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i

37–316 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–28]

AIR FORCE AND ARMY AIRLIFT AND AERIAL REFUELING FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

PROGRAMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

MARCH 7, 2007

(II)

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

[VACANCY]

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member

BEN KOHR, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, March 7, 2007, Air Force and Army Airlift and Aerial Refueling

Fixed-Wing Aircraft Programs ............................................................................ 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, March 7, 2007 ..................................................................................... 49

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2007

AIR FORCE AND ARMY AIRLIFT AND AERIAL REFUELING FIXEDWING AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Air and Land Forces

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking Member,

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 2

WITNESSES

Bolkcon, Christopher, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research

Service ................................................................................................................... 7

Chandler, Lt. Gen. C.H. ‘‘Howie’’, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans

and Requirements, U.S. Air Force; Lt. Gen. Donald J. Hoffman, Military

Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,

U.S. Air Force; Lt. Gen. Mark Curran, Deputy Commander, Training and

Doctrine Command, U.S. Army; Maj. Gen. (Select) Jeffrey Sorenson, Deputy

for Systems Management, Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics

and Technology, U.S. Army; Maj. Gen. Thomas P. Kane, Director of Strategic Plans, Requirements and Programs, Air Mobility Command, U.S. Air

Force beginning on page ...................................................................................... 22

Solis, William M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues,

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 3

Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Issues, Government Accountability Office ......................................................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Bolkcon, Christopher ........................................................................................ 81

Curran, Lt. Gen. John M., joint with Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A. Sorenson .......... 110

Ortiz, Solomon P. .............................................................................................. 53

Solis, William M., joint with Michael J. Sullivan .......................................... 57

Hoffman, Lt. Gen. Donald, joint with Lt. Gen. Howie Chandler, and

Maj. Gen. Thomas Kane ............................................................................... 102

Page

IV

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Defense Transportation, Study Limitations Raise Questions about the

Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study and

Report ............................................................................................................ 117

Slides and map submitted by General Kane .................................................. 150

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 157

Mr. Akin ............................................................................................................ 162

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 164

Mr. Meek ........................................................................................................... 164

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 159

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 161

(1)

AIR FORCE AND ARMY AIRLIFT AND AERIAL

REFUELING FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 7, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:03 p.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon Ortiz presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ORTIZ.The subcommittee will come to order.

Chairman Abercrombie has been delayed in getting back from

Hawaii, so he has asked that I sit in to get the hearing started.

Today we will receive testimony from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) witnesses, plus Air Force and Army fighting experts, about the airlift

and the aerial refueling aircraft programs.

Today’s hearing will focus on parts of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) recent mobility study and its conclusions, which

shape the Air Force and Army force structure requirements for aerial refueling and airlift aircraft.

Over the past 10 years, the United States has reduced its Cold

War infrastructure and closed two-thirds of its forward bases. Yet,

we have increased our operational tempo of deployments. Our aircraft platforms continue to age without replacement due to procurement shortfalls that began in the last century.

We now see the results of these challenges as we look at our

aging airlift and the tanker fleets of aircraft. These aircraft, including even our new strategic airlifters, the C–17s, are getting used

up far faster than we had planned.

In January 2006, the Department of Defense released a mobility

capability study, or MCS, and they are currently conducting other

airlift and tanker studies.

There are many programs and associated issues that we would

like to discuss today regarding the C–17, the C–5, the C–130

airlifters, the KC–X, the KC–135 tankers, and the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA).

To help us understand the results of the MCS, to give us insight

into program issues and the way forward, for recapitalization, we

have two panels of witnesses today.

For our first panel, I welcome Mr. Solis—good to see you again,

sir—Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the GovVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:54 Jul 08, 2008 Jkt 037316 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-28\066250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
2

ernment Accountability Office; Mr. Michael Sullivan, Director of

Acquisition and Sourcing Management of the Government Accountability Office; and, Mr. Chris Bolkcom, Specialist in National Defense from the Congressional Research Service.

We want to welcome you and thank you for joining us today.

But before we begin with witnesses’ opening statements, let me

call on my good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey and ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Saxton, for any remarks that

he would like to state today.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM

NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate

you holding this very important hearing on airlift and refueling

programs for the Air Force and, of course, for their best customer,

the Army.

I am very pleased to be here because I believe the issues we are

addressing today are absolutely crucial to the nation’s ability to

meet our nation’s national security strategy.

We have several witnesses before the committee today, and they

come to us with a tremendous amount of knowledge on these extremely important issues.

I would like to welcome all of you gentlemen. Thank you for

being here. We appreciate it, and I know I speak for myself as well

as for Chairman Abercrombie, who is not here of course.

We are here to examine the Department of Defense’s airlift and

aerial refueling program requirements. These requirements and capabilities have gaps that vary against a backdrop of ever-changing

global security challenges.

I am reminded, Mr. Chairman, of the first time I went to Iraq

and was briefed there on airlift capabilities and requirements. We

were using C–130’s tactically in the country, and, as you just mentioned, as the C–130’s become less capable because of wear and

tear, we have supplemented them with a permanent contingent of

20 C–17s in country to do tactical lift.

The programs we are talking about are an enormous part of the

defense budget and, for that reason, we, the Congress, like to be

very sure before we commit to a course of action.

Part of being sure is to gather as many facts, study the issue and

to examine all of the alternatives.

We first saw mobility requirements study MRS–05 in the spring

of 2001. That study was designed to tell us how many millions of

ton miles per day of cargo capacity we needed to meet our national

security strategy. With those conclusions, we could then go about

the business of developing a fleet of aircraft to fill that requirement.

The problem here, of course, is that MRS–05 was initiated prior

to the attacks of 9/11 and was outdated even before it was released.

Next, we had, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Mobility Capabilities Study, MCS. Started in the summer of 2004, MCS was

designed to take a hard look at the nation’s airlift requirements as

the global war on terror (GWOT) unfolded.

3

Unfortunately, the MCS, at least in my opinion, didn’t say much.

It validated that we can do the things that we are doing with the

assets we have. There were no hard questions asked by the MCS

and there were certainly no answers in MCS. Yet, we waited for

MCS, hoping that it would steer us in the right direction.

Along with MCS, we awaited the QDR to be released. The QDR

finally arrived only to call for five more studies related to airlift requirements and provided us little insight into the nation’s true airlift capability needs.

Today we are waiting for MCS–06 to be released. MCS–06 is designed to incorporate the findings of the five other studies called

for in the QDR.

On top of all these studies, we wait for DOD requirement validations, Nunn-McCurdy certifications, operational test results and

fleet viability reports, while we are sitting around waiting for these

reports, studies and analyses.

In a world that is moving much faster than our bureaucracy, we,

as a nation and the Congress, are faced with some tough decisions

and everyone I talk to tells me they are waiting on another study

before they can answer our questions.

While we are waiting for those studies, let me share some facts.

The fiscal year 2008 budget request is here. Long lead suppliers

for C–17 are being issued stop-orders. The line is scheduled to close

in 2009, although I received a call last week that said it may close

even sooner or may begin to phase down even sooner.

The Army and the Marine Corps are increasing their endstrength by 65,000 personnel, I believe, increasing the requirement.

The weight of most armored vehicles now required in Iraq precludes the use of C–130 aircraft. We do not know the final weight

of the Army’s future combat system nor has it been taken into account in establishing future requirements.

The number of improvised explosive Device (IED) attacks continues to grow. The one sure way to keep our troops out of that threat

is to keep them off the roads.

The global war on terror is just that, a global war that is being

fought by many nations and many continents.

We are faced with several decisions regarding the nation’s airlift

and tanker requirements. We cannot afford to put off those decisions in order to wait on another report, because as we wait, the

world continues to change around us.

To be clear, I am not advocating disregarding any of our current

policies. I am making one simple point: Reports don’t make decisions; leaders make decisions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our

witnesses.

Mr. ORTIZ. Without objection, all witness statements will be entered for the record.

And, Mr. Solis, it is all yours. You can proceed with your opening

statement, sir.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. SOLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4

Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Saxton and members of the

subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to discuss the development

of aircraft program requirements and issues related to the acquisition process.

Before I review our work concerning DOD’s efforts to assess our

future mobility needs, allow me to summarize what I am going to

tell you: Good analysis equals good requirements, which support

good decision-making.

We have spent the last year reviewing DOD’s efforts to assess future mobility needs and can state emphatically that this is a very

complex process, with many moving parts.

There are no easy answers to very tough questions. However, we

do believe that distinguishing wants from needs starts with good

analysis based on good data modeling.

We recently issued our report on high-risk areas in the Federal

Government, which was DOD acquisition processes as one of the

longstanding areas of concern.

Acquisition has been on this list since 1990. As we have reported,

DOD knows what needs to be done to achieve more successful outcomes, but finds it difficult to apply the necessary discipline and

controls or assign much needed accountability.

We have reported in the past that a sound business case for acquisition contains firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding.

However, we found that many of these elements are missing or

incomplete as DOD and the services attempt to acquire new capabilities.

Persistent acquisition problems include failure to identify needs

versus wants and to limit cost growth, schedule delays and quantity reductions, but fiscal realities will not allow budgets to accommodate these problems any longer.

Today I will highlight some of the issues related to the analysis

supporting the DOD’s mobility capabilities and requirements and

Mike Sullivan will discuss actions that are needed to improve the

outcome of weapons system acquisitions.

DOD has an obligation to deliver high-quality products to warfighters when they need them at a price the country can afford.

However, our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for buying the right

things the right way.

This foundation begins with setting requirements that are based

on adequate and complete analysis using current and operational

data and updated and effective models.

For the past several years, we have reported our concerns with

the analysis done to support requirements and have recently issued

two reports that raise concerns about the quality of analysis underpinning programmatic decisions surrounding the DOD airlift requirements.

In September 2006, we issued our report on DOD’s mobility capability study, or the MCS. The MCS determined that the projected

mobility capabilities are adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with

an acceptable level of risk during the period fiscal years 2007

through 2013.

5

That is, the current inventory of aircraft, ships and pre-positioned assets and other capabilities are sufficient in conjunction

with host nation support.

In our report, we stated that conclusions of the MCS were based

on incomplete data, inadequate modeling and metrics that did not

fully measure stress on the transportation system.

We further observed that the MCS results were incomplete, unclear or contingent upon further study, making it difficult to identify findings and evaluate evidence.

It is not clear how the analysis was done for the study to support

DOD’s conclusions and we suggest that decision-makers exercise

caution in using the results.

This year we issued a report on the lack of mandatory analysis

to support a pasture or cargo capability for the new replacement

refueling aircraft, the KCX tanker.

Contrary to mandatory Air Force implementing guidance, the Air

Force proposed a capability without an identified need, a requirement that was not supported by need and not underpinned by analysis.

Air Force officials could not provide supporting information sufficient to explain this discrepancy between the required analysis and

the proposal.

In closing, as I said at the beginning of my testimony, acquisition

problems will persist until DOD provides a better foundation for

buying the right things the right way.

This concludes my oral statement. I will be happy to answer any

questions that you may have.

I will now turn to Mike Sullivan for his comments.

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Solis and Mr. Sullivan can

be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Sullivan.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.

Over the last several years, we, the GAO, have examined weapon

acquisitions from the perspective of best practices for product development. We have found that successful product development

programs begin with a sound business case, as Bill was alluding

to, business cases that provide evidence that a product can be developed and produced if it has proven technologies at the outset,

there is design knowledge at the right times, and adequate and stable funding is available, and then the business case must be executed through an acquisition process that is anchored in knowledge

to reduce risk.

Basic systems engineering practices should provide the underpinning for all of this.

Without these kind of practices in place, a cascade of negative effects results in cost increases and delays in getting new capability

to the war-fighter.

While DOD has included many of these best practices into its acquisition policies, its programs still often do not follow through on

6

them. The underlying cause for this is the department’s inability

to enforce those policies at the programmatic level.

Airlift acquisitions are not immune to this and have experienced

unnecessary cost growth and schedule delays as a result.

In the past 25 years, DOD has invested more than $140 billion

on airlift and tanker forces. Between 2007 and 2011, it plans additional investments of nearly $32 billion. Roughly a third of this is

planned for four ongoing programs under discussion today.

These programs include programs to modernize the C–5 and the

C–130 avionics systems, re-engine the C–5 aircraft and develop the

C–130 airlifter.

All of these programs were considered low technological risks because they relied on proven commercial technology when they

began. However, they have not delivered on their original business

cases.

As a result, each program has encountered some difficulty in

moving into production and delivering to the field.

Poor results in each program stem, at least in part, from a failure to use basic systems engineering practices to do three things.

First, fully analyze requirements and the resources that are needed

to integrate the proven technologies into a military system; second,

begin system demonstration only after you have stabilized the design; and, three, demonstrate that the aircraft will work in its intended environment before you make large production investments.

The net effect of the problems across all four of these programs

is additional unplanned expenditures so far of $962 million and a

longer wait than planned for the war-fighter to get the equipment

delivered to him.

For example, the Air Force now expects by 2011 to have completed the modification of about 135 fewer C–130 airlift aircraft

when compared to its plan 2 years.

There could be additional cost increases and schedule delays reported in the near future. Programs’ current budget indicates that

total costs have recently increased almost another $700 million and

planned quantities have been reduced from 434 to 268, nearly doubling the unit costs for the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP).

The program recently notified Congress of a critical NunnMcCurdy breach concerning this.

I will conclude by making five points.

First, DOD will continue to face big challenges in modernizing its

forces, especially with the new demands on the Federal dollar.

Second, the four acquisition cases that I cite in this testimony

are not atypical and, in fact, were not as complex as most major

acquisitions. Even with no major technological invention to meet

war-fighters’ needs in these cases, they have achieved suboptimal

results in terms of costs and deliveries.

Third, there are major consequences to these outcomes. The warfighter does not receive needed capability on time and the department and the Congress must spend additional unplanned money to

correct mistakes.

Fourth, a product development process based in knowledge,

steeped in best practices from systems engineering can solve many

of these problems that happen before they start.

7

And, finally and perhaps most important, DOD knows how to do

this and, in fact, already informs its acquisition policy with systems

engineering rules. It should redouble its efforts to enforce these

policies on programs by ensuring, first, that the right mix of programs, given all available resources, is in the mix; second, establishing sound business cases for each one of those programs; and,

third, by holding people accountable for better cost, schedule and

performance results as they execute those programs.

That concludes my remarks.

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Solis can

be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Bolkcom.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM, SPECIALIST IN

NATIONAL DEFENSE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. BOLKCOM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee,

thanks for inviting me to speak with you today about airlift and

aerial refueling. As requested, I will address the potential oversight

issues for this and future legislative cycles.

First, I will address the KC–X, the Air Force’s plan to recapitalize its aging tanker fleet. The Air Force hopes to begin replacing

its 500 KC–135 tankers with a 179 new aircraft, either the Boeing

KC–767 or the KC–30, made by Airbus and Northrop Grumman.

Media reports have raised concerns that this competition may be

biased against Airbus’ larger aircraft. After an initial review, CRS

found that as DOD defined its tanker requirements, the KC–X

competition does not appear biased in favor of either aircraft.

Another issue is whether the Air Force plan is affordable. In

2006, DOD’s tanker analysis of alternatives found that buying new

commercial aircraft was the most cost-effective way to initially recapitalize the KC–135 fleet, but that overall affordability was an

important consideration.

Purchasing new aircraft is more capital intensive than other options, such as re-engining KC–135Es, buying used aircraft, and

leasing aerial refueling services.

The Air Force has consistently objected to these other options

and hopes to purchase approximately 350 more new aircraft after

KCX.

Congress will have future opportunities to examine the efficacy

of buying used aircraft or leasing tanker services. However, the Air

Force wants to retire its last KC–135E aircraft in fiscal year 2008.

If it is successful, the re-engining option will be moot.

The final point on tankers is that the requirement is unclear.

DOD’s last study on tanker requirements in 2001 is outdated. The

2006 mobility capabilities study, or MCS, provided guidance on

tanker capabilities, but it did not estimate required force size.

Further, there is debate among the acquisition community, the

mobility community and the combatant commanders on specific

tanker requirements, such as airlift capacity.

My second subject is long-range airlift. The airlift requirement is

also imprecise and can be met in different ways.

8

The MCS found that DOD’s airlift programs could meet the national military strategy with moderate or acceptable risk. But these

are subjective terms and a close examination of this classified

study and the recent addition of 10 C–17s to the plane inventory

could lead many to perceive the risk as actually being low.

As the C–17 production line wanes, pressure is building to procure more aircraft. This brings C–17 funding in direct competition

with C–5 modernization.

There are strong arguments in favor of both programs, but it is

not simply an either/or competition. Broader tradeoffs exist because

more airlift capacity in the tanker fleet could make smaller C–5 or

C–17 fleets acceptable.

Because the C–17 can perform both long-and short-range airlift,

it may compete against programs like the C–130 for funding and

for mission.

Last, I will address short-range airlift, specifically the C–130 and

joint cargo aircraft programs.

Again, a number of aircraft are competing for limited funding to

satisfy an ambiguous requirement. C–130J procurement competes

with the C–17 and with the modernization of older C–130 models.

In fiscal year 2006, for example, DOD proposed terminating the

C–130J, in part, because modernizing older C–130’s was cheaper.

Since then, C–130J funding was reinstated and procurement of

nine aircraft is planed in fiscal year 2008.

Conversely, C–130 modernization programs are now being reduced, as Mike just mentioned.

The Joint Cargo Aircraft program is, in many ways, a shotgun

marriage between Army and Air Force programs. There is noteworthy disagreement between the services on how this aircraft

would be used.

Formally, the Air Force agrees with the Army’s initial vision, but

is still defining its own final requirements.

An issue for Congress is whether the Army could begin acquiring

the Joint Cargo Aircraft only to find that the Air Force’s final requirements are not easily met by the aircraft chosen. If this turns

out to be the case, it could mean costly retrofits or even the need

for a different aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you

and look forward to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolkcom can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much, Mr. Bolkcom.

Maybe you can expand a little bit to help us understand the capabilities about the C–5 and the C–17 aircraft and why they are

important to the Air Force inventory.

Could you please compare and contrast what advantages both

give to the Air Mobility Command in moving cargo and supplies to

the war-fighter, if you can elaborate a little bit on that?

Mr. BOLKCOM. I would be happy to, sir.

Both airplanes are long-range strategic platforms and what distinguishes them from commercial carriers, such as Civil Response

Air Fleet (CRAF), are a number of things, but one of the most important is the ability to carry outsized and oversized cargo, like Patriot antimissile systems, Apache helicopters and the like. They

9

provide a certain capability that you just can’t find anywhere else

in that regard.

I do note that in an earlier hearing, General Mosley characterized the C–5 as ‘‘a little bigger than the C–17.’’ And, respectfully,

I believe that General Mosley might have misspoken, because Air

Force planning factors show it is almost twice as big. Depending

on what you are carrying, it can carry twice as many larger outsized objects or twice as many pallets. So there is a nontrivial difference between the two in terms of their size.

And the final point I will just make is although quite capable,

the C–5 is limited to large prepared runways, where the C–17, of

course, can do both short-range austere operations and the longer

operations.

Mr. ORTIZ. The ranking member, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I think I would like to yield my time

to one of the junior members who may not have had an opportunity

to ask questions in the last hearing.

Mr. ORTIZ. Do you want to single anybody out?

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Saxton. I greatly appreciate that.

There are a couple things that interest me about the subject matter that you have been testifying about.

One is General Mosley and Secretary Wynn have been talking

about concerns of the aerospace industry to meet the capacity

needs of the Air Force and it certainly seems that inherent in all

of our concerns with the acquisition process, the health of the underlying industry’s ability to meet our needs is certainly an important one.

Do you have any thoughts or comments concerning the aerospace

industry’s overall capacity in looking at future acquisitions?

Mr. BOLKCOM. I would be happy to address that, sir.

I think that the way you phrased it actually confuses me a little

bit, because when I look at the Air Force plans, they are actually

planning to purchase fewer aircraft than our industry has the capacity to build.

The over-capacity tends to be the problem, not an under-capacity.

I didn’t hear his testimony.

Mr. TURNER. Their perspective was in the future, that as we

begin the process of turning the spigot off and constraining what

we are currently acquiring, that the loss of production capacity can

have an impact on our abilities in the future.

And, certainly, if you look at the issue of the tankers, our acquisition planning for replacement and then looking at those aircraft,

the amount of time that will expire before all the aircraft are replaced and what their service would have to be before we then are

able to replace them based on the capacity of the aerospace industry is certainly a very lengthy projection.

Mr. BOLKCOM. Specifically on that, sir, I think you have characterized it correctly. The days of buying 100 aircraft a year are really gone. So those old models of the industrial-government relationships have got to change and they have changed and, frankly, that

is one of the stronger arguments against purchasing just new aircraft.

10

Certainly, that is an important part of recapitalizing the fleet,

perhaps the foundation, but I agree with that assessment that buying 15, 17, 20 a year doesn’t recapitalize the fleet very quickly and

still does not reduce the average age of our fleet very quickly.

Mr. TURNER. And, therefore, then has an impact of reducing the

overall capacity of the industry in case we should look to trying to

close the gap at a quicker pace or have higher needs.

Mr. BOLKCOM. That would be one approach.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. We are going to try to see if we can stick to the 5-

minute rule, but at the same time, give sufficient time for the witnesses to respond to the question, because we do have two panels.

This is the first panel, then we have the second panel.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I will strive to be quick, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

that.

First of all, I just want to thank you gentleman and the Air

Force for their work on the refueling tanker issue. I know that

wasn’t easy, and I know my hometown company there at one time

or another didn’t make it easy for you. So I appreciate that that

process is being moved forward and we have got a decision date

and the project is going forward. I know that wasn’t easy. I appreciate you working that.

My question is on the airlift piece, in terms of what we need to

have the airlift between the C–17 and the C–5 and the 130’s,

where you think we are at, what we need to add. I know there are

questions about that. Do we have sufficient airlift now, a sufficient

plan? What are the major challenges in that area?

And, second, not to insert my own subcommittee into this discussion, but I chair the terrorism subcommittee, jurisdiction over special ops. Special ops folks in particular have a need for an updated

C–130, and they are, as you know, dependent upon the Air Force

for getting that set up to transfer it over to them.

If you could give me an update on when that update—and the

130’s specific to the special ops needs, how that is progressing. So

just those two pieces of the question.

And, forgive me, I don’t know which one of you would be best

qualified to answer that, but I will let you figure out amongst yourselves. Thank you.

Mr. SOLIS. I will take a first crack at it.

In terms of the needs, right now, if you go back, and recognizing

that there were limitations on the MCS, it didn’t indicate that

there was adequate airlift in the inventory to take care of the existing missions.

Having said that, there are things that have changed since the

MCS with regard to things like pre-positioning of Army equipment

that have changed possibly some of those ideas and, also, recognizing that there are still studies under way for intratheater lift.

So it is a little muddied at this point as to exactly how much in

terms of lift is needed at this point.

Mr. SMITH. Do you have an idea of when we are going to clarify

those questions?

11

Mr. SOLIS. Well, the studies are under way. We don’t have visibility, that is, GAO doesn’t have visibility over where those studies

are at. But my understanding is that they are under way.

Mr. BOLKCOM. I would add on that subject, sir, I think the larger

challenge is to take a holistic view of our airlift needs and although

the MCS was the first sort of comprehensive study by the participants of the mission, it didn’t look at certain aspects of lift.

The thing I would also mention is that we do have an evolving

sort of need and it is questionable how useful oftentimes the

metrics are.

Mr. SMITH. That is something I have often wondered about. We

do a fabulous study that takes two years and when it is done, it

tells you exactly what we needed two years ago. And how do we

make sure we update that a little bit more quickly?

That is obviously a problem throughout the military, but this is

an area——

Mr. BOLKCOM. So really it comes down to comfort level in terms

of sort of public policy-making, how much risk are you comfortable

with, are you taking a holistic approach, looking at pre-positioned

stocks, capacity lift and the like.

My view, and I will make this my last comment, is the military

is incredibly flexible and creative in terms of satisfying their military challenges and a shortfall in their lift can be made up with

another way.

Mr. SMITH. And my second question I realize is better suited for

the next panel, unless one of you want to take a stab at it. And

I am not sure I am going to be here for the next panel, so if not,

those of you who are going to be on that can consider that and submit it for the record and just get the answer to my office when you

get a chance.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Just so we understand, I guess, it is something we

could probably also get for you.

Were you asking about where they are in terms of delivering——

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. For special ops.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don’t have a complete answer to that yet, but

we could certainly get that and get back to you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo.

Dr. Gingrey, do you have a question, sir?

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am going to address

a question to Mr. Bolkcom.

Mr. Bolkcom, you outline in your testimony that the C–5A fleet

has at least 25 years of life remaining and investment in the modernization would be recouped for decades. And, additionally, current estimates of the per aircraft cost of AMP and Eligibility Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) combined are onethird that of a new C–17.

And, in fact, as you pointed out, and I am glad you did this, that

the C–5 will actually carry almost twice the payload of a C–17 and

I also read in your testimony that we are leasing Russian AN–124

Condor aircraft to carry outsized and oversized cargo in both OperVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:54 Jul 08, 2008 Jkt 037316 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-28\066250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
12

ation and Enduring Iraqi Freedom, because we didn’t have enough

C–5 availability.

So that DOD is outsourcing missions to Russian aircraft shows

us, I think, that C–5 can perform missions that no other aircraft

in our fleet can accomplish.

Doesn’t this make the case that we should be supporting modernization of an aircraft that can perform critical missions no other

aircraft can, especially in light of the fact that the C–5 has a 70

percent service life remaining and it can be modernized at a fraction of the cost of a new C–17?

And, again, any one of the three of you can respond to this. In

the president’s 2008 budget, I didn’t see any request for C–17s. In

fact, I think we have maybe 10 more than was recommended in the

fleet that we really need something like 190 aircraft.

So I am just not sure that we—all these studies and everything

would suggest that we need this balance, and, yet, what we heard

from the secretary and from the chief sort of contradicted what was

in the president’s budget for 2008.

So if you can respond to that, I would appreciate it.

Mr. BOLKCOM. Yes, sir. I couldn’t have said it better myself, but

as a CRS guy, of course, I am not going to say that. But I think

your summation of the facts were very powerful.

The point I would just make is the Air Force program of record

currently is to modernize all the C–5s. So that is their plan.

And we have read in the open press that they have experienced

some cost growth in RERP especially that we have heard

anecdotally may cause some changes in the program, but that,

again, remains to be seen and it is really for the Air Force to bring

up.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I guess I would just note that I would probably

reinforce that a little bit. The thing that would be troubling right

now is the problems that the C–5 RERP has had and I think they

are looking at the costs now.

They are going to probably come out with a new cost estimate.

There are problems on the program that are going to probably be

fairly costly. So I think that is something we need to keep in mind.

Dr. GINGREY. Maybe when we hear from my colleague from Georgia, Mr. Marshall, we will find out a little bit more about those

costs and the specifics of that, because I know he is extremely

knowledgeable about it. But I appreciate it.

Any further comments from the GAO?

I yield back, then, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. A lot of pressure on you now, Jim, but

your expertise has been called upon and you are up. Mr. Marshall?

Mr. MARSHALL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

And I don’t know whether I need to thank you, Mr. Gingrey. I

shouldn’t have said anything about you riding up just one flight

earlier today. [Laughter.]

It is better for your health, by the way, to walk those flights of

stairs.

I do have questions about the C–5A, C–17 and joint cargo aircraft. I have had lots of conversations on this subject.

If I recall correctly, it was the Institute for Defense Analysis, at

the request of the Senate, concluded in 2002, after a lengthy study,

13

that the RERP AMP for C–5A/C–5B made absolute sense and they

considered all different configurations that we might go with.

I am not sure whether it is IDA or some other group, but the

study was quite clear and it wasn’t a close call.

And so we decided to go ahead and do that. I now hear Air Force

saying, ‘‘Lockheed, the costs are going up unacceptably here,’’ and

the dynamic is changing and the cost may to get a point where it

is no longer cost-effective to consider RERPing and AMPing these

C–5As.

I have suggested to Lockheed that Lockheed lock in a price. I

don’t see any reason why Lockheed can’t do that and, frankly,

would advise Lockheed, if it wants to have this business, to go

ahead and do it rather than keep up in the air the question concerning how much cost we are going to incur.

In talking with the Air Force, I understand there are 29 or 31

C–5—well, all but two of which are C–5As, two C–5Bs, that Air

Force simply considers to be, as Chief Mosley describes it, ‘‘hard

broke.’’

Are you gentleman familiar with that? You are not.

We have torn down a C–5A and concluded that its frame was

good to go for quite some time, which would justify the RERP/AMP

investment and the viability board has said the C–5As are good to

go.

But we just need to hear more about those that have been specifically identified as ones that should be retired.

So it is a twofold thing here. It is not retire all the C–5As, but

there are some that just seem to be so broken that it doesn’t make

sense to fix them. They would like to permission to retire those. We

need to know more about that.

Then the second thing is this quandary we are in with regard to

rising costs and an inability apparently to manage the program as

well as it needs to be managed.

Where KC–X is concerned, are any of you gentlemen involved at

all in the process of thinking through how in the acquisition process we get an agreement from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) that is appropriate so that we know how sustainment,

modernization, maintenance is going to occur over the lifetime, the

projected lifetime of the platform?

Are you involved at all in any of that? If you are not, just say

‘‘no’’ and we will go to the next panel.

Mr. BOLKCOM. No, sir.

Mr. MARSHALL. Let me try one more here.

Mr. SULLIVAN. If I could, we look at acquisitions of the major

weapons systems, something like the C–17 program, for example,

and in doing so, we are focused mostly on what it takes to develop

and then procure the aircraft.

But there is also, especially in the past ten years or so, this idea

of performance-based logistics, which has become very important.

The department and the services have tried much harder to

make the life-cycle costs part of the cost of acquiring—the total

ownership costs more important at the time they are acquiring the

aircraft.

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Sullivan, I don’t really think it is a just-inthe-last–10-years kind of phenomenon. I think, historically, while

14

we might not have taken that into account, it was simply assumed

that we, the government, would be in control of the long-term

maintenance, sustainment and modernization process for everything we bought militarily.

It was all ours. We got all the data rights. You didn’t have to go

back to the OEM for anything and you began immediately developing the management process that you needed in order to

logistically take care of the platform over a long period of time.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. MARSHALL. We quit doing and probably the most glaring example of our failure in that regard, to the detriment of the Air

Force, the detriment of DOD and the American taxpayer, is the C–

17.

We have got a real problem with the C–17 because we didn’t

think that through at that time and we don’t know how, over the

long haul, we are going to wind up, what sort of partnership we

will develop that will enable us to, in a cost-effective way, deal with

that platform.

It was a real mistake and I am just hoping that we get to a

point—I think the KC–X is our opportunity to set a model that

makes sense in the long run and that is why I bring that up.

Mr. SULLIVAN. If what you are discussing is organic capability

versus contractor-based capability.

Mr. MARSHALL. It is more basic than that. Yes, that is true, but

it is more basic than that. We buy these things without taking into

account what they are going to cost over the long haul and the

kinds of understandings we need to have up front that will help us

with cost over the long haul.

We buy them cheaper to start out with, but in the long run, if

you discount the present value of what it is going to cost us, we

are spending more than we should.

May I, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would just like to say, Congressman, I think I

am exactly with you there. And what I was trying to say, I guess,

is there are ways to build in reduced total ownership costs or lifecycle costs when you acquire a weapons system.

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, are we going to have a second

round?

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. Well, we have another panel, but I think

if we move fast enough, we could have a second round.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. My good friend from Michigan, Ms. Miller.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be

brief, as well, knowing we have another panel.

And perhaps this question is better-suited for the second panel.

But let me ask you, gentlemen, if you have any comment, since you

are in the business, about how the Air Force and the Army is coordinating, as they look to the future, in regard to strategic airlift

and specifically how are they looking to accommodate Future Combat Systems, for instance?

That is really the Army’s future there and being able to strategically airlift those kinds of vehicles. Do you see good coordination

amongst the groups there? Could you comment on that?

15

Mr. SULLIVAN. I could comment briefly on what the—the Joint

Combat Aircraft, I think, would be the best example right now of

where we see the Army and the Air Force having to come together

now to collaborate a little bit more and see if they can get

synergies out of the requirements process.

And I think you would have to give them an incomplete grade

at this point, because the process has really just gotten started. I

think they just stood up a joint program office and some joint requirement-setting mechanisms to see how well they can work together.

So it is kind of in its infancy in that regard.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. One follow-up question, as well, for

Mr. Bolkcom from CRS.

You mentioned you thought there was quite a bit of resistance

about the possibility of leasing for refueling. Could you flesh that

out just a little bit about how much resistance you think there is

to that kind of a thing and if that really is an appropriate way for

us to go?

Mr. BOLKCOM. Ma’am, I base my observations on ongoing relationship with the Air Force at many different levels, but their stated position is that there is a part B to the RFP, the request for

proposal. And they will conduct a business case analysis (BCA) to

look into this and see if it is worth doing and then submit an RFP

for refueling services. That is their position. So it sounds like they

are taking it under consideration.

I think if you look at the proposed business case analysis, the

study design seemed to contain a number of assumptions that

might not have been favorable to fee for service compared to other

options.

So that raised some questions, in my mind. And just my continued interaction with Air Force staff has kind of raised a question

mark. What has happened to it? The BCA was supposed to have

been completed.

I don’t know who is doing it, its status, if one even exists. So I

think it is up to the Air Force to document whether they are pursuing it or not.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Joint Cargo Aircraft, I am not as sanguine as you

are, Mr. Sullivan, about the current status of the development of

that. I almost feel as if I am emissary between the parties at this

point, listening to both sides and our Air Force’s worries about

what Army is going to do and Army’s worries about what Air Force

is going to do.

I am wondering what advice—and if you all can’t do this, if this

is beyond you, fine with me, don’t try and answer—but what advice

do you have to us? Is it Congress? Who in DOD, I mean, who pulls

these folks together and tries to make sure that they are on the

same page or at least if they can be gotten on the same page, get

them on the same page?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, one of the things that we look at when we

look at the major acquisitions is the joint capability requirements

process that the department has tried to put in place, in some

16

sense, trying to go more toward functional capabilities in a way to

set requirements as opposed to across the services or platforms, if

you will.

The department has worked very hard to try to institute those

policies. There are cultural problems with that. There is

stovepiping and things like that.

But we have reported quite a bit on some of the failings of that

process, some of the ways that the process and the funding process,

for example, mechanically, don’t link up. So it makes it more difficult for these services to come together.

Mr. MARSHALL. What worries me is that Army is about to make

a decision and that decision made by Army will be one that Air

Force will conclude it can’t live with at some point down the future.

And it seems to me that there ought to be some mechanism for

Congress or DOD or some other group to come in and stop the

stovepiping and the cultural problem between the two services and

if there is, in fact, some legitimate reason why there needs to be

two different pipe forms, fine, so be it.

It is going to cost us a lot of money to do that, it is not smart

economically, but maybe we have to live with it.

If, in fact, there is not a good reason, we ought to force them together.

How do we force them together? I understand the problem. How

do we force them together? Who does that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. If you are asking me, mechanically, how would

that operate in the department, I think there it the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions probably would be the right position to get up above.

Mr. MARSHALL. Would it be maybe this subcommittee that has

a hearing and says, ‘‘Don’t do this to us. Can you come to us and

explain why you can’t do this jointly??

Mr. SULLIVAN. This subcommittee certainly has a stake in them

developing doable and efficient requirements that can take advantage of the synergies across the services. It certainly does, yes.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I understand that you gentleman tried to give us an overview

perspective on the planning, particularly in some of these larger

kinds of systems, and the line of questioning, I want to stay on

where we have been, which is particularly airlift capacity.

I guess my first question is, do you know if the Air Force or the

Air Mobility Command, when they are trying to lay out their requirements, have they been preparing for new and future systems

that have to be lifted to combat zones?

Has that been specifically built into their numbers? Maybe that

is for the second panel, I don’t know if you know that.

The second question I have for you is it seems, from what we

have seen in the last number of years in Iraq, that there is going

to be a trend to go to more armor on almost everything that we

are hauling people around with.

Maybe at the point of making that case would be the mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, MRAPS, that 4,000 of the Marines

are going to be using and it is probably quite possible that the

17

Army may be moving into more of those, too, which is 1.5 times

the weight of an up-armored Humvee.

And then in my district, we are doing a lot of the engineering

work on Future Combat Systems and the idea was to kind of keep

it really light, but as you design it, it is coming out almost a little

too big a bite for a C–130.

So I guess my question is, is the trend that we see partly projected because of Iraq, is that going to be typical for military vehicles, that they are going to be heavier? And if that is the case, is

the Air Force doing the planning needed to realize that we are

going to have to be lifting heavier loads into these combat zones,

wherever we end up fighting?

Mr. BOLKCOM. Sir, I will say I don’t believe it is a truism that

all our ground equipment is always going to be heavier. Certainly,

we have a data point.

We are fighting an insurgency in this context, in this environment, where the roadside bombs are a very effective tool, then, yes,

in this case we need more armor. But we don’t know that is always

going to be the case.

And I will just mention I think that I have witnessed pretty clear

communication between Air Force and Army both directions. The

Army is designing vehicles to fit on particular aircraft and the Air

Force is considering what the Army is working on.

So I see appropriate interaction.

Mr. SOLIS. I think it depends not so much on the vehicle, per se,

although that certainly is a consideration, but the operational scenarios that they are planning for for the future that would probably dictate more about what the aircraft and the lift requirements

are going to be into the future.

One of the problems, if we go back to Stryker, for example, now,

this was intratheater. There was the requirement that the Chief of

Staff of the Army laid out at one time to move that brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours.

Noble goal, but then trying to figure out how to do that became

very problematic both strategically and intratheater, given some of

the weight of the Stryker and just what they were trying to do and

the number of assets, both C–5 and C–17, that you would have to

employ to do that.

The other thing, for example, with the Stryker, too, and you notice all the Strykers in Iraq have the slat armor, you are going to

almost probably need to aircraft, like C–130’s, to move that, because you can’t necessarily put all that armor on that aircraft.

So, again, it probably depends on the particular scenarios and

how you are going to operate and what you are going to do into

the future.

Mr. AKIN. So it sounds like ‘‘all depends’’ is your answer. But

somehow or other, I have a hard time visualizing that we are going

to send a whole lot of Humvees that don’t have any armor on them

anywhere where we get in trouble in the world.

But you are saying, ‘‘No, we may just be sending all these very

light pieces of equipment over.’’

Mr. SOLIS. No, I am not saying that. I am just saying that your

airlift requirement may be dictated by that very thing that you are

saying, Congressman.

18

If we are going to have, for example, as I said, with the Stryker,

if you are going to be moving the Stryker and the armor and everything else, the people that go with it, you may need more aircraft,

depending on the operational scenarios and the requirements that

are laid out.

Mr. AKIN. That is what common sense seemed to dictate to me,

but I know you can sometimes look at one war and just plan everything based on one scenario and things can change.

But still I am having a hard time seeing where future combat

systems seem to be going. I am having a hard time seeing that we

are getting lighter somehow.

It is true they are not battle tanks, but still, just because of the

physical size, as well as the weight, that is what I am curious

about.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Solis, you brought up an interesting subject that I lived

through. That was the——

Mr. SOLIS. I know. You and I talked about this at one time.

Mr. SAXTON. Did we?

Mr. SOLIS. Yes, if it is the same question I think you are going

to ask.

Mr. SAXTON. Let me go to the next chapter then. With regard to

Future Combat System and deployment, I believe the concept, once

again, is to deploy a brigade quickly with airlift.

My understanding, however, is that in carrying out the mobility

requirement study, as well as the MCS, that the Army has not

come up on the net yet to put the requirement forward for the Air

Force to meet that deployment and that, therefore, conclusions that

were drawn about how much airlift we need in terms of C–5 or C–

17, whichever, were made in the absence of that requirement.

Is that true, and do you see that as a problem?

Mr. SOLIS. Congressman, I don’t know. I can’t answer specifically.

What I would note, again, is that, for example, the study on

intratheater lift is still ongoing. I don’t know what the results of

that may be, but, obviously, as I mentioned with the Stryker, that

was a big issue.

How are you going to move those vehicles within theater? Are

you going to do that by, in the case of C–130, going back to what

I know, the Stryker, or are you going to start moving to buy other

aircraft, such as C–17?

I can’t answer specifically, but if you would like, we could probably take it for the record.

Mr. SAXTON. Do you know if the Stryker would fit on a C–130

with the slat armor on it?

Mr. SOLIS. I don’t believe so.

Mr. SAXTON. I don’t believe so either.

My great friend, Jim Marshall, and my other great friend, Mr.

Gingrey, talked a little about the C–5 and its attributes, and I

agree that it is a great platform.

19

As I listened to Mr. Bolkcom and his analysis, he talked about

the size and its capability of carrying twice as much as a C–17. I

just wanted to point out—and I am sure this makes a difference.

I just wanted to point out that there is a reason that the Air Force

didn’t build another great big airplane like the C–5 and that was

that the number of times that we fly it fully loaded is really small.

Very few times do we fly that airplane fully loaded.

So when they went out to design the airplane that they thought

they needed that could land on a short runway and take off on a

short runway, carry a heavy load, they thought that the C–5 fit the

bill better than the C–17. There is something to be said for having

more tails that carry a partial load.

So I think we have to be very careful of saying that the C–5 is

the ultimate airplane because it can carry almost twice as much as

the C–17. Would you agree?

Mr. BOLKCOM. Sir, I think that is very fair. I think the DOD’s

transportation system is really elegant. If you look at the layers of

CRAF, the C–5, the C–17, they are very complementary. So I think

that is a very fair statement.

Mr. SAXTON. Okay, thanks.

Now, let me just throw something else out. The C–5 modernization program is a good program, and I here in this committee

helped to put in place and promote it. And I think it makes sense

in some respect.

But I am not sure that it makes sense in modernizing, fully modernizing both the C–5A and the C–5B, and here is why. In order

to modernize the C–5A, you start from a baseline of a mission capability rate of 49.3 percent today and that is going down. You

start with a fleet availability rate of 35.5 percent for C–5As. That

means, I think in layman’s terms, that they have a lot of problems

to fix.

And so this committee, some years ago, actually initiated by the

Senate, as Mr. Marshall pointed out, said that we should do a test

run on one bird, one C–5A, and that is in the process of being done.

So I guess my question is, what needs to be done to correct the

problems that have these low mission capability rates?

And, incidentally, the C–17 has a mission capability rate of 86.8

percent, not 49 percent. So my question is, what needs to be done

to the C–5A to correct the problems that result in a 49 percent mission capability rate and a 35 percent fleet capability rate and how

much does it cost?

And, finally, how does that relate to the tripwire in NunnMcCurdy?

Mr. BOLKCOM. The C–5M, which will be the version that is

AMP’ed and RERP’ed, is estimated to be 85 percent mission capable. I think that is, by comparison to most aircraft, reasonable and

effective.

So I think the answer to your first question is AMP and RERP,

if it works the way they would like it to work. That should make

it as available as you are going to make it.

In terms of the tripwire of Nunn-McCurdy, I guess, sir, I really

don’t know how to answer that. You have got a tripwire of, what

is it, 15 percent over the initial baseline. I don’t know where RERP

is.

20

Mr. SAXTON. They haven’t come up with a final cost estimate, but

I understand it is likely to trip Nunn-McCurdy and that will set

in motion a whole set of new requirements.

Mr. BOLKCOM. Yes, sir. And I will just say, in conclusion, that

those laws and thresholds are there for a reason. That sort of cost

growth is of concern.

I will also note that the Air Force is very supportive of some programs that have 200, even 300 percent cost growth. Those might

be different cases, but those are some data points for you in terms

of——

Mr. SAXTON. When we get to this tripwire, we have the responsibility of making a decision, if we have the opportunity, if we don’t

let the C–17 line go down.

We then have the opportunity to say based on the cost that resulted from the test of the C–5A rebuild, do we want to decide to

buy new airplanes or AMP and RERP C–5s, and I think that is a

decision point that we need to come to.

Does that make sense?

Mr. BOLKCOM. Agreed, sir. That is a tradeoff one can make.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I guess I would add I think the redone cost estimate for the C–5 RERP we are talking about here should be available probably in the June-July timeframe. So that is when we

should know that, and the cost could be pretty high.

Mr. SAXTON. When you say the cost could be pretty high, can you

elaborate on that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Some of the indications we have had, some of the

problems they are having with touch labor on the program, for example, I think the thrust reverser problems they have had, designs

like that, they are looking at that now and it looks like there is

going to be a lot more engineering effort needed to redesign that.

It could be fairly substantial, Nunn-McCurdy breach kind of

numbers, I think.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. The C–5A experienced significant problems fairly

early in its life with wind damage, interior wind damage, which

have been indicated when the plane was being constructed at Lockheed Georgia, because of dynamic testing before the lane was operational showed damages in the spars and struts inside the wing. Later, the wing had to be replaced at a cost of about $2 billion,

rebuilt for the C–5A.

In assessing the viable life, future life, given the stress that the

wings have to bear, has any study been made of the wing? General

Mosley mentioned that there were certain bad apples that they

wanted to get rid of.

Is there a particular set of problems that this airplane has experienced that needs to be addressed? I mean, are they still having

structural problems with the wings, the old C–5As, do you know?

Mr. BOLKCOM. Sir, I don’t have a specific answer. I think right

now the authoritative study on the C–5 is the Air Force’s own fleet

viability board.

I don’t recall seeing any mention of bad apples in that report, but

I would be happy to look at it more closely and get back to you.

Mr. SPRATT. How many C–5As are operational today?

21

Mr. BOLKCOM. We have 60 in the inventory, sir. I don’t know

how——

Mr. SPRATT. Sixty?

Mr. BOLKCOM. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. There were 81 originally contracted to be built. One

burned up on the runway at Lockheed Georgia. One crashed at

Dover, and a couple of others were lost by other means. That

means there are about 20 that have been retired.

Mr. BOLKCOM. Sounds about right, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Do we have any idea as to why those 20 were retired as an indication of what is problematic about the airplane?

Let me ask you this. Has anybody considered possibly keeping

the good, still viable C–5s, but putting in a system where they

would be utilized a lot less, so that you would have this airlift capacity when and if needed, but you wouldn’t fly this airplane which

is otherwise operationally much more expensive to fly than the C–

17, particularly if it is not fully loaded?

Mr. BOLKCOM. I haven’t heard of such an idea, sir. One challenge

may be that you have air crews that need to fly these and they

need to get certain hours in and training and experience.

So any movement in the number of airplanes or how they are

used tends to have a ripple effect through the force that you would

have to wrestle with.

But I want to just point out there are a number of tradeoffs we

can make in our larger system, as I said. It is a very elegant system of CRAF and other capabilities.

So, certainly, some reduction in C–5s is one of the tradeoffs you

can make.

Mr. SPRATT. It has the unique capacity to carry outsized equipment. Is there anything that it can carry that the C–17 can’t carry

in smaller loads?

Mr. BOLKCOM. Yes, sir. There is a list of things, an engineering

bridge comes to mind. Maybe the most significant is a special operations force, a Sea Air and Land Forces (SEAL) boat that the C–

17 cannot carry, and the others escape me.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

Mr. ORTIZ. I want to ask the members here that we are going

to have one 15-minute vote and then followed by three 5-minute

votes. It is going to take us at least 25 to 30 minutes before we

come back.

If we have any questions for these witnesses, do you all have any

questions? If not, we can dismiss them so that we can get ready

for the second panel. Is that okay?

And if you all have any questions, some of the members who are

not here, we will give them time to submit some of the questions

to you in writing.

Thank you so much. You have made good statements, and you

answered our questions. So thank you so much for joining us today.

When we come back, we will be ready for the second panel.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. MARSHALL [presiding]. Let me go ahead and recognize our

second panel and get started.

22

I am Jim Marshall. I am sitting in for Mr. Ortiz, who is not feeling very well at the moment, and it wouldn’t surprise me if we

have a much smaller group of members here, given other things

that members are doing this time of day.

For our second panel, we have Lieutenant General Howie Chandler, Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations plans and requirements; Lieutenant General Don Hoffman, Air Force military

deputy for the assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition;

Lieutenant General Mark Curran, Army deputy commander for the

training and doctrine command; Major General Tom Kane, air mobility command of the Air Force director’s strategic plans, requirements and programs; and, Major General Jeff Sorenson, Army deputy for systems management in the Office of the Secretary of the

Army for acquisition, logistics and technology.

Gentlemen, welcome.

Lieutenant General Chandler, if you would please proceed with

your opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. C.H. ‘‘HOWIE’’ CHANDLER, DEPUTY

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE; LT. GEN. DONALD J. HOFFMAN,

MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE; LT.

GEN. MARK CURRAN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, TRAINING AND

DOCTRINE COMMAND, U.S. ARMY; MAJ. GEN. (SELECT) JEFFREY SORENSON, DEPUTY FOR SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT,

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS

AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. ARMY; MAJ. GEN. THOMAS P. KANE,

DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC PLANS, REQUIREMENTS AND

PROGRAMS, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. C.H. ‘‘HOWIE’’ CHANDLER

General CHANDLER. Sir, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Saxton, distinguished members of

the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here

today to talk about Air Force airlift and tanker programs.

As you know, your Air Force is fully engaged around the world

fighting the global war on terror. We also stand guard as our nation’s strategic reserve, ready to respond rapidly to conflict or humanitarian needs around the globe.

The combat and combat support missions your Air Force is flying

today are the latest in a string of 16 continuous years of Air Force

combat in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.

Through last March or March 1, 2007, your Air Force has flown

82 percent of the coalition’s over 282,000 sorties in Operation Iraqi

Freedom (OIF) and 78 percent of the coalition’s over 160,000 sorties in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

At home, we have flown almost 47,000 sorties in support of Operation Noble Eagle and we are also supporting the war on drugs,

having flown over 3,000 counter-drug sorties since 1991.

Despite this operation’s tempo, fiscal year 2006 was the safest

year ever in Air Force aviation. In 1947, the first year the Air

Force was an independent service, we recorded 1,555 major acciVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:54 Jul 08, 2008 Jkt 037316 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-28\066250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
23

dents, for a rate of 44.22 per every 100,000 flying hours. In the

process, we destroyed 536 aircraft at a cost of 584 lives.

In 2006, your Air Force recorded 19 major accidents for a rate

of .9 for every 100,000 flying areas, destroying eight aircraft, with

one fatality.

This record is indirectly attributable to the hardworking men

and women at all levels across the Air Force who focus on performing our mission safely, even as we fly in combat.

Air Force mobility aircraft are essential to the expeditionary nature America’s armed forces. None of our current operations would

be possible without our airlift and aerial refueling aircraft.

An Air Mobility Command aircraft departs a runway somewhere

in the world every 90 seconds, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year,

and through March 1, 2007, these aircraft have flown 315,000 mobility sorties, moving over 5 million passengers and 2.2 million tons

of cargo in support of the war effort alone.

Air Force tankers provide global mobility and reach for Air Force

aircraft, the joint team and coalition forces. Through the end of

February 2007, our aerial refueling aircraft have flown more than

92,000 sorties, offloading over 5 billion pounds of jet fuel to more

than 343,000 receiver aircraft in support of the global war on terror.

While the average tanker is over 40 years old, KC–135s and KC–

10’s nonetheless fly 30 tanker missions on a typical day in Central

Command and stand alert to provide additional endurance for our

aircraft performing homeland defense.

For the past 50 years, the Air Force’s primary tanker platform

has been the KC–135 and it has served with distinction.

However, we are carrying greater risks operating this aircraft beyond expected service life. Some of the oldest models already operate well beyond the point of cost-effective repair.

Tanker recapitalization is not a new idea. In 1999, a GAO report

appreciated the declining operational utility of our aging tankers

and underscored the need for immediate investment in recapitalization.

Given the increased operational requirements of the global war

on terror, procurement of a new tanker aircraft, a KCX, has become both an operational necessity and the most fiscally prudent

option to maintain America’s global presence and expeditionary capabilities.

The KC–X is our number one procurement priority. KC–X tankers will provide increased aircraft availability, more adaptable

technology, and greater overall capability than the current inventory of KC–135E tankers they will replace.

Enhancements to every aspect of aircraft operation will provide

the joint war-fighter with more flexible employment options.

It is imperative that we begin a program of smart, steady reinvestment in a new tanker, coupled with measured timely retirements of the oldest, least capable tankers. Recapitalizing our tankers will ensure viability of this vital national capability.

Sir, again, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. We

deeply appreciate your support and the support that you have provided for our Air Force as we pursue our chief’s three priorities—

fighting and winning the global war on terror as part of the joint

24

team, developing and caring for our airmen and their families, and

recapitalizing and modernizing our aging aircraft and space inventories.

Sir, I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of General Chandler, General

Hoffman and General Kane can be found in the Appendix on page

102.]

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, sir.

General Hoffman.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DONALD J. HOFFMAN

General HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Saxton and

members of the committee, it is my pleasure to be here today to

discuss the military capability that truly makes the United States

a global power, and that is mobility.

Since last year’s testimony cycle, the following things have happened in the mobility acquisition area. We have retired 29 grounded KC–135E models. By the end of this year, an additional 14 E

models will have been grounded due to expiration of the interim repair on engine pylons.

We need the flexibility to manage this aging fleet, to include retirements and harvesting of key parts after retirement.

The KC–X tanker is now in source selection with contract award

expected later this year. The Air Force has gone through a rigorous

review process for KC–X and we remain committed to a competitive environment for this important program.

The Joint Cargo Aircraft is in source selection and we expect results in the next several months.

The Air Force is in the final stages of the C–17 production line.

To date, 162 C–17 aircraft have been delivered. The production line

closure that was forecast for a year ago was delayed by one year,

with an additional 10 aircraft added to the U.S. buy and nine additional foreign buys.

However, Boeing has already started sub-vendor line closures,

which require 34 months of lead time from production delivery.

The C–130J contract was converted from a Federal acquisition

regulation Part 12 commercial contract to a Part 15 military contract. Thirty-eight aircraft remain on this multi-year contract.

The C–130 AMP program, the first test aircraft has flown 24 sorties and a second aircraft will fly later this month.

This program is in a Nunn-McCurdy breach and we are working

with OSD to restructure and recertify this program.

C–5 AMP has delivered 23 aircraft. C–5 RERP delivered the first

two aircraft and the third will fly this month. The test aircraft

have flown 66 flights and the performance is meeting our expectations.

However, this program has experienced significant cost growth,

and we are in the middle of a re-pricing process to determine affordability and the way ahead.

In short, every major mobility program moved forward over the

last year.

I would ask for the committee’s continued help on one area, and

that is the area of specialty metals. In last year’s Authorization

Act, Congress provided some relief in the area of electronic compoVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:54 Jul 08, 2008 Jkt 037316 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-28\066250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
25

nents, where the source of minute amounts of specialty metals cannot be traced throughout the commercial production supply chain.

This relief is certainly helpful, but I would ask that there be further consideration for relief in the area of commercial products.

Tracing the source of metals in commercial products is very problematic for industry, particularly where DOD is a very small part

of their market.

The cost of creating a separate supply chain that is able to trace

specialty metals down to the lowest tier, such as fasteners, is something industry has been unwilling to accept if it is to remain commercial competitive.

While the Congress has authorized a waiver process, the justification and support of the waivers can be labor-intensive.

As an example, the waiver process last year for the Advanced

Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM), the government contractors spent over 2,200 man hours to review 4,000 parts and produced the documentation to justify the waiver. This documentation

was eight inches tall in printed form. All this work was to justify

a waiver for $1,400 on an item that is valued at $566,000.

I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, General Hoffman.

General Curran.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK CURRAN

General CURRAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Saxton and distinguished

members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to

talk about Army aviation. Both General Sorenson and I welcome

this opportunity and appreciate the outstanding support you have

provided to Army aviation and our soldiers engaged in the global

war on terror.

Just a little over 3 years ago, in February 2004, the acting secretary of the Army terminated the Comanche helicopter program to

achieve the aviation transformation and modernization plan, the

plans that would restructure, reorganize and equip Army aviation,

to be prepared to execute the full spectrum of military operations.

Critical to these plans is the Joint Cargo Aircraft. Last year we

promised you that the Army and Air Force would sign a memorandum of agreement, establish a joint program office, and conduct a

joint source selection board.

We have done just that. In May of this year, the program will

proceed through the defense acquisition board for a milestone C decision.

We, the Army and the Air Force, are a unified team, with a common goal to provide the best support to the joint war-fighter. We

truly embody the premise, one team and one fight.

We are a joint team working together to field the best equipment

possible to meet the combatant commander’s needs.

Fiscal year 2008 will be a pivotal year for Army aviation. The resources provided to the Army to conduct operations, while transforming and modernizing the aviation force, will determine Army

aviation’s ability to continue to accomplish its mission and to be

postured to meet future commitments.

Your continued leadership and support in providing full, timely

and sustained funding is critical to our success. We are facing the

26

challenging tasks of winning the war on global terrorism while simultaneously having to transform and modernize our force.

Sir, we are ready for any questions that you may have. Thank

you.

[The joint prepared statement of General Curran and General

Sorenson can be found in the Appendix on page 110.]

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, General Curran.

General Sorenson.

General SORENSON. Chairman, I have no statement at this time.

Mr. MARSHALL. General Kane.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. THOMAS P. KANE

General KANE. Sir, if you would allow me. Mr. Chairman, Mr.

Saxton, thank you for the opportunity on behalf of General

McNabb, our commander, and the 161,000 active guard and reserve

total force members of the Air Mobility Command.

As the major command in the United States Air Force responsible for airlift and tankers and as a component of the U.S. Transportation Command, we appreciate the committee taking the time

to look at this very important part of our capability.

As you know, our nation drives the requirements of this command and our Air Force in support of the services and the nation.

Recent examples of Katrina and Rita, the Pakistan earthquake scenario, Lebanon, and, of course, what we do every day in the global

war on terror.

Our command today is performing over 900 sorties in support of

the nation. On all seven continents, the men and women of the Air

Mobility Command appreciate the opportunity to tell our story

today and to answer your questions.

Thank you.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you all for your statements.

The record, of course, is open for you to put written statements

into the record, if you wish to do so. Please feel free to follow up

with any of the questions or responses with additional remarks

that we can put in the record, as well.

You gentlemen were present earlier when I questioned the preceding panel about the C–5A and this notion, and I guess this is

directed to Air Force here, this notion that some of the C–5As and

two Bs, apparently, have been identified as so structurally broken

that it doesn’t make sense, in Air Force’s opinion, to RERP and

AMP them and Air Force, at least the chief tells me he would like

to retire them.

Could you gentlemen tell us a little bit about that?

General CHANDLER. Sir, at this point, the program of record is

to continue with the AMP and the RERP modifications. There may

be a time, as we do that, when we take airplanes apart that we

may run into structural issues that would cause those kinds of

things to happen.

As an aviator, there are airplanes that fly better than others,

quite honestly. Some of them are a little easier to maintain than

others, for whatever reason.

So you can have some that don’t fly as well as others might. We

are going to have to dig a little deeper, though, before we actually

27

come up with a list of airplanes that we would necessarily like to

retire.

Mr. MARSHALL. General Chandler, if I could interrupt.

So do you not have within Air Force a team that has been specifically looking at different planes, trying to figure out whether or

not it makes sense?

General CHANDLER. Sir, the fleet viability board does that and

they looked at the C–5 and, as you heard earlier, they have said

that there are 25 years of serviceable life left in the aircraft.

Mr. MARSHALL. But beyond that, has there been an attempt, instead of just generally making the comment about the fleet, an attempt to look at individual planes and do an analysis of whether

or not that individual plane is, as Chief Mosley would say, ‘‘hard

broke?’’

General CHANDLER. Sir, if I may, let me defer to General Kane

from the M.C. staff to see if they have a list at their level. We do

not keep that on——

General KANE. Sir, I would answer the question this way. We

have heard earlier that the reliability rates for the C–5A range in

the 40 percent to 50 percent range.

The C–5Bs, which are operated with a total force formula, Dover

and Travis Air Force Base, and now at Westover, range about 55

percent in their mission capable rates.

What General McNabb looks at, because the airplanes are in

maintenance cycles, PDM, going through RERP or AMP modifications, that the availability of that fleet is much lower.

The availability of the C–5As today is only 36 percent. So those

A models that are in the fleet today, most of them in the ARC, in

the Air Reserve component, are available to the war-fighter about

36 percent of the time.

The B models, on the other hand, are available about 47.5 percent of the time, again, reflecting the AMP program that is going

on that has taken airplanes out of the mix.

Today in the theater, in GWOT, we have five C–5s flying in support. On the other hand, you have about 22 dedicated C–17s to the

theater and there is about 40 that are operating in support of the

combatant commander in CENTCOM.

Mr. MARSHALL. That doesn’t really answer my question and

maybe I am just talking out of turn here a little bit.

General KANE. Sir, we don’t have a list that we keep.

Mr. MARSHALL. So if you could just look into that.

General KANE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARSHALL. Is there somebody out there that is evaluating

individual C–5s? Is there a list of C–5As and C–5Bs, particular

planes that have been identified as ones where a case can be made

that these individual planes, not the fleet entirely, but these individual planes should not be RERP’ed and AMP’ed?

I think we need to know that. We are going to make a big decision here shortly on how we are going to fund different things and

we need to know whether or not you are on the verge of making

a recommendation to us with regard to specific planes and retiring

those planes.

I am going to give a quick summary here and just correct me if

I am wrong.

28

The C–5Bs that have already been RERP’ed and AMP’ed, and I

think there are two of them——

General HOFFMAN. Negative, sir. We have 23 C–5s that have

been AMP’ed. Only the three test aircraft have been RERP’ed and

our production ramp-up rate for the RERPing runs over several

FYDPs. It is a long-term process.

Mr. MARSHALL. But I am talking about you have got three—I

thought it was two, but you have got two airplanes here——

General HOFFMAN. Two are flying right now. The third one will

fly probably tomorrow.

Mr. MARSHALL. All right, great.

But what you have is you have got two at this point that have

gone through the entire process.

General HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARSHALL. And at this point, they are performing as we anticipated.

General HOFFMAN. Correct.

Mr. MARSHALL. And as we anticipated, of course, costs now seem

to be spiraling out of control, but as we anticipated, their level of

availability was going to come close to matching the C–17’s general

level of availability.

Is that what we are experiencing?

General HOFFMAN. It would be 10 percent to 15 percent higher

than the baselines that they are operating from right now. That is

the expectation from an AMP’ed, RERP’ed aircraft.

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, that is not directly responsive to what I

asked. What I understood, based on testimony that we have received over the last couple of years, the expectation by Air Mobility

Command was that the RERP’ed and AMP’ed As and Bs were

going to wind up being about 5 percent off the average performance

level of the C–17s.

Am I mistaken?

General KANE. Sir, it is a 10 percent increase in the RFP. We

will give you that number and that is what it is.

General HOFFMAN. But, Mr. Chairman, the comment that you

have time to decide on how far we go into RERPing here, because

of the rate at which we are entering this program, we have only

done three and our production rate is fairly slow over the next couple years.

One other statistic, though, that I think General Mosley is referring to when he talks about bad actors, and he kind of goes by the

fleet, the B fleet and the A fleet, it is one thing to talk about mission capable rates, but a more telling statistic is how hard do we

have to work to keep them in the air.

And for every flying hour that they fly, over the last 16 years,

the A model C–5s require 61 percent more maintenance man hours

per flight hour. So it is a significant burden on the backs of the airmen to keep that aircraft flying.

Mr. MARSHALL. I am with you, but we have decided to do this

RERP/AMP thing. We are about to have A, right? And I guess we

will see what those same figures are with regard to the A that we

are about to have come on.

General HOFFMAN. Right.

29

Mr. MARSHALL. I will have more questions later, but I want to

move to the ranking member here, my good friend and great Member of Congress, Mr. Jim Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just continue on the other side of the lift. Let me ask

some questions.

Let me start here. The requirement for lift has been elusive, it

seems to me, and I would just like to ask you where we are on defining the requirement at this point given the major events that

have happened in recent times and given the requirements that

exist going forward.

Where are we now on the requirement?

General CHANDLER. Sir, I know the first panel discussed earlier

a bit about the requirement and we talked about the mobility, the

MCS, mobility capabilities study.

We in the Air Force need to stay on the glide path we are on

with RERP and AMP with the C–5 program. One hundread and

eighty was the number for C–17s and we thank you for the plusup, because that certainly helps offset the wear and tear for the

global war on terror and the loss of the C–5 we had at Dover.

As well, if we stay where we are at with the C–130J, we can stay

on glide path to meet the minimum requirement.

Now, we understand that is the minimum requirement and we

also understand that the world has changed. We are looking at potentially a larger Army and Marine Corps. We are looking at the

Future Combat System and, as we talked about earlier, still defining how we are going to do that in terms of a concept of operations

between the Army and the Air Force.

That leaves us also in a situation where Air Mobility Command

(AMC) has gone back to take a look at the appropriate fleet mix

which will bring in the C–17 and the C–130 and where we need

to go with that end of the airlift spectrum in terms of intra and

intertheater lift.

But to answer your question directly, those requirements are yet

to be defined. We hope to have the AMC work done by the end of

this year.

Mr. SAXTON. A reasonable person could conclude then, based on

what you just said in your statement, particularly the closing part

of your statement, that if we include the requirements caused by

the war on terror, if we include the requirements resulting from a

larger force, and if we include the requirement that comes from a

new weapons system in the future, known as the FCS, we might

want to order some more C–17s at some point.

General CHANDLER. Congressman, I think that is a reasonable

statement.

Mr. SAXTON. Here is my problem and here is your problem and

my problem.

The line is going to close and so we could, at some point, be precluded from making a decision to buy more if we don’t make the

decision in a timely manner.

And just let me say this for the record and I am not trying to

be—it is not my nature to say things to be contrary, but the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of the Air Force, last year,

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planes that you just said thanks for, the Air Force said we didn’t

need them and based on the requirement that the Air Force had

defined.

Now, I don’t blame the Air Force for that and here is why. We

here and the folks over at the White House and other parts of the

administration define the needs of our country and send you a list

of things to do and then we authorize and appropriate money to do

it and we give you a cost level here and send you this much money.

So I am contrary to all of us.

The real problem here is, this is my view anyway, this is a chart,

which I have a bigger one someplace, but I couldn’t find it, it is a

chart that shows the defense budget as a percentage of GDP.

You have all seen it, I am sure. It says that during World War

II we spent 34.5 percent of GDP on national security. During

Korea, we spent almost 12 percent. During Vietnam, we spent almost 9 percent of GDP.

During the big rig and buildup, we spent almost 6 percent of

GDP, and today we are spending—in 2005, we were spending 3.9

percent of GDP.

So this is more of an endemic problem for all of us to solve than

just the Air Force. But having said that, we are now at a crossroads where, last Friday, a very high official in the contractor office

in C–17 called me at home and said if we don’t have an answer

on C–17 in 2 months, we are going to have to start taking the line

down.

And that is where we are today. And so I know you know this,

because I have had this conversation with you before, like yesterday, but this is a conversation to be had on the record and somehow, in the next few months, we are either going to have to decide

that we are going to be able to do without C–17s or else we are

going to have to tell the contractor that we are going to order some

more.

So anyway, that is that.

Now, on the Army side, on the Air Force and Army side, the Future Cargo Aircraft, General Curran, you said that we, that you

and the Air Force, the Army and the Air Force signed the memorandum of agreement and I have got a copy of that right here. It

was signed on June 20, 2006. That is a good thing.

I am wondering what decisions remain to be made by the Army

and the Air Force subsequent to the signing of this agreement.

General CURRAN. Yet to be completed based upon that memorandum of agreement?

Mr. SAXTON. Let me tell you one thing that concerns me here.

In defining roles and missions, in the first paragraph, it says, ‘‘It

is understood that the Air Force is DOD’s provider of fixed-wing

intratheater airlift. However, that does not preclude the Army from

operating weapons systems in a service organic airlift role.’’

I think that says the Army can do this and the Air Force is the

provider of fixed-wing theater airlift and I am not sure exactly—

I am not sure precisely what that means.

I mean, you told me earlier in a private conversation that the Air

Force is going to have 75 of these new aircraft to fly. Is that right?

General CURRAN. Sir, we talked about the Army, at least its

analysis of alternatives, is pursuing 75 and the Air Force is still

31

determining exactly what they are going to pursue, but it could be

as many as 70.

Mr. SAXTON. If the Air Force is provider, do they have access to

the Army airplanes?

General CURRAN. The Air Force, as the general support provider

to the joint force commander, would clearly have whatever joint

cargo aircraft they would have. The Army component commander

would have whatever he had.

When those aircraft that the Army is operating are not flying in

time-sensitive, mission-critical sensitive missions for the Army

component commander, they would be available to the Air Force

and to the joint force commander for operational support aircraft.

General CHANDLER. Congressman, if I could add one thing.

That is not anything different really than we do today with the

Sherpa that the Army is trying to recapitalize.

Any excess airlift over and above what General Curran talked

about in terms of mission-essential and time-critical come back to

the joint force air component commander (JFAC) to be distributed

to support the joint force commander’s requirements.

The Air Force aircraft, on the other hand, are part of the transportation command (TRANSCOM) transportation system that the

CFAC or the JFAC would work with to meet, again, the joint force

commander’s lift requirement.

So the statement on the memorandum of agreement (MOA), to

me, is a restatement of what we do today in terms of fixed-wing

aircraft.

Mr. SAXTON. Here is my concern. The Army, I believe, and correct me if I am wrong, is planning on replacing capabilities that

are carried out by CH–47 and other current aircraft that is used

by the Army for this mission.

And I think we want to be sure that when it comes time for the

Army commander on the ground to say that, ‘‘I have got to fly

these ten guys and their ammo and equipment from point A in theater to point B in theater,’’ that the Air Force doesn’t somehow

have the aircraft that is necessary to do that mission in a timely

fashion.

General CHANDLER. Sir, I would tell you that any Combined

Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) worth his or her salt

would have exactly the same concern. We deliver goods and can deliver goods that last tactical mile to the Army, as required, just as

we deliver ordnance off F–16s. We have that capability.

Now, I will be honest with you, there is always friction that surrounds efficiency and effectiveness, but, again, the CFACC understands the effectiveness part of that. So that in some cases, we will

not be as efficient as we necessarily might be in order to meet the

effectiveness needs of the Army.

Mr. SAXTON. I assume that the efficient type are the well

planned routes that we run kind of on a regular basis.

General CHANDLER. Well, I would describe it more as collecting

and filling the aircraft, so you have got the maximum use out of

the aircraft to distribute whatever it is you are trying to distribute

at the time.

32

Said another way, you may not fill all the pallet positions. You

may simply go with people or pallets or backhaul, wounded or

whatever is required.

Mr. SAXTON. And that is a different concept than the Army commander on the ground has when he has a need to get from point

A to point B now.

General CHANDLER. Well, sir, what I just described, I think,

matches with what the Army commander would want in terms of

effectiveness.

General KANE. Sir, if I could give you one more comment. In the

current scenario in CENTCOM, the joint force commander

CENTCOM drives through his J–4 an analysis of the larger stuff

that comes into theater and then works that with the service components.

They do that through the J–4 and then a deployment distribution

operations center, which TRANSCOM chops to the combatant commander. That gives them visibility from the depot, DLA, where

they are building pure pallets, all the way into theater to the warfighter.

We acknowledge the fact that there is, and today I think the

number is about seven to ten percent of time-sensitive, missioncritical mission that the Army component or the Marine component

engaged in combat need real-time supply.

We have worked with the theater in a way that makes our assets

available, as General Chandler has described, to the CFACC and

the MD. One of the initiatives is we are putting more Aircraft

Liason Officers (ALOs) in with the Army and the Marine components. We are dedicating 25 more people next year for those units

engaged in combat, so that they can better clarify those requirements.

And then, last, I would say things like joint precision airdrop, a

joint program between the Army and the Marines and the Air

Force, we are trying to define new ways to deliver into areas like

in Afghanistan, where the helicopters are getting shot at.

Today we have mobility airplanes being shot at at a higher rate

because we are trying to satisfy the needs of the war-fighter engaged in combat.

General CURRAN. If I could just add. We agree absolutely with

all that. That is the process. That is what we are attempting to

achieve.

The land component commander has capabilities nested within

his organization force. If he has a critical requirement, he will use

up his assets first to meet that requirement.

If he can’t meet it with his own assets, he will then take it to

the CFAC or the joint force commander to satisfy those requirements. That is the way we have worked it in the past. That is how

we plan to work in the future.

Mr. SAXTON. Very good. One final question. Can you explain to

us the difference in requirements that the Air Force may currently

believe it needs and how they are different from the requirements

that the Army may think it needs in the platform?

General CURRAN. Well, to start with, and then Howie can pile on,

as we have gone through the process of turning an Army program

and an Air Force program into a single program, somewhat already

33

clearly stated in the MOA, but in the process of building those requirements documents, we have partnered with each other and reviewed what those key performance parameters (KPPs) will be for

the base aircraft.

And from that, we have agreed that that is a good start, a good

base from which we could then build our capabilities on.

The Air Force will define what specific mission packages I believe

that they will need for their particular use of a JCA and then be

able to add those as we go to a block two of that platform.

I think that is how we have kind of laid out.

General CHANDLER. Sir, that is exactly right. There will be some

differences. One thing that comes to mind is the ability to fly in

national and international airspace and the right avionics and

equipment to be able to do those kinds of things, night vision goggle equipped.

Some of those things are still being worked out with regard to

what is in the basic aircraft and then, of course, AMC will help us

define over and above that.

We can get you a list of those requirements for the record, if you

would like us to do that.

Mr. SAXTON. I would be interested in seeing it.

Thank you very much.

Mr. MARSHALL. Let me recognize the gentlelady from Florida,

Ms. Castor.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good evening, gentlemen.

On the KCX, General Mosley was quoted recently that he believed awarding the tanker replacement contracts to more than one

company would have some utility, because the Air Force would be

able to purchase a mix of larger and smaller tankers to mirror this

current fleet.

Is that an accurate reflection of the position of the Air Force?

General HOFFMAN. That is what the article said, but what I believe General Mosley said is that we will have a mixed fleet.

In fact, we have a mixed fleet today. We have KC–130’s, we have

KC–135s, we have KC–10’s. So we see a mixed fleet all the way

out into the future that will be medium size and some large size

tankers.

So he is talking about a mixed fleet and, in fact, until the last

R model goes away, we are going to have a mixed fleet for 40 years

no matter what we do.

But tour present competition right now is to pick a single tanker

and this is just the first wave, this is what we call the first

traunch. We know we need around 500 tankers. We are sizing this

first traunch at about 179 and we did that because no matter what

commercial aircraft we pick, they only make commercial aircraft

for 10 to 15 years.

If they run longer than that, it is a very successful run, but even

then they have different models, different engines, different lengths

of fuselages and so forth.

So to pick a commercial aircraft that we think is going to be

made for 40 years probably won’t happen.

Ms. CASTOR. But it is not your intention to bifurcate this contract

award. You are going to stick with awarding it to a single——

34

General HOFFMAN. No, because of the duality of separate——

Ms. CASTOR [continuing]. The first wave that you said of 179.

General HOFFMAN. Right. We see all 179 as being the same type

of aircraft. To go down a dual track would require doubling our expense in the development and having both vendors develop an aircraft, produce an aircraft, test an aircraft and then produce it, and

you get the inefficiencies there with two sustainment lines, two

training lines, et cetera, et cetera.

So we see 179 single aircraft. Now, 10 or 15 years from now, if

they are still making that aircraft, we love that aircraft, we may

just continue. That is a separate decision that can be made later

if that option still exists. But we see that option probably will close

at some point.

Technology will move along and other commercial aircraft will be

available. So the second traunch may look the same or may look

different.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you for clarifying that.

One vendor right now is producing tankers for Italy and Japan.

Another is maybe selling tankers to Saudi Arabia, Britain, Australia.

Are any of those out of testing yet? Explain where they are. Are

any operational yet?

General HOFFMAN. They are not operational yet, but they are

built and they are in various phases of the test phase. And you are

right, both vendors have a strong tanker with cargo capability and

some other capabilities that are out there flying for foreign customers.

Now, unlike the first panel had said, here are the two answers

to the KCX, we don’t know what they are going to bid. They may

pick the ones that they have already built for someone else. They

may offer a different commercial aircraft.

So we don’t know what they are going to bid, or they may offer

two bids from a single vendor.

So you would think that those that are already out there and developed would be stronger contenders and would be more competitive for those companies to bid something that they have already

built than to start from scratch.

Ms. CASTOR. Does the Air Force actively monitor those aircraft

for other countries that are testing those right now as they move

into operations?

General HOFFMAN. They are direct commercial sales. We don’t

have a government role. But we do pay very close attention to their

progress.

Ms. CASTOR. I am a new member and I am going back and trying

to learn some history about the KC–X or KC–135 and I know that

due to not having a full rate of the KC–135, the recapitalization

program under way, the Air Force was legislatively restricted from

retiring 114 KC–135E aircraft in fiscal year 2005 and 2006, but

then Congress allowed retirement of 29 aircraft in fiscal year 2007.

In reviewing the materials, it wasn’t clear to me what your recommendation is for 2008 and then looking out into 2009 and 2010.

General HOFFMAN. We would like permission, as the other services have permission, to manage their fleets. We want to do what

we call fleet management and make a timely decision when it is

35

right to retire an aircraft, to not have boundaries put on that retirement, like even the permission we got last year for the 29s said

they had to be recallable, which means you have to leave them in

kind of inviolate status there.

Then they sit in the desert and they are going to age out very

useful parts on those aircraft. So the remaining fleets, even the R

models, could benefit from some of those parts.

So we would like permission in 2008 to have the ability to fleet

manage our fleets. There are 85 remaining E models. We would

like permission to retire and fleet manage those remaining 85 aircraft.

General KANE. Ma’am, if I could add one thing to that. Today we

have grounded airplanes that are combat ineffective sitting on the

ramps that our Guardsmen and Reservists of the 135 fleet or active

duty in the C–130 fleet are taking care of at an expense to the

country and, frankly, it is these people who are already stressed.

It is disheartening to them and lowers their morale when they

have to take care of an airplane they know will never fly.

So we do applaud the Congress for giving us the permission to

retire 15 C–130Es and 29 KC–135Es, but we need to go the distance in managing the fleet, because it come on the backs of our

people.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Ms. Castor.

Now, to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just ask a hypothetical. You have got some C–5A models—this is for the Air Force—and you start taking a look at fixing

them up because they are costing you a lot to maintain and you

think, ‘‘Well, we are going to put some money into these things,’’

and each one you take apart, you are looking at a couple of them,

each one you take apart, they are more just stress cracks, I mean,

they are completely—you are going to have to replace the whole

airplane.

Now, do you have the flexibility that if you wanted to, that you

could retire those planes?

General HOFFMAN. Not at the present time. We are restricted

from retiring any C–5As until the first C–5A that is going through

the RERP process, which should fly we think tomorrow or Friday,

until that goes through operational evaluation, which will take

until the 2009–2010 timeframe before we have the test results on

that, that is a present legislative restriction.

Mr. AKIN. So currently we are going to close down a potential

source of a replacement airplane and burn that bridge behind us

before we really have any data.

So in a way, it is almost like Congress has been micromanaging

your job to manage your own air fleet, haven’t we?

General HOFFMAN. I think the chief and secretary they want authority, as other chiefs of services, to manage the fleet and they are

restricted in not C–5s, but it is 130’s, it is F–117s, it is B–52s.

There are multiple aircraft out there that we have specific language that binds our hands.

36

Mr. AKIN. But we put these restrictions on so that you really

can’t manage the fleet.

General HOFFMAN. That is right. Your comment is right there. I

wouldn’t describe it so much as burning the bridge. We can talk

about storage of tooling and line closure on the C–17 there and

there are expensive ways and less expensive ways of doing that,

but there is definitely a line break and a gap and a timeframe requirement and significant costs to retool and restart that line.

But the bridge is not totally burned. We will keep the blueprints

for the bridge, if we have got to rebuild it.

Mr. AKIN. But you have got all kinds of subcontractors and subsubcontractors that are going to have to be rehired and re-contracted. So there is going to be a tremendous cost of trying to get

that thing back up and going again, right?

General HOFFMAN. Right.

Mr. AKIN. And I think what I heard you say, also, so in other

words, if we could put some language in to release you in terms

of the C–5, particularly A models, is that where you would start?

General HOFFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. And give you the flexibility that if you need to retire

those things, you can do it. If you want to rebuild them, you could

still rebuild them, but you would have that flexibility to take a look

and, at the same time, you would have the flexibility, if you wanted

to retire a few of them, because you have got a pretty good number

of them, right?

General HOFFMAN. Sir, we have a 111 total C–5s and about half

of them are C–5As.

Mr. AKIN. So you have got 50 at least. So if you wanted to, you

could retire a certain number of them and get a replacement airplane or something like that now and then the ones that you have

done this rebuilding on, you can evaluate that as quickly as you

can.

General HOFFMAN. Yes, sir. We will not make the decision to actually RERP or even if we make the decision today, we won’t actually be getting around to doing that modification for many years,

because they will follow the B models in their modification process.

Mr. AKIN. So that seems to make sense for us to be working

along those lines.

Now, I think what I heard you say was that the Air Force or Air

Mobility Command has not really built in the requirement for

heavier lift that might be required by a lot of these new additions

of armor to things that weren’t as heavy before, that that is something that is going to be sort of built into the equation next year,

but that isn’t in this year. Is that right?

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir. The existing mobility capabilities

studies do not address some of the things that we talked about in

terms of the potential for a larger Army, larger Marine Corps,

those kinds of things.

Mr. AKIN. Larger in terms of more numbers or heavier equipment?

General CHANDLER. People and the definition, as you suggest,

the Future Combat System and what that airlift requirement will

actually be.

37

AMC today is taking a look at how that all fits together with our

smaller aircraft fleet, the fleet that flies intratheater and intertheater, to see how that all fits together.

Mr. AKIN. Right. So that has still got to be built into the equation.

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. I think you have pretty much answered the question.

I guess I have one question for the Army and this is more because I am not that familiar.

The Joint Cargo Aircraft, how is that different than a C–130 and

does it do anything a C–130 wouldn’t do? Is there any reason to

build it or what is the logic on that?

General CURRAN. Sir, the Joint Cargo Aircraft is a smaller aircraft than the C–130, but it is compatible with the C–130 in that

it will handle the same palleting system that is in the C–130 for

ease of cross-load of cargo and equipment.

It has an additional capability of being able to land with a smaller load, but land on a shorter runway than you would find with a

C–130, given both the Air Force and the Army greater flexibility

with smaller loads and into more austere locations.

So those are some of the significant differences, I guess, between

the C–130 and the JCA.

Mr. AKIN. So what is the load relative to C–130, two-thirds or

something of the load or half the load?

General CURRAN. It is about half, sir.

Mr. AKIN. Half. So it is significantly smaller, significantly smaller.

General CURRAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. And do we have trouble landing C–130’s in short landing strips? Because it seems like, to me, we manage to drop them

down pretty fast over in Iraq and didn’t seem like it took a whole

of pavement to get them up or down on the C–130’s.

General CURRAN. C–130’s are operating on, what would you say,

3,000 to 5,000 foot runways, based upon what loads they are carrying today. We are looking at a platform that could operate on 2,000

to 3,000 feet, based upon what its load is, to give you a relative

comparison.

Mr. AKIN. And you think there is a need for that short of landing

strips in some of the possible scenarios and places we might get involved.

General CURRAN. Yes, sir. There are F series analysis and analysis that we have done have indicated that we do have a gap there.

Mr. AKIN. And just one make sure to make sure I got my numbers right.

I think what I was hearing you say, with the rebuild, this is back

to the Air Force again, I am sorry, with the rebuild of the C–5A

models, I assume that includes new engines.

I don’t know the AMP and RERP and those things.

General CHANDLER. Sir, the AMP program is an avionics enhancement program. It is a precursor and a requirement before the

RERP, which is the acronym for the re-engining program.

Mr. AKIN. So you put those two together, you have got currently

a 35 percent reliability rate and you think that you may jump it

as much as 50 to 51 percent.

38

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. And what is the reliability rate of a C–17?

General CHANDLER. That reliability rate will run in the mid 80’s,

sir.

Mr. AKIN. So you are talking 51 versus mid 80’s.

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. So if you are planning a mission and you have got

these rebuilt A models, unless you are a gambling man, you are

going to send two sets of gear for every one that you want to land

and do the job.

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir. There is no doubt that the aircraft

is going to be less reliable based on a number of issues.

Mr. AKIN. This is one that you rebuild.

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. Well, that doesn’t sound like a very good way to go.

General CHANDLER. Let me ask if there is some distinction?

Tom, if you want to——

General KANE. Sir, the one thing I might point out is the way

we operate the C–5 today, and it was pointed out in the earlier

committee, that there are about nine pieces of equipment this nation depends on on the C–5 to carry and we will provide that for

the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 162.]

General KANE.But, in fact, we have been challenged to change

the concept of operations for the C–5 to do major hubs where we

have the logistics base to support that airplane.

Today, in support of GWOT, we have airplanes going into like

Turkey, drooping off very large loads, particularly armor, that are

moved forward on C–17s. That concept of operations (CONOPS)

works very well and the C–5 performs very admirably in a system

that I would call managed.

So that is the challenge is to use that. Remember that the mobility capabilities study number, the base number was 292. We have

always questioned why do you pick the bottom of the range, because when the C–5 crashed at Dover last April, it drove us to 291

and gave the Congress some impetus to try to replace at least one

of those airplanes or the 10 that we got.

I would suggest that the C–5, in those kind of roles, in a two

major contingency operation scenario, is what drove that number

in the requirement and left the risk at moderate.

So those fleets of 111 remaining C–5s is important to a global

power that has to look two ways and overlap two scenarios. That

is where that number came from.

Mr. AKIN. You went a little faster than I could go with that explanation, but I think what I am hearing you say is there are

needs for some C–5s, just because of the massive lift that it can

do.

General KANE. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. But that you have got to be in an environment where

you can really manage that and it has a low reliability rate.

General KANE. There are seven Russian sailors alive today because our C–5 delivered the undersea submersible at Kamchatka

39

Peninsula last year. And even though the British beat us there, we

had the support equipment to download and save those sailors.

Mr. AKIN. So the point isn’t to retire them all, but certainly to

have the flexibility to manage your fleet. That just is common

sense and sooner is a lot better than later right now in terms of

cost of if we have to start to try to restarting a line or something.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARSHALL. I thank the gentleman.

I want to pick up, if I could, where Mr. Akin just left off, and

it is back to the C–5.

I made reference to what I understand to be an analysis done by

Air Force or some team of different specific C–5 planes and we are

going to make a difficult decision here and if, in fact, Air Force is

on the verge of being able to say, ‘‘We think these specific planes

should be retired for these specific reasons,’’ clearly, if they are

going to be retired, that is going to drop those numbers down below

the mobility capabilities study’s bottom number.

And most of us think the mobility capabilities study is flawed to

start out with, that the range should be a good bit higher, for reasons that are evident just reading the study.

So that would be pretty persuasive to us on buying more C–17s,

but we need to know it now. It makes no sense at all to close down

the C–17 line if, in fact, we are going to add more C–17s later, because we are getting rid of some of the C–5As. And I understand

it is two C–5Bs and one of the C–5As.

I would like to clarify something. When you say 51 percent availability, that is a term that most of us I don’t think understand particularly well. In part, that is because of the way the platform is

managed with Guard and Reserve.

It is not that the platform is—if you manage the C–17 fleet the

same way you have been managing the C–5A fleet, its availability

would drop dramatically, as well.

So if we are comparing apples to apples, the idea behind the

RERP/AMP program, as we understood it, was that C–5A would

get pretty close to the reliability rate of the C–17. So that we could

figure when a C–5A took off, or a C–5B or whatever it is, this

RERP/AMP’ed platform, when it took off and landed, it was going

to be able to take off again and do the next leg and the next leg

and the next leg and we weren’t going to have to worry about that.

It is not going to get stuck in Argentina and we are going to have

the embarrassment of Argentina telling us they won’t take any C–

5s, that sort of thing.

Am I correct?

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir, I agree with that. We make most

of our money in the re-engining, quite honestly, although the avionics program is important. It is a precursor to give you the electronic backbone to be able to do those things.

But the ability to take off with heavier loads from shorter runways, climb to higher altitudes faster, cruise at higher altitudes

using less fuel, then, in turn, less tanker requirements if you do

that, is important to us for all the reasons that General Kane described earlier and that we discussed earlier here.

40

It is a cleaner, more efficient airplane overall and it would give

you the dependability then that would allow you to leave it at the

kind of rates that we leave it at when it is in the Air Reserve Component (ARC) and then bring it up to standard should we need that

surge capability and that is the way the fleet is managed today.

Mr. MARSHALL. I think it was IDA, I am not sure, I can’t recall

now who it was, did the study at the request of Senator Warner

back in 2002 of our air mobility choices and that study clearly

shows, dollars and cents-wise, that we should go through the

RERP/AMP process even with the C–5As, tear one down, determine

whether or not, in fact, it has got all these structural problems.

Well, we have done that. We tore a C–5A down and concluded

that it was in good shape, it was good to go for 25 years or so.

So that study specifically said that this made financial sense, but

that, of course, assumes certain costs associated with RERP and

AMP. Now, these costs are spiraling out of control either because

we can’t manage it particularly well or because Lockheed is having

problems managing things from its end.

I said earlier, and I say again, I really think Air Force and Lockheed need to be talking to one another and Lockheed, if it is interesting in having this continued business RERPing and AMPing,

needs to be talking to the Air Force about how to control these

costs and maybe locking in a cost so that we know what this is

going to be cost-effectiveness-wise as we move forward.

I would just make that observation. I hope you are talking to

Lockheed along those lines.

KCX, General Hoffman, you, I am sure, saw that GAO has raised

some concerns that Air Force hasn’t done an adequate analysis

validating the uplift, the airlift capability of the new tanker.

Could you, just for the record—I am sure you are interested in

replying to that. So for the record, could you comment on——

General HOFFMAN. Yes, sir. This is a requirements issue, so I

will turn it over to my comrade here, General Chandler.

Mr. MARSHALL. General Hoffman is not interested in responding

to that.

General CHANDLER. Sir, I am interested in requirements, but if

I could ask you to rephrase the question. I was writing as you were

talking, I apologize.

Mr. MARSHALL. I am sorry, I asked it to the wrong person.

I am sure you have heard the GAO has raised some concerns

about whether or not the Air Force has gone through an appropriate analysis that validates the airlift capacity of the new tanker.

And if you could, just for the record, respond to that.

General CHANDLER. The mobility study that we talked about earlier actually recognizes the ability to carry cargo and people as a

secondary mission in the tankers.

The joint doctrine addresses the ability to do that. Common

sense, from an operator’s perspective, would tell me that if we had

the capability to put people and cargo on an aircraft, particularly

during a deployment phase, where airlift could be at a premium

and tanker requirements would be minimum, then it would make

sense to look at the ability to carry cargo on a tanker aircraft, particularly from an operational perspective.

41

I would tell you, sir, that the tanker program that we are looking

at today, the KCX, is probably the most studied program that I

have seen in my 33 years in the Air Force.

I am convinced we have got the requirements right. The JROC,

the joint requirements process, is convinced that we have it right

and that the 6 percent cost over the life-cycle of this tanker, to

have a cargo-passenger capability is worth the money.

We think we are on solid ground and we are in an effort here

to progress with a transparent program to produce a tanker.

I guess if I could add just one more thing. It is important for us

to get started from the aspect of when we will actually be able to

retire the last KC–135R. If we would look at that, we are going to

have some airframes that are nearly 80 years old in order to keep

tanker availability where we need to if we are going to continue to

maintain the——

Mr. MARSHALL. I regret, by the way, that Mr. Bartlett’s not here.

He would object to any suggestion that 80 years is too long to be

around.

General CHANDLER. But I guess that is what I would say in

terms of the KCX. We think it has been thoroughly scrubbed. We

think we are on solid ground with the requirements and General

Hoffman and his folks are proceeding with an open and fair, transparent acquisition process.

Mr. MARSHALL. General Kane.

General KANE. Sir, if I could add just a couple things.

Airlift has always been a part of the aerial refueling mission. To

formalize that in this requirements document was important.

In 1991, during the Gulf War, we learned that units who could

self-deploy on the tanker, fighter units, F–18s, A–10 units, saved

a lot of lift that was more important to support the Army and the

Marine Corps moving their heavy equipment.

We have re-learned that lesson again today.

In 1996, we were a little confused, because the GAO told us at

that time that any future aerial refueling platform should consider

the airlift responsibilities. In fact, if we look today, while it will

cost some more to put that capability on the airplane, it will cost

a lot more if we de-scope that airplane and not take advantage of

the cargo.

So I think that is very important. In addition, I would answer

the studies part of the question, we use the mobility capabilities

study aerial refueling scenarios, program analyses and evaluation

(PA&E) allowed us to do that.

We ran those scenarios with the airlift KPPs involved and we

proved again that that was important and the analysis supported

the use of airlift in that platform.

Mr. MARSHALL. Would you gentlemen get together with whoever

in GAO has——

General KANE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARSHALL. —produced the report and narrow your difference

of opinion, resolve the difference of opinion, if possible, at the very

least, just narrow it, and then get back with staff on the committee

with where is the difference of opinion here, so that we clearly understand what it is?

General KANE. Yes, sir.

42

Mr. MARSHALL. Let me stay for KCX. For some time now, I have

not been a one-man show, but I have really been beating the drums

here about using this as a model for how to do it right with the

C–17 acquisition as a model for how to get it wrong, at least with

regard to the long-term questions of maintenance, sustainment,

modernization.

It is the life-cycle issue, which is 75 percent of the cost of the

craft and sometimes more than that. And I know there is this

temptation to buy it cheap upfront. Car dealers will tell you in a

heartbeat, and I used to represent a bunch of those guys, I will sell

a car for no profit, anticipating that I will make my money at the

tail end on repairing that car.

We have got depot issues, core issues, all kinds of other things

to be thought about and it just looks like we are stovepiped on this

stuff and that it is inappropriate stovepiping and acquisition

doesn’t really pay attention to what the long-term sustainment

folks do.

And somehow we need to bring the two together and I know it

is troublesome, because it means that maybe the cost of initial acquisition goes up, so you don’t get as many as quickly, and nobody

ever wants that, typically.

But it is something that we need to do and I thought that the

KC–X was a good opportunity here, because one of the bidders is

France—well, France, in a sense—and, at the moment, we are not

terribly fond of France. Maybe we will get over that.

But we don’t want to be beholding France for data rights, equipment, management of this thing, long-term management of

sustainment, modernization, et cetera, in any way.

So I expect that whoever is the team that includes Airbus is

going to be making a proposal, should make a proposal which

shows that we will never be subject to that, directly or indirectly,

and then it seems that Boeing would have to do the same thing

just to make it fair and we could use that as a model.

Are you heading in that direction at all?

General HOFFMAN. Sir, I think the acquisition community holds

hands very closely with the sustainment community and we are

striving to do that better and better with every acquisition.

There have been some encouraging changes over the last year on

CSAR–X, on JCA, and on KC–X. We specifically included in the

RFP data rights issues that aren’t in previous examples of acquisitions.

In other words, we want them to price to us all the data rights

that we will need to do our own organic sustainment, should we

choose to go that route in the future.

If we choose and source select and then we say, ‘‘Oh, forgot about

data rights, go back’’ and we have already source selected, there is

no competitive advantage there. That is going to be sky-high.

So in the competitive environment, we are going to have all the

vendors price the data rights and we will execute that option in

later years, if, in fact, we choose to go organic. But that is a business case decision that evolves over time about how much is organic, how much is not.

43

We might take in certain elements, leave engines out, bring in

the airframe. There are all kinds of combinations of how we do

long-term sustainment.

Mr. MARSHALL. But we would be managing that and wouldn’t be

beholden——

General HOFFMAN. Initially, especially on commercial aircraft,

which all three of these are commercially-derived aircraft or other,

they have a prior life like the H–47, but we didn’t know which

CSAR–X we were going to select at the time, because there were

some commercial ones out there.

Commercial aircraft tend to have more traceability for

sustainment argument in the commercial side. KC–X is going to be

FAA-certified aircraft, which means will sustain that in accordance

with FAA standards and a growing part of our workforce in the

depot is now FAA-certified to do that level of work.

It also allows us to benefit by the wide network that is out there

for engines and other parts, if it is a commercially-derived tanker,

to use other sources of vendors that are FAA-certified to do repair.

So we are not wedded to that original OEM necessarily.

Mr. MARSHALL. One problem we have got with the C–17 right

now is even if we had the data rights available to us, we don’t have

the infrastructure to manage the supply chain, et cetera.

General HOFFMAN. Depot standup is always one of the elements.

It is one of the elements that gets scraped off first when you are

under budget pressure in a program, is the facilitation of a depot

standup.

It doesn’t matter what the program is, whether it is F–22, F–16,

KC–X and all that. We want to baseline our programs properly

that have a cost line in there to say this is the cost of standing up

organic depot.

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, that sounds very encouraging. Where Joint

Cargo Aircraft is concerned, again, we have had this question concerning how are we going to maintain it in the long run.

When I first talked to Army about this, Army’s business case was

CLS and forget about it, that is it, that is what is going to happen.

General HOFFMAN. We had that discussion when the Army had

their RFP. In fact, we amended the RFP after dialogue with the

Army to allow the data rights entry to be there.

Mr. MARSHALL. I had a great conversation with the chief of staff.

I was in Jerusalem and it was 2 in the morning. He was in his

plane over Russia and we talked about this for an hour about a

year ago.

So I am glad that progress has been made.

I am getting some feedback, though, that there have been some

problems agreeing on what the requirements should be, that Air

Force is pushing back on some of the things that Army wants and

Army’s pushing back on some of the things that Air Force wants,

and that there may be a separation.

You heard my question to the prior panel along those lines.

I have heard a specific reference to the size of this thing. Will

it carry the standard pallet that Air Force typically moves around?

Army is focused on a pallet that will go into a Chinook. I have

heard things like that.

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Now, of course, General Curran, when you were talking just a

minute ago, you said, if I understood you correctly, that the pallet

size for this was going to be one that is the C–130 size and if that

is the case, then it seems to resolve the pallet size, but there may

be other things.

How are you all getting along as far as the requirements under

this?

General CHANDLER. Sir, at this point, with the MOA, signed by

the vice chiefs, we work closely with the Army to do exactly what

we have been asked to do.

There are still two outstanding things that we are working in

each service. Mark and his folks are working their mission-essential, time-critical needs. We on the Air Force side are seeing how

this will fit in with our C–130/C–17 fleet mix.

All of those things have to come together in the May timeframe

for a milestone C decision.

I would tell you that is where we are today.

Mr. MARSHALL. So that is a general description. What are some

of the specific issues here where you see a possible difference of

opinion that could cause Air Force to say, ‘‘We are not on board,’’

or Army to say, ‘‘We are not on board?’’

General CHANDLER. At this point, sir, I would tell you I am not

sure there are issues like that.

Mr. MARSHALL. Do you think you are going to get there?

General CHANDLER. I think we are going to get there at this

point.

General CURRAN. Sir, I don’t know of any that come to mind.

Mr. MARSHALL. I guess we are asking for bids with data rights.

Is Army still telling Air Force Air Force has to pay for the data

rights, Army is not interested?

General SORENSON. Sir, let me address that. As was mentioned

before, in the RFP, we have requested contract line items for the

vendors to basically bid the data rights and, at some point in time,

the Army and the Air Force will do the business case analysis,

sometime, per statute, over the next five years to make a determination is it better to proceed with contracts for logistics support

or do we take those data rights, excise that particular CLIN option,

buy the data rights and do organic support.

The business case analysis will be done after the award is made

and the milestone C decision.

Mr. MARSHALL. The Army recognizes that Air Force has a slightly different circumstance than the Army finds itself in. Air Force

has depots capable of managing this thing and has core requirements that necessitate that those depots have workload.

General SORENSON. That is why those contract line items are

there to be priced in the RFP as they provide their response.

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, that is very encouraging.

Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. The other day, when the Chief of Staff was here

with the Secretary of the Air Force, they talked a little bit about

the aircraft retirement issue and I was wondering if you could give

us a list, just a verbal list here of the aircraft, the types of aircraft

that are old and need to be retired and why they need to be retired.

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General CHANDLER. Sir, there are five different systems that are

involved. The B–52 is one of those. The B–52 has been a great

workhorse for us. We think we can do the job with fewer of those

aircraft.

We have a three-pronged approach really to the next generation

long-range strike aircraft, said another way, a new bomber. One of

those is to modernize the existing fleet.

One of the ways for us to do that is to decrease the size of the

B–52 and use the funds remaining to modernize and continue to

upgrade the existing fleet and we think that is a viable way to do

business.

C–130E, you are familiar with some of the stresses that we have

got on that aircraft in terms of the center wing box problem and

that is primarily the reason for retirement and the fact that we

don’t want to AMP those airplanes either.

The F–117A has been a great airplane for us. It is first generation stealth. It is a very expensive airplane to fly. We have replacements coming online in the F–22 and if you look at what we can

do with the B–2 and the F–22 combined, we think it is acceptable

to let that aircraft go to the bone yard.

We hate to do it. It is a great airplane and it has served us well.

I think we tend to forget that it was in the black world for a long

time and we were flying it for quite a while before it was generally

known that we had that aircraft.

KC–135E, I think we have been through all the issues with regard to the engine mounts and why we would like to retire the last

85 of those aircraft.

Then the U–2, again, has been a great aircraft for us. It is,

again, getting to be old, difficult to maintain. Global Hawk gives

us a lot more persistence when you take the person out of the cockpit. We can now get a lot more persistence than we can get with

a U–2, for example.

We think we can meet the combatant commander’s needs. We realize that we need to meet those needs before we start to bring the

U–2 offline. So we are going to have to make the Global Hawk program work as advertised.

But those are the five systems, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. I may have missed it, but I thought you said earlier

that there were a few C–5s.

General CHANDLER. I am sorry. C–5 is also a part of that. I

would tell you there is a knee in the curb somewhere, as we described earlier, as we talked, about how many C–5s we need to do

the job. We will provide you the list of outsized cargo.

We have got the Patriot battery in its full mode is one of those

and, as the GAO described, there are some other systems that can

only be hauled in that aircraft. But whether or not we need the full

111 in that program AMP’ed and RERP’ed, which is our program

of record today, is going to be dependent on whether or not we can

make AMP and RERP work for us the way we thought it was going

to work.

Mr. SAXTON. And the chief and the secretary, also, one of them

mentioned a figure, a cost figure to keep airplanes around that we

are not using because they are not safe or that we don’t need and

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I was astounded to find out from them that they thought that figure was about $1.7 billion a year.

Can you tell us how we run up a bill like that?

General CHANDLER. Sir, that bill basically involves about 400 aircraft, I think the number is 407, to be exact.

That bill totals up storage costs, as well as the costs to keep

them in storage and the inspections required and, in the meantime,

it also includes the cost to fly and maintain those aircraft that we

would like to retire until such time as we could retire them.

Mr. SAXTON. And I understand that, not being an aeronautical

guy myself, I understand that when an airplane sits like that, you

have to do things to it to maintain it, even though it never flies.

General CHANDLER. Yes, sir. Part of the language that we are

dealing with right now involves inviolate storage, which means we

have to be able to bring that aircraft out of storage in a certain

amount of time and be able to fly it.

So not only are you paying the storage costs and the required inspections in storage to make sure that it is at that status, there

is a cost avoidance issue in terms of not being able to cannibalize

parts from those aircraft to keep the remainder of the fleet flying

that we are talking about, also

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Mr. MARSHALL. Just following up a little bit on that.

It would be enormously helpful to us and I suspect to Air Force

if this bend or knee or whatever you were talking about there, if

you have an analysis that suggests that in the mix, meeting the

mobility capabilities study’s minimum at least, it would be better

to have fewer C–5s for some reason and more C–17s, I mean, that

is the kind of thing we need to know now.

We also need to know if, in fact, there are some C–5s out there,

As, Bs, that for reasons we are unaware of and certainly aren’t

suggested by the teardown of the one C–5A, because that indicated

to the fleet viability board that the C–5A fleet was fine, but for reasons that we are just not aware of at this point, that some of those

really do need to be retired.

General CHANDLER. Sir, we will work with General Kane and Air

Mobility Command. We owe you a list of aircraft out there, if that

lists exist, and we will also go back and look at the appropriate

mix.

We appreciate that question.

Mr. MARSHALL. And we may need to real quickly think about

how do we establish that, in fact, these things are going to be too

expensive to fix. Obviously, Air Force came in and said, ‘‘Let’s retire all the C–5As’’ and Congress, for whatever reasons, part political, part not, I suspect, said, ‘‘Let’s get IDA to look at it’’ and then

IDA came back and said, ‘‘No, the most cost-effective thing to do

here is RERP/AMP. Keep the C–5A around.’’

So it is very different from what Air Force wanted to do and so

we may be in a position where somebody needs to be talking to

somebody like IDA to say, ‘‘Hey, fellows, we are going to have to

do this on a hurry up schedule here. We have got some planes that

we really think ought not to be flying and we may need you to lend

your voice to Congress on this subject.’’

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I would encourage you to think along those lines.

General CHANDLER. Sure, we will take that for the record.

Mr. MARSHALL. I guess I would end by saying that we appreciate

your service and your patience here today and the service of all

those who managed to stay awake behind you through your testimony and then all of those who serve for us in the armed forces.

God bless you all.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 7, 2007

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

MARCH 7, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does the Air Force see the Joint Cargo Aircraft as necessary

in meeting its intratheater airlift requirements and obligations for Air Mobility

Command? Why would additional procurement of C–130J aircraft not meet these requirements?

General CHANDLER and General KANE. The JCA and C–130J have similar capabilities for use in the intra-theater airlift role. Both are capable of short takeoff and

landing at fields as short as 2000 feet and in high altitude and hot conditions (95

degrees F at 6000 ft pressure altitude). Both aircraft are capable of moving the department’s standard 463 L pallet and can airdrop container delivery system bundles. Additionally, both aircraft will be equipped with all the requisite communications, navigation, and defensive gear to operate as an integral part of our combat

theater airlift system.

Still, the C–130J offers capabilities that the JCA does not, and the JCA offers efficiencies not available in the C–130J. The C–130J is faster and offers greater cargo

capacity, higher climb gradients, and more flexibility on similar sized runways than

the JCA. The C–130J is compatible with all current Air Force Material Handling

Equipment (MHE) and can accept a 463L pallet configured at a standard height of

96 inches, both of which the JCA cannot. Finally, the C–130J can carry many vehicle types that the JCA cannot (Stryker, Fire Engine, Up-armored HMMVVE etc).

However, our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows frequent, and required,

movement of less-than-C–130 sized loads. In these situations, the JCA offers more

efficiency than the C–130J because its cost to operate per flight hour is less. Similarly, depending on which aircraft is selected for the JCA, it may burn fewer pounds

of fuel per passenger or pallet mile than the C–130J.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. There have been concerns raised about promoting fair and

open competition during the tanker recapitalization program in regards to World

Trade Organization subsidy allegations between the U.S. and European Union,

Berry Amendment compliance for specialty metals, and International Traffic in

Arms Regulations for construction and final assembly. How do you plan to mitigate

these issues during the KC–X program and what factors go into source selection?

General HOFFMAN. Our planned approach for all of the issues listed is focused on

legal and regulatory compliance, rather than issue mitigation. Our specific actions

taken on each issue are detailed in our Request for Proposal (RFP) and listed below.

None of these concerns are considered as separate or specific evaluation factors in

the RFP and all offerors must comply with all applicable laws and regulations.

World Trade Organization (WTO): Wording in the special clauses section of the

RFP (Section H034) disallows contractor pass-on of costs resulting from past,

present, or future WTO rulings:

‘‘H034 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE—COSTS UNALLOWABLE Any penalties, taxes, tariffs, duties, or other similar-type costs imposed by a Governmental entity as a sanction, enforcement or implementation measure resulting from a decision in the Matters of European Communities and Certain Member States Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil

Aircraft, United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft

before the World Trade Organization shall not be included in the negotiated

price of this contract, nor shall such costs be an allowable direct or indirect

charge against this contract.’’

Berry Amendment: Offerors must comply with applicable specialty metals restrictions, although offerors may submit waiver requests in accordance with applicable

law and regulations. Per the RFP, paragraph 8.3.3, Berry Amendment Compliance:

‘‘If an Offeror is unable to comply with the specialty metals restrictions set

forth in the clause, and intends to seek an exception under 10 USC

2533b(b) (‘‘Availability Exception’’), the Offeror shall submit a request for

a Domestic Non-Availability Determination (DNAD) waiver no later than

30 days after release of the RFP. Offerors requesting a DNAD shall provide

factual information to justify approval of the determination as part of their

DNAD request.’’

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International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): Offerors must comply with established ITAR guidelines and regulations.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How do you plan to fairly evaluate the airlift and aerial refueling capabilities of the KC–X bidders’ submissions and what metrics will you use?

General HOFFMAN. Our acquisition planning has focused on ensuring the KC–X

program proceeds in a fair, full and open competition and all efforts have been made

to present program information in a fully transparent manner. We emphasized this

environment of fairness in the source selection planning and in the evaluation. The

following KC–X program Request for Proposal sections are included to highlight our

evaluation process and list the metrics used in the source selection evaluation. The

following is an excerpt from the KC–X request for proposal, Section M001 Source

Selection and Section M002 - Evaluation Factors:

‘‘The Government will select the best overall offer, based upon an integrated assessment of Mission Capability, Proposal Risk, Past Performance,

Cost/Price and the Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA).

Contract(s) may be awarded to the offeror who is deemed responsible in accordance with the FAR, as supplemented, whose proposal conforms to the

solicitation’s requirements (to include all stated terms, conditions, representations, certifications, and all other information required by Section L of

this solicitation) and is judged, based on the evaluation factors and subfactors, to represent the best value to the Government. The Government seeks

to award to the offeror who gives the AF the greatest confidence that it will

best meet, or exceed, the requirements. This may result in an award to a

higher rated, higher priced offeror, where the decision is consistent with the

evaluation factors and the Source Selection Authority (SSA) reasonably determines that the technical superiority and/or overall business approach

and/or superior past performance, and/or the IFARA of the higher priced offeror outweighs the cost difference. The SSA will base the source selection

decision on an integrated assessment of proposals against all source selection criteria in the solicitation (listed below). While the Government source

selection evaluation team and the SSA will strive for maximum objectivity,

the source selection process, by its nature, is subjective and, therefore, professional judgment is implicit throughout the entire process.

2.1 Evaluation Factors and Subfactors

The following factors and subfactors will be used to evaluate each proposal.

Award will be made to the offeror submitting the most advantageous proposal to the Government based upon an integrated assessment of the evaluation factors and subfactors described below. The Mission Capability, Proposal Risk, and Past Performance evaluation factors are of equal importance and individually more important than either Cost/Price or IFARA

evaluation factors individually. The IFARA is equal in importance to Cost/

Price. Within the Mission Capability factor, the five (5) subfactors are listed

in descending order of relative importance from 1 to 5. In accordance with

FAR 15.304(e), the Mission Capability, Proposal Risk, Past Performance,

and IFARA evaluation factors, when combined, are significantly more important than Cost/Price; however, Cost/Price will contribute substantially to

the selection decision.’’

List of Evaluation Factors and Subfactors:

Factor 1: Mission Capability

Subfactor 1: Key System Requirements

Subfactor 2: System Integration and Software

Subfactor 3: Product Support

Subfactor 4: Program Management

Subfactor 5: Technology Maturity and Demonstration

Factor 2: Proposal Risk

Factor 3: Past Performance

Factor 4: Cost/Price

Factor 5: Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does the Army view the Joint Cargo Aircraft as a core asset?

Does the Air Force, Air Mobility Command and/or regional air component commander adequately meet intra-theater airlift requirements of the Army by moving

required equipment and supplies the ‘‘last tactical mile’’?

General SORENSON. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is a core asset to the Army

for delivery of time-sensitive mission-critical supplies. As per Joint Publication 4–

0 (Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations), it is the Service Component’s

responsibility to distribute supplies to their subordinate units after the component

receives the supplies at the Service Component hand-off point, which in most cases

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is the Sustainment Brigade area. The Army’s JCA complements the Air Force Common-user Airlift pool. Both are necessary to get things where they need to be (point

of need) when they need to be there (timeliness).

Given the amount of supplies that must be transported, the JFC must ensure this

is done efficiently. Most bulk supplies (such as fuel, non-perishable food, and water)

are moved by surface transport (ships and trucks). Other supplies must be transported more rapidly (such as low density or high demand repair parts, ammunition,

perishable goods, blood and medical supplies, etc). These are typically moved by air

to the theater by strategic airlift, and further distributed within the theater by Air

Mobility Command assets OPCON to the JFC. These common-user airlift assets routinely deliver their cargo to Service Component hand-off nodes, typically Army

Sustainment Brigades. These supplies, now under the ownership and control of the

Ground Component, must be further distributed to the point of need - ‘‘the last tactical mile.’’ This portion of tactical distribution (i.e., ‘‘the last tactical mile’’) is the

responsibility of the Ground Component Commander (Army). To effectively accomplish this tactical distribution of supplies to the point of effect, the Ground Component Commander uses a mix of ground, rotarywing and fixed wing transportation

assets under his control. The Army JCA will be used to provide responsive transport

of time-sensitive mission-critical assets to forward units - ‘‘the tip of the spear.’’

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In September 2005, GAO completed a report titled Air Mobility

Command Needs to Collect and Analyze Better Data to Assess Aircraft Utilization;

what lessons were gained from that report and what actions have been taken in response to the GAO report?

General KANE. Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) Air Mobility Master Plan (AMMP)

recognizes that ‘‘Accurate tracking of cargo is critical to efficient deployment and

sustainment operations.’’ Improving data collection and subsequent analysis is an

ongoing effort within AMC and TRANSCOM. Innovative technologies, such as Radio

Frequency Identification Tags (RFID), have been incorporated into the Global

Transportation Network (GTN) to significantly improve in-transit visibility. Requisitions may now be tracked in a manner similar to UPS or Federal Express. Further, the formation of the Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center (JDPAC) will

consolidate the analytic power of the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution

Command (SDDC) and the AMC Analysis Directorate (A9) into one center of excellence; improving the distribution process from an end-to-end perspective.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Schwartz, Commander, United States Transportation

Command, and General McNabb, Commander, Air Mobility Command, testified in

March 2006, that no more than 200 C–17s would be the ideal C–17 force structure

as long as it did not affect procurement of the KC–X tanker aircraft. Further, given

the increased C–17 utilization rate for intra-theater airlift operations, the condition

of the C–130E/H fleets, the lack of defined airlift requirements for Army modularity

and Future Combat Systems operations, and the personnel end strength increases

of the Army and Marine Cops, what does Air Mobility Command now believe is the

ideal number of C–17s to have in the Air Force inventory?

General KANE. Air Mobility Command, through United States Transportation

Command, is currently engaged with the joint community to help define the scope

of the planned Army/Marine Corps end strength increase and its impacts on air mobility. Quantifiable insights in response to this question are anticipated in the early

June 2007 timeframe.

Neither the most recent Mobility Capability Study (MCS) published in 2005 nor

the follow-on excursions in MCS–06 included the force structure in question. OSD

and the Joint Staff anticipate the next MCS round to begin in the Spring of 2008.

This study should fully incorporate and examine the changes to Service force structure and impacts on mobility (air, land, sea, and prepositioning).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. What is the current critical need of the Joint Cargo aircraft and the

status of the acquisition?

General HOFFMAN and General CHANDLER. Based on experience in Afghanistan

and Iraq, the JROC validated the JCA Capability Development Document (CDD) to

address a capability gap for delivery of time-sensitive/mission-critical cargo.

The Milestone C decision to proceed to Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is

planned for 30 May 07. Assuming approval to enter LRIP, the Joint Program Office

will announce the winner of the JCA competition in the summer.

Mr. MILLER. Have there been major conflicts regarding the JCA between the

Army and the Air Force?

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General HOFFMAN and General CHANDLER. Sir, to answer your question up

front—absolutely not. The Army and the Air Force have been rapidly moving out

on this joint program ever since receiving guidance in December 2005 to join the

Army’s Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) and the Air Force’s Light Cargo Aircraft (LCA)

programs. The Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff signed a Joint Memorandum

of Agreement (MOA) that outlines the way ahead addressing roles and missions,

command and control, standardization and training, sustainment, resources and

public affairs efforts. On the current timeline, we anticipate a milestone decision in

late May with source selection announcement to follow about a week later. The

Army and the Air Force are on track to jointly procure the same basic aircraft platform for the Joint Cargo Aircraft program.

Mr. MILLER. What is the current critical need of the Joint Cargo aircraft and the

status of the acquisition?

General CURRAN AND GENERAL SORENSON. The JCA is one of the key elements

of Army Aviation Transformation, specifically in regards to the Army National

Guard and the Army Reserve. The JCA will replace aging and inadequate C–23

Sherpas, C–26s and some C–12 aircraft with a more capable, modernized, cargo aircraft. The JCA will also provide relief to the CH–47 fleet which is currently carrying

a large portion of the logistics transportation burden. The JCA will reduce stress

on the CH–47 fleet for logistical transport, while increasing the availability of CH–

47s for tactical missions. The JCA will also reduce ground tactical convoys and risk

to Soldiers.

The JCA will meet the Army’s critical need for a robust, multi-functional fixed

wing cargo aircraft able to operate on short, austere, unimproved landing areas.

Service component commands are responsible for logistic support of their forces, including the distribution of supplies from the Service hand-off point to the point of

need. The Army JCA will deliver critical cargo and personnel to the point of need—

the last tactical mile. The Army’s primary mission for the JCA is responsive, ondemand transportation of time-sensitive/mission-critical cargo and key personnel to

forward deployed tactical units. The JCA will deliver cargo as far forward as feasible, either directly to the tactical maneuver units or the closest forward support

base for further movement by Army rotary wing aircraft or ground transportation.

On return missions, the JCA will backhaul personnel and repairable equipment for

repair.

The JCA is a joint Army/Air Force program with the Army as the lead agency.

A joint program office was established on 1 October 2006. The Army and the Air

Force have agreed that the Army and Air Force JCA will be the same basic platform. However, the Air Force may include selected mission equipment packages

(MEP) on the JCA to address broader intra-theater airlift requirements. The Army

will initially procure 64 TOE aircraft plus 4 training and 7 operational readiness

floats, for a total of 75 JCAs. These aircraft will be split 75/25% between the Army

National Guard and the Army Reserve. The Air Force will initially procure 40 JCAs.

Further Air Force JCA procurement plans are pending completion of an intra-theater fleet-mix analysis in December 2007.

On 17 March 06 the Defense Acquisition Executive approved the Acquisition

Strategy for a nondevelopmental aircraft for the JCA, and the Request for Proposals

was subsequently released. The JCA is currently nearing the completion of the

source selection process. Milestone C is scheduled for 30 May 2007. The Army plans

to start fielding the JCA in late 2008 with the first unit to be equipped in 2010.

The Air Force will start fielding the JCA in 2012.

Mr. MILLER. Have there been major conflicts regarding the JCA between the

Army and the Air Force?

General CURRAN AND GENERAL SORENSON. Today the Army and the Air Force are

working closely together towards the fruition of the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program. To the Army, the JCA shores-up its direct support capability to deliver timesensitive/mission-critical equipment to Brigade Combat Teams and subordinate

units on the current and future asymmetrical battlefield. To the Air Force, it supplements it current intra-theater bulk hauler, the C–130, with added efficiency and effectiveness. The benefits to both Services are clear and consequently we are working

together towards this common end.

Only a year ago both Services were still grappling with the challenges inherent

in merging two programs into one as directed by the Director, Acquisition Executive

for Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Army had a two year jump start with

its Future Cargo Aircraft program and had obtained Joint Staff approval and OSD

approval. The Air Force had just determined a possible need for a light, bulk hauler

to compliment its C–130 fleet, but did not have the opportunity to begin the analysis

to determine the specifics defining the requirement. Obviously this program mismatch in regards to concept and requirement development resulted in initial clashes

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between the Army and Air Force in regards to platform, utilization and the defining

lines of debarkation between Army and Air Force pertaining to operating on the battlefield. Over the past few months, the Army and Air Force have resolved these

issues as witnessed in obtaining Joint Staff and OSD approval for the program in

regards to business case analysis, Joint Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and

programmatics. The program’s Milestone C decision is schedule for May 2007, we

anticipate contract award following that decision.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER

Ms. TAUSCHER. The USAF Program of Record supports modernization of the entire C–5 Fleet (A/B/Cs). The 2006 QDR and 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study validated that 292 strategic airlifters meets national requirements and included modernized C–5s as part of that solution set. Your FY08 PB submission fully supports

both AMP and RERP programs for the entire C–5 fleet. These documents and reports indicate complete DoD support for the C–5 modernization program, yet recent

AF comments in testimony and to the media raise questions regarding your commitment to this important program, and quite honestly, are sending mixed signals. For

the record, does the AF support the results of their own studies to modernize the

entire C–5 fleet? If not, what new studies have the AF done that would now suggest

that fleet modernization of the C–5s is not the right solution?

General CHANDLER. A November 2000 Analysis of Alternatives on Outsize and

Oversize Cargo Airlift Capability came to the conclusion that the C–5 RERP program offered the best value approach at that time, and the Air Force crafted its program based on that conclusion. No new formal studies, along the lines of the 2005

Mobility Capabilities Study, have addressed this issue. However, the Air Force continually examines force structure options based on the most up-to-date information

available and is currently refining analyses to inform decisions on the most costeffective mixture of C–5s and C–17s to meet strategic airlift requirements. Also, the

Department is examining options and inputs from ongoing analyses associated with

defense planning that may impact strategic airlift requirements.

Ms. TAUSCHER. AF and Industry studies have previously affirmed the value of C–

5 modernization as the most cost effective solution for the entire fleet. In a fiscally

constrained environment, it simply makes sense to modernize all the C–5s as part

of your baseline capability and if there is a need for more airlift, you build additional capability with C–17s? The AF has testified that it would prefer to rid itself

of C–5As and buy more C–17s, yet the AF’s own data suggests they have similar

annualized O&M cost, and the C–5 already has a cheaper cost per-ton-mile. Trading

serviceable C–5s simply doesn’t seem to be good stewardship of the taxpayer’s

money, especially when C–5s carry twice as much cargo and you can RERP three

C–5s for the cost of one C–17. It seems to me that a more balanced approach is

the right way to go and that for the AF to enter into a trade—discussion is simply

not the correct way to view the current situation. Why isn’t a fully modernized 111

C–5 fleet and 190 C–17s (or more if needed) an adequate solution? Why does the

AF feel compelled to make this an either/or discussion on C–5As and C–17s?

General KANE. Since the AMC Outsize and Oversize Cargo Analysis of Alternatives recommended modernization of the C–5 fleet in August of 2000, projected

modernization costs have risen significantly. Additionally, the C–5A fleet has begun

to exhibit stress corrosion cracking that must be repaired. This further adds to the

investment needed to maintain the viability of the fleet. Hence, the years required

for operational cost savings from C–5 RERP to recover expenses of the program

have increased. At current projected prices, an investment to modernize 40-year-old

C–5s makes much less business sense than it did just a few years ago. Adding to

this concern is the looming shutdown of the C–17 line, currently projected to start

in October of this year and be complete in September 2009. Should production line

shutdown begin, and we then decide to procure more C–17s, the cost to start a new

aircraft line would be very high, not to mention the potential operational cost we’d

pay as we dealt with the production gap.

Operationally, the C–17 provides improved reliability over the C–5, even the fully

modernized version, and is more flexible and responsive to warfighter needs with

the ability to safely fly into more short and unimproved airfields. Overall, it’s the

best platform for providing enhanced support to the warfighter on a dispersed battlefield. To maintain our baseline strategic airlift capability we need a mix of C–

5s and C–17s. Current cost projections combined with the operational advantages

of the C–17 point to the retirement of some of our oldest C–5As and replacing them

with newer, more flexible C–17s that cost less per flying hour.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN

Mr. AKIN. So if you are planning a mission and you have both of these rebuilt

A models—unless you are a gambling man—you are going to send two sets of gear

for every one that wants to land and do the job?

General KANE. Some of the payloads the C–5 can carry are the Mark V Special

Ops Patrol Boat and towing vehicle; Navy FFG–7 Frigate Reduction Gear on Light

Tactical Vehicle (LTV); Navy Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles on LTV; Space

Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor and LTV; Minuteman SSCBM; and the Mobile Medical

53 ft. Hospital. These are six common ‘‘C–5 only’’ payloads as certified by the Air

Transportability Test Loading Agency.

1. Mark V Special Ops Patrol Boat and towing vehicle

2. Navy FFG–7 Frigate Reduction Gear on LTV

3. Navy Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles on LTV

4. Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor & LTV

5. Minuteman SSCBM

6. Mobile Medical 53 ft Hospital

■ These are six common ‘‘C–5 only’’ payloads. See below for other ‘‘C–

5 only’’ ATTLA certified loads

Additional List of ‘‘C–5 Only’’ Items:

SEAWOLF PROPULSOR AND TALBERT HEAVY

LIFT TRANSPORTER.

TITAN IV STAGES 1 & 2 CORE VEHICLE

TRANSTAINER

45 TON LIMA TRUCK CRANE TITAN IV UPPER FLIGHT SECTION UFS

BATCH PLANT AGGREGATOR CEMENT MIXER TITAN IV UPPER FORWARD ADAPTER SIMULATOR UFS

MILLER ADVANCED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

MATS VAN

ATLAS II/CENTAUR II

ARBAU-KLAUS KM32 SIDE LOADING CRANE,

ARBAU KLAUS

AN/TSM–163 Maintenance Center-Battalion

AFOG THEATER VAN WITH HYDRAULIC FIFTH

WHEEL TRACTOR

Small Repair Parts Transporter (SMPT) M–1032

BW SHIPPING CONTAINER TRAILBLAZER COMPONENTSAN/TSM–164 Maintenance Center-Battery

AFE-PRO 93–03 SV–424 TRAILER AFE/PRO 93–03 DGA TRUMP D40–D DEICING TRUCK, DG–A DEICING TRUCK

DSV SEACLIFF TURTLE MINI MUTES

SM97,NAUTILE,FRENCH SUBMERSIBLE,

FRENCH SUBMARINE

M703 TRAILER, M–313 TRAILER, M–656 HMTT,

S–280

CATERPILLAR 3516 POWER PLUS MODULE GENERATOR/TRANSFORMAN/TSQ–112 GENERAL PURPOSE DETECTING

SET (TACELIS)

S/C CONTAINER PPLU TRAILER TDRSS NASA S101, S102 SHELTERS, M113 PERSONNEL CARRIER

GODDARD MODIFIED

GPS–12 SPACECRAFT AFRTS SYSTEM

LMSC VBG EQUIPMENT VERTEX EARTH STATION, NABORS TRI-AXLE

TRAILER

HUGES SYNCOM IV LEASAT Spacecraft and Associated EquipCOMMUNICATIONS RESTORAL SYSTEM AN/

TSC–115

ESS SPACECRAFT TRANSPORTER/SPACECRAFT

HANDLING FIXTURE

DBA SYSTEMS ELECTRONICS VANS, INTERNATIONAL F–2375

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XTE X-Ray Timing Explorer Transporter System MILSTAR MOBILE CONSTELLATION CONTROL

STATION MMCCS (Lockheed)

GLOBAL GEOSPACE SCIENCES (GGS) POLAR

PROJECT SPACECRAFT/TRANSPORTER

DORSAY TRL.MODEL DDG & FREIGHT -LINER

TRACTOR MODEL 120

TITAN II PAYLOAD FAIRING, MARTIN MARIETTA MOBILE ADVANCE DISASTER ELEMENT - ONE

(MADE-ONE) FEMA

COMMERCIAL TITAN MISSILE, CORE VEHICLE

STAGES I AND II

40 FOOT VAN ID# B17890 SV–459

ARFOR Trailer (Mobile Training Classroom with

HVAC extension)

Mobile Telemetry Data System (MTDS) Trailer

P&H 430–ATC Crane (Harnischfeger) JPL ELECTRONICS VAN TRAILER

SMC Missile Transporter Tractor/Trailer AN/MSQ–118, CSS SHELTER

AVCATT–A Simulators & Electrical Equipment TrailersAFE/PRO 94–01 ALUMINUM BODY TS1 TRAILER

USCENTAF 609 ACOMS Van Trailers AFE/PRO 96–04 AND 96–05

PTS Support Benson 48–ft aluminum single drop flatbedMilstar Mobile Constellation Control Station

(MMCCS) with Antenna Deployment Enhancement

Sattelite Communication Control Central (SCCC)

AN/TSQ–180VO

PTS support Fontaine 48’–70’ Single Drop flatbed

(7D–FT–5–4AW Extend)

Mine Hunter

PTS Support Great Dane 48–ft Flatbed trailers

(GPS–248)

Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS) Navy & LTV

Submersible on Trailer

JSF F–35 Air Transportability & Wing Fixture Thule Tracking Station A-Side Upgrade Program

CECOM Harris/Mobilized Systems 40’ x 14’ x 10.5’

Shelter SEES & SBX (ref 2002.11.25)

Deployable Trailers for AH–64 Aircrew Trainer Devices

Boeing Spacecraft Next Generation Shipping ContainerAFE/PRO 00–01 (Stacked S/V shipping container)

CALIPSO Sattellite on NASA double drop trailer AFE/PRO 00–01 (Stacked S/V shipping container)

Amended

MK V Special Operations Craft (SOC), Production

version with Trailer

Mobile Training Semi Trailer

F–18 Recovery Medium Payload Transporter

C–5 AMARC Horizontal Stabilizer Trailer

ACTION OFFICER INFORMATION

Action Officer’s Name and Phone Office Symbol

Lt Col Christopher Smith, DSN 779–2266 AMC/A8XL

COORDINATION

Office Symbol Action Name Phone Date Comments

AMC/DA5/8–1 Coord Mr. Scott

McMullen

779–3314 13 Apr

AF/A5RM Coord Col

Genshiemer

697-4939 17 Apr

AF/A5R Coord Brig Gen

Sabol

695–3018 18 Apr

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Office Symbol Action Name Phone Date Comments

AF/A3/5 Approve Lt Gen

Chandler

697–3331 19 Apr

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON

Mr. JOHNSON. The National Guard is responsible for Civil Support Teams (CST)

to support homeland security threats (Biological, Chemical and Nuclear) in each

state and territory. These teams consist of 22 personnel and 8 vehicles and that

must be air/land transportable and be able to deploy CONUS wide to support any

and all threats in the three categories mentioned as well as natural disasters. However, I understand that these teams cannot be transported on the Army’s two Twinengine Joint Cargo Aircraft candidate aircraft due to the limited size of the cargo

compartment. In these times of war and tight budgets, I am questioning if we have

the luxury of purchasing an aircraft that has limited utility in the theater airlift

mission and for Homeland Security mission without any flexibility for growth potential that may be required for future. Can you comment on these observations?

General KANE. To address the main issue of purchasing the JCA at this time; the

Air Force and the Army have collectively determined there is a need for JCA now

and in the future. The JCA will have a dual role: Homeland Security/Defense, and

a combatant commander support at home and abroad. The JCA will help satisfy the

critical needs of the Combatant Commanders as well as Governors.

The JCA fits a niche as a light cargo tactical airlifter. It will be capable of landing

and taking off on short, unimproved surfaces while being able to carry as much as

6,000 pounds of cargo in a hot and high pressure altitude environment, much like

Afghanistan or Nevada. Additionally, the JCA will be able to fly 1200 nautical miles

with 18,000 pounds of cargo.

As the question relates to a CST package; the primary method to transfer a CST

package to an incident is by land versus air due to 250 NM response radius. CST’s

teams were established to deploy rapidly in order to assist local first-responders in

determining the nature of an attack, provide medical and technical advice, and pave

the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets.

Currently, there are 55 CST packages that are strategically positioned throughout

the United States. Stationing criteria used to identify the CST locations included

coverage of major metropolitan areas based on population density; minimizing overlap with adjacent CSTs and other DoD response elements; and availability of existing facilities and support capabilities. The use of airlift requires coordination and

additional time. The use of airlift is conditions-based depending on the disaster scenario (e.g., earthquakes, weather) which causes decision makers to employ CSTs via

the most expeditious means. Airlift is always a consideration; however, CST responders have built their Concept of Employment around ground movement. The

JCA would augment responding forces especially to response times needed.

If an incident location is greater than 250 miles away from the CST package, airlift may be considered; however, this is a decision for the supported COCOM to

make (in this case USNORTHCOM) it would depend on a number of factors, such

as weather, airfield availability/conditions. The current airlift requirement for a

CST package is either 6 C–130’s, 2 C–17’s, or 1 C–5.

[See map and slides in the Appendix beginning on page 150.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEK

Mr. MEEK. As you undertake the KC–X acquisition to buy the next generation

Tanker, can you comment on how you will ensure our taxpayers get the best value

(best capability for best price) for our future warfighting requirements?

General HOFFMAN and General KANE. Our documented and approved KC–X acquisition plan and source selection strategy is based on obtaining the best value

(best capability for best price) for the taxpayer, while meeting all warfighter Key

Performance Parameter thresholds. We have provided excerpts from the KC–X Request for Proposal that highlight our focus on a best value source selection. Per the

KC–X Request for Proposal, section M001 - SOURCE SELECTION, 1.1 Basis for

Contract Award:

‘‘The Government will select the best overall offer, based upon an integrated assessment of Mission Capability, Proposal Risk, Past Performance,

Cost/Price and the Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA).

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Contract(s) may be awarded to the offeror who is deemed responsible in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations, as supplemented, whose

proposal conforms to the solicitation’s requirements (to include all stated

terms, conditions, representations, certifications, and all other information

required by Section L of this solicitation) and is judged, based on the evaluation factors and subfactors, to represent the best value to the Government. The Government seeks to award to the offeror who gives the AF the

greatest confidence that it will best meet, or exceed, the requirements. This

may result in an award to a higher rated, higher priced offeror, where the

decision is consistent with the evaluation factors and the Source Selection

Authority (SSA) reasonably determines that the technical superiority and/

or overall business approach and/or superior past performance, and/or the

IFARA of the higher priced offeror outweighs the cost difference. The SSA

will base the source selection decision on an integrated assessment of proposals against all source selection criteria in the solicitation.’’

Æ