OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

October 18, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ 

MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

 DEVELOPMENT 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

SUBJECT: Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial 

 Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq (SIGIR-07-015) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit 

in accordance with our statutory duties under Public Law 108-106, as amended. The law 

requires that we produce independent and objective audits of—as well as leadership, 

coordination, and recommendations on—policies designed to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of programs and operations and to 

prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

We received comments from the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and Headquarters, Multi-National 

Force-Iraq (MNF-I) on a draft of this report, which were considered when preparing the 

final report. The comments are addressed in this report, where applicable, and are 

discussed in the Management Comments section of the report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on 

this report, please contact Walt R. Keays (walt.keays@iraq.centcom.mil) / 914-822-2796) 

or Mr. Robert Gabriel (robert.gabriel@iraq.centcom.mil)/ 703-343-7921. For the report 

distribution, see Appendix E. 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: See Distribution

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 

Background 1

Provincial and Baghdad Governance 2 

PRT Functional Areas of Emphasis and Key Tasks 5 

Progress Viewed By Five PRT Functional Areas of Emphasis 7 

Progress Viewed Across Regional Areas of the Country 9 

Observations 33 

Conclusion and Recommendations 33 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 36 

B. PRTs/Partner Military Units 38 

C. PRT Program Funding 39 

D. Acronyms 40 

E. Report Distribution 41 

F. Audit Team Members 43 

Management Comments 

U.S. Embassy-Iraq 44 

Headquarters, Multi-National Force-Iraq 47 
Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial 

Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq 

SIGIR-07-015 October 18, 2007

Executive Summary 

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program for Iraq is a U.S.-led, civil-military 

effort to help Iraq’s provincial and local governments govern effectively and deliver 

essential services. The initiative has evolved and expanded considerably since the 

opening of the first PRTs in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hillah in November 2005. As of August 

2007, the program comprised: 

• seven PRTs led by the United States and three led by the coalition 

• seven provincial support teams (PSTs)—small cells of advisors who provide 

advice to provincial officials1

• 15 recently deployed ePRTs—the latter embedded with brigade combat teams 

(BCTs) in and around Baghdad and Al Anbar province 

The PRT Program provides integrated and multidisciplinary teams of U.S. and coalition 

civilian and military personnel to teach, coach, and mentor provincial and local 

government officials in core competencies of governance and economic development. 

This report examines the PRT program and provinces in Iraq across five selected areas of 

program emphasis: 

1. assisting Iraq’s provincial and local governments in developing a transparent and 

sustained capability to govern 

2. promoting increased security and rule of law 

3. advancing economic development 

4. providing the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the 

population 

5. promoting reconciliation and shaping the political environment. 

This report provides some generalizations across each area of emphasis and also provides 

an assessment of progress across the country. To show the progress of the PRTs in 

 

1

 Commenting on a draft of this report, MNF-I Headquarters stated that PSTs for the most part have been 

converted to PRTs, with two PSTs incorporated into an existing PRT. SIGIR used the PST designation in 

this report to generally reflect the status at the time of the review—both in name and size relative to other 

PRTs. 

i
different parts of Iraq, SIGIR has grouped the 18 provinces into a nominal construct of 

five geographic regional areas. This grouping is only for discussion purposes in this 

report. 

In making the assessment, SIGIR visited the existing ten PRTs and seven PSTs, as well 

as nine of the new ePRTs. The work included discussions with senior-level military and 

U.S. Embassy officials in Baghdad and structured interviews throughout Iraq with 274 

civilian and military officials and officers, including senior leaders in the BCTs, team and 

deputy team leaders, technical specialists, bilingual bicultural advisors, civil affairs 

members, and Iraqi and third-country government advisors. SIGIR did not systematically 

obtain the perspective of Iraqi provincial-government officials on the effectiveness of the 

PRTs. (See Appendix A for a complete description of our scope and methodology.) 

Results 

In many locations, the PRT Program in Iraq is making incremental progress in 

developing the nation’s provincial and local government capacity to effectively govern 

and manage its own reconstruction, despite continuing political and ethnic conflicts, as 

well as the difficult security situation. However, Iraq’s complex and overlapping 

sectarian, political, and ethnic conflicts, as well as the difficult security situation, 

continue to hinder progress in promoting economic development, rule of law, and 

political reconciliation. Despite these general observations, some differences do exist 

across sections of the country and individual provinces. The following are summaries of 

SIGIR’s findings on the five areas of PRT program emphasis that SIGIR examined: 

Governance—At the sites SIGIR visited, PRT officials provided mixed judgments of 

their provinces’ effectiveness at governing and managing their governmental institutions, 

but noted that each had improved incrementally over the previous year. Officials told 

SIGIR that a key obstacle to developing governance capacity was the lack of a Provincial 

Powers Law to define the rights and responsibilities of government offices and hold 

provincial officials accountable for their actions. 

Rule of Law—Numerous PRT officials identified rule of law as their most problematic 

core function. In many locations, there is little cooperation between the police, courts, 

and correction facilities, and judicial orders are routinely ignored. With a few exceptions, 

the local population views police officers with suspicion because of suspected links to 

local militias and criminal activity. Judges and other participants in the judicial process 

are subjected to intimidation, and courts are often unable or unwilling to hear cases 

because of inadequate security. 

Economic Development—The dangerous security environment continued to undermine 

efforts by the PRTs to increase living standards and reduce unemployment. Therefore, it 

is difficult to ship raw materials into provinces and transport agricultural and 

manufactured products to markets, and there is little Iraqi or foreign investment. Many 

provinces suffer from shortages of fuel oil and electrical power, and PRT economic 

advisors report that it will be difficult to create employment opportunities without a 

stable power source. The PRTs are engaged in a number of efforts to foster economic 

ii
iii

development, including micro-lending programs, agribusiness development, smallbusiness development centers, and plans to resurrect state-owned enterprises. 

Reconstruction—PRT officials generally believe that the provinces are effective at 

managing their infrastructure and brick-and-mortar reconstruction projects. However, 

provincial governments have little ability to manage and sustain existing infrastructure 

projects, and they are not budgeting for operation and maintenance requirements. The use 

of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) exacerbated the problem. 

SIGIR documented frequent instances of CERP projects that conflicted with the capacitydevelopment mission of the PRTs by performing tasks that properly belong to local and 

provincial governments. 

Political Reconciliation—PRT officials reported little progress in this key area at the 

local and provincial level—with the notable exception of Al Anbar province, where the 

tribes banded together to oppose al-Qaeda and support the national government. Efforts 

toward reconciliation have been undermined by tension between rival Shia groups, a 

sense of alienation among Sunnis, and growing public frustration over the inability to 

obtain government services. 

Looking across the five regional areas and the provinces associated with them, one can 

see differences across and within the regions. The northern area is heavily Kurdish, the 

western area largely Sunni, the southern areas largely Shia, and the central region mixed. 

The chart on the following page summarizes the results of our work examining PRT areas 

of emphasis in key functional areas across the regional areas. 
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
Despite the best efforts of PRT civilian and military officials who are working under 

dangerous and austere conditions to accelerate the Iraqi transition to self-reliance, 

resolving these problems will likely be a slow process. It will require years of steady 

engagement and will depend heavily on the security environment and political 

settlements at the national level. 

Observations 

PRTs are coaching their provincial counterparts to execute their province’s capital budget 

allocations. Most provinces report that they are ahead of their 2006 spending pace and 

generally on course to spend their 2007 funds. The provinces were generally spending 

their funds on brick-and-mortar construction projects, although issues with procurement 

complexity and lack of contractors have caused some provinces to focus instead on 

spending to stockpile materials for future projects. 

As SIGIR has previously reported, management actions are needed to improve 

sustainment capacity for reconstruction programs. However, this problem continues.2

SIGIR noted that the provinces struggle to staff and maintain buildings and facilities once 

constructed—such as clinics, schools, and water treatment plants. One PRT team leader 

characterized the problem as a future “train wreck” unless steps are taken now to begin 

budgeting and deploying the systems needed to sustain the new construction. In an earlier 

report, SIGIR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador, in coordination with the 

Commanding General, MNF-I, formulate and implement a plan with clear goals and 

objectives for the sustainment of IRRF projects, and review the GOI’s leadership in this 

area to determine its adequacy and shore up any shortfalls. Although SIGIR directed this 

recommendation to the Embassy, it also has relevance at the Provincial level. SIGIR 

believes that the PRTs should expand their focus on budget execution efforts to include 

helping budget for and carry out sustainment tasks. This would also have the salutary 

secondary effect of increasing coordination between the central ministries’ provinciallevel representatives and local officials. 

Further, SIGIR’s two previous reports on the PRT program recommended the 

development of clearly defined objectives and performance measures to guide the PRTs 

and determine their accomplishments.3

 SIGIR believes that those recommendations are 

still appropriate and are particularly relevant for those provinces where the PRTs access 

and engagement with Iraqi officials have been limited. SIGIR also found frequent 

instances in which the military’s use of CERP to perform tasks that properly belong to 

local and provincial governments conflicts with the PRT’s capacity development mission. 

 

2

 SIGIR-05-022, Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Programs, Oct. 24, 2005. 3

 SIGIR-06-034; Status of Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, Oct. 29, 2006; SIGIR-07-014, 

Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, SIGIR-07-014, July 25, 2007.

ix
Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, 

MNF-I, take these actions: 

1. In an expeditious manner, jointly establish a comprehensive plan for the PRTs 

(including ePRTs), with elements tailored for each PRT. At a minimum, the plan 

should: (a) clearly define objectives and performance measures, (b) clearly define 

milestones for achieving stated objectives, (c) be linked to funding requirements, 

and (d) identify the organization(s) within each agency that are accountable for 

the plan’s implementation. To provide senior level attention to this issue, the plan 

should be approved by the Office of the Chief of Mission and the MNF-I 

Commander to demonstrate each agency’s commitment to this effort. 

2. Develop guidance on the use and synchronization of CERP funds to support the 

U.S. government’s capacity-development mission. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

The U.S. Embassy-Iraq and Headquarters, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), provided 

comments on a draft of this report. DoD did not provide comments. Both the Embassy 

and MNF-I expressed disagreement with a recommendation in the draft report relating to 

reassigning certain PRT personnel because of security issues and outlined steps underway 

to address the security challenges. They differed in their response to the second 

recommendation dealing with the use and synchronization of CERP funds: the Embassy 

concurred, and MNF-I non-concurred. MNF-I also provided other technical comments, 

which were incorporated in the report as appropriate. 

The draft report recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding 

General, MNF-I, consider reassigning the PRT personnel from Basrah, Najaf, Karbala, 

Qadisiyah, and Maysan to functioning PRTs until the security environment improves, or 

develop a plan to better use the staff of those five units and provide clearly defined 

objectives and guidance for what they are to accomplish. The Embassy responded that it 

was premature to reassign the affected PRT personnel and that retaining provincial 

contacts is important because it demonstrates a political commitment to developing the 

affected provinces. The Embassy and MNF-I both commented that efforts are underway 

to provide appropriate security and movement and other actions to accomplish their 

objectives. MNF-I also noted that an effort is underway to relocate the Qadisiyah PRT to 

Camp Echo and have it become an ePRT, presumably with enhanced security. The 

Embassy indicated that further measures will be considered if PRT operations languish 

and security conditions do not improve. Because of these actions, SIGIR modified the 

recommendation by deleting the portion that addressed the reassignment of personnel. 

Neither the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq nor the Commanding General, MNF-I, however, 

responded to the part of the recommendation to develop a plan to better utilize the staff at 

Basrah, Najaf, Karbala, Qadisiyah, and Maysan. The need to develop clearly defined 

objectives and performance measures to guide PRT activities and measure their 

x
accomplishments was discussed in SIGIR’s two previous reports, and SIGIR still 

considers a plan to be an essential tool for those purposes. A plan is also essential for 

managing the human capital and financial resources at those locations. To date, SIGIR’s 

earlier recommendations have not been implemented. Accordingly, SIGIR modified this 

portion of the recommendation to emphasize the need for senior management attention to 

develop a management approach to address these issues. SIGIR also continues to believe 

that this area will require close monitoring by the Embassy and MNF-I. 

Concerning the SIGIR recommendation related to the synchronization of CERP funds, 

the Embassy concurred and indicated that it was providing guidance to its PRTs to use 

the Mission Strategic Plan and the Joint Campaign Plan as they coordinate with their 

military counterparts on capacity development projects. MNF-I did not concur with the 

recommendation, noting elements of ongoing coordination; however, MNF-I also noted 

room for improvement by having provincial level PRTs develop and implement Joint 

Common plans with their paired combat force elements. MNF-I noted that the latter has 

already been proposed and is under consideration. Based on these comments, SIGIR 

believes that this recommendation continues to have merit and is retained. 

xi
Introduction 

Background 

The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program for Iraq is a U.S.-led, civil-military effort 

to help Iraq’s provincial and local governments to govern effectively and deliver essential 

services. Situated in Iraq’s northern, western, central, south-central, and southeastern 

regions, the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), smaller provincial support teams 

(PSTs), and recently deployed ePRTs—those embedded with brigade combat teams 

(BCTs)—are tasked with a strategic mission that encompasses not only capacity 

development but also counterinsurgency and increased stability. Through their daily 

interactions and projects, PRT members build and implement grass-roots support for 

Iraq’s transition to a self-reliant society. (For locations of the teams mentioned above, see 

map on following page.) 

The U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), was established in May 

2007 under the leadership of an ambassador-level coordinator, and is charged with 

providing operational direction, including political and economic guidance, to the PRTs 

and ePRTs. The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), headquartered in Baghdad, leads 

coalition military efforts in establishing the PRTs, and MNF-I’s subordinate command, 

the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), provides support, including deputy team leaders, 

liaison officers, movement security, and other logistical assets. MNC-I oversees the 

major subordinate commands that work alongside and support the PRTs and ePRTs. The 

BCT commanders exercise authority over security and movement of personnel for the 

ePRTs, based on the danger of insurgent activity; but the commanders do not direct the 

ePRT actions in other ways, including who they should or should not see. 

Program funding comes primarily from U.S. sources, including the Economic Support 

Fund, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and new appropriations targeted 

specifically for stabilization, community action, local governance, and PRT expansion. 

As of August 2007, the United States has provided $1.9 billion to support the Iraq PRT 

Program; $700 million and $1.2 billion from the fiscal year 2006 and 2007 supplemental 

appropriations, respectively4

. This figure does not include funding provided by 

agencies—for example, personnel funded from their operating budgets. (See Appendix 

C.) Other money has come from the Iraqis, coalition partners, nongovernmental 

organizations, and donor nations. 

 

4

 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane 

Recovery, 2006 (Public Law No. 109-234), June 15, 2006 and U. S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, 

Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law No. 110-28), May 25, 

2007. 

1
Provincial and Baghdad Governance 

Under Iraq’s federal system, the country is divided politically into 18 governorates 

including three forming the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, and the capital 

governorate (province) of Baghdad, plus lower-level local administrations.5

Map—PRT Program in Iraq 

Note: "Variations in spelling of provincial names sometimes exist depending on sources used. For example, Ninewa is sometimes 

spelled Ninawa."

 

5

 The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of 2005 incorporated many of the authorities and responsibilities 

of the Governorates and municipal and local governments, as outlined in Coalition Provisional Authority 

Order 71, sub: Local Governmental Powers, April 6, 2004. 

2
By law, the governorates, which receive national-government funding to discharge their 

provincial responsibilities and duties, function without oversight by ministry or 

ministerial representatives (such as the directors general) or allied institutions. Each 

governorate outside the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan has a provincial council 

and, as approved by a majority vote, any number of municipal committees (see Chart 

1). Under the leadership of a chairman, each provincial council elects a governor and a 

deputy governor for the province, with the governor directing and overseeing 

implementation of the council’s decisions. Municipal councils have the authority to 

elect a mayor and a deputy mayor.

Chart 1—Provincial Governance 

Source: SIGIR analysis of Government of Iraq, U.S. Embassy, and MNF-I documents. 

a Provincial projects are funded by national-level ministries and directed by director generals. Each ministry appoints one or more 

directors general to function as representatives at the local-level ministries. The governor can approve or disapprove of the 

appointment but has no supervisory authority. b

 Provincial projects are also funded by provincial allocations from the Ministry of Finance and are directed by the Provincial 

Councils. c

 The number of municipal committees fluctuates, with each created as needed by a majority vote of the Provincial Council. 

The governorate of Baghdad, as the seat of national government, has a complicated and 

fluctuating array of councils as well as numerous elected officials and representatives. 

Under the Provincial Council, which appoints a governor and deputy governor, there are 

major political units with respective local councils—nine city districts subdivided into 94 

neighborhoods and six rural county-level qadas subdivided into 20 town-level nahias

(see Chart 2). The mix of a traditional system of governance and new institutions created 

since 2003, plus periodic changes of personnel, make governing a fluid and sometimeschaotic activity. Baghdad PRT and ePRT governance advisors told us they learn 

something new every day about the workings of the Baghdad city government. 

3
Chart 2—Baghdad Governance 

Source: Baghdad Governance, Provincial Reconstruction Team Baghdad, Iraq, 3rd edition, April 2007. 

Note: The Provincial Council (PC) is the supreme council for the province and is responsible for the performance of all lower 

councils. Legislative activity is limited, but the PC issues directives governing activities under its jurisdiction. Services for the city are 

provided by the directors general and workers of the Amanat (municipal authority); for the rural areas, by those of the Ministry of 

Municipalities and Public Works via the Governorate. Both the Amanat and Governorate receive spending allocations from the PC, 

which is responsible for coordinating budgetary needs with the Ministries of Finance and Planning. The Amanat has broken the city 

down into 14 service districts called beladiyas. Each belidiya has an assigned director general who is in charge of essential services for 

a particular geographical area. Local councils advocate for their communities by requiring that directors general start new projects or 

fix problems areas under their authority. The Governor exercises authority through the qa’im makams (executive officers) of the 

province, which also have responsibilities to local councils. 

4
PRT Functional Areas of Emphasis and Key Tasks 

In our reports on the status of the PRT Program in Iraq, issued in October 2006 and July 

2007, we recommended that the U.S. Ambassador and the Commanding General, MNFI, develop clearly defined objectives and performance measures to guide the PRTs and 

determine their accomplishments. We have previously noted limited agency actions 

taken to address this recommendation. On several occasions during the course of this 

audit, we approached officials of OPA concerning the development of objectives and 

performance measures. We also offered to work collaboratively with OPA staff to help 

develop these measurement indicators, but were unable to obtain OPA participation. 

Absent official objectives and performance measures, we elected to assess the PRT’s 

work across five areas of emphasis and tasks associated with that work. Table 1 below 

presents functional areas and key tasks/performance measures we used to examine the 

effectiveness of the PRT program. We arrived at the functional areas of emphasis by 

analyzing Baghdad Cable 4045 (October 2005) that set up the PRT Program and the 

Memorandum of Agreement between Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of State 

(DoS) (February 2007), which expanded the program to include the new ePRTs. The 

tasks/performance measures were based on our analysis of DoS, DoD, and U.S. Embassy, 

including OPA and MNF-I documents and discussions with PRT officials. We also 

consulted with a U.S. Institute of Peace representative on tasks associated with the 

political-reconciliation functional area. 

5
Table 1—SIGIR Identified PRT Areas of Emphasis and Associated Tasks 

Areas of 

Emphasis Tasks 

Governance • Develops local and provincial-government core competencies emphasizing 

administrative capacity, transparency, and sustainability 

• Assists local and provincial governments and local-ministry representatives in 

strengthening mechanisms for citizen engagement and increasing satisfaction 

with, and legitimacy of, Iraqi government entities 

• Trains and assists governments to prepare and execute capital and operationand-maintenance budgets to include identification of funding needs, 

procurement, and contracting 

• Fosters effective linkages between all levels of government 

Rule of Law • Assists government in strengthening public trust and a genuine belief among 

all citizens that the police, courts, prisons, lawyers, and other participants in 

law enforcement and judicial systems function openly and equitably to protect 

and serve them 

• Helps build nonviolent avenues of redress for citizens’ claims in commercial, 

labor, family, property, civil rights, and other areas of daily life 

• Supports and strengthens underpinning legal institutions, including bar 

associations, law schools, public service groups, law libraries, and legal-aid 

offices 

Economic 

Development • Supports the development of policies and programs that spur economic activity 

and business development 

• Helps focus provincial government on job creation and retention through 

specific efforts targeting agriculture/agribusiness, construction, retail/wholesale 

business, industrial/commercial enterprises, and banking/finance 

• Helps establish provincial-government ability to devise short- and long-term 

strategies for economic development programs, and to provide training and 

mentoring that assist implementation 

Reconstruction • Develops provincial and local government skills to identify and prioritize 

essential service and reconstruction needs of their citizens, and to address 

those needs through the use of Iraqi Government, coalition, donor, and private 

resources 

• Strengthens provincial capacity to plan and coordinate civil construction and 

development activities, including the sustainment of completed projects 

• Builds government capacity to deliver effective provincial and municipal 

services—including clean water, sewer and sanitation, and electricity— 

through short-, medium-, and long- term development planning 

Political 

Reconciliation • Encourages and facilitates dialogue among provincial- and local- levels parties 

whose interactions have been severed by violence; channels conflict resolution 

into political forums 

• Supports grassroots initiatives that forge links between disparate societal 

groups and institutions—sectarian, tribal, religious, ethnic, civil society, 

military/police—to reduce tension and violence and re-establish trust 

• Encourages availability of key reconstruction and economic-development 

support tools once the reconciliation process is underway 

Source: SIGIR analysis of DoS, DoD, U.S. Embassy, and OPA documents; and discussions with PRT and U.S. Institute 

of Peace officials. 

Note: In commenting on a draft of this report, MNC-I expressed concern over our use of the terms core functions and performance 

measures as headings in this chart . In response we have modified our captions to reflect areas of emphasis and tasks we identified 

associated with the PRTs’ work.

6
Progress Viewed By Five PRT Functional 

Areas of Emphasis

In many locations, the PRT Program in Iraq is making incremental progress in 

developing the nation’s provincial and local government capacity to effectively govern 

and manage its own reconstruction despite continuing political and ethnic conflicts, as 

well as the difficult security situation. However, Iraq’s complex and overlapping 

sectarian, political, and ethnic conflicts, as well as the difficult security situation, 

continue to hinder progress in promoting economic development, rule of law, and 

political reconciliation. The following summarizes our findings regarding the five PRT 

areas of emphasis we examined. 

Governance—At the sites we visited, PRT officials provided mixed judgments of their 

provinces’ effectiveness at governing and managing their governmental institutions, but 

noted that each had improved incrementally over the previous year. Provincial officials 

were finalizing development strategy plans and changing to a more participatory and 

transparent mode of government. PRT officials cited improvements in the skill level of 

the governors, provincial council members, and local office holders, although challenges 

remain in improving the overall talent level. Broken links between central ministries, 

provincial governments, and local officials, and poor working relationships between the 

parties limit the provinces’ abilities to govern and provide services to their citizens. 

Deconflicting communication between these various levels of government and 

identifying ways to enable resources and services to flow are big parts of the job for the 

PRTs. The officials told us that their biggest challenges are trying to keep provincial and 

local officials on task to solve problems and getting them to take ownership of their 

government. The lack of a Provincial Powers Law that defines the rights and 

responsibilities of government offices and holds provincial officials accountable for their 

actions was cited as a key obstacle to developing governance capacity. 

Rule of Law—Numerous PRT officials identified rule of law as their most problematic 

core function. In many locations there is little cooperation between the police, courts, and 

correction facilities, and judicial orders are routinely ignored. With a few exceptions, the 

local population views police officers with suspicion because of suspected links to local 

militias and criminal activity. Judges and other participants in the judicial process are 

subjected to intimidation, and due to inadequate security, courts are often unable or 

unwilling to hear cases. PRT officials reported that many areas of Iraq are outside the 

influence of the national police and courts, with disputes often resolved by local militia 

and religious leaders. After more than 30 years of neglect, Iraq’s legal system needs 

wholesale reform, and supporting institutions, such as law schools and bar associations, 

require assistance and training. The PRT rule of law advisors told us there is a pressing 

need for legal training and a desire on the part of judges and lawyers for up-to-date legal 

concepts in such areas as due process and human rights. During the course of our 

fieldwork, PRT advisors were attempting to upgrade the technical skills of judges, 

prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and they reported some success both in increasing 

7
visibility over detainees processing through the judicial system and in addressing 

overcrowded prison conditions. 

Economic Development—The dangerous security environment continued to undermine 

efforts by the PRTs to increase living standards and reduce unemployment. Therefore, it 

is difficult to ship raw materials into provinces and transport agricultural and 

manufactured products to markets, and there is little Iraqi or foreign investment. Many of 

the provinces suffer from shortages of fuel oil and electrical power, and PRT economic 

advisors report that it will be difficult to create employment opportunities without a 

stable power source. PRT officials are concerned that programs to create permanent jobs 

are lacking and that, without the temporary day-labor employment under U.S. 

reconstruction programs, there would be little economic activity. Outside Iraq’s larger 

cities, subsistence agriculture is the main source of employment, followed by government 

service, mainly in the police and armed forces. U.S. Embassy and Multi-National ForceIraq (MNF-I) officials see a pressing need to reduce unemployment to counter 

recruitment by militias. The PRTs are engaged in a number of efforts to foster economic 

development, including micro-lending programs, agribusiness development, smallbusiness development centers, and plans to resurrect state-owned enterprises. 

Reconstruction—PRT officials generally believe that the provinces are effective at 

managing their infrastructure and brick-and-mortar reconstruction projects. The 

development of Provincial Development Strategy plans provided a good starting point for 

guiding the reconstruction effort, and most of the provinces are on course to execute their 

2007 budget allocation—a prime objective of the PRTs. However, provincial 

governments have little ability to manage and sustain existing infrastructure projects; and, 

they are not budgeting for operation and maintenance requirements. PRT officials are 

focusing their efforts on raising the management skill level of provincial officials and 

getting the provinces to take ownership of the reconstruction process. Nevertheless, the 

lack of interagency coordination is hampering this process. We documented frequent 

instances where the Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects were 

performing tasks that properly belonged to local and provincial governments and thus 

conflicted with the capacity-development mission of the PRTs by performing tasks that 

properly belong to local and provincial governments. 

Political Reconciliation—PRT officials report little progress in this key area at the local 

and provincial level—with the notable exception of Al Anbar province, where the tribes 

banded together to oppose al-Qaeda and support the national government. Efforts toward 

reconciliation have been undermined by tension between rival Shia groups, a sense of 

alienation among Sunnis, and growing public frustration over the inability to obtain 

government services. Military officers with the BCTs, and PRT officials from mixed 

Sunni-Shia areas, told us that, if U.S. forces leave, many neighborhoods would become 

battlegrounds of ethnic cleansing. In the northern provinces, we were told that no 

significant political reconciliation would take place until issues involving Article 140—a 

constitutionally mandated referendum to determine if disputed territories of northern Iraq 

will be incorporated into Kurdistan—are resolved. In the southern, predominantly Shia 

provinces, officials report that political and religious parties are aggressively working to 

consolidate power in the run-up to provincial elections. 

8
Progress Viewed Across Regional Areas of 

the Country 

Notwithstanding generalizations that can be made across the country involving the five 

functional areas of emphasis we examined, differences do exist across the country and the 

provinces associated with them. To better depict these differences, we have organized 

this discussion across five regional areas of the country—a construct that we developed 

for discussion purposes only in this report. The northern regional area is heavily Kurdish, 

the western area largely Sunni, the southern areas largely Shia, and the central region 

mixed. 

Northern Regional Area 

Provinces: Erbil, Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, Ninewa, Ta’mim, and 

Salah ad Din 

The northern regional area is comprised of the Kurdish provinces of Erbil, Dahuk, and 

Sulaymaniyah (commonly called the Kurdish Region); the primarily Kurdish but 

ethnically mixed provinces of Ninewa and Ta’mim; and the primarily Sunni but also 

ethnically mixed Salah ad Din province. PRT Erbil, established in February 2007, is a 

South Korean-led, geographically split team with the South Korean contingent located at 

Camp Zaytun and U.S. personnel located in a residential/office compound a few miles 

away. PRT Erbil officials travel to Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk provinces to conduct 

business and meet with their Iraqi counterparts. PRTs Ninewa, Ta’mim, and Salah ad Din 

are located on U.S. military forward operating bases; they utilize military transportation 

and security when they meet with Iraqi officials. PRTs Ninewa and Ta’mim, established 

in November 2005, and Salah ad Din, established in September 2006, are relatively 

mature operations, and they have been expanding their outreach to areas outside their 

provincial capital. PRT Ninewa, for example, recently assigned one of its members to the 

western city of Tall Afar to better coordinate economic development and reconstruction 

efforts in that part of the province. PRT Salah ad Din has a governance representative in 

Samara and has plans to establish satellite offices with a few members in the 

economically and politically important cities of Baiji and Balad. 

Compared to other parts of Iraq, the PRTs in the northern region have a more permissive 

security environment. The Kurdish security force (known as the Peshmerga) has 

established relative peace and stability in the Kurdish provinces, and the Ninewa and 

Ta’mim provinces have seen a redeployment of U.S. military forces in 2007 to support 

operations in other areas of Iraq. PRT officials in Salah ad Din are concerned, however, 

that the security situation could worsen quickly if insurgents fleeing coalition combat 

operations in Baghdad and Diyala migrate north in search of safe haven. PRT officials 

9
also expressed fears about rising violence connected to the implementation of Article 

140.6

Governance 

Because of their political cohesiveness and stability, the Kurdish provinces of Erbil, 

Dahuk, and Sulimaniyah have generally effective governing institutions. Governance in 

Ninewa, Ta’mim, and Salah ad Din provinces remains more of a challenge due to the 

mixed composition of the population and uncertainty and political positioning connected 

to resolving Article 140 issues. PRT Ta’mim reports that Arab and Turkmen members 

have boycotted provincial council meetings since November 2006 over disputes with that 

legislation. In predominantly Sunni Salah ad Din province, the Shia-controlled city of 

Balad routinely ignores the provincial government and deals directly with its national 

counterpart in Baghdad. Resolving Article 140 issues, as well as passage by the 

Government of Iraq of a Provincial Powers Law that fully defines the relationship 

between local, provincial, and central governments, would set the stage for improved 

governance in their provinces. 

In spite of these challenges, PRT officials report progress in the governance skills of their 

Iraqi counterparts, especially in Ninewa and Ta’Mim, where the PRTs forged productive 

relationships through teaching and coaching provincial officials. For example, PRT 

officials say they have established better links between provincial officials and their 

counterparts at both the local and central-government level. In Salah ad Din, the 

provincial council has adopted rules and procedures for conducting meetings and has 

established various task forces to address such provincial problems as fuel distribution. 

All the region’s provinces were making progress executing their 2007 budgets and were 

ahead of their 2006 pace in spending provincial money. 

Rule of Law 

The northern region’s rule-of-law advisors provide a mixed assessment of the provinces’ 

law enforcement and judicial systems’ effectiveness to protect and serve the population. 

Problems include inadequate vetting of police candidates, resulting in militia infiltration 

and corrupt elements in the police force; threats and intimidation of judicial system 

officials, including judges, attorneys, and witnesses; and overcrowded detention facilities. 

The region’s most significant rule of law accomplishments are the establishment of a 

Major Crimes Court in Ninewa province and, for the first time, the trying of terrorism 

cases at the provincial level. From December 2006 through May 2007, in four court 

sessions, 168 defendants were tried in 135 different cases, resulting in 96 convictions. 

The sessions were presided over by Baghdad judges because of concerns for the safety of 

local judges. 

 

6

 Article 140 calls for a referendum to be held by December 31, 2007 to determine the final status of 

Kirkuk and Northern Iraq's disputed territories, including whether any of them will be incorporated into the 

Kurdish Region. The purpose of the article is to redress the prior Iraqi regimes’ forced relocation of nonArabs, principally Kurds, from the areas bordering Kurdistan. 

10
Polling conducted during this period showed public confidence in the judicial system 

increasing from 6% to 25%. While acknowledging that public confidence in the rule of 

law remains low, a PRT advisor noted that local police are pursuing more terrorismrelated cases because they know their efforts will result in a trial. 

Ta’mim and Salah ad Din provinces are also establishing Major Crime Courts, to be 

presided over by local judges, though again there is concern over providing them with 

adequate security. In an effort to address the many needs of the provinces’ rule of law 

functions, PRT advisors have been actively assessing the justice system by visiting 

judicial, prison, and police facilities and building relationships with provincial officials. 

They point to a number of recent heartening initiatives: 

• In Ninewa, consolidation in a secure compound of a juvenile-detention facility, 

transfer jail, crime lab, medical center, and residential center for judicial-system 

professionals traveling to Mosul 

• In Ta’mim, start of weapons training for judicial investigators 

• In Salah ad Din, holding a judicial conference with 40 participants; performing a 

security assessment of the court houses; and persuading judges to teach legal dueprocess courses to cadets at the police academy 

Economic Development 

Because of a relatively permissive security environment, the Kurdish provinces are able 

to attract international donors and investors, and are thus experiencing healthy economic 

growth. A 13-company South Korean consortium recently announced that it had signed 

interim deals worth $25 billion to build dams, highways, and houses in Iraqi Kurdistan. 

PRT Ninewa reports that the province’s economic recovery and political maturity have 

reached the point where the central government needs to allot increased legislative and 

executive powers to the province to sustain progress. PRTs Ta’mim and Salah ad Din 

have efforts underway to stimulate economic growth by developing their financial sectors 

and assisting small businesses and agriculture production; efforts are relatively small, 

however, and not expected to result in significant job creation in the near term. Shortages 

of fuel and reliable electrical power in all provinces continue to impose a significant 

constraint on economic development. 

Ninewa province is making progress growing its economy. Mosul and Tall Afar now 

have business centers that provide entrepreneurs with technical assistance and loans. 

PRT Ninewa is actively supporting micro-lending programs and agri-business 

development, and also trying to identify and develop markets for a targeted number of 

state-owned enterprises. 

Ta’mim province continues to suffer from high unemployment. The PRT there is 

focusing its effort on re-establishing the agricultural economy that was decimated by 

policies instituted under the Ba’athist regime. Although shortages of water, fertilizer, and 

fuel hamper cultivation, the PRT continues to provide technical training in rural villages 

in areas such as irrigation, orchard cultivation, and animal-husbandry. Additional efforts 

11
include establishing the Kirkuk Business Center and its subsidiary, the Investment and 

Economic Development Center, which provides business development training and 

marketing assistance. 

Source: U.S. Embassy Baghdad 

Photo 1—A canal cleaning project funded with CERP funds provides significant 

employment opportunities for the local community. 

Salah ad Din’s lack of critical economic infrastructure (banking, transportation, 

electricity) continues to inhibit its economic growth. PRT officials report that security in 

the province, already tenuous, appears to be deteriorating, undermining prospects for 

economic growth. The PRT is working to develop local organizations to promote and 

sustain growth initiatives, and has established several economic task forces and directed 

private sector assistance through the province’s Chamber of Commerce and Business 

Union. 

Reconstruction 

PRT Ninewa, Ta’mim, and Salah ad Din officials note that although shortfalls exist in the 

provision of essential services—including clean water, electricity, and waste 

management—provincial officials are now able to identify, prioritize, and coordinate 

construction projects that will help deliver the services. The reconstruction process was 

originally managed through the coalition-sponsored Provincial Reconstruction 

Development Committee (PRDC). It used coalition funds to rebuild the provinces’ 

failing infrastructure, while teaching provincial officials how to manage the process. The 

12
PRDC process in all three provinces has been expanded to include Government of Iraq 

funding, and is slowly transitioning to full Iraqi control. 

PRT efforts are now focused on building management skills rather than funding 

construction projects. The PRTs also use individual projects for teaching management 

skills to provincial officials. PRT Ta’mim, for example, is coordinating the development 

of a waste- management program for Kirkuk that includes construction of a solid-waste 

landfill, transfer station, and waste collection-management system funded under CERP. 

Completion of construction is anticipated in December 2007, with the local government 

expected to take full operational control of the program next year. 

Political Reconciliation 

PRT efforts have thus far failed to influence sectarian and tribal leaders to address the 

issue of political reconciliation. For one thing, the uncertainty created by the Article 140 

referendum is casting a shadow over the region. The various political and ethnic groups 

seem to be focused on consolidating their relative positions in the provinces in the run-up 

to the referendum, and no significant political reconciliation is expected until the voting 

has taken place. Given that reality, the PRTs are attempting to find common ground 

between the various parties. One positive development was a reconciliation conference—

sponsored by PRT Ninewa—that brought together more than 500 attendees, including the 

sheiks of two prominent tribes that had been feuding for two decades. 

Western Regional Area 

Province: Al Anbar 

Al Anbar province, the largest of Iraq’s 18 governorates, is in the process of transforming 

itself from a recent violent past as the bastion of Iraqi resistance. At the outset, the 

indigenous, predominantly Sunni Arab tribes either passively accepted al-Qaeda in Iraq’s 

(AQI) presence or worked in concert with the forces hostile to the coalition. However, the 

onslaught of indiscriminate attacks against inhabitants and tribal leaders soon produced a 

dramatic change in allegiance: By the spring of 2007, the tribes had banded together to 

oppose AQI and support the national government. According to BCT military officers 

operating in the region, AQI’s heavy-handed treatment of the tribes included murder and 

interference in lucrative business schemes, and resistance to that treatment has brought a 

new level of calm to the province. 

Given the chaotic security environment that existed previously, the PRT Anbar team 

leader acknowledged that—in 2006 and early 2007—PRT staff members were largely 

marking time, unable to gain much traction in their pursuit of improved governance and 

economic development. They nonetheless achieved positive results by building 

relationships with such key players as the governor, provincial council members, 

directors general, and local officials, and now are able to capitalize on those contacts. At 

the time we did our field work in mid-June 2007, the new ePRTs were becoming familiar 

with their communities, identifying key players and institutions and assessing their 

capabilities. PRT and ePRT team members generally agreed that, with the improved 

13
security environment, they expect their efforts to begin showing positive results in the 

next four to six months. According to the PRT team leader, Al Anbar province has now 

moved beyond the battle with AQI and is engaged in an economic struggle to jump-start 

the economy and create jobs. 

Governance 

The integral components comprising Al Anbar’s provincial government structure are in 

place: central ministries and respective directors general; the provincial council and 

governor; city councils and assistant directors general, local councils and mayors. But 

ineffective linkages and poor working relationships between the parties have limited the 

province’s ability to govern and provide services. PRT and ePRT members told us they 

directed their efforts to improve communications between the various levels of 

government and identify links between personnel and systems that will enable resources 

to flow from the central government downward. PRT Anbar concentrates its effort on 

improving the links between the central and provincial levels; the ePRTs, between the 

provincial government and the local councils. As PRT Anbar officials note, obtaining 

increased funding for the Sunni-led province from the Shia-led central government 

represents a significant accomplishment for the provincial government. 

Many of those who had fled the violence are returning to the province and, in some 

instances, seeking to resume their former positions. After being in Baghdad for more than 

a year, the Provincial Council in May 2007 resumed its business meetings in Ramadi; by 

late July, the security situation in the province had improved so much that the Provincial 

Council and the governor were able to move back into their renovated offices in the city’s 

Government Center. Furthermore, some of Anbar’s influential sheiks—who had sought 

refuge in Jordan, along with some directors general—had recently returned, and longplanned provincial elections are now anticipated as a pivotal event. 

Despite these positive signs, however, PRT Anbar military officers and civil officials 

agree that work on governance issues in the province is only in the formative stages— 

primarily because key players and institutions remain in a state of flux. In addition it was 

initially envisioned that the elections would provide the Sunnis, who boycotted the 2005 

vote, with more power and thus better representation in the central government. 

However, the tribal chieftains who emerged to fight and suppress AQI have complicated 

the process by demanding more political power from their own, traditional Sunni leaders. 

Rule of Law 

Although Al Anbar’s civil courts had been functioning, the insurgency, and personal 

security threats prevented judges from hearing major crime cases. Military officers with 

the BCTs and PRT Anbar officials pointed out that criminal trials are central not only to 

validating the rule of law but also to containing the number of insurgents in the region. At 

present, there is little linkage or chain-of-command relationships between the police, 

courts, and correction personnel. According to PRT officials, the inability to convene 

trials within a reasonable time frame has major negative consequences, with many 

detainees languishing for prolonged periods in crowded detention facilities and others 

14
being released because of a lack of space. Furthermore, reports reaching PRT Anbar 

officials cite deplorable conditions in those facilities and raise serious human-rights 

issues.

At the end of June 2007, a judicial conference held in Ramadi resulted in two orders 

signed by Iraq’s Chief Judge: the first established a court for major crimes; the second 

assigned judges to various courts throughout the province. In August, BCT officers were 

expecting Al Anbar to hold its first terrorist trials the following month in Ramadi, when 

renovation of the courthouse was completed. While recognizing these positive 

developments, PRT Anbar officials are also realistic: because the PRT and ePRTs lack a 

sufficient number of experts to provide the necessary technical legal and criminal-justice 

assistance to the Iraqis, the officials expect limited impact on rule of law issues in the 

province. 

Economic Development 

According to PRT Anbar officials, dedicated efforts to foster economic development are 

underway now that large-scale combat operations have ended in the province. To sustain 

the increased small-scale market activity, however, a reliably secure environment is 

required. Officials remain concerned over the lack of programs to create permanent jobs; 

without the temporary day-labor employment (mainly for clearing rubble) under CERP, 

there would be little economic activity in the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. The lack of 

fuel–and the security needed to transport it—are undermining efforts by manufacturing 

and industrial enterprises to restart operations, and sporadic electricity makes it difficult 

to run production lines in an economically viable manner. When we did our fieldwork, in 

mid-June 2007, several PRT and ePRT economic-development specialists had just 

arrived in the province, and they were beginning their assessments and meeting with local 

officials and businessmen. 

During a follow-up visit to Ramadi two months later, progress was evident at a ceramics 

factory that had produced floor tile and porcelain bathroom fixtures prior to 2004. Iraqi 

plant managers, working with nearly $1 million in financial and technical support from 

the DoD Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations, were in the process of 

updating training for plant engineers and confronting fuel and operation-andmaintenance issues. The governor and the mayor of Ramadi both indicated they were 

anticipating a gradual reopening of the facility beginning in September, a development 

that would put 500 individuals back to work. Ramadi ePRT officials also cited, in the 

first weeks of August, the reopening of the city’s main market; a walk-through showed a

heartening level of economic activity. 

Reconstruction 

There is a concerted effort on the part of the PRT and ePRTs to assist the governor, the 

mayors, and provincial and city councils to plan for and begin spending Iraqi government 

funding for the reconstruction of essential services—water, sewer, and electricity— 

throughout the province. According to military officers with the BCTs and PRT Anbar 

officials, progress has been slow. The infrastructure in Ramadi and Fallujah remains 

15
largely destroyed from the years of fighting between coalition forces and insurgents. The 

U.S. Marines are using CERP funds to clear rubble and remove trash in the hope that the 

Government of Iraq will follow suit and devote increased resources to funding 

reconstruction projects. BCT leaders in Ramadi told us that, although the municipal 

government is capable of repairing power, water, and sewer lines, it still lacks the 

capacity to initiate new projects and rebuild infrastructure from scratch. PRT and ePRT 

officials were assessing the reconstruction needs of the province and working with their 

Iraqi government counterparts to compile, screen, and submit for funding lists of projects 

for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. 

Source: U.S. Embassy Baghdad 

Photo 2—In an effort to jump-start the rebuilding process, CERP-hired workers 

remove rubble in downtown Ramadi. 

Political Reconciliation 

As a result of the tribes having mobilized to align with coalition forces against AQI, 

military officers with the BCTs and PRT Anbar officials are optimistic that measurable 

progress may now be made on reconciliation issues. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Al 

Anbar does not face many of the political issues confronting other provinces, they remain 

cognizant of the ongoing challenge of getting the predominantly Sunni provincial 

government to better engage with the Shia-dominated central government. PRT officials 

report some recent successes in impressing on provincial officials the need to obtain 

funding and services from the central ministries. For example, the provincial officials 

were able to get officials from the Shia-controlled Ministry of Education to intervene and 

allow end-of-year high school exams to take place as scheduled. Also, new police were 

successfully recruited from the tribal areas, raising the total number of police in the 

province from approximately 3,000 in February 2007 to more than 14,000 in June 2007. 

16
Military officers with the BCTs and PRT Anbar officials, however, are circumspect: they 

expect in the coming months (when the transition from dealing with AQI is completed) 

that tribal issues—long dormant—will begin to surface as the tribes begin to position 

themselves for power and economic advantage. Also, according to PRT officials, most of 

the provinces’ influential players—army, police, tribes, sheiks—had a hand in business 

and racketeering ventures. The key will be establishing a modus operandi for managing 

the spoils systems and the distribution of wealth without violence. 

Central Regional Area 

Provinces: Baghdad and Diyala 

Baghdad is the most populous of Iraq’s 18 provinces, with an estimated seven million 

inhabitants, and stabilizing Baghdad city and its surrounding neighborhoods is a high

U.S. priority. With 79 advisors, PRT Baghdad, established in March 2006, is the largest 

of the 10 existing PRTs. Situated in Baghdad’s International Zone, its members work 

primarily at the provincial level and play an active role bringing each of the city’s major 

“political communities” together to become full stakeholders in the conduct and 

management of the province’s governance and economy. 

Although Baghdad remains very dangerous, with sections of the city generally off-limits 

to U.S. personnel, PRT Baghdad officials have taken more than 1500 trips into the socalled ‘Red Zone’ over the past year. Fortunately, living and working in the International 

Zone enables the PRT to deal productively with many Iraqis, who prefer holding 

meetings there for safety’s sake. 

In April 2007, six new ePRTs were established in Baghdad province, with an additional 

three expected to become operational by September. (Elsewhere in the Central Region, an 

ePRT was also set up in nearby north Babil, and a new one was being established in south 

Diyala province.) The ePRTs’ primary mission is to support the counterinsurgency, and 

to that end they have expanded U.S. interaction with Iraqis in the neighborhoods as well 

as at the district and municipal levels. In our visits to the six ePRTs in Baghdad province, 

we found civilians and military working under dangerous conditions, with members 

having sustained casualties traveling the region’s dangerous roads. With few exceptions, 

however, we observed good civil-military integration and cooperation, and brigade 

combat team leaders seemed convinced that ePRT members provide valuable advice and 

expertise and constitute a tangible benefit to their battle. For example, in some instances 

local officials were reticent to engage with U.S. military officers but willing to work with 

ePRT civilians. ePRT officials also received credit for advising BCT commanders on 

how to revise their CERP programs to avoid performing functions that belong to local 

government. 

Diyala province is predominantly Sunni, although it contains a large number of Shia 

villages and towns and a concentration of Kurds along its northern border with Kurdistan. 

Diyala became an important battleground in spring 2007, when the Al Anbar tribes 

mobilized and aligned with coalition forces against AQI and chased the foreign fighters 

17
and other insurgents into Diyala. During this period, according to PRT Diyala’s team 

leader, Shia death squads were preying on Sunni villages, and the Sunnis asked AQI to 

protect them—throwing a temporary wrench into the U.S. strategy of turning local tribes 

against that group. In early June, coalition forces conducted Operation Arrowhead Ripper 

to expel AQI from the province. By mid-July, combat operations in Baqubah, the 

provincial capital, were largely concluded, with the fight migrating northward up the 

Baqubah valley toward Salah ad Din province. During our fieldwork in Baqubah in early 

August, the level of violence in the city—though not rural areas—was decreasing. PRT 

Diyala members remained engaged with their Iraqi counterparts throughout the period, 

despite the difficult security situation. It is noteworthy that every member of the PRT 

team has encountered direct hostile fire. 

Governance 

Politics and governance in both Baghdad and Diyala provinces remain extremely 

contentious. Because Sunnis boycotted the December 2005 provincial elections, political 

power is dominated by Shia parties, and they continue to fight any structural changes that 

might weaken their position. In Baghdad province, Sunni political parties have been shut 

out of governance, although key technocrats from the previous regime remain in some 

managerial positions. In predominantly Sunni Diyala, the links between the central 

ministries, the directors general, and the provincial government have been broken since 

the boycotted elections. According to the PRT team leader there is also a fractured 

relationship between the province’s Shia governor, Sunni deputy governor, and Kurdish 

provincial council chairman that undermines their efforts to bring improved governance 

to the province. It is the consensus opinion of PRT Baghdad and Diyala officials that a 

Provincial Election Law, along with a Provincial Powers Law, must be passed before 

governance in the two provinces can improve. 

In spite of these problems, PRT officials pointed to areas of improved governance. PRT 

Baghdad and the provincial council hosted a Baghdad-wide meeting with the Ministry of 

Education and representatives from various councils to develop a plan for rehabilitating 

and staffing the province’s schools. An ePRT in southwestern Baghdad province 

collaborated with its qada council to prepare and submit a budget that resulted in the 

district obtaining funding for the first time. Despite the three-week battle of Baqubah, 

PRT Diyala officials traveled every day to the downtown government center and worked 

side by side with the governor and other provincial officials and kept the operations of 

government open to the public. The PRT believes it is well positioned to assist the 

government of the province as the latter emerges from months of heavy fighting. 

PRT officials agree that their biggest challenge lies in trying to keep provincial and local 

officials on task to solve problems and to take ownership of their government. Officials 

from the six ePRTs we visited in and around Baghdad believe that their major impact 

would be in the area of governance—but that it will be months before they see 

meaningful results. There was broad agreement that capacity in district, qada, and 

neighborhood governance remain in the formative stages and generally ineffective. The 

PRT cited the need for the Provincial Powers Law to define and legitimatize the role of 

the neighborhood and district councils which have a somewhat-broken relationship with 

18
the Baghdad provincial council and the Amanat. The governance advisors at the ePRTs 

are assessing the capabilities and needs of the local belidiyahs and directors general, and 

they are working to establish links between local/district officials and their 

provincial/central government counterparts to assure that essential services reach the 

grassroots level. 

Finally, the presence and threat from Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) and Sunni insurgents 

including AQI, restrict contacts between local government officials and the PRT. During 

the course of our fieldwork, several local government officials, who work closely with 

ePRT advisors, were assassinated; others fled due to threats. When events of that sort 

occur, all forward momentum seems to stop, and a great deal of time and effort must be 

expended to get it going again. Security conditions also prevent local officials from 

attending the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-sponsored 

governance training in Baghdad city, and lack of security in some areas has kept 

instructors from providing on-site training. 

Security challenges notwithstanding, ePRT officials believe they are making some 

progress. An illustrative example: Sadr City (in northeast Baghdad, estimated population 

2.5 million), where Shia district council members were under orders from the 

Organization of Martyr as-Sadr7

 (OMS) not to meet with U.S. military officials. Because 

they are civilians, members of an ePRT were able to talk with elements of the Sadr City 

leadership in an attempt to change the center of gravity from the JAM-controlled council 

to a more moderate council. According to the team leader, he and his unit were directly 

supporting and investing in moderates–especially local tribal leaders—in hopes that the 

tactic would draw out other moderates, including some OMS and district council 

members. 

Rule of Law 

As the seat of national government, Baghdad city is home to the High Juridical Council 

and to newly created “special courts” such as the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) 

and the Iraq High Tribunal (IHT).8 Baghdad Province is the location for 12 local courts 

in the city and four in the neighboring qadas. Among its activities, the U.S. Embassy’s 

Rule of Law Team conducts a variety of programs to strengthen the Iraqi criminal justice 

system. PRT Baghdad’s rule of law advisors (11 legal specialists) expressed concern that 

the approach taken by the Rule of Law Program at the Embassy level was too focused on 

 

7

 Titles and translations for the Shia political parties active in Iraq vary and frequently change. According 

to U.S. Embassy and coalition officials, OMS is a more widely used term for Muqtada al-Sadr’s office and 

its militia wing known as the JAM. Seeking to accent its Iraqi-nationalist ties with a name change, the 

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq recently replaced the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Its 

militia is the Badr Organization, officially known as the Badr Organization for Reconstruction and 

Development. 

8

 The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, the nation’s premier criminal tribunal, was created by the Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003 to hear major criminal cases related to terrorism and the insurgency 

that were previously handled by provincial judges. The IHT was also established by the CPA with the 

mission of trying Iraqi nationals or residents accused of genocide, war crimes, or other serious crimes. The 

IHT tried Saddam Hussein and other members of his Ba’ath Party regime. 

19
short-term concerns at the expense of the longer-term, developmental needs of the 

province’s judicial system. While recognizing the important work of the CCCI and IHT, 

and the need to address such issues as detainee overcrowding, PRT Baghdad officials 

were concerned that a large segment of Iraq’s judicial system was not receiving enough 

U.S. assistance. Representatives of the Embassy’s Rule of Law Office do not believe 

their activities fail to address longer-term development needs citing its work on long-term 

construction projects—courthouses, detention facilities, law enforcement training 

academies—and financial and operational support of training programs for judges, 

investigators, and police officers, among others. 

PRT officials told us that Iraqi police in Baghdad engage in criminal and sectarian 

behavior and have thus earned the distrust of the population. Normal cooperation 

between the police, courts, and correction facilities is routinely ignored, and judicial 

orders tend to be ineffective. Judges, witnesses, and attorneys are subject to intimidation, 

and due to the insecure environment, courts were often too unsettled to hear cases. 

Assessments by PRT Baghdad rule-of-law advisors indicate that Baghdad’s courts have 

important and unmet needs: inadequate physical structures, administrative services, and 

security. Visits to local courthouses reveal overcrowded and deteriorating facilities in 

which judges operate several hours a day without electricity or adequate protection from 

militia and terrorist attacks. 

PRT Baghdad officials also chronicled the poor foundation of Iraq’s legal system, 

especially its legal-education and bar associations. Over the past 30 years, the nation’s 

law schools suffered from neglect in the areas of (1) infrastructure, including law 

libraries, (2) curriculum development, (3) computer and internet access and training, and 

(4) access to international study and exchange. According to a PRT Baghdad official, 

judges and long-time practicing attorneys complain that recent graduates have not been 

adequately prepared for the practice of law. An additional problem: the lack of a strong 

and independent bar association to serve as an advocate for a legal profession that was 

seriously weakened by Saddam’s regime. A functioning bar, issuing assessments on 

problem areas of the law, reviewing judicial appointments, and enforcing disciplinary 

standards and ethics, would be a major contribution to Iraq’s judicial system. 

Despite the many problems facing the Central Region’s judicial system, PRT Baghdad 

and Diyala rule of law advisors were able to point to a number of initiatives that led to 

what they characterized as incremental progress—the first four pertaining predominantly 

to Baghdad, and the fifth primarily to Diyala: 

• Upgrading the technical skills of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys 

• Improving the treatment of juveniles in police detention 

• Raising awareness of women’s-rights issues within the judicial system and police 

force 

• Increasing contact and visibility over individuals who are in custody or being 

processed through the judicial system 

• Addressing overcrowded conditions in Diyala’s prisons 

20
Economic Development 

The insecure environment in Baghdad and Diyala provinces continues to undermine 

efforts by the PRTs to promote economic development, increase living standards, and 

create jobs. Security concerns make it difficult to get raw materials shipped into the 

provinces and agricultural products and manufactured items transported out to markets. 

Baghdad ePRT officials report little economic activity in mixed neighborhoods and along 

Sunni-Shia fault lines; the officials have seen more robust economic and market activity 

in neighborhoods with a relatively secure environment. Baghdad province also suffers 

from shortages of fuel and electrical power. Until there is a stable source of power, PRT 

Baghdad’s economic advisors say, it will be difficult to get people back to work there. 

In an effort to return Baghdad city to some semblance of normalcy and foster economic 

development, the U.S. government has put great effort into securing and re-opening 

Baghdad’s markets. Using a combination of funding sources—CERP, micro-loans, and 

grants— the military and the PRTs have been able to re-open a number of them, 

including the large Doura market in that southern suburb and the popular Abu Newas fish 

market and Mutnabi book market in “old Historic Baghdad” east of the International 

Zone. PRT officials consider market re-opening an important accomplishment, but they 

acknowledge that markets generally have a modest impact on unemployment. 

Because of limited foreign and direct investment in Baghdad and Diyala provinces, and 

because banks have limited capital to invest, the PRTs have been aggressively promoting 

a micro-lending program. Sponsored by USAID, the program established seven locations 

in Baghdad districts to educate prospective borrowers and make loans to small 

businesses. PRT officials are also assisting small and medium-sized businesses. For 

example, industry specialists from an ePRT in eastern Baghdad have been working to 

obtain generators to provide a stable power source for an industrial park. 

Similarly, a business specialist from an ePRT in northern Baghdad province has been 

able to arrange a large text book order from the Ministry of Education for a printing plant 

in their area. The PRT members have also been assessing a number of state-owned 

enterprises to determine their economic viability (revitalizing state-owned enterprises is 

primarily a DoD initiative conducted by the Task Force to Improve Business and 

Stabilization Operations). PRT officials say that although state-owned enterprises have 

significant problems, such as outdated equipment and ghost employees, they offer the 

most promising opportunity for generating employment. 

21
Source: ePRT 1st BCT/1st Cavalry Division, Camp Taji

Photo 3—A furniture factory in the northern Baghdad suburbs that escaped looting 

after the fall of Saddam in 2003; an ePRT is working with former employees to reopen the business. 

PRT officials and BCT military officers admit there is much they don’t know about the 

economic situation in Baghdad province. They report vast unemployment and 

underemployment, which they estimate at 40%-50%. Permanent job creation has been 

limited, and most new jobs are tied to the large amount of CERP funding that is being 

spent in and around Baghdad. Officials from the ePRTs told us that there is significant 

criminal activity in their districts and that contractors, shop owners, and the heads of 

other businesses and industries are shaken down for protection money. Despite the 

turmoil, the BCT civil affairs team that patrols southern Baghdad has been puzzled at 

appearances in southern Baghdad. People there do not appear impoverished. They dress 

decently, markets are operating and goods are being sold, and life is moving on. 

PRT Diyala reports two distinct economies in the province. The economy in the 

predominantly Kurdish north, is relatively stable and experiencing a housing boom as 

more displaced Kurds return as part of the effort to reverse the “Arabization” program 

carried out by the previous regime. The economy in the south, centered on Baqubah, is 

largely dysfunctional due to lack of security. PRT officials noted that Diyala province has 

(1) significant agribusiness potential but little ability to transport crops to market; (2) 

abundant resources, but a lack of product-refining capability in most sectors; and (3) a 

solid industrial base for mass employment, yet all industries are closed or operating at 

22
less than 10% of capacity. The same officials cited the difficulty of imparting forward 

movement to economic development in Diyala’s kinetic environment; their best hope is 

not to lose too much ground. In that regard, the officials are optimistic about getting the 

Diyala Electrical Industries complex—with 200 employees and the potential to employ 

nearly 3,000—up and running and working to fill a sizeable back order of electrical 

transformers and batteries. 

Reconstruction 

PRT Baghdad officials told us that the province’s governmental institutions are steadily 

improving in their management of provincial reconstruction programs and are assuming 

functions formerly carried out by U.S. officials. An Iraqi official now chairs the weekly 

Joint Planning Session that coordinates and directs all reconstruction projects in Baghdad. 

Iraqi engineers and employees from the Amanat, the essential service ministries, and 

other government offices are working in the International Zone’s Joint Reconstruction 

Operation Center that serves as the information hub for all reconstruction projects. PRT 

Baghdad coordinates closely with the governor, provincial council, and Amanat, and 

recent months have seen increased buy-in and support for projects supporting the 

Baghdad security plan. However, PRT and ePRT officials stated that getting their 

provincial counterparts to plan and assume responsibility for the maintenance and 

continued operation of infrastructure projects remains a big challenge. Central ministries 

and the Amanat will budget for capital projects but then fail to provide funds for the 

belidiyas to maintain them. 

PRT Diyala reports that, thanks to improvements in Baqubah’s security situation, work 

crews have re-entered the city to repair electricity, water, and sewer lines. Nevertheless, 

the sectarian divide in Diyala’s provincial government undercuts the province’s overall 

reconstruction effort, with decisions on which projects to execute heavily influenced by 

tribal and sectarian considerations. The province is awash in funding, with nearly $240 

million in allocated Iraqi funds available through 2007, and only 14% of that obligated as 

of August 2007. Yet CERP funds were used again in 2007 to pay for date-crop spraying 

and canal-cleaning projects. But PRT officials seriously doubt that the province has the 

capacity to use the funds because of a lack of competent reconstruction managers and a 

shortage of both reconstruction projects and the contractors necessary to undertake them. 

The Diyala provincial government has not budgeted for the operation and maintenance of 

existing infrastructure; it is focusing its reconstruction effort instead on brick-and-mortar 

projects and stockpiling materials. Despite efforts by PRT officials to help manage the 

province’s reconstruction effort, the team leader told us that he expects “a train wreck” in 

a few years, when infrastructure projects begin to fail due to inadequate sustainment 

efforts. 

We observed in Baghdad and surrounding areas the considerable use of CERP funds in 

the province’s reconstruction. Since 2004, the U.S. military has obligated $512 million 

for more than 3,400 projects in Baghdad province. (In November of this year, SIGIR 

plans to report on the scope of CERP reconstruction projects in Iraq and their overall 

contribution to Iraq reconstruction.) PRT officials are concerned that, while they 

recognize that CERP is a valuable tool for commanders to influence their battle space, 

23
their use sometimes conflicts with the PRT’s capacity development mission. For 

example, in eastern Baghdad, CERP funds purchased diesel fuel to operate a pump 

station to drain sewers and remove solid wastes from the city streets; in south Baghdad, 

to remove trash from neighborhoods; in southwestern Baghdad province, to clear canals. 

In each of those instances, ePRT officials told us, they were teaching and coaching local 

officials to assume responsibility themselves for carrying out these governmental 

functions. After four years of U.S. engagement, the officials felt, it is time for local and 

provincial government officials to handle such routine tasks and not rely on the U.S. 

military. Economic problems were also evident: PRT officials also noted that CERP 

support was inflating the labor market and that the local belidiyas were finding it difficult 

to compete for labor when CERP contracts exceeded the market rate. 

Political Reconciliation 

Despite gains by U.S. and Iraqi security forces in tamping down violence in some 

sections in and around Baghdad and Baqubah, PRT officials are generally pessimistic 

that lasting political reconciliation was taking place in the Baghdad and Diyala provinces. 

According to PRT Baghdad officials, some of their districts and neighborhoods remain 

too “hot” for reconciliation to take place. In areas that included mixed Sunni-Shia 

populations, we were told, the departure of U.S. forces would produce open battlegrounds 

of ethnic cleansing. For example, ePRT officials stationed in southern Baghdad’s told us 

that if forces were withdrawn at the Doura market, Shia militias would expel Sunni shop 

keepers and patrons. 

At the provincial level, PRT Baghdad reports that it has seen an increase in the 

government’s desire to work toward reconciliation. Officials cited several high-profile 

visits by the Shia governor to primarily Sunni qadas—the first Baghdad politician seen in 

any qada in recent memory. Although the provincial council is comprised predominantly 

of Shia members, PRT analysis showed that projects implemented through the PRDC 

process were split roughly 50-50 among Sunni and Shia neighborhoods. A PRT advisor 

attributed this fact to good fortune: the province’s infrastructure—water, sewer, 

electricity—was not constructed along ethnic lines. However, the OMS-dominated 

Ministries of Health and Education withhold services and support to clinics and schools 

in Sunni districts. In a positive development, PRT Diyala reported in early August that 

paramount sheiks from 14 of the 17 major tribes recently met and voiced support to resist 

AQI and militias and work together to maintain peace in the province. Nonetheless, illwill between the tribes in the province is long-standing, and PRT officials believe it will 

take years to overcome. The PRT Diyala team leader told us that only the presence of 

U.S. forces has prevented open sectarian violence, and after years of war it will be a 

tough job getting the tribes to trust each other again. 

At the neighborhood level in Baghdad, ePRT officials described the political situation for 

the average Iraqi citizen as a matter of intimidation and fear. Sunni and Shia extremists 

target local government officials, religious leaders, and tribal sheiks who step forward to 

help on matters of reconciliation. Governance advisors at the ePRTs noted that Baghdad 

had largely lost key components of its civil society— senior civil service, academics, and 

business leaders— making it difficult to identify and recruit serious and capable partners 

24
who would normally lead reconciliation efforts. There are some signs that officials in

some Shia neighborhoods feel sufficiently secure to engage in political discussions on 

how to move forward. 

Similarly, we were also told that although Sunnis perceive the central government as 

hostile to their interests, some local Sunnis have been willing to work with Shia sheiks. 

An encouraging example: a recently concluded, community-based tribal-outreach 

meeting held by prominent citizens from Mahmoudiyah district, southwest of Baghdad, 

with senior Sunni tribal leaders based in Amman, Jordan. (Mahmoudiyah, in the highly 

sectarian area known as the Triangle of Death, is a predominantly Shia city in a Sunni 

belt that runs along the borders of the Shia-dominated Najaf and Karbala provinces.) 

South-Central Regional Area 

Provinces: Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit 

The south-central regional area is known as the Shia heartland, with the city of An Najaf 

serving as the capital. Iranian influence exists in some degree in all the south-central 

provinces, but is most concentrated in Najaf, Karbala, and Babil. The security situation is 

generally calm for Iraqis and Iranians but dangerous for coalition forces and civilians. In 

the run-up to provincial elections, the region is being politically and militarily contested 

by the three main Shia parties: the OMS, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and Dawa. 

Among PRT and PST officials stationed at the Regional Embassy Office (REO) Al 

Hillah, it is the consensus view that the security situation has worsened in South-Central 

since SIGIR’s last visits in the summer and fall of 2006. 

A fundamental issue facing PRT officials concerns movement security and the level of 

risk they are willing to accept to meet face to face with their Iraqi counterparts versus the 

benefits of such a meeting. Overall, PRT Babil officials believe they are making some 

tangible progress, while officials responsible for Najaf, Karbala, and Qadisiyah are less 

optimistic of their effectiveness due to their inability to engage with their Iraqi 

counterparts and monitor first-hand what is taking place. 

Babil province, south of Baghdad, is mixed Sunni-Shia and an important transport route 

and fuel network—making it explosive in a sectarian sense. The Sunni population, 

concentrated in the northern part of the province, faces attempts by Shia militias to force 

its members to leave. Shia–dominated southern Babil is considered safer, and PRT Babil 

officials were able to meet with their provincial counterparts. Karbala, the home of 

religious shrines, is heavily influenced by Iran. Because of security risks, the PST 

Karbala team has made only three trips to the province in the past year, with an average 

of three or four monthly engagements between PST members and provincial officials 

confined to the REO in Al Hillah. Najaf is considered the center of Shite political power 

in Iraq, and its importance to all Shia parties has brought an atypical amount of

reconstruction activity and the generally efficient provision of essential services. 

According to REO Al Hillah officials, Iran has significant influence in the province and 

25
funnels cash to various Shia factions; security concerns have kept PST officials from 

traveling there for almost a year. 

Qadisiysah province is a battleground among the various Shia militias, with coalition 

forces hardly visible; there has been no PST overland travel to the province since May 

2006. Wasit is a mainly rural society, where tribal ties are more important than party 

connections. Unlike the more politically polarized provinces in the region, the Shia 

militias cooperate and they attack Sunnis located in the northern part of the province. 

Before converting and relocating PST Wasit to an embedded PRT at Camp Delta in Al 

Kut, there was no overland movement to Wasit for months, and provincial officials 

traveled to meetings—largely confined to Camp Delta—by helicopter transport. 

Governance 

PRT personnel at REO Al Hillah agree that provincial officials have generally not been 

effective at managing their government institutions, including the provision of essential 

services, but have been incrementally better than the previous year and are getting still 

better as they move forward. All five provinces are finishing their Provincial 

Development Strategy plans and making modest improvements in budgeting, strategic 

planning, and forming civil societies. PRT officials noted remaining problems with 

transparency and accountability at the provincial-government level, but they were seeing 

some improvement in the skills of the governors and provincial council members. 

According to the PRT officials, however, the provinces’ directors general are not good 

performers—poor at planning and obtaining funding and services from central 

ministries—and constitute the weakest link in provincial governance. 

As in other regions, PRT officials cited the lack of a Provincial Powers Law as a 

hindrance to their provinces’ governance and development. The officials believe that 

provincial authorities require direction and supervision with regard to the rights and 

responsibilities of office and that the Provincial Powers Law would serve as a useful tool 

in holding the authorities accountable for their actions. PRT officials complained of an 

overall lack of leadership on the part governors, deputy governors, provincial council 

chairmen, and mayors. Provincial leadership was described as beholden to political 

parties and unsupportive of efforts to stabilize society. And because of tenuous security, a 

problem except around Al Hillah, the PRTs have limited ability to teach, coach, and 

mentor their Iraqi counterparts. 

Rule of Law 

The South-Central region’s rule of law advisors describe the provincial governments as 

marginally able to provide law enforcement and judicial functions that openly and fairly 

protect and serve the population. A recent accomplishment: establishing Major Crimes 

Courts in each of the five provinces. Political influence is a major factor, however. With 

the exception of Babil, where strong leadership by the chief of police has resulted in 

impartial treatment of all citizens, political parties strongly influence these provinces. 

Geographical areas remain outside the reach of the police and courts; many disputes are 

resolved by local OMS and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq officials. The police 

26
generally will not take action against JAM and Badr members, and judges are often 

intimidated and subject to bribes. 

The advisors told us that this region, like the rest of the country, suffers from the conflict 

between older laws consistent with a free-market democracy (like the Civil Code of 

1951), the statist and politically centralizing orders of the Ba’athist government, and the 

decrees and legislation of the CPA and later the Iraqi governments, which were limited 

attempts at reform. A wholesale reform of Iraqi law, the advisors believe, is required to 

bring coherence to the law and to fill many gaps in political and regulatory practice. 

Officials describe a need for judicial training and a desire on the part of judges and 

lawyers for up-to-date legal concepts in such areas as due process and human rights; yet 

judges and lawyers are reluctant to work too closely with U.S. personnel because doing 

so risks pressure and intimidation from political and religious parties across the 

provinces. 

PRT officials working with provincial officials cited progress in a number of areas: 

• Incorporating principles of human rights into police-curriculum training 

• Distributing to judges laptop computers with software capable of searching Iraqi 

law from 1920 through 2006 

• Working to end a year-long dispute between the Ministries of Justice and Interior 

over whether to open the U.S.-funded Al-Tasfirat prison, in Al Hillah, to relieve 

overcrowding at jails 

• Brokering an agreement between provinces over the use of arrest warrants for outof-province citizens (addressing concerns of sectarian targeting) 

Economic Development 

According to PRT officials, the region is economically stagnant, with little evidence of 

growth or permanent job creation. Religious tourism and small-scale agricultural 

production constitute the main economic activities, along with the labor utilized by the 

booming reconstruction industry in Karbala and Najaf. There is believed to be 

considerable Government of Iran money flowing into Karbala and Najaf provinces. 

Security has restricted commercial credit and Iraqi and foreign investment in small and 

medium-sized business. 

PRT Babil officials report an acute need for business-development training. The PRT 

there recently opened two business-development centers in Al Hillah, but told us it is too 

soon to determine their effect. There are plans for tourism promotion, including the 

establishment of a “tourism corridor” along pilgrimage routes to Karbala and Najaf. 

Other plans envisage repairing and resurrecting a number of state-owned enterprises, 

including a cold-storage facility, which officials hope will have a ripple effect through the 

agricultural industry, increasing marketing opportunities and spurring food-processing 

operations. PRT officials are at last optimistic that with the recent release of quickresponse fund, they can increase agricultural production by providing seed money for 

such activities as an agricultural extension service, fish farming, and mosquito spraying. 

27
PRT officials see a pressing need to reduce unemployment to counter recruitment by the 

JAM and Badr Corp militias.

Reconstruction 

PRT officials feel that the provinces are doing a reasonably effective job of managing 

their infrastructure and building-reconstruction projects. At the time of our visit, all the 

provinces were on course to execute their 2007 capital budgets. The officials noted, 

however, that provincial authorities must plan their projects more strategically so they 

enhance economic development; they further noted that the provinces generally do a poor 

job of staffing and sustaining buildings and facilities once they are constructed. That 

observation applies particularly to clinics, schools, and water treatment facilities. 

Karbala and Najaf are generally able to provide basic services, but the other provinces 

struggle to do so. Here again, security concerns have limited the amount of teaching and 

mentoring PRT officials can provide their Iraqi counterparts. The native-born 

bilingual/bicultural advisors working at REO Al Hillah said there is a great need and 

desire among provincial officials for training in modern project planning and 

management to bring Iraq into the modern era. The ability to offer such training, they 

feel, provides a means for the U.S. government to counterbalance growing Iranian 

influence in the south-central region. 

Political Reconciliation 

Predominantly Shia, South-Central does not face the sectarian problems of the mixed 

areas in and around Baghdad. There is one exception: the fault lines in the northern 

districts of Babil and Wasit, where sectarian fighting and insurgent infiltration have 

become endemic. According to PRT Babil officials, the provincial government has 

largely abstained from working to solve problems in the north. But although Sunnis have 

no representation in the provincial government and JAM has been growing in influence, 

the PRDC process has generally resulted in projects being equitably distributed 

throughout the province. For example, the PRDC recently approved the construction of a 

maternity hospital in a north Babil Sunni district. Another positive sign was a mid-July 

meeting between predominantly Sunni Al Anbar and Karbala officials which resulted in a 

signed agreement to establish a security committee that will coordinate joint border 

patrols, arrest orders, and make related moves to address the infiltration of AQI and other 

foreign influences along the shared rural border. 

According to PRT officials, the planned provincial elections represent a key event for the 

region, and political parties are aggressively jockeying for position and working to 

consolidate their power. Politics in the region, it seems, is a zero-sum, winner-take-all 

proposition. Political dialogue is scarce and civil society too weak to mediate and tamp 

down political conflict. PRT officials find it difficult to figure out what underlies the 

assassinations and intimidation taking place among their provincial counterparts; the 

governor and police chief of Qadisiyah were assassinated, and the governor of Karbala 

went into hiding during our visit in early August. The U.S. government, it appears, will 

28
be hard pressed to move the parties toward political reconciliation, and PRT officials on 

the ground question what role and effect they can have on that process. 

Southeastern Regional Area 

Provinces: Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Muthanna 

The southeastern regional area is dominated by Basrah province. With a population of 

nearly 2.4 million, home to two-thirds of Iraq’s oil resources, and the country’s sole 

dependable outlet for exporting oil, Basrah has become a strategic battlefield for local 

political parties. While there is relative calm in the region’s other three provinces, the 

political and security situation in Basrah casts a political and economic shadow over the 

sparsely populated, largely rural provinces of Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Muthanna. 

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Photo 4—Al Basrah Oil Terminal, known as ABOT, is one of Iraq’s two main oil 

outlets for crude oil produced from southern Iraq. 

The regional PRTs and PSTs were established between April and November 2006. PRT 

Basrah is a British-led, multinational team, with members from the United Kingdom, 

United States, Denmark, Australia, and Canada. The team was originally located in 

Basrah Palace, along with the REO and British Embassy Office. Increased rocket and 

mortar fire forced the team to relocate a small number of staff members to Basrah Air 

Station in November 2006, and temporarily move remaining staff to a satellite office in 

29
Kuwait. Fears of violence prevent team travel into the city, so meeting with provincial 

officials are largely confined to the commercial airport. 

PRT Dhi Qar is an Italian-led group with a mix of American, Romanian, and Tunisian 

staff located at a U.S. military forward operating position on the Tallil Air Base near the 

provincial capital, Al-Nassiriyah. PRT Dhi Qar officials note that, with the exception of 

major Shia political party confrontations in May and June of this year, the province has 

enjoyed a peaceful environment that allows for open and frequent engagement with Iraqi 

counterparts. 

PST Maysan and PST Muthanna are also located at Tallil Air Base. PST Maysan’s fourperson team operates under significant constraints. Maysan government officials have 

longstanding, historically based reservations about the activities of U.S. and coalition 

forces in the province, particularly following the aborted Gulf War Shia uprising against 

Saddam. An anti-insurgent operation by British Forces in early 2006 resulted in Maysanis 

formally severing ties with coalition forces. Following a spasm of sectarian violence 

between JAM and Badr forces in late 2006, the British strategically redeployed from the 

province. Security restrictions now prevent PST Maysan team members from entering the 

province, and their infrequent face-to-face meetings with provincial officials are held in 

Basrah or at regional conferences outside the country. Members of PST Muthanna’s fourperson team believe their province offers the most relaxed security environment in Arab 

Iraq and the key to their footing in the southeast region. Even though the team’s 

accomplishments to date are modest, it is well positioned to help the province jump start 

self-governance and economic development in the near future. 

Governance 

PRT officials characterize the southeastern provinces as possessing generally functional 

provincial governments. On the positive side, the governments were on track to expend 

their entire 2007 budget allotments, and PRT officials discern momentum building 

provincial officials’ capability to see beyond the needs of the provincial capital and their 

own tribes to consider what’s best for the entire province. We heard about instances of 

water projects, health clinics, and schools going to rural areas that previously did not get 

them. PRT officials believe that, through their coaching and mentoring, they are getting 

government officials to develop overall provincial plans and to switch from 

authoritarianism to a more participatory, transparent mode of governance. 

Despite these accomplishments, much work remains in the area of governance. The entire 

region, with the exception of Basrah city, suffers from low literacy and a lack of a skilled 

workforce. The provincial governments thus far have shown themselves incapable of 

substantially improving the essential services for their populations and of planning for 

new infrastructure while also maintaining what is already in place. The PRTs finds that 

provincial officials lack hard skills in such areas as public administration and 

management, planning, and accounting. What is needed is intense training and a focus on 

long-term efforts to develop and strengthen the provincial governments’ management 

capacity. 

30
Rule of Law 

PRT Basrah has made some headway in this area, but its inability to work in the city—

due to the risk of violence—has limited its effectiveness. PRT reporting documents do 

indicate progress in terms of (1) securing funding for the construction of a new 

courthouse and prison, (2) developing a “Human Rights Passport” designed to give law 

enforcement officials access to human rights standards, and (3) delivering legal, forensic, 

and human rights training to judges and lawyers. The PRT/PST Dhi Qar, Maysan, and 

Muthanna officials have only a limited understanding of rule of law activities in their 

provinces, including links and activities between the police, courts, and corrections. PRT 

Dhi Qar has a rule of law staff person and has held preliminary discussions with local 

judges and members of the bar association to discuss the needs of the province. But 

neither PST Maysan nor PST Muthanna has had staff responsible for that core function, 

and it is not part of their current work plans. Overall, PRT officials reported, police 

officers are viewed with suspicion by the local population due to their links to local 

militias and propensity for corruption. Although courts are functioning in the provinces, 

the PRTs do not know the types of cases being adjudicated or the level of due process 

afforded by the proceedings. 

Economic Development 

With the exception of the lucrative oil industry and port facilities in Basrah, little new 

economic activity has been taking place in the region. Unemployment stands at an 

estimated 40% to 60%, and there is vast underemployment. Subsistence agriculture is the 

main source of jobs, followed by government service, mainly in the police and army. 

Before 2003, small-to medium-sized agricultural enterprises flourished—date palm 

processing, poultry farms, dairy farms—but they have ceased functioning, and restarting 

them appears to be stymied by lack of skill or interest. Until the violence in Basrah 

subsides and the region is perceived as secure, PRT officials do not expect significant 

economic development or job creation to take place in the region. Lack of national 

investment and a system of taxation are seen as hindrances to foreign investment. 

PRT Basrah officials hail a couple of recent initiatives to spur economic growth: efforts 

to relax travel and commercial restrictions between Basrah and Kuwait; and the 

establishment of a bankers association and a Basrah development forum for local 

businessmen. Bolstered by the recent addition to its team of two staff members from 

USAID, PRT Dhi Qar will begin addressing the economic development issue. The team 

leader said the teams plan to introduce a micro-finance lending program to encourage the 

start of small and medium-sized enterprises. Neither the PST Maysan nor PST Muthanna 

at this writing has staff dedicated to addressing economic development, but both have 

requested business-development specialists as part of the PRT surge. 

Reconstruction 

PRT officials pointed to the recent development of their provinces’ Provincial 

Development Strategy documents as good starting points for their regional reconstruction 

effort. They acknowledged, however, that thus far most reconstruction projects have been 

carried out by coalition forces with little Iraqi input. Furthermore, provincial officials 

31
have little ability to manage and sustain even those projects. Few of the officials possess 

the administrative and management skills needed to handle their reconstruction program; 

most are content to allow coalition forces to run the show. For example, the recently 

completed, U.S.-funded, $250 million Al Shartra water plant, in Dhi Qar province, is 

ready to begin producing fresh drinking water that will serve two-thirds of the province’s 

population. But the U.S. government is unable to hand over operation of the plant to the 

provincial government because of the latter’s inability to identify125 people willing to 

undergo training and assume positions to operate and maintain the facility. The PRT 

understandably is focusing its efforts on raising local management-skill levels, 

encouraging provincial “ownership” of the reconstruction process, and getting the 

province to spend its own budget resources. 

Due to its inability to travel into and around the province, PST Maysan has no visibility 

in the reconstruction process and assessing the state of essential services. Furthermore, 

PST Maysan officials told us that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was also prevented 

from travelling in the province and thus was no longer able to inspect its projects. 

Political Reconciliation 

Reconciliation, in terms of sectarian considerations, is not an issue in the southeast region 

because the vast majority the population is Shia.9

 Conflict between political parties is 

nonetheless a concern in some areas. In Basrah, Shia militias have escalated a violent 

conflict for political dominance and control over oil resources and port facilities. 

According to an unclassified report by the International Crisis Group, Shia political 

groups—principally JAM and Badr, but also Dawa and Fadihla – are locked in a violent 

struggle, leaving the city in control of militias and criminal gangs.10 In Dhi Qar, violence 

erupted in May-June 2007 between elements of the JAM and Badr, breaking months of 

relative calm. In Maysan, the JAM has established effective political control of the 

province, and the parties have settled into their areas of influence. In Muthanna, tribal 

loyalties take precedence over political parties—which are seen more as parties of 

convenience than of policies—and there is generally unanimity between the tribes. 

 

9

Prior to the war, Basrah city was a pluralistic, socially diverse city that included Christians, Sunnis (Arab 

and Kurdish), and Mandaeans. Shia-induced violence after the bombing of the Shiite mosque in Samarra in 

February 2006, together with an Islamist-led purge of the city’s liberal political culture, forced most 

minorities to flee. 

10 Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons From Basra, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°67, 

June 5, 2007 

32
Observations 

PRTs are coaching their provincial counterparts to execute their province’s capital budget 

allocations. Most provinces report that they are ahead of their 2006 spending pace and 

generally on course to spend their 2007 funds. The provinces were generally spending 

their funds on brick-and-mortar construction projects, although issues with procurement 

complexity and lack of contractors have caused some provinces to focus instead on 

spending to stockpile materials for future projects. 

As SIGIR has previously reported, management actions are needed to improve 

sustainment capacity for reconstruction programs. However, this problem continues.11

SIGIR noted that the provinces struggle to staff and maintain buildings and facilities once 

constructed—such as clinics, schools, and water treatment plants. One PRT team leader 

characterized the problem as a future “train wreck” unless steps are taken now to begin 

budgeting and deploying the systems needed to sustain the new construction. In an earlier 

report, SIGIR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador, in coordination with the 

Commanding General, MNF-I, formulate and implement a plan with clear goals and 

objectives for the sustainment of IRRF projects, and review the GOI’s leadership in this 

area to determine its adequacy and shore up any shortfalls. Although SIGIR directed this 

recommendation to the Embassy, it also has relevance at the Provincial level. SIGIR 

believes that the PRTs should expand their focus on budget execution efforts to include 

helping budget for and carry out sustainment tasks. This would also have the salutary 

secondary effect of increasing coordination between the central ministries’ provinciallevel representatives and local officials. 

Conclusion and Recommendations 

The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq is making incremental progress at 

most locations in developing Iraq’s provincial and local government’s capacity to 

effectively govern and manage its reconstruction but has shown little progress in 

promoting economic development, rule of law, and political reconciliation. Iraq is faced 

with a complex series of overlapping sectarian, political, and ethnic conflicts, and the 

difficult security situation continues to shape the PRT mission and determine the level of 

engagement PRT officials can have with their Iraqi counterparts. According to PRT 

officials, improvement in all functional areas is likely to be slow and will require years of 

steady engagement. 

 

11 SIGIR-05-022, Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Programs, Oct. 24, 2005. 

33
Our two previous reports on the PRT program recommended the development of clearly 

defined objectives and performance measures to guide the PRTs and determine their 

accomplishments.12 We believe those recommendations are still appropriate and are 

particularly relevant for those provinces where the PRTs access and engagement with 

Iraqi officials has been limited. We also found frequent instances in which the military’s 

use of (CERP) to perform tasks that properly belong to local and provincial governments 

conflicts with the PRT’s capacity development mission. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, MNF-I, 

take these actions: 

1. In an expeditious manner, jointly establish a comprehensive plan for the PRTs 

(including ePRTs), with elements tailored for each PRT. At a minimum, the plan 

should: (a) clearly define objectives and performance measures, (b) clearly define 

milestones for achieving stated objectives, (c) be linked to funding requirements, 

and (d) identify the organization(s) within each agency that are accountable for 

the plan’s implementation. To provide senior level attention to this issue, the plan 

should be approved by the Office of the Chief of Mission and the MNF-I 

Commander to demonstrate each agency’s commitment to this effort. 

2. Develop guidance on the use and synchronization of CERP funds to support the 

U.S. government’s capacity-development mission. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

The U.S. Embassy-Iraq and Headquarters, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), provided 

comments on a draft of this report. DoD did not provide comments. Both the Embassy 

and MNF-I expressed disagreement with a recommendation in the draft report relating to 

reassigning certain PRT personnel because of security issues and outlined steps underway 

to address the security challenges. They differed in their response to the second 

recommendation dealing with the use and synchronization of CERP funds: the Embassy 

concurred, and MNF-I non-concurred. MNF-I also provided other technical comments, 

which were incorporated in the report as appropriate. 

The draft report recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding 

General, MNF-I, consider reassigning the PRT personnel from Basrah, Najaf, Karbala, 

Qadisiyah, and Maysan to functioning PRTs until the security environment improves, or 

develop a plan to better use the staff of those five units and provide clearly defined 

objectives and guidance for what they are to accomplish. The Embassy responded that it 

was premature to reassign the affected PRT personnel and that retaining provincial 

 

12 SIGIR-06-034; Status of Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, Oct. 29, 2006; and SIGIR07-014, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, SIGIR-07-014, July 25, 

2007.

34
contacts is important because it demonstrates a political commitment to developing the 

affected provinces. The Embassy and MNF-I both commented that efforts are underway 

to provide appropriate security and movement and other actions to accomplish their 

objectives. MNF-I also noted that an effort is underway to relocate the Qadisiyah PRT to 

Camp Echo and have it become an ePRT, presumably with enhanced security. The 

Embassy indicated that further measures will be considered if PRT operations languish 

and security conditions do not improve. Because of these actions, SIGIR modified the 

recommendation by deleting the portion that addressed the reassignment of personnel. 

Neither the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq nor the Commanding General, MNF-I, however, 

responded to the part of the recommendation to develop a plan to better utilize the staff at 

Basrah, Najaf, Karbala, Qadisiyah, and Maysan. The need to develop clearly defined 

objectives and performance measures to guide PRT activities and measure their 

accomplishments was discussed in SIGIR’s two previous reports, and SIGIR still 

considers a plan to be an essential tool for those purposes. A plan is also essential for 

managing the human capital and financial resources at those locations. To date, SIGIR’s 

earlier recommendations have not been implemented. Accordingly, SIGIR modified this 

portion of the recommendation to emphasize the need for senior management attention to 

develop a management approach to address these issues. SIGIR also continues to believe 

that this area will require close monitoring by the Embassy and MNF-I. 

Concerning the SIGIR recommendation related to the synchronization of CERP funds, 

the Embassy concurred and indicated that it was providing guidance to its PRTs to use 

the Mission Strategic Plan and the Joint Campaign Plan as they coordinate with their 

military counterparts on capacity development projects. MNF-I did not concur with the 

recommendation, noting elements of ongoing coordination; however, MNF-I also noted 

room for improvement by having provincial level PRTs develop and implement Joint 

Common plans with their paired combat force elements. MNF-I noted that the latter has 

already been proposed and is under consideration. Based on these comments, SIGIR 

believes that this recommendation continues to have merit and is retained. 

35
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated this audit on 

June 18, 2007, (Project No. 7021) to determine the effectiveness of the Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program in Iraq and whether it is accomplishing its mission 

of (1) assisting Iraq’s provincial and local governments in developing a transparent and 

sustained capability to govern, (2) promoting increased security and rule of law, (3) 

advancing economic development, (4) providing the provincial administration necessary 

to meet the basic needs of the population, and (5) promoting reconciliation and shaping 

the political environment. 

To determine the functional areas of emphasis we analyzed Baghdad Cable 4045 

(October 2005) that set up the PRT Program and the Memorandum of Agreement 

between Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of State (DoS) (February 2007), 

which expanded the program to include the new ePRTs. To determine the tasks to 

consider within the individual areas of emphasis we analyzed DoS, DoD, and U.S. 

Embassy, including Office of Provincial Affairs and Multi-National Forces- Iraq 

documents and discussions with PRT officials. We also consulted with a U.S. Institute of 

Peace representative on performance measures for the political-reconciliation core 

function. 

To assess the work of PRT Program in Iraq and progress of provinces within the 

functional areas of emphasis, we visited the existing 10 PRT and seven Provincial 

Support Teams, as well as nine of the new embedded ePRTs. Our work included 

discussions with senior-level military and U.S. Embassy officials in Baghdad and 

structured interviews throughout Iraq with 274 civilian and military officials and officers, 

including senior leaders in the brigade combat teams, PRT team and deputy team leaders, 

technical specialists, bilingual bicultural advisors, civil affairs members, and Iraqi and 

third-country government advisors. We reviewed the work plans of the PRTs, program 

documents of the respective participating organizations, and PRTs’ weekly situation 

reports and provincial monthly assessment reports. While conducting fieldwork at the 

PRT sites, we observed PRT members engaging their Iraq counterparts at provincial 

government centers and other work locations and discussed the work of the PRTs with 

Iraqi provincial officials. We did not systematically obtain the perspective of Iraqi 

provincial-government officials on the effectiveness of the PRTs. 

We conducted this audit from June to August 2007. This audit was conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit. 

36
Prior coverage of this topic by SIGIR 

Status of Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 

2006. 

Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, SIGIR-07-

014, July 25, 2007. 

37
Appendix B—PRTs/Partner Military Units 

Province Team Nearest City Encampment/Base Military Unit 

RRT Erbil Erbil Camp Zaytun Coalition (Korea) 

PST Dahuk Dahuk Camp Zaytun Coalition (Korea) 

PST Al Sulaymaniyah As Sulaymaniyah Camp Zaytun Coalition (Korea) 

PRT Ninewa Mosul FOB Marez 4th BCT, 1st InfD 

PRT Ta’mim Kirkuk FOB Warrior 3d BCT, 25th InfD 

PRT Salah ad Din Tikrit FOB Speicher 3d BCT, 82d AbnD 

PRT Diyala Baqubah FOB Warhorse 3d BCT, 1st InfD 

 ePRT (1) Southern Diyala Camp Taji 4th BCT, 2d InfD 

PRT Baghdad Baghdad International Zone MND-Baghdad 

 ePRT (2) Southern Baghdad Camp Falcon 4th BCT, 1st InfD 

 ePRT (3) Northern Baghdad Camp Taji 2d BCT, 82d AbnD 

 ePRT (4) Northern Baghdad Camp Taji 1st BCT, 1st CavD 

 ePRT (5) Central Baghdad Camp Liberty 2d BCT, 1st InfD 

 ePRT (6) Western Baghdad Camp Striker 2d BCT, 10th MtnD 

 ePRT (7) Eastern Baghdad Camp Loyalty 2d BCT, 2d InfD 

 ePRT (8) Central Baghdad Camp Prosperity 2d BCT, 1st CavD 

 ePRT (9) Eastern Baghdad Butler range complex 3d BCT, 3d InfD 

 ePRT (10) Southern Baghdad Camp Victory 2d BCT, 3d InfD 

PRT Anbar Ramadi Camp Blue Diamond 1st BCT, 3d InfD 

 ePRT (11) Fallujah Camp Fallujah RCT-6 

 ePRT (12) Al Asad Camp Ripper RCT-2 

 ePRT (13) Ramadi Camp Ramadi 1st BCT, 3d InfD 

PRT Babil Hillah REO Hillah n/a 

 ePRT (14) Northern Babil Camp Kalsu 4th BCT, 25th InfD 

PST Karbala Karbala REO Hillah n/a 

PST Najaf Najaf REO Hillah n/a 

PST Qadisiyah Diwaniyah REO Hillah n/a 

ePRT Wasit (15) Al Kut Camp Delta 214th Fires Bde 

PRT Dhi Qar Tallil Camp Adder Coalition (Italy) 

PST Muthanna As Samawah Camp Adder Coalition (Italy) 

PRT Basrah Basrah Basrah Air Station 

Source: SIGIR analysis of OPA and MNC-I data 

Coalition (UK) 

PST Maysan Al Amarah Camp Adder Coalition (UK) 

//Key to Abbreviations// 

AbnD Airborne Division MtnD Mountain Division 

BCT Brigade Combat Team MND Multi-National Division 

Bde Brigade PST Provincial Support Team13

CavD Cavalry Division PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

ePRT embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team RCT Regimental Combat Team 

FOB Forward Operating REO Regional Embassy Office 

InfD Infantry Division RRT Regional Reconstruction Team 

 

13 In commenting on a draft of this report, Headquarters Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) stated that 

PSTs for the most part have been converted to PRTs, with two, PSTs Dahuk and Al Sulaymaniyah 

incorporated into the Erbil PRT. We have elected to retain the PST designation in this report to generally 

reflect the status at the time of our review both in name and size relative to other PRTs. 

38
Appendix C—PRT Program Funding 

PRT Funding Category 

($ in millions) 

FY 2006 

Supplemental 

Enacted

FY 2007 

Supplemental

Enacted 

FY 2008 

 Budget 

Requested Total

Operational Funding $230a $ 414 $679 $1,323

Program Funding

● Provincial Reconstruction 

Development Council 

Projects b

315 720 160 1,195

● Local Governance Program c 155 90 98 343

Program Subtotal 470 810 258d 1,538

Grand Total $700 $1,224 $937 $2,861

Source: Department of State 

a

 None of the operating funds from the FY 2006 supplemental (Public Law 109-234) were obligated or expended in FY 2006, and 

were carried forward into FY 2007. b The Economic Support Fund is used for local reconstruction projects coordinated by the PRTs through Iraqi Provincial 

Reconstruction Development Committees. The main thrust of this effort is to build capacity at the provincial level by teaching local 

officials how to prioritize projects and manage infrastructure development and sustainment. c Since 2003, USAID has supported, through its Local Governance Program (LGP), the establishment of structures aimed at increasing 

Iraqi capacity to deliver basic services. The LGP supports the PRT Program by providing competency-based mentoring and 

technical assistance to local councils, committees, and departments. d Includes $93 million in base agency funding and $165 million in Global War on Terror (GWOT) funding. GWOT, also known as 

Title IX, makes funds available for military and diplomatic operations overseas, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. These 

operations may include a wide variety of activities, such as combating insurgents, civil affairs, capacity building, and reconstruction 

of infrastructure.

39
Appendix D—Acronyms 

BCT brigade combat team 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

CCCI Central Criminal Court of Iraq 

ePRT embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

IHT Iraq High Tribunal 

JAM Jaysh al Mahdi 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

OMS Organization of the Martyr al-Sadr 

OPA Office of Provincial Affairs 

PC Provincial Council 

PRDC Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

PST Provincial Support Team 

REO Regional Embassy Office 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

40
Appendix E—Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State* 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq* 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for 

International Development 

 Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction 

 Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer, 

 Bureau of Resource Management 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq* 

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

Coordinator, Office of Provincial Affairs* 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development* 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Regional Inspector General-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense* 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International 

Security Affairs* 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq* 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq* 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

*Recipient of the draft audit report 

41
Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic 

Affairs, and International Environmental Protection 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and 

Human Rights 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, 

Federal Services, and International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia 

42
Appendix F—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared, and the review conducted, under the direction of Glenn D. 

Furbish, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

The following staff members conducted the audit and/or contributed to the report: 

Patrick A. Dickriede 

Walter J. Franzen 

Robert B. Gabriel 

Walt R. Keays 

Larry T. Monson 

Waheed E. Nasser 

Nadia Shamari 

Clifton E. Spruill 

Roger M. Williams 

43
Management Comments 

U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

44
45
46
Management Comments 

Headquarters, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

47
48
SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine Belisle 

Director, Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

49