondent’s assertions regarding his 

licensure status in jurisdictions outside 

of Texas are ultimately irrelevant since 

his DEA Certificate of Registration is for 

a Texas address, and he is currently not 

authorized to handle controlled 

substances in that state. See, Layfe 

Robert Anthony, M.D., 67 FR 35582 

(2002). 

Accordingly, the Deputy 

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, pursuant to the 

authority vested in her by 21 U.S.C. 823 

and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, 

hereby orders that DEA Certificate of 

Registration, BC1457818, issued to 

Roland F. Chalifoux, Jr., D.O., be, and it 

hereby is, revoked. The Deputy 

Administrator further orders that any 

pending applications for renewal or 

modification of such registration be, and 

they hereby are, denied. This order is 

effective November 22, 2004.

Dated: October 5, 2004. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 04–23708 Filed 10–21–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 02–35] 

Imran I. Chaudry, M.D.; Revocation and 

Denial of Registration 

On February 6, 2002, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), issued an Order 

to Show Cause to Imran I. Chaudry, 

M.D. (Respondent) at two separate 

addresses in Monroe, Louisiana. The 

Order to Show Cause notified 

Respondent of an opportunity to show 

cause as to why DEA should not revoke 

his DEA Certificate of Registration, 

BC4775233, and deny any pending 

applications for modification or renewal 

of that registration, pursuant to 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(4) and 823(f), for reason 

that Respondent’s continued registration 

was inconsistent with the public 

interest. 

Specifically, the Order to Show Cause 

alleged that in March of 2001, 

Respondent, (1) had been abusing the 

controlled substances cocaine and 

methamphetamine, an (2) in April of 

2001, Respondent offered to purchase, 

and in fact purchased, approximately 14 

grams of methamphetamine, for which 

he was arrested and charged with 

Possession of Methamphetamine with 

Intent to Distribute, and Conspiracy to 

Distribute Methamphetamine. 

By letter dated March 5, 2002, 

Respondent through his legal counsel 

requested a hearing on the issues raised 

by the Order to Show Cause. Following 

pre-hearing procedures, a hearing was 

held on December 4, 2002, in Monroe, 

Louisiana. While both parties called 

witnesses to testify at the hearing, 

Respondent elected not to testify in his 

behalf. Both parties also introduced 

documentary evidence. After the 

hearing, both parties submitted written 

proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and argument. 

On June 13, 2003, Administrative Law 

Judge Gail A. Randall (Judge Randall) 

issued her Recommended Rulings, 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 

and Decision (Opinion and 

Recommended Ruling) in which she 

concluded that grounds existed to 

revoke Respondent’s DEA registration, 

but recommended that Respondent’s 

then-pending applications for renewal 

and change of registered address be 

granted, subject to certain conditions. 

On June 19, 2003, the Government filed 

exceptions to Judge Randall’s Opinion 

and Recommended Ruling and on July 

2, 2003, Respondent filed a response to 

the Government’s exceptions. On 

August 6, 2003, Judge Randall 

transmitted the record of these 

proceedings to the Administrator of 

DEA. 

The Deputy Administrator has 

considered the record in it entirety, and 

pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby 

issues her final order based upon 

findings of fact and conclusions of law 

as hereinafter set forth. As set forth 

below, the Deputy Administrator adopts 

in part, the recommended findings of 

fact and conclusions of law of the 

Administrative Law Judge. The Deputy 

Administrator does not adopt the 

Administrative Law Judge’s 

recommendation that Respondent’s 

applications for renewal of registration 

and change of registered address be 

granted. 

The record before the Deputy 

Administrator shows that as of the date 

of the hearing, Respondent’s license to 

practice medicine in Louisiana was in 

good standing and that he possessed a 

then-current Louisiana narcotics 

license. Respondent practices medicine 

in the vicinity of Monroe, Louisiana as 

a cardiologist. In the rural area where 

Respondent’s practice is located, the 

ratio of physicians to patients is 

approximately 1 to 2,000 to 2,500. 

Respondent is the only cardiologist in 

that community. Evidence was also 

presented during the hearing that, 

although twenty-five percent of 

Louisiana’s citizens reside in rural areas 

of the state, only six percent of 

Louisiana’s practicing primary care 

physicians practice medicine in rural 

areas.

On August 19, 1998, DEA issued 

Certificate of Registration BC4775233 to 

Respondent and that certificate expired 

on August 31, 2001. Nevertheless, by 

application dated September 4, 2001, 

Respondent attempted to renew the 

registration and modify it to reflect a 

new address. A Government witness 

testified that because Respondent 

submitted a renewal application, he was 

authorized to prescribe controlled 

substances within the course of 

legitimate medical practice on a day-today basis until conclusion of these 

proceedings. However, since he was no 

62082 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 204 / Friday, October 22, 2004 / Notices 

longer practicing at his registered 

address, he could not administer, store 

or dispense controlled substances at the 

unregistered location. 

Around March 2001, law enforcement 

officers from Ouachita Parish in 

Louisiana received information from a 

source that Respondent was abusing 

cocaine and methamphetamine, both 

Schedule II controlled substances. In 

response, on April 24, 2001, local law 

enforcement personnel used a 

cooperating individual to engage 

Respondent in a controlled sale of 

fourteen grams of methamphetamine for 

$850.00. Prior to their meeting, 

Respondent and the cooperating 

individual had a series of monitored 

phone calls during which Respondent 

indicated the methamphetamine was 

not just for personal use, but would be 

shared with another physician. He 

requested the methamphetamine be 

packaged in three separate containers; 

two containing two grams each and a 

third with ten grams. 

As officers watched, Respondent, who 

was alone, met the cooperating 

individual in a parking lot. While seated 

in adjoining vehicles, Respondent 

received the drugs, packaged as 

requested, through the open window of 

his car. Respondent was then 

immediately arrested for possession of 

methamphetamine with intent to 

distribute and conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine. 

During a videotaped post-arrest 

interview (admitted into evidence as a 

Government exhibit in this proceeding), 

Respondent admitted purchasing and 

using methamphetamine three or four 

times during the preceding six months. 

He told officers the methamphetamine 

he was buying when arrested was for 

himself and another physician. He 

admitted obtaining methamphetamine 

for that same colleague on one prior 

occasion. Respondent claimed he was 

not addicted to illegal substances and 

that he never used drugs at any time 

while working. 

No charges were filed against 

Respondent’s colleague and Respondent 

was ultimately charged in state court 

with possession of methamphetamine. 

As of the date of the hearing before 

Judge Randall, a motion to suppress 

Respondent’s post-arrest statement was 

then pending and no trial date had yet 

been set. There is no evidence in the 

record that Respondent was ever 

subsequently tried or convicted of any 

charges related to this incident. 

After his arrest, Respondent entered 

the Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center 

(‘‘Palmetto Center’’) in Rayville, 

Louisiana. The Palmetto Center is 

approved for evaluation and treatment 

of substance abuse patients by the 

Louisiana State Board of Medical 

Examiners (Board). Respondent was 

evaluated for chemical abuse or 

dependency at the request of the Board. 

Following the Palmetto Center 

evaluation, Respondent was referred to 

the Physician’s Health Program 

(‘‘PHP’’). The PHP is a professional 

group that monitors physicians with a 

prior history of substance abuse. It has 

had a Memorandum of Understanding 

with the Board since 1984 and has been 

accepted by the Board for monitoring 

the evaluation and treatment of 

impaired physicians since August 2001. 

Respondent entered into a monitoring 

contract with PHP from October 2001 

through October 2002 for the purposes 

of determining whether or not he had 

developed a chemical dependency. 

During this contract period, 

Respondent was required to abstain 

from consuming any mood altering 

substances unless prescribed by a 

physician, after consultation with PHP. 

Respondent was randomly drug tested 

twice a month for the presence of over 

thirty-five different drugs, including 

methamphetamine and completed each 

of his ramdom drug screenings in a 

timely manner without missing a test. 

The results were all negative. 

PHP also required that Respondent 

work with a psychiatrist on a regular 

basis, as well as with a licensed clinical 

social worker and work-site monitor. 

The work-site monitor saw Respondent 

on a daily basis and reported to PHP on 

Respondent’s overall progress in the 

program, including his interaction with 

patients, staff and ‘‘timeliness in 

responding to calls, timeliness in doing 

charts’’ and his overall professionalism. 

The record in this proceeding shows 

Respondent never missed a session with 

these clinicians.

PHP’s medical director testified for 

Respondent as an expert in addiction 

medicine. He testified to receiving 

reports every two months from the 

monitor and that reports on 

Respondent’s overall interaction with 

staff and patients were found, among 

other things, to be ‘‘exemplary.’’ The 

director also received very favorable 

progress notes from the psychiatrist and 

the clinical social worker and neither 

reported any evidence of clinical 

disorders in Respondent. Specifically, 

there were no reports of any indications 

of substance abuse or addictive behavior 

from their professionals monitoring 

Respondent’s conduct. 

Respondent attended continuing 

medical education courses as part of his 

contract with PHP. Specifically, he 

completed a review course sponsored by 

the American Society of Addiction 

Medicine. In addition to successfully 

completing his one-year monitoring 

contract, Respondent completed his exit 

interview with PHP personnel and 

voluntarily remained in communication 

with PHP. 

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 

824(a)(4), the Deputy Administrator may 

revoke a DEA Certificate of Registration 

and deny any pending applications for 

renewal of such registration, if she 

determines that the continued 

registration would be inconsistent with 

the public interest. Section 823(f) 

requires that the following factors be 

considered in determining the public 

interest: 

(1) The recommendation of the 

appropriate state licensing board or 

professional disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing or conducting research with 

respect to controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record 

under federal or state laws relating to 

the manufacture, distribution, or 

dispensing of controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable state, 

federal, or local laws relating to 

controlled substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may 

threaten the public health or safety. 

These factors are to be considered in 

the disjunctive; the Deputy 

Administrator may rely on any one or a 

combination of factors and may give 

each factor the weight she deems 

appropriate in determining whether a 

registration should be revoked or an 

application for registration denied. See 

Henry J. Schwartz, Jr., M.D., 54 FR 

16422 (1989). 

As to factor one, the recommendation 

of the appropriate state licensing board 

or professional disciplinary authority, 

the Deputy Administrator finds that the 

Louisiana State Board of Medical 

Examiners has not made a 

recommendation in this matter. 

However, it has not taken adverse action 

against Respondent’s medical or 

narcotic licenses and he is fully licensed 

as a physician in Louisiana with 

controlled substance handling privileges 

in that state, despite the Board’s 

awareness of the then-pending criminal 

proceedings. While this may weigh in 

favor of continuing his registration with 

DEA, ‘‘inasmuch as State licensure is a 

necessary but not sufficient condition 

for a DEA registration * * * this factor 

is not dispositive.’’ See Edson W. 

Redard, M.D., 65 FR 30616, 30619 

(2000). 

With regard to factors two and four, 

Respondent’s experience in handling 

controlled substances and his 

compliance with applicable controlled 

substance laws, the record contains no 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 204 / Friday, October 22, 2004 / Notices 62083

evidence that Respondent unlawfully 

dispensed controlled substances during 

the course of his professional practice. 

However, on April 24, 2001, 

Respondent unlawfully purchased 

fourteen grams of methamphetamine 

from a cooperating individual for 

$850.00. He also admitted that he had 

unlawfully used methamphetamine 

three or four times in the preceding six 

months.

Of particular concern to the Deputy 

Administrator is Respondent’s 

admission that he previously distributed 

methamphetamine to a fellow local 

physician and the evidence showing a 

portion of the methamphetamine he was 

buying when arrested was intended for 

distribution to that same medical 

colleague. Respondent’s purchase, use 

and distribution of methamphetamine 

violated Louisiana and federal law and 

factors two and four weigh in favor of 

a finding that his continued registration 

with DEA would be inconsistent with 

the public interest. 

Factor three, the applicant’s 

conviction record under federal or state 

laws relating to the manufacture, 

distribution, or dispensing of controlled 

substances, is not relevant for 

consideration, as there is no evidence 

Respondent was ever convicted of any 

crime related to controlled substances. 

With respect to factor five, other 

conduct that may threaten the public 

health and safety, Respondent’s 

unlawful purchase and use of 

methamphetamine on prior occasions 

and his distribution of the controlled 

substance to another physician are also 

relevant under factor five and weigh in 

favor of a finding that continued 

registration would be inconsistent with 

the public interest. 

As noted above, Respondent did not 

testify at the hearing. The Deputy 

Administrator may draw a negative 

inference from Respondent’s failure to 

testify during the administrative 

hearing. See David A. Hoxie, M.D., 60 

FR 51477 (2004); Alexander Drug 

Company, Inc., 66 FR 18299 (2001); 

Alan L. Ager, D.P.M., 63 FR 54732 

(1998); Raymond A. Carlson, M.D., 53 

FR 7424 (1988); Antonio C. Camacho, 

M.D., 51 FR 11654 (1986). The negative 

inference drawn from Respondent’s 

failure to testify is that he was unwilling 

to be forthright and completely honest 

with the Administrative Law Judge and 

the Drug Enforcement Administration. 

See Antonio C. Camacho, M.D., supra.

The Deputy Administrator agrees with 

the Government and Judge Randall that 

Respondent’s choice in not testifying 

left the record silent as to possible 

remorse following his unlawful 

purchase and use of controlled 

substances. The Deputy Administrator 

also shares Judge Randall’s concern 

about the lack of reassurances on the 

part of Respondent that he will not 

again engage in unlawful conduct with 

respect to controlled substances. 

The Deputy Administrator agrees with 

Judge Randall that the Government met 

its prima facie burden for revoking 

Respondent’s DEA Certificate of 

Registration and deny his pending 

requests for renewal and modification. 

Specifically, the Deputy Administrator 

agrees with Judge Randall that, 

‘‘Although not linked with his medical 

practices per se, the Respondent 

unlawfully handled methamphetamine 

by purchasing it for his personal use 

and the use of others without 

appropriate medical justification. Such 

total disregard for the law governing 

controlled substances can not be 

tolerated in a physician who has been 

entrusted to use his professional 

discretion in treating patients with these 

same substances.’’

However, as Judge Randall notes in 

her Opinion and Recommended Ruling, 

the governing statute is discretionary. 

See Mary Thomson, M.D., 65 FR 75969 

(2000). In exercising her discretion in 

determining the appropriate remedy in 

any given case, the Deputy 

Administrator should consider all the 

facts and circumstances of the case. See 

Martha Hernandez, M.D., 62 FR 61145 

(1997).

Judge Randall concluded a lesser 

sanction than total revocation of 

respondent’s DEA Certificate of 

Registration was warranted, based 

primarily on Respondent’s efforts since 

2001 to demonstrate continued 

avoidance of substance abuse and, 

secondarily, on his community’s need 

for a cardiology specialist, coupled with 

the absence of any evidence that 

Respondent mishandled controlled 

substances in the course of his medical 

practice. Judge Randall recommended 

that the Deputy Administrator grant 

Respondent’s application to renew his 

DEA Certificate of Registration and 

modify it to the requested new address, 

with the conditions that he continue 

participating in the PHP program for the 

duration of his registration period and 

that the results of continuing random 

drug tests be provided the local DEA 

office. 

The Deputy Administrator 

acknowledges Respondent’s positive 

efforts to tackle his problems. He 

entered himself into the Palmetto 

Addiction Recovery Center and was 

subsequently referred to PHP, where he 

completed an intensive one-year 

monitoring program for impaired 

physicians. It appears Respondent was 

compliant with all phases of the 

program, including submission to 

random urine screens designed to detect 

the presence of illicit drugs and alcohol. 

Respondent was deemed to not have a 

chemical dependency. 

The initial findings of the Palmetto 

Center and Respondent’s compliance 

with the physician monitoring program 

were corroborated at the hearing by the 

PHP medical director’s testimony on 

Respondent’s behalf. There is no 

evidence of any misuse of controlled 

substances by Respondent since his 

April 2001 arrest, nor is there evidence 

of any disciplinary action being brought 

against Respondent by the Louisiana 

State Medical Board with respect to his 

handling of controlled substances. 

However, it is also recognized that these 

rehabilitative steps were taken while 

Respondent was under the threat of 

state prosecution and would have been 

motivated, at least in part, by the impact 

they might have on then-pending 

criminal proceedings, as well as his 

ability to remain licensed to practice 

medicine. 

As noted above, the Government filed 

exceptions to Judge Randall’s Opinion 

and Recommended Ruling and 

Respondent filed a response in 

opposition to the Government’s 

exceptions. 

The Government took exception to 

Judge Randall’s finding that Respondent 

was the only cardiologist in Rayville, 

Louisiana; that Judge Randall made 

ancillary findings regarding physician 

populations generally in Louisiana; and, 

that Judge Randall neglected to note that 

one of the maps in a Respondent’s 

exhibit showed that nearly every parish 

in Louisiana was classified as 

‘‘medically underserved.’’

There was no evidence presented in 

this matter that anyone other than 

Respondent was a licensed cardiologist 

practicing in Rayville, a town of 

approximately 4,000 people, which was 

the parish seat. While there was 

evidence that six physicians, including 

Respondent, practiced in the area, there 

was no evidence that any of them, other 

than Respondent, were trained, licensed 

or otherwise possessed credentials to 

practice cardiology. 

The Deputy Administrator is also not 

persuaded by the Government’s 

argument regarding the physician 

population in Louisiana, or its argument 

regarding the appropriate weight to be 

accorded evidence of maps purportedly 

demonstrating medically underserved 

parishes in Louisiana.

The Deputy Administrator finds that, 

regardless of any demographic showing 

as to what proportion of Louisiana’s 

population is medically underserved; 

62084 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 204 / Friday, October 22, 2004 / Notices 

such information does not detract from 

the fact that Respondent provides 

needed medical services to such an area. 

However, as will be discussed below, 

while this provides some support for 

maintaining registration, under the facts 

of this case, it also has a negative 

implication for continued registration. 

The Government also took exception 

to Judge Randall’s finding regarding the 

veracity of the random drug tests 

administered Respondent, especially as 

they relate to the detection of 

methamphetamine. The Government 

argued in part, that ‘‘[f]rom the factual 

findings, it would be possible that 

Respondent could have taken 

methamphetamine many times in the 

month, and yet evaded detection.’’ The 

Government further argues that the 24 to 

36 hour metabolism rate for 

methamphetamine, in effect, creates an 

adequate window for a person to avoid 

detection when administered a drug 

test. 

The Deputy Administrator is reluctant 

to apply the Government’s arguments to 

these facts. While it is acknowledged it 

is ‘‘possible’’ Respondent could have 

taken methamphetamine and avoided 

detection, to accept the premise that he 

continued abusing would require 

assumptions about his conduct that are 

not supported by the record. 

The primary aim of a ‘‘random’’ drug 

test is to create a level of 

unpredictability as to when the test will 

be administered. The unpredictable 

nature of such a test theoretically 

creates a disincentive for the continued 

use of drugs on the part of the 

individual being monitored. Against 

this backdrop, it is important to point 

out there is no evidence in the record 

raising any question as to the efficacy of 

the PHP drug testing program. Without 

such evidence, and in light of evidence 

of Respondent’s negative drug tests, the 

Deputy Administrator concludes that 

the random nature of the PHPadministered tests served as an effective 

deterrent to Respondent’s further drug 

use. 

The Government also argued it would 

be unreasonable to reach the conclusion 

testified to by the PHP medical director 

that ‘‘a single use of illegal drugs or 

even three illegal uses in a one-year 

period’’ does not constitute evidence of 

chemical abuse. This argument is not 

particularly compelling. 

The Deputy Administrator agrees with 

Respondent that the term ‘‘abuse,’’ as 

being used by the witness, was referring 

to the diagnosis of chemical abuse 

under the DSM–4, which requires 

certain criteria which, in the witness’s 

opinion, were not present in 

Respondent’s case. While the Deputy 

Administrator agrees with the 

Government that a single or multiple 

uses of illegal drugs can be deemed 

‘‘abuse’’ in non-diagnostic terminology, 

Judge Randall’s findings on this point 

were primarily credibility findings as to 

the expert’s assessment of Respondent’s 

lack of chemical dependency. 

The Deputy Administrator considers 

Respondent’s illicit purchase and use of 

methamphetamine particularly serious 

acts of misconduct. As the record 

demonstrates, Respondent was not 

chemically dependent. This infers that 

it was neither addiction nor dependency 

that motivated his ‘‘street’’ purchases of 

methamphetamine. Instead, he 

exercised unhindered judgment to 

illegally obtain and use what he as a 

physician, well knew to be an 

insidiously dangerous controlled 

substance and did so, according to his 

post-arrest interview, to enhance his sex 

life. This motivation to violate the law 

and risk his reputation and livelihood 

evidences a particularly cavalier and 

irresponsible attitude toward his 

responsibilities as a DEA registrant.

There is no evidence in the record 

that Respondent used illicit drugs while 

actually engaged in the practice of 

medicine. However, as a cardiologist, it 

is inferred that it was possible that he 

might be subject to being called on 

unexpectedly to treat patients 

experiencing serious heart problems on 

an emergent basis. If this had occurred 

while Respondent was under the 

influence of methamphetamine, his 

patients would either have been placed 

at risk by Respondent’s impairment or, 

if he declined to treat them because of 

his drug use, they would not have been 

able to be seen immediately by another 

cardiology specialist, as Respondent 

was the only one in the rural area. These 

potential risks should have been 

apparent to Respondent when he 

elected to use methamphetamine and 

raise significant questions as to his 

judgment and ability to use sound 

professional discretion in treating 

patients with controlled substances. 

Of particular concern to the Deputy 

Administrator is the finding that 

Respondent admitted previously 

purchasing methamhetamine and 

illicitly distributing it to another 

individual. This criminal conduct is 

made even more egregious because the 

recipient was a fellow physician. The 

evidence also shows that a portion of 

the methamphetamine Respondent was 

purchasing when arrested was destined 

for distribution to that medical 

colleague. Thus, in an area already 

undeserved by medical professionals, 

Respondent not only placed himself at 

risk, but, by distributing 

methamphetamine to another physician, 

added to the threat posed to his rural 

community by potentially impaired 

physicians. 

Since his arrest, Respondent’s 

professional practice has continued 

without blemish and he has avoided 

illicit drugs. These are commendable 

and indicate potential for future 

registration. On the other hand, 

Respondent’s calculated abandonment 

of his responsibilities and willingness to 

risk serious criminal and professional 

sanctions do not auger well for 

continued registration being in the 

public interest. As observed by the 

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal, ‘‘[a]n 

agency rationally may conclude that 

past performance is the best projector of 

future performance.’’ ALRA 

Laboratories, Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 

451 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Based on the foregoing, at this time, 

the Deputy Administrator does not have 

sufficient confidence that Respondent 

can successfully fulfill the 

responsibilities of a registrant. 

Accordingly, the Deputy 

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, pursuant to the 

authority vested in her by 21 U.S.C. 823 

and 28 CFR 0.100(b), and 0.104, hereby 

orders that DEA Certificate of 

Registration BC4775233, previously 

issued to Imran I. Chaudry, M.D., be and 

it hereby is revoked. His pending 

application for renewal of that 

registration and his request to modify 

said registration to reflect a new 

requested address, are hereby denied. 

This order is effective November 22, 

2004.

Dated: October 5, 2004. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 04–23709 Filed 10–21–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Juan Pillot-Costas, M.D. Revocation of 

Registration 

On February 20, 2004, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), issued an Order 

to Show Cause to Juan Pillot-Costas, 

M.D. (Respondent) of Ponce, Puerto 

Rico, notifying him of an opportunity to 

show cause as to why DEA should not 

revoke his DEA Certificate of 

Registration BP3441475, as a 

practitioner, under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5) 

and deny any pending applications for 

renewal or modification of that