### Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO
Expansion

Author:  Jeffrey Simon

Note: Opinions, conclusions, and 
recommendations expressed or implied in
this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
the Department of Defense or any other government agency.



#### CONCLUSIONS

What Needs to Be Done?

Poland. During 1988-June 1989, Poland effectively
wrested the National Defense Council (KOK), which
controlled the defense and interior ministries, from the
communist party by placing it under de jure control of the
president.  Since April 1989 the KOK has been a collegial
state organ subordinate to parliament.  This is of immense
importance because of Poland's experience with the defense
council during the Pilsudski and 1980-81 martial law eras.

After the June 1989 elections, parliament began to exert
greater moral authority (reformers now controlled the
Senate and one-third of the Sejm) and some oversight of
the military.  Two Solidarity civilians (Bronislaw Komorowski
and Janusz Onyszkiewicz) became deputy defense ministers
and began efforts to eliminate the Main Political
Administration (communist party) from the military and to
control contact with foreign states (in part, to ensure that
the Soviet Union could no longer command Polish armed
forces).  Piotr Kolodziejczyk, an independent-minded
admiral, became defense minister in July 1990.  General
Zdzsislaw Stelmaszuk, who had never attended a Soviet staff
college, became chief of staff.  President Jaruzelski resigned
following the elections and requested that new presidential
elections be held two-and one-half years early.

After Lech Walesa was elected president in December
1990, power began to shift from parliament (the Sejm still
had two-thirds communist membership) to the president. 
Not only did Walesa chair the KOK, which provided reformers
with de facto control of the military and police,  he also
exercised oversight by attempting to change the KOK to a
National Security Council and put it under presidential
financial control.  He further expanded his authority over
the National Security Bureau (BBN), which developed
Poland's military doctrine, developed threat analyses, and
drafted the reforms to reorganize the defense ministry and
restructure the General Staff. Poland's efforts to write a
constitution during this period were frustrated by tensions
between the communist-dominated Sejm on the one hand,
and the Senate and president on the other. Frustrated with
the Sejm, Walesa, like Jaruzelski, pushed for parliamentary
elections two-and-one-half years earlier than planned.

Following the October 1991 parliamentary elections,
Poland's legislative and executive institutions were fully
legitimate in democratic, political terms. However, a heavily
fragmented and weak coalition government and the absence
of a constitution became its Achilles heel.

Ambiguity in authority and differences in interpretation
over command and control caused the downfall of Poland's
first civilian defense minister Jan Parys, then its prime
minister, Jan Olszewski, and his government.

Defense minister Onyszkiewicz initially brought new
cooperation between the government and the president and
some progress in defense ministry efforts to establish
oversight of the military.  In October 1992 he reformed the
defense ministry into three departments (strategy, training,
and logistics).  Military courts and intelligence were
subordinated to the civilian defense minister.

Onyszkiewicz's attempts to fuse the civilian defense
ministry financial and personnel services with the General
Staff and Deputy Defense Minister Kuriata's attempts to set
up an independent department to oversee military
infrastructure and acquisition were frustrated when the
General Staff effectively maintained autonomy by playing
off civilian defense ministry oversight against the president.

The so-called Small Constitution (November 1992) was
a provisional effort to clarify legislative and executive
authority that failed because of continued ambiguity.

The post-communist SDP-PPA-coalition victory in the
September 1993 parliamentary elections again showed how
the absence of a constitution contributed to ineffective
civilian oversight of the military and to governmental crisis
and collapse.  The defense ministry's reduced role was
evident in defense minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk's early
actions.  In November 1993, he reduced the defense
ministry staff and restructured the ministry by unifying the
strategy and training directorates under a first deputy,
Jerzy Milewski, who retained his BBN position. He gave the
General Staff more authority by transferring the civilian
Department of Education back to the military, creating an
organization/mobilization directorate, and placing 
intelligence and counterintelligence under its purview.  In the
September 1994 Drawsko affair, when the president
undermined the defense minister's authority, the military
gained greater  autonomy.    In effect,  the government 
lost effective control and oversight over the military.

Government crises and the lack of effective civilian
oversight of the military will continue until Poland has
adopted  a new Constitution  that establishes  clear  lines
of  authority between president and government and
returns enough authority to the civilian defense ministry to
provide effective oversight of the military.  The absence of
any clear command authority and of civilian control over
the military is a recipe for disaster.

Poland is restoring prestige to the military.  Parliament
now has effective oversight of the defense budget. 
Onyszkiewicz has begun restructuring the armed forces for
NATO compatibility, but Poland's reform remains
incomplete.

Hungary.  The October 1989 constitution defined
authority among the president, government, and national
assembly, which only by majority can declare a state of
emergency or war.  The Hungarian National Assembly
amended the defense law in February 1990 to assume
authority (from the Defense Council) to deploy Hungarian
armed forces at home or abroad.  This change effectively
terminated Soviet control of Hungarian armed forces.

Reform communists promulgated a Defense Reform
(December 1989) that created many problems between 
presidential and governmental authority.  The reform
separated the armed forces from the defense minister and
placed them under the president, who the communists
thought would be their reform leader, Imre Poszgay.

After the March 1990 elections, which resulted in a Free
Democrat (AFD) president (Arpad Goncz) and Hungarian
Democratic Forum (MDF) government (Jozsef Antall), the
new Hungarian government had to undo the problems
created by the December 1989 communist reform.  Indeed,
most of Hungary's defense reform has involved amending
the Constitution.  For example, in June 1990 it was amended
to require a parliamentary two-thirds rather than simple
majority to employ armed forces.

Problems arose over the control of  professional
military education and military institutes (defense minister
or army commander), the use of the armed forces during
domestic transport strikes (president or defense minister),
and during Yugoslav air-space violations (parliament or
government). Differences became so tense that Hungarian
Commander Kalman Lorincz resigned in frustration and,
during 1991, the government sought Constitutional Court
decisions on presidential and governmental authority over
the Hungarian armed forces during peacetime and crisis.

The Court's decisions in favor of the government led to
the 1992 Defense Reform that restructured the defense
ministry so the defense minister could assume oversight of
the armed forces and military intelligence, and recommend
military promotions for presidential approval.  During 1993,
a defense law gave Fur the authority to fuse the positions
of Hungarian Army Commander with the Chief of the
General Staff.  Constitutional amendments in December
placed the border guard under the police in peacetime
(hence, under government control) and gave the
government authority to call up to 5,000 troops in an
emergency without specific agreement of the president or
parliament.  Parliament retained authority to approve the
principles of national defense, military development, and
the budget.

Although the Main Political Administration was
eliminated from the armed forces, Defense Minister Fur
packed the defense ministry with MDF civilians, creating a
new form of political influence.  Problems followed the May
1994 elections, which returned the post-communist
Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) in coalition with the AFD to
power by two-thirds majority.  Under the new government,
the defense ministry was subordinated to retired Colonel
Gyorgy Keleti, who had been relieved by Fur as defense
ministry spokesman.  Keleti now replaced MDF civilians with
retired or acting military officers, reorganized the defense
ministry and reduced its staff, provided the General Staff
more authority in military planning (to include
intelligence), and reversed an earlier decision to separate
the position of Chief of Staff from Hungarian Army
Commander. Keleti's actions raise questions about
"effective" civilian defense ministry oversight of the
military.

Hungary also needs a new constitution.  Among other
things, the constitution needs to clarify the role of the
president during war and establish a new formula (presently
two-thirds) for amending the constitution.

On the military side, the armed forces have been cut
from 120,000 to 65,000 and are being restructured for NATO
integration.  But financial resources have greatly
constrained the restructuring, modernization, and PFP-
exercise participation.

Parliament has been effective in exerting control over
the defense budget and deploying the armed forces.  The
Constitutional Court's decisions have been respected and
have led to major defense reforms allowing the government
(prime minister and defense minister) to take control of
the military in peacetime and emergency.  However,
Hungary still needs a constitution that is not a two-thirds
majority victor's mandate to define the president's wartime
powers.  Also, in light of recent defense ministry and
General Staff changes, Hungary needs to reassert effective
"civilian" defense ministry oversight of the military.

Czechoslovakia. Both Czech and Slovak successor
states benefitted from the three years of reform in
Czechoslovakia.  By the end of December 1989 the Federal
Assembly had elected Vaclav Havel president.  That Havel
wielded national command authority was particularly
important for Czechoslovakia not only because it eliminated
Soviet control, but also because its military, in contrast to
Poland's and Hungary's, had been involved in failed efforts
at counter-revolution (Operation Wave).

By the end of 1989, the president (not the party
secretary) chaired the Defense Council, General Vaclavik
(who had given orders to prepare to use force) had been
replaced by General Vacek as defense minister, and a Civic
Forum civilian Antonin Rasek had become deputy defense
minister.  During 1990, parliament created an Inspector
General to oversee the defense ministry, and various Civic
Forum and government oversight bodies were attach-ed to
the armed forces to screen military cadres and monitor
democratization.  After a Commission concluded that
Vacek had been involved in Operation Wave, Lubes
Dobrovsky became Czechoslovakia's first civilian defense
minister in October.

Dobrovsky also screened the cadres and assumed control
of intelligence and counter-intelligence (military and
interior).  During the spring of 1991 the defense ministry
was restructured into three directorates (strategy, economics,
and social and human affairs) to strengthen civilian
oversight, and Karel Pezl who had been cashiered from the
armed forces in 1968 and now deemed politically reliable 
became chief of staff.  Widespread screening of senior
officers ensued.  Elections in June 1992 sealed the
disintegration of the federation.  During the last half of
1992, Czech and Slovak attention turned to preparing new
constitutions and planning to divide their armed forces and
property.

Czech Republic. The Czech Republic has enjoyed
political stability and accomplished significant defense
reforms.  The defense ministry appears to have established
"effective" control of the military.  When a civilian,
Antonin Baudys, became the first Czech defense minister,
he initially retained Karel Pezl as chief of staff.  Pezl was
then succeeded by Jiri Nekvasil, a colonel promoted from
the ranks.  First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil has
developed a personnel management system for military
careers, initiated further "screening" of cadres (for political
reliability and military competence), and the General Staff
has no holdover from the communist period.  The armed
forces have been reduced  from 106,400 in January 1993 to
65,000 this year and restructured to accommodate NATO
integration.

The Czech Republic seems to have made the most
progress in developing "effective" civilian defense ministry
control of the military.  The president and parliament have
deemed the armed forces to be reliable, and the armed
forces have publicly apologized for previous interferences in
Czech society.

The Czech Republic still faces two constitutional tasks:
what to do with the Senate, the upper house of its
parliament, and how to correct a significant constitutional
ambiguity.  The president, as "supreme commander of the
armed forces," must secure the prime minister's approval to
employ forces and to commission and promote generals. 
Since the president's emergency powers can cause confusion
during a crisis, this needs to be rectified.

Slovakia. In contrast to the Czech Republic, political
instability has characterized Slovakia, which is now on its
third government in less than two years, and has hampered
its more daunting military tasks and reform efforts.  In
many ways Slovakia's January 1993 independence has
thrown the country back in time.  Slovakia must build its
institutions from scratch a new defense ministry, an Army
command (now General Staff), and armed forces.

During the first Meciar-coalition government (January
1993-March 1994), military reform was hampered by
government instability and crisis.  Nevertheless, it created
a National Security Council, and approved two key
documents: Principles of National Security and a Defense
Doctrine.

Moravcik-coalition government (March-December 1994)
military reforms included naming a civilian defense
minister, placing greater stress on NATO integration,
changing the Army Command to a General Staff,
restructuring and reducing the size of the defense ministry
and General Staff, and restructuring the armed forces into
corps and brigades.

Whether these initial reform efforts will continue during
1995 under the Meciar-coalition government that emerged
from the October 1994 elections is questionable.  First 
indications (Meciar's campaign  to unseat president Kovac)
suggest renewed political instability and potential
constitutional challenges.

Slovakia also needs to fix its constitution, which stresses
national rather than civil rights.  This exacerbates ethnic
tensions within Slovakia as well as with neighboring
Hungary.  The real question is whether the Meciar-coalition
government will continue along the defense reform path
established  by the Moravcik-coalition government.  The
first indications are discouraging, particularly if Meciar
pursues his efforts to remove the president.

Summary

Central Europe has significant work to do to meet the
standards proposed in this paper.  All four Visegrad states
have made notable progress in establishing real
parliamentary oversight of the military and in restoring
military prestige to their respective armed forces. The
common problem of resource scarcity has uniformly limited
the development of Central Europe's armed forces
modernization and compatibility with NATO.



- Poland and Hungary need new constitutions to
address fundamental civil-military problems that still exist; presidential
and governmental powers peacetime and war must be clarified.
- Hungary must face the question of how to assert
     "effective" civilian defense ministry control over its
     armed forces.
- Slovakia needs to amend its constitution regarding
civil rights, and it must jump start its defense reforms.
- The Czech Republic needs to amend its
     constitution to clarify the President's role for employing
     forces during emergencies.

Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a Central European senior analyst at the Institute for National
Strategic Studies.  This Forum is a brief summary of McNair Paper #39, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO ExpansionThe McNair
Paper will be presented during an April 1995 NATO conference concerning the
expansion of NATO membership among Central and East European states. For a
copy of the McNair Paper call Mrs. Laura Hall at (202) 475-1913.  For more
information call Dr. Simon at (202) 287-9219 ext. 524, FAX (202) 287-9475, or Internet:  [email protected].