USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006 

United States

Department

of Agriculture

Forest Service

Rocky Mountain

Research Station

Research Note

RMRS-RN-30

April 2006

Introduction_____________________

In recent years, expenditures on wildfire suppression 

have escalated, forcing reallocations within fiscal years 

and supplemental budget requests to cover unexpected high 

costs. Although the issue of cost containment has become 

widespread, information about what affects the expenditures 

is not. One study (Gonzales-Caban 1997) looked at the effect 

of individual managers on prescribed fire costs, but it did not 

address wildland fire suppression costs. Another (Donovan 

2005) compares costs of contracted crews to that of agency 

crews.

In the aggregate, the rise in expenditures can be related to 

known factors such as 1) increased residential development 

in former wildlands (Wildland-Urban Interface, or WUI) 

(Snyder 1999); 2) suppression-related fuel build-up over the 

last century resulting from, in many cases, several missed fire 

cycles in fire-dependent ecosystems (Arno and Brown 1991); 

and 3) a tendency toward warmer, drier weather conditions 

over the past several decades, especially in the western part 

of the country (Calkin and others 2005; National Academy 

of Public Administration 2002).

Factors Affecting Fire Suppression Costs as

Identified by Incident Management Teams

Janie Canton-Thompson, Brooke Thompson, Krista Gebert, 

David Calkin, Geoff Donovan, and Greg Jones

Abstract—This study uses qualitative sociological methodology to discover information and insights 

about the role of Incident Management Teams in wildland fire suppression costs. We interviewed 48 

command and general staff members of Incident Management Teams throughout the United States. 

Interviewees were asked about team structure, functioning, and decision making as a framework for 

determining their views on issues that drive costs. Topics affecting costs that emerged prominently 

are discussed in this report. They include, in no particular order: lack of decision space; outside 

costs over which Incident Management Teams have no control; rigid policies and rules limiting the 

ability to manage effectively, including cost-effectively mitigating for safety dangers on the ground; 

external decisions affecting costs; use of sophisticated technology; expanding public demand for 

information related to sophisticated technology; increased use of contracting for equipment and 

services; other demands on the agency; increased aircraft use; agency reorganizations affecting 

workforce availability; and new rules and regulations limiting flexibility needed for geographic differences. These findings should be useful in addressing wildfire suppression cost issues in the future.

Keywords: wildfire suppression costs, Incident Management Teams, qualitative sociological 

research 

Janie Canton-Thompson is a Social Scientist, Krista Gebert is an 

Economist, David Calkin is a Research Forester, and Greg Jones is a 

Research Forester and Project Leader with the Economic Aspects of Forest 

Management on Public Lands Work Unit, Rocky Mountain Research 

Station, USDA Forest Service, in Missoula, MT. Geoff Donovan is a 

Research Forester with the Pacific Northwest Research Station, USDA 

Forest Service, in Portland, OR. Brooke Thompson is a former longterm incident management team member and fire management officer, 

respectively, and he is currently employed by Management and Engineering 

Technologies, International, INC. (METI), in Missoula. During the period 

of interview data collection, Janie Canton-Thompson was a Social Scientist 

employed by Recreation Solutions, Troy, MT.

However, these factors alone cannot explain the variation 

in expenditures among fires. In many cases fires that seem 

quite similar physically, and occur in similar biological and 

social settings, often have significantly differing suppression 

costs.

Researchers and managers speculate that fire suppression 

management by Incident Management Teams (IMTs) may 

relate heavily to costs, but there has been little scientific 

investigation of this premise. Calls for cost containment 

and efficiency have not, until now, led to a scientific look at 

the Incident Command System (ICS), nor at IMT structure, 

functioning, and decision-making processes as they affect 

costs. Likewise, incident commanders and members of their 

staffs have never, in any systematic collective study, been 

asked for their views on reasons for incident cost escalation, 

nor for what they believe may, or should, be done to address 

the cost issue. 

Studies addressing decision making in the context of fire 

suppression have most often focused on one of four things: 

perceptions of risk and how those perceptions influence 

decision making (Cortner and others 1990; Taylor and 

others 1988; Wise and Freitag 2002), decision-support tools 

to aid in fire suppression decision making (Donovan and 

Noordijk 2005; Mills and Bratten 1988), economic theory 

(including risk and uncertainty) behind fire management 

decisions (Blattenberger and others 1984; Donovan and 

Brown 2005; Mills and Bratten 1988), and reviews of past 

incidents and the decisions that were made (Meuchel and 

Poncin 2004; National Academy of Public Administration 

2002). Additionally, most of these studies looked at decision 

making from the standpoint of fire managers, not IMTs or 

interactions between land managers and IMTs. 
USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006

Fire suppression cost studies have not addressed the 

preceding issues either. They often focus on attempts to 

relate fire characteristics to the costs of suppression, either 

by using statistical models or taking into account the professional judgment of those fighting the fires (for example, see 

Schuster and others 1997; Steele and Stier 1998; Truesdale 

and others 1995; USDA Forest Service 1995). Moreover, it 

has been our experience over the last seven years working 

in this area that statistical models relating fire expenditures 

to fire characteristics explain only a portion of the variation 

in suppression costs, leading to further questions about what 

other factors are influencing expenditures.

Other studies describing factors contributing to rising fire 

suppression costs and what can or should be done about them 

are scarce. This is curious because fire costs have become 

a hot topic, especially since suppression expenditures have 

begun to significantly affect funding for management of 

public natural resources. Agencies that administer public 

lands have approached the issue of cost containment in 

several documented ways (Meuchel and Poncin 2004; 

Strategic Issues Panel on Large Fire Cost 2004; USDA 

Forest Service, USDI, and National Association of State 

Foresters 2003). For instance, any federal jurisdiction fire 

over $5 million is required to have an Incident Business 

Advisor to oversee spending on the fire. Guidelines have 

also been established regarding approval and certification 

of the chosen suppression alternative in the Wildland Fire 

Situation Analysis. For the Forest Service, the Regional 

Forester must certify the WFSA for any fire with estimated 

suppression costs of more than $10 million, while the WFSA 

for any fire greater than $50 million must be approved by 

the Chief of the Forest Service. Other examples of cost 

containment measures include reducing the use of large 

helicopters and air tankers whenever possible and increasing 

the use of state and local resources. However, there is no 

published material that synthesizes extensive input from 

those whose on-the-ground experience relates most closely 

to the topic—the IMT members themselves.

In theory, and in practice, persons with a wide breadth 

and depth of experience, training, and knowledge in 

real-life situations have meaningful insights and valuable 

information about their field of expertise (Creswell 1998; 

Gold 1997; Rose 1960; Spradley 1979). This study uses 

both qualitative and quantitative sociological methodology, 

together with economic methodology, to address the cost 

issue with those most intimately involved in suppressing 

large wildland fires—IMT command and general staff 

members themselves. 

Each wildland fire emergency is unique, often involving 

dangerous and rapidly changing events. This study provides 

information that may be applied to guide future firefighting 

policies and decisions to improve efficiency and cost effective 

suppression actions. Its application will not 1) diminish focus 

on firefighter and public safety or 2) compromise the coherence 

of IMTs and usefulness of the Incident Command System. 

Our Approach_ __________________

In the first two phases of our multi-phase study addressing 

decision making in the context of large fire suppression, our 

project team is using qualitative sociological methodology. 

This includes in-depth interviewing, sociological sampling, 

and qualitative analytical methods described by Driessen 

(1997); Glaser and Strauss (1967); Schatzman and Strauss 

(1973); and Strauss and Corbin (1998). This is an inductive 

research approach that allows issues and solutions to arise 

from “persons in-the-life” who are recognized as “experts” 

in their field.

Over an eight-month period, researchers conducted 48 

in-depth interviews nationwide. With one exception, selected 

individuals were current or former members of either National 

(Type 1) or Area (Type 2) IMTs and were from all geographic 

areas where federal IMTs are located. The exception was a 

member of a state team, neither generally within the national 

IMT rotation nor under federal control for assignments. 

Most interviewees were current employees; however, we 

interviewed some recently retired former team members to 

obtain a historical context for the study. 

We conducted each interview using a written interview 

guide to direct and focus the conversation on topics pertinent 

to the study. (See Appendix A for a sample interview guide.) 

We designed the guide to cover the general topics of IMT 

structure, function, and decision making as a framework for 

getting at the cost issue. Subtopics within these general topics 

allowed the interviewer to probe more deeply to “flesh out” 

the topics and ensure that interviewees did not inadvertently 

leave out or forget to mention important information. We 

inquired about the cost implications embedded in each topic 

so that no avenue of thought in this arena was overlooked.

The interview guide was a “living document.” We often 

made minor changes in it after interviews, incorporating 

new or changing information so that other interviewees 

could expand on what we had heard. Likewise, we deleted 

references to topics that appeared to be so well covered that 

no new information was being revealed. 

To obtain a wide range of perspectives we used stratified sociological (snowball) sampling. Interviewees were 

selected according to 1) team type, 2) agency represented, 

3) position in the command and general staff organization, 

and 4) location, using Geographic Area Coordination 

Centers (GACCs) as a guide. Time constraints and logistical 

challenges of personal, on-site interviews notwithstanding, 

we were able to obtain interviews with a wide variety of 

team members. Persons interviewed represented teams from 

each GACC (table 1), all Federal and many state agencies 

whose employees participate on teams, and a sampling of 

all positions in the command and general staff organization 

of both Type 1 and Type 2 IMTs (table 2). 

Specifically, study participants included 28 members 

from Type 1 IMTs and 20 from Type 2 teams. Agencies 

represented include the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of 
USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006

Land Management, Forest Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, 

National Park Service, and also natural resource management 

or fire protection agencies from the states (or various counties 

within states) of Alaska, California, Colorado, Montana, Utah, 

Washington, and Wyoming. Every interviewee was assured 

confidentiality, meaning that information they provided could 

not be associated to them. Tables 1 and 2 contain additional 

general information about interviewees.

Our study is divided into three distinct phases, each building 

on information obtained in the previous phase. During Phase 

1, we interviewed IMT members and former members in 

the Northern Rockies area. Here we sought to discover, in 

members’ own words, how IMTs are structured, how they 

function, the decision space they operate under, how they 

make decisions—both formally and informally—and how 

it all relates to incident costs. We modified the interview 

guide slightly after each interview to reflect emerging 

information.

During Phase 2, we expanded the study to include interviews 

with team members in other GACCs throughout the United 

States. We continued to revise our interview guide to more 

narrowly focus on cost issues while retaining the most salient 

features of former guides.

In Phase 3, we intend to complete analysis of information 

obtained during the first two phases, using it as a basis for 

further quantitative inquiry (for example, surveys) and as 

a springboard for other qualitative research. One of the 

strongest features of our approach is that any quantitative 

investigations we undertake will be well grounded through 

qualitative research that reveals the real life experiences of 

persons who are intimately involved with the phenomena under 

investigation. This lessens chances of spurious or inaccurate 

assumptions by researchers at the outset and enables us to 

focus on solutions that arise from and make sense to those 

who regularly deal with wildfire incident management and 

its costs. 

In this report we recount the common experiences, impressions, and views of 48 recognized experts in field-going 

wildfire suppression management, that is, persons who serve 

on the command and general staffs of Incident Management 

Teams. Based on their experience, many, if not most of these 

individuals, identified the following key factors that influence 

wildfire suppression costs. In some instances, quantitative 

research may be available to confirm their experiences; 

however, in others, we have no other data to either confirm 

or refute these findings, suggesting these topics may prove 

ripe for future investigation.

Initial Results____________________

This Research Note describes some initial findings from 

the 48 interviews conducted in Phases 1 and 2. Although 

interview data have yet to be analyzed in depth, the themes 

we present below (in no specific order) were voiced by most 

of the 48 interviewees. We sent out an earlier draft of this 

Research Note, presenting the same results contained in 

this version, to all 48 interviewees for review. Those who 

provided comments reported that it accurately reflected their 

experiences. For example, an IC stated: “Great job capturing 

certainly what I shared and what appears to be a number of 

general agreement by the 48 individuals you interviewed.”

Decision Space

All IMT members interviewed for this study indicate that 

cost effectiveness is a major objective documented in their 

team’s operating plan and/or team meetings, as well as in 

Wildland Fire Situation Analyses. However, they believe 

team decision space leaves them limited room for major 

cost-reducing decisions. IMTs work for the receiving agency 

administrator (land manager). Delegations of Authority, Wild 

Fire Situation Analyses (WFSAs), and agency in-briefings 

typically result in teams receiving specific strategic objectives 

that include cost considerations or prescribe actions that 

dictate the necessity of certain tactics (and therefore certain 

costs). Even though these initial objectives are subject to 

negotiation and daily review between the IMT (normally the 

Incident Commander or deputy) and the agency administrator, 

Table 2—Number of interviewees by Incident Management Team 

(IMT) position.

IMT Position Number of interviewees

Incident Commander (or Deputy) 22

Operations Section Chief 8

Planning Section Chief 5

Finance Section Chief 5

Logistics Section Chief 3

Safety Officer 2

Information Officer 1

Liaison Officer 1

Air Support Group Supervisora 1

a

 Position not officially considered command/general staff on IMTs but used 

as such by some, especially in incidents requiring a large number of aviation 

resources.

Table 1—Number of interviewees by Geographic Area Coordinating 

Center (GACC).

GACC Number of interviewees

Northern Rockies 12

Rocky Mountain 3

Southwest 5

Great Basin 8

 (Both East and West Zones)

Pacific Southwest 6

 (Both North and South Zones)

Pacific Northwest 8

Southeast 3

Alaska 3
 USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006

the latter makes the final overall decision on suppression 

objectives, including expenditures. Multi-agency coordinating 

(MAC) groups, Area Commands, and even the Dispatch 

System, including local (expanded dispatch), geographic area 

(GACC), and national level coordination centers, impose 

firefighting resource priorities or influence resource use. 

Such prioritization and influence can have large effects on 

expenditures associated with a specific team on a suppression 

assignment. Likewise, a lack of ordered firefighting resources 

in times of overload fire occurrence can have a major effect, 

either increasing costs by prolonging a fire or, in some cases, 

decreasing costs significantly when the weather changes 

before needed suppression resources arrive. 

Outside Costs

IMT members also report they have no control over the 

costs that host agencies charge to the fire, either prior to their 

arrival, during their stay, or after they leave. In some cases 

these are not consequential, but there are times when these 

can be significant, especially after the IMT leaves. This is 

particularly true now because, under recent policy changes, 

rehabilitation of the burned area (Burned Area Emergency 

Response [BAER]) is now also chargeable to the suppression 

effort. In the past, only rehabilitation of the suppression 

activities (for example, fire lines, camp areas, and roads) 

was charged to the suppression effort. Dispatch functions 

also accrue charges to the incident that are outside the team’s 

ability to control, especially when large expanded dispatch 

functions are formed at all levels of the organization to support 

multiple large incidents. In some cases, coordinating centers 

reportedly stage scarce firefighting resources for anticipated 

use in emerging incidents or when the potential for escaped 

incidents exists, charging currently active incidents for the 

costs. Likewise, in extended incidents when two or more 

teams are assigned sequentially, the effect that one team’s 

decisions have on the cost of an incident is effectively lost 

or at best extremely difficult to track.

Policies and Rules 

All IMT members acknowledge the need for policies and 

rules to guide their decision making. However, many believe 

there has been a significant increase in rules, policies, and 

procedures during recent years, mandating certain responses 

and actions. These mandates have come in response to legitimate safety or cost issues, but they are often confusing, 

overlapping, or even contradictory and missing their target, 

according to many team members. They say it is difficult to 

keep up with the perceived ever-changing and ever-tightening 

policies that govern their activities. Members report that rigid 

policies and rules constrain a team’s flexibility; some rules are 

viewed as “one size fits all” (for example, mandating arbitrary 

limits on team size), which they feel is cost inefficient because 

each incident is unique.

Such policies and rules, in turn, have led to greater risk 

aversion and the potential for higher costs, especially because 

many team members are concerned about their agency’s 

support should something go wrong on an incident. These 

factors sometimes limit the team’s ability to manage effectively 

and can significantly affect an individual team member’s 

ability to act quickly and decisively for fear of inadvertently 

violating a rule. Some team members say they plan to quit 

team membership (or have quit), citing this issue as the real 

reason behind their decision.

Safety

Firefighting is inherently risky. Safety in suppression actions, as in most everything else, has cost implications. All 

IMT members report that safety issues preempt all others in 

their decision-making process. While no one is willing to 

compromise safety to save money, many interviewees have 

suggested they can cost-effectively mitigate for dangers on 

the ground better without the extensive rules and policies 

network that currently governs suppression work. Members 

explain that the analysis paralysis promoted by these extensive 

rules actually tends to decrease safety and cost effectiveness 

because it inhibits rational response to specific events. In 

addition, many IMT members feel subject to increased legal 

exposure because they perceive their agencies are no longer 

willing to back them in the positions they have been asked to 

fill. Combinations of such factors lead to a certain amount of 

risk aversion, which often results in an increase in suppression 

costs. In this specific arena, several team members expressed 

concern that their employer might use their remarks to the 

interviewer against them.

External Decisions

Sometimes political and/or strategic decisions that have 

large cost impacts are made in upper levels of an agency or 

political entity. These decisions, outside the team’s control, 

are not necessarily perceived as unsound, but they do impact 

costs of suppressing a fire. One example is requests to stage 

numerous expensive resources at the fire camp for possible 

future use elsewhere in the area. Another is visits from highly 

placed officials whose large entourages (security, information, 

and so forth) have reportedly been charged to the fire. A third 

example is costly “political” suppression action—deemed not 

necessary by IMT members and/or not in line with management policy, but requested or prescribed by officials outside 

the team to allay immediate public concerns (for example, 

“political smokes” [fires] well inside control lines that pose 

minimal escape threats but receive suppression actions to 

satisfy expressed public concern). A final example is delays 

in receiving necessary resources and infrastructure items. 

These are now sent “cheapest way” rather than “quickest 

way,” which can increase suppression effort and costs in the 

long run—we have heard amounts up to $40,000 for each 

hour the team is delayed.
USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006

Technology 

Increased use of sophisticated technology to manage 

wildfires has been a big influence on escalating fire suppression costs. Even though such technology can improve 

data availability for managing and documenting incidents, 

it has not come cheaply. IMT members express concerns 

that reliance on technology can present significant safety 

and operational problems when computer systems are down. 

Fires that 20 years ago would have had only a radio link 

with the host agency dispatch now routinely have multiple 

(we have heard up to 30) temporarily placed phone and 

data processing lines linking them to the host agency and 

elsewhere. Installing, maintaining, and providing technical 

support for this equipment is expensive. Most teams have had 

to add at least one technical support specialist to their roster, 

sometimes at the expense of traditional suppression-oriented 

positions. Likewise, whereas team members previously could 

usually work in tents, required use of electronic equipment 

now necessitates a relatively dust-free environment and airconditioned housing. This has resulted in a need for office 

trailers, carpeting, and either stringing electric lines to remote 

fire camps or locating camps at some distance from incidents 

to access utilities. This increases transportation time (a cost 

factor) and decreases time available to work on suppression 

activities.

Public Information 

The public demand for more and more information has 

increased costs. Over the past several years, public demand 

for immediate and sophisticated information has impacted 

every function of IMTs and created a need for resources well 

beyond what was previously necessary (for example, more 

staffing, more phone lines, and more requests for tours and 

interviews).

Contracting

According to IMT members, escalated reliance on contracted suppression resources has resulted in cost increases 

chargeable to fires. Previously, most suppression resources, 

either personnel or equipment, were government owned or 

employed. The switch to contracted resources has occurred 

during the past 15 to 20 years as government agencies charged 

with suppressing wildfires have attempted to reduce overall 

costs. This has included downsizing the federal workforce and 

divesting of equipment this previous workforce would have 

used in emergency wildfire situations. To meet subsequent 

workload demands, the preceding government workers and 

equipment have been replaced with contracted services. 

Interviewees perceive the prices contractors charge for 

equipment and human resources to be very high (in many 

cases unreasonably so). IMTs have no jurisdiction over these 

contracts as they are locked in place by contracting guidelines 

beyond the team’s control. 

Many IMT members state that work performed by 

contractors is substandard in too many cases. Training and 

experience requirements that apply to government employees 

are reduced or non-existent for contractors hired to do similar 

work. Interviewees also fault some contractors for lack of 

accountability when they fail to perform as expected. It is 

difficult to hold contractors accountable under the wildland fire 

conditions typified by short timeframes, too few contracting 

officers, and different standards for performance than what 

apply to the agency. Furthermore, returning unsatisfactory 

contracted resources to their home base (especially hand crews) 

increases transportation costs, necessitates additional time 

and expense to order replacements, and prolongs suppression 

activities.

Agency Culture 

Another significant factor believed to escalate the need 

for contracting, and therefore increase costs, is a perceived 

change within natural resource management agency culture. 

IMT members state that many employees now no longer view 

wildfire suppression work as the priority they once did. Some 

interviewees report that supervisors, intent on meeting home 

base management targets, are reluctant to permit (and may 

actually forbid) their staff to participate on fire suppression or 

team assignments, even after attempts to negotiate solutions. 

Some describe being chastised on their return to home office 

stations for what they did not get done to meet management 

targets while away on an IMT assignment. 

Aircraft Use

Interviewees cite increased aircraft use in wildfire suppression as a reason for escalating costs. For instance, heavy 

lift helicopters, capable of dropping large quantities of water 

or slinging large loads, were seldom seen on fires a decade 

or two ago. Now their use is much more routine. Often they 

are necessary and effective, especially in WUI situations 

requiring water drops for structure protection and in remote 

areas with no/few roads for bucket work and quicker delivery 

of personnel and supplies. However, unless they are well 

managed, kept busy, and retained no longer than necessary, 

they can add significantly to fire costs in a short time. 

Workforce Issues

Almost every team member interviewed mentioned the effects of recent workforce issues as contributing to the potential 

for increased costs in suppression activities. Centralization of 

Forest Service employees involved in Finance Functions has 

left teams with unfilled finance positions and great uncertainty 

in the very function they look to for help in tracking costs. 

Forest Service competitive sourcing has likewise produced 

uncertainty and insufficient qualified staffing for team technology support and other positions. Moreover, as we previously 

noted, there is a perception of decreased agency support 
USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006

for IMT members if something goes wrong. This, together 

with the increased personal financial liability members have 

been told to expect, is driving some team members away and 

discouraging others from pursuing team positions. 

Most team members are nearing the ends of their careers, and 

some are beyond retirement age. The pipeline of replacement 

employees is viewed as less than full (except in one GACC) and 

employee morale (in the case of the Forest Service) is usually 

reported to be low. Incentives to participate as a member 

of an IMT are not as great as they previously were. Many 

interviewees predict that as agencies increasingly lose their 

ability and expertise in suppressing and managing wildfires 

for the reasons mentioned above, costs will increase. Once 

lost, the ability and expertise may be difficult or impossible 

to restore.

Geographic Constraints 

IMT members explain that flexibility is necessary when it 

comes to managing large wildland fires cost effectively. Teams 

encounter regional cultural differences, depending on where 

they are assigned in the country. Biophysical characteristics, 

land ownership patterns, and logistical considerations also 

differ widely across the country, which forces IMTs to adapt 

their suppression strategies and tactics to fit local needs. 

Unless teams are afforded flexibility to adapt to these situations, suppression costs will often be higher than necessary. 

Yet the flexibility that IMTs require to accomplish work is 

systematically being compromised by the myriad of new rules 

and regulations. Additionally, members point out that use of 

contract crews is inherently less flexible than use of agency 

crews. 

More specifically, agency administrators, influenced by 

regional culture, local government, and publics in their 

respective areas, assign different objectives to incoming 

teams. Achieving varying objectives means teams need to 

develop unique combinations of strategies and tactics for each 

incident. “Every incident is different,” said many interviewees. 

Likewise, land management plans, weather patterns, terrain, 

season of the year, and many other variables combine with a 

dynamic, ever-changing incident to force continually creative 

and constantly changing responses from IMTs. As examples, 

incident objectives are typically significantly different in 

rural Alaska than in Southern California; likewise, fire camp 

locations in the Southeast are usually in motels (for seemingly 

good reasons—snakes, bugs, heat, humidity, and so forth) 

while in many other parts of the country teams stay in tents. 

Expenditures do vary according to incident context

Motivation 

As a final note of interest, almost to a person, IMT members 

state their involvement with teams is not motivated by any extra 

money they may receive for their efforts. Rather, it has more 

to do with relationships (both to the land and/or other team 

members), a service ethic, and feelings of accomplishment 

they obtain from their work. Many believe that involvement 

in fire suppression was a part of their agencies’ previous 

cultures and they wholeheartedly buy in with that idea.

Discussion______________________

Incident management team members are intimately 

involved in the costs of suppression activities and have 

given the subject considerable thought. Understanding the 

complexities and challenges of incident management team 

structure, functioning, and decision making is essential to 

prescriptive policy for safe, efficient wildfire suppression 

and controlling costs. 

Emphasizing IMT relationships with agency administrators 

and land management plans may be one key to reducing costs. 

Interviewee responses identify two apparent problems in 

doing this. First, land management plans are becoming less 

prescriptive and therefore less likely to provide the necessary 

guidance on suppression strategy and tactics. Second, land 

managers are under intense pressure to suppress fires, often 

at all costs, and often it is only after the smoke has cleared 

that critical attention is paid to costs of the effort. What may 

appear heroic and appropriate during the heat of battle, at 

times, becomes much less so when costs are reviewed months 

later, after the fire is out and the anxiety forgotten.

Agencies may need to deal with certain policy, workforce, 

public information, WUI suppression, technology, and 

contracting issues to tighten up incident costs and improve 

wildfire suppression efficiency. IMT members agree that 

fire suppression work is inherently difficult, inexact, risky, 

and ultimately costly. Coping with unpredictability and 

safety issues, a very important focus, invariably means high 

costs. Expanded public knowledge of and interest in natural 

resource management, wildfire suppression in particular, 

has placed more pressure on agencies to provide up-to-date 

information through state-of-the-art means. Because the 

public is increasingly relying on sophisticated technology 

to access this information, agencies and the IMTs who work 

for them need the staff and technology to provide it. Such 

realities are additional contributors to increased wildfire 

suppression costs.

While factors outside the scope of this study (for example, 

federal fiscal policy and political realities) may, at times, drive 

the outcomes relating to these issues, we need to realize all 

the trade-offs as we seek solutions to rising costs. Enacting 

more rules, regulations, and policies to govern actions does not 

appear to be a workable solution, according to interviewees. 

If we are to address costs in a safe, effective manner, we need 

to understand the environment and challenges experienced 

by the people who make the critical decisions in the field 

and base future decisions at least in part on their informed 

input.

To completely understand the factors influencing wildland 

fire suppression costs, we need to learn the perspectives 

of other key incident management participants. One very 

important group is land managers. Throughout our interviews, 

the interactions between local land managers (both agency 

administrators and their staffs) and IMTs were brought up 
USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006 

as an essential factor influencing costs. During the life of 

an incident, critical interactions take place between IMTs 

and land managers on a regular basis. Therefore, examining 

results from this study without understanding issues and 

challenges associated with large fire suppression experienced 

by land managers will provide an incomplete picture. Other 

groups whose crucial roles in fire suppression costs need to be 

understood include: 1) dispatchers and dispatch coordinators 

who play a big role in obtaining resources for suppression 

activities on large wildfire incidents, 2) Fire Use Management 

Teams (FUMTs), and 3) Type 1 suppression resources such 

as smokejumpers and hotshot crew members. According to 

our interviewees, these groups can significantly affect IMTs’ 

operating environments.

Acknowledgments________________

We deeply appreciate those who have made this study 

possible. Forty-eight incident management team members 

from the lower 48 states and Alaska unreservedly gave of their 

knowledge, expertise, and time to provide us with thorough, 

quality interview data for our study. Ruth Harris, Trusty 

Transcriptions, has done an excellent job with the interview 

transcriptions. Jon Driessen, Research Social Scientist, 

Missoula Technology Development Center (MTDC) and 

Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, University 

of Montana, provided invaluable guidance on qualitative 

methods as we developed our study plan and moved from 

Phase 1 to Phase 2 of the study.

References______________________

Arno, Stephen F.; Brown, James K. 1991. Overcoming the paradox 

in managing wildland fire. Western Wildlands. 17(1): 40-46.

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USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006

I. Introduction___________________

I really appreciate your willingness to visit with me about 

incident management teams (IMTs). I’ll be recording our 

conversation to accurately document what you tell me so my 

analysis is valid. I’ll also be taking notes as a backup because 

sometimes the recorders fail.

All interview content is confidential. Any quotations I might 

use in reports will be attributed to a pseudonym. Because 

you are the XXth interviewee, you are INTXX. If I want to 

use any quotes from our conversation, I’ll be sure to clear 

them with you.

Hopefully you have been able to read the short study summary I sent you. As we mentioned, we’re into Phase 2 of our 

Incident Management Team study. In the first phase we focused 

on getting an overview of teams and the environment in which 

they operate relative to costs. To do this, I interviewed team 

members located in the Northern Rockies Geographic Area 

Coordinating Center (GACC) region. I asked them about how 

their teams are structured, how they function, and how they 

make decisions about fire suppression activity. In Phase 2 

we’re focusing in more on fire costs. 

As you’re probably aware, cost containment in the arena of 

fire suppression is drawing a whole lot of publicity and interest 

these days. Instead of second guessing what’s going on with 

respect to fire management teams and cost, we want to allow 

team members to tell us their stories on cost containment. 

We want to understand their perspectives on, and experiences 

with, fire suppression costs. Specifically, we want to learn 

how IM Team’s organizational structure, daily functioning, 

and decision-making practices on fire incidents interact with 

and/or influence fire suppression costs. Finally, we want to 

verify whether what I learned about Northern Rockies teams 

generally holds true for teams in other GACCs or if there are 

significant differences among different GACC teams.

Do you have any questions before we get started?

II. Personal Background_ _________

Let's start with a little background on yourself.

A. What’s your current regular job? (Is it part of your agency’s 

fire organization?) How did you end up in this job?

B. I understand you’re an for a Type Team. How’d 

you end up in this position?

C. What other team positions have you held and on what 

types of teams?

D. What GACC is your team in? 

E. Have you served on teams in other GACCs? Which 

ones?

F. Do you happen to have a brochure or handout that 

describes your team?

III. Team Structure________________

Now we’ll talk about IMTs in terms of their structure.

A. Interviewee’s Team:

1. Can you describe the character or culture of your 

team? Is there anything about your team that makes 

it unique compared to other teams?

2. What’s the motivation to be on your team?

3. What agencies are represented on your team?

4. I’ve heard that dealing with people has become a 

major part of a team member’s job these days. What 

are your thoughts on this?

5. Are costs an issue for your team? Does your team 

address costs in its operating plan? Do you have a 

copy of your team’s operating plan?

B. Team Types:

1. What are the key differences between Type 1 and 

Type 2 teams?

2. Do these differences affect fire suppression costs? 

How?

3. Do you have any suggestions on how teams could be 

structured/configured to be more cost effective?

4. What do you think about the use of formalized Type 

3 teams?

C. Team Size:

I understand there are short teams and long teams.

1. Is it customary for teams in your GACC to go as short 

teams or long teams?

2. What determines whether you go as a long team or 

short team?

3. Does team size affect costs? Ability to achieve objectives? The team itself?

D. Team Selection Process:

1. What are your thoughts on interagency teams in 

contrast to single agency teams?

2. Some say there’s a shortage of qualified people available 

to serve on teams. Can you comment on this?

3. Does a shortage of qualified, and available, people to 

be on teams affect costs?

4. Is the current trainee program cost effective?

5. I’ve been told it takes many years to become qualified 

for command and general staff positions. What are 

your thoughts on this?

Appendix A: Sample Interview Guide

(Team position= , Team Type= )

Date:
USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006 

E. Incident Command System (ICS) (Optional):

1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of ICS?

2. How do these strengths and weaknesses affect costs?

F. GACCs:

1. Have you noticed any difference between teams in 

your GACC and those in others? In other words, do 

different GACCs have distinctive personalities?

2. What are the cost implications?

G. Area Command:

1. What’s been your experience with area command 

setups.

2. Are area commands a cost effective way of managing 

fires? How?

H. Unified Command:

1. What are your thoughts on this setup for managing 

multi-jurisdictional fires?

2. What do you think about the cost effectiveness of 

these arrangements?

I. Multi-Agency Coordinating (MAC) Groups:

1. What’s been your experience with MAC groups?

2. Do you think MAC groups influence cost effectiveness? 

How?

J. National Incident Management Organization (NIMO):

I understand policymakers are considering a National 

Incident Management Organization (NIMO) approach 

to augment existing teams:

1. Have you heard anything about this proposal?

2. What are your thoughts on NIMO relative to a) 

incident management teams, b) cost effectiveness, 

and c) recruitment of team members?

K. Cost Containment Teams:

1. What’s your experience with these teams? 

2. Do they typically have backgrounds in fire?

3. Have these teams helped or hindered cost containment? 

How?

L. Incident Business Advisors:

1. What’s your experience with these types of folks?

2. Do they typically have backgrounds in fire?

3. Have they helped or hindered cost containment? 

How?

IV. Team Functioning______________

Now we’ll talk about how IMTs function.

A. Team Call up (Mobilization):

1. How do freelancers compare with regular members 

when it comes to cost effectiveness for team 

operation?

2. Transportation to the Incident:

a. Any thoughts on how travel to the fire influences 

suppression costs?

b. Who determines whether teams drive or fly?

c. When teams in your GACC travel by air, do they 

use contract or commercial carriers? What’s the 

trade-off in terms of costs?

d. Are team members subject to federal travel regulations? If so, does this affect costs?

3. Resource ordering, both initially and during the span 

of the incident:

a. How do the following resource ordering process 

elements affect costs:

1) Dispatch System

2) ROSS (Resource Order and Status System)

3) Team Preorder lists vs. Mobilization Check 

Lists

4) Aviation resources

5) Availability of resources

6) Number of subordinate overhead ordered by 

section chiefs (What determines this?)

b. Is there any reason why having what you need when 

you need it where you need it would not result in 

significant cost savings and meeting your objectives 

in a timely and safe manner? What’s been your 

experience with this?

B. Team Arrival/In briefing/Taking Over the Incident 

(Transitioning):

1. What are some elements associated with team arrival, 

in briefing, or taking over the fire that may have cost 

implications?

2. Some interviewees say the following may have 

cost implications. What are your thoughts on the 

following?

a. Line officer experience/expectations

b. Receiving unit’s land management/fire management 

action plans.

c. WFSA

d. Delegation of Authority

e. Transitioning between teams.

f. Use of host facilities vs. providing/ordering your 

own

C. Day-to-Day Team Activities:

1. General Routine:

a. Has your team developed any ways to implement 

your daily routine that might be more cost effective 

than your past SOP? 

2. Security:

I’ve heard security managers are used more in fire camps 

now than previously.

a. What’s been your experience with this? ... 

Costs?
10 USDA Forest Service Research Note RMRS-RN-30. 2006

b. Has the Homeland Security Act done anything to 

affect fire costs?

3. I’ve also heard of increasing demand for public 

information:

a. What’s been your experience? 

b. Has this affected incident costs?

4. Constraints and Facilitators to Team Function:

a. What are some constraints (hindrances) and 

facilitators that affect your team?

b. How do they affect costs?

D. Demobilization:

What elements associated with demobilization have cost 

implications?

V. Team Decision Making__________

A. Decision-making Process:

Describe briefly the process your team uses to make 

decisions. 

B. Team Decision-making Factors:

1. What factors influence team decision making?

2. How do these affect costs?

C. Flow of Decision Making:

1. What has been your experience with the flow of team 

decision making? In other words, does the flow go 

from bottom to top, top to bottom, or both? 

2. Have you observed anything in team decision making that could be made more cost effective or cost 

efficient?

D. I understand teams have to make many types of decisions 

on incidents. Some are internal to the team. Some are 

external to the team (for example, what the fire is doing). 

Some are policy decisions. Some are routine decisions 

made during the course of the day. Others are responses 

to significant events or emergencies. Some are planning 

meeting-based. Others are negotiated among ICs, AAs, 

and Ops Chiefs, and so forth. Still others are matters of 

safety. Some are tactical in nature, and some are decisions on things outside the current fire’s realm. Some are 

political (public, elected official, and agency pressures), 

and some are resource constraints-based. Yet others are 

the personal responsibility of a given individual. Some 

are “out-of-IC hands.” Others are disciplinary decisions 

made by the IC. Yet others are “leadership” moments. Still 

others are “personnel” decisions (team member brings 

“baggage” with them). Finally, others are “anticipatory” 

decisions.

1. Can you think of other types of decisions your team 

has to make?

2. Have you experienced any connection between the 

type of decision and its cost effectiveness?

E. I’m hearing some team members are becoming reluctant 

to serve on teams because decisions are increasingly 

subject to litigation.

1. What are your thoughts on this?

2. Cost implications?

F. Do you think there’s any relationship between team 

members’ decision-making styles and the costs of 

incidents they manage? (Probe: risk aversion—does this 

perception have any grounding in reality?)

VI. Hidden Costs_________________

I’ve heard some costs get charged to an incident that the 

team has no control over and never sees. Has this significantly 

affected costs of any fires you’ve been responsible for?

VII. Opinion on Cost

Containment_____________________

Now that we’ve discussed team structure, function, decision 

making, and hidden costs, and how they influence incident 

expenditures, tell me what you think is responsible for 

escalating large fire suppression costs and what can be done 

about it.

VIII. Additional Information________

Our study team intends to survey incident management team 

members about the topic of fire costs. Questions we ask will 

be based on information we gain through these interviews. To 

help us with this effort, can you think of anything else I need 

to know about team structure, function, and decision making, 

particularly as they relate to fire suppression costs? 

THANKS SO VERY MUCH FOR ALL THE USEFUL 

INFORMATION YOU’VE GIVEN ME! I REALLY, 

REALLY APPRECIATE THE TIME YOU’VE SET 

ASIDE FOR THIS EFFORT!
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mailing information in label form through one of the following media. 

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E-mail rschneider@fs.fed.us

Web site http://www.fs.fed.us/rm

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