OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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AAAPPPRRRIIILLL222888,,,222000000666
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

April 28, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 

 OFFICE 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING 

 COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

 

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Review of Task Force Shield Programs 

(SIGIR-06-009) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed the audit in 

accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

requires that we provide for the independent and objective conduct of audits, as well as 

leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations 

and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

We considered comments from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and the Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan on the draft of this report when preparing the final 

report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott at joseph.mcdermott@iraq.centcom.mil or at 

(703) 343-7926; or Mr. Clifton Spruill at clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil or at 

(703) 343-9275. See Appendix E for the distribution of the report. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: Distribution 
i

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SIGIR-06-009 April 28, 2006 

Review of Task Force Shield Programs 

Executive Summary 

Introduction. Task Force Shield was established in September 2003 with the mission of 

building Iraq’s capacity to protect its oil and electrical infrastructure. Iraq’s oil and 

electrical infrastructure includes approximately 340 key installations, 7,000 kilometers of 

oil pipeline, and 14,000 kilometers of electricity transmission line. To protect this 

infrastructure, Task Force Shield was to oversee the training and operation of an Iraqi Oil 

Protection Force (OPF) of 14,400 guards for the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the training and 

equipping of 6,000 Iraqi Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS) guards for the Iraqi 

Ministry of Electricity. We determined that about $147 million was spent from the 

Development Fund for Iraq and the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund on these efforts 

between August 2003 and September 2005. Records for these programs are maintained 

by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), the Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), and other U.S. agencies. 

Objectives. This report addresses the U.S.-led effort, implemented by Task Force 

Shield, from September 2003 through April 2005, to build the capacity of the Iraqi 

Government to protect its oil and electrical infrastructure. Specifically, this report 

addresses the extent to which: 

• U.S. agencies in charge of reconstruction activities provided a clear management 

structure for Task Force Shield 

• Task Force Shield trained and equipped a competent Oil Protection Force 

• Task Force Shield trained and equipped a competent Electrical Power Security 

Service 

Limitation of Assessment. As part of our efforts to perform this review in accordance 

with government audit standards, we must report that during the course of this review 

there was a lack of available program, financial, and contract records and U.S. officials in 

Baghdad with first-hand knowledge of the Task Force Shield program. Further, we did 

not receive access to selected information we requested from the Multi-National ForceIraq subordinate commands that was material to the audit objectives announced in our 

memorandum of January 27, 2006. This limitation affected our ability to respond to the 

request made during a Senate hearing on February 8, 2006, from members of the 

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to report on the capacity of 

the Iraqi government to protect its infrastructure. 

Results. Task Force Shield’s management of the programs to train and equip the OPF 

and EPSS to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government to protect its oil and electrical 

infrastructure ultimately proved to be unsuccessful. Although the OPF showed some 

initial success, the EPSS program barely got started before it was cancelled. Most of the 

information we gathered generally indicates that the lack of a clear management structure 

for the U.S. agencies responsible for the protection of Iraq’s security degraded the ability 

of Task Force Shield to effectively manage the OPF and EPSS programs. We also found 

limited records documenting program cost, how the money was used, or the location of 
ii

the millions of dollars of equipment purchased with Task Force Shield funds. The lack of 

records and equipment accountability raises significant concerns about possible fraud, 

waste, and abuse of Task Force Shield programs by U.S. and Iraqi officials. We 

therefore believe that U.S. agencies cannot provide reasonable assurance that the 

$147 million expended to train and equip the OPF and EPSS was used for its intended 

purposes. In addition, we found about $7 million in unexpended IRRF funding that is 

potentially eligible for to be de-committed or de-obligated, and used for other purposes. 

 

Indications of Potential Fraud. During this audit, we found indications of potential 

fraud and referred these matters to the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, 

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

Management Actions. During the course of this audit, we notified IRMO that we 

identified approximately $7 million currently obligated for Task Force Shield contracts 

that could be de-committed or de-obligated and used for other purposes. IRMO agreed 

and $3.1 million of these funds were de-committed or de-obligated as of April 22, 2006. 

We also notified JCC-I/A of the lack of contract documents for the EPSS contract, and 

that the EPSS Training Academy at Taji was never appropriately transferred to the U.S. 

military. JCC-I/A agreed and took steps to reconstruct the EPSS contract file and to also 

transfer the Academy to the appropriate authority. These actions were still in process at 

the time of publication of this report. 

Recommendations. We recommend the following: 

1. Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, require IRMO management to: 

• In cooperation with JCC-I/A, determine the current status of equipment 

procured for the OPF and the EPSS programs, including equipment 

transferred to the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Electricity. 

• In cooperation with JCC-I/A, conduct a thorough examination of the 

performance of the contractor in relation to the construction of the EPSS 

Training Academy at Taji. A determination needs to be made if the 

government received what the statement of work called for, and if not, a 

financial adjustment by the contractor should be made to the government. 

• In cooperation with JCC-I/A, ensure that the EPSS Training Academy at Taji 

is formally transferred from the Task Force Shield EPSS contracting officer 

representative to either the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

or the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. 

• Determine whether unexpended IRRF funds currently committed or obligated 

to Task Force Shield contracts can be de-committed, de-obligated and reallocated for other purposes. 
iii

2. Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, require 

JCC-I/A management to: 

• In cooperation with IRMO, determine the current status of equipment 

procured for the OPF and the EPSS programs, including equipment 

transferred to the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Electricity. 

• In cooperation with IRMO, conduct a thorough examination of the 

performance of the contractor in relation to the construction of the EPSS 

Training Academy at Taji. A determination needs to be made if the 

government received what the statement of work called for, and if not, a 

financial adjustment by the contractor should be made to the government. 

• In cooperation with IRMO, ensure that the EPSS Training Academy at Taji is 

formally transferred from the Task Force Shield EPSS contracting officer 

representative to either the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

or the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. 

• Determine whether unexpended IRRF funds currently committed or obligated 

to Task Force Shield contracts can be de-committed, de-obligated and reallocated for other purposes. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. IRMO and JCC-I/A officials concurred 

with the recommendations. IRMO and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also provided 

technical comments for this report. We reviewed these comments and changed our report 

where appropriate. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objectives 4 

Findings 

 U.S. Government’s Management of Task Force Shield 5 

 The Iraqi Oil Protection Force (OPF) Program 9 

 The Iraqi Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS) Program 16 

Conclusion and Recommendations 22

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 24 

B. OPF and EPSS Contract Exhibits 26 

C. Task Force Shield Programs Funding Detail 31 

D. Acronyms 32 

E. Report Distribution 33 

F. Audit Team Members 35 

Management Comments 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 36 

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 37 
1

Introduction 

Background 

As stated in the January 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority Infrastructure Security 

Working Group Final Report, “Iraq cannot prosper without the uninterrupted export of oil 

and the reliable delivery of electricity”. Iraq’s oil and electrical infrastructure includes 

approximately 340 key installations, 7,000 kilometers of oil pipeline, and 14,000 

kilometers of electricity transmission line. Coalition Joint Task Force-Shield, herein 

referred to as Task Force Shield, was established by the Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA) in September 2003, with the mission of building Iraq’s capacity to protect this 

infrastructure. We determined that about $147 million was expended from the 

Development Fund for Iraq and the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund on these efforts 

between August 2003 and September 2005, for the OPF and EPSS programs. See 

Appendix C for the funding details. 

Task Force Shield’s mission began with overseeing the training and operation of an Iraqi 

Oil Protection Force (OPF) to guard Iraq’s oil infrastructure. The OPF was a new guard 

force that was to be trained and equipped by a private security firm with the goal of 

providing a competent force of roughly 14,400 guards to the Ministry of Oil by August 

2005. In addition, the contractor was to deploy the guards and operate the guard force for 

the Ministry of Oil at the direction of Task Force Shield until August 2005. Between 

August 2003, when the OPF train and equip contract began, and September 2005 when 

final payment was made for a contract established to transition the OPF to the Ministry of 

Oil, $73.3 million was expended from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and about 

$30.8 million was expended from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)1

 to 

train and operate the OPF. 

Task Force Shield’s mission was also expanded in June of 2004 to train and equip 6,000 

Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS) guards. The EPSS had existed since 1961 but 

the CPA determined the need in January 2004 to improve its capabilities to safeguard the 

delivery of electricity to the people of Iraq. The U.S.-led training and equipping of the 

EPSS was conducted by another private security firm, with similar goals of providing a 

competent guard force to the Ministry of Electricity by March 2006 to guard Iraq’s 

electrical infrastructure. The EPSS, however, was to remain under the operational 

control of the Ministry of Electricity during the training and equipping program. 

Although Task Force Shield did not take over the program until June 2004, the CPA had 

previously allocated $50 million from the IRRF for the EPSS in February 2004, of which 

about $42.8 million was expended and $7.2 million was de-obligated from the program. 

Department of Defense Program Responsibilities. Task Force Shield was under the 

command of the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), which reported 

directly to the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida. CJTF-7 was the top coalition 

military command in Iraq from June 2003 until May 2004 when CJTF-7 was replaced by 

the U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), which is currently the top coalition 

military command in Iraq. Both CJTF-7 and MNF-I provided program and operational 

guidance and resources to Task Force Shield to execute its mission. Task Force Shield 

remained under the command of MNF-I until transferred to the Multi-National CorpsIraq (MNC-I) on April 18, 2005, which effectively disbanded Task Force Shield. 

 

1

 See Public Law 108-106. 
2

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was created in May 2003 to oversee and 

operate the interim governing authority in Iraq. In addition to providing a temporary 

government for Iraq, the CPA also had the duty to oversee the reconstruction and 

rehabilitation of Iraq. The CPA prioritized its efforts into five general areas, which 

included security and the provision of essential services such as energy to the Iraqi 

people, among others. Reconstruction and rehabilitation activities to address these 

priorities were divided into ten categories, or CPA offices, pursuant to Public Law 108-

106 to support the Iraqi provisional ministries. These ministries were advised by CPA 

personnel. The CPA office of the Senior Oil Advisor to the Ministry of Oil provided 

guidance and funding to Task Force Shield for the OPF program. The CPA office of the 

Senior Electric Advisor provided funding for the training and equipping of the EPSS. 

The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) supports MNF-I by 

providing operational contracting support for non-construction projects, such as the OPF 

and EPSS programs, that support U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq. As part of this mission, 

JCC-I/A is the current repository for all non-construction contract files including the 

contracts to train and equip the OPF and the EPSS. JCC-I/A also has the responsibility of 

the administration for all records for all U.S. property obtained through JCC-I/A 

contracts. 

The U.S. Army’s Joint Area Support Group-Central manages the DFI money that is 

administered by the U.S. Government. The DFI was originally managed by the CPA 

Comptroller, however, when CPA was dissolved in June 2004, the CPA Comptroller was 

realigned as the Joint Area Support Group-Central Comptroller, who assumed 

responsibility for the DFI. This included tracking and managing DFI payments for the 

OPF train and equip contract. 

 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division and the Project and Contracting 

Office merged on December 4, 2005. The Project and Contracting Office, was a 

temporary organization created under the Department of Defense on May 11, 2004, by 

National Security Presidential Directive 36, United States Government Operations in 

Iraq, which replaced the CPA Program Management Office. Both the Project and 

Contracting Office and the Program Management Office provided project management 

and administrative support to Task Force Shield to execute the OPF and EPSS programs. 

As a result, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division is the current 

repository for program and project management files, including those that still exist for 

Task Force Shield. 

 

Department of State Program Responsibilities. The CPA was dissolved on June 28, 

2004, and replaced by the U.S. Mission to Iraq as sovereignty of Iraq was transferred to 

the Interim Iraqi Government. Prior to the dissolving of the CPA, the U.S. established 

the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) on May 11, 2004, pursuant to 

National Security Presidential Directive 36. IRMO, a temporary office within the 

Department of State and the U.S. Mission to Iraq, was established to facilitate the 

transition to a democratically elected, sovereign government of Iraq. IRMO executes its 

mission by assisting the U.S. Ambassador in setting reconstruction policy and provides 

expertise and operational assistance to Iraqi ministries in the reconstruction process. 

IRMO is organized into sectors to support the current Iraqi ministries much in the same 

manner as the CPA. As such, the IRMO Oil and Electric Sectors supported the Ministry 

of Oil and the Ministry of Electricity’s involvement with the OPF and EPSS programs. 
3

Chronology of Task Force Shield. Table 1 summarizes the chronology of significant 

events relating to the Task Force Shield program. 

Table 1: Chronology of Task Force Shield 

Date Significant Event 

August 2003 

The contract to train and equip the OPF is awarded by the CPA for one 

year with a potential option year. 

September 2003 

Task Force Shield is established under the command of CJTF-7 and is 

made responsible for the training and equipping of 6,650 OPF guards. 

December 2003 

Total OPF guard requirements are increased to 14,400 guards including 

mobile patrol teams to guard the oil pipelines. 

March 2004 

The contract for the EPSS program is awarded by the U.S. Army 

Northern Region Contracting Command for one year with a potential 

option year. 

May 2004 

The former Republican Guard base at Taji is chosen as the site to build 

the EPSS Training Academy.

 

June 2004 

Task Force Shield takes over responsibility for the training and equipping 

of the EPSS. 

August 2004 

The contract to train and operate the OPF is extended until December 31, 

2004. 

December 2004 The contract to train and equip the OPF expires. 

January 2005 

The Oil Security Transition Contract to extend support of the OPF 

through April 2005 is awarded. 

January 2005 Ministry of Oil assumes control of the OPF. 

March 2005 

The first year of the EPSS contract comes to an end and the option for a 

second year is not exercised. 

March 2005 

IRMO gives the EPSS training academy at Taji to the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command – Iraq. 

April 2005 Task Force Shield is disbanded on April 18, 2005. 

April 2005 The Oil Security Transition Contract expires. 

Source: SIGIR 
4

Objectives 

This report addresses the U.S.-led effort, implemented by Task Force Shield to build the 

capacity of the Government of Iraq to protect its oil and electrical infrastructure from 

September 2003 through April 2005. Specifically, this report addresses the extent to 

which: 

• U.S. agencies in charges of reconstruction activities provided a clear management 

structure for Task Force Shield 

• Task Force Shield trained and equipped a competent Oil Protection Force 

• Task Force Shield trained and equipped a competent Electrical Power Security 

Service 

For a discussion of the scope (including limitations), methodology and a summary of 

prior coverage, see Appendix A. For exhibits of the OPF and EPSS program contracts, 

see Appendix B. For details on the funding, see Appendix C. For definitions of the 

acronyms used in this report, see Appendix D. For a list of the audit team members, see 

Appendix F. 
5

U.S. Government’s Management of Task Force 

Shield 

We have previously reported2

 on problems caused by the lack of clear management 

authority and responsibility for reconstruction activities and the OPF and EPSS programs 

managed by Task Force Shield provides another example. Almost all of the people 

involved in the Task Force Shield program have left Iraq, and with little government 

documentation on the program, we could not develop a precise picture of all that 

occurred. However, based on available records and several interviews of personnel with 

knowledge of the program, it is clear that the OPF and EPSS programs were beset with 

confusing management and inconsistent oversight from its inception. 

Support from CJTF-7 and the CPA: August 2003 – May 2004. A key document 

describing the management of the OPF, which was the primary focus of Task Force 

Shield, is an after-action report prepared by the OPF contractor.3 While we recognize 

that this document describes events from the OPF contractor’s perspective, it nonetheless 

provides a good historical timeline of how management changed as the Task Force Shield 

programs evolved. According to the report and former CPA officials, the original 

contract was awarded by the CPA on behalf of the Ministry of Oil, using DFI funds under 

CPA control. Given that the OPF contractor was to guard Ministry of Oil assets, the 

beneficiary was the Ministry, represented by the CPA Senior Oil Advisor’s office. 

At the same time, security was a CJTF-7 responsibility and the OPF contractor was 

expected to integrate into the array of forces under CJTF-7’s control. However, the OPF 

was initially placed under the operational supervision of Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil, a 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers organization working for the CPA, and tasked with 

program management of the oil infrastructure refurbishment. The CPA’s contracting 

office retained contractual oversight. Thus, from the beginning the OPF fell under three 

managers; CJTF-7 which had overall command and control of all security forces, Task 

Force Restore Iraqi Oil which had initial operational supervision of the OPF program 

(replaced by Task Force Shield in September 2003), and the CPA Senior Oil Advisor’s 

office which had contractual responsibility for the OPF contract. 

The after-action report states that almost from the beginning, there were tensions between 

the various stakeholders and their staffs. According to the report, CJTF-7 wanted to 

unload site guarding commitments from its mission portfolio. Task Force Restore Iraqi 

Oil wanted security for reconstruction projects but did not have the mission or resources 

to provide it. The office of the CPA Senior Oil Advisor was primarily interested in 

raising oil production and refinery output and had limited understanding of security 

issues or guard forces. According to the OPF contractor who prepared the report, the 

diversity of stakeholder interests was exacerbated by the lack of a coherent coordinating 

mechanism. 

As plans for the OPF began to take shape, a major change in contract oversight and 

tasking took place. According to the contractor, Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil was fully 

focused on its reconstruction program management mission and saw the need to 

 

2

 Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs (Report Number SIGIR-05-

022, October 24, 2005). 

3

 The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment (Erinys Iraq 

Ltd., October 1, 2005). 
6

disaggregate oversight and control of the oil infrastructure security function, for which it 

was not structured. Therefore, the CPA created Task Force Shield in September 2003 as 

the new military unit to take on this role. The contractor and former members of the unit, 

however, state that its responsibilities were never clearly understood and its reporting 

relationships in the CJTF-7 or CPA chain of command were never clarified. 

Other sources we spoke with also stated that the unclear reporting relationships caused 

confusion within Task Force Shield as to which agency, CJTF-7 or the CPA, was 

ultimately responsible for providing guidance and resources. This resulted in both 

personnel and resource problems through the early part of the units’ formation that 

persisted until April 2005. For example, the CPA Oil Ministry directed that the OPF 

organize into three regional commands that corresponded to the major oil infrastructure 

nodes in Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Basrah. Task Force Shield, however, only had four 

personnel to oversee OPF operations across Iraq from September 2003 to January 2004. 

Although Task Force Shield made every effort to be “in the field” observing OPF 

operations, according to former members of the unit, it would take the commander of the 

Task Force Shield 20 days to make a trip through Iraq to observe all of the OPF sites. 

The Task Force Shield commander requested 42 additional staff (for a total end-strength 

of 46 personnel) but the CPA rejected the request. CJTF-7 then added an additional eight 

coalition personnel for a total of end-strength of 12 personnel by April 2004. 

The 12 members of Task Force Shield were responsible for overseeing the operations of 

approximately 14,400 OPF guards and about 80 contractor personnel across Iraq. 

Although all of the former members of Task Force Shield interviewed for this report held 

the OPF contractor personnel in high-regard and thought of them as an extension of the 

unit, we believe that Task Force Shield’s ability to oversee the OPF during the first 

several months of the program was limited due to the their lack of personnel and 

equipment required to adequately oversee the OPF program. This problem persisted 

throughout Task Force Shield’s management of the OPF and EPSS programs.4

 

Support from MNF-I and the IRMO: May 2004 – April 2005. In early summer 2004, 

MNF-I and IRMO replaced CJTF-7 and the CPA, respectively, and the CPA’s Senior Oil 

Advisor office was subsumed into IRMO as its “Oil” Sector. The transition of power 

from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government also gave Iraqi ministries control of DFI 

funds. According to the contractor report, the first year of the contract was coming to an 

end and Task Force Shield was focused on the process of negotiating terms for the 

contract’s second year. According to the report, however, the Coalition’s interest in the 

OPF program had lessened due to the change in reconstruction priorities resulting from 

the transfer of authority to the Interim Iraqi Government and the increasing costs of the 

programs. While MNF-I clearly saw infrastructure security as part of its mission, it 

seemed to have difficulty engaging with either the Project and Contracting Office or Task 

Force Shield to determine how the OPF or the EPSS could best be integrated into the 

Coalition’s evolving concept for securing infrastructure. At the same time, the Ministry 

of Oil, now in control of DFI funds, was intent on taking greater responsibility for 

securing its own infrastructure. Nevertheless, the OPF contract was extended on August 

11, 2004 until December 31, 2004. 

The staffs of the Ministry of Oil, the IRMO Oil Sector, and the Project and Contracting 

Office conducted a review of all oil sector projects in October 2004, which included a 

review of Task Force Shield OPF projects. The CPA had allocated $68 million from the 

 

4

 Task Force Shield took over oversight of the EPSS program from the IRMO Electric Sector in June 2004. 

 
7

IRRF for oil security projects through Task Force Shield in FY 2004. This included 

planned funding for projects for the emergency repair of the oil infrastructure and for the 

purchase of mission essential equipment such as vehicles, communications, and weapons 

for Task Force Shield and for the OPF. However, only about $33 million of the $68 

million allocation was approved for obligations and expenditures. The IRMO Oil Sector 

found that while some of the projects directly benefited Task Force Shield and/or the 

OPF, others did not according to IRMO Oil Sector officials. Specifically: 

• Task Force Shield had initiated a project for the construction of three regional 

operations centers for the OPF. IRMO officials questioned the utility of these 

centers because the OPF was being transitioned to the Ministry of Oil at the end 

of December 2004 and Task Force Shield and the OPF contractor would not be 

involved in the operation of the OPF. In addition, at least one of the centers was 

to be built within the International Zone in Baghdad where the OPF could not 

access it. When Task Force Shield could not provide adequate justification or 

documentation for these operations centers, IRMO Oil Sector officials cancelled 

the funding for the project. 

• Task Force Shield had committed almost $23 million of the $68 million IRRF 

allocation to complete the construction of the EPSS Training Academy at Taji.5 

According to available Task Force Shield project documentation, the Minister of 

Oil agreed to enter into a partnership with the Minister of Electricity to construct, 

operate and maintain the Training Academy at Taji, which would now also train 

OPF guards. About $13.4 million of the $23 million was eventually disbursed for 

the project, but Task Force Shield and IRMO Oil Sector officials could not 

determine exactly how many OPF guards were trained at the academy. 

Funding and U.S. interest in managing the OPF and EPSS programs dried up towards the 

end of 2004. Task Force Shield had asked the IRMO Oil Sector for additional funds to 

extend the OPF contract past December 31, 2004. The OPF contract, however, was 

funded with DFI funds and there were no more DFI funds administered by the U.S. 

available at the time to continue the contract. Control over DFI funds transferred to the 

Iraqi government and Task Force Shield could not convince the Ministry of Oil to extend 

the OPF train and equip program, according to IRMO officials. As a result, the OPF 

contract expired as planned on December 31, 2004 with control of the OPF scheduled to 

transfer to the Ministry of Oil on January 1, 2005. Therefore, the OPF program was 

terminated eight months earlier than the CPA had originally planned. 

In the case of the EPSS program, the IRMO Electric Sector took a more critical interest 

in the program as the costs for the program increased. The IRMO Electric Sector 

conducted an analysis to justify the cost of training per each student and this was deemed 

too high for either the Ministry of Electricity or the IRMO Electric Sector to sustain. As 

a result, the IRMO Electric Sector determined in January 2005 that the EPSS contract 

would be allowed to expire on March 9, 2005, thereby terminating the EPSS program one 

year earlier than the CPA had originally planned. 

Although IRMO officials said the discussion about the status of the OPF and EPSS 

programs were held at the highest levels by both U.S. civilian and military officials, we 

could not locate, nor were we provided with, any information or documentation on 

 

5

 As listed in Table 5, the $23 million was for Modification P00002 of the EPSS train and equip contract. 

 
8

MNF-I’s role, if any, in the decision to let the OPF contract expire and have control of 

the OPF transferred to the Ministry of Oil. According to former members of Task Force 

Shield, the contract was set to expire as the Interim Iraqi Government prepared for the 

January 2005 elections. MNF-I was concerned that if the OPF was under the command 

of the Ministry of Oil during the elections it would not be able to prevent Anti-Iraqi 

Forces from interdicting the flow of oil. If this happened, Iraq would not be able to 

generate enough electrical power in Baghdad and across the country to hold the elections. 

Therefore, the Oil Security Transition contract was awarded on January 3, 2005, through 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division to retain a reduced number of 

contractors from the firm that had the OPF contractor under the oversight of Task Force 

Shield to support the transition of the OPF to the Ministry of Oil until April 30, 2005. 

We believe the need for the Oil Security Transition Contract resulted from a lack of 

coordination between MNF-I and IRMO as to who was in charge of Task Force Shield 

and the OPF (and EPSS) programs. The OPF and EPSS programs are discussed in detail 

below. 
9

The Iraqi Oil Protection Force (OPF) Program 

Training and Equipping the OPF 

We could not determine whether Task Force Shield’s OPF program objectives were met 

for a number of reasons. First, the file for the OPF program in JCC-I/A’s contract 

database was incomplete. Second, the OPF contractor representative maintained that all 

program documentation and intellectual property was provided to the IRMO Oil Sector 

but the IRMO Oil Sector is not currently in possession of these documents. Finally, the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Regional Division did not provide us access to its 

electronic oil sector program management files, which we believe contained additional 

information on the OPF and Task Force Shield. As a result: 

• The specific line item costs of the program could not be verified. 

• The number of OPF guards trained by the contractor could not be verified. 

• The majority of the equipment procured for the OPF could not be accounted for. 

We also could not clearly determine the effectiveness of the OPF under Task Force 

Shield. 

Program Costs. Our analysis indicated that the total available funding for the OPF 

program was $136 million, with about $104 million in expenditures. Our analysis shows 

that the OPF program received approximately $98.6 million in DFI funding for the 

original OPF train and equip contract, and about $37.8 million in IRRF funding. The 

IRRF funds include about $33 million approved from the $68 million allocated to Task 

Force Shield by CPA, and $5 million for the contract to transition the control of the OPF 

to the Ministry of Oil. However, the available records show that only about $104 million 

of available funds were expended. Of the $98.6 million in DFI funds, records show that 

about $73.3 million was actually disbursed for the contract. Except for a pending 

$387,000 payment to the OPF contractor, the roughly $25 million funding balance has 

been returned to the Iraqi government. Of the $37.8 million in IRRF funding, available 

records show that $30.8 million was disbursed, leaving $7 million available funding 

balance. For details of the OPF funding, see Table 2. 
10

Table 2: Task Force Shield Funding Activity for OPF 

 between August 2003 and September 2005 (Dollars in Millions) 

* A $387,000 payment is pending to the contractor. 

Source: SIGIR analysis of available U.S. program and funding data

DFI Funding. 

We could not clearly determine what specifically was purchased with the DFI money 

because of a lack of clearly written contract requirements6 and a lack of detail in the 

contractor invoices. Rather than a clearly itemized description of the supplies or services 

provided, the contracts and invoices tended to lump costs into large aggregate categories, 

such as labor or equipment and material. For example, Modification P00004 increased 

the cost of the OPF contract almost $21 million for additional equipment and security 

guards who were to be trained to meet the OPF’s expanded mission requirements. 

However, none of the documentation describes how many guards or what types of 

equipment the $21 million was used for. Table 3 shows the eleven modifications made to 

the contract between August 2003 and August 2004, and the description of what was 

purchased on each. 

 

6

 For an exhibit of the OPF contract, see Appendix B. 

Oil Protection Force (OPF)

Purpose Obligated 

and 

Committed 

Expended Funds Deobligated 

by U.S. 

Funds 

Returned to 

Iraqi 

Government 

Potential DeCommitment 

or DeObligation 

DFI

Total DFI: 

Train & Equip contract 

for OPF

$98.6 $73.3 $ 0 $25.0 * $ 0 

IRRF

CPA allocation to 

Task Force Shield to 

support OPF activities 

(includes EPSS 

Training Academy) 

$32.8 $26.9 $ 0 n/a $5.9 

Oil Security Transition 

Contract 

$5.0 $3.9 $ 0 n/a $1.1 

Total IRRF $37.8 $30.8 $ 0 n/a $7.0 

Total Funds $136.4 $104.1 $ 0 $25.0 $7.0 
11

Table 3: OPF Train and Equip Contract Modifications Associated with DFI 

Funding 

Source: SIGIR

IRRF Funding. 

Records describing how the IRRF money was spent were somewhat better. Data 

provided by the IRMO Oil Sector from the Army Corps of Engineer’s Financial 

Management System showed that about $26.9 million was expended from the funds 

provided by the CPA. This included the $13.4 million that was disbursed to complete the 

construction of the EPSS Training Academy at Taji in order to train OPF personnel. 

Another $13.5 million of the total was disbursed on various types of equipment for Task 

Force Shield and the OPF. This included armored vehicles, weapons, communications 

equipment, night vision goggles and other equipment. The numbers and cost of this 

equipment is fairly well documented, however as discussed below, the cost of the EPSS 

Training Academy is not. 

We also identified about $7 million in IRRF funds that can potentially be re-allocated. 

For instance, we identified approximately $5.9 million of IRRF funds that remained 

committed or obligated for Task Force Shield contracts as of January 29, 2006, nine 

months after Task Force Shield was disbanded. Due to the lack of manpower during the 

transition from the CPA to IRMO, a de-emphasis on the reporting of security related 

projects by IRMO for the Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

submitted quarterly to the U.S. Congress, and the lack of contract and project 

documentation maintained by Task Force Shield, we believe that the IRMO Oil Sector 

may have lost visibility of some of these projects. This has resulted in a lack of 

documentation for equipment procured through these contracts, which is discussed in 

Date 

(m/d/y) 

Modification 

Number 

Description of 

Modification Amount Total Cost 

08/12/03 P00001 

Administrative 

Changes $0 $39,454,896

08/21/03 P00002 

Administrative 

Changes $0 $39,454,896

12/31/03 P00003 

Equipment and 

personnel $9,939,933 $49,394,829

01/19/04 P00004 

Equipment and 

personnel $20,800,000 $70,194,829

02/24/04 P00005 

Furnish third 

surveillance aircraft $0 $70,194,829

02/15/04 P00006 

Administrative 

Changes $0 $70,194,829

08/05/04 P00007 Contract Extension $0 $70,194,829

08/08/04 P00008 Contract Extension $0 $70,194,829

08/10/04 P00009 Contract Extension $0 $70,194,829

08/11/04 P00010 Contract Extension $4,000,000 $74,194,829

08/23/04 P00011 

Definitized 

Modification P00010 $24,452,859 $98,647,688
12

more detail below. Former Task Force Shield officials have indicated to us that most, if 

not all, of these contracts should be closed and, as such, we believe the $5.9 million could 

potentially be de-committed or de-obligated and used for other projects. Without a 

determination on whether these funds should be re-allocated or expended, we could not 

determine the exact cost of the OPF program. 

In addition, we found $1.1 million in IRRF obligated funds that had not been disbursed 

for the OPF Oil Security Transition Contract. About $5 million from the IRRF was 

obligated on December 25, 2004 for the contract, which was awarded on January 3, 2005, 

by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division for the transition control of 

the OPF from Task Force Shield to the Ministry of Oil. Although the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers awarded the contract, the $5 million was allocated from the IRMO Oil 

Sector’s IRRF funds and the oversight for the contract was provided by Task Force 

Shield. The contract, however, ended on April 30, 2005, with a final payment made to 

the OPF contractor in September 2005. Financial information provided by the IRMO Oil 

Sector from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer Financial Management System showed an 

open obligation of roughly $1.1 million remained on this contract as of January 29, 2006, 

and we believe that this money should also be assessed for potential de-obligation and 

availability to use for other purposes. 

Training the OPF. We could not verify the number of OPF guards trained under Task 

Force Shield. Task Force Shield was to oversee the hiring, training, equipping, deploying 

and operation of a guard force of 6,650 Iraqis to protect approximately 140 key oil sites 

for the CPA and the Iraqi Ministry of Oil in accordance with the statement of work in the 

August 2003 contract award. According to the OPF contractor after action report and 

former Task Force Shield members, the CPA gradually increased the requirements of the 

OPF so that by December 2004 the contractor was required to train a force of 14,400 

guards. The OPF would now be charged with protecting 810 key oil sites including 

mobile patrols of the oil pipelines. However, we were unable to precisely determine how 

many guards were trained because of the lack of complete and detailed descriptions of the 

services contracted or paid for. 

Although former members of Task Force Shield have stated that up to 17,300 guards 

were trained over the course of the OPF program, we were only provided with 

documentation listing 11,413 guards on the OPF’s roster as of September 23, 2004. 

These various discrepancies in the number of OPF guards expected to be trained and 

actually trained are summarized in Table 4. 

Table 4: Discrepancies in the number of OPF guards trained 

Timeframe of Training 

Requirement 

Source Guards to be 

Trained 

Guards Believed 

to be Trained 

Initial training program 

contract awarded August 2003 

Task Force Shield 

6,650

By December 2004 

Increases by CPA per 

OPF contractor’s 

after action report 14,400

Over the course of the OPF 

Program 

Former members of 

Task Force Shield up to 17,300

As of September 23, 2004 

 

OPF guard roster 

11,413

Source: SIGIR summary of available information. 
13

In addition, the lack of clearly written contract requirements and documentation verifying 

performance by the OPF contractor, as noted above, made it difficult to verify the costs 

that the contractor claimed when submitting their invoices for payment. The contractor 

used the exact dollar figures from the modifications and these did not contain detailed 

information identifying the exact number of OPF guards trained and the labor costs for 

this, as illustrated in Figure 1. 

Figure 1. OPF Contractor Invoice from September 30, 2003 

Source: JCC-I/A Contract Database 

Required monthly progress reports on training also provided little information as to the 

number of guards trained. The contractor was required to submit monthly progress 

reports on the training of the OPF to Task Force Shield to meet the quality control 

requirements of the OPF contract. These reports were to be submitted through the 

regional commands to the commander of Task Force Shield, who in turn was to 

consolidate these reports and provide updates to U.S. military and civilian agencies and 

the Ministry of Oil. However, an IRMO Oil Sector official told us that these reports were 

never provided to them. Task Force Shield officials were also required to conduct 

monthly site inspections to verify the number of guards reported by the contractor, and 

provide quality assurance reports to the contracting officer. 

We were only able to locate 36 of these reports, however, and the ones we located were 

compiled by the OPF contractor and not by Task Force Shield officials. In any event, we 

believe it would have been unlikely that Task Force Shield could have conducted 

inspections of all 810 OPF sites with its limited personnel. Given the lack of quality 

control and quality assurance reports and other supporting documentation to verify the 

costs the contractor billed the CPA for training the OPF guards, we were unable to 

confirm whether the OPF contractor fully complied with requirements of the contract 

since we could not validate the number of guards actually trained to protect Iraq’s oil 

infrastructure. 
14

Equipping the OPF. We identified, but could not account for $21.2 million worth of 

equipment procured for the OPF. Through available receiving reports, payment records, 

and other official documentation we determined that $7.7 million was disbursed for 

equipment through the OPF train and equip contract using DFI money. This included 

$1.2 million for six armored vehicles, $5 million for 310 other vehicles, and $1.5 million 

for communications equipment. Task Force Shield also disbursed about $13.5 million 

from the CPA’s IRRF allocation for the OPF for 9,792 automatic rifles worth $1.8 

million and 7,000 sets of protective vests and armored plates worth $1.6 million, among 

several other items.7 

The lack of documentation maintained by U.S. agencies made it difficult to determine 

whether the OPF or the U.S. government is in possession of this equipment. For 

example, receiving reports indicate that the 9,792 automatic rifles were received by U.S. 

government officials in August 2004. One equipment inventory report provided to us 

dated September 23, 2004, however, indicates that the OPF should have had 5,515 rifles 

on-hand but could only account for 3,015 of these. It is not clear from available 

documentation, however, whether all of the 9,792 weapons were distributed to the OPF 

or if there is a remaining inventory. In addition, although financial records show that the 

protective vests and armored plates were paid for by the U.S. government, we could not 

locate nor were we provided with receiving reports for this equipment. Furthermore, 

Task Force Shield’s inventory report did not list the number of sets of distributed and 

whether the OPF had this equipment on-hand. 

Task Force Shield and IRMO Oil Sector officials believe all of the weapons and vests, 

along with the rest of the equipment procured for the OPF, has either been transferred to 

the Ministry of Oil or other U.S. government agencies. In some cases, IRMO Oil Sector 

officials provided confirmation of the location of some of the equipment transferred to 

U.S. government agencies in writing. This does not, however, properly document how 

the equipment was transferred or account for all equipment transferred to U.S. agencies. 

Additionally, we were not provided with any official documents verifying the transfer of 

equipment to the Ministry of Oil. Therefore, we could not officially confirm the current 

location of most of the equipment procured for the OPF or verify that it was transferred to 

the appropriate recipients or in accordance with property transfer requirements. 

 

Effectiveness of the OPF. The effectiveness of the OPF under Task Force Shield was 

difficult to determine. For the first seven months of the program, from August 2003 to 

February 2004, available data indicates a correlation between an increase in the number 

of guards in the OPF and the decrease in the number of sabotages of Iraq’s oil 

infrastructure. With 3,500 OPF guards in place from August 2003 to October 2003, AntiIraqi Forces attempted to sabotage the oil infrastructure 54 times with the OPF preventing 

seven of these attacks before any damage to the infrastructure occurred. In contrast, 

Anti-Iraqi Forces attempted to sabotage the oil infrastructure 35 times from December 

2003 through February 2004; and the OPF, now with about 12,000 guards deployed,8

prevented 20 of these attacks. The locations of these attacks are illustrated in Figure 2. 

 

7

 Some of the equipment purchased with the CPA’s IRRF allocation for the OPF, such as an additional 8 

armored vehicles worth $1.3 million, was used by Task Force Shield in support of the OPF program. 

8

 We could not confirm the amount of OPF guards trained and deployed during these months. 
15

Figure 2: Attacks and Pre-Empted Attacks on Iraq’s Oil Infrastructure from 

December 2003 through February 2004. 

 Source: Task Force Shield 

It is not known, however, whether the OPF actually deterred the attacks on the pipeline in 

this period or whether Anti-Iraqi Forces focused their efforts elsewhere. Former Task 

Force Shield and CPA officials have said, however, that the OPF was one of the few Iraqi 

security forces that held its ground and repelled Anti-Iraqi Forces when they increased 

their attacks across Iraq in 2004. We do not, however, have similar data detailing the 

number of sabotages that the OPF prevented from March through December 2004 to 

validate former Task Force Shield and CPA official’s opinions. 

Management Actions

During the course of this audit, we notified the IRMO Oil Sector that we believed 

approximately $7 million currently committed or obligated for Task Force Shield 

contracts could be de-committed or de-obligated and used for other purposes. IRMO Oil 

Sector officials agreed and initiated actions with JCC-I/A and the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers Gulf Region Division to de-commit or de-obligate these funds. We 

determined that as of April 22, 2006, $3.1 million of these funds were already 

de-committed or de-obligated. The balance of the funds is expected to be de-committed 

or de-obligated by the end of May 2006. 

Tigris R.

Euphrates R.

Kuwait City Distance in kilometers

0 75 150

Tallil

Irbil

Ar’ar

Samawah

Hamadan

Umm Qasr

Dezful

Ghabur Gate

Qurnah

Baqubah

Ar Rutbah

Dayr az Zawr

Rafha

Sulaymaniyah

Bashur

Hadithah 

Dam

UNCLASSIFIED

Ninawa

Damage/

Sabotage

Prevented 

Samarra

Fallujah

Kufa

Najaf

Hillah

Diwaniyah

Al Qaim

Bayji

Basrah Zubayr

Safawan

Ar Ramadi

Kirkuk

Baghdad

Mosul

Karbala

Latafiya

Tikrit
16

The Iraqi Electrical Power Security Service 

(EPSS) Program 

Training and Equipping the EPSS 

We could not determine the extent to which Task Force Shield met any of the CPA’s 

program objectives for training and equipping 6,000 EPSS guards due to a lack of 

program and contract documentation maintained by U.S. agencies. Specifically: 

• The specific costs for the program cannot be verified. 

• The construction of the Academy in accordance with the statement of work 

cannot be verified. 

• The total number of students trained at the Academy cannot be confirmed. 

• The majority of the equipment procured for the EPSS cannot be accounted for. 

Cost of the EPSS Program. Based on available contract documents, the original EPSS 

program cost was $19 million, as awarded on March 10, 2004, which included all labor, 

transportation, tools, training aids, equipment, weapons and ammunition, facilities and 

life support required to perform the statement of work. The cost of the contract was 

subsequently increased to $64.8 million when the contract was definitized on November 

10, 2004, with contract Modification P00002. The cost on the final modification for the 

contract, however, was about $59.5 million. Cost adjustments included de-obligations of 

about $6 million for cancelled orders of equipment and about $50,000 for cancelled 

construction, and an increase of $700,000 for security costs. Table 5 shows the six 

modifications made to the contract between July 2004 and March 2005, and summarizes 

what was purchased with each modification. 

 

Table 5: EPSS Train and Equip Contract Modifications 

Source: SIGIR 

The final cost represents a 313% increase over the original $19 million cost of the 

contract. Most of this increase resulted from the fact that the government used a letter 

contract. Letter contracts are typically used for emergencies or other immediate needs 

and place all risk on the government by allowing work to begin before the cost is 

negotiated between the contractor and the government. As a result, the final total cost of 

the contract exceeded the $50 million that the CPA office of the Senior Electric Advisor 

had allocated in February 2004 from the IRRF to pay for the EPSS program by about 

$9.5 million. 

Date Modification 

Description of 

Modification Amount Total Cost 

07/02/04 P00001 Base Year Increase $23,029,025 $42,029,025

11/10/04 P00002 Supplies & Services $22,806,833 $64,835,858

02/22/05 P00003 De-obligation $(5,957,287) $58,878,571

03/09/05 P00004 Base Year Increase $ 643,758 $59,522,329

03/22/05 P00005 

Administrative 

Changes $0 $59,522,329

No Date P00006 Final Closeout $0 $59,522,329
17

However, financial records from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial 

Management System indicate that about $42.8 million was expended from the 

$50 million that the CPA had obligated on this contract. The remaining $7.2 million was 

de-obligated from IRRF funds in Fiscal Year 2005 and used for other purposes.9 For 

details of the EPSS funding from IRMO Electric Sector funds, see Table 6. 

Table 6: Task Force Shield Funding Activity for EPSS between August 2003 and 

September 2005 (Dollars in Millions) 

Source: SIGIR analysis of available U.S. program and funding data 

There are few documents that identify exactly how funds provided for the EPSS were 

spent. We believe the bulk of the money was spent on the construction of the EPSS 

Training Academy at Taji, but cannot verify this because we were not provided with all 

estimated or actual costs of construction. The cost estimates for specific line items in 

statement of work for the EPSS train and equip program were not included in the contract 

award or subsequent contract modifications.10 Rather, the contract documents and 

invoices only identify in broad categories how the money was used. For example, 

Modification P00002 shows the modification was for the purchase of supplies and 

services to complete the statement of work but does not identify specifically what was 

purchased. 

During our audit we were provided with documents detailing some of the program 

purchases (as noted in this section), but these documents were incomplete and did not 

provide a full picture of all program expenditures. In addition, we could not locate a 

signed copy of Modification P00006 which closes the contract, although U.S. 

government and contractor officials all have indicated the contract is closed. Because 

additional documentation for the costs of the program was not available, including the 

signed copy Modification P00006, we were unable to substantiate the total costs of the 

EPSS program. 

Construction of the EPSS Training Academy at Taji. The Academy at Taji was not 

built according to the requirements specified in the statement of work of the EPSS 

contract. Phase 1 of the contract called for the construction of a permanent training 

facility for the EPSS through the renovation and/or refurbishment of an existing structure 

 

9

 Total expenditures on the EPSS train and equip contract were $56.2 million. This includes the 

$42.8 million disbursed from the Electric Sector funds and $13.4 million from Oil Sector funds used to 

complete the construction of the EPSS Academy. 

10 For contract, see Exhibit 2 of Appendix B. 

Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS) 

Purpose Obligated 

and 

Committed 

Expended Funds Deobligated 

by U.S. 

Funds 

Returned to 

Iraqi 

Government 

Potential DeCommitment 

or DeObligation 

CPA allocation for 

the training and 

equipping of the 

EPSS 

$50.0 $42.8 $7.2 n/a $0 

Total IRRF $50.0 $42.8 $7.2 n/a $0 
18

and construction of new facilities. The statement of work in the EPSS required the 

construction of a permanent structure suitable for large class training and formal 

presentations for 400 people. Our site visit conducted on March 12, 2006, however, 

verified that an existing open air pavilion was renovated and substituted for a new large 

auditorium/multipurpose room. The renovation of the pavilion appeared to be comprised 

of the installation of a concrete pad, installation of new overhead lighting, and partial 

replacement of the metal roof panels. The contractor's estimated budgeted cost for the 

construction of the auditorium/multipurpose room was $1.4 million. We estimated the 

cost of the renovation of the existing open air pavilion would likely be between $50,000 

and $100,000 and therefore substantially less than $1.4 million. The open air pavilion is 

shown in Photo 1. 

Photo 1: Open Air Pavilion Substituted for the Auditorium/Multipurpose Room 

Source: SIGIR

Neither the government nor the contractor could provide any documentation explaining 

why this substitution was made. The requirement for the construction of the auditorium 

was consistent throughout the life of the contract. The only other changes to the 

construction requirements were reflected in changes to the statement of work or in a 

modification to the contract. For example, the original contract called for 30 sleeping 

rooms to accommodate 300 people was changed to the current arrangement of 12 open 

bays that accommodate 34 people each in the June 16, 2004 statement of work and 

codified in Modification P00002 on November 10, 2004. In addition, the elimination of 

the Muslim religious worship center, which included a corresponding decrease to the cost 

of the contract, was captured in Modification P00004. 

The project contracting officer is responsible for quality assurance oversight of the 

contract for the U.S. government and is the only U.S. government official who can make 

changes to the contract’s statement of work. During the construction phase of the 

contract, the project contracting officer was located in the United States and did not 

appoint a U.S. government official in Iraq to oversee the construction of the Academy. 

Therefore, we believe that due to the lack of oversight by the government the contractor 

was able to substitute an inferior quality building for the large auditorium/multipurpose 

room without the consent of the project contracting officer and the U.S. government. 
19

Moreover, we could not determine the financial impact of the substituted open air 

pavilion on the total cost of the contract. Although the EPSS contractor cooperated with 

SIGIR on this audit and provided us with actual construction costs through July 31, 2004, 

as well as several other documents, neither the original program contracting officer, JCCI/A, or the contractor provided us with the estimated costs for all the buildings or the final 

costs negotiated between the government and the contractor on October 21, 2004, prior to 

the definitization of the contract.11 Without this information we could not establish the 

actual costs of construction and the effect of substituting the open air pavilion for the 

auditorium that was budgeted at $1.4 million. 

 

We also identified that the Academy was never officially transferred from the Task Force 

Shield EPSS contracting officer representative to the U.S. military, which now uses the 

Academy to train U.S. forces to operate with the Iraqi Armed Forces. Prior to the EPSS 

contract expiring on March 9, 2005, IRMO made arrangements for the Academy, 

including the buildings, office equipment, and furniture, to be turned over to the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq. This command currently manages the 

facility, but a MNC-I unit runs the training program on the site. The Iraqi ministries of 

Defense and Electricity, however, signed an agreement leasing the land for the base to the 

Ministry of Electricity from May 27, 2004 to May 27, 2006. We were not provided, 

however, with any documentation indicating that the land was transferred back to the 

Ministry of Defense from the Ministry of Electricity. We believe the Academy and its 

components should be formally transferred from Task Force Shield to the proper U.S. 

military command or government agency. 

Training of the EPSS Guards. We could not verify the number of students purported to 

be trained at the Academy. Phase 2 of the EPSS contract called for the training of 300 

EPSS guards per month, and 6,000 EPSS guards over the course of two years. Training 

was to commence within three months after the contract was executed with the 

expectation that the Academy would be fully staffed and able to train a full class of 300 

guards two months after training commenced. Former Task Force Shield officials stated 

that about 700 guards from the EPSS, OPF and the Iraqi Facilities Protection Service12

were trained at the Academy from October 2004 through January 2005, which may have 

included about 300 EPSS and anywhere between 35 and 200 OPF guards. The terms of 

the EPSS contract required the contractor to provide all certificates of completion for all 

students who completed the EPSS guard course to the project contracting officer or the 

Task Force Shield contracting officer representative. We were provided, however, with 

only 334 certificates of completion to support the number of guards trained at the 

Academy and there is no way of knowing how many of the guards were from each Iraqi 

agency according to former Task Force Shield officials. 

Given the limited number of guards trained, and the overall costs of the program, IRMO 

Electric Sector officials determined the program was too costly to continue. Task Force 

Shield officials believed, however, the costs for training students would be nominal 

compared to the improvements in the capability of the EPSS once the Academy was up 

and running even though construction costs were significant. We could not analyze these 

costs to verify Task Force Shield’s statements because estimated training costs were 

never provided to us. An analysis conducted by the IRMO Electric Sector, however, 

 

11 A record of the definitization of the contract was not in JCC-I/A’s contract file; the EPSS contractor 

provided us with this date. 

12 The Iraqi Facilities Protection Service is responsible for the protection of Iraqi government buildings. 
20

indicated a cost of about $5,843 per student for the basic two week guard course. Though 

there were several factors including security-related work stoppages outside the control 

of Task Force Shield and the contractor that may have increased construction and training 

costs and timelines, we believe that because both the IRMO Oil and Electric Sectors 

could not ascertain exactly how many OPF and EPSS guards were being trained at the 

Academy, they could not justify the costs of the program. As a result, the IRMO Electric 

Sector in conjunction with the Ministry of Electricity decided to let the EPSS contract 

expire. We could not verify the effect of this decision on the capability of the EPSS 

during the course of our audit. 

 

Accountability of Equipment Procured for the EPSS. We could not account for the 

current status of approximately $4.7 million worth of equipment procured for the EPSS. 

Phase 3 of the contract called for the complete equipping of 6,000 EPSS guards over the 

course of two years. The EPSS would be equipped with vehicles, uniforms, weapons, 

ammunition, night vision goggles, protective vests, and other personal equipment. Of 

particular note, the last statement of work for the contract dated December 25, 2004 

specifically called for the following inventory to equip the EPSS: 

• 430 automatic rifles and 105 pistols • 212 sets of night vision goggles • 4,020 protective vests • 60 pick-up trucks and 10 vans 

The documentation verifying the receipt of this equipment varied. We were provided 

with receiving reports documenting 84 vehicles which included an additional 10 pick-up 

trucks and four vans, 212 sets of night vision goggles, and 4,020 protective vests. The 

weapons were provided to the contractor as Government Furnished Equipment, however, 

we were not provided with receiving reports or documentation for the transfer of the 

weapons to the contractor. As a result, we cannot confirm how many weapons were 

provided to the contractor to equip the EPSS. 

 

The IRMO Electric Sector determined that this equipment was to be inventoried and 

turned over to the EPSS when the contract expired on March 9, 2005. An official 

inventory was conducted for the rest of the equipment by JCC-I/A’s Office of the 

Government Property Administrator, who issued a report on April 21, 2005, that 

estimated the cost of the entire inventory, except vehicles, at about $3.4 million. This 

also did not include the 212 sets of night vision goggles, worth $421,880, which 

remained in the possession of the U.S. government according to a Task Force Shield 

official. We found that the inventory report was not recorded with the proper forms, the 

forms that were used were not signed and dated, and the numbers of equipment and cost 

totals were not specified. Based on this inventory, we calculated that the contractor had 

964 automatic rifles and 119 pistols valued at $103,512 in their possession at the 

Academy. We could not determine, however, how the additional 534 rifles and 14 pistols 

came into the possession of the contractor due to the lack of receiving reports and transfer 

documents noted above. 

Task Force Shield officials stated that all of the equipment procured for the EPSS 

program was turned over to the EPSS and the Ministry of Electricity or the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq, but we could not identify, nor were we 

provided with, all the proper documentation supporting these transfers. We were 

provided with four “Letter(s) of Authorization for Transportation of Sensitive Items” for 

the transportation of the inventory to the EPSS, but these documents do not account for 

all the equipment transferred to the EPSS and do not constitute an official transfer 

document according to U.S. Army regulations. We also could not locate, nor were we 
21

provided with, any documentation for the transfer of equipment from the contractor or 

Task Force Shield to Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. 

We calculated the cost of the 60 trucks and 10 vans purchased per the last statement of 

work to be about $1.4 million. The additional 14 vehicles that the contractor purchased 

cost $278,000 for a total cost of about $1.7 million for the 84 vehicles. The additional 14 

vehicles was a change in the scope of the contract that was not reflected in any statement 

of work or modification of the contract. These 84 vehicles were also to be transferred to 

the EPSS upon completion of the contract and Task Force Shield officials stated that all 

of the vehicles were, in fact, transferred to the EPSS. However, we were only provided 

with documents certifying the transfer of 48 of these vehicles to the EPSS. Task Force 

Shield officials informed us that the EPSS does not have the ability to track or locate any 

of the equipment transferred to them. Therefore, given the overall lack of proper U.S. 

government documentation for these equipment transfers, we could not determine the 

current status of the equipment procured for the EPSS. 

Management Actions

During the course of this audit, we provided JCC-I/A with the EPSS contract documents 

we collected from the contracting officer representative and notified them of the lack of 

documentation in their contract file. As a result, JCC-I/A has taken action to reconstruct 

the contract file to establish the integrity of the documentation for this contract. We also 

notified IRMO and JCC-I/A that the Academy had not been transferred to either the 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq or MNC-I. IRMO and JCC-I/A and 

have taken steps to address the Academy transfer issue, but this was not resolved at the 

time of publication of this report. 
22

Conclusion and Recommendations_________ _

Conclusion

U.S. efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government to protect its oil and 

electrical infrastructure, as implemented by Task Force Shield through the programs to 

train and equip the OPF and EPSS, ultimately proved to be unsuccessful. Although the 

OPF appeared to have been initially successful, we could only determine that about 

11,400 OPF guards were trained and equipped under this program and there is not 

enough data available to determine if the OPF was effective. The EPSS program barely 

got underway and only trained a limited amount of guards. As a result, Task Force 

Shield did not come close to meeting the CPA’s requirements for training about 20,000 

guards to protect Iraq’s oil and electrical infrastructure and both the OPF and EPSS 

programs were cancelled earlier than originally envisioned. Although most U.S. 

personnel who worked with Task Force Shield are no longer in Iraq, and few program 

records exist to document what occurred, the information we gathered generally indicates 

that the lack of a clear management structure for the U.S. agencies responsible for the 

protection of Iraq’s infrastructure degraded the ability of Task Force Shield to effectively 

manage the OPF and EPSS programs. We believe that this resulted in the cancellation of 

the programs earlier than originally envisioned. 

We also found little information on what the programs cost, how the money was used, 

how many guards were actually trained, or the location of the millions of dollars of 

equipment purchased with Task Force Shield funds. The lack of records and equipment 

accountability raises significant concerns about possible fraud, waste, and abuse of Task 

Force Shield programs by U.S. and Iraqi officials. We therefore believe that U.S. 

agencies cannot provide a reasonable assurance to the leadership of the Department’s of 

Defense and State, and to the Congress, that the $147 million disbursed to train and equip 

the OPF and EPSS was used for its intended purposes. In addition, we found about 

$7 million in unexpended IRRF funding that is potentially eligible to be de-committed or 

de-obligated, and used for other purposes. 

Indications of Potential Fraud. During this audit, we found indications of potential 

fraud and referred these matters to the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, 

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

 

Recommendations, Management Comments and Audit 

Response 

We recommend the following: 

1. Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, require IRMO management to: 

• In cooperation with JCC-I/A, determine the current status of equipment 

procured for the OPF and the EPSS programs, including equipment 

transferred to the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Electricity. 

• In cooperation with JCC-I/A, conduct a thorough examination of the 

performance of the contractor in relation to the construction of the EPSS 

Training Academy at Taji. A determination needs to be made if the 

government received what the statement of work called for, and if not, a 

financial adjustment by the contractor should be made to the government. 
23

• In cooperation with JCC-I/A, ensure that the EPSS Training Academy at Taji, 

is formally transferred from the Task Force Shield EPSS contracting officer 

representative to either the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

or MNC-I. 

• Determine whether unexpended IRRF funds currently committed or obligated 

to Task Force Shield contracts can be de-committed and de-obligated and reallocated for other purposes. 

2. Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, require 

JCC-I/A management to: 

• In cooperation with IRMO, determine the current status of equipment 

procured for the OPF and the EPSS programs, including equipment 

transferred to the Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Electricity. 

• In cooperation with IRMO, conduct a thorough examination of the 

performance of the contractor in relation to the construction of the EPSS 

Training Academy at Taji. A determination needs to be made if the 

government received what the statement of work called for, and if not, a 

financial adjustment by the contractor should be made to the government. 

• In cooperation with IRMO, ensure that the EPSS Training Academy at Taji, is 

formally transferred from the Task Force Shield EPSS contracting officer 

representative to either the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

or MNC-I. 

• Determine whether unexpended IRRF funds currently committed or obligated 

to Task Force Shield contracts can be de-committed, de-obligated and reallocated for other purposes. 

Management Comments and Audit Response. IRMO and JCC-I/A officials concurred 

with the recommendations. IRMO and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also provided 

technical comments for this report. We reviewed these comments and changed our report 

where appropriate. 
24

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology__________

This audit was initiated on January 30, 2006 (Project No. 6004) with the overall objective 

of determining whether program managers of Task Force Shield, which was created to 

provide infrastructure security for Iraq; efficiently and effectively used funds to meet the 

intended goals of the program. More specifically, we addressed the following questions 

during the course of the audit: 

• What was the role of Task Force Shield and the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office with respect to the training and equipping of security forces for oil and 

electricity infrastructure? 

• Did government officials establish policies, procedures and processes to monitor 

and manage Task Force Shield projects; particularly for the construction and 

management of the infrastructure security force training facility at Taji? 

• To what extent were equipment purchases and contractor services determined to 

be within the scope of applicable contracts and projects? 

• Did government officials establish controls to ensure the proper accountability of 

U.S. government-owned property transferred between U.S. government activities 

or to the Government of Iraq? 

Members of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations requested 

SIGIR to report on the capacity of the Government of Iraq to protect its infrastructure 

during a hearing on February 8, 2006. Pursuant to the committee members’ interest we 

expanded the scope and methodology of this audit. The methodology for this report does, 

however, incorporate answers to our initial research objective and questions in the text of 

this report. These initial findings directly support the report’s broader overall findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations. 

To determine the roles and responsibilities of U.S. agencies that directed and supported 

Task Force Shield, we interviewed the few remaining U.S. officials in Baghdad with 

knowledge of Task Force Shield. We also contacted several former Task Force Shield 

and CPA officials located in the United States to better understand who was responsible 

for the OPF and EPSS programs from August 2003 to June 2005. We then collected and 

reviewed guidance, fragmentary orders, and other records documenting the roles and 

responsibilities of U.S. agencies from MNF-I, IRMO, and U.S. government databases. 

We also met with and obtained documents from the representatives of the OPF and EPSS 

contractors located in Iraq to get their perspectives on working with Task Force Shield. 

To determine the success of the programs to build and operate the OPF, and to train and 

equip the EPSS, we interviewed current and former U.S. officials and obtained relevant 

documentation from IRMO, MNF-I, and quarterly reports submitted to the Congress to 

meet the requirements of Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106. In addition, we retrieved 

briefings, reports, and other documentation from U.S. government databases for 

additional information on Task Force Shield program and its results. 

We also collected and analyzed documents from JCC-I/A’s contract database to assess 

whether the contracts for the OPF and EPSS programs were executed in accordance with 

the requirements established by the CPA. This included reviewing available contracts, 

statements of work, contract modifications, invoices, receiving reports, transfer 

documents, contractor reports, memoranda, and other documented communications. To 

better understand the requirements of these contracts we interviewed contracting 
25

personnel from JCC-I/A, the U.S. Army, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and 

representatives from the OPF and EPSS contractors. Furthermore, we conducted a site 

inspection of the EPSS Training Academy at Taji on March 12, 2006, to assess whether 

the core structures built for the Academy met the specifications of the EPSS contract 

statement of work. Last, we reviewed all available financial data for the programs as 

provided by the U.S. government agencies in Iraq and contractors to determine the costs 

of the OPF and EPSS programs. 

Audit Limitations. Our audit was limited because the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Gulf Region Division did not provide appropriate access to the their electronic files for 

Oil and Electricity sector programs and projects, which we believe included Task Force 

Shield documents relevant to this audit. Furthermore, we requested a U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers report on lessons learned on the restoration of Iraq’s oil and electrical 

infrastructure, which contained a section on Task Force Shield, from several U.S. Army 

components, but this report was not provided to us. Last, many program documents were 

reportedly destroyed by a former Task Force Shield commander. This U.S. Army officer 

did not respond to several requests for information on OPF and EPSS program actions 

during his command. 

This audit was conducted from January 2006 through April 2006, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We reviewed Task Force Shield reports that were 

compiled in spreadsheets and other documents that were based on data taken from reports 

run in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System as provided by 

U.S. government agencies that use the system. We did not audit this financial 

management system. For more information on the reliability of data drawn from the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System, see the following U.S. 

Government Accountability Office reports. 

• Financial Management: Significant Weaknesses in Corps of Engineers’ Computer 

Controls (GAO-01-89, October 11, 2000). 

• Information Security: Corps of Engineers Making Improvements But Weaknesses 

Continue (GAO-02-589, June 10, 2002).

 

Prior Coverage. There have been no audits of Task Force Shield programs to date. 
26

Appendix B. OPF and EPSS Contract Exhibits 

Exhibits 1 and 2 are copies of the original OPF and EPSS train and equip contracts. As 

discussed, specific descriptions with detailed cost estimates per contract line item were 

not provided in the contract or in other government documents. Therefore, we could not 

determine the specific costs for services and equipment procured for the OPF and EPSS 

programs. These contracts were obtained from the JCC-I/A electronic contract database. 

Exhibit 1: The contract to train and operate the OPF 
27
28

Exhibit 2: The contract to train and equip the EPSS
29
30
31

Appendix C. Task Force Shield Programs 

Funding Detail 

Task Force Shield Funding Activity between August 2003 and September 2005 

(Dollars in Millions) 

* A $387,000 payment is pending to the contractor. 

Source: SIGIR analysis of available U.S. program and funding data.

Purpose Obligated 

and 

Committed 

Expended Funds Deobligated 

by U.S. 

Funds 

Returned to 

Iraqi 

Government 

Potential DeCommitment 

or DeObligation 

OPF: DFI Funds 

Total DFI: 

Train & Equip contract 

for OPF 

$98.6 $73.3 $ 0 $25.0 *$ 0 

OPF: IRRF Funds 

CPA allocation to 

Task Force Shield to 

support OPF activities 

(includes the EPSS 

Training Academy) 

$32.8 $26.9 $ 0 n/a $5.9 

Oil Security Transition 

Contract 

$5.0 $3.9 $ 0 n/a $1.1 

Total IRRF – OPF $37.8 $30.8 $ 0 n/a $7.0 

Total OPF $136.4 $104.1 $ 0 $25.0 $7.0 

EPSS: IRRF Funds 

CPA allocation for the 

training and equipping 

of the EPSS 

$50.0 $42.8 $7.2 n/a $ 0 

Total IRRF – EPSS $50.0 $42.8 $7.2 n/a $0.0 

TOTAL IRRF FUNDS 

Total IRRF 

(OPF and EPSS) 

$87.8 $73.6 $7.2 n/a $7.0 

TOTAL ALL FUNDS 

Total DFI and IRRF $186.4 $146.9 $7.2 $25.0 $7.0 
32

Appendix D. Acronyms 

CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force-7 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DFI Development Fund for Iraq 

EPSS Electrical Power Security Service 

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

OPF Oil Protection Force 
33

Appendix E. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace
34

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

 
35

Appendix F. Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. 

McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to the report 

include: 

Glenn Furbish 

Nelson Reyes 

Michael Stanka 

Jason Venner 

Ralph White 
36

Management Comments 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Note: Attachment is Sensitive But Unclassified, and therefore, not reproduced in this 

report. 
37

Management Comments 

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 
38