OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

April 24, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

SUBJECT: U.S. Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: Progress Made in Implementing Revised 

Management Plan (SIGIR 08-016) 

This is the latest in a series of reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

(SIGIR) assessing U.S. anticorruption activities in Iraq. SIGIR instituted reviews of these 

programs in recognition of the significant detrimental effect corruption has on Iraq’s economic, 

social, and political reconstruction. SIGIR has described corruption in Iraq as the “second 

insurgency.” Previous SIGIR reports concluded that U.S. efforts in this area lacked a 

comprehensive plan featuring metrics that tie programs to an overall strategy as well as baselines 

from which progress can be measured. Moreover, SIGIR found that U.S. anticorruption efforts 

have gone through periods of high activity and periods when they have languished. In a January 

2008 report, SIGIR reported that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq had taken, or planned to take, steps to 

improve U.S. anticorruption activities as part of a new anticorruption management plan. If those 

measures were effectively implemented, SIGIR said, they would address all SIGIR 

recommendations. Our objective for this report was to review U.S. Department of State (DoS) 

and U.S. Embassy progress in that regard. This report was conducted as SIGIR Project 8013. 

Results 

SIGIR found that DoS and the U.S. Embassy are taking steps to implement the revised 

anticorruption management plan approved by the Secretary of State on January 9, 2008. 

Although the action plan is in the early stages of implementation, progress to this point is 

encouraging. Recent actions support the plan’s goals to elevate the priority of anticorruption 

activities by reorganizing personnel and assets and improving oversight and coordination. 

Specifically, on March 11, DoS appointed a senior official as the new Coordinator for 

Anticorruption Initiatives (Coordinator) in Iraq. The Coordinator will report directly to the 

Deputy Chief of Mission and will synchronize all U.S. anticorruption policy and programs. 

Moreover, the Embassy has reassigned staff to the office of the coordinator and is recruiting 

personnel experienced in anticorruption work. The Embassy has also begun to move forward in 

other ways. It has drafted a preliminary Anticorruption Strategy Framework; set up seven 

Anticorruption Working Group (ACWG) sub-groups with specific areas of responsibility, such 

as strategy and planning, assessments, public education, and program deconfliction and 

coordination; and completed an initial inventory of all U.S.-funded anticorruption programs. 

Moreover, to monitor and provide support for GOI efforts, the Embassy has decided to track the 

status of the anticorruption initiatives announced by GOI in a January 2008 conference it held on 

the subject. 

1
SIGIR notes, and is encouraged by, the progress the Embassy has made in just the three months 

since we published our last anticorruption report. At this point, the Embassy is addressing the 

concerns we raised in January 2008 that prior efforts to revitalize and coordinate U.S. 

anticorruption efforts have been largely ineffective and suffered from a lack of management 

follow-through. We continue to encourage the Embassy’s sustained commitment to managing 

effective anticorruption efforts, particularly in terms of day-to-day leadership and senior-official 

oversight. SIGIR will continue to provide quarterly status reports on the program. 

Background

The U.S. Embassy and the Iraqi Prime Minister have stated that developing the capacity of the 

GOI to address corruption is critical to good governance. The Ambassador reported that 

pervasive corruption poses a serious threat to Iraq stability and reconstruction efforts. 

As we noted in our January 2008 report, corruption undercuts the construction and maintenance 

of Iraq’s infrastructure, deprives people of goods and services, reduces confidence in public 

institutions, and potentially aids insurgent groups reportedly funded by graft derived from oil 

smuggling or embezzlement. A report submitted by the GOI, pursuant to the requirements of the 

recently enacted International Compact for Iraq, identified “high levels of corruption and an 

immature accountability framework” within the government; incidents of corruption, the GOI 

added, could potentially be endemic. The Prime Minister stated that 2008 is the year his 

government will address corruption. 

A multitude of U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Justice, U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), Department of the Treasury, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

(MNF-I), and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are involved in 

combating corruption. The U.S. Embassy began significant efforts in this area in 2005, when it 

held an anticorruption summit. The event brought together U.S. and Iraqi officials with direct 

anticorruption responsibilities, and resulted in the rejuvenation of the ACWG. That group’s aim 

was to develop an anticorruption strategy and to synchronize it with all U.S.-led anticorruption 

activities. Heads of Embassy offices, such as the Political Affairs Section and USAID, as well as 

officials from MNF-I, participate in the ACWG. 

In July 2006, SIGIR issued a report1

 that identified problems such as a lack of coordination and 

leadership in anticorruption activities. We recommended that DoS appoint a senior leader to 

direct the anticorruption program and provide continuity in program administration. The report 

contained 11 other recommendations for program improvement. 

In July 2007, another SIGIR report assessed progress in implementing those recommendations 

and found that little progress had been made.2

 We noted that the program lacked focus and that 

the Embassy had not completed either a recommended inventory of anticorruption activities or 

an assessment of U.S. government anticorruption efforts. Of particular concern, SIGIR found 

that the Embassy lacked a comprehensive, integrated plan that tied anticorruption activities to an 

overall U.S. Mission-Iraq strategy and also lacked a baseline to measure progress. The absence 

 

1 Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program, SIGIR 06-021, July 28, 2006. 2

 Status of U.S. Government Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq, SIGIR 07-007, July 24, 2007. 

2
of a strategy made it difficult to assess funding requirements. SIGIR determined that as of June 

30, 2007, the Embassy had fully implemented only two of our 12 recommendations. In 

response, SIGIR urged that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq re-emphasize and re-address the entire 

list of recommendations made in our July 2006 audit report. As part of the re-addressing, this 

second report stated that the Ambassador should: 

1. Include in the corrective action plans an estimated completion date for implementing each 

recommendation. 

2. Complete the inventory of anticorruption programs, activities, and initiatives. 

3. Complete the assessments of the major program initiatives that are supporting the Embassy’s 

anticorruption strategy. 

The U.S. Embassy responded that it remained committed to a vigorous and effective 

anticorruption program and that the SIGIR recommendations provided a helpful framework for 

developing specific initiatives and the implementing practical plans to address this serious 

problem. The Embassy said that it would completely implement the recommendations no later 

than September 30, 2007. One month after that target date, SIGIR testified that the Embassy had 

been unable to secure enduring and effective leadership for its anticorruption program and that, 

except for progress on a few points, the overall effort had languished. Our testimony noted that 

at that time, the Embassy had neither completed its promised assessment of U.S. government 

anticorruption efforts nor drafted an integrated, strategic plan. SIGIR concluded that the 

Embassy had not addressed the ten open3 recommendations.4

In its January 2008 report,5 SIGIR said that U.S. Embassy Baghdad had developed, and received 

DoS approval of a plan to improve the management of U.S. anticorruption activities. 

Recent Actions Support Implementation of New Anticorruption 

Management Plan 

SIGIR’s current review finds that the Embassy has made progress in implementing its plan to 

reorganize and re-energize management and oversight of its anticorruption activities. The 

strategy has two major components: to elevate the importance of anticorruption activities within 

the Embassy’s area of responsibilities; and to initiate specific actions in support of the 

reorganization of Embassy priorities. Full implementation of the plan should address all SIGIR 

recommendations. However, 10 of those recommendations continue to remain open and will 

continue to remain open until the plan has been fully implemented. (See Appendix A) 

 

3

 A recommendation is closed when it has been implemented, when actions have been taken that meet the 

recommendation’s intent, or when circumstances have changed and the recommendation is no longer valid. Absent 

these conditions the recommendation remains open. 

4

 Testimony of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Assessing the State of Iraqi Corruption”, House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007 

5

 SIGIR report 08-008, “U.S. Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: Sustained Management Commitment is a Key to 

Success,” January 24, 2008.

3
Elevating Prominence of Anticorruption Activities 

DoS and the U.S. Embassy have taken measures to elevate the priority of anticorruption 

activities within the Embassy’s areas of responsibilities. The first step was assigning a highranking official of “stature and prominence” to lead the campaign, and both entities agreed that 

the coordinator should be an individual with significant State Department experience. (Such a 

person would be wholly familiar with the Embassy structure and how DoS functions.) 

On March 11 of this year, therefore, DoS appointed a senior official as Coordinator for 

Anticorruption Initiatives efforts in Iraq. The Coordinator arrived in Baghdad on March 30. He 

will report directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission and act as the Ambassador’s personal 

representative in planning, staffing, and managing the new anticorruption initiative. Moreover, 

the Coordinator will be the liaison with MNF-I, charged with synchronizing all civilian and 

military efforts. In pursuit of that duty, the Coordinator is scheduled to meet with the deputy 

commanders of MNF-I Strategic Operations and MNF-I Strategic Effects to initiate discussions 

on ensuring that civilian and military anticorruption programs and other initiatives are 

coordinated and mutually enforcing. 

Actions to Support New Anticorruption Strategy 

DoS and the U.S. Embassy had moved forward on several key initiatives in the plan before the 

Coordinator arrived. For example, the ACWG drafted an Anticorruption Strategy Framework. 

The framework outlines key elements for U.S. government engagement and programming. 

Proposed annexes will establish specific action items and program goals to advance each 

element. 

If effectively implemented, these actions would implement key SIGIR recommendations that the 

Embassy (1) give increased direction and oversight to the U.S. anticorruption effort; (2) develop 

a plan linking individual programs to a strategy; and (3) establish a policy to vet all new 

anticorruption activities through an executive steering group. 

• Reinvigorate the ACWG. SIGIR has previously determined that the ACWG was not 

sustained and in December 2007 the Embassy noted that the ACWG had been on hiatus 

again during the previous few months. The Ambassador, however, has now directed the 

group to prepare for an intensified focus on anticorruption in 2008. The ACWG is to 

serve as a forum for coordinating, integrating, and addressing conflicts among all 

Embassy and military anticorruption activities. Comprising the group are representatives 

of many U.S. government entities, including USAID, Embassy Political Affairs, the 

Economic and Rule of Law sections, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. 

Treasury Attaché, Department of Justice, Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq and MNF-I. The representatives meet each month. 

To better focus its efforts, the ACWG recently established in late January 2008 seven 

sub-groups and assigned them specific areas of responsibility, such as strategy and 

planning, assessments, public education, and deconfliction and coordination. For 

example, the Monitoring Sub-Group will assist in establishing standards for evaluate 

anticorruption assistance, programs, and outreach and for assessing GOI progress. The 

final structure of the ACWG, including the sub-groups, is subject to revision, pending the 

coordinator’s review and assessment. 

4
Appendix B provides a complete summary of the seven sub-groups and their areas of 

responsibility. Those areas generally track many of the previous SIGIR 

recommendations. If effectively implemented, the actions taken by the sub-groups would 

address such SIGIR recommendations as the following: (i) develop action plans in 

concert with an overall strategic goal; (ii) conduct a complete review of each funded 

program and assess how that program helps achieve the strategic goals; (iii) establish a 

baseline for each program to document a starting point by which progress can be 

measured. 

• Inventory and evaluate all military and civilian U.S.-funded programs. In 2006, SIGIR 

recommended that the Embassy review the effectiveness of U.S. anticorruption programs 

and the following year reiterated the need to inventory and evaluate all activities and 

initiatives. Before the coordinator’s arrival in Baghdad, the ACWG completed an initial 

inventory of those programs and gave it to him. The coordinator informed us that he 

plans to speak directly with the implementing agencies and offices during his first weeks 

in Baghdad to obtain more detailed information. That additional information, he said, 

will enable him to identify program gaps and areas in which resources may need to be 

supplemented, shifted, or curtailed. 

• Address necessary administrative support for reorganization efforts. Previous SIGIR 

reports determined that the Embassy needed to provide the personnel necessary for 

sufficient oversight of U.S. anticorruption efforts. To begin addressing this issue, in 

December 2007 the Embassy established a seven-member Anticorruption Coordination 

Office and reassigned to it Embassy employees experienced in anticorruption efforts. In 

addition, new position descriptions have been written, and recruiting for vacant positions 

is expected to begin in the near future. Coupled with the arrival of the recently appointed 

coordinator, this workforce restructuring begins to address the staffing issues. 

• Encourage and monitor GOI-initiated anticorruption activities. SIGIR previously 

recommended that the Embassy encourage the GOI to take measures to institutionalize 

anticorruption activities. The Embassy endorsed a proposal by the GOI Deputy Prime 

Minister to hold what became the January 2008 conference, and provided his staff with 

expertise and guidance on a daily basis. 

The GOI stated that the purpose of the conference was to kick off the national 

mobilization and targeting campaign to halt the epidemic of financial and administrative 

corruption in Iraq. In his opening remarks, the Deputy Prime Minister noted that 

corruption threatens the process of reconstruction, building, and investment and poses a 

serious threat to the rule of law as well as to social stability and security. He remarked 

that corruption will not be addressed through slogans, but rather through economic, 

administrative, systematic, and objective reforms that address imbalances and stalemates 

affecting the economic and administrative systems in Iraq. To address these problems, he 

presented 18 specific initiatives, assigning completion deadlines to various Iraqi 

Ministries and offices. The initiatives include ratification and implementation of the UN 

Convention against Corruption; review of contracting guidelines; follow-up on 

anticorruption audits and reports; and establishment of standards by which to evaluate 

governmental units. 

5
The ACWG established a mechanism to track the status of each GOI initiative. For 

example, Embassy liaisons to the Commission on Integrity, Iraqi Inspectors General, and 

Board of Supreme Audit have been discussing with their GOI counterparts how to follow 

up on the conference’s action items. One such item involves drafting new legislation to 

harmonize the responsibilities of these agencies. 

Conclusions 

SIGIR regards recent State Department and Embassy actions to execute its anticorruption 

reorganization plan and strategy as encouraging, but notes that sustained management attention 

is critical to overcoming the longstanding management problems that have hindered the effective 

implementation of prior efforts. The Embassy’s current and planned actions are generally 

consistent with our earlier recommendations. SIGIR supports these actions while noting that the 

revitalization of the Embassy’s anticorruption program remains in its early stages. The newly 

appointed coordinator arrived in Baghdad only recently, and the ACWG sub-groups have just 

begun their work. As a result, most of our recommendations have not been fully implemented, 

and it is too early to assess current actions. Continuation of the forward progress made during the 

calendar quarter that just ended will require sustained management commitment. SIGIR will 

continue to monitor Embassy implementation efforts, provide progress reports, and make 

recommendations as appropriate. 

Management Comments 

We provided a draft copy of this report to the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy-Iraq. 

Neither organization had comments on the draft report. 

__ __ __ __ 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Glenn Furbish, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (703) 

428-1058 / glenn.furbish@sigir.mil, or Robert Gabriel at (703) 343-7921 / 

robert.gabriel@iraq.centcom.mil. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix D. 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

Appendices 

6
Appendix A—SIGIR Analysis of Actions Planned or 

Taken To Address SIGIR Recommendations 

In July 2006, SIGIR issued a report on anticorruption activities that identified problems such as a 

lack of coordination and leadership. SIGIR made 12 recommendations to improve the 

management of U.S. anticorruption efforts. A year later, SIGIR reported that limited progress 

had been made in implementing these recommendations and that the U.S. Embassy was reestablishing and reorganizing its efforts to better oversee U.S. anticorruption activities. In 

January 2008, SIGIR reported the Embassy had completed its reorganization plan and that it had 

been approved by the Department of State on January 9, 2008. SIGIR’s 2008 assessment of 

actions taken or planned indicated that the actions generally supported the outcomes the SIGIR 

recommendations were designed to achieve, but that 10 of 12 recommendations remained open 

pending full implementation of the strategy and actions. 

This review assessed progress on the strategy and actions taken or planned since our last report 

to determine whether they addressed the 10 remaining open recommendations. SIGIR’s review 

shows that 2 recommendations have been closed6

 and some progress has been made in 

implementing the remaining 10 recommendations. Nonetheless, 10 SIGIR recommendations 

remain open pending full implementation of the strategy and individual actions. The table below 

presents U.S. Embassy actions on SIGIR’s 10 open recommendations, as of March 31, 2008 and 

SIGIR’s analysis of the actions. 

SIGIR Recommendations 

SIGIR Analysis of Actions 

Planned or Taken 

SIGIR Analysis of 

Recommendation 

Status 

Recommendation 1: The U.S. Ambassador to 

Iraq provide the necessary resources to have 

sufficient direction and oversight of the U.S. 

Embassy’s anticorruption program, including a 

senior leader from DoS and a senior officer 

from MNF-I. Both positions should be filled 

with staff that have an appropriate background 

to bring value to the position. 

On March 11, 2008, the Department of State 

announced the appointment of a senior 

official as U. S. Embassy Baghdad’s first 

Coordinator for Anticorruption Initiatives 

(Coordinator). The Coordinator arrived in 

Baghdad on March 30. 2008. In addition, 

DoS is currently recruiting to fill a Deputy 

Coordinator position and three subject-matterexpert positions. 

This recommendation was 

closed. SIGIR will continue to 

monitor progress in achieving 

sufficient direction and oversight 

of Embassy anticorruption 

efforts. 

Recommendation 2: Continue efforts to 

recruit an Iraqi local national staff member to 

provide support to the full-time anticorruption 

program manager. This person should have 

the necessary skills and level to be 

instrumental in forging joint U.S.-Iraqi 

anticorruption initiatives. 

The Anticorruption Coordination Office 

currently includes an Iraqi national who serves 

as a training liaison to the Iraqi Inspectors 

General and Board of Supreme Audit. In 

addition, a Coalition contractor with an Iraqi 

background provides technical support to the 

Iraqi Inspectors General and BSA. Decisions 

on hiring additional local staff for the office 

were deferred until the arrival of the recently 

appointed coordinator. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway.

 

6

 A recommendation is closed when it has been implemented, when actions have been taken that essentially meet the 

recommendation’s intent, or when circumstances have changed and the recommendation is no longer valid. Absent 

these conditions, the recommendation remains open. 

7
SIGIR Recommendations 

SIGIR Analysis of Actions 

Planned or Taken 

SIGIR Analysis of 

Recommendation 

Status 

Recommendation 3: Establish a joint 

executive steering group, chaired by the 

anticorruption program manager, with 

oversight of all U.S. government anticorruption 

programs to ensure that all initiatives are 

working toward a common goal in the most 

efficient and effective manner. 

SIGIR noted in its January 2008 report that 

Embassy reorganization plans supported the 

intent of this recommendation. The 

Embassy’s Anticorruption Working Group 

established in late January 2008 an Executive 

Sub-Group, comprised of USAID and DoS 

section heads, that will assist the coordinator 

in establishing, guiding, and assessing the 

Embassy’s strategies 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation 4: Direct the Joint 

Executive Steering Group to provide to the 

Deputy Chief of Mission periodic reports (at 

least quarterly) on progress, barriers, and 

funding needs to support the anticorruption 

program. 

Under the current plan, the coordinator 

reports directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission 

on a regular basis. In addition, minutes of the 

ACWG and Executive Sub-Group meetings 

are shared with the DCM’s office. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation 5: Establish a policy that 

will require all participating organizations to vet 

new anticorruption initiatives through the new 

joint executive steering group. 

SIGIR noted in its January 2008 report that 

the DoS plan to recruit a high level 

coordinator supported the intention of the 

recommendation. On March 11, 2008, the 

DoS announced the appointment of a 

coordinator, and he arrived in Baghdad on 

March 30. SIGIR will continue to monitor 

implementation of the reorganization plan to 

determine if all initiatives are being vetted 

through the coordinator. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation 6: Direct the joint 

executive steering group to conduct a 

complete review of each U.S.-funded 

anticorruption program and assess how that 

program helps achieve the U.S. Government’s 

strategic goals for anticorruption. 

In February, 2008, the ACWG completed an 

initial inventory of U.S.-funded anticorruption 

activities and provided it to the new 

coordinator prior to his arrival in Baghdad. He 

plans to meet with officials from the 

implementing agencies and offices during his 

first weeks on the job to obtain more detailed 

information on their anticorruption activities. 

Through these meetings, he plans to identify 

programming gaps and areas in which 

resources may need to be supplemented, 

shifted, or curtailed. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation 7: Direct the members of 

the ACWG to develop action plans for each 

activity’s program in concert with the overall 

strategic goals. 

The U.S. Ambassador has stated that the 

Embassy must design and implement a 

comprehensive, integrated anticorruption 

strategy. The ACWG began drafting an 

Anticorruption Strategy Framework in 

February prior to the Coordinator’s arrival. 

The framework outlines key elements for U.S. 

government engagement and programming. 

Proposed annexes to the framework will 

establish specific action items and program 

goals to advance each element. The 

Coordinator will review the draft framework 

and annexes, suggest revisions, and forward 

them to senior Embassy officials for approval. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation 8: Establish a baseline for 

each anticorruption program to document a 

starting point for the program to measure 

progress. 

The ACWG monitoring sub-group has been 

tasked with developing appropriate metrics to 

measure the success of current and future 

anticorruption programming. In addition, DoS 

is currently recruiting a program manager for 

the Anticorruption Coordination Office who will 

support this activity. Because baselines are a 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

8
SIGIR Recommendations 

SIGIR Analysis of Actions 

Planned or Taken 

SIGIR Analysis of 

Recommendation 

Status 

critical component of any evaluation, the subgroup’s purpose supports the intent of the 

recommendation. However, the sub-group 

remains in its formative stage and only 

recently began work. 

Recommendation 9: Establish interim and 

long-term objective(s) for each anticorruption 

program consistent with the overall 

anticorruption program strategy. 

In announcing the program in December 

2007, the Ambassador highlighted the 

importance of developing an anticorruption 

strategy and specific program objectives. 

Establishing such objectives will follow the 

adoption of the new Anticorruption Strategy 

Framework. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation 10:. Engage Iraqi 

anticorruption counterparts in the new 

government and establish the joint U.S.-Iraq 

ACWG. 

On May 16, 2007, the JACC charter was 

signed by the Prime Minister and senior Iraqi 

leaders, and since then, the JACC has held 

several meetings. 

This recommendation is Closed. 

Recommendation 11: Encourage the GOI to 

establish its own anticorruption working groups 

with regional and international partners. 

Key components of the December 2007 

reorganization plan address efforts to 

encourage the GOI to make such measures 

as supporting the development of 

anticorruption systems and procedures as 

part of its administrative practices at all 

government levels 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

Recommendation 12: Based on the 

unresolved recommendation 20 from the 

October 2005 DoS Office of Inspector General 

report, 7

 develop and implement an action 

plan to: 

A) Identify the training requirements of the 

Commission on Public Integrity, Board 

of Supreme Audit, Central Criminal 

Court of Iraq, and the ministerial 

Inspector Generals, with special 

emphasis on requirements that apply to 

all four institutions. 

B) Prioritize the identified training 

requirements. 

C) Identify training solutions for the 

requirements that can cut across 

multiple institutions to avoid duplication 

and maximize resources. 

The ACWG includes an Assistance subgroup whose purpose is to assist the group 

and the coordinator maintain an accurate 

inventory of USG anticorruption assistance 

programs that will prevent duplication of 

efforts among U. S. civilian and military 

entities. This sub-group was formed in late 

January 2008 and is in the early stage of 

addressing this recommendation. 

This recommendation remains 

Open, Actions Pending or 

Underway. 

 

7

Report of Inspection: Rule of Law Programs, Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq , DoS OIG, ISP-IQO-06-0, October 2005. 

9
Appendix B—Sub-Groups of the Anticorruption 

Working Group 

The Anticorruption Working Group serves as a forum for coordinating and integrating, among 

all Embassy and military anticorruption activities, and addressing any conflicts that arise in that 

regard. The ACWG includes representatives from numerous U.S. Embassy sections and military 

organizations. It established seven sub-groups in late January 2008 to perform specific, assigned 

tasks in assisting the anticorruption coordinator and ACWG: 

1. EXECUTIVE SUB-GROUP—Participants currently include the U.S. Embassy Economics 

Office, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office, Rule of Law Office and the 

Anticorruption Coordination Office (ACCO). This sub-group’s area of responsibility is 

strategy and planning. It will assist the coordinator establishing, guiding, and assessing the 

U.S. Embassy’s strategy. It is also charged with engaging international partners to coordinate 

anticorruption assistance and directing the ACWG’s other six sub-groups. 

2. POLICY SUB-GROUP—Participants include the U.S Embassy’s Legal, Political and 

Economics Offices, ACCO, U.S. Treasury Attaché Office, and the Strategic Effects Division 

of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). This sub-group’s area of responsibility is legislation 

and political consensus. It will identify legislative priorities and help build political 

consensus for anticorruption initiatives through outreach to the Prime Minister’s Office, the 

Council of Representatives, and Government of Iraq ministries and financial institutions. 

GOI anticorruption efforts will provide a major focus of attention. 

3. GOVERNANCE SUB-GROUP—Participants include the Iraq Transition and Assistance 

Office (ITAO), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Provincial 

Affairs, Provincial Reconstruction Team-Baghdad, U.S. Embassy’s Political/Military Office, 

and ACCO. The Governance sub-group focuses on implementing and monitoring 

anticorruption reform. It will advise on regulatory and administration reform, ministerial 

capacity development, and local government anticorruption initiatives. It will also address 

such concerns as public transparency and institutional safeguards against corruption. 

4. DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUB-GROUP—Participants include the U.S. 

Embassy’s Public Affairs Office, ACCO, USAID, MNF-I and Provincial Reconstruction 

Team-Baghdad. The sub-group area of responsibility is public education and citizen 

involvement. It will advise on how best to reach out to civil society. It will design public 

education, awareness and assistance materials to enhance the capacity of the media to 

investigate and monitor public integrity. 

5. RULE OF LAW SUB-GROUP—Participants include the U.S. Embassy’s Rule of Law and 

Legal Offices, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), MNF-I, ACCO 

and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Legal actions and courts will be Rule of Law’s focus. 

The sub-group will advise the coordinator and ACWG on law enforcement assistance and 

legal support for GOI and U.S. government anticorruption efforts. 

10
6. MONITORING SUB-GROUP—Participants include USAID, ITAO and ACCO. The subgroup is responsible for conducting assessments and after-action analysis. It will help the 

coordinator and ACWG establish standards for evaluating USG anti-corruption assistance, 

programs, and outreach, and for assessing GOI progress. 

7. ASSISTANCE SUB-GROUP—Participants include INL, DOJ, ITAO, ACCO, the MNF-I’s 

Strategic Effects Division and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. This 

sub-group is responsible for resolving conflicts and coordinating activities. To prevent 

duplication of efforts among U.S. civilian and military entities the sub-group will assist in 

maintaining an accurate inventory of USG anticorruption assistance programs. 

11
Appendix C—Scope and Methodology 

SIGIR initiated this review in January 2008 (Project 8013) as the first in a series of quarterly 

assessments of U.S. Government anticorruption efforts in Iraq. The objective was to determine 

the progress made by the Department of State and U.S. Embassy in implementing its plans and 

SIGIR recommendations to improve the management of anticorruption efforts for the calendar 

year quarter ended March 31, 2008. We reviewed internal management controls from the context 

of specific plans, policies, and procedures aimed at improving the anticorruption program. For 

example, we addressed such internal control issues as maintaining the requisite number and level 

of competent staff to manage the multi-agency effort, and developing systems to evaluate 

individual programs.

To determine current U.S. efforts to strengthen management, we analyzed recent U.S. Embassy 

cables and other documents detailing new anticorruption measures. We also met with Embassy 

personnel and attended meetings of the Embassy’s Anticorruption Working Group. 

To evaluate progress in addressing SIGIR recommendations, we analyzed current, planned and 

ongoing anticorruption management changes, and assessed the extent to which they supported 

the objectives of the recommendations. In each instance, we concluded whether actions (1) 

were sufficient to completely address, and therefore close out, a specific recommendation; (2) 

were pending or underway, but not to the extent that they had resolved the particular problem; or 

(3) did not address the recommendation. 

This audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978. SIGIR conducted this performance audit from January 2008 through April 2008 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this review. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed these reports and relied on them in conducting our review: 

• “U.S. Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: Sustained Management Commitment is a Key to 

Success” (SIGIR-08-008, January 24, 2008) 

• Status of US Government Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq (SIGIR-07-007, July 24, 2007) 

• DoS OIG, ISP-IGO-06-50, “Report of Inspection: Survey of Anticorruption Programs, 

Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,” August 2006 

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Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

Staff members who contributed to the report include: 

Robert Gabriel 

Dan Haigler 

Joan Hlinka 

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SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle 

Director for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

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