OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

January 24, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, U.S. ARMY 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMANDIRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

SUBJECT: Report on Use of Appropriate Award-Fee Conversion Scales Can Enhance Incentive 

for Contractor Performance (SIGIR-08-009) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit in 

accordance with our statutory duties under Public Law 108-106, as amended. The law requires 

that we produce independent and objective audits of – as well as leadership, coordination, and 

recommendations on – policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness the 

administration of programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

This review was conducted as SIGIR project 8008. 

We received comments from the Office of the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Policy and Procurement) – Iraq/Afghanistan and an e-mail response from the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers Gulf Region Division on a draft of this report, which was considered when 

preparing the final report. The comments are noted in the Management Comments section of the 

report. 

SIGIR appreciates the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Glenn Furbish (glenn.furbish@sigir.mil /703-428-1058); or William Shimp 

(william.shimp@iraq.centcom.mil /703-343-7923 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

January 24, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, U.S. ARMY 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMANDIRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

SUBJECT: Report on Use of Appropriate Award-Fee Conversion Scales Can Enhance Incentive 

for Contractor Performance (SIGIR-08-009) 

In March 2004, the U.S. government issued seven cost-plus award-fee contracts providing 

program-management support services for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. SIGIR issued a report 

on October 29, 2007, that broadly addressed the use and performance of these contracts in 

managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction projects.1

 SIGIR decided to separately address the 

issue of using conversion scales in determining contractor performance-award fees. 

Accordingly, this follow-on report discusses the extent to which these contracts followed the 

U.S. Army’s recommended best practices in using conversion scales in the award-fee process. 

Each of the seven contracts was awarded a on a cost-plus award-fee basis in which contractor 

costs were reimbursed. The contractor also received a base fee of 3 percent of budgeted cost and 

was eligible for an award fee of up to 12 percent of the budgeted cost. (One exception: the 

electricity sector, in which award-fee eligibility ranged from nine to 13 percent, depending on the 

year). 

Results 

The contracts and related guidelines did not specify the type of award-fee conversion scale that 

was to be used in calculating award fees under these contracts, and the government agencies 

involved in managing the contracts used the same scale for calculating award fees for all sectors 

and all award-fee periods. The conversion scale used, however, was not a type recommended by 

the U.S. Army in that it did not provide proper incentives for contractors to strive for better-thanexpected results. For example, the scale awarded no fee for a performance score of less than 60, 

but did award a fee of at least 60 percent of the fee pool for a score of at least 60. Thus, a 

performance score of 65, which is in the “Good” range and barely above the award threshold, 

would bestow on the contractor 65 percent of the award-fee pool. Use of this scale represented a 

 

1

 SIGIR audit report 08-003, “Review of the Use of Contractors in Managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Projects,” October 29, 2007. 

1
departure from best practices recommended by the Army and reduced the incentive for improved 

contractor performance. 

The Army Contracting Agency Award Fee Contracts Handbook was issued in September 2003 to 

provide information and guidelines for developing and administering this type of contract. The 

ACA handbook is intended to be a “living” document, updated to reflect current best practices 

and policy concerning award fee contracts, and to be responsive to the needs of the ACA 

acquisition community. The handbook suggests different types of conversion scales that could 

be used to create incentives for the contractor to achieve superior results. However, a common 

characteristic of effective incentives on all of the recommended scales is that the percentage of 

the fee awarded for meeting the minimum threshold begins at zero, not 60. For example, one of 

the conversion scales recommended by the ACA is called the cubic-distribution award-fee scale, 

in which a score of 70 would translate to an award of only 19 percent of the fee pool. 

The value of using a more appropriate conversion scale is best illustrated through the example of 

the fees awarded to one of the sector contractors. Over a 15-month period, the contractor 

received performance ratings ranging from 61.79 to 81.23. These scores were converted to 

award fees totaling $3,239,178. If the cubic-distribution award-fee scale had been used, the 

authorized fees would have been $1,085,700, a difference of $2,153,478. Because the contractor 

received high fees for a relatively modest performance, we conclude that use of a recommended 

conversion scale might have provided greater incentive for the contractor to achieve superior 

results at perhaps less cost to the government. 

Background 

After examining options for managing its large reconstruction program in Iraq, the Coalition 

Provisional Authority decided in August 2003 to form a Program Management Office (PMO) 

that would oversee the effort. The PMO established six program-management offices organized 

by work sector, such as electricity and public works/water. Although these offices were led by 

government employees, the PMO decided to rely on contractors to fill key roles in supporting 

and executing the reconstruction program; technical contractors would be used to design, plan, 

build, and complete projects, and another group of contractors would provide program 

management-support services. Seven contracts for the latter were awarded in March 2004—one 

for the PMO as a whole and one for each of the six sector offices, as shown in Table 1. 

2
Table 1—Program Management-Support Contracts Awarded in March 2004 

Contract Number Services/Sectors Contractor 

W914NS-04-C-0001 PMO Support ATC Services, Inc. 

W914NS-04-C-0002 Electricity Sector Iraq Power Alliance Joint 

Venture (JV) 

W914NS-04-C-0003 Public Works/Water Sector CH2M Hill/Parsons Water 

Infrastructure JV 

W914NS-04-C-0004* Security/Justice Sector Berger/URS JV 

W914NS-04-C-0005* Buildings/Health/Education Sector Berger/URS JV 

W914NS-04-C-0006* Communication/Transportation 

Sector 

Berger/URS JV 

W914NS-04-C-0007 Oil Sector Foster Wheeler 

* Denotes three contracts subsequently consolidated into one

Source: SIGIR analysis of data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD) and Joint Contracting 

Command – Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). 

Under these cost-plus award-fee contracts, contractor costs were reimbursed. Contractors also 

received a base fee of 3 percent of budgeted cost, with a possible award fee of up to 12 percent. 

The electricity sector was an exception: there the contractor was eligible for an award fee 

ranging from nine to 13 percent, depending on the year. Each contract included a base year plus 

two option years—and in each case, the options were exercised. 

Award-Fee Process 

Contractor performance is evaluated through the implementation of award-fee plans built into the 

contracts. The plans judge performance on a set of factors, such as program management; 

capacity development; contract-acquisition strategies; technical management; and participation 

of small businesses, coalition partners, Iraqi companies, and Iraqi women-owned businesses. 

Despite some small differences in the award-fee plans for these seven contracts, the process was 

basically the same. Contractors began each evaluation period with zero percent of the available 

award-fee and work toward earning the maximum award fee for each evaluation period. 

The award-fee pool is the total dollars that can be earned for each evaluation period and is based 

on budgeted costs for the period. Award-fee determinations are based on subjective performance 

evaluations provided by an Award-fee Evaluation Board (AFEB) and an Award-fee Determining 

Official (AFDO). Performance monitors are supposed to provide continuous evaluation and 

assessment of each contractor’s daily work. Performance monitors cannot be members of the 

award-fee board. 

Typically, membership on an AFEB includes the sector lead, the contracting officer, and other 

sector staff. The board is responsible for reviewing the performance monitors’ evaluations, the 

contractor’s self-evaluation, and other information in order to arrive at an objective and impartial 

judgment of the contractor’s work. The task is then to decide how well the contractor performed 

3
in each area using the metrics provided in the award-fee plan. Voting members score contractor 

performance individually and in writing, with the reports consolidated into a single, award-fee 

score. Scores are then converted into an award-fee amount through the use of a conversion scale. 

Because it is independent of the AFEB, the AFDO makes the final decision on the amount of 

award-fee earned. The latter becomes involved only after the evaluation board has met and 

agreed on a recommended award-fee score. According to the Joint Contracting CommandIraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A)2

 guidelines, the AFDO’s decision must be documented and provided 

to the contractor within five days after the decision and simultaneous with the contract 

modification signed by the contracting officer to obligate the fee amount. The contractor can 

then immediately submit an invoice for the earned fee. 

In July 2005, the JCC-I/A issued a memorandum to the AFDO, the AFEB chairmen, contracting 

officers, and other concerned officials in an effort to establish JCC-I/A AFEB policy. The goal: 

to provide guidelines and establish responsibilities for evaluating and administering award fees 

for JCC-I/A cost-plus award-fee contracts. The award-fee plans for these contracts were 

generally consistent with these guidelines, with the policy stating that “award fee provisions are 

added to a cost reimbursement contract to provide an incentive to excel in critical performance 

areas emphasized in an Award Fee Plan.” However, neither the guidelines nor the individual 

plans identified an award-fee conversion scale to be used in determining the fees awarded. 

In recent years, SIGIR has issued several reports dealing with award fees, including two that 

focused on the use of conversion scales. In July 2005 SIGIR issued an interim briefing,3 and in 

October 2005 SIGIR final audit report,4

 on the award-fee plans and their execution for major 

cost-plus award-fee contracts--both design-build and program-management types. The report 

found various weaknesses in managing the award-fee process, including the fact that the awardfee conversion scale used for most of the plans was substantially different from the types of 

scales recommended by the Army in that they did not provide proper incentives for contractors 

to strive for better-than expected-results. We recommended a method of applying the award fee 

to provide additional incentive for contractors to achieve quality results. 

More recently, in October 18, 2007, we issued a report on the use of contractors in supporting 

management of Iraq reconstruction projects—the contractors discussed in this document.5

 We 

elected to defer a discussion of the award-fee conversion-scale issue and deal with it in a separate 

report. See Appendix A for a discussion of our scope and methodology for this review. Other 

SIGIR reports related to program management and award fees are also included as part of 

Appendix A. 

 

2

 JCC-I/A was created on November 12, 2004, under PCO, to centralize contracting under one organization. 3

SIGIR interim briefing 05-010, “Interim Briefing to the Project and Contracting Office and the Joint Contracting 

Command – Iraq, Audit of the Award Fee Process”, July 26, 2005. 

4

 SIGIR audit report 05-017, “Award Fee Process for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction”, October 25, 

2005. 

5

 SIGIR audit report 08-003, “Review of the Use of Contractors in Managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Projects”, October 18, 2007. 

4
Appropriate Award-Fee Conversion Scales Are 

Important to Effective Contract Management 

Army Has Identified Best Practices 

The purpose of the award fee is to motivate specific performance levels that cannot be 

objectively quantified but can be assessed by government personnel. An important step in this 

process involves developing an award-fee conversion scale structure that will best motivate the 

contractor. The Army Contracting Agency Award Fee Contracts Handbook was issued in 

September 2003 to provide information and guidelines for developing and administering awardfee contracts. The handbook is intended to be a “living” document, updated to reflect current 

best practices and policy concerning this type of contract, and to be responsive to the needs of 

the ACA acquisition community. 

The handbook states that the first step in developing a conversion scale is to determine the 

incentive structure that will best motivate the contractor. The handbook further states that there 

is no cookie-cutter way to determine the best strategy. A scale on which each performance point 

equals the same percentage of the available award fee pool is known as a linear scale, and one 

that awards smaller proportions of the fee at the lower half of the range and higher proportions at 

the upper half of the range is known as a non-linear scale. The handbook cites two overarching 

principles when designing an award-fee conversion scale: 

• As a result of the “law of diminishing returns,” a contractor’s performance requires a 

disproportionate expenditure of resources as it comes closer and closer to perfection. 

When performance is mediocre, there are a number of low cost improvements available; 

but as performance is strengthened, the available improvements become more and more 

expensive to implement. 

• As improvements become more difficult and expensive to achieve, with performance 

climbing into the excellent range, a non-linear scale, which places more fee in the upper 

half of the scale, rewards the contractor for the greater effort and management expended. 

The handbook identifies three non-linear scales, each represented graphically by a curve: the 

power, quadratic, and cubic curves. All three scales specify that the fee awarded starts at zero 

percent for a score of 60 and rises incrementally. The cubic curve has an S-shape that, unlike the 

other two, tails off as it approaches 100 points. Further, the cubic curve provides a distribution 

scale that is more appropriate to recognition of the law of diminishing returns and properly 

rewarding superior performance. A fee table assists in the conversion of scores to a specific, 

recommended amount of fee. For the cubic distribution table, see Appendix B. 

In our October 2005 audit report, we observed that the award-fee methodology for all of the 

program-management contracts had a linear conversion scale that awarded a fee percentage that 

directly matched the performance rating (if it was at least 60). In other words, if the rating was 

less than 60 (in the “Poor/Inadequate” range), the contractor received no award fee. If the 

performance rating was 65 (in the “Good” range and barely above the threshold to receive an 

award), the contractor received 65 percent of the fee pool. 

5
The impact of using a linear scale instead of the recommended scales becomes most acute and 

apparent for performance scores that barely exceed the threshold to receive an award fee. Four 

of the five contractors consistently received scores of 81 or above, in the “Excellent” or 

“Outstanding” range, so the difference in award fee by using the recommended conversion scales 

would have been relatively small. Nevertheless, benefits might have accrued from using a moreappropriate, non-linear scale to encourage better contractor performance. 

Selected Sector Contract Illustrate How Conversion Scales Can 

Impact Performance Incentives and Award Fees 

To illustrate the differences between using linear and non-linear scales to calculate award fees, 

we identified the amount of actual award fees granted on the seven program-management-sector 

contracts6 for periods through June 2007. We then compared the actual award fees under one of 

these contracts, using a linear scale with the fees that might have been awarded had an 

appropriate non-linear scale been used. Table 2 shows the difference in award fees for that 

contractor over a 27-month period.7

 

Table 2—Comparison of Award Fees Using a Linear and Non-linear Conversion 

Scale 

Award Fee Period 

Eligible 

Award-Fee 

Pool 

Performance 

Rating 

Award Fee 

Authorized Using 

a Linear Scale

Award Fee 

Based on a 

Non-linear, 

CubicConversion 

Scale Difference

3/10/05 – 6/09/05 $714,811 74.25 $530,890 $224,451 $306,439

6/10/05 – 9/09/05 714,811 77.71 555,480 304,509 $250,971

9/10/05 – 12/09/05 714,811 68.48 0.008 - $0.00

12/10/05 – 3/09/06 947,611 67.58 640,396 121,294 $519,102

3/10/06 – 6/09/06 435,011 61.79 269,576 8,700 $260,876

6/10/06 – 9/09/06 435,011 70.03 304,638 83,087 $221,551

9/10/06 – 12/09/06 435,011 65.02 282,844 31,756 $251,088

12/10/06 – 3/09/07 435,011 69.42 301,995 76,562 $225,433

3/10/07 – 6/09/07 435,011 81.23 353,359 235,341 $118,018

Totals $3,239,178 $1,085,700 $2,153,478

Source: SIGIR analysis of GRD data and Army Contracting Agency Award Fee Contracts Handbook criteria 

 

6

 Three contracts for the same contractor were combined into one contract in March 2005. 7

 The contract selected for this comparison was one where the award fee scores were only slightly above the 

minimum needed to receive an award fee. 

8

 Although the AFEB originally recommended an evaluation score of 68.48, the AFDO letter states that the 

contractor performance was in the “Poor - Inadequate” range and no fee was awarded. 

6
By choosing not to change the conversion scale, the U.S. government authorized an additional 

$2,153,478.15 to the contractor for performance mostly in the “Good” or “Very Good” range. 

As a result, the award-fee plan did not effectively provide an incentive to achieve superior 

performance and may have resulted in the government paying award fees with funds that could 

have been put to better use. 

The other four program-management contractors consistently received scores of 81 or above, in 

the “Excellent” or “Outstanding” ranges, so the difference in fee awarded by using the 

recommended conversion scales would have been relatively small. Nevertheless, benefits might 

still have resulted from using a more appropriate, non-linear scale to encourage better contractor 

performance. 

7
Conclusion and Lesson Learned 

Conclusion 

As of June 7, 2007 the U.S. government had spent approximately $451.6 million on programmanagement-support contracts and, as of June 9, had authorized approximately $41.8 million in 

award fees. However, because the contract did not specify the use of a non-linear conversion 

scale, the contractors had less incentive to strive for greater performance. 

Lesson Learned 

Because work on the support contracts we reviewed has ceased or will end soon, we make no 

new recommendations. On September 23, 2007, we advised JCC-I/A officials of our findings, 

and a senior JCC-I/A official stated that the U.S. government had transitioned to a strategy of 

awarding more firm-fixed-price contracts for Iraq reconstruction and was relying less on costplus award-fee contracts. However, when cost-plus award-fee contracts are used, government 

agencies can provide a contractor a greater incentive to achieve superior results by adopting an 

appropriate conversion scale and writing it into the award-fee plan. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD), in commenting on a draft of 

this report, indicated that it agreed with SIGIR’s “lesson learned” regarding the use of 

appropriate conversion scales as an incentive for greater performance. The Office of the 

Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)-Iraq/Afghanistan 

noted that the Army’s Award-Fee Contracts Handbook does not mandate the use of a particular 

conversion scale and that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the 

Contracting Officer determined that the incentive structure provided in the contract was the one 

that would best motivate the contractor under the difficult circumstances of working in Iraq. 

The Assistant Deputy also referenced Office of the Secretary of Defense policy guidance issued 

in 2006, which emphasizes that award-fee contracts must be structured in ways that will focus 

the government and contractor’s efforts on meeting or exceeding cost, schedule, and 

performance requirements. The response suggested that the Army’s handbook and the OSD 

policy guidance would be used in the development of future award fee plans. The SIGIR report 

provides a discussion of best practices and notes that the conversion scale used for contracts 

included in this report was never identified in the award-fee plans for these contracts. This is the 

basis for the lesson learned. SIGIR did not receive comments from the Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) or the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO). 

8
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

In March 2007, SIGIR initiated the audit (Project No. 7013) to determine the roles and 

responsibilities assigned to the program-management contractors and the extent to which the 

U.S. Government benefited from such services. We elected to defer to a second report a 

discussion of the award-fee conversion-scale issue arising from our fieldwork. We initiated the 

second audit in November, 2007 (Project No. 8008). 

We obtained copies of the seven program-management contracts, the associated modifications, 

and other relevant documentation from the electronic contract files, and the hard-copy contract 

files at JCC-I/A. Some award-fee documentation was provided from files of the GRD. 

To determine the cost of the support contracts, we reviewed financial data obtained from the 

Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) and provided by GRD. 

To determine measurements of contract performance, we interviewed knowledgeable personnel 

from GRD, JCC-I/A, the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, and the contracting companies. We 

also obtained and reviewed the relevant award-fee plans, performance evaluations, award-fee 

rating sheets, AFEB recommendations, AFDO letters, and contract modifications. In addition, 

we reviewed JCC-I/A Award Fee Board policy. 

To determine the appropriateness and impact of the award-fee conversion scales used, we 

obtained the Army Contracting Agency Award Fee Contracts Handbook and compared the best 

practices cited there with the conversion scales used under the contracts. 

We performed both the initial audit (from March 30 through September 10, 2007) and the 

follow-up (from November 16 through January 3, 2008) in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We reviewed financial data relating to program-management contract costs that was derived 

from CEFMS. This was a limited amount of data and we considered it sufficiently reliable for 

purposes of this report. 

Prior Coverage 

SIGIR’s prior reports related to program management and award fees can accessed on our 

website http://www.sigir.mil. 

• “Review of the Use of Contractors In Managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Projects” (SIGIR 08-003, October 29, 2007) included a review to determine the extent to 

which the U.S. government benefited from the services provided by programmanagement contractors. Because of weaknesses in the implementation of required 

contracting policies, the review could not conclusively determine the degree to which 

using these contractors succeeded. 

9
• “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management”, (SIGIR, March 

2007) included a history of program management during Iraq reconstruction and found 

that the reconstruction effort required, but did not initially receive, consistent and 

effective oversight. The report also found that policy shifts resulted not only in long 

periods of uncertainty but also adjustments to new systems, procedures, and reporting 

requirements. 

• “Award Fee Process for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction” (SIGIR 05-017, 

October 25, 2005) included a review of 18 cost-plus award-fee type contracts funded 

under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and found that the award-fee plans did not 

include required criteria with definable metrics. The review also found that the AFEB 

recommendations and determinations of fees were not documented in sufficient detail to 

show that the integrity of the award fee process was maintained. 

• “Interim Briefing to the Project and Contracting Office – Iraq and the Joint Contracting 

Command – Iraq on the Audit of the Award Fee Process” (SIGIR 05-010, July 26, 2005) 

included a review to determine if award fees are adequately reviewed, properly approved, 

and awarded according to established standards. The review found that policies and 

procedures were established but not consistently applied. 

• “Defense Contract Management – DOD’s Lack of Adherence to Key Contracting 

Principles on Iraq Oil Contract Put Government at Risk” (GAO-07-839, July 2007) 

included a review to determine the extent to which the Department of Defense paid award 

fees for the Restore Iraqi Oil contract and followed the award fee-process. The review 

found that DoD did not conduct a formal award-fee board until almost all work was 

complete and did not provide the contractor with formal award-fee feedback. 

• “Defense Acquisitions – DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless 

of Acquisition Outcomes” (GAO-06-066, December 2005) included a review to 

determine if award and incentive fees have been used effectively as a tool to achieve 

DoD’s desired acquisition outcomes. The review found that the power of monetary 

incentives to motivate excellent contractor performance and improve acquisition 

outcomes is diluted by the way DoD structures and implements incentives. 

10
Appendix B—Cubic-Distribution Award-Fee Scale 

Table 9

PERFORMANCE 

POINTS 

PERCENT OF 

AVAILABLE 

AWARD FEE (%) 

PERFORMANCE 

POINTS 

PERCENT OF 

AVAILABLE 

AWARD FEE (%) 

60 0.0 81 53.3 

61 1.0 82 56.6 

62 2.3 83 59.8 

63 3.7 84 63.1 

64 5.4 85 66.2 

65 7.3 86 69.4 

66 9.3 87 72.4 

67 11.5 88 75.4 

68 13.9 89 78.2 

69 16.4 90 81.0 

70 19.0 91 83.6 

71 21.8 92 86.1 

72 24.6 93 88.5 

73 27.6 94 90.7 

74 30.6 95 92.7 

75 33.8 96 94.6 

76 36.9 97 96.3 

77 40.2 98 97.7 

78 43.4 99 99.0 

79 46.7 100 100.0 

80 50.0 

Source: Army Contracting Agency; Award Fee Contracts Handbook; September 2003 

11
Appendix C—Acronyms 

ACA Army Contracting Agency 

AFEB Award Fee Evaluation Board 

AFDO Award Fee Determining Official 

CEFMS U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System 

DoD Department of Defense 

GRD Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

JV Joint Venture 

PMO Program Management Office 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

12
Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared, and the review conducted, under the direction of David Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to this report include: 

Benjamin Comfort 

Nadia Shamari 

William Shimp 

Frank Slayton 

Roger M. Williams 

13
Management Comments 

Office of the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Army (Policy and Procurement) – 

Iraq/Afghanistan 

14
15
SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine Belisle 

Director, Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

16