OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

AAWWAARRDD FFEEEE PPRROOCCEESSSS FFOORR

CCOONNTTRRAACCTTOORRSS IINNVVOOLLVVEEDD IINN

IIRRAAQQ RREECCOONNSSTTRRUUCCTTIIOONN

RREEEPPPOOORRRTTT NNNUUUMMMBBBEEERRR SSIIGGIIRR--0055--001177 OOOCCCTTTOOOBBBEEERRR 222555,,,222000000555 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

October 25, 2005 

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING 

COMMAND – IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

SUBJECT: Award Fee Process for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction 

(Report No. SIGIR-05-017) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. We initiated an audit of the 

award fee process for contractors involved in Iraq reconstruction in June 2005 as a result 

of concerns previously brought to our attention by staff of the United States Army Corps 

of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, Iraq. We performed the audit in accordance with 

Public Law 108-106, which mandates the independent and objective conduct of audits 

relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise 

made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Public Law 108-106, as 

amended, requires that we provide for the independent and objective leadership and 

coordination of and recommendations on policies designed to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations and to 

prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

We considered comments received from the Joint Contracting Command - 

Iraq/Afghanistan on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott by email at joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil

or at (703) 428-1100, or Mr. James Carrera by email at james.carrera@sigir.mil or at 

(703) 428-1100. For the report distribution, see Appendix E. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Report No. SIGIR-05-017 October 25, 2005 

 (Project No. SIGIR-2005-10) 

Award Fee Process 

for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction 

Executive Summary 

Introduction. This audit report discusses the Award Fee Process for contracts awarded 

for projects that are funded with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. 

The goal of award fees in contracting is to motivate a contractor’s performance by 

offering financial incentives in areas critical to program success that are susceptible to 

measurement and evaluation. Upon execution of a contract that contains an award fee 

arrangement, the contracting officer initiates a process that provides incentives to a 

contractor to improve performance and requires the Government to record assessments of 

the contractor’s performance upon which award fees will be based. 

Title II of Public Law 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 

Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004,” authorized $18.4 

billion for security, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction projects in Iraq funded 

through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). 

Objective. The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether award fees 

provided to contractors performing IRRF-funded projects are adequately reviewed, 

properly approved, sufficiently substantiated, and awarded according to established 

standards. Specifically, we sought to determine whether: 

• An award review board has been established, and pertinent policies and adequate 

procedures have been consistently applied to the evaluation of award fees. 

• Award fee plans clearly identified the specific award fee evaluation criteria for 

assessing contractor performance and determining the amount of the award fee. 

• The performance indicators were properly established, and the performance 

requirements were properly defined. 

• Award review board recommendations and determinations were supported by 

appropriate evaluations of contractor performance. 

• The award fee determination was documented in sufficient detail to show that the 

integrity of the award fee determination process has been maintained. 

Results. We reviewed the 18 cost-plus award-fee contracts funded with IRRF monies. 

The contracts and the associated contract files were located at the Project Contracting 

Office (PCO) and the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). The 18 

contracts reviewed consisted of 11 design-build (DB) contracts valued at up to $6.75 

billion and 7 program management and support (PMAS) contracts valued in excess of 

$200 million. These 18 contracts were awarded through six different procuring activities. 

i 
In general, cost-plus-award-fee contracts include a base award fee (for simply meeting 

contract requirements) and a merit-based award fee for performance that exceeds contract 

expectations. For 16 of the 18 contracts, the base fee component was 3 percent, which is 

the highest base fee allowed by the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) Supplement. To receive merit-based award fees, management should 

evaluate and measure contractors’ performance against specific award fee evaluation 

criteria, which should be provided in the contracts. However, the 18 contracts did not 

contain the required criteria with definable metrics. This missing component creates the 

potential for inflated contractor performance evaluations. 

Further, the Army FAR Supplement 5116.405-2 states that “contractors should not 

receive award fees (above the base fee) for simply meeting contract requirements.” For 9 

of the 11 DB contracts, the award fee plans allowed awards of an additional 50 percent to 

74 percent of the award fee pool for average results. For the 7 PMAS contracts, the 

award fee plans permitted awards of an additional 60-70 percent of the award fee pool for 

some performance above standard while still allowing several weaknesses in performance 

to remain. 

In addition, we reviewed award fee files and found that the Award Fee Evaluation Board 

recommendations and determinations of fees were not documented in sufficient detail to 

show that the integrity of the award fee determination process has been maintained. The 

documentation we reviewed in contract files was insufficient to substantiate the award 

fees that were approved. 

On July 19, 2005, we provided the JCC-I/A, the PCO, and the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Gulf Region Division Award Fee Determining Official a briefing on the 

interim results of our audit.1 At that time, these officials advised us that they were 

implementing new procedures that would address many of the corrective actions we 

identified. Since our July 19th briefing, the JCC-I/A and PCO have been proactive in 

implementing corrective actions we identified during our review, including interim 

recommendations. In fact, on July 23, 2005 JCC-I/A issued a new Award Fee Board 

Policy. Consequently, we consider two of the conditions noted in the interim briefing 

corrected, however, during the finalization of our audit, we identified conditions that 

continue to need to be addressed and make the following additional recommendations. 

Recommendations. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting 

Command - Iraq/Afghanistan: 

1. Ensure that the appointments of the members of the Award Fee Evaluation Board, 

specifically the Chairperson of the board, the board members (both voting and nonvoting), and the contract performance monitors are documented. 

2. Continue to revise award fee plans to more clearly identify the specific award fee 

evaluation criteria for assessing contractor performance by providing clearer metrics 

and more quantifiable criteria that permit better performance evaluations. 

ii 

 

1

 Interim Briefing to the Project and Contracting Office - Iraq and the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq on 

the Audit of the Award Fee Process, SIGIR-05-010, July 26, 2005. 
3. Continue to review and modify the current contracts to utilize a method of applying 

the award fee to provide additional incentive for contractors to achieve quality results. 

4. Ensure that the Award Fee Determination Officer’s and the Award Fee Evaluation 

Board’s recommendations and determinations are fully documented as to their 

rationale. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. The Joint Contracting Command – 

Iraq/Afghanistan concurred with four of five recommendations made in a draft of this 

report, and provided a reason for the non-concurrence. For management comments, see 

page 22. We agreed and changed our report accordingly. 

iii 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objective 2 

Finding 

Award Fee Process 3 

 

Appendixes 

A. Scope and Methodology 11 

B. Acronyms 13 

C. Contract Files Reviewed 14 

D. JCC-I/A Award Fee Board Policy, dated July 23, 2005 15 

E. Report Distribution 19 

F. Audit Team Members 21 

Management Comments 

Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan 22

 
1 

Introduction 

Background 

This audit report discusses the Award Fee Process for contracts funded from the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). 

Public Law 108-106, as amended, mandates the Special Inspector General of Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) to engage in the independent and objective conduct of audits 

relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or 

otherwise made available to the IRRF. It also requires SIGIR to provide for the 

independent and objective leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, 

policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 

administration of such programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, 

fraud, and abuse. 

Reconstruction Program. Title II of Public Law 108-106, “Emergency 

Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 

Afghanistan, 2004,” authorized $18.4 billion for security, relief, rehabilitation, and 

reconstruction projects in Iraq funded through the IRRF. The Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA) established the Project Management Office (PMO) to execute the 

Iraq infrastructure reconstruction program. During its initial planning stages for the 

reconstruction of Iraq, the PMO identified over 5,000 potential Iraq infrastructure 

reconstruction projects that it potentially could execute. From that initial review, 

approximately 2,311 projects were selected for funding through the IRRF. 

Project and Contracting Office. The CPA was the authority responsible for the 

temporary governance of Iraq from April 2003 until June 28, 2004. Along with the 

CPA, the PMO ceased to exist on June 28, 2004, and the Project and Contracting 

Office (PCO) was established as its successor organization. The PCO is responsible 

for over $12 billion dollars of IRRF funds and has management control of hundreds of 

projects in the electricity, water, oil, health, transportation, education, security, and 

justice sectors. 

Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan. The Joint Contracting Command 

- Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) provides operational contracting support to the Chief of 

Mission, PCO, and the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I). The Principal Assistant 

Responsible for Contracting to the Commanding General, JCC-I/A, has responsibility 

for the award fee plan and appointing the Award Fee Determination Official (AFDO). 

The AFDO is a senior procurement official with responsibility for appointing the 

Award Fee Board Evaluation Chairperson, Award Fee Evaluation Board, and 

performance monitors. 

United States Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division. United States 

Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD) provides construction 

management functions such as: construction execution and closeout; construction 

administration; property management; safety; quality assurance; schedule analysis; 

Administrative Contracting Officer delegation; and construction progress reporting to 

PCO. GRD also provides some construction management services to the MNF-I and 

the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq.

Federal Acquisition Regulation. Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 16.3 and 

16.4, entitled “Cost Reimbursement Contracts,” sets specific award fee requirements 

for cost-reimbursement contracts that provide for: (1) a base amount fixed at inception 

of the contract; and (2) an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in 
2 

part during performance and that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in 

such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective management. 

The amount of the award fee is determined by the Government’s judgmental 

evaluation of the contractor’s performance based on the criteria stated in the contract. 

This determination and the methodology for determining the award fee are decisions 

that rest solely within the discretion of the Government. 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). Defense Federal 

Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Subpart 216.405-2, states that a cost-plus-awardfee (CPAF) contract is suitable for level-of-effort contracts where mission feasibility 

is established but measurement of better-than-expected achievement must be by 

subjective evaluation rather than objective measurement. 

Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS). The Army Federal 

Acquisition Regulation Supplement Sub-part 5116.4052, entitled, “Cost-plus-awardfee Contracts,” states the intended goal of award fee contracting is to motivate the 

contractor’s performance in those areas critical to program success that are 

susceptible to measurement and evaluation. By entering into an award fee 

arrangement, the contracting officer initiates a process that provides incentives to a 

contractor to perform at a superior level and requires the government to record 

assessments of the contractor’s performance upon which the award fee will be based.

Objective 

The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether award fees are 

adequately reviewed, properly approved, sufficiently substantiated, and awarded 

according to established standards. Specifically, we sought to determine whether: 

• An award review board has been established, and pertinent policies and 

adequate procedures have been consistently applied to the evaluation of 

award fees. 

• Award fee plans clearly identified the specific award fee evaluation criteria 

for assessing contractor performance and determining the amount of the 

award fee. 

• The performance indicators were properly established, and the 

performance requirements were properly defined. 

• Award review board recommendations and determinations were supported 

by appropriate evaluations of contractor performance. 

• The award fee determination was documented in sufficient detail to show 

that the integrity of the award fee determination process has been 

maintained. 

For a discussion of the audit scope, methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, 

see Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix B. 

For the list of contract files reviewed see Appendix C. For a list of the audit team 

members, see Appendix F. 
3 

Award Fee Process 

Award Fee Process Administration Criteria 

The 18 contracts and associated contract files reviewed consisted of 11 design-build 

(DB) contracts with a not-to-exceed value of up to $6.75 billion, and 7 program 

management and support (PMAS) contracts with a value in excess of $200 million. 

The contracts, contract files, and the Award Fee Evaluation Board’s (AFEB) 

summaries and supporting documentation were located at PCO and JCC-I/A. The 

Award Fee Plan for each contract describes the policies and procedures for 

determining award fees and outlines the duties and responsibilities of personnel 

associated with the award fee process. 

Documentation could not be located for the required appointment of the AFEB 

Chairperson, performance monitors, or for the other board members in the contracts. 

Moreover, the AFEB recommendations and determinations were not documented in 

sufficient detail to show that the integrity of the award fee determination process had 

been maintained. Additionally, the Award Fee Determination Official’s (AFDO) 

decisions were not documented in sufficient detail to show that the integrity of the 

award fee determination process has been maintained during the entire period 

reviewed. These conditions occurred because the PCO did not establish adequate 

administrative processes, controls, and criteria to properly administer the Award Fee 

Evaluation Board. 

We looked at two award fee periods governing the 18 contracts awarded in January 

2004 through July 2005. For those periods, we found deficiencies in the following 

areas for each contract file reviewed: 

AFEB Chairperson: 

• 1st Award Fee Period: 9 of 18 contract files reviewed did not document the 

required chairperson appointment. 

• 2nd Award Fee Period: 7 of 18 contract files reviewed did not document the 

required chairperson appointment. 

Contract Performance Monitor: 

• 1st Award Fee Period: 14 of 18 contract files reviewed did not document any 

monitor appointments. 

• 2nd Award Fee Period: 12 of 18 contract files reviewed did not document any 

monitor appointments. 

AFEB Members: 

• 1st Award Fee Period: 13 of 18 contract files reviewed did not document any 

appointments. 

• 2nd Award Fee Period: 12 of 18 contract files reviewed did not document any 

appointments. 
4 

Moreover, limited evidence was found indicating that the required monthly contract 

assessments were performed. 

Performance Monitor’s Monthly Reports: 

• 1st Award Fee Period: 13 of 18 contract files reviewed showed no evidence of 

monthly monitoring being performed. 

• 2nd Award Fee Period: 12 of 18 contract files reviewed showed no evidence 

of monthly monitoring being performed. 

AFEB Monthly Meetings: 

• 1st Award Fee Period: 16 of 18 contract files reviewed showed no evidence of 

monthly meetings. 

• 2nd Award Fee Period: 13 of 18 contract files reviewed showed no evidence 

of monthly meetings. 

Additionally, self-assessments from contractors were not always documented in the 

contract files. 

• 1st Award Fee Period: 9 of 18 contract files reviewed showed no evidence of 

the contractor’s self-assessments. 

• 2nd Award Fee Period: 5 of 18 contract files reviewed showed no evidence of 

the contractor’s self-assessments. 

Because of the poor administration of contract files for award fees, contractors have 

successfully appealed adverse decisions made by the AFEB. For example, Contract 

No. W914NS-04-C-0007, awarded to Foster Wheeler, received an evaluation score of 

15% at the end of the 1st award period (March – September 2004), which should have 

resulted in no award fee to the contractor. However, Foster Wheeler appealed the 

decision because of management’s failure to perform monthly performance meetings 

and the absence of the required performance feedback. The U.S. Government 

subsequently awarded Foster Wheeler a score of 50%, which resulted in an award fee 

of $439,145 that was paid from the award fee pool of $878,291. The final decision 

approving the award fee was issued in a contract modification that allowed payment 

of the award fee in February 2005. 

Award Fee Plan Criteria 

The Award Fee Plan in each contract describes the policies and procedures for 

determining award fees and outlines the duties and responsibilities of personnel 

associated with the award fee process. However, Award Fee Plans we reviewed did 

not clearly identify specific award fee evaluation criteria and performance indicators 

were not properly established. 

Specifically, we found that the evaluation criteria were subjective with few metrics 

being used. Schedule Adherence Criteria used undefined terms such as “timeliness, 

accuracy, and completeness of performance,” as the standard of review. Cost Control 

Criteria used general terms such as “maintain effective cost control measures” as the 

standard of review. Quality Control Criteria used measurement terms such as 

“minimization of rework” as the standard of review. The effect of having evaluation 

criteria without clearly defined metrics could have the potential to result in inflated 

contractor performance evaluations and consequently inappropriately approved award 

fees. 
5 

We reviewed 11 award fee contract files for design-build contractors and 7 award fee 

files for program management and support contractors. We found the following 

performance ratings for the 2nd award fee period, as approved by the AFEB for the 18 

contracts: 

For the 11 Design-Build contract files: 

• 1 below average rating of 66.9%. 

• 1 average rating of 67.3%. 

• 4 above average ratings of 82.0% to 86.6%. 

• 5 excellent ratings of 93.8% to 96%. 

For the 7 PMAS contract files: 

• 1 very good rating of 78.3%. 

• 6 outstanding ratings of 93.5% to 98.7%. 

Cost-plus award-fee contracts allow the government to evaluate a contractor’s 

performance according to specific criteria and to grant an award amount within 

designated parameters. Award fees can serve as a valuable tool to help control 

program risk and encourage excellence in contract performance. 

The current award fee plan does not provide proper incentives for contractors to strive 

for better-than-expected results. For example, 16 of the 18 Award Fee Plans reviewed 

allow awards tied the amount of the award directly to the performance grade (e.g., a 

70 percent performance score results in a 70 percent award from the fee pool), 

whereas the other two Award Fee Plans3

 were scaled, allowing no award fee for a 

score less than 70 and rising proportionally from there. 

Per the Army FAR Supplement (AFARS 5116.405-2) “contractors should not receive 

an award fee (above the base fee) for simply meeting contract requirements.” The 

base fee is three percent of the negotiated contract/task order cost for 16 of the 18 

contracts we reviewed; which is the highest base fee percentage allowed by the 

DFARS. For 7 of the 18 contracts (the PMAS contracts), the award fee plans allowed 

awards of an additional 60-70 percent of the award fee pool for performance above 

standard (but still with several weaknesses). For 9 of the 18 contracts (design-build 

contracts), the award fee plans allowed awards of 50-74 percent of the award fee pool 

for simply average results. 

The award fee plans allowed 50-60 percent of the award fee pool to be earned for 

meeting minimum requirements. For example, for the seven PMAS contracts, a 

minimum of 60 percent of the award fee pool is awarded if the contractor receives a 

performance score of 60 (which equates to some part of the performance above 

standard but with several weaknesses) and earns up to 100 percent of the award fee 

pool for earning a performance score of 100. This is illustrated in Chart 1. For 9 

design-build contracts, a minimum of 50 percent of the award fee pool is awarded if 

the contractor receives a performance score of 50 (which equates into average results) 

 

3

 Contracts W9126G-04-D-0001 and W9126G-04-D-0002 have criteria that performance scores less 

than 70 percent receive no fees, and award fees begin at zero percent for meeting the specifications and 

increasing to 100 percent of the award fee for a performance score of 100. The remaining 16 contracts 

receive a percentage of the award fee pool equal to their performance score, provided the score is not 

unsatisfactory (i.e. performance score of 75 received 75 percent of award fee pool, 91 performance 

score receives 91 percents of the award fee pool, etc.) 
6 

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Performance Score

Percent of fee awarded

PMAS Contracts (7 of 18)

Design-Build Contracts (9 of 18)

D-001/D-002 Contracts (2 of 18)

and earns 100 percent of the award fee pool for earning a performance score of 100. 

The chart also illustrates the award fee pool awards used by W9126G-04-D-0001 (D001) and W9126G04-D-0002 (D-002) for their performance rating. 

Chart 1 - Current Award Fee Plan - Percent of Award Fee Pool That Can be Earned 

Based Upon Performance Rating 

The Army Contracting Activity (ACA) Award Fee Contracts Guide identifies a more 

common and apt award fee mechanism called the “cubic scale.” This alternate 

method for distributing award fees more properly rewards superior performances and 

complies more fully with the Army FAR Supplement (AFARS 5116.405-2), which 

requires superior performance for an award fee. As illustrated in Chart 2, the cubic 

scale is similar to the award used for D-001 and D-002, although the cubic scale is 

slightly more generous in awarding fees at the lower scores than D-001/D-002. 
7 

0

20

40

60

80

100

40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Performance Rating

Percent of Award Fee

D-001/D-002

Cubic

PMAS

Design-Build

Chart 2 - Comparative Analysis of the Current Scoring Scale to the Cubic Scale 

The cubic award fee scale or another award fee scale as deemed appropriate by the 

Contracting Officer could be applied through a unilateral modification to existing 

contracts prior to the start of a performance period. 

The effect of using the cubic scale to compute the award fee pool to be awarded for a 

corresponding performance score is shown by the following table, which illustrates 

the award fee that would have been awarded using the cubic award fee scale for 

awarding fee versus using the current methodology of awarding fee. 

Table 1: Comparison of Cubic Award Fee Scale verses Current Award Fee 

Methodology 

Award Fees 

Using Cubic 

Strategy for 

Awarding Fee 

Actual Award 

Fees Using 

Current Fee 

Strategy 

For the 11 Design-Build Contracts Reviewed: 

 1 below average rating of 66.9%* $ 0 $ 0

 1 average rating of 67.3% 309,436 1,666,772

 4 above average ratings of 84.7% to 86.6% 21,088,041 27,616,696

 5 excellent ratings of 93.8% to 96% 20,536,016 21,062,281

For the 7 PMAS contracts reviewed: 

 1 very good rating of 78.3% 49,787 86,667 

 6 outstanding ratings of 93.5% to 98.7% 9,327,239 9,479,620

* No award fee is awarded for below average performance. 
8 

As is evident from Table 1, the contractors who exceed contract expectations make 

award fees approaching the maximum. The contractors whose award fees are affected 

most are those who perform at a marginal level or average level. 

Documentation of the AFEB’s Determination Criteria 

To determine whether the AFEB recommendations and determinations are supported 

by appropriate evaluations of contractor performance, we reviewed the supporting 

documentation provided to the AFDO to support the AFEB’s determination. 

The AFEB recommendations and determinations were not documented in sufficient 

detail to show that the integrity of the award fee determination process has been 

maintained. Specifically, we found that: 

• 15 of 18 contracts reviewed showed no evidence of either the monitor’s 

monthly reviews or the AFEB board monthly meetings with the contractor 

during the first award fee period as required by the award fee plan. 

• 12 of 18 contracts reviewed showed no evidence of either the monitor’s 

monthly reviews or the AFEB board monthly meetings with the contractor 

during the second award fee period as required by the award fee plan. 

In addition, we reviewed the method used by the AFEB to determine the award fee on 

the Design Build contracts that involved multiple Task Orders (TO). Each TO has its 

own award fee pool, and thus, each TO should be evaluated individually. For the first 

award fee period, the contracts had not matured to the point of having significant TOs 

under each contract, so we took no exception for this period. However, during the 

second award fee period that we reviewed, we found no evidence that the AFEB 

looked at the TOs on an individual basis and found no evidence that the AFEB 

weighed the TOs as to their significance in award dollars (to the total contract value) 

in 10 of the 18 contracts reviewed. Thus, without sufficient evidence to document 

and support the awarding of award fees under each TO, we were unable to ensure the 

validity of the fees or the integrity of the award fee determination process. 

Documentation of the Award Fee Determination Criteria 

Overall, the award fee determinations we reviewed were not documented in sufficient 

detail to demonstrate that the integrity of the award fee determination process had 

been maintained. 

• 16 of the 18 contracts reviewed showed no evidence that the AFDO decisions 

were documented in sufficient detail to maintain the integrity of the Award 

Fee Process for the first award fee period. 

• 7 of the 18 contracts reviewed showed no evidence that the AFDO decisions 

were documented in sufficient detail to maintain the integrity of the Award 

Fee Process for the second award fee period 

We did note that during the second award fee period, improvements had been made 

regarding the level of contract file documentation maintained by the AFDO. In 

addition to the written correspondence that either approved or disapproved the AFEB 

decision, the current AFDO documented the meetings held with the AFEB regarding 

their recommendations, the rationale behind his decisions, and made his personal 

electronic and written files available for our review. 
9 

Management Actions

JCC-I/A and PCO have been proactive in implementing corrective actions that we 

identified. Notable examples include: 

• Contract files have been indexed and filing system improved. 

• JCC-I/A has conducted additional training regarding Award Fees and the 

process to use for personnel involved in evaluating contractor performance. 

• JCC-I/A issued an Award Fee Board policy dated July 23, 2005, to provide 

guidance on the responsibilities for award fee evaluation and administration – 

see Appendix D. This policy include provisions that: 

o Emphasize that the contractor earns an award fee by performing the 

work requirements as stated in the contract and by excelling in the 

areas specified in the award fee plan. 

o The contractor begins each evaluation period with 0% of the available 

award fee and works up to the evaluated fee for each evaluation period, 

the PMAS contractors serve primarily as performance monitors and 

provide input to the AFEB on contractor performance. 

o The AFEB shall be composed of only Government personnel and that 

performance monitors and other technical experts serve in advisory 

capacity only and may not participate during AFEB discussions. 

o Rollover of fees to successive periods is normally not permitted other 

than for reasons such as Government-caused delay or changes to the 

performance work statement. 

o The Contracting Officer is an AFEB member to ensure contract 

integrity, contract compliance, and centralization of contract files. 

• JCC-I/A has coordinated with PCO and the AFDO, and has notified the 

contractors of the intent to change the award fee plans for the next award fee 

evaluation period to ensure that issues such as property management, 

inventory control, and changes in the rating and applications of award fees 

will be incorporated into future award fee plans.4

• JCC-I/A is in the process of revising the award fee scales to provide added 

incentives to encourage excellence in contract performance; a performance 

evaluation of less than good will no longer earn award fee. 

Because management actions were still ongoing at the time our audit work was 

concluded, we could not assess the ultimate efficacy of all those actions. In our 

opinion, however, two of the cited conditions have been corrected and the results of 

these remaining actions probably will aid in the correction of the other conditions 

identified in this report. 

Conclusion 

Although JCC-I/A and PCO have been proactive in improving the award fee process, 

we believe there are additional opportunities that can be made by leveraging the 

award fee pool by applying an alternate methodology (e.g., cubic scale, improved 

metrics and criteria) that is transparent to determine award fees in a way that 

 

4

In response to Interim Briefing to the Project and Contracting Office - Iraq and the Joint Contracting 

Command - Iraq on the Audit of the Award Fee Process, dated July 19, 2005. 
10 

encourages contractors to demonstrate above-expectations efforts toward 

accomplishing the tasks and functions cited in the contract to reward performance 

excellence. 

Since our July 19th briefing, the JCC-I/A has been proactive in implementing 

corrective actions we identified during our review, including interim 

recommendations. In fact, on July 23, 2005, JCC-I/A issued a new Award Fee Board 

Policy (see Appendix D). Consequently, two of our recommendations in the interim 

report have already been implemented. However, during the finalization of our audit, 

we identified conditions that continue to need to be addressed and make the following 

additional recommendations. 

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit 

Response

We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command - 

Iraq/Afghanistan: 

1. Ensure the appointments of the members of the Award Fee Evaluation Board, 

specifically the Chairperson of the board, the board members (both voting and 

non-voting), and the contract performance monitors are documented. 

2. Continue to revise award fee plans to more clearly identify the specific award fee 

evaluation criteria for assessing contractor performance (i.e. more metrics, and/or 

quantifiable criteria to distinguish between a poor performer and an excellent 

performer). 

3. Continue to review and modify the current contracts to utilize a method of 

applying the award fee to provide additional incentive for contractors to achieve 

quality results. 

4. Ensure that the Award Fee Determination Official’s and the Award Fee 

Evaluation Board’s recommendations and determinations are appropriately 

documented as to their rationale. 

Management Comments. The Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan 

concurred with four of five recommendations made in a draft of this report, and 

provided a reason for the non-concurrence. For management comments, see page 22. 

Audit Response. We agreed and changed our report accordingly. 
11 

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

We initiated this audit because Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction met with the AFDO, Mr. James Dalton, Director of Business 

Management, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD), 

to discuss the Award Fee Process. Mr. Dalton identified several deficiencies 

occurring in the award fee process during the meeting as follows: 

• The current procedure of awarding fees by the AFEB is that the contractor 

starts at 100 percent of the award fee pool, decreases the percentage if 

problems are found with the contractor’s performance. This is contrary to the 

concept of award fees. The award fee process should operate according to the 

award fee plan, that is, award fees are awarded based upon the performance 

score which ranges from average performance to excellent (performance 

scores of less than average receive no award fees.) 

• Previous AFEB comments have not been sufficient to justify the contractor’s 

performance, either good or bad. 

• Unearned fee was carried over into the next evaluation period by the previous 

AFDO. Mr. Dalton did not believe this was the correct process, that the 

contractor should do their best to earn the entire award fee during the period 

being rated, and no carryover will be provided, except for elements of the 

award fee plan that cannot be performed during the rating period. 

Mr. Dalton identified the 18 contracts that were Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) 

contracts. We decided to review all 18 contracts. The 18 contracts reviewed consisted 

of 11 design-build contracts valued at up to $6.75 billion, and 7 program management 

and support (PMAS) contracts valued in excess of $200 million. These 18 contracts 

were awarded by six different procuring activities. 

The on-site review of the AFDO’s files was conducted from the 1st and 2nd Award 

Fee periods, at the PCO Compound in June 2005. We also evaluated documents, 

procedures, and processes at the JCC-I/A. We reviewed the hard contract files and 

electronic contract files including emails, WORD documents, EXCEL spreadsheets, 

and PDF files not contained in hardcopy format at the JCC-I/A between June 11, 2005 

and June 25, 2005. We conducted interviews with JCC-I/A managers and staff to 

discuss contract and task order procedures with key personnel at both JCC-I/A and the 

PCO. 

As a basis for our review and evaluation, we used: 

• Provisions of Public Law 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 

Afghanistan, 2004”. 

• Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 16.3 and 16.4, “Cost-reimbursable 

Contracts”. 

• Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations 216.405-2, Cost-plus-award-fee. 

• Army Federal Acquisition Regulations 5116.405-2, Cost-plus-award-fee 

contracts. 

• Procedural guides from the Army Contracting Agency. 
12 

We conducted interviews with the Head of the Contracting Activity and the Principal 

Assistant Responsible for Contracting, a Sector Chief, five contracting officers, and 

two contract specialists. Our review included contracts with effective dates from 

January 2004 through July 2005.

In addition, we made inquires to the other recipients of IRRF monies, specifically, the 

U.S. Agency for International Development, the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command – Iraq, the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Gulf Region 

Division, and the Department of State. Except for the Department of State, who did 

not respond to our inquiries, none of the recipients utilized CPAF contracts at the time 

of this review. However, based upon our review of available IRRF contract 

databases, we believe that any CPAF contracts awarded by the Department of State 

were not significant to this review. Thus, we used our universe of 18 contract files to 

test the Award Fee process by determining whether the minimally required documents 

were contained in each file. 

We performed this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to 

perform this audit.

Prior Coverage. We did a search of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 

the Office of Inspector General Department of Defense (DoDIG), and the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR - formerly the Office of the 

Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority), NASA, and Army Audit Agency 

web sites for “Cost Plus Award Fee,” type reports. The GAO reports can be accessed 

over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov. The DoDIG reports can be assessed at 

http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports. SIGIR reports can be located over the 

internet at http://www.sigir.mil. The search was conducted for dates July 2000 to 

August 2005, using “Cost Plus Award Fee,” as the search keywords. There were no 

recent GAO, DoDIG, or SIGIR reports on Cost Plus Award Fee contracts. One Army 

Audit Agency report was provided in hardcopy and is referenced below. 

Army Audit Report No. 01-169, “Best Practices for Using Award Fees.” February 

20, 2001. 
13 

Appendix B. Acronyms 

ACA Army Contracting Activity 

AFDO Award Fee Determination Official 

AFEB Award Fee Evaluation Board 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

CPAF Cost Plus Award Fee 

DB Design-Build 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

GRD Gulf Region Division 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

MNF-I Multi-National Force - Iraq 

PCO Project and Contracting Office 

PMAS Program Management and Support 

PMO Project Management Office 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

TO Task Order 
14 

Appendix C. Contract Files Reviewed 

The 18 contract files reviewed during this audit are listed below. 

Contract Number Contractor Sector 

Contract Value 

7 June 2005 

Contract 

Issue Date Contract Issued By 

W914NS-04-C-0001 AECOMS PCO Services $ 40,466,723 3/10/2004 

Pentagon Renovation 

Office 

W914NS-04-C-0002 

Iraq Power 

Alliance PMAS Electrical 49,202,499 3/10/2004 

Pentagon Renovation 

Office 

W914NS-04-C-0003 

CH2M 

Hill/Parsons 

PMAS Public Works 

& Water 67,001,082 3/10/2004 

Pentagon Renovation 

Office 

W914NS-04-C-0004 Berger, URS 

PMAS Facilities & 

Transportation 3,000,000 3/10/2004 

Pentagon Renovation 

Office 

W914NS-04-C-0005 Berger, URS 

PMAS Facilities & 

Transportation 4,000,000 3/10/2004 

Pentagon Renovation 

Office 

W914NS-04-C-0006 Berger, URS 

PMAS Facilities & 

Transportation 5,553,043 3/10/2004 

Pentagon Renovation 

Office 

W914NS-04-C-0007 

Foster 

Wheeler PMAS Oil 29,802,165 3/11/2004 

Pentagon Renovation 

Office 

W912G6-04-D-0001 KBR Oil 763,077,645 1/16/2004 

United States Agency 

for International 

Development 

W912G6-04-D-0002 Parsons/Iraq Oil 267,139,474 1/16/2004 

Army Corps of 

Engineers 

W914NS-04-D-0003 Fluor-AMEC Electrical Generation 193,839,567 3/11/2004 

Coalition Provisional 

Authority 

W914NS-04-D-0005 Lucent 

Facilities, 

Transportation. & 

Communications 142,497,133 3/23/2004 

Coalition Provisional 

Authority 

W914NS-04-D-0006 

Parson's 

Delaware 

Facilities, 

Transportation. & 

Communications 382,492,138 3/25/2004 

Department of the 

Army 

W914NS-04-D-0007 

Washington 

International 

Public Works & 

Water 86,131,671 3/11/2004 

Coalition Provisional 

Authority 

W914NS-04-D-0008 Fluor-AMEC 

Public Works & 

Water North 41,557,713 3/23/2004 

Naval Facilities 

Engineering 

W914NS-04-D-0009 

Parson's 

Delaware 

Facilities, 

Transportation. & 

Communications 381,192,583 3/26/2004 

Coalition Provisional 

Authority 

W914NS-04-D-0010 

Washington 

International Electrical T/D North 368,515,403 3/12/2004 

Coalition Provisional 

Authority 

W914NS-04-D-0011 Perini Electrical T/D South 291,323,523 3/12/2004 

Coalition Provisional 

Authority 

W914NS-04-D-0022 Fluor-AMEC 

Public Works & 

Water South 15,768,393 3/23/2004 

Naval Facilities 

Engineering 

TOTAL $ 3,331,586,267 
15 

Appendix D. JCC-I/A Award Fee Board Policy 

US DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

APO AE 09316 

 

 Reply to: 

JCC-I/A/A-R 23 July 2005 

MEMORANDUM FOR: JCCI-R Sector Chiefs / Contracting Officers / Award Fee 

Determining Official / Award Fee Board Chairmen / PCO Program Managers 

SUBJECT: Award Fee Board Policy 

1. The purpose of this policy is to provide information and guidance on the responsibilities 

for award fee evaluation and administration on JCC-I/A/A-R CPAF contracts. Contracting 

officers and those who participate during award fee management in the Iraq theater may 

change several times during the extended performance of IDIQ contracts for reconstruction 

and construction management services. This policy is an effort to maintain continuity during 

transitions which will inevitably occur. This policy does not restrict or deviate from any 

requirement of the FAR, DFARS, or AFARS. A more in-depth review of award fee 

contracts is provided in the ACA Handbook for “Award Fee Contracts” and is posted on the 

ACA web site at http://aca.saalt.army.mil/. We strongly encourage that anyone administering 

a CPAF contract or participating on an AFB to read or review this guide periodically. 

2. Under the terms of a cost reimbursement contract, the Government reimburses for a “best 

effort” where the Government assumes all or most of the performance risk. Award fee 

provisions are added to a cost reimbursement contract to provide an incentive to excel in 

critical performance areas emphasized in an Award Fee Plan (AFP). The award fee process 

evaluates a contractor’s performance level and rewards superior performance by providing a 

“bonus” based upon evaluated factors incorporated in the contract AFP. 

3. The CPAF type contract provides for a fixed portion of the fee (base fee) to be paid for 

compliance when meeting all term and conditions of the contract and by an additional award 

fee to be earned based upon level of performance tied to critical evaluation factors contained 

in the AFP. It is important to emphasize that the contractor earns an award fee by performing 

the work requirements as stated in contract and by excelling in the areas specified in the AFP 

and not by doing what the program manager or other government personnel may want of the 

contractor on a particular day. Government personnel must avoid the temptation to try to get 

“extra” work using the subtle threat of withholding award fee. 

4. Available award fee during the evaluation period must be earned. The contractor begins 

each evaluation period with 0% of the available award fee and works up to the evaluated fee 

for each evaluation period. Contractors do not begin with 100% of available fee and have 

deductions withdrawn to arrive at the evaluated fee.
16 

5. The AFP and the managing structure should avoid becoming an overly structured process. 

Simplicity is the key – a simple plan is more direct, easier to follow and simpler to defend. It 

should be based on a few critical factors that best reflect desired end product. A simple plan 

also reduces layers of review. The AFP establishes the methods that the Government will use 

to assess performance and includes performance evaluation criteria. The AFP is a living 

document and, due to changing priorities, may change during contract performance. The AFP 

may be changed unilaterally by the Government if the change occurs at least 30 days before 

the beginning of the next evaluation period. If the change occurs during the evaluation period, 

then it must be bilateral, i.e. a negotiated agreement between the parties. The plan also 

establishes the standard to measure how well a contractor is performing. 

6. AF evaluations and earned fee determinations are based upon subjective performance 

evaluations provided by the Award Fee Evaluation Board (AFEB) and an Award Fee 

Determining Official (AFDO). It is important that the personnel involved with the AF 

process understand their roles and responsibilities. This team includes the program manager, 

performance monitors (PMAS contractors or CORs), the AFEB and the AFDO. 

 

7. The program manager has responsibility for the performance work statement (PWS) 

technical function. The PM maintains overall technical responsibility for the mission and 

provides technical oversight and guidance to the performance monitors. 

8. The PMAS contractors serve primarily as performance monitors and provide input to the 

AFEB on contractor performance. The monitors provide continuous evaluation and 

assessment of the contractor’s daily performance. This daily monitoring and regular reporting 

are the foundation of the award fee evaluation process. The monitor must be familiar with the 

contract requirements and the rating criteria of the AFP. Performance monitors are not 

members of the AFEB. 

9. The AFEB is responsible for review of the performance monitors’ evaluations, the 

contractor’s self-evaluation, and any other information to arrive at an overall objective and 

impartial position on the contractor’s performance. The AFEB shall be composed of only 

Government personnel. The AFEB will consist of a chairperson, the contracting officer and 

up to five additional voting members. The contracting officer will be a voting member. All 

members will be experts in their fields. In addition there will be a recorder who is a nonvoting member. The recorder coordinates the administrative actions required by the AFDO, 

AFEB and performance monitors. The AFEB members must be familiar with the award fee 

process, contract requirements, and the AFP. Performance monitors and other technical 

experts serve in advisory capacity only and may not participate during AFEB discussions. 

10. The AFDO is independent of the AFEB and makes the final decision that determines the 

amount of award fee earned during the evaluation period. The AFDO will be appointed in 

accordance with the AFP and should be a staff member at a senior level. The AFDO will be 

designated by position title rather than by name in the AFP. The AFDO becomes involved in 

the evaluation process only after the AFEB has met and agreed on a recommended award fee 

amount. The AFDO’s role is to independently evaluate the AFEB recommendation, to 

consider any contractor self-assessment, and to render a final decision on the amount of fee 

earned for the period. The AFDO’s final decision must be documented and provided to the 

contractor. If the decision varies upward or downward from the AFEB’s recommendation, 

the rationale for the change shall be documented in the contract file (not with the decision 

letter) and related back to the AFP. The AFDO letter should be provided to the contractor 

within 5 days after the decision and simultaneously with the modification signed by the 

contracting officer to obligate the fee amount. The contractor can then immediately invoice 

for the earned fee. 
17 

11. The board processes and timelines will be established in the AFP. All members should be 

prepared and available for the scheduled session(s). The chairperson or recorder will 

generally set the meeting date and assure that all documents are ready to review. The 

contracting officer will notify the contractor of the date, time and location where the 

contractor may present a self-evaluation to the AFEB. The performance monitors provide 

surveillance observations for the period to the program manager who will then provide this 

information to the AFEB. The AFEB chairperson should meet monthly with the performance 

monitors to ensure that they are documenting performance. Feedback should also be provided 

to the contractor on a monthly basis to identify negative performance trends and to give the 

contractor an opportunity to take corrective action. 

12. The AFEB will convene within two weeks after the end of the rating period in order to 

complete the process within 45 days from the end of the rating period. The chairperson should 

arrange for refresher training or training of new board members prior to the meeting if 

needed. Once the board is in session the chairperson should provide a brief overview of the 

evaluation criteria, purpose of the meeting, and introduction of any new members. The 

contractor will be allowed to present a self-evaluation to the AFEB with a follow-up written 

analysis. The board members may ask questions, but will not discuss the Government 

surveillance reports with the contractor. Performance monitors will not attend the board 

meeting. This is a fact-finding meeting and should be conducted in a non-adversarial manner. 

13. After completion of the contractor self-evaluation, the board will reconvene and discuss 

the performance monitor’s evaluation report along with any other information relating to 

contractor performance. The task is then to decide how well the contractor performed in each 

area using the metrics provided in the AFP. Voting members will individually score 

contractor performance in writing. These individual reports will be submitted to an assigned 

individual for consolidation into a single weighted and rated recommendation for award fee. 

The consolidated rating will be included in the AFEB report to the AFDO along with a 

synopsis of strengths and weaknesses, the contractor’s self-evaluation, and any other key 

factors that were considered. 

14. The AFDO will review the recommendation for award fee and, if necessary, request 

clarification of issues. The AFDO will determine the dollar amount and provide a written 

analysis of the contractor’s strengths, weaknesses and award fee amount for distribution to the 

contractor. This process should be complete within 45 days after the end of the rating period. 

Once the decision has been made the Contracting Officer will unilaterally modify the contract 

to obligate funds. (NOTE: In accordance with DFAS-IN 37-1, a CPAF contract is to be 

obligated upon award less the award fee amount.) Once the AF determination is made, the 

Prompt Payment Act becomes effective so timely modification is critical. 

15. The definition of the award fee pool is the total dollars available for each evaluation 

period. The award fee allocated for each evaluation period is the maximum amount that can 

be earned during that period. This amount is established prior to award of the contract or task 

order and included in the AFP. Changes to this amount may occur only as a result of new 

work negotiated via supplemental agreement to an existing task order or definitization of a 

new task order. 

16. Rollover of fees to successive periods is normally not permitted other than for reasons 

such as Government-caused delay or changes to the performance work statement. The reason 

for rollover of fee must be documented in the file. If the unearned fee is rolled over, the 

contracting officer must monitor the appropriation for violation of the “bona fide need rule”. 

However, the Government may move a portion of fee from one performance period to another 
18 

so long as it is not associated with failure to earn fee in previous evaluation periods. This 

may be done unilaterally if done before the start of the next evaluation period. 

17. Continuous communication with the contractor during the evaluation period is critical. 

Meetings should be conducted monthly and attended by the contractor, performance monitors 

and members of the AFEB. Informal monthly evaluation reports will be prepared; however, 

these reports will not be scored or assigned any type of rating. These reports should be used 

when the AFEB convenes for the formal evaluation at the end of the award fee period. 

 

 /s/ 

 Edwin H. Martin 

 Colonel, USA 

 Principal Assistant Responsible 

 for Contracting 
19 

Appendix E. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commander, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq 

 Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq 

 Commander, Joint Area Support Group – Central 

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 
20 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Mission Director – Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman 

and Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information 

and International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 

Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related 

Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 
21 

Appendix F. Audit Team Members 

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this audit report. The staff 

members who contributed to the report include: 

Tony L. Adams 

James A. Carrera 

Ronald L. Rembold 
22 

Management Comments 

Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan 
23