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MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: ENSURING SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, 

AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 16, 2008 

Serial No. 110–106 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

AL GREEN, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

ALISON ROSSO, Director 

DENISE KREPP, Counsel 

CARLA ZAMUDIO-DOLAN, Clerk 

MANDY BOWERS, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, 

and Global Counterterrorism .............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism .................................................................... 19 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 2 

The Honorable Louise M. Slaughter, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New York: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27 

The Honorable Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Michigan: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

WITNESSES

Ms. Kathleen Kraninger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Screening 

Coordination Office, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

Mr. Robert Jacksta, Executive Director, Traveler Security and Facilitation, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

Mr. Derwood K. Staeben, Senior Advisor, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Ms. Elizabeth Luce, Director, Washington State Department of Licensing: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 31 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32 

Mr. James D. Phillips, President and Chief Executive Officer, CAN/AM Border Trade Alliance: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36 

Ms. Janice L. Kephart, President, 9/11 Security Solutions: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez .................................................... 67 

(1) 

MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: ENSURING SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE 

Wednesday, April 16, 2008 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL

COUNTERTERRORISM, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sanchez, Cuellar, Green, Souder, and 

Bilirakis. 

Also present: Representative Christensen. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [presiding]. The Subcommittee on Border, Maritime 

and Global Counterterrorism will now come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on 

‘‘Moving Beyond the First 5 Years: Ensuring Successful Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.’’ 

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today to talk 

about the current status of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, or WHTI, and the future of this important border security program. 

The program was developed in response to congressionally 

passed legislation to require U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to 

present documents verifying their citizenship and identity before 

arriving into the United States. 

The program addresses a concerning security gap and implements a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. The challenge with WHTI has been and continues to be how to roll out the 

program in a way that minimizes the inconvenience to and the financial impact on Americans and border communities. 

When WHTI went into effect at airports on January 23, 2007, 

millions of Americans were impacted by the new requirement that 

they must have a passport to travel to Canada and Caribbean nations. 

As we all know, the spike in passport applications in 2007 led 

to an incredible backlog in passport processing and, as a result, 

many Americans had to delay or had to cancel their travel plans. 
2 

The situation was very concerning, especially considering the Department of Homeland Security’s plan to implement the program 

at land and sea borders on March 27, 2008. 

As a result, my colleagues and I voted, a large majority of us, to 

delay the implementation at land and sea ports until June 1, 2009. 

I know that there are some people who have said that a delay 

in implementing the program is unacceptable, but I believe it is important to ensure that WHTI is implemented correctly, so we minimize the negative economic impact on our individuals and our communities. 

I am pleased with the progress that the Departments of Homeland Security and State have made on their plans for the continued 

implementation of the program. I hope this rollout continues 

smoothly and that we do get it done under the new deadline. 

Moreover, I urge that both departments continue to work diligently to ensure that acceptable documents and the trusted traveler programs are streamlined so that the public and border officers alike have a clear understanding of the requirements and are 

able to travel efficiently. 

I look forward to hearing more about the current status of the 

program and in light of the fact that the program will only be fully 

implemented until the next administration, I would like to hear 

about the plans for the continuity of the initiative with all relevant 

offices and agencies. 

Thanks again to our witnesses for being here today to share their 

insights. 

I would like to now give some time to Mr. Bilirakis of Florida as 

our ranking member. Mr. Souder isn’t here. He will be reading Mr. 

Souder’s statement. 

Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Actually, this is my statement. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Good. Thanks. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I appreciate your willingness to hear and examine 

the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. 

This is an especially important issue for my constituents and the 

economic prosperity of my congressional district, which relies heavily on tourism and the economic contributions made by the Canadian citizens who reside in my district during the winter months. 

As a result, I am very interested to hear from DHS and the State 

Department officials on implementation of WHTI and efforts to balance the need for security, which is of paramount importance, with 

promoting trade and travel. 

I also am looking forward to hearing what steps are being taken 

now by Federal officials to prevent passport issuance, as the chairwoman said, the delays similar to what we saw when this was implemented for air travel. 

I agree with many of my constituents that I heard from at the 

time that these problems simply cannot be repeated. 

I also hope that the majority will move forward on an authorization bill for the Department of Homeland Security so that members 

of this committee can weigh in on what we believe its priorities 

should be in this area and other important issues under our committee’s jurisdiction. 
3 

Thank you again for calling this hearing, Madam Chairwoman, 

appreciate it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The Chair acknowledges the presence of Representative Donna Christensen and the possibility that Ms. Miller, 

Candice Miller, of Michigan may also join us. 

They are not members of this subcommittee, but they have a 

great interest in the issue before us today and have asked to participate. 

Consistent with the rules and the practices of the committee, we 

are pleased to honor their request, and I would ask for unanimous 

consent to allow Representative Christensen and Ms. Miller to sit 

and question the witnesses at today’s hearing. 

Without objection, it is so ordered. 

The other members of the subcommittee are reminded that under 

committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

I am going to welcome our first panel of witnesses and I have 

some lengthy bios on all of you, but in the interest of time, because 

I hear that there will be some votes coming up on the floor, I would 

love to at least get all of your opening statements on the record. 

Our first witness will be Ms. Kathleen Kraninger. Is that correct? She is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for policy at the Department of Homeland Security, managing the screening coordination office. 

Our second witness is Mr. Robert Jacksta, Executive Director for 

Traveler Security and Facilitation at Customs and Border Protection’s office of Field Operations. 

Our final witness on the first panel is Mr. Derwood ‘‘Woody’’ 

Staeben, Senior Advisor on the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for the Office of Passport Services at the State Department. 

Without objection, your full statements will be inserted into the 

record and I now will ask each witness to please summarize his or 

her statement for 5 minutes or less, beginning with Ms. Kraninger. 

STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN KRANINGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR POLICY, SCREENING COORDINATION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. KRANINGER. Chairwoman Sanchez and other distinguished 

members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today 

to discuss the Department’s approach to the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative implementation. 

As recommended by the 9/11 Commission, Congress moved in 

2004 to statutorily close the critical vulnerabilities that existed far 

too long, the fact that a significant number of individuals presenting themselves for entry into the United States were not required to present proof of their identity and citizenship. 

Recognizing this vulnerability, consider for a moment the position of the Customs and Border Protection officer who has an average of 45 seconds to process each individual at the land port. 

Without reliable, secure documentation, that officer is charged 

with making an informed decision about the risk posed by this individual and their admissibility. 

We train our officers to make that choice with respect to the approximately 800,000 people who enter by land every day. But we 
4 

need to do more to arm them with the right tools to make the best 

decision possible with timely, accurate information. 

As we deploy better tools to help our officers increase our Nation’s security, we also serve to continue facilitating legitimate 

trade and travel across the border. 

Implementation of WHTI is about security and facilitation. It will 

provide the CBP officers with a limited set of acceptable documents 

that are more secure, machine readable, and include facilitative 

technology. 

DHS has done a number of tests demonstrating that use of facilitative technology and standardizing documents will speed processing time. 

How do we get to WHTI land implementation? Since 2004, Congress and the administration have recognized that requiring documents of identity and citizenship, particularly at our land and sea 

ports of entry, is a cultural change that needs to be implemented 

in a practical, flexible and deliberate fashion, and, given the security imperative, as expeditiously as possible. 

In partnership with the Department of State, the governments of 

Canada and Mexico, the trade community and other stakeholders, 

our strategy includes several prongs in a phased, flexible implementation. 

No. 1, clear, consistent communications and education of the 

traveling public; No. 2, availability of a range of acceptable documents that are convenient and will expedite land border crossing; 

No. 3, deployment of radio frequency identification, or RFID, readers to speed that processing; and, No. 4, continued training of our 

officers. 

I will touch on communications and document availability at this 

time. 

Our communications efforts began in 2004 and a few months ago, 

we kicked off an even more robust campaign that will continue 

over the next 14 months and beyond June 2009. 

The WHTI land and sea final rule reflected extensive consultation with our stakeholders, including border communities and officials. 

The final rule provides special provisions for children and that 

children under 16 need only have copies of their birth certificates 

and accommodations are made for those aged 16 to 18 traveling in 

official groups. 

We also outlined a path to work with States, Canadian provinces, 

and Native American communities to develop WHTI-compliant enhanced driver’s licenses and tribal documents. 

It is incumbent on DHS to ensure that we offer document options 

that best meet the needs of the traveling public. 

U.S. citizens are able to present a passport, a passport card, a 

State-issued DHS-approved enhanced driver’s license, a trusted 

traveler card under our NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST programs, a 

merchant mariner document, a U.S. military ID with travel orders, 

or a WHTI-compliant enhanced tribal card. 

It is also a clear responsibility of the U.S. government to ensure 

that we can produce these documents in a timely manner. 

DHS and the Department of State are continually monitoring our 

resources, infrastructure and ability to produce these documents 
5 

and have put in place practices and plans to manage the expected 

increase of applications as we continue to move toward June 2009. 

On January 31, we began our transition to a more secure border. 

U.S. and Canadian citizens are now presenting the requested documents to demonstrate identity and citizenship at our borders and, 

in fact, many U.S. citizens are surprised to learn that documents 

have not been required before now. 

Compliance rates have steadily increased. More than 90 percent 

of U.S. and Canadian citizens queried have the appropriate documents today, and this is all part of our plan to move in a direction 

where people have more secure documents and we can even better 

facilitate cross-border travel. 

I have outlined, in a very broad way, our plan to WHTI implementation, but I am happy to take any questions that you have 

and elaborate further. 

[The joint statement of Ms. Kraninger and Mr. Jacksta follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN KRANINGER AND ROBERT JACKSTA

APRIL 16, 2008 

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and other distinguished Members of the committee. We are pleased to appear before you today to discuss how 

we plan to implement the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which is 

both a statutory mandate of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

(IRTPA) of 2004 and 9/11 Commission recommendation, to designate specific identity and citizenship documents that can be used to gain entry at our land, sea, and 

air ports of entry. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in partnership 

with the Department of State (DOS), is working to secure our homeland by 

strengthening our ability to accurately identify all persons—U.S. citizens and visitors alike—before they enter the United States. We are accomplishing this through 

the implementation of secure document requirements at all ports of entry in the 

United States. Our approach to implementing WHTI has been, and will continue to 

be, both practical and flexible, as we work to achieve the goal of increased security 

while significantly facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. We would like 

to assure you that we are taking the appropriate and necessary steps to ensure that 

both travelers and the U.S. Government are prepared to successfully and efficiently 

implement the second phase of WHTI at land and sea ports on June 1, 2009. 

Access to our Nation is critical for a terrorist to plan and carry out attacks on 

our homeland. As the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report states, ‘‘For terrorists, travel 

documents are as important as weapons. Terrorists must travel clandestinely to 

meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack. To them, international 

travel presents great danger, because they must surface to pass through regulated 

channels to present themselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent 

inspection points.’’ 

Preventing easy access to our homeland by requiring secure identity and citizenship documents at all ports of entry for both U.S. citizens and non-citizens will help 

keep those hoping to do us harm from entering the country. In order to begin closing 

a critical vulnerability that had existed for far too long, on January 31, 2008, the 

practice of accepting oral declarations alone at our land and sea ports of entry 

ended. Since fiscal year 2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has identified over 33,000 individuals who attempted to enter our country at our air, land, 

and sea ports of entry with a false oral claim of U.S. citizenship—drug and human 

traffickers, homicide suspects, and potential terrorists could show up at our borders, 

and attempt to enter by telling us they were U.S. or Canadian citizens when they 

were not. For example, in December 2007, at the San Ysidro port of entry, a traveler 

presented a State of California identification card and claimed erroneously to be a 

U.S. citizen. An electronic check of his fingerprints revealed that the man was actually wanted for two counts of murder in San Diego County. This case demonstrates 

the importance of this change in policy and the move toward WHTI secure documents. 

On January 31, 2008, we began our transition to a more secure border—a border 

that will welcome legitimate travelers and facilitate their entry into the country efficiently. It will also be a border that inhibits entry of individuals who cannot confirm 
6 

their identity and citizenship. We implemented these most recent changes in travel 

document requirements without causing discernable increases in wait times at the 

border. Compliance rates are high and continue to increase. United States and Canadian citizens are presenting the requested documents when crossing the border. 

The institution of a travel document requirement and the standardization of travel documents are critical steps to securing our Nation’s borders and facilitating legitimate travel. In fiscal year 2007 alone, more than 30,000 individuals were apprehended at ports of entry trying to cross the border with false documents. 

Our layered security strategy involves identifying and interdicting individuals attempting to harm or illegally enter the country as early as possible—if not before 

they enter our country, then at our ports of entry. DHS must be able to capitalize 

on our border inspection process. We must be able to inspect or examine those who 

seek to enter. Through its requirement that individuals carry a passport or other 

limited set of acceptable documents, WHTI will greatly reduce the opportunities for 

identity fraud or misrepresentation. Advanced technology embedded in these travel 

documents, with the appropriate privacy protections and infrastructure, will allow 

DHS the ability to verify an individual’s identity and perform real-time queries 

against lookout databases even before our officers begin to question them. Implementation of WHTI will allow our officers to focus more time and greater attention 

on each individual traveler. WHTI provides the platform to implement an integrated 

secure land border system, and we are taking every step to take full advantage of 

that opportunity. 

The initial phase of WHTI went into effect January 23, 2007. The WHTI Air Final 

Rule requires all arriving air travelers, regardless of age, to present a passport or 

other acceptable secure document for entry into the United States. In the last 7 

months, CBP has reported a compliance rate of 99 percent for citizens of the United 

States, Canada, and Bermuda, and there has been no interruption to air transportation attributable to WHTI implementation. The high level of compliance shows 

that Americans and foreign nationals alike are willing and able to obtain the necessary documents to enter or re-enter the United States once the requirements are 

known and enforced. This compliance is the result of the collaborative planning 

process on behalf of DHS and DOS, working closely with the airline industry, travel 

industry and the public, well in advance of implementation. 

INTELLIGENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHTI

The WHTI Land and Sea Final Rule, published on April 3, 2008, in the Federal 

Register, was developed after extensive consultation and constructive dialog with 

various stakeholders, including border communities and officials, and after carefully 

considering the more than 1,300 comments received during the public comment period for the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The policy decisions in this Final Rule, 

such as the development of special provisions for children and DHS’s approach to 

working with Native American communities on the development of a WHTI-compliant enhanced tribal document, reflect the valuable input we received from the public 

and stakeholders. 

Based on the successful strategy surrounding the implementation of the WHTI 

Air Final Rule, DHS published the WHTI Land and Sea Final Rule a full 14 months 

prior to implementation to ensure adequate time for planning, education, and communication. During the next 14 months, DHS and DOS will work diligently so that 

travelers will know what documents will be needed, how to obtain these documents, 

and when they will need them. 

DHS is confident that all the integrated components are in place to ensure successful implementation of the WHTI land and sea requirements and infrastructure 

by June 2009. In preparation for full implementation, DHS awarded a contract on 

January 10, 2008, to begin the process of deploying vicinity radio frequency identification (RFID) facilitative technology and infrastructure to 354 vehicle primary 

lanes at 39 high-volume land ports, which process 95 percent of land border traveler 

crossings. Currently, we are conducting site surveys to identify construction requirements needed to support RFID technology installation. Site surveys will be completed by the end of May 2008. This summer, we will begin the actual construction 

at land border locations and the installation of the integrated solution will commence shortly thereafter. However, until that time, we have the optical character 

reader technology in place at virtually all air, land, and sea ports of entry. This 

technology will read any travel document with a machine-readable zone (MRZ), including passports, border crossing cards, trusted traveler cards, and the new passport card. All CBP officers are currently trained in the use of this technology. This 

means that right now, our ports of entry can accept all WHTI-complaint documents. 
7 

On February 12, 2008, we deployed the new vehicle primary client software application to the ports of Blaine, Washington, and Nogales, Arizona, in anticipation of 

implementing the vicinity RFID primary lane solution. This critical software deployment quickly and effectively provides officers with vital information on border crossers. The training and tools necessary for the successful transition from the current 

antiquated, text-based system, to a modern, graphical user interface was successfully delivered to 254 CBP officers ahead of the critical deployment. We will be deploying this new 21st century tool to the ports of Buffalo, New York; Detroit, Michigan; and El Paso, Texas, by the end of June 2008. Deployment will continue to most 

land border locations, with completion scheduled for fall 2008. 

On February 4, 2008, DHS awarded a public relations contract to develop a 

proactive campaign to the traveling public. This campaign will increase traveler 

awareness by emphasizing document requirements and soliciting traveler compliance through education, while facilitating a smooth transition to WHTI implementation on June 1, 2009. 

Nearly 200 new CBP officers are being added to critical land border locations in 

fiscal year 2008. In addition, we are adding 15 positions at the Williston, Vermont, 

Trusted Traveler Vetting Center. Officer deployment is focused on current and proposed enrollment centers and land border secondary locations, where an initial increase in secondary referrals is expected upon WHTI implementation. As of April 

10, 2008, 126 of these 205 CBP officers have come onboard. 

ALTERNATIVE DOCUMENTS

It is incumbent on DHS and CBP to ensure that we offer document options that 

best meet the needs of the traveling public. In addition to a U.S. passport, U.S. citizens will be able to present a passport card, a State-issued, DHS-approved enhanced 

driver’s license, a trusted traveler program card, a merchant mariner document, a 

U.S. military ID with travel orders, or a WHTI-compliant enhanced tribal card. It 

is also a clear responsibility of the U.S. Government to ensure that we can produce 

these documents in a timely manner. DHS and DOS are continually monitoring our 

resources, infrastructure, and ability to do so, and have put in place practices and 

plans to manage the expected increase of applications for all our travel document 

programs. 

Let me illustrate our progress toward ensuring that we can provide sufficient 

WHTI-compliant documents for United States citizens by June 1, 2009. Currently, 

many cross border travelers already have WHTI-compliant documents such as passports, trusted traveler cards, or enhanced driver’s licenses (EDL). Over 88 million 

U.S. citizens have passports. Our partners at DOS started taking applications for 

the new passport card in February 2008 and have received over 143,000 applications 

for the passport card that will begin to be issued in June. States and Canadian 

provinces will be issuing EDLs in the next several months—additional options for 

United States and Canadian citizens. 

The flexibility of the number of WHTI-compliant documents addresses the needs 

of each type of traveler, while providing CBP officers with secure documents to review. Some citizens who travel frequently both within and outside the Western 

Hemisphere may benefit from getting a passport card in conjunction with their U.S. 

passport. Individuals that frequently cross the Southern border may be best served 

by obtaining a Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) 

card. Less frequent border crossers might choose an enhanced driver’s license that 

offers the benefits of a license but also serves as a limited use travel document. 

Low-risk business travelers who fly between New York and Toronto for work might 

choose a NEXUS card. 

Our trusted traveler programs, NEXUS, SENTRI, and Free and Secure Trade 

(FAST), have a total of 436,000 members and we expect as many as 1.6 million participants by the end of fiscal year 2009. For frequent crossers, the ability to use 

dedicated NEXUS or SENTRI lanes at the border for expedited processing is a very 

clear benefit sought by the traveling public—the processing time for border crossers 

presenting trusted traveler cards is often less than half that for other travelers. By 

the end of 2008, we expect to open five additional NEXUS enrollment centers in 

Sweetgrass, Montana; International Falls, Minnesota; Niagara Falls and Alexandria 

Bay, New York; and Calais, Maine. To increase traveler awareness of NEXUS, we 

are investing in mobile enrollment centers, which will give us the flexibility to enroll 

travelers in remote parts of Alaska, Washington, Montana, and Minnesota. 

CBP and Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) have worked diligently to develop and implement a plan to handle the potential surge in NEXUS applications 

as a result of WHTI. On a daily basis, we monitor application intake, vetting, and 

the number of interviews conducted so that we can be proactive in reallocating re-
8 

sources where demand has increased. From March 31, 2007, to March 31, 2008, 

membership in NEXUS has increased by over 50 percent with the vast majority of 

applications being approved within 6 to 8 weeks, while membership in SENTRI has 

increased by 35 percent. 

DHS has entered into memoranda of agreement with the States of Washington, 

Vermont, Arizona, and New York to develop and produce WHTI-compliant EDLs, 

which will be acceptable travel documents at all land and sea ports of entry. Traveler demand for the enhanced driver’s license has exceeded expectations in Washington State. As of April 10, 2008, Washington State has scheduled more than 

21,000 appointments and has issued more than 8,500 EDLs. The States of New 

York, Arizona, and Vermont remain on track to issue EDLs in 2008. The Canadian 

province of British Columbia began issuing EDLs to Canadian citizens this month, 

and we expect Ontario and Quebec to follow by the end of the year. We continue 

to work with other States, including Michigan, which has recently passed legislation 

supporting the development of an EDL. We believe that with the success of EDLs 

other States may also wish to produce the documents for the convenience and benefits they offer to their resident citizens. 

We have sent out over 600 letters to all the federally recognized Native American 

tribes and offered to work with them toward developing a WHTI-compliant enhanced tribal document. This partnership is critical to the success of WHTI and 

demonstrates our commitment to listening to the concerns and ideas expressed by 

the Native American community. 

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF WHTI

Concerns have been expressed about the potential impact of the WHTI documentation requirements on traveler wait times at our land ports of entry. The risk 

that document requirements will negatively impact ports of entry in June 2009 is 

minimal, as the majority of travelers will have been presenting documents for inspection at the border for over 16 months. Many U.S. citizens are surprised to learn 

that documents have not been mandatory before now. Since January 31, 2008, compliance rates have steadily improved—more than 90 percent of U.S. and Canadian 

citizens queried while crossing the land border are in compliance with document requirements. Most travelers want to comply with January 31, 2008 change in document procedures and will want to comply with WHTI requirements in June 2009. 

At the Blaine, Washington, port of entry, approximately 85 percent of U.S. and Canadian citizens queried are already presenting WHTI-compliant documents. 

DHS recognizes our responsibility to educate the public on what the new travel 

document requirements are and provide ample opportunity for individuals to become 

acclimated to traveling with and presenting required documents. 

A traveler is easily verifiable if a passport or other acceptable document with an 

MRZ or appropriate RFID technology that can be queried automatically is presented. Processing times are considerably longer for a vehicle with passengers presenting documents that cannot be verified by the inspecting officer. Often, a CBP 

officer will need to manually enter an individual’s identifying information into the 

computer if the documentation presented does not have a machine readable zone. 

The additional time it takes to process these individuals contributes to delays. 

Our decision to adopt vicinity RFID technology for the land border was based on 

the need to process legitimate travelers as speedily as possible without impacting 

security. After extensive review of available and even possible technologies, DHS selected vicinity RFID as the best technology for our land border management system—and the standard to which all future land border travel documents will comply. Vicinity RFID technology affords the most benefits for the facilitated movement 

of travelers. Facilitation requires the ability to read a travel document in advance, 

verify identity, pre-position information, and, most importantly, perform automated 

watch list queries without impeding the flow of traffic. Our research and testing indicates that RFID technology is able to accomplish each of these requirements. 

DHS and CBP have instituted best practices for the collection, protection, and use 

of personal information for WHTI. No personal identifying information is stored on 

the RFID tag and all data is stored at remote locations on secure storage devices 

that can only be accessed via DHS’s secure, encrypted networks. Issuance of an attenuating sleeve by DOS for the passport card and the States for the EDL will protect the tags from unauthorized reads when not in use at the border. Implementation of a card specific tag identifier number will ensure that a card cannot be cloned 

or duplicated. On January 22, 2008, DHS published a Privacy Impact Assessment 

for the use of vicinity RFID technology for border crossings. 

Time and motion studies are in progress at 16 of the busiest land border ports. 

These studies examine all aspects of vehicle primary processing and time each indi-
9 

vidual inspection activity. A series of computer models were developed to look at 

cause and effect of the introduction of RFID-enabled documents and their increased 

use. At every port for which a model was developed, the introduction of RFID-enabled documents significantly reduced primary processing time. For example, at San 

Ysidro, California, use of an RFID-enabled document reduces vehicle primary processing time by an average of 27 percent. At the Bridge of the Americas in El Paso, 

Texas, the reduction is an average of 32 percent per vehicle. Both of these estimates 

are based on actual observations and computer modeling. Although we expect to 

quickly process the documents of most travelers, we will not focus on speed as the 

singular measure of success. Speeding up the document querying and authentication 

process gives more time for our CBP officers to ask questions and conduct inspections of those who require additional scrutiny. Time now spent examining a document will, instead, be used to probe those seeking to enter the United States who 

may present a higher risk. 

While the new document requirements and the implementation of WHTI are anticipated to have minimal negative impact on current wait times, other factors such 

as port design, infrastructure, traffic volume, and vehicle mix greatly affect border 

wait times. DHS and CBP are taking advantage of WHTI implementation to improve port infrastructure, but some challenges such as physical limitations will not 

be resolved. As we undertake necessary construction and technology installations at 

individual ports of entry, it is possible that wait times may temporarily be impacted. 

Wait times are monitored on an hourly basis and proactive measures are taken to 

reduce wait times to the greatest extent possible using a variety of mitigation strategies and staff and lane utilization. 

Both DHS and DOS have worked closely with the Canadian and Mexican governments on numerous fronts, including the Smart Border Declaration and the Shared 

Border Accord. The objectives of these initiatives are to establish a common security 

approach to protecting North America from external threats, and to streamline the 

secure and efficient movement of travel and trade. We remain committed to such 

consultations that have fostered WHTI accomplishments and progress to date. In 

particular, DHS has been involved in extensive discussions with our Canadian counterparts regarding secure alternative documents that can be made available to Canadian citizens for WHTI purposes, including the development of EDLs for Canadian citizens. 

We recognize that concerns remain about the impact of WHTI on border communities. We acknowledge that WHTI represents a social and cultural change, but assure the American people and Congress that WHTI will provide substantive enhancements to border security. The significant investments being made at the ports 

of entry and to the CBP systems will provide significant benefits to communities on 

both sides of the border and facilitate the legitimate flow of people and trade. WHTI 

is a key step in creating an effective and more efficient 21st century border. Our 

experience, to date, with both WHTI air implementation and the January 31, 2008, 

transition has been positive with no discernable negative impacts to the borders. We 

are confident that the deliberate, practical approach we are taking for the next 

phase of WHTI implementation will afford us the same results. 

DHS and DOS are committed to implementing this change in a practical way, and 

we want to foster an open and productive dialog. Both CBP and DOS have retained 

public relations firms to ensure consistent and complementary messaging. We have 

engaged at the local, national, and international levels. We will continue to partner 

with border communities, the travel industry (including cruise lines), and non-traditional stakeholders. We are coordinating with our Canadian counterparts as well as 

our State partners to get the maximum benefit for our efforts and taxpayer dollars. 

CONCLUSION

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder and Members of the committee, 

we have outlined our WHTI implementation plan that, with your assistance, will 

help DHS continue to protect America. We continue to move in the right direction 

of increasing identity document security, increasing information sharing among 

partners, and deploying the necessary resources to protect the border. Strong borders are a pillar of national security and WHTI is a key cornerstone supporting that 

pillar. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, we will be happy to answer any 

of your questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. I appreciate your conciseness. 

Thank you for the testimony. 

Mr. JACKSTA. for 5 minutes or less. 
10 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

TRAVELER SECURITY AND FACILITATION, U.S. CUSTOMS 

AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. JACKSTA. Good afternoon, Chairman Sanchez and other distinguished members. 

I am pleased also to be here today to discuss how we plan to 

move forward with the implementation of the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative, which, as you know, is both a statutory mandate 

and a 9/11 Commission recommendation. 

The Department of Homeland Security, in partnership with the 

Department of State, is working to secure our homeland by 

strengthening our ability to accurately identify all persons, U.S. 

citizens and visitors alike, before they enter the United States. 

We are accomplishing this through the implementation of secure 

document requirements at all ports of entry in the United States. 

Our approach to implementing WHTI has been and will continue 

to be both practical and flexible. 

Our goal is to increase security, while significantly facilitating 

the flow of legitimate trade and travel. 

Access to our country is critical for a terrorist to plan and carry 

out attacks on our homeland. To them, international travel presents great dangers because they must surface to pass through the 

regulated channels to present themselves to border security officials or attempt to circumvent inspection points. 

Preventing easy access to our homeland by requiring secure identity and citizenship documents at all ports of entry for both U.S. 

citizens and non-U.S. citizens will keep those hoping to do us harm 

from entering our country. 

In the past, drug and human traffickers, homicide suspects, and 

potential terrorists could show up at our borders and attempt to 

enter by telling us they were a U.S. or Canadian citizen when they 

were not. 

Since fiscal year 2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has 

identified over 33,000 individuals who attempted to enter our country at our land and sea ports of entry with a false oral claim of U.S. 

citizenship. 

In fiscal year 2007 alone, more than 30,000 individuals were apprehended at ports of entry trying to cross our border with false 

documents. 

We must be able to inspect or examine those who seek to enter 

the United States. Through its requirements that individuals carry 

a passport or other limited set of acceptable documents, WHTI will 

greatly reduce the opportunities for identity fraud or misrepresentation. 

Advanced technology embedded in these travel documents, with 

the appropriate privacy protections, and infrastructure will allow 

DHS the ability to verify an individual’s identity and perform realtime queries against lookout databases. 

Implementation of WHTI will allow our officers to focus more 

time and greater attention on each individual traveler. 

Based on the successful strategy surrounding the implementation 

of the WHTI air final rule, DHS published a WHTI land and sea 

final rule on April 3, a full 14 months prior to implementation, to 
11 

ensure adequate time for planning, education and communication 

to the travelers and the communities along the border. 

During the next 14 months, DHS and DOS will work diligently 

so that travelers will know what documents will be required, how 

to obtain these documents, and when they will need them. 

Some key points to our WHTI effort to date are all CBP officers 

are currently trained in the use of machine-readable zone technology. This means that right now our ports of entry can accept all 

WHTI-compliant documents. 

On February 4, 2008, DHS awarded a public relations contract 

to develop a proactive approach to the WHTI information campaign 

to the traveling public. 

Nearly 522 new CBP officers are being added to critical land border locations in fiscal year 2008. 

Our land border trusted traveler programs, NEXUS, SENTRI 

and FAST, have a total of 436,000 members. 

DHS has entered into a memorandum of agreement with the 

States of Washington, Vermont, Arizona and New York to develop 

and produce WHTI-compliant enhanced driver’s licenses, which will 

be acceptable travel documents at all land and sea ports of entry. 

On the second panel, you will hear today how the traveler demand for enhanced driver’s license has exceeded expectations in 

the State of Washington. 

The Canadian province of British Columbia began issuing EDLs 

to Canadian citizens this month and we expect Ontario and Quebec 

to follow by the end of the year. 

We have sent over 600 letters to all federally recognized Native 

American tribes and offered to work with them toward developing 

a WHTI-compliant enhanced tribal document. 

Time and motion studies are being conducted at our ports of 

entry today. 

Finally, both DHS and Department of State have worked closely 

with the Canadian and Mexican governments on numerous fronts, 

including the smart border declaration, the security and prosperity 

partnership agreement, and the shared border accord. 

DHS and Department of State are committed to implementing 

WHTI in a practical way and we want to foster an open and productive dialog. 

We continue to move in the right direction of increasing identity 

security, increasing information sharing among partners and deploying the necessary resources to protect the border. 

Chairman Sanchez, distinguished members, we have outlined our 

WHTI implementation plan and we hope that it addresses your 

concerns today, and we are ready to address any type of questions 

you may have. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Jacksta. 

We have some votes on the floor. I am told they are going to be 

50 or 60 minutes’ worth. 

So, I would like to get Mr. Staeben’s words in. We will break to 

vote. We have got about 6 minutes left on the floor. 

Then we will ask you to go get lunch or something, and we will 

be back in about an hour’s time. 

Mr. Staeben, please, summarize your statement in 5 minutes or 

less. We would appreciate it. 
12 

STATEMENT OF DERWOOD K. STAEBEN, SENIOR ADVISOR, 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE, DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Mr. STAEBEN. Thank you. Chairman Sanchez and other distinguished members, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the 

role of the Department of State in implementing the Western 

Hemisphere Travel Initiative to enhance the security of our borders 

and facilitate legitimate trade, travel and tourism. 

Our primary role is to provide American citizens with passports 

and soon passport cards that they can comply with the new travel 

document requirements that take effect June 1, 2009. 

Our increased workload indicates that Americans are already 

aware of the new requirements. In fiscal year 2007, we issued 18.4 

million passports, a 50 percent increase over fiscal year 2006 and 

an 80 percent increase over fiscal year 2005. 

Currently, more than 88 million Americans have passports or 

about 28 percent of our population. 

Thus far in fiscal year 2008, we are seeing a 7 percent increase 

in receipts over the same time period last year and our processing 

time is well within the standard 4 weeks for routine service and 

2 weeks for expedited service. 

As of last week, we issued 9.1 million passports. 

Our initial workload projections indicate the demand for U.S. 

passports could reach as high as 26 to 29 million this year, 30 million in fiscal year 2009 and 36 million in fiscal year 2010. 

Although we continue to prepare for a possible 26 to 29 million 

this year, our current workload indicates that it may be more, in 

the range of 20 to 21 million. 

We attribute this lower demand due to recent legislation extending the implementation date, but we expect to see an increase in 

demand in the months leading up to June 1, 2009. 

Our long-term strategy is to provide the staffing levels and infrastructure necessary to meet the increased demand generated by 

WHTI. To that end, we have hired hundreds of new passport adjudicators and support staff since spring 2007 and are continuing our 

recruiting efforts into 2008. 

We opened a mega passport center in Hot Springs, Arkansas 1 

year ago to process 10 million documents per year, and we are 

opening a second printing and shipping facility in Tucson this 

month with the same capacity. 

We are also opening three new passport agencies in Detroit, Dallas and Minneapolis to better service border communities. We are 

extending our agencies in Seattle, Miami and Chicago and are doubling the size and adjudicative capacity of the national passport 

center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 

We have also established a reserve corps of passport adjudicators 

to supplement our full-time passport services staff during demand 

surges. 

One of the key objectives of the Department is to ensure that the 

passport application process be as convenient as possible. 

The most convenient way to apply for a passport is at an acceptance facility. Currently, there are more than 9,400 sites at post offices, clerks of court and other government offices nationwide 

where citizens can apply for a passport. 
13 

Since April 2005, when WHTI was announced, the Department 

has added more than 2,400 facilities, many of which are located 

along the borders. 

In fact, there are currently 301 acceptance facilities located within 25 miles of the U.S.-Canada border and 128 acceptance facilities 

located within 25 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border. 

In response to the needs of border resident communities for more 

affordable and lower cost alternative to the traditional passport 

book, the Department began issuing passport cards this June. 

The passport card will have the same validity period as a passport book, 10 years for an adult, 5 for children 15 and younger. 

The passport card, designed to meet the operational needs of the 

Customs and Border Protection Agency, will use a vicinity read 

technology to facilitate entry and expedite document processing at 

U.S. land and sea ports of entry. 

The card is not a globally interoperable travel document and may 

not be used to travel by air. 

This card is the result of an interagency effort to produce the 

most durable, secure and tamper-resistant card possible to the 

American public using state-of-the-art laser engraving and security 

features. 

The Department has benefited from the collaborative efforts, 

among others, of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Sandia National Labs, the DHS forensics document lab, 

and, of course, our colleagues at Customs and Border Protection 

Agency. 

In consultation with DHS’ forensics document lab, the card is designed with multiple layers of overt, covert and forensic security 

features to guard against tampering and counterfeiting to provide 

easy visual and tactile verification to Customs and Border Protection officers. 

It is important to note that there is no personal identity information on the RFI chip itself, only a unique number that points to the 

bearer’s file in a secure government database. 

To mitigate the risk of tracking, a card will be issued with a protective sleeve to prevent unauthorized reading of the chip. 

To encourage Americans to apply for passports and card and to 

level demand during our traditional peak season, we began accepting applications for the card on February 1. 

As of this morning, we have received 162,300 card applications. 

Public outreach, of course, is a key to successful implementation 

of WHTI. The Department awarded a contract to a marketing firm 

on March 3 to help us inform Americans about WHTI requirements, the new passport card, and the differences between the card 

and the traditional book, and to encourage Americans to apply for 

their documents early. 

As we move toward full implementation of WHTI, we and our 

colleagues at DHS will continue public outreach efforts, particularly in border resident communities, and we will continue our outreach to business associations and stakeholder organizations. 

We, like our colleagues at DHS, are committed to implementing 

WHTI in a rational and intelligent manner, one that facilitates 

trade, travel and tourism, while enhancing our national security. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 
14 

[The statement of Mr. Staeben follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DERWOOD K. STAEBEN

APRIL 16, 2008 

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, Distinguished Members, thank 

you for this opportunity to discuss the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 

(WHTI) and the role of the State Department in providing American citizens with 

reliable, secure passports and soon passport cards so that American citizens can 

comply with the new travel document requirements under WHTI. 

In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress required the Departments of Homeland Security and State to develop and implement a plan to require all travelers, U.S. citizens and foreign nationals alike, to 

present a passport or other secure document to denote identity and citizenship when 

entering the United States. The goal of the program is to strengthen border security 

and facilitate entry into the United States for U.S. citizens and legitimate foreign 

travelers. 

To meet this mandate, the State Department is adjudicating and issuing passports to eligible U.S. citizens in record numbers; we have also begun to accept passport card applications and will begin issuing the cards in June. Our workload indicates that Americans are aware of the new document requirements under WHTI 

and are coming into compliance with them. In fiscal year 2007, the Department 

issued 18.4 million passports—a 50 percent increase over fiscal year 2006 and an 

80 percent increase over fiscal year 2005. Thus far in fiscal year 2008, there is a 

7 percent increase in passport demand over the same time period in fiscal year 

2007. We are meeting this demand by processing routine passport applications well 

within our 4-week service standards for routine applications and 2 weeks for expedited applications. 

INCREASING PASSPORT PRODUCTION CAPACITY

Today’s record-breaking demand is not an anomaly. Implementation of WHTI has 

created a permanent increase in passport demand, and we believe it will continue 

to grow. More than 88 million Americans currently have passports—about 28 percent of all citizens. Our initial workload projections for fiscal year 2008 indicated 

demand for U.S. passports could reach as high as 26–29 million in 2008, 30 million 

in fiscal year 2009, 36 million in fiscal year 2010. Although we continue to prepare 

for that possibility, our current workload indicates that fiscal year 2008 demand 

may be more in the range of 20–21 million passports. We attribute this decline to 

the recent congressional action mandating implementation of the final phase of the 

land and sea rule of WHTI to no earlier than June 1, 2009. This legislation passed 

subsequent to our demand study, and we fully expect demand to increase as we approach the June 1, 2009 implementation date. 

The Department is implementing a long-term strategy to provide the staffing levels and infrastructure necessary to meet the increased passport demand generated 

by WHTI. To that end, the Department has hired hundreds of additional passport 

adjudicators and support staff and continues to recruit aggressively. The Department has also established a reserve corps of passport adjudicators to supplement 

our full-time Passport Services staff, providing the ability to react quickly to demand surges. 

To increase production capacity, we opened a mega-processing center in March 

2007 in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The Arkansas Processing Center (APC) differs from 

our other passports centers in that it focuses solely on printing and mailing passports. It will have the capacity to produce 10 million travel documents per year. The 

centralization of passport printing and mailing frees up space and personnel at our 

existing passport agencies to focus on the critical areas of customer service and adjudication, and to process more passport applications. Using APC as a model, we 

expect to open a second printing and mailing facility in Tucson later this month. 

This facility, like the one in Arkansas, will have the capacity to produce over 10 

million travel documents per year. 

EXPANDING PASSPORT ACCEPTANCE FACILITIES

One of the key objectives of the Department is to ensure that passport services 

are provided in a secure, efficient and courteous manner. At the same time, we need 

to make our application process as convenient as possible for citizens. The most convenient and least expensive way to apply for a passport is at a passport acceptance 

facility or by mail for adult renewals. A full 90 percent of our passport applications 
15 

are submitted via an acceptance agency or mailed directly to us. We have significantly expanded our network of passport acceptance agents in the last several years. 

Currently, there are more than 9,400 sites at post offices, clerks of court and other 

government offices nationwide where citizens can apply for a passport. 

We have heard the concern of border residents, and are aggressively recruiting 

acceptance facilities along the northern and southern border regions. Since the administration announced WHTI to the public in April 2005, the Department has increased its network of acceptance facilities by more than 2,400 facilities, many of 

which are located along the borders. 

There are currently 301 acceptance facilities located within 25 miles of the U.S.- 

Canada border and 128 acceptance facilities located within 25 miles of the U.S.- 

Mexico border. In fact, since the end of the calendar year 2006, we increased the 

total number of facilities within 25 miles of the Northern border by 5 percent and 

the total number of facilities within 25 miles of the Southern border by 15 percent. 

Our largest acceptance partner, the United States Postal Service (USPS) has held 

successful passport acceptance events in several border regions around the country. 

These ‘‘Passport Fairs’’ help meet high customer demand for passports in underserved areas. The USPS plans more of these passport acceptance events in the future, leading up to the June 1, 2009 implementation date. 

We are continuing our recruitment efforts in the southern and northern border 

regions and continue to work with our acceptance agent partners to make the passport application process easily accessible to all Americans. 

PASSPORT AGENCIES

In addition to our 18 passport facilities, the Department is also opening three new 

Passport Agencies in Detroit, Dallas, and Minneapolis in 2008 to serve border communities readying themselves for WHTI land and sea rule requirements. These 

agencies will provide personal, direct passport services to customers. Unlike our regional passport agencies and centers, these new agencies are primarily counter 

agencies designed to meet the urgent travel needs of citizens. These agencies will 

have the capability of serving 650 customers per day, issuing passport books and 

cards on-site to qualifying applicants. 

The Department looked at several criteria to determine the location of these new 

passport agencies, including location, distance from an existing passport agency/center, volume of current passport applicants, service and volume of international and 

domestic departures, and an upward trend in population growth. 

Along the northern border, we are expanding our agencies in Seattle and Chicago, 

and are doubling the size and adjudicative capacity of the National Passport Center 

in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Along the southern border, we are expanding our 

facilities in Houston, Miami, and New Orleans. 

PASSPORT CARD

In response to the expressed desire for a more portable and less expensive document than the traditional passport book on the part of American citizens who live 

in border communities, we will begin issuing a wallet-sized passport card in June 

with full production beginning in July. The passport card will facilitate entry and 

expedite document processing at U.S. land and sea ports-of-entry when arriving 

from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean region and Bermuda. The card may not be 

used to travel by air. It will otherwise carry the rights and privileges of the U.S. 

passport book and will be adjudicated to the exact same standards. The passport 

card is designed for the specific needs of border resident communities and is not a 

globally interoperable travel document as is the traditional passport book. 

The card will have the same validity period as a passport book: 10 years for an 

adult; 5 years for children 15 and younger. For adults who already have a passport 

book, they may apply for the card as a passport renewal and pay only $20. Firsttime applicants pay $45 for adult cards and $35 for children. 

To meet the operational needs of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and to facilitate document processing at U.S. ports-of-entry, the Department of Homeland Security selected vicinity-read radio frequency identification technology (RFID) for use 

in the passport card as well as their Trusted Traveler Card program and for use 

in the Enhanced Driver’s License (EDL). The passport card will therefore contain 

a vicinity-read (RFID) chip which will link the card to a stored record in a secure 

DHS database. There will be no identifying information on the RFID chip; only a 

number will be read at a distance by an authorized CBP reader mounted alongside 

the traffic lane at ports of entry. The reader will automatically retrieve the personal 

data from the secure database and populate the officers’ screens as the vehicle ap-
16 

proaches. To mitigate the risk of tracking, the card will be issued with a protective 

‘‘attenuation’’ sleeve to prevent unauthorized reading of the chip. 

This card is the result of an inter-agency effort to produce for the American public 

the most durable, secure and tamper-resistant card possible, using state of the art 

laser engraving and security features. To ensure the durability for the 10-year validity period, we have chosen to make the card of a durable polycarbonate composite 

material rather than the standard plastic used for ID and credit cards. The Department has benefited from the collaborative efforts of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Sandia National Labs, the DHS Forensics Document 

Lab (FDL), and, of course, colleagues at CBP. To ensure the durability and integrity 

of the card, the Department subjected the test cards to a full battery of durability 

and chemical testing at Sandia National Labs in accordance with guidance from 

NIST. In consultation with the DHS/FDL, the card is designed with multiple layers 

of overt, covert, and forensic security features to guard against tampering and counterfeiting and to provide easy visual verification to CBP officers. 

To encourage Americans to apply for passports and cards and to level demand 

during our traditional peak season, we began accepting applications for the passport 

card on February 1, 2008. Given the volume of applications to date, particularly 

from the southern border states, there is clearly a demand for the card. As of April 

9, the Department has received more than 143,000 applications for the card. These 

applications have been adjudicated and are awaiting production. As noted above, the 

Department expects to begin issuing these cards in June and to be in full production 

by July. 

PUBLIC OUTREACH

Public outreach is the key to successful implementation of WHTI. The Department awarded a contract to a marketing firm on March 3 to help inform Americans 

about WHTI requirements, the new passport card, and the differences between the 

card and the traditional book, and to encourage them to apply for their documents 

early—well in advance of their planned trips and certainly well in advance of June 

1, 2009. 

As we move toward full WHTI implementation, the Department of State, working 

with our colleagues at DHS, will continue public education efforts which will include 

greater advertising with local media in areas that specifically target those persons 

who use the land borders. We will also continue sponsoring information sessions 

with business associations and civil organizations. 

The frontline of our outreach efforts will be the more than 10,000 passport acceptance agents in every corner of the United States, especially along our border, who 

will continue to reach out to their customers and neighbors with passport fairs, 

press releases, and visits to their post offices, town halls and libraries. 

CONCLUSION

We understand that our national security is dependent on our economic well being 

and that of our neighbors to the north and south. We also understand that the economic well being of the border communities depends on the free flow of people and 

goods. 

As we have stated since we announced WHTI 3 years ago this month, we are committed to implementing the WHTI in a rational and intelligent manner, one that 

facilitates trade, travel, and tourism while enhancing our national security. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You read it quite fast. 

We will be back in about 50 to 60 minutes. 

We are in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The committee will now come back to order. Hello, 

again. 

So just to recap for the members, before we left for the votes, we 

heard from the three members of the panel and it is now time to 

ask questions. 

I will remind each member that he or she will have 5 minutes 

to question the panel. 

Now I will recognize myself for questions. 
17 

In July 2007, our subcommittee held a hearing on the Department’s frequent traveler programs, NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST, 

and several members, including myself and the Ranking Member, 

expressed concern that enrollees in the NEXUS program are not 

subject to as many security checks and are charged $79 less than 

enrollees in the SENTRI program, and, in addition, NEXUS cards 

were not being accepted on the southern border. 

Your testimony highlights the advantages of having trusted travel cards be WHTI-accepted documents. 

So my question for you: are all trusted traveler program cards 

accepted at borders and have the security checks, fees and technology been standardized among the different programs? 

Mr. JACKSTA. I will address that question by, first of all, stating 

that over the last couple of months, we have been moving forward 

to take a look at utilizing our automation system so that cards, the 

NEXUS cards can be used on the southern border, as well as the 

SENTRI card being used up on the northern border. 

We are currently working on that automation enhancement and, 

as of today, I can tell you that it is not in place, but it is something 

that we feel is extremely important to make sure that individuals 

who are registered in our trusted traveler programs will be identified either if they arrive on the northern border or southern border. 

Regarding the issue of trying to bring consistency across the 

board, we have implemented our global enrollment system, where 

all individuals who want to enroll in one of our trusted traveler 

programs can apply online, send the application in. 

It goes to our central vetting center, where all applications are 

treated the same way, go through the same screening process, and 

then the issuance of the card actually takes place at the ports of 

entry. 

So we have uniformity in that process. We have uniformity on 

how we notify the travelers whether they have been accepted to the 

programs or not. 

We still maintain the fee differences between the southern border and the northern border. We did reduce the southern border fee 

to $122, but it is still higher than the fee for the northern border. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why is that? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Once again, we believe that because of the fact that 

we have the responsibility on the southern border to review and to 

actually inspect the vehicles that are—for individuals who are accepted into the SENTRI program, this creates additional costs for 

our employees and for our system to collect that information, to 

spend the time to do the inspection, to validate that the car is secure. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Your testimony states that since January 31, 2008, 

when the practice of accepting oral declarations of citizenship 

ended, the compliance rate has been 90 percent for U.S. and Canadian citizens. 

We have heard this policy change has caused no significant 

delays, because there is less stringent enforcement. 

So my questions are: are Customs and Border Protection officers 

requesting further identification and proof of citizenship from each 

and every traveler who present themselves at a port of entry and 

what type of enforcement are you conducting when a person does 
18 

not possess the required documents and how many people have 

been turned away at the border due to the lack of the necessary 

documents since January 31 of this year? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Well, one of the ways forward, when we implemented the requirement for no longer accepting oral declarations, 

was that we had to make sure that we were able to measure it. 

Today, our officers, when an individual arrives at the port of 

entry and they are not in compliance with the oral declaration requirement, they are basically advised—first of all, the officer makes 

a decision on whether the person is admissible or not, whether they 

can ascertain whether the person is a U.S. citizen. 

They remind them of the responsibility and we give them what 

we call a tear sheet, which outlines exactly what type of documents 

are required. 

We let the officer make the decision based on his experience and 

knowledge of the traveler, the travel routes, the traveler’s history, 

and he, through that interview process, makes a decision. 

What we do on a regular basis is that when a person is not in 

compliance and does not have a photo ID or the birth certificate, 

we will refer them to the secondary area. 

We will record that we have an individual who was not in compliance and we keep track of that record. That is how we can tell 

that we have basically over a 90 percent compliance rate. 

What we planned to do, when we went forward back in January, 

we said we would do a phased approach, taking a look at what are 

the next steps. Over the next couple of weeks, we hope to decide 

on exactly what would be the next phase. 

I think one of the things that we are looking at is when individuals arrive and they do not have the proper documentation, we can, 

first of all, make sure that they get a passport card application. We 

can also work with the States and make sure that they receive an 

enhanced driver’s license application, to advise them that, once 

again, they are required to be in compliance with the laws of the 

United States, that they should make every effort to get it. 

As we move forward, going forward to June 1, 2009, we will step 

up the enforcement and send those individuals back into the secondary area and, once again, ascertain whether they have all the 

proper documentation and then we can feel comfortable that they 

are admissible into the United States. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So, Mr. Jacksta, you believe that by the July date, 

that when somebody comes to the border, then they will—if they 

don’t have the correct documents, will we just turn them back? 

Will you do the same process you are doing where you ascertain 

where do you live, what is the grocery store down from your street, 

things that you might be able to pick up that, in fact, they are a 

U.S. citizen, but they just—— 

Mr. JACKSTA. That is correct. First of all, if they are a U.S. citizen, we can’t refuse them entry into the United States once we determine that they are a U.S. citizen. 

So we want to make sure that people get into compliance and 

what we are going to do is make sure that they are a U.S. citizen 

by asking them the specific questions, making sure that we know 

their identity. 
19 

Our officers are very well-trained in this area and over the last 

couple of months, we have stopped a number of individuals at our 

ports of entry that have claimed that they were a U.S. citizen, presented maybe a driver’s license and when our officers sent them 

back and started questioning them, they determined that the person was, in fact, a fraudulent individual with fraudulent documents 

and that they were actually, in certain cases—I have an example 

where we had an individual down in San Diego that was actually 

wanted for murder in San Diego County. 

These are the types of things that our officers are seeing on a 

regular basis. 

As we get closer to June 1, 2009, we are going to see more and 

more of these individuals having a difficult time crossing our border, because our officers are going to be able to validate the documentation. 

If they don’t have the proper ID and citizenship documentation, 

we are going to send them back to the secondary area. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

I will now recognize my ranking member, Mr. Souder of Indiana 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. 

I want to, again, apologize for missing the testimony. I was trying to catch up, but we had markups in two other committees and 

they are continuing later on. 

I have one very specific question that somewhat relates to my 

district and one broader. 

In trying to develop the travel documents, there is something in 

your testimony about the Native American tribes and particularly 

some of them like Tohono O’odham, where they are cross-border, 

and the challenges that you face there. 

I have a different type of challenge and that is with the Amish. 

We have been working with your Department. Ironically, this particular group believes that it is immoral, based on the scriptural 

verse, ‘‘graven image, or the likeness thereof,’’ to have their picture 

taken. 

Because we have a large Canadian community just east of Windsor, over by Kitchener and Waterloo, also up in the western provinces, we have a lot of back-and-forth. 

I have met with the bishops a number of time. The Department 

gave us all sorts of different types of answers. They are willing to 

do 10 fingerprints, which is absolutely secure, but everything else 

is less than secure. 

They are willing to do 10 fingerprints. My understanding is we 

have the ability to read that. They have said that they would find 

their way to a center where they can do the 10 fingerprints. 

The idea that they have been told at the Port Huron and Detroit 

crossings, in particular, is that, ‘‘Well, we will see how we enforce 

this’’ and the Department’s official position has been, ‘‘We will work 

with them,’’ and they should trust. 

But they have been told by different Inspectors, and it depends 

on who is there on a given day, that they may not be able to get 

back. When their father and mother visit or they go to visit them 

and you don’t own your own car. You are often contracting it out. 
20 

Being told that maybe I will get through, maybe I won’t get 

through, is not an acceptable final answer. There needs to be some 

sort of accommodation to a group of people who are not against secure IDs. They are willing to go more secure than what the government is asking. 

I have not understood the resistance of the Department to be 

willing to go to 10 fingerprints, which is where we are likely headed anyway, if you look at this 10–20 years from now, because of 

the next question I am going to ask you. 

I would like to kind of get your feeling on that and why this is 

so hard to do the fingerprint document, which would be the most 

secure document you could possibly have. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Well, first of all, let me begin by saying that when 

individuals arrive at our ports of entry, our officers are responsible 

for interviewing the individual. 

If there is a question where they don’t have the proper documentation, in this case, a photo ID, they would most likely be referred to a secondary area if the officer does not feel comfortable 

that they are U.S. citizens, and that normal process takes 5 to 10 

minutes to do. 

I don’t know what type of information has been relayed, but 

clearly people who arrive at our ports of entry, our officers are 

going to ask them their citizenship and where they are going and 

the reason why they are visiting the United States or coming back. 

That questioning normally will allow the officer to make a decision on whether they are admissible. 

It would help, and I understand the religious reasons, but it 

would help if they had a picture ID. That is consistent with what 

we are putting out there with the REAL ID and our effort with 

WHTI. 

So I think we are willing to look at the possibility that we can 

expedite them through the secondary area, but the bottom line is 

that they would be processed in an easy fashion if they were able 

to present the proper documentation at the primary booth. 

Mr. SOUDER. That is not possible. It is under the religious freedom amendment and that is not a possible alternative. 

The alternative is not to travel, and it is unfair of the U.S. Government to expect them to change their religion. 

Now, at the same time, they have to understand we have national security concerns. Quite frankly, if we do officer discretion, 

let me say this just in general, I am worried, because people can 

fake being Amish. It is not hard to fake it. This isn’t a viable option 

that is currently on the table from the administration. 

It is complicated by the fact that some Muslim groups also don’t 

believe in photographs. But you have an alternative. 

It may require a scanner or to go to secondary, but there is an 

alternative for people who have a religious objection, and, that is, 

then they have to do 10 fingerprints. 

It isn’t as though we don’t know who they are. It isn’t as though 

they are not planning to cooperate. 

What I don’t understand is why the administration is opposed, 

given the fact that we have the ability to read this at the major 

entries and the Amish are even willing to negotiate even if it is 

just a few entries; they won’t cross at the small border entries. 
21 

What they are looking for is some clarity, because they understand our goals, but we are asking them to give up their religious 

beliefs if they want to go visit their relatives. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Sir, I just want to let you know that we have a 

process in place when those travelers come across the border today. 

Mr. SOUDER. Why aren’t fingerprints acceptable? 

Mr. JACKSTA. I would say that, down the road, that might be an 

option to look at. 

Mr. SOUDER. Why isn’t it acceptable, now, given the fact you 

have the ability to read it? 

Mr. JACKSTA. We will take it under consideration. 

Mr. SOUDER. Okay. Well, I would like to continue. There are a 

number of us who are very concerned, and a group of very innocent, scared people right now who are trying their best and are 

willing to go farther than we are willing to, and it just seems like 

we ought to follow up. 

I know I am over. I want to put this question on the table. I have 

concerns. I want to compliment you on working with British Columbia, with Washington State and others, but we are seeing the 

proliferation of the secondary documents being copied, whether it 

is birth certificates and other types of things that lead to these documents. 

I have a concern that we are now going to set up a second tier 

to try to get around that, and I would like to continue to talk with 

the Department about how you are going to address that challenge. 

We had one county in Ohio, near Fort Wayne, that had their entire birth certificates stolen out of their county courthouse. Actually, a birth certificate is easier to reproduce than a driver’s license. 

In looking at these four documents, that is why I personally believe that we are moving to fingerprints, because every other document is so easily copied. 

I yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the gentleman from Indiana. Many of us 

have concern for different groups, as you say. So I think we do 

need to find a solution on that. 

I would like to recognize, for 5 minutes, for her questions at this 

time, Mrs. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Welcome to the panelists. 

Ms. Kraninger, you said that you had met with border groups 

and officials as you have prepared to implement this. 

Did you meet with people from our third border, officials from 

the Caribbean Basin? 

Ms. KRANINGER. Yes, actually, we have. Personally, I have had 

meetings with Caribbean representatives in Washington, DC prior 

to the air implementation. 

I do know, however, that Customs and Border Protection have 

been meeting them, along with the cruise lines, in moving to sea 

implementation. 

Bob, if you want to add anything. 

Mr. JACKSTA. I think that we have had a number of trips down 

to the Caribbean area, meeting with various groups, the cruise line 

industry, the private boats, the small charter groups. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Oh, really. 
22 

Mr. JACKSTA. And making sure that they were aware of the requirements for, first of all, the air requirements that went into effect last year and then now as we move forward to the time of the 

oral declaration and, finally, the WHTI, that they are fully aware 

of it. 

I will tell you that they have been very supportive and there has 

been very high compliance. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thanks. 

I want to try to get in as many questions as possible. 

Thank you. 

How will U.S. lawful permanent residents be affected by the 

passport requirements? Is their alien resident card sufficient ID for 

purposes of travel by air, land and sea? 

Ms. KRANINGER. Yes, it is. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I have one of these cards. It has got my eye 

iris, my 10 fingerprints. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Is this the NEXUS? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. No. This is a clear card. 

Ms. KRANINGER. Clear. 

Mr. JACKSTA. A clear card, okay. That is not an acceptable card. 

That is a card that is issued by TSA—well, not by TSA, but it is 

not an acceptable card on WHTI. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. The State Department Web site says 

that NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST cards are successful cards in implementation using the RFID. 

How quickly does DHS and State plan—how quickly do they plan 

to deploy radio frequency identification readers at the 39 land ports 

of entry? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Actually, we have a contract with Unisys that we 

are moving forward on. The company right now is doing surveys at 

the 39 locations. 

We are going to start the construction this summer and then we 

are going to start implementing, putting the equipment out. The 

first location is Nogales. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Five to 10 years? That is what I am hearing. 

Mr. JACKSTA. No. Under the contract, it is less than 1 year. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Even though you are just at the survey point 

now. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Right. But we plan to have the surveys done by 

May. We have the construction being done this summer at various 

locations and then we are going to be, wont for a better term, hanging the equipment that is going to be needed to be able to read the 

cards. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I also have a concern about counterfeiting. 

Isn’t it true that the NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST cards are being 

counterfeited at an alarming rate and, also, that most features, 

such as holograms, chronograms and others are generally counterfeited easily so that the FAST card may be vulnerable to counterfeiting, as well? 

Mr. STAEBEN. Thank you. We are designing the passport card 

with multiple layers of covert, overt and forensic security features 

in order to mitigate the possibility of tampering. 

We are using a polycarbonate substance in order to make it more 

durable to last for 10 years and it will allow us to use laser engrav-
23 

ing, which is much more difficult to duplicate than other processes 

used in other types of IDs. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Is all of that on the Web site? Because I understand that the artwork and specifications for the pass card are 

on the State Department Web site. 

Mr. STAEBEN. The only information that is on the State Department Web site is a very low resolution photograph, which is for 

standard public release purposes. 

It is not actually the final artwork itself and there is no information about the security features, except that we say that it will use 

state-of-the-art laser engraving and security features. That is all 

we say. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. So a person can’t go to the Web site and get 

enough information to create a card. 

Mr. STAEBEN. Absolutely not. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. We have also heard that DHS did not 

test some of the cards that were submitted, including one with an 

optical stripe. 

Could you provide the committee or can you answer today about 

the evaluation process and adversarial testing and the procurement 

process? 

Mr. STAEBEN. We are familiar with that technology, but none of 

the final offers included an optical memory strip for testing. 

We submitted all the test cards to a full battery of tests at 

Sandia National Labs, to include chemical durability, electromagnetic testing, and all of the tests were conducted in accordance 

with the certification requirements that were given to us or mandated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. So an optical stripe was not required. 

Mr. STAEBEN. It was not offered and it was not required. The request for proposal stated that the vendors, at a minimum, had to 

submit a tactile feature and a hologram, but they also had the option of offering additional security features of their choice. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I think my time is up. Thank you, Madam 

Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the gentlelady. 

Now to my good friend, Mr. Bilirakis of Florida for 15 minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, appreciate it 

very much. 

This question is for Mr. Staeben. 

What lessons have been learned about passport processing times 

and public outreach in the air environment and how are you applying that knowledge to prevent potential problems with the land 

and sea rollout? 

Mr. STAEBEN. Thank you for that question. 

We have reviewed every aspect of passport services in order to 

determine how best we can meet the projected demand as a result 

of WHTI, as well as the possibility of reacting very quickly to any 

surges. 

We have looked at personnel. We have looked at IT systems. We 

have looked at infrastructure and we have looked at passport facilities. 

As I mentioned briefly in my opening remarks, we are increasing 

our personnel. We hired, in the last couple months of the last fiscal 
24 

year, upwards of 400 people. We intend to hire approximately 650 

people this year. We are going to hire additional personnel next 

year. 

The goal is to have the adjudicative capacity to meet 36 million 

applications by the year 2010. 

We are doubling our production capacity when we open the Tucson printing facility this month, which will have another 10 million 

capacity on top of the 10 million that we can get out of the Arkansas facility, which we opened 1 year ago. 

In order to meet surges, we have created a reserve corps of people that we can draw on very quickly. We also have remote adjudication capability so that we can draw on the expertise of consular 

officers serving abroad as yet one more layer if we reach another 

tripwire. 

So we have learned many lessons that we are implementing now, 

but the basic goal is to have the infrastructure and the adjudicative 

capacity to meet whatever comes our way as a result of WHTI. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

This question is for the DHS panel. 

My district and the entire State of Florida relies heavily, as you 

know, on the cruise industry for much of its economic vitality. 

Do you foresee any particular infrastructure limitations or challenges that need to be addressed regarding implementation in this 

environment? 

Mr. JACKSTA. We have a working group that has been working 

with the cruise line industry down in Florida, in the Tampa area, 

the Port Canaveral area, to make sure that we address the issues 

that are going to go forward. 

As you know, based on the comments received from the industry, 

we made some modifications to the final rule where individuals, 

U.S. citizens who are what we call a closed loop, leaving from 

Miami, going to visit the Caribbean, coming back to Miami, would 

not be required to have a pass card of a passport card. 

They would just have to have an ID and their birth certification. 

So we have made that accommodation. 

We are also working with the cruise industry down in those 

areas and also in the Puerto Rico area to make sure that we can 

expedite them through the process. 

We now get advanced information both when the vessel leaves 

the United States, as well as when it arrives. 

We also are working with them on the handling of the I–94 documentation for the visitors who go on cruise ships. 

So I think that we have a very good working relationship with 

the various lines down there, trying to take a look at the limited 

facilities and making sure that we can get the travelers once they 

come back from a cruise through the process as quickly as possible. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Back to the land border. I have one question for the panel. 

Have you gotten any feedback from the Canadian counterparts 

regarding the ability of Canadian citizens to obtain WHTI-approved 

documents or their willingness to do so? 

Ms. KRANINGER. We have had longstanding relationships with 

our Canadian counterparts. In the testimony, we mentioned Presidential level initiatives, like the security and prosperity partner-
25 

ship, as well as DHS global initiatives, since the Department was 

created. 

We started with the small border accord even just post-9/11. So 

our partnership has been very robust. In fact, the Canadian government has been a strong partner, talking about WHTI implementation and potential impacts and certainly working through different issues. 

They are encouraging their provinces and working closely with 

their provinces to go the enhanced driver’s license route as an alternative to the passport, but they do have a very high passportholder rate, which is something that means the Canadian citizens 

have the WHTI-compliant documents, for the large part, already. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Anyone else wish to address it? 

Mr. JACKSTA. I would just mention, consistent with what Kathy 

just mentioned, that we have a very good working relationship. We 

have been having a number of conversations with the Canadians 

on this. 

We have had a number of conversations with the various groups 

representing the Canadians, Border Trade Alliance, the various 

groups, talking groups. 

So we have a good relationship. They understand the requirements. One of the efforts that we have is that as we move forward 

with making sure everyone gets into compliance with the final rule, 

that we have to work with the Canadians and the Canadian groups 

to make sure the message is sent out for the travelers. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Very good. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, appreciate it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You are welcome. 

Now we will go to Mr. Green of Texas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I thank the ranking member for his comments that were made 

earlier and would look forward to working with you on the finger 

identification. 

Mr. Jacksta, let’s talk for just a moment about the vicinity radio 

frequency identification. 

It is my belief that this is entirely doable, and I admire the notion that you are convinced that it will be done, but I have to be 

mindful of P–28, part of SBInet, and I have to be mindful of the 

fact that we have a TWIC card, but no card reader for the TWIC 

card, and the TWIC card is now being deployed. 

So the question becomes if we do not meet the deadline and we 

have this card, but we don’t have the reader, because the reader 

is the key to the success of the vicinity screening, what will we do? 

Mr. JACKSTA. First of all, sir, let me put on that we plan to meet 

the June 1, make sure that we have the equipment out there. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Let me just intercede and say this. I have 

been here through other hearings—and this is not to demean you 

and, by the way, I have great admiration for Secretary Chertoff. 

We are just being factual now. I have been at other hearings. I 

was the guy who questioned on P–28 and was given assurances 

about when it would be deployed. 

Now, it is, shall we say, indefinitely suspended. 
26 

Mr. JACKSTA. So let me go to the point that you want me to address, and that is the issue of that on June 1, 2009, if the equipment is not out there, we have the ability to have the pass cards. 

We have the responsibility to use the other types of cards that 

are going to be machine readable, but they are going to show the 

identity and the citizenship of the individuals. 

So even though the RFID may not be read, the ability for our 

CBP officers to have a single document that does show the identity 

and the citizenship are going to be extremely important. 

As Department of State indicated, these documents that we are 

putting out there, in addition to making them more enhanced so 

that they could not be used for fraudulent reasons, we are also enhancing our trusted traveler cards. 

We are enhancing other types of documents that we are going to 

accept. So on June 1, 2009, we are going to have better cards in 

the hands of travelers coming across the border. 

The enhanced driver’s license that the States are putting out 

there are also going to have a machine readable zone. They are 

going to have the biographic information. They are going to have 

the security features. 

So it is a success story even if the RFID does not work. 

Mr. GREEN. Are you allowed to buy members lunch? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. If it is done, I will buy you lunch. If it is not done, 

will you buy me lunch? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay, all right. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Appreciate that. 

Mr. GREEN. I want to make sure we get information on you before you leave so that I can find you. 

What is the value of this contract, please, sir? 

Mr. JACKSTA. The contract is somewhere in the area of about $80 

million for Unisys to deploy the equipment, do the site surveys. 

I don’t have the exact money value. We can give you that value. 

The money that Congress has given to us has also enabled us to 

enhance and put additional positions out in the field, CBP officers. 

It also has enabled us to enhance our capabilities. 

As you know, sir, I know you have been down on the border. You 

have seen the screens that we have. It is old technology. 

This WHTI enhancement is going to change the whole way we 

do business down on the southern border and bring more information to that CBP officer so that, in the long run, it is going to help 

facilitate the travelers through the process. 

So we are excited about taking a look at the land border locations for the first time in a number of years and making these important changes. 

Mr. GREEN. One more quick question and then we will be off to 

vote. 

You have talked a lot about coordinating your efforts with Canada and working with them to make sure that their concerns are 

met. 

What about our southern neighbor, Mexico? 
27 

Mr. JACKSTA. Absolutely, sir. We have had a number of conversations. I have been personally down to Mexico City, down to other 

places in Mexico along the southern border. 

Once again, we are meeting with the officials from the Mexican 

government. We are working with the BTA on the southern border 

with the various local chapters on the southern border. 

So every effort is being made to make sure that the message is 

getting out, that they understand. 

For this WHTI, it is really not going to affect Mexican citizens, 

since they still are going to be required and are currently required 

to have a passport or a border crossing card when they come and 

cross. 

Mr. GREEN. I yield back, Madam Chair. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

We have some votes on the floor. 

First, let me say that the chair has received a written statement 

on the subject of today’s hearing from Representative Louise 

Slaughter and from Representative Stupak, and I ask unanimous 

consent to insert the statements in the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The statements of Ms. Slaughter and Mr. Stupak follow:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER

APRIL 16, 2008 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I would like to thank you for taking the time to hold this hearing on this important subject, as well as giving me 

the opportunity to submit my remarks for the record. The committee has been incredibly supportive in its efforts to ensure that the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) is properly implemented; even holding a field hearing on the subject 

up in Buffalo, NY last year. As you know, given that nearly my entire district runs 

along the Canadian border, I am particularly concerned about WHTI and the effects 

of its implementation on border community economies. 

More than a relationship of shared proximity and principles, the Northern border 

represents a major component of our global economy. U.S.-Canada trade supports 

7.1 million jobs and generates tens of billions of dollars in annual revenue. Each 

day, $1.5 billion in trade crosses our border; that is $1 million every minute. Canadians made more than 40 million visits to the United States in 2006, spending more 

than $13.5 billion. Just a 5 percent decline in Canadian visits to the United States 

could cost the American economy nearly $700 million. 

Given that Canada is our largest trading partner and the intertwining economic 

relationship between border communities, I have long been concerned that WHTI 

could unintentionally close the U.S.-Canada border and create an economic disaster 

for both countries. While I support the intent of WHTI and recognize the need to 

improve the physical security of the documents presented for entrance into the 

United States, we must not let WHTI freeze cross-border travel. I believe that there 

are ways to implement WHTI that are smart and secure, and make certain that our 

border remains open for business. 

DHS insisted on implementing the WHTI air requirements in January 2007, despite concerns in the travel community that the agency had not properly notified 

the public or prepared for a smooth execution. The travel community’s concerns 

were borne out when DHS was forced to postpone the air regulations for 3 months 

after thousands of travelers were unable to receive passports in a timely manner. 

The challenges for the effective implementation for land and sea are far greater 

than for air as DHS must install the ports-of-entry (POE) with new card-readers, 

test and develop the technology for the proposed passport card, and start the driver’s license pilot program in several States. As the January, 2008 deadline for implementing the full WHTI requirements approached, it became increasingly unlikely 

that any of these tasks could be achieved. 

Recognizing this, last year I led the charge in Congress to delay the implementation of WHTI from January, 2008 until June, 2009. Language mandating this delay 

was successfully included in the fiscal year 2008 omnibus appropriations bill which 
28 

was signed into law in December. This action was necessary in order to make sure 

that we do not rush this proposal that currently has many flaws, and it was incorporated into the final rule on the land and sea portion of WHTI which was released 

by DHS on March 27, 2008. 

This delay, however, is only that: a delay. DHS still must address the primary 

concerns that are shared by people in border communities throughout the United 

States and Canada. 

According to the State Department, nearly 50 percent of the annual Northern border crossings are made by just 400,000 people. These are the frequent travelers who 

rely on cross-border travel and trade in their every day lives. In order to ensure that 

WHTI implementation does not hamper the regular trade and travel, DHS must implement and actively promote efficient trusted-traveler programs such as NEXUS 

and FAST for frequent travelers. The 9/11 Commission found that NEXUS and 

FAST are critical to improving the security of our borders. The programs are a joint 

venture between the United States and Canadian governments, and are designed 

to simplify border crossings for pre-approved, low-risk travelers and commercial 

drivers. Carefully screened applicants get access to expedited border crossing lanes, 

and do not have to stop to be inspected. Not only is the NEXUS card less expensive 

than a passport, it also allows our border inspectors to use their limited resources 

to better inspect high-risk travelers. 

Yet despite the high percentage of frequent travelers crossing the border, NEXUS 

enrollment currently stands at just 75,000. Even worse, CBP expects to enroll only 

50,000 more individuals in the NEXUS program through 2011. Now that DHS has 

declared in their final rule that Trusted Traveler Cards such as NEXUS, SENTRI 

and FAST will be WHTI compliant, it is even more imperative that we make serious 

investments in these Trusted Traveler Programs. While I am encouraged that construction on an enrollment center at Whirlpool Bridge in Niagara Falls is set to 

begin next month, DHS must create more enrollment centers all along the border. 

Additionally, there must be aggressive outreach effort by DHS to educate people 

about the new border rules. DHS and the State Department must engage in a public 

relations campaign to educate border communities and Americans seeking to cross 

the border on the new requirements and encourage continued cross-border travel 

and commerce. DHS should ensure that the public is well aware of what documentation will be accepted under the new requirements, as well as how individuals can 

obtain the new alternatives to a passport. People need to know that they will not 

be forced to suffer through long delays when crossing the border, and that they will 

not be hassled with unreasonable identification requirements. 

An efficient, cost-effective Trusted Traveler Program, as well as a robust public 

outreach plan are measures that will help alleviate congestion at the border while 

increasing security, and will free critical Customs resources for more pressing security concerns. However, it is clear that we all still have a lot of work to do to ensure 

that we have a smooth transition to the new documentation security measures, and 

that WHTI requirements do not unnecessarily hamper tourism and trade across the 

border. We must find an appropriate balance between ensuring our country’s security, and protecting the economic health of our border communities. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to submit my remarks for the 

record, and I look forward to working together as WHTI moves forward. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK

APRIL 16, 2008 

Thank you, Chairwoman Sanchez and Ranking Member Souder, for allowing me 

to submit testimony to the subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. 

As co-chair of the Northern Border Caucus, I would like to share my concerns 

about the final rule for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), especially 

the impacts it could have on cross border travel and trade between the United 

States and Canada. 

On March 27, 2008, the Departments of Homeland Security and State issued a 

final rule on the land and sea portion of WHTI. While I pleased that the departments have listened to Congress and will not implement WHTI until June 2009, I 

remain concerned whether the departments will be ready to properly implement 

WHTI in this time frame. 

The stakes for northern border communities are extremely high, with so many 

communities and businesses dependent upon the ease of travel between the United 

States and Canada. In my Northern Michigan district, like many northern border 
29 

areas, smooth, reliable, and efficient movement between the two countries is essential to the economy. Commerce and trade between Canada and the United States 

supports more than 220,000 Michigan jobs and more than $71.3 billion in trade for 

the State. In addition, $489 billion in merchandise trade passes between the United 

States and Canada via Michigan annually. The International Bridge in my district 

is one of the 10 largest crossing points on the northern border, and the only vehicular crossing between Ontario and Michigan for 300 miles. More than 2.5 million 

vehicles cross the bridge annually, making a significant contribution to northern 

Michigan’s economy. 

In documents released with the final rule, the Department of Homeland Security 

states it ‘‘has determined that the benefits—facilitation of travel and increased security that would reduce the probability of a terrorist attack—are greater than the potential costs.’’ Ironically, just days before the final rule was published, an independent study released by the Brookings Institution found that new border crossing 

requirements impede economic growth in the Great Lakes region, and one of the report’s chief authors expressed ‘‘alarm’’ with the speed at which new rules—like 

WHTI—are being implemented. The study found that border crossing requirements 

put in place since 2001 are already impeding economic growth in the Great Lakes 

region, and implementing WHTI without the proper infrastructure in place will only 

make this problem worse. 

The Department of State began accepting applications from individuals for the 

Passcard on February 1, 2008; however, the Passcard does not exist, has not been 

properly tested, and critical infrastructure has not been installed at ports of entry. 

The Passcard should not be made available to U.S. citizens until it is proven effective. It is imperative that the Departments of State and Homeland Security test the 

Passcard technology at land and sea ports of entry to ensure that the necessary infrastructure is in place before making Passcard applications available to U.S. citizens. Without providing the required report to Congress on the effectiveness of the 

Passcard, DHS is in direct violation of the provisions included in the fiscal year 

2008 Omnibus Appropriations Act. 

A December 20, 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report conducted 

for Chairwoman Sanchez, Congressman John McHugh, and Congresswoman Louise 

Slaughter indicates that DHS has ‘‘outlined a general strategy for the upgrades at 

the 39 highest volume land ports, beginning in January 2008 and continuing over 

roughly the next 2 years.’’ This means that the technology needed to read the 

Passcard will not be in place at all ports of entry when the Department of State 

begins accepting applications for the Passcards, nor when the Department of Homeland Security intends to fully implement WHTI in 2009. It is simply irresponsible 

for the departments to move forward with WHTI when the pilot testing has not 

been completed and will not be completed in time. 

The GAO report also explains that Customs and Border Protection ‘‘would like to 

complete the upgrades at least at the first 10 ports before the documentation requirements are implemented.’’ WHTI should not be fully implemented until all land 

and sea ports of entry are outfitted with the Passcard technology, and all Customs 

and Border Protection staff has received the proper training. It does our constituents no good when they have a Passcard that doesn’t work! 

In addition, it remains unclear to me what is required for boaters who travel on 

the Great Lakes and enter Canadian waters. The Great Lakes are a vital fishing 

and recreational resource for northern Michigan. 

The Department of Homeland Security had indicated that trips into international 

waters are treated like a domestic trip unless the individual drops anchor in international waters, land on or call to port in another country, or come in contact with 

another boat while on the water. Should these incidents occur, then the boat captain 

and passengers must check in with Customs and Border Protection. However, recent 

news reports have indicated that the Department will not require fishers and divers 

to provide WHTI compliant documents for merely entering Canadian waters in the 

Great Lakes. These requirements further confuse recreational boaters, charter boat 

captains, and tourists traveling to the Great Lakes. It is important that the Department of Homeland Security clearly lay out requirements for sea travel. 

Any economic or bureaucratic impediments to trade and travel could jeopardize 

thousands of local jobs in border districts like mine. Enhancing safety on the border 

must be balanced with the need to efficiently transport people and goods. 

As the subcommittee continues to evaluate the progress made by the Departments 

of Homeland Security and State in implementing the land and sea travel requirements, it is important that the departments meet critical benchmarks prior to full 

implementation. If the departments have not deployed equipment, tested the 

Passcard, and clearly informed constituents of the new requirements, then it should 

not move forward with full implementation of WHTI even if June 1, 2009 arrives. 
30 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We have a vote on the floor and, actually, it is a 

strange series of votes that are going on on the floor. 

So we will dismiss this panel. 

I am going to ask my Ranking Member for unanimous consent 

to be allowed, when we finish the votes, to come back and start up 

with the second panel without a quorum here, as I believe that you 

also are going to be going in and out of the markup, Mr. Souder. 

So what we will do is we will recess, we will go for these series 

of votes, which is probably about a half an hour’s worth, and we 

will come back for the second panel, and you will probably just see 

me, but I am hoping that my Ranking Member gets back at some 

point. 

So if I could ask for unanimous consent to start up without a 

quorum when we come back. 

Mr. SOUDER. Yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes. Okay. We are in recess. I thank the panel and 

the witnesses. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I would like to thank the witnesses so much for 

staying to give your testimony. 

I am sorry, but the rest of the members, there is so much going 

on today, including an enormous amount of markups, and I know 

that some of them will try to get back. 

But since we do have unanimous consent to be able to take your 

testimony, and I, of course, will have some questions for you, I 

would like to welcome you. 

Our first witness is Ms. Liz Luce, director of the Washington 

State Department of Licensing, appointed in 2005 by Governor 

Chris Gregoire. Ms. Luce oversees the licensing of over 19,000 vehicles and 4,000 drivers in the State of Washington each day. 

In that capacity, she has played an integral role in implementing 

the State’s new enhanced driver’s license program. 

Our second witness is Jim Phillips, president and CEO of the Canadian-American Border Trade Alliance, CANAMBTA, formed in 

1992. This transcontinental, bi-national organization includes 

members from producers, shippers and bridge and tunnel operators, chambers of commerce, business and trade corridor associations, and economic development and government agencies. Welcome. 

Our final witness is Ms. Janice Kephart, president of 9/11 Security Solutions. She is recognized as a border security expert, specializing in the nexus between immigration and counterterrorism 

issues. She served as a counsel to the 9/11 Commission and helped 

develop recommendations on border security that appear in the 

Commission’s final report. 

Without objection, your full testimony will be inserted in the 

record. 

I will now ask Ms. Luce to summarize her statement for 5 minutes. 
31 

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH LUCE, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON 

STATE DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING 

Ms. LUCE. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Sanchez. 

My name is Liz Luce. I am the director of the Washington State 

Department of Licensing. 

Border security is a big deal, but the State of Washington has 

brought it down to size. Through the leadership of Governor Chris 

Gregoire and Premier Gordon Campbell, we started our journey to 

create the country’s first enhanced driver’s license and identification card, a viable solution for all States in response to the challenges posed by the implementation of the WHTI land and sea 

rules. 

I have been asked to describe the Washington enhanced driver’s 

license or, as we like to call it, the EDL, and address four main 

points—relationship, security, costs and challenges. 

Currently, we are the only State in the Nation issuing EDLs. An 

enhanced driver’s license is a driver’s license that has been approved by Homeland Security as an alternative WHTI travel document. 

Not only is it a convenient, low-cost alternative to a passport, it 

also provides more protection against identity theft than the conventional driver’s license. 

A Washington citizen can choose to obtain an EDL for only $15. 

Applicants must demonstrate their identity, prove U.S. citizenship 

and reside in the State of Washington. 

The EDL program is based on security standards set by Homeland Security and the industry’s best practices. 

It includes 20 state-of-the-art security features, including a radio 

frequency identifier and a machine-readable zone, which are both 

currently used in new passport cards and facilitates border management. 

To ensure we have one record and one record only, for each driver, we use a facial recognition biometric. We also verify online Social Security numbers. We use state-of-the-art equipment that can 

detect fraudulent documents. 

EDL employees have undergone fraud document training and 

Federal background checks. Data to and from Homeland Security 

is encrypted and a sleeve is provided to protect against reading the 

RFID chip. 

Finally, our legislature passed a law prohibiting unauthorized 

use of the RFID number. 

I would like to thank the Department of Homeland Security for 

their unwavering support and partnership. Members of the WHTI 

program office came to Washington State to meet with us early in 

the process. 

They looked at our procedures firsthand and work in partnerships with us to ensure our mutual success. 

As to the cost of the program, the process of producing a new 

travel document is not for the fiscally faint of heart. To date, the 

State of Washington has invested over $12 million. 

The public response has been extremely positive. As of February, 

over 25,000 appointments have been made through May and June 

is filling quickly. 
32 

Other States, such as Oregon, Montana, Alaska, California, 

Utah, Texas, New Mexico, Idaho and Michigan, have approached 

us about producing EDLs. However, we have been told that until 

the EDL is recognized as REAL ID compliant, they are hesitant to 

make the investment. 

We believe the EDL satisfies both the WHTI and REAL ID requirements. 

At the REAL ID press conference, Secretary Chertoff was quoted 

as saying, ‘‘The enhanced driver’s license will automatically be 

compliant with REAL ID, but they will have some additional features that are relevant for crossing the border that are not relevant 

for REAL ID. So you might describe the enhanced driver’s license 

as REAL ID plus.’’ 

WHTI rules state, ‘‘EDLs are being developed consistent with the 

requirements of the REAL ID and, as such, can be used for official 

purposes, such as accessing Federal facilities, boarding federally 

regulated commercial aircraft, and entering nuclear power plants.’’ 

The benefits of recognizing the EDL as REAL ID compliant are 

significant not only for States, but also for the Federal Government. 

Driver’s licenses will become more secure nationwide and identity theft would be reduced. 

As we near the 2010 Olympics, citizens will be confronted by 

what travel document they will need, how long will it take them 

to get across the border. 

The EDL can solve this dilemma if it is also recognized as a 

REAL ID document. 

After all, how many documents does one person have to have to 

prove who they are? 

Border management can be facilitated by more States producing 

EDLs. 

So in conclusion, to make an EDL a nationwide program, we 

need the EDL to be declared REAL ID compliant and eligible for 

the REAL ID grant. 

I thank you for your support and the chance to have the opportunity to discuss it. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Luce follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH LUCE

APRIL 16, 2008 

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and Members of the committee, 

my name is Liz Luce, I am the Director of the Washington State Department of Licensing. We license approximately 5 million drivers, almost 7 million vehicles, and 

over 30 professions. I am pleased to be here to share information about our Enhanced Driver License. 

Border security is a big deal, and the State of Washington has brought it down 

to size. 

In June 2006, Washington State Governor Chris Gregoire met with Canada’s British Columbia Premier Gordon Campbell to discuss challenges posed by implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) to both the State of Washington and British Columbia. Washington State shares more than a border with 

British Columbia, we also share significant cultural ties and a mutual reliance on 

trade and tourism. It was at this meeting that Governor Gregoire wrote a note directing me to, ‘‘Look into creating a driver license that could also work as a travel 

document for border crossing.’’ 
33 

It was through Governor Gregoire’s leadership and vision that we started on our 

journey to create the country’s first Enhanced Driver License and Identification 

Card—a viable solution for all States in response to the challenges posed by the implementation of WHTI land and sea rules. We have developed a realistic solution 

that addresses the concerns about security, cost, privacy and ease of travel for 

Washington State citizens. 

I would like to thank the Department of Homeland Security for their unwavering 

support and partnership throughout our development of the Enhanced Driver License and ID Card program. Members of the WHTI Program Office came to Washington to meet with us in person early in the process, look at our procedures first 

hand, and work collaboratively with us to ensure our mutual success. We consider 

our Enhanced Driver License to be a national model for how Federal agencies can 

work with States to bring about solutions that minimize impacts to a State’s economy. We value these relationships and look to the future to accomplish mutually 

beneficial programs. 

Ours was not an easy task. We worked closely with the Department of Homeland 

Security and the Department of State to evaluate and ultimately meet standards 

for a secure travel document. We conducted an extensive gap analysis of our current 

systems and procedures, developed an infrastructure within our field offices and 

management, provided extensive training to our employees and spent over 33,000 

technology hours on various applications that had to be altered to implement the 

Enhanced Driver License and ID elements. 

The card itself has 20 state-of-the-art security features. As required by Homeland 

Security it also contains a Radio Frequency Identifier (RFID), and a machine readable zone which are both currently used by the Department of State in the issuance 

of our country’s new Passports. The application cost to our customer is $15. 

An Enhanced Driver License is voluntary. Privacy concerns for those who wish 

to participate in the Enhanced Driver License program have been addressed by the 

security added to the process as well as encrypting data to and from Homeland Security. We also provide citizen education and a sleeve to protect against unauthorized reading of the RFID number. In addition, our Legislature passed a law this 

past session that makes it a class C felony for a person to intentionally possess, 

read, or capture information on another person’s Enhanced Driver License without 

that person’s knowledge and consent. 

Applicants for the Enhanced Driver License must prove their identity and U.S. 

citizenship, and show that they have resided in the State of Washington for more 

than 30 days. This secure card application approval and issuance process requires 

that the licensee’s picture is taken and run through a facial recognition biometric 

to ensure we have one record, and one record only, for each driver. We also verify 

his or her Social Security number. 

The response from our staff has been extremely positive. We had 24 EDL licensing positions available and over 100 of our staff applied. Our licensing staff has received extensive training. Staff is required to pass a Federal background check, be 

trained in detecting fraudulent documents and go through interview technique 

training. 

The process of producing a new travel document is not for the ‘‘fiscally faint of 

heart.’’ This effort required significant resources from our State in both staff and 

dollars. The State of Washington has invested over $12 million to equip 14 offices 

to address a consistent demand. We, in concert with the Department of Homeland 

Security and British Columbia, have demonstrated that it can be done, and now 

other States are interested in our experience and in offering an EDL to their residents. We are proud of our accomplishment and the precedent we established working collaboratively with DHS. 

At this time we have Enhanced Driver License capacity available in only 14 of 

our 63 licensing locations throughout the State. We would like to offer it in more 

locations, but are fiscally constrained. Our legislature has been generous, but to expand to other areas of the State and to realize the full potential and demand for 

the EDL, we will require external funding. 

The public’s early response to the Enhanced Driver License has been positive and 

supportive. This is evident by the fact that we already have booked over 25,000 appointments. In our border communities and the Seattle metropolitan area, we are 

booked through May, and June is filling quickly. 

In an effort to manage the demand we have suspended all paid advertising 

throughout the State. However, we continue to streamline our processes and enhance our capacity while still maintaining the integrity of this very secure and voluntary program. But the demand remains steady as we speak. 

Our citizens are responding because they recognize the value and benefits of the 

Enhanced Driver License, and the benefits are significant. According to Washington 
34 

State Attorney General Rob McKenna, ‘‘Washington State’s Enhanced Driver License and Identification Card program provides citizens with a convenient, low-cost 

alternative to a passport that provides more protection against identity theft than 

a conventional license.’’ 

Another benefit of Enhanced Driver License that cannot be overlooked is how it 

can fulfill the intent of the REAL ID Act. The intent to create one secure document 

that would satisfy both WHTI and REAL ID requirements appears to be supported 

by Secretary Chertoff. At the REAL ID Press Conference, Secretary Chertoff was 

quoted as saying ‘‘enhanced driver’s licenses will automatically be compliant with 

REAL ID. But they will have some additional features that are relevant for crossing 

the border that are not relevant for REAL ID. So you might describe the enhanced 

driver’s license as ‘REAL ID plus.’ ’’ 

In addition, the recently published WHTI rules state, ‘‘EDLs are being developed 

consistent with the requirements of the REAL ID and, as such, can be used for official purposes such as accessing a Federal facility, boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft, and entering nuclear power plants.’’ 

Also, in WHTI’s Privacy Impact Assessment, January 11, 2008, page 7, it states, 

‘‘In addition to implementation of REAL ID, DHS is encouraging States to enter into 

voluntary agreements to produce enhanced driver’s licenses (EDLs) that would serve 

as alternative documents to passports under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). These State-issued EDLs, intended to also meet REAL ID requirements, would be available only to U.S. citizens who voluntarily apply. 

We believe that our Enhanced Driver License and Identification Cards are REAL 

ID compliant and as stated by Secretary Chertoff, we believe they are ‘‘REAL ID 

plus,’’ and should be recognized accordingly within the REAL ID rules framework. 

We also would like our Federal partners to consider expanding the use of Enhanced Driver Licenses and ID Cards for air travel to countries identified by WHTI. 

It would make the development of an Enhanced Driver License more attractive to 

more States and make travel easier and less costly for citizens across the country. 

I realize this option would require a significant investment on the part of the Federal Government, but I urge you to keep it in mind as more States choose to offer 

this type of document to their citizens. 

In summary, some of our existing challenges of the program include Federal funding for the full expansion of Enhanced Driver License capability in all of our offices 

throughout the State. Another challenge is the recognition of the Enhanced Driver 

License as a Real ID materially compliant document as suggested by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. We have also requested approval for a priority 

lane for enhanced card holders at the Blaine Border Crossing. In addition, we ask 

to gain recognition of the Enhanced Driver License as an alternative document for 

air travel within the United States. Funding is a large challenge and will be a particularly critical concern as the time nears for the 2010 Olympic events and if the 

REAL ID Act is implemented and demand for the EDL increases. 

There is a lot of confusion out there about how many documents or which documents are needed to cross the border these days. But I can tell you with certainty 

that at least by land or by sea, you can use Enhanced ID. 

Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Luce, I thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Phillips to summarize his statement in 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES D. PHILLIPS, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CAN/AM BORDER TRADE ALLIANCE 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Chairwoman Sanchez, it is an honor to be here to 

talk about common sense border security. 

They key is to achieve national security for our country and the 

public, while simultaneously increasing our economic, trade and 

travel activity, on which our quality of life depends. 

To achieve success, one must have a vision of the final objective, 

the end state. To deliver seamless movement of legitimate people 

to ensure economic security requires that we know who is low-risk 

before they get to our border, give them a special ID and a 

streamed access to and through primary inspection to encourage 

and, in fact, achieve increased tourism and legal visitation. 
35 

People’s incomes, not to mention infrastructure financing, depends on it. 

Collectively, we must ensure common sense prevails while 

achieving both essential objectives with proper levels of security to 

deter, detect and prevent threats to the public, while making crossbroader travel for known low-risk individuals, the overwhelming 

majority, seamless as never before reached. 

Unfortunately, from the outset of the initial Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative, WHTI, announcement in April 2005, the initiative was misunderstood as to require a passport to catch the bad 

guy. 

In reality, WHTI was and is an initiative to provide secure documentation for border crossing into the United States. WHTI will 

substantially improve the ability of CBP officers at border primary 

lanes to facilitate the entry of low-risk individuals, thus providing 

increased time and attention for unknown and high-risk. 

Today, WHTI has settled on the selection of acceptable documents that utilize the proven and long in use technology of 

NEXUS, FAST, SENTRI, known low-risk programs and the US– 

VISIT program. 

The RFID technology utilized in NEXUS, FAST and US–VISIT 

has been mandated the additional WHTI acceptable documents, 

i.e., the passport card from the State Department and enhanced 

driver’s license to be issued by participating States and Canadian 

provinces, an excellent addition. 

Controlled contrails at the busy Peace Arch land border port, entering the United States from British Columbia, resulted in the 

time to process an equal group of passenger vehicles as follows. 

Current documents and declarations, 65 minutes; when all used 

proximity RFID passports, 25 minutes; when all used vicinity RFID 

documents, NEXUS, FAST, US–VISIT, pass card, enhanced driver’s license technology, 8 minutes; and, if a dedicated NEXUS lane 

was open, as well, 5 minutes. 

With the expected mix of passports and vicinity RFID documents, after June 1, 2009, a reduction of wait time from 65 minutes to approximately 15 to 20 minutes should occur, thus actually 

achieving the two objectives of facilitating low-risk for vicinity of 65 

minutes to 8 minutes, while enhancing public security, as everybody will have a more secure document. 

A like time trial performed in the Nogales-DeConcini land border 

port entering from Mexico resulted in the following time trials. 

Current documents, 123 minutes; when all used proximity RFID 

passports, 90 minutes; when all used vicinity RFID documents, 

such as SENTRI, FAST, US–VISIT, pass card, enhanced driver’s license from Texas, 32 minutes; and, if a dedicated SENTRI lane 

was open, 19 minutes. 

The results of the time trials indicate that WHTI is a commonsense solution when implemented properly. 

It is a complementary process to the already proven known lowrisk vicinity RFID programs of the low-risk programs already in 

place, providing officers with the identity of individuals and their 

status prior to them entering the primary booth. 
36 

WHTI-approved documentation is a foundation introduced subsequent to known low-risk programs, such as the planned CBP global 

entry pilot program encompassing international trusted travelers. 

I have three suggested further steps. DHS should consolidate all 

pre-enrolled low-risk travelers in one designated authority. That is 

NEXUS, FAST, SENTRI, TWIC, all the TSA programs, and other 

CBP programs, including HAZMAT, from transport, so that one 

card, one ID, after the appropriate background checks, would be 

utilized, i.e., a known low-risk truck driver with FAST, TWIC, 

HAZMAT and NEXUS, for his vacation, all on one card, with required different biometrics. 

Maximize enrollment in known low-risk programs by outreach by 

the public and the next and final major improvement is to fully implement offshore, at point of departure for international visitors, a 

check of their documents to identify inadmissible individuals before 

they board transportation, prohibiting them from physically reaching our soil. That would also secure the air and sea travel lanes. 

I have provided you with a coordinated clearance point of departure strategy PowerPoint that specifically describes what needs to 

be done. 

Currently, Canada does this at 39 locations and DHS is doing it 

at seven, and we recommend that we do it at all locations. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. 

[The statement of Mr. Phillips follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES D. PHILLIPS

APRIL 16, 2008 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss 

Common Sense Border Security. The key is to achieve national security for our 

country and the public while simultaneously increasing our economic trade and 

travel activity upon which our quality of life depends. 

To achieve success one must have a vision of the final objective, the ‘‘End State.’’ 

To deliver seamless movement of legitimate people to ensure economic security requires that we know ‘‘who is low-risk’’ before they get to our border, give them a 

special ID and a streamed access to and thru primary inspection to encourage and 

in fact achieve increased tourism and legal visitation. People’s income not to mention infrastructure financing depend on it. 

Passport, passport card, REAL ID, drivers license, birth certificate, etc. provide 

only ID and nationality or just ID but regardless the essence is none of these allow 

passage without query since they do not identify low-risk people for facilitated access and processing at this time. This is our one chance to achieve facilitated seamless processing for the vast majority to protect economic benefits by delivering a degree of seamless travel never before achieved at the U.S./Canada shared border 

while satisfying public security requirements. 

Collectively we must ensure that common sense prevails while achieving both essential objectives of proper levels of security to deter, detect and prevent threats to 

the public while making cross-border travel for known low-risk individuals (the 

overwhelming majority) seamless as never before reached. 

Unfortunately, from the outset of the initial Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 

(WHTI) announcement in April 2005, the initiative was ‘‘misunderstood’’ as to require a passport to assist ‘‘to catch the bad guy.’’ In reality WHTI was and is an 

initiative to provide secure documentation for border crossing into the United 

States. WHTI would substantially improve the ability of CBP officers at border primary lanes to facilitate the entry of low-risk individuals thus provide increased time 

and attention for unknown or non-low-risk individuals. 
37 

Today WHTI has settled on the selection of acceptable documents that utilize the 

proven and long in use technology of the NEXUS, FAST, SENTRI (known low-risk 

programs) and the US–VISIT program for foreign visitors. 

Vicinity RFID technology, utilized in NEXUS, FAST and US–VISIT, has been 

mandated for the additional WHTI acceptable documents i.e. PASS CARD from the 

State Department and the Enhanced Drivers Licenses to be issued by participating 

States and Canadian Provinces. 

Controlled time-trials at the busy Peace Arch Land Border Port entering the 

United States from British Columbia resulted in the time to process an equal group 

of passenger vehicles as follows: current documents and declarations, 65 minutes; 

when all used Proximity RFID Passports, 25 minutes; when all used Vicinity RFID 

documents (NEXUS, FAST, US–VISIT, PASS CARD, Enhanced Drivers License 

technology), 8 minutes; and, if a dedicated NEXUS lane was open as well, 5 minutes. With the expected mix of Passports and Vicinity RFID WHTI documents (after 

June 1, 2009), a reduction of wait time from 65 minutes to approximately 15–20 

minutes should occur thus actually achieving the two objectives of facilitating lowrisk while enhancing Public Security. 

A like time-trial was performed at the Nogales East—Desconcini Land Border 

Port entering the United States from Mexico resulting in the time to process an 

equal group of passenger vehicles as follows: current documents, 123 minutes; when 

all used Proximity RFID Passports, 90 minutes; when all used Vicinity RFID documents (SENTRI, FAST, US–VISIT, PASS CARD, Enhanced Drivers License), 32 

minutes; and if a dedicated SENTRI lane was open as well, 19 minutes. 

The results of the time-trials indicate that ‘‘WHTI is a common sense solution 

when implemented properly.’’ It is the complementary process to the already proven 

known low-risk Vicinity RFID programs of NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST and US–VISIT. 

The key is providing the Officer with the identity of individuals and their status 

‘‘prior to them entering’’ the Primary Booth for assessment. 

WHTI approved documentation is a foundation to introduce subsequent KnownLow Risk Programs such as the planned CBP Global Entry Pilot Program encompassing known International ‘‘Trusted’’ Travelers. 

Suggested Further Steps 

• DHS should consolidate ‘‘all pre-enrolled low-risk traveler and designated special categories’’ including US–VISIT in one responsibility. These should include 

NEXUS, FAST, SENTRI, TWIC & OTHER TRUSTED TRAVELER TSA & CBP 

PROGRAMS. I would hope HAZMAT and other Government specialties would 

also be included to allow an individual to use only one ID Card after appropriate background check etc. requirements with a menu option that activates 

all programs an individual is approved to utilize i.e. a known low-risk truck 

driver could be FAST, TWIC, HAZMAT AND NEXUS for his vacation travel 

(ALL ON ONE CARD) with required differing biometrics having been captured. 

• Maximize enrollment in known low-risk Programs (NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST). 

• The NEXT MAJOR IMPROVEMENT is to fully implement: offshore; (at point 

of departure); for International Visitors; a check of their documents to identify 

inadmissible individuals BEFORE they board transportation prohibiting them 

from physically reaching our soil that would also secure the air and sea travel 

lanes. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Phillips. 

Let me ask you just a quick question, since I don’t have any of 

my colleagues here. 

Are you saying that you think that all of the NEXUS and other 

programs, that card should be equal to—in other words, the TWIC, 

the TSA cards, everything should all just use one card. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. I am saying that the person should be able to 

apply to all the different programs the way they are and if they are 

approved, all their biometrics would be collected and they would 

get one card and that card would give me access. 

If I was a truck driver, I could get into the ports to deliver materials. If I was carrying hazardous material, I could get cleared for 

that. Also, on my vacation, when I wouldn’t be in my truck, but I 

am a low-risk individual, I can use NEXUS or SENTRI. 
38 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I am not sure if the background checks on the individual programs are all the same depth of background checks. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, you do the same background check for each. 

I am not suggesting that you make one background check for all. 

Obviously, certain cards have fingerprints, certain cards have a picture, certain cards have the iris. 

I am just suggesting that all those programs, if they were unified, could be put together on a menu and if I applied and I was 

approved for five of them, that all those five things could be indicated on one card. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I see what you are saying. So each has a different 

level, but it could be a menu, basically. I could say I want to apply 

for three of the five, but it would be the same type of card. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. I appreciate that clarification. 

Ms. Kephart, summarize your statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JANICE L. KEPHART, PRESIDENT, 9/11 

SECURITY SOLUTIONS 

Ms. KEPHART. Thank you, Chairwoman Sanchez. I appreciate 

this committee’s continued interest and effort in implementing in 

the 9/11 Commission recommendations. 

Without assuring that people are who they say they are and the 

documents they present are legitimate at our borders and within 

our borders, we have done little to nothing to contain what we on 

the 9/11 Commission termed ‘‘terrorist travel.’’ 

WHTI fulfills a 9/11 Commission recommendation calling for a 

passport or equivalent for all persons seeking entry into the United 

States. Equivalent alternatives for entry that satisfy the Commission’s recommendation are the trusted traveler program, such as 

NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST and the new global entry, alongside EDL 

and the pass cards. 

All were designed to be vetted against derogatory information 

and adequately assure citizenship, while enhancing facilitation for 

low-risk travelers and permitting focus on high-risk travelers. 

The slate of 9/11 hijackers, you might recall, had a 97 percent 

success rate at entering the United States by passing inspectors 34 

of 35 times. After 9/11, from 2002 to 2006, the General Accounting 

Office had a 93 percent success rate in 45 attempts of entry at our 

land ports of entry with fake birth certificates and driver’s licenses 

and other travel documents. 

Containing terrorist travel is so pivotal to national security, because terrorists nearly always require travel across borders to conduct their operations. 

Terrorists are trained in document forgery and travel techniques, 

exploiting any loophole in a border apparatus they can. 

For decades, the Western hemisphere travel exception had been 

one extremely large loophole that permitted anyone claiming to be 

from the Western hemisphere to present easily forged documents, 

like birth certificates or driver’s licenses, that couldn’t be authenticated or nothing at all sometimes to enter the United States. 

WHTI flips that, making it significantly harder to fake entry. 

On our northern border, cross-border terrorist travel between 

Canada and the United States is well documented. With the To-
39 

ronto–17 in June 2006, having received visits from two other terrorists via Greyhound bus across the border who were residing in 

Atlanta, Georgia. 

In addition, Hezbollah trafficked illegal goods across our northern border for over a decade. Their cigarette scams in both Canada 

and the United States were worth multi-millions. 

Money was used to buy dual use military equipment in both 

countries and then shipped to Lebanon. 

In the Caribbean, Trinidad has produced a number of individuals 

who have come to the United States undetected until their terrorist 

plots became known to authorities, including the JFK Airport plot 

of last June. 

Remember, too, that south of the border, Al Qaeda and Hezbollah 

have both sought to work with travel facilitators to move terrorists 

across the southwest ports of entry and the land border. 

Now, let me turn to REAL ID for a moment, which I was asked 

to discuss. 

REAL ID fulfills another 9/11 Commission recommendation that, 

‘‘The Federal Government should set standards for sources of IDs, 

such as driver’s licenses.’’ 

Today, REAL ID stands at the verge of implementation, with a 

final rule that most States agree is doable. 

REAL ID and its final rule deal directly with the abuse of the 

State ID issuance system, enabling States to check other State and 

Federal Government databases about identity and license issuance 

through a private network during the application process, with no 

entity other than the State having access to an applicant’s data. 

These hardened issuance processes also make it difficult for fake 

breeder documents to receive a green light when entered into the 

system. 

The ID cards themselves are also hardened against counterfeiting, simultaneously helping law enforcement protect against national security, prevents ID theft, combat drug trafficking, and address other important societal concerns affected by the multi-million dollar fake ID document industry. 

Recall that the 9/11 hijackers assimilated into the United States 

by attaining 17 driver’s licenses from Arizona, California and Florida, and 13 State-issued IDs, including the seven fraudulently acquired in Virginia. 

At least six hijackers total presented State-issued IDs on the 

morning of 9/11 to help make sure they could board aircraft. 

The pilot who flew into the Pentagon had IDs from four States. 

The Pennsylvania pilot had three IDs, and an unverifiable ID when 

stopped for speeding 2 days prior to 9/11. 

Honorable Chairwoman, WHTI, EDL, trusted traveler programs, 

and REAL ID, taken as a whole, go a long way towards implementing key 9/11 Commission secure ID and border recommendations. 

I urge you to continue to provide these programs with strong 

oversight and sound funding, and I will make a special plea for 

REAL ID, which is in a funding emergency at the moment. 

When REAL ID is funded at adequate levels, I do believe EDL 

should be deemed an allowable use under REAL ID grant programs 

language. 
40 

1 In addition, I have written three papers on the subject. The most recent was published in 

February 2008. REAL ID: Final Rule Summary takes the 280-page Final Rule and summarizes 

it in 9 pages. The second paper from April 2007, Identity and Security: REAL ID in the States, answers policy concerns being echoed in some States regarding REAL ID implementation. This 

paper remains salient, as criticisms of REAL ID implementation are answered, and some of 

these criticisms are still heard today. The third I published in February 2007 and sets out the 

policy backdrop for the REAL ID Act, explains its content, and discusses what is at risk if it 

fails. Identity and Security: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Identity Document Security 

emphasizes the need for security at the base of the Nation’s identity document issuance processes. 

Thank you so much for having me. 

[The statement of Ms. Kephart follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANICE L. KEPHART

APRIL 16, 2008 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder. Thank you for having me here 

today. It is an honor to be here. I appreciate very much this committee’s continued 

interest and effort in the 9/11 Commission recommendations, including the issue of 

identity document security that the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, REAL 

ID and Enhanced Driver Licenses addresses head-on. Without assuring that people 

are who they say they are, and that the documents they present are legitimate at 

our borders and within our borders, we have done little to nothing to contain what 

me and my team mates on the 9/11 Commission termed ‘‘terrorist travel’’. 

I am here in my own capacity today, but you should know that when the 9/11 

Commission issued its final report card in December 2005, one of the highest marks 

it gave was to Congress for passing REAL ID legislation that set minimum standards for the issuance of State-issued driver licenses (DL) and IDs.1 I am also happy 

to be one who speaks with the 70 percent of Americans who, in a Zogby/UPI poll 

from late last year, are in favor of secure driver licenses. Like REAL ID, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) fulfills a 9/11 recommendation that called 

for the presentation of a passport or equivalent for all persons seeking entry into 

the United States. 

The Enhanced Driver License and State Department issued PASS Cards will assure citizenship while providing a cost-effective way to facilitate travel for those living and working on our land borders. These alternative forms of ID for the border 

satisfy the Commission’s recommendation that other, ‘‘equivalent’’ documents, might 

be sufficient for border inspection. As long as these documents are able to be 

checked for fraud, citizenship, and against derogatory information to the extent 

passports are today, I can say with confidence that the Commission would consider 

them acceptable for entry today. Trusted traveler programs such as NEXUS, 
41 

SENTRI and the Global Entry programs are essential to such systems, to help assure high (not low) risks are the focus for border inspectors. 

One crucial caveat remains: national standards for birth certificates—made a 

legal requirement in 2005—and digitization of birth (and death) records are pivotal 

to verifying identity for other government issued IDs, including REAL IDs and epassports. While States are making progress in digitizing birth and death records, 

continual building of the Electronic Verification of Vital Events system needs to remain a priority. Where States are partnering with the Federal Government to 

digitize records, huge dividends are being found in the fraud fight in health care, 

but hooking this information in for DMVs and other legitimate uses will provide the 

essential foundation to the secure ID framework upon which all these programs ultimately rely. 

TERRORIST TRAVEL AND PASSPORTS

Terrorists need to travel in a manner that shields them from detection or suspicion. In the Al Qaeda Afghan training camps, we know that terrorists were well 

trained in travel and travel document forgery. Terrorists were instructed in how to 

move into Afghanistan through Iran or Pakistan, and what travel facilitators to use 

for acquiring travel documents and travel. Digital copies of travel documents were 

kept in e-files in safehouses (we obtained a couple of 9/11 hijacker passports from 

such files), and Adobe Photoshop was a favorite tool for manipulating multiple forms 

of identifications, including passports. Upon leaving training camps, Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammed (mastermind of the 9/11 plot) would instruct new recruits on how to behave to pass into the West unsuspected. 

Photo Caption.—A partly-burned copy of Ziad Jarrah’s U.S. visa recovered from the 

Flight 93 crash site in [sic]. 

We know 9/11 operational ringleader Mohammad Atta used his training as well 

to manipulate passports to hide travel and substitute information that would leave 

a fraudulent trail of less suspicious travel. We also know that the recently assassinated Mugniyah of Hezbollah supplied his members with travel documentation as 

needed. 

For the terrorist, the underlying purpose of the travel will often determine how 

he decides to travel. For example, the 19 9/11 hijackers had a mission which required a relatively short time for legal admission into the United States, but also 

required that none of them be compromised for failure to obey immigration law. 

(Violations of law did exist; it was the Federal Government that failed to exercise 

its authority under the law.) Therefore, they needed to appear ‘‘clean’’ to immigration authorities. 
42 

2For more information about the threat of Canadian terrorist entry over the northern border, 

see my testimony of November 17, 2005 before the House Small Business Committee, ‘‘Building 

a Wall Between Friends: Passports to and from Canada?’’ 3Levine, Samantha. ‘‘Terror’s Best Friend.’’ US News & World Report. December 6, 2004. 

They thus worked hard to appear to follow the rules. They all had passports. 

(Thirteen acquired new passports within 3 weeks prior to seeking U.S. visas. A 

number had indicators of extremism that remain classified today and still other 

passports contained fraudulent manipulations.) They all had visas (22 or 23 applications were approved). They all sought entry through immigration inspection kiosks 

at U.S. international airports (a total of 34 times over 21 months). In the five times 

9/11 hijackers were pulled into secondary, only once did a hijacker resist questioning, and then quickly became cooperative once a new inspector was assigned to 

conduct the questioning. In two cases terror alerts or visa revocations were placed 

in the immigration system; but it was too late—in August 2001, subsequent to the 

last successful 9/11 hijacker entry in July 2001. 

In other words, the 9/11 hijackers had been taught what to do to attain successful 

entry into the United States. The frustrating irony is that at least some of the hijackers could have been denied admission into the United States if critical information had been provided to border officers via lookouts or regarding the passports 

themselves. Today, we have the ability to provide that information to our border security personnel as long as a passport or verifiable biometric equivalent is required 

for admission. Our air ports of entry using US–VISIT have helped upgrade this 

process. However, where there is no passport or equivalent biometric travel document required for admission, our border personnel have little to no baseline upon 

which to make an initial judgment about whether a particular individual may pose 

a terrorist or public safety threat to the United States. 

Until WHTI comes into full implementation at all U.S. border crossings, terrorists 

with Canadian, Caribbean or Mexican citizenship—or those that pose as such—can 

move in and out of the United States right virtually unconcerned about detection. 

There are legitimate concerns about both the northern, southern and sea borders. 

The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative thus becomes an important first step in 

at least chilling terrorist travel between the United States and Canada/Mexico and 

the Caribbean. This includes any variety of terrorist, whether a Mexican Islamic 

convert (as sought out by Al Qaeda) or Canadian.2 Terrorists do not like to be detected or detectable, nor do they want their identity ‘‘frozen’’. (We know, for example, from detainee reporting after 9/11, that the tightening of immigration admission 

standards for persons traveling from countries of interest resulted in Al Qaeda leaders seeking out young recruits and others with easy access to the West—U.S. citizens, Canadians, Mexicans and those with access to Visa Waiver passports that 

would not be subject to biometric entry requirements.) 

Even if terrorists choose to acquire a passport with a false identity and with false 

underlying support documents (as Millenium wannabe bomber Ahmed Ressam did) 

that identity is at least frozen and aliases to cross the border (as Ressam did use) 

are not possible. What would have caught Ressam was a biometric in that passport 

that then linked up to the watchlist Ressam was indeed listed on in Canada. Today, 

a hit on a terrorist such as Ressam would most likely occur through either a DHS 

TECS Lookout provided by U.S. or foreign law enforcement, a U.S. terror watchlist 

hit, an IDENT or FBI IAFIS hit, or through a biometric wanted notice now available 

to our border inspectors through Interpol. 

The staff report I co-authored with my 9/11 Commission border teammates, 9/11 

and Terrorist Travel, details in even greater depth how the 9/11 hijackers exploited 

our vulnerabilities using our legal border system. Part of the everyday business of 

terrorist travel is the bustling black market in doctored and false passports. In addition, an estimated 10 million lost or stolen passports or national identification cards 

worldwide afford terrorists easier access to world travel.3 This permits easy travel 

based on aliases, fake or stolen identities that, at a land border, may or may not 

be subject to a database check. Requiring U.S. citizens to carry a passport or biometric equivalent also means U.S. border inspectors no longer need to play a guessing game as to who is and who is not a U.S. citizen. On the Canadian and Mexican 

sides of the border, having a combination of the standard passport or equivalent and 

registered traveler programs that limit what a border officer must review gives border officers a better chance of snuffing out Canadian, Mexican or other Western 

Hemisphere passports or ‘‘equivalents’’ that might be fake or stolen. 
43 

4Dimmock, Gary and Aaron Sands. ‘‘Toronto Shop Clerk Tied to World Terror.’’ The Ottawa 

Citizen. Oct. 29, 2001. 5 Ibid. 

6Schiller, Bill. ‘‘Terrorism Suspect had Florida Link.’’ Toronto Star. Oct. 26, 2001. 7Philip Shenon and Don Van Natta Jr., ‘‘U.S. Says 3 Detainees May Be Tied to Hijackings,’’ 

The New York Times, November 1, 2001. 8Wilgoren, Jody and Judith Miller. ‘‘Trail of Man Sought in 2 Plots Leads to Chicago and Arrest.’’ The New York Times. Sept. 21, 2001. 9 USA v. Al-Marabh. WDNY 01–CR–244–A. Plea Agreement. July 8, 2002. 10Fainaru, Steve. ‘‘Sept. 11 Detainee is Ordered Deported.’’ The Washington Post. Sept. 4, 

2002. 11 Ibid. 12Owens, Anne Marie. ‘‘Judge Gets No Answers on Syrian: Former Toronto Suspect Jailed in 

U.S. for Border Breach.’’ The National Post. Sept. 4, 2002. 

TERRORIST TRAVEL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Until WHTI is fully implemented, terrorists with Canadian citizenship can move 

in and out of the United States virtually unconcerned about detection. It has long 

been known—and I testified extensively to this fact in 2005 and 2006 before both 

Houses of Congress—that Al Qaeda recruiters targeted youths with U.S., Canadian 

or Western European passports, solid English language skills and an understanding 

of these cultures. A couple of years ago FBI reported these efforts were resurging. 

Plenty of examples of terrorists seeking or accessing the United States based on Canadian residency or citizenship, or illegally: • Jabarah brothers who were recruited to blow up the Singapore harbor but were 

caught by authorities after swearing allegiance to bin Laden; • 9/11 mastermind KSM’s affiliate Abderraouf Jdey who was initially slated to 

take part in a second wave of attacks after 9/11; • Ahmad Said Al-Khadr was bin Laden’s highest ranking associate in Canada 

and raised a family sworn to allegiance to Al Qaeda; a high-ranking ranking 

Al Qaeda operative who had emigrated to Canada from Egypt in 1975; • Mohammed Warsame attained U.S. residency after becoming a naturalized Canadian citizen and moved to Minneapolis in 2002. He was arrested in December 

2003 as a material witness in the Zacarias Moussaoui case; • Hizballah cigarette smuggling scam operated for over the U.S.-Canadian border 

for over a decade with single truckloads sometimes yielding $2 million. Profits 

were used to buy dual use military equipment and sent back to Hizballah high 

command in Lebanon. Credit card and banking scams in Canada provided funding, and the Canadian section reported directly to Hizballah’s military procurement officer in Lebanon; • Nabil Al-Marabh tried to illegally enter the United States near Niagara Falls 

by hiding in the back of a tractor-trailer in June 2001. He had a forged Canadian passport and fake social insurance card.4 He later told authorities he had 

regularly traveled illegally between Canada and the United States.5 Moreover, 

Michigan State records showed Al-Marabh receiving five driver’s licenses there 

in 13 months; he had licenses for Massachusetts, Illinois, Ontario, and Florida,6

and a commercial driver’s license and a permit to haul hazardous materials,7

including explosives and caustic chemicals.8 In 2002, he pled guilty to conspiracy to smuggle an alien into the United States 9 and was ordered deported.10 Prosecutors said the government had no evidence linking him to terrorism.11 The judge questioned the government’s previous documentation of Al- Marabh’s ties to terror and also noted he was found with $22,000 in cash and 

$25,000 worth of amber jewels in his possession when he was arrested.12 He 

was deported to Syria in January 2004 for his strong ties to the Jordanian 

Millenium plot. 

Seventeen Canadian citizens and residents were arrested in Toronto on June 3, 

2006 for terrorist conspiracies across southern Ontario, including subway systems 

and the Parliament Building in Ottawa. Found in their possession were three tons 

of ammonium nitrate, 11⁄2 times that used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing responsible for 168 deaths. The arrests were only the second time Canada has used 

the Anti-Terror law passed after 9/11. 

The LA Times reported that the FBI has been working closely with the Canadians 

on the case, and that the Canadian cell received visits from two terror suspects arrested in April 2006 from Georgia, Syed Haris Ahmed, a 21-year-old Georgia Tech 

student and naturalized U.S. citizen, and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a 19-year-old 

Fairfax, VA native. They had met at an Atlanta mosque. The men, according to U.S. 

court documents, had been in email communication with the Canadian cell and 

physically went to Canada to meet in early March via Greyhound bus from Atlanta 

to discuss U.S. attacks and receiving military training in Pakistan. (The two men 
44 

13 Jason Chow and Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, ‘‘Canada Arrest 17 in Alleged Terror Plot.’’ Los 

Angeles Times, June 4, 2006. 14 Ibid. 15Most of this section was attained while I was counsel on the 9/11 Commission, with supplemental research provided by Vinay Tripathi while I was a senior consultant for the Investigative 

Project on Terrorism on a to date unpublished report entitled ‘‘An In-Depth Analysis of the 

Structure of Al Qaeda and Militant Islamic Terrorist Groups in the United States: The Enterprise of Terror in the United States’’ (March 2005). 16 ‘‘Trail of a Terrorist: Introduction.’’ PBS FRONTLINE. Oct. 25, 2001 http://www.pbs.org/ 

wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/inside/cron.html. 17 USA v. Ressam, et al. WDWA 99–CR–666. ‘‘Indictment.’’ April 3, 2001. See also Zill, Oriana. 

‘‘Crossing Borders: How Terrorists Use Fake Passports, Visas, and Other Identity Documents.’’ 

Frontline. October 2001. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/fake.html; 

and USA v. MOKHTAR HAOUARI, et al. SDNY S4 00 Cr. 15. Cross-examination of Ahmed 

Ressam, July 3, 2001 (transcript p. 549–551). 18Zill, Oriana. ‘‘Trail of a Terrorist: Crossing Borders: How Terrorists Use Fake Passports, 

Visas, and Other Identity Documents.’’ PBS FRONTLINE. Oct. 25, 2001 http://www.pbs.org/ 

wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/fake.html. 19Zill, Oriana. ‘‘Crossing Borders: How Terrorists Use Fake Passports, Visas, and Other Identity Documents.’’ Frontline. October, 2001. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 

trail/etc/fake.html. 

had already conducted surveillance, including in Washington, DC.)13 Both the Canadian cell and the U.S. suspects were in internet communication with each other and 

suspected terrorists abroad, including a London cell arrested shortly thereafter. 

Over the internet, a variety of plots focusing on the U.S. Capitol, the World Bank, 

fuel storage facilities and aviation towers were discussed.14

The reporting on the Canadian plot does not mention whether there are any immigration records for the two Georgia men on their entry into Canada or their return into the United States. 

Ahmed Ressam of the LAX Millenium Plot 15 used a false French passport to travel to Montreal where he lived for the next 4 years. In Canada he ‘‘became interested 

in going to bin Laden’s camps for training’’ after ‘‘friends returned to Montreal with 

stories about Osama bin Laden’s ‘Jihad University’ in Afghanistan.’’16

In April 1998, after meeting with Abu Zubaydah in Pakistan, Ressam was sent 

to the Khalden camp in Afghanistan where he spent the next 5 to 6 months. 

Khaldan had earned a reputation for its instruction in how to acquire, forge, and 

manufacture travel documents and credit cards, and Ressam learned well.17 At 

Khaldan Ressam also learned the other tradecrafts of a terrorist, the use of weapons, bombmaking, and urban warfare. 

Zubaydah himself was sufficiently impressed with Ressam’s passport manipulation abilities to have apparently asked him to acquire additional Canadian passports for distribution to al Qaeda fighters.18 And it was Ressam’s deft handling of 

fake travel documents that brought him to the attention of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed during his final visit to Pakistan. He would soon return to Canada (in January 

1999) to pursue the plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport. 

On December 14, 1999, a sweaty, nervous Ahmed Ressam was given a secondary 

inspection when he became reluctant to answer a basic question about his destination. He had just pulled off from a late-arriving ferry at Port Angeles, Washington. 

In answer to questions, Ressam pulled out fake documents—including a Canadian 

passport—in the name of Beni Antoine Noris. This was not the first time Ressam 

was asked questions. Ressam had already undergone a cursory examination by a 

U.S. immigration officer in Vancouver, who had been suspicious of Ressam as he 

was the last to board an already-late ferry. The examination included a cursory look 

in the trunk (but not the tire well where the explosives materials were hidden) as 

well as a run of the name on the passport (Noris) against the INS terrorist database 

without getting a hit. Although a subject by the name of Ressam was wanted in 

Canada, neither that name nor the alias Noris was in the INS database. Ressam 

was admitted for boarding. 

Ressam’s trial testimony provides valuable insight into one terrorist’s ability to 

circumvent border security around the world. He described how al Qaeda supplemented its global terrorist network with operatives trained in Afghanistan and 

thereafter embedded in satellite locations. In France, Canada and elsewhere, 

Ressam operated in conjunction with fellow terrorists stationed in Europe. He traveled extensively using doctored travel documents that allowed him to take on a variety of identities, including the one he used in Canada—that of a refugee seeking 

asylum and a new home. In actuality, Ressam was a member of the Armed Islamic 

Group 19 (GIA, or Groupes Islamiques Arme ́s). 

Ressam testified that manufacturing and trafficking fraudulent travel documents 

served several functions, providing entre ́e to the target country, a means to make 
45 

20 USA v. Ressam, et al. WDWA 99–CR–666. ‘‘Indictment.’’ April 3, 2001. 21 Ibid. 

money, and a way to stay embedded in a given location. From 1994 to 1998, Ressam 

lived in Montreal, actively robbing tourists—some thirty to forty times, by his 

count—of money and travel documents. Ressam described his livelihood: ‘‘I used to 

take the money, keep the money, and if there [were] passports, I would sell them, 

and if there [were] Visa credit cards, I would use them up, and if there were any 

traveler’s checks, I would use them or sell them.’’20 Though Ressam was arrested 

four times for his thievery, he was convicted just once; and he was punished with 

a fine, not jail time.21

Photo Caption.—Trinidad and Tobago is on lower right. Below is Venezuela. Antigua 

and Barbuda is mid-right. 

TERRORIST TRAVEL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN

Trinidad and Tobago, a rich tourist island located off the northeast coast of Venezuela, had a failed attempted Islamic extremist coup in July 1990. Fifteen percent 

of the island is Muslim. The island is also to the immediate northeast of Venezuela, 

which has long flaunted its contempt of the United States and support for terrorist 

activity, including reported travel facilitation to terrorists. 

In June 2007, four men, three from Guyana (sharing a southeast border with Venezuela) and one from Trinidad were arrested for their plot to destroy fuel lines that 

support JFK International Airport. One of the suspects reportedly said the airport 

was picked due to the esteem held in the United States for John F. Kennedy. The 

FBI was involved with the case since January 2006, when one of the four alleged 

plotters, Russell Defreitas, unknowingly attempted to recruit an FBI informant in 

an attack within the United States. Its goal was to be more spectacular than September 11. Defreitas had previously been a baggage handler at JFK airport and assured his co-conspirators that he knew the airport intimately. 

‘‘This was a very determined group that engaged in precise and extensive surveillance, surveillance that included physical surveillance, photograph surveillance, 

video surveillance, and even the use of the Internet to obtain satellite photographs 

of the JFK facility,’’ according to FBI agent Mershon who had investigated the case. 

Abu Bakr is a former policeman who founded the violent Jama’at al Muslimeen 

(commonly referred to simply as the Jamaat). A Trinidad native, he formed the 

group after studying in Canada where he converted to Islam while a student there. 

His group attempted a coup against the Trinidad government in 1990. The group, 

especially with Abu Bakr as leader, had a close relationship to Libyan leader Muam-
46 

22 Antigua and Barbuda Final Report of Task Force Investigation of John Allen Williams, a.k.a 

John Allen Mohammad. (Dec. 2003). 

mar al Qaddafi. Most recently, after threatening violence and extortion against fellow Muslims, he was convicted in March 2006 for attempted murder of former organization members. A search of his headquarters found a cache of weapons and 

equipment. He was long considered to be a crime kingpin in Trinidad, and his rivalries spun off a number of other radical Islamic groups. 

Other groups active on the island are Waajihatul Islaamiyyah (The Islamic Front) 

and the Jamaat al Murabiteen. The Waajihatul Islaamiyyah group has links to al 

Qaeda, Hamas, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Jemmah Islamiyyah, the organization 

behind the Bali beachfront bombing that killed close to 200 people. In December 

2002, the FBI, CIA and British SAS agents were in Trinidad investigating separate 

reports about specific plans to attack local U.S. and British interests by the head 

of The Islamic Front, Umar Abdullah, who had reportedly been threatening U.S. 

and British interests on the island. 

Abdullah publishes a monthly newsletter that pontificates on behalf of Osama Bin 

Laden, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, a ‘‘Jihad’’ (Holy War) against the United States and 

Britain and the setting up of an Islamic State here. 

There were also reports prior and subsequent to 9/11 U.S.-sought Adnan ElShukrijumah was living in Trinidad near schools that share his last name. (I had 

evidence while on the Commission that El-Shukrijumah may have tried to help 

9/11 pilots Atta and Jarrah with an immigration matter at the Immigration offices 

in Miami in May 2001. See 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, p. 30–31) In addition, two 

men with ties to Trinidad have been arrested in the United States. Keith Andre 

Gaude, a Jammat linked to bin Ladin, pled guilty on September 19, 2001 to unlawful possession of a machine gun. BATF officials stated he had come to Florida to 

‘‘buy as many as 60 AK–47 assault rifles and 10 MAC–10 submachine guns with 

silencers.’’ 

In 2002, Trinidad native and U.S. naturalized citizen Shueyb Mossa Jokhan was 

sentenced to 58 months in Federal prison for a ‘‘jihad’’ mission that included bombing an electrical power station and a National Guard Armory. According to the FBI, 

‘‘these attacks were then to be followed by a list of demands to be placed on the 

U.S. Government and other governments around the world. The defendants also 

sought to acquire AK–47 type assault weapons for their jihad training and operations, and sought to obtain the release from custody of an individual described as 

a ‘mujahedin’ fighter committed to jihad.’’ 

Since 9/11, there have been reports of Al Qaeda members setting up shop in Trinidad, smuggling weapons and organizing cells. 

Antigua and Baruba were the home of John Lee Mohammed prior to his ten fatal 

shootings and three other near fatal shootings during a terrorist-style spree in the 

autumn of 2002. As a U.S. citizen, he had financially survived prior to coming to 

the United States by selling forged U.S.-accepted travel documents—driver’s licenses and birth certificates.22

Muhammed brought Lee Boyd Malvo and his three children into the United 

States under false names, and in at least 20 incidents forged or stole identities for 

clients, secured air travel, and provided documents in order to secure their travel 

to the United States. In some cases, he charged as much as $3,000. Muhammed 

forged documents for Lee Boyd Malvo’s mother when she deserted her son, but 

when he was not paid, Malvo essentially was kept as collateral. 

With simply a birth certificate or baptismal record and a driver’s license, Mohammed’s clients, covered by the Western Hemisphere Exception for travelers from 

North, South or Central America or the Caribbean (but for Cuba), could easily pose 

as American citizens or citizens of one of the covered nations, and enter the United 

States. 

After the Task Force created by the Attorney General of Antigua and Baruba released its Final Report in December 2002, the GAO released two 2003 studies about 

the ease of being admitted into the United States with counterfeit birth certificates 

and driver’s licenses from Canada, Mexico, Jamaica and the Bahamas. According to 

the GAO, the ease of fraudulent entry using something other than U.S. passports 

for those claiming U.S. citizenship was not limited to Muhammed and his clients. 

TERRORIST TRAVEL AND STATE-ISSUED DRIVER LICENSES AND IDS

The 9/11 hijackers assimilated into the United States by attaining 17 DLs from 

Arizona, California and Florida (four of which were duplicates) and 13 State-issued 

IDs from Florida, Maryland and Virginia. The hijackers then used those IDs for the 

purpose of renting cars, obtaining living quarters, opening bank accounts, and 
47 

boarding aircraft on the morning of 9/11. We know that at least six hijackers total 

presented State-issued IDs on the morning of 9/11. The pilot who flew into the Pentagon, Hani Hanjour, had ID cards from four States: Florida, Maryland and Virginia, and an Arizona driver’s license. The Pennsylvania pilot, Ziad Jarrah, had 

three IDs and an unverifiable ID when stopped for speeding 2 days prior to 9/11. 

Both pilots had obtained a Virginia ID by fraud. 

At the foundation of the 9/11 Commission ‘‘terrorist travel’’ recommendations on 

secure IDs was the basic understanding that terrorists will continue to easily assimilate within the United States as long as identity and identity document 

issuance processes are easily manipulated. The Commission stated: 

All but one of the 9/11 hijackers acquired some form of U.S. identification document, some by fraud. Acquisition of these forms of identifications would have 

assisted them in boarding commercial flights, renting cars, and other necessary 

activities. 

Recommendation.—Secure identification should begin in the United States. The 

Federal Government should set standards for... sources of identifications, 

such as DLs. 

Recommendation.—The President should direct the Department of Homeland 

Security to lead the effort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting common standards with system wide goals 

in mind. (p. 390, 387). 

Photo Caption.—State-issued IDs acquired by 9/11 hijackers, ‘‘9/11 and Terrorist 

Travel’’, p. 44. 
48 

As the 9/11 Commission noted, there was only one 9/11 hijacker who did not obtain some form of U.S. identification, whether a State-issued DL, personal ID or 

both. Three of the five hijackers who crashed a plane into the Pentagon used fraudulently obtained licenses to board. The pilot of that plane had four IDs, all from different States, with at least one obtained by fraud. If REAL ID had been in effect 

in 2001, the 9/11 operational ringleader and pilot that conducted the first World 

Trade Center suicide, Mohamed Atta, would only have been 4 days from having had 

an expired license when he was pulled over for speeding violation on July 5, 2001. 

The 9/11 hijackers could have done the same today. It is still possible to obtain 

multiple licenses and IDs because identities are not verified. It’s not only possible 

to game the system; it’s likely, because States still don’t exchange information with 

each other regarding those holding legitimate IDs. Police officers’ hands are tied 

when they can’t cross-check the ID they’ve been handed against any other information. 

The 9/11 hijackers are not the only terrorists we know of who have taken advantage of blind spots and weaknesses in ID issuance standards. One terrorist caught 

in 2001 on the northern border, Nabil al Marabh, had five DLs and a hazardous 

materials permit. He told authorities he frequently crossed the U.S.-Canadian border illegally. Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed two people outside CIA headquarters in 

1993, got a Virginia DL despite being in the U.S. illegally. These same problems 

exist in many States today. As long as they do, terrorists will continue to take advantage of them. 

In addition to terrorists, criminals of all ilks—identity thieves, counterfeiters, 

deadbeat—and even underage teens seeking IDs to drive and drive, also use multiple IDs to hide their true identity from the law. In 2005 identity theft costs were 

at a staggering $64 billion, with $18.1 billion of that cost involving theft of a DL 

or ID. Individual consumers spend an average of 330 hours trying to undo identity 

theft and suffer $15,000 on average in losses. With REAL ID, identity theft will be 

much more difficult due to more robust, secure ID verification systems will protect 

consumers from identity thieves both during the application process and once the 

DL or ID is issued. 

The cards themselves will also be less susceptible to alteration, with three levels 

of security making the cards more tamper-resistant and easier for law enforcement 

to determine fakes. Counterfeiting remains alive and well. The accompanying photo 

is from a November 2007 New York press conference whereby State and Federal authorities from seven different law enforcement agencies shut down six ID document 

mills in New York and made at least 128 arrests. The bust covered two criminal 

enterprises that together took in more than $1.5 million annually. Typical street 

price was $40–$60. The ring supplied fraudulent government identity document 

such as DLs, Social Security cards and resident alien cards. Suppliers were located 

in California and New York and forged documents from many States, Central America and Mexico. 
49 

Photo Caption.—Nov. 2007: New York State investigators alongside Federal authorities make arrests pending a 2-year investigation of two criminal counterfeiting enterprises spanning California to New York. Annual income was more than $1.5 million. 
50 

Of particular note was the 2006 bust of the Castorena Family organization, which 

beginning in the 1980’s operated a Mexico-based counterfeiting operation with cells 

in every major U.S. city. Annual sales in Chicago alone were $2.5 million. According 

to informants, they could make IDs ‘‘as good as any we carry in our pockets.’’ 

The major source for the case, the stepdaughter of the organization’s leader, asked 

her grandfather whether the organization sold to terrorists. She was told: ‘‘We do 

this for business, for money. So it doesn’t really count whether you’re a Mohammed 

or a Julio or somebody else, as long as you have the money to pay for it. Terrorism 

is not our problem.’’ 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE

The tenets of WHTI were recommended by the 9/11 Commission to both tighten 

border security and streamline the inspection process, especially at our land ports 

of entry. We cannot afford our borders be bifurcated from the discussion of national 

security. Our economic strength as a Nation is only as strong as our national security. We must continue to work alongside our friends in the trade and tourism industries to achieve both security and facilitation. 

Assuring our border inspection process is fast, fair and complete is essential. It 

is also doable. We can do so if we prioritize how personnel, budgets and technologies 

are allotted and deployed with precision. The focus must be on how to properly train 

and equip our border inspectors so that procedures assure security of our borders 

are the most effective and least intrusive manner possible. I applaud DHS for not 

waiting despite continual efforts by special interests to delay implementation indefinitely, even if border inspection has waited for over 7 years for the significant upgrades in procedures and processes that should have been in place before 9/11 and 

forthcoming after 9/11. The new rules set in place for WHTI implements policy that 

shores up significant, large and sweeping holes in our border security so that all 

persons seeking entry into the United States show standardized travel documents 

or equivalents that can be vetted in a manner that assures identity and maximizes 

facilitation simultaneously. 

Remember where we are without WHTI: terrorists, drug dealers and those who 

abuse our lax security will continue to easily move through our border system with 

fake documents or no documents at all. The policy which has been in effect for years 

at our ports of entry, the Western Hemisphere Travel Exception, actually encouraging fraudulent entry by permitting any traveler claiming to be a U.S. citizen to 

talk their way into the United States or show any variety of identity document and 

claim to be from the Western Hemisphere. At least on the Canadian border, surveys 

from even a couple of years ago showed that 40 percent of Canadians state they 

have not been asked to show any identification when seeking entry into the United 

States. In a 2006 GAO report, GAO proved the point when in 42 of 45 instances 

between 2003 and 2006 GAO agents with counterfeit documents were able to flash 

false papers, or in a few instances, no papers at all, and enter the United States. 

Consider that number transferred over to attempted terrorist entries, and we have 

much to be concerned about until WHTI is fully rolled out. 

The only way to secure our borders is to make the terrorists choose between using 

a passport, and enhanced DL (where available), applying to a trusted traveler program, or enter illegally. As long as a terrorist can pose as a U.S. citizen or traveler 

from the Western Hemisphere by producing a birth certificate, fake DL that can’t 

be verified, or other forms of identification that can be neither verified for identity, 

checked against a watchlist, or authenticated as a legitimate document, the Western 

Hemisphere Travel Exception is an open invitation to enter and embed in the 

United States with little disincentive not to try. 

We can argue all we want about how to achieve the balance between actual secure 

borders and facilitation of trade and commerce, but we cannot ever afford to say it 

is not important or there is a segment of our border apparatus to which security 

does not apply. Nor can we afford to unravel well-based recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission and passed into law by this body. Lest we forget that September 

11 has taught us that secure borders are a matter of national security, and to secure 

them we must remember that terrorists will use any means to enter and embed into 

the United States. 

We must treat our borders as they truly are: as a marker of U.S. sovereign rights 

to assure that people who seek to come here are who they say they are, and will 

not cause a public safety or terrorist threat to American citizens. At the border, the 

passport or equivalent is the manner in which we as a Nation can better assure 

that the people who seek to come here do so for legitimate reasons. A top priority 

in all we do in border security must then be to assure practical, on the ground, security measures at our ports of entry and physical borders. However, let me be clear: 
51 

we need not give up privacy nor hinder commerce to attain border security. In fact, 

with efficient and streamlined security, privacy and commerce are both enhanced. 

People and goods that should make it through the system in an efficient manner 

are more likely to be when the acceptable forms of travel documents go from dozens 

to a few known and easily authenticated, and trusted or registered traveler/commercial programs augment the system as an alternate to a federally issued travel document. 

REAL ID

REAL ID is one of the only 9/11 Commission recommendations that relies heavily 

on the States for implementation. REAL ID might have curtailed 9/11. REAL ID can 

make a difference to our national security, our economic security and our public 

safety—but only if fully implemented and adequately funded. To make REAL ID a 

reality, however, requires more than either the Federal Government or the States 

can do on their own. It requires a partnership. It also requires an acknowledgement 

that securing our Nation’s physical and economic integrity is not just a Federal responsibility; it is everyone’s responsibility. It requires a further acknowledgement 

that the ability to verify an individual’s true identity is one of the cornerstones of 

national and economic security. 

The REAL ID Act stipulates that in order for a DL or State-issued ID to serve 

as an identity document for entering a Federal facility—including boarding a 

plane—the document must meet, at a minimum, the security standards spelled out 

in the act. Thus States are not required to issue licenses and IDs in accordance with 

REAL ID, but they could be subjecting their residents to considerable inconvenience 

if they do not. There is no intent under REAL ID for the Federal Government to 

assume responsibility for issuing DLs. That process should and will remain with 

each State. REAL ID seeks only to ensure that every State’s process for issuing DLs 

and IDs—including the documents themselves—meets specified minimum security 

standards. 

Today, the controversy around REAL ID has shifted significantly from one of the 

value of the law to its funding, and for good reason. With only $79 million available 

for 50 States and 6 jurisdictions to meet initial compliance deadlines in a year and 

a half, this Congress needs to take the funding of REAL ID seriously. If ever there 

was a domestic funding emergency, REAL ID represents one of significance. 

Debunking Myths About REAL ID 

Myth.—REAL ID is a Federal imposition, with little to no connection to State efforts to improve ID issuance. 

Fact.—REAL ID was passed into law based on the States’ own Secure Document 

Framework developed by AAMVA after the States acknowledged post 9/11 that the 

current State DL issuance system is deeply flawed in its ability to generate IDs both 

secure in their content and production. Such deep weaknesses threaten national and 

economic security, public safety, and privacy. 

On October 24, 2001 the American Association of Motor Vehicles Administrators 

(AAMVA)—an organization promoting information exchange, uniform practices and 

reciprocity, with representatives from every U.S. and Canadian jurisdiction—passed 

a resolution to form a special task force to enhance the security and integrity of the 

DL and ID issuance processes. AAMVAnet already supported the Commercial Driver License Information System and provides connectivity for such things as SSN 

checks by DMVs, and AAMVA’s leadership in setting standards for bad drivers 

made them the logical choice for taking on issues related to 9/11. 

Prior to 9/11, AAMVA had a significant leadership role that included petitioning 

Congress in 1996 to mandate minimum standards for DLs. From 1999 to 2001, 

AAMVA worked with the National Highway Transportation Administration 

(NHTSA) and Congress toward creation of the Driver Record Information 

Verification System (DRIVerS). So when AAMVA went to work on creating a special 

task force to deal with the panoply of issues involved in creating a more secure ID 

issuance framework, the organization had the ability and credibility to make a difference. And they did. Their work became the foundation for the technical requirements of the REAL ID Act. 

The REAL ID Final Rule, issued on January 11, 2008, has responded to thousands of comments by States and other stakeholders and provided a new set of compliance deadlines which the National Governor Association acknowledges as reflective of their concerns and suggestions. All States are now set up to comply, with 

all States having been issued an extension to comply with the initial benchmarks 

set out by the Rule of January 1, 2009 instead of the law’s deadline of May 11, 2008. 

The relaxation of the timeline to comply has resulted in a reduction of estimated 
52 

costs by DHS from about $11 billion burden on the States to a $3.965 billion requirement spread over 11 years, or about $360 million per year to implement. 

Photo Caption.—9/11 hijacker Ahmed al Ghamdi, shown above, checked in at Logan 

Airport in Boston on the morning of 9/11, using his fraudulently obtained VA ID 

card. 

The Driver License/ID Security Framework that emerged from the AAMVA Special Task Force was detailed and comprehensive; that Framework became the backbone for REAL ID. The outline of the task force responsibilities is worth repeating 

as it shows how AAMVA—and thus the State DMVs—were well aware and desirous 

of fixing the multiple vulnerabilities in State ID issuances systems. In some ways, 

then, REAL ID was simply a Federal bow to the States’ own work in this area. 

AAMVA’s ‘‘Uniform Identification Subcommittee’’ divided the issues into sub-categories. What is interesting is that despite the permutation of the mission statements from these subcommittees to the AAMVA Security Document Framework, to 

REAL ID, to the Proposed and Final Rule, much of the language and policy statements have remained relatively unchanged. 

Another interesting aspect of AAMVA’s tasking was a group established just to 

deal with enforcement issues, including those treating/ID fraud, and determine increased penalties for dealing with such fraud. A significant justification for REAL 

ID is that by setting minimum standards as a foundation in both the verification 

of identity and card production processes, security is built into all State systems. 

This will make law enforcement activity more effective while at the same time discouraging fraud. As Chuck Canterbury, National President of the Fraternal Order 

of Police stated in a Feb. 21, 2007 letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid: 
53 

23 Janice Kephart, REAL ID Final Rules: a Summary (Feb. 21, 2008) was used for column 

three. Found at http://911securitysolutions.com/index.php?option=comlcontent&task=view& 

id=154&Itemid=38. 

[REAL ID] is very much of an officer safety issue. Law enforcement officers 

need to have confidence that the documents presented to them to establish the 

identity of a given individual are accurate. Officers rely on these documents 

during traffic stops and other law enforcement actions to access information related to that individual’s criminal history. No police officer wants to be in the 

dark about the fact that he may have detained a wanted or violent criminal who 

has simply obtained false identification. This places both the officer and the 

public he is sworn to protect in greater danger. For this reason, the FOP will 

strongly oppose any bill or amendment that would repeal the REAL ID Act. 

Below is a chart that shows that the policies advocated by the States via 

AAMVA’s 2001 working groups remains a strong influence on REAL ID policies advocated today by DHS and also influenced by the National Governors’ Association 

and National Conference of State Legislators. This chart reflects where AAMVA 

started in 2001 as closely tied to REAL ID Final Rule.23

Secure ID Feature 

Tasked by AAMVA 

2001 AAMVA Secure ID Issuance 

Task Force Assignments 

2008 DHS REAL ID Final Rule for 

Secure ID Issuance 

Model Legislation ‘‘Develop model legislation to 

assist States in implementing the overall package 

of Uniform Identification 

Standards’’.

REAL ID is that legislation. 

Process and Procedures.‘‘Gather and incorporate all 

deliverables of the Uniform 

ID Subcommittee (Task 

Groups) into one Model Program. This model program 

will include minimum requirements, best practices 

and model legislation to support a uniform and secure 

DL and identification card 

system for motor vehicle 

agencies in the U.S. and 

Canada.’’ 

Section 37.01: REAL ID is applicable to States and U.S. 

territories that choose to 

issue DLs in compliance 

with REAL ID, and IDs not 

in compliance of REAL ID. 

The Rule sets out minimum 

requirements to support a 

uniform and secure DL and 

identification card system 

for Motor Vehicle Agencies. 

Driver License 

Agreement.

‘‘The DLC/NRVC (Driver License Compact/Non-Resident 

Violator Compact) Joint 

Compact Executive Board 

has been asked to explore 

enhancing the newly created 

Driver License Agreement 

(DLA), a voluntary DL compact between States, to include requirements established for a more secure DL/ 

ID issuance system.’’ 

DRIVerS Infrastructure.‘‘The Driver Record Information Verification System 

(DRIVerS) task group will 

be charged with creating an 

all driver pointer system, to 

keep bad drivers off the 

road. Simply put, DRIVerS 

will direct a State where to 

find and accurately verify 

someone’s driving history in 

another State. ’’ 
54 

Secure ID Feature 

Tasked by AAMVA 

2001 AAMVA Secure ID Issuance 

Task Force Assignments 

2008 DHS REAL ID Final Rule for 

Secure ID Issuance 

Acceptable Documents.‘‘Validate and update the existing acceptable ID document list for the proof/authentication of specific personal information, such as, 

name, date of birth (DOB), 

legal presence, etc. and 

evaluate the utilization of 

foreign documents for the 

same purpose. Phase two 

will result in a recommendation for document (DL/ID) 

validity periods in relation 

to legal status/validity’’.

Sections 37.11 (Identity 

Verification) and 37.13 (Document Authentication) require that an applicant provide sufficient documentation for a State to verify 

identity and authenticate 

documents presented for the 

purpose of establishing identity and includes specific 

personal information such as 

name, DOB, legal presence 

and use of documents, including foreign documents, 

for that purpose. An ID document list is provided. 

Residency ............ ‘‘To develop a definition of 

residency/domicile with and 

without a legal presence requirement for the purpose of 

driver licensing (establishment of the driver control 

record) and identification.’’ 

Lawful Presence is defined in 

37.03, and the procedure for 

determining lawful status 

for the purpose of driver licensing is found in 37.13. 

Lawful status must be 

checked in SAVE, Section 

37.13(b)(1). The issuance 

with or without legal presence is covered by Section 

37.21, Temporary or Limited 

Term IDs and in Section 

37.71, Non REAL ID DL or 

ID. 

Verification ......... ‘‘Identify and establish methods for verifying documents 

used to establish identity of 

an individual applying for a 

DL or identification card. 

Verification of identity may 

include, but is not limited 

to, full legal name, date of 

birth, Social Security Number (when applicable), and 

residency and/or legal presence’’.

Again, methods for verifying 

(authenticating) documents 

are covered by Sections 

37.11 and 37.13. Section 

37.31 provides requirements 

for source document retention. Section 37.33 sets out 

minimum requirements for 

information held by DMV 

databases. Sections 

37.41(b)(2) set out security 

requirements for personally 

identifiable information. 

Fraudulent Document Recognition.‘‘To assist jurisdictions with 

the formal training of motor 

vehicle employees and law 

enforcement in the recognition/detection of fraudulent 

identification documents.’’ 

Section 37.41(b)(5) requires 

employee fraudulent document training and security 

awareness training. 
55 

Secure ID Feature 

Tasked by AAMVA 

2001 AAMVA Secure ID Issuance 

Task Force Assignments 

2008 DHS REAL ID Final Rule for 

Secure ID Issuance 

Card Design 

Specifications.

‘‘Deals with physical and encoded features of the DL/ID 

document. Features include 

security elements, card layout, printed and encoded 

data, and machine-readable 

technologies. It is our hope 

that this effort produces a 

standard for the DL document that specifies minimum data and minimum 

technologies to be used on 

the DL/ID document’’.

Section 37.15 sets out minimum security requirements 

to harden the DL or ID but 

assures flexibility, based on 

comments received during 

rulemaking. Section 37.17 

lists card surface requirements and 37.19 the machine readable zone requirement. 

Internal Controls ‘‘To identify best practices for 

internal fraud control and 

prevention measures’’.

Sections 37.41 to 37.45 set out 

controls for physical security 

of production facilities; employee background checks 

and access control; requires 

a State to submit a plan on 

preventing access to personally identifiable information; 

and a separate report on 

safeguarding IDs in coordination with law enforcement. 

Oversight Compliance System.‘‘To review current procedures 

for the oversight and compliance of Federal and State 

programs and to develop a 

process for compliance to 

AAMVA standards regarding DL/ID Processes/Procedures’’.

Sections 37.51 to 37.65 set out 

in detail procedures for determining State compliance. 

Unique Identifier ‘‘Developing a way to uniquely 

identify an individual such 

that: 

• A holder will have no 

more than one (1) DL/ID 

card and record; 

• authorized users can 

verify that the holder of a 

DL/ID card is the individual 

to whom the card was 

issued; and 

• an individual’s driver 

record contains only information that pertains to that 

individual. 

• Section 37.29 sets out the 

‘‘one driver one license’’ rule 

designed in part to verify 

driver licensing in another 

State. This helps get out the 

underlying principle of ‘‘keep 

bad drivers off the road’’ as 

referred to in DRIVerS infrastructure above. 

• Supported by document 

security requirements in 

Section 37.41(b)(2) and 

source document retention 

Section 37.31. 

Myth.—REAL ID creates a national ID and is a Federal mandate. 

Fact.—The driver’s license is the most common form of ID used in the United 

States today, accepted for everything from opening a bank account to boarding a 

plane to picking up movie tickets with a credit card. Securing an already widely 

used credential makes good sense. Each State will still issue many varieties of 

REAL ID compliant—and if they choose—non-compliant IDs. REAL ID does not affect States’ right to decide who is eligible for a DL or ID; that decision remains with 

each State. There is thus nothing ‘‘national’’ about such issuance. If anything, REAL 

ID can be said to obviate the need for a national ID. 

One example of how REAL ID does not create a national ID is that the benchmarks do not mandate anti-counterfeiting features of the card. Instead, under Section 37.15 of the Final Rule, anti-counterfeiting is described as follows: 
56 

37.15(c) Three levels of security are required to detect false cards: 

Level 1 requires an ‘‘easily identifiable visual or tactile feature’’ for cursory 

examination without any aids. 

Level 2 is a feature detected by ‘‘trained inspectors with simple equipment.’’ 

Level 3 is a feature only detectable by forensic inspectors. 

To meet these security levels States have numerous choices from a large variety 

of vendors. The Rule simply states that the card technologies must not be commonly 

available to the general public, must be multilayered, and must be able to be integrated into the cards. There is nothing about these requirements that creates one 

type of card issued by one government entity; in fact, these rules are designed to 

give States the choices they need to make to achieve fiscal responsibility and security in equal doses. 

Myth.—REAL ID will create a hackable, national database. 

Fact.—There is no aggregation of personal data into ‘‘one huge, hackable database 

operated by the Federal Government,’’ as some claim. REAL ID calls for the States 

to operate secure databases that are searchable by other authorized parties such as 

motor vehicle agencies and law enforcement. The Act also calls for crosschecking applicants’ information with Federal and State databases to better authenticate credentials. No actual information is shared between these databases, just simply ‘‘yes’’ 

or ‘‘no’’ answers, and there is no access to the actual information that stands behind 

queries. 

Further, the Federal Government does not hold applicants’ information; in fact, 

the REAL ID Final Rule requires that applicant information be protected by each 

State. Nor does the Federal Government network the databases together. The databases are likely to be networked to the States by an AAMVA secured network, for 

which DHS has requested fiscal year 2009 funding of $50 million for further upgrades. Most of these databases are currently used by States already to verify identity in a variety of ways—with no privacy complaints. Thus the Federal Government 

will not hold individual applicants’ information, and the notion that REAL ID would 

create a single Federal database is completely erroneous. 

Myth.—REAL ID invades privacy. 

Fact.—REAL ID protects privacy by ensuring that people are who they say they 

are. The information contained on a REAL ID license will be the same as what is 

required by most States today. That information, such as a digital photo, name, permanent address, age, height and weight, is widely available and does not implicate 

privacy concerns. REAL ID licenses are not required to contain RFID technology, 

biometric fingerprint information, or Social Security numbers. 

The Final Rule supports privacy of personal information in a number of areas, including protection of personally identifiable information; access to information by 

employees; and securing production facilities. 

Best practices on securing privacy have existed in the DL arena for years and 

build on the Commercial Driver License Information System (CDLIS) and National 

Driver Register (NDR) database created in 1986. These databases together have 

been servicing 45 States for 20 years, and REAL ID does not even go so far as creating a new database. Even so, there have been no complaints about intrusions on 

privacy or identity theft with either of these databases. One reason why is because 

Federal law already protects the use of such data under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994. This law restricts how DL information can be used by States, barring States and their employees from selling or releasing personal information such 

as SSNs, images, addresses, phone numbers and birthdates. Until that law was 

passed, 35 States had such information public and many made money off the sale 

of such information to all varieties of private enterprise. Congress set a higher bar 

to protect privacy in the area of State-issued DLs then, and REAL ID 20 years later 

is a natural followup: not only securing data, but identities and the documents that 

support those identities as well. 

Also worthy of mention is that the Information Technology Association of America, who represents the largest producers of computer security systems—IBM, 

Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Oracle and others—has concluded that REAL ID, if implemented, will further protect privacy. In a May 7, 2007 report, the ITAA stated 

that REAL ID will actually ‘‘raises the bar on privacy for driver licenses’’ because 

it sets higher benchmarks for data security; requires tougher identity adjudication; 

and builds on existing practice. 

REAL ID also provides greater protection of privacy, requiring background checks 

of DMV employees, secure productions sites of cards, alongside due respect to civil 

liberties. Just to be clear, there are no plans for an embedded RFID chip in REAL 

ID DLs. Enhanced DLs are a different species, designed for border crossers who also 

regularly use a DL, and who voluntarily choose to acquire an Enhanced DL with 

a chip readable for border crossing purposes. 
57 

Myth.—The opportunities for identify theft will multiply exponentially. 

Fact.—A collateral positive side effect of REAL ID is that it will help curtail identity theft, not enable it. For legal residents, REAL ID requires stronger security features with the intention of driving up the cost of creating counterfeit ID documents 

and enabling law enforcement both working with DMVs and in the field to make 

a quicker, more reliable determination of whether an ID is legitimate or not. 

For criminals, terrorists and others who want to live in the United States for nefarious purposes or under false guise, obtaining a license or ID has been their ticket 

to acquiring legitimate cover for their illegitimate activities. Once our identity 

issuance systems and the IDs themselves are tightly secured, it will be much more 

difficult to obtain these ‘‘tickets’’ fraudulently. 

FUNDING REAL ID

A review of the Final Rule shows that the administration request does not adequately reflect the costs in the Final Rule as they pertain to State investment in 

order to become REAL ID compliant. That is the crux of the current debate. Six 

years after 9/11, we can no longer afford delays simply due to funding when acceptable rules are in place. 

After collecting thousands of comments from States and other interested parties, 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued final rules for the REAL ID Act 

in January 2008. All 56 U.S. jurisdictions meet initial REAL ID requirements and 

as of April 2, 2009, have been granted an extension until December 31, 2009 by the 

DHS. That means that every jurisdiction will continue to have their DLs acceptable 

for official purposes after the May 11, 2008 deadline as mandated by Congress in 

the REAL ID Act of 2005. 

Funding for REAL ID under these circumstances is wholly inadequate. While 

Congress provided additional funding to implement REAL ID in fiscal year 2008 at 

$50 million, current REAL ID funding is at approximately $79 million in a separate 

fund created under the REAL ID Act for all U.S. jurisdictions. 

The DHS Final Rule places the cost to the States at $3.965 billion. With an 11- 

year implementation cycle, States need on average $360 million per year to fund full 

REAL ID under their own estimates. 

In fiscal year 2009, the administration made a request to fund REAL ID at a total 

of $160 million, with $50 million going to USCIS for the identification verification 

‘‘hub’’ that is likely to be expanded by AAMVA (as of now). The administration has 

made a separate request for a combined grant program for critical infrastructure/ 

bomb prevention and REAL ID of $110 million. This proposed fund is neither dedicated to REAL ID nor does it reflect the costs to the States as set out by the Final 

Rule. Here is the relevant language as set forth by the administration: 

OMB fiscal year 2009 proposed budget numbers, p. 480: 

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Federal Funds, UNITED 

STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES: For necessary expenses for citizenship and immigration services, [$80,973,000] $154,540,000; of 

which $100,000,000 is for the E-Verify program to assist U.S. employers with 

maintaining a legal work force; and of which $50,000,0000 is to support implementation of the REAL ID Act to develop an information sharing and 

verification capability with States. 

P. 516: 

National Security and Terrorism Prevention Grants ($110 million).—This program provides competitive grants to specific State and local agencies to support 

proposals which address national vulnerabilities identified by the Secretary as 

priorities. In 2009, the Secretary will invite States to submit project proposals 

to support REAL ID implementation and buffer zone protection for critical infrastructure. Final grant allocations will be determined competitively by the Secretary on the basis of how well proposals address identified national 

vulnerabilities. 

In a March letter to the White House, the National Governors’ Association (NGA) 

requested $1 billion on 2008 spring supplemental, citing compliance deadlines beginning in 2009. In addition, a group of seven Governors has told Secretary Chertoff 

that they want complete funding for REAL ID in the supplemental this spring of 

$1 billion: REAL ID is an emergency, as all States seeking compliance or approved 

for an extension (all but one so far) need to reach 18 benchmarks by January 2009. 

Most are well on their way, but many lack sufficient funding to reach all 18 benchmarks by this date. 
58 

ESTIMATED COST OF REAL ID FINAL RULE OVER AN 11-YEAR PERIOD 1

Estimated Costs (11 years) 

Millions of 

$ 

Millions of 

$ 

Millions of $ 

(2006 dollars) 

Percent Total 

7% Discounted 3% Discounted Undiscounted Undiscounted 

Costs to States ............................ 2,879 3,413 3,965 39 .9 

Customer Services ...................... 636 804 970 9 .8 

Card production .......................... 690 822 953 9 .6 

Data Systems & IT ..................... 1,171 1,352 1,529 15 .4 

Security & Information Awareness ........................................... 365 415 490 4 .9 

Data Verification ........................ 5 7 8 0 .1 

Certification process ................... 11 13 16 0 .2 

Costs to Individuals .................... 3,808 4,814 5,792 58 .3 

Opportunity Costs ....................... 3,429 4,327 5,215 52 .5 

Application Preparation (125.8 

million hours) .......................... 2,186 2,759 3,327 33 .5 

Obtain Birth Certificate (20.1 

million hours) .......................... 348 440 530 5 .3 

Obtain Social Security Card (1.6 

million hours) .......................... 31 37 44 0 .4 

DMV visits (49.8 million hours) 864 1,091 1,315 13 .2 

Expenditures: Obtain Birth Certificate ...................................... 379 479 577 5 .8 

Cost to Private Sector ................ 8 9 9 0 .1 

Costs to Federal Government .... 128 150 171 1 .7 

Social Security card issuance .... 36 43 50 0 .5 

Data Verification—SAVE ........... 9 11 14 0 .1 

Data Systems & IT ..................... 65 74 82 0 .8 

Certification & training .............. 17 21 25 0 .3 

Total Costs ........................ 6,853 8,406 9,939 100 .0 

1Source: DHS Final Rule, p. 221. http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/laws/gcl1172765386179. 

shtm. 

The total, undiscounted 11-year cost of the final rule is $9.9 billion. Based on a 

total of 477.1 million issuances over the 11 years of the analysis, the average marginal cost per issuance for States is $8.30. Individuals will incur the largest share 

of the costs. More than 58 percent of the costs (discounted or undiscounted) are associated with preparing applications, obtaining necessary documents, or visiting 

motor vehicle offices. 

The final cost to States and the Federal Government at $4.4 billion for complete 

implementation of REAL ID. States have to be compliant by 2011, leaving only 3 

fiscal years for reaching benchmarks set out for DHS, although the final implementation date is 2017. 

According to the Federal Government, their burden is priced at $171 million. 

These costs cover Social Security Card issuance ($50 million); Data Verification via 

SAVE ($14 million); Data Systems & IT ($82 million); and certification and training 

($25 million). 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

I thank all the witnesses once again for their testimony. 

I will remind the members that they each have 5 minutes to 

question, in case they come back. I have to put that on the record. 

I will now recognize myself for questions. 

There has been a lot of debate on the security and privacy of the 

proposed pass cards, the enhanced driver’s licenses and other 

WHTI-acceptable travel documents. 

Can you tell me specifically what your opinions are with respect 

to the security and the privacy of those proposed cards, if they are 

acceptable, if we need to change something on them? Maybe each 

of you can answer that. 
59 

Mr. PHILLIPS. I will defer to Liz on the license, but on the pass 

card, NEXUS card, SENTRI cards, there is absolutely no personal 

data in that card. 

The honorable Mrs. Christensen mentioned earlier that NEXUS 

was widely counterfeited and used, and that is not quite right. 

If anyone uses a trusted traveler card or the new pass card, 

there is simply a 9-digit number in that document that brings up 

the record in the CBP booth on the screen. 

So if anybody stole my card and tried to use it, even put their 

picture on my current card, my picture is going to come up in the 

booth and they can’t use it. 

Second, there is no way that they can get—my name isn’t in the 

card, my Social Security number, my birth date, it is not there. It 

is just this number. 

So it is not correct when people say wirelessly they could hijack 

data from reading your card. 

So I do feel it does need a machine-readable zone and they are 

going to be issuing a new card for NEXUS, SENTRI, called the 

trusted traveler card that is going to have a machine-readable zone 

to make it even better, because it is true that the current card 

might be able to have someone put a fake picture on it. But they 

still couldn’t use the card even if they did. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Luce. 

Ms. LUCE. Yes. Our card has an RFID chip that goes to a unique 

number. So when you come up to the border, it will bounce into our 

driver’s license data, which brings up all the information that is on 

the card. 

But if anybody tried to take the information from the RFID chip, 

first of all, it is a Class C felony in the State of Washington. So 

that is something we have worked strongly with the ACLU to get 

in place this year. 

Second, there is no personal information they could have. It 

would be a unique number. 

I have an enhanced driver’s license. I don’t even know what my 

RFID number is. There is just no way you would ever know. 

Ms. KEPHART. Let me address it from REAL ID. I think that this 

is a good way to do this. 

It is a little more complicated with REAL ID, because there are 

a number of different tiers of privacy arguments that have been 

made in regards to REAL ID. So let me just take a couple of them. 

First, under the final rule, every State has to protect their information and provide a security plan to DHS as to how personal information is going to be protected. 

Second, only the State will hold, as it does now, only the State 

holds personal data. No one else will have access to it. 

Third, there is no national database which links into the privacy 

claim. The databases are where they are, either in the Social Security Administration or the saved database, which issued for legal 

precedence, the vital events information is at each State. Those will 

be interstate exchanges. 

But these are more like red light-green light exchanges. Is this 

person who they say they are? Is this the correct birthdate? No information actually as to that person is given back. 
60 

So privacy is protected that way, too, and, also, to mention the 

Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, which has been in place since, I believe, 1986, if I have that right, has protected privacy information 

of drivers since that time. 

The commercial driver’s license database, on the fourth point. 

The commercial driver’s license information system also has been 

in effect for a large number of years. AMVA controls that, which 

is a private network. 

There has never been a privacy breach on that network ever that 

has been reported. 

So we have a pretty secure system in place. Of course, security 

of private information and personal information on the REAL IDs 

is really important, but there are a large number of tiers to protect 

that and while States need to still do their work to make sure it 

happens, I think it is on its way to having that issue solved in 

REAL ID, because there has been a lot of pushback on that issue 

and DHS has had to do a lot work in that area. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. I appreciate your candid comments on 

that. 

The other issue we have is let’s say that we get a good card together, I was very interested in the statistics that Mr. Phillips— 

not statistics, the length of time to process people, because, of 

course, we want to make it easy for the right people to cross borders, et cetera, or get into the country and we want to be able to 

stop the bad guys or people who aren’t complying with our laws. 

So with respect to the port, especially the land port of entries, 

how do you feel, are they adequately staffed? Are they correctly operated and maintained? 

What changes do you think we could do, since we are changing 

these cards or making these cards or maybe going to a full card, 

ultimately, Mr. Phillips, and the REAL ID and the whole issue? 

What do you think we need to do at the particular land port of 

entries to be more efficient? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. I would answer in two pieces. I really think that 

serious thought be given to do the document checks where people 

leave from. 

In other words, we ought to do it at the airport in London instead of when they land at JFK Airport. If we did it there, then 

inadmissible people would not have to be checked at our border. 

That is one change. 

At our own borders, under the current conditions, CBP is very 

responsive to making the changes that they have. The key is the 

RFID documentation to allow the document data to be in the possession of the officer before the person enters the primary booth. 

That is where you are saving is going to occur and in order to 

do that, we need the readers that were discussed earlier. They 

have got to be installed. 

I would hope that that project is going to be successfully 

achieved, and Mr. Jacksta will get lunch for it later on, I hope. 

It is critical. The readers are critical. 

Second, as far as, I think, Congressman Reyes’ bill, we do need 

some staff additions to man the booths. It is nothing more angry 

than to arrive at a border which has 10 booths and six of them 

have an officer in it and four are empty. 
61 

On the northern border, that happens. Sometimes on the southern border. They are pretty good about manning the booths, I 

think, on the southern border. 

But the key is the processing time per individual going through. 

Infrastructure is critical. There are certain ports on both sides of 

the country that need additional access, need additional facilities, 

where you can’t process people properly. They are 40, 50, 60 years 

old in some cases. 

Most importantly on both borders is the key that infrastructure 

also includes road approaches. You can’t just talk about a plaza 

and the building that you are processing. You have got to talk 

about the two-lane highway and make it three sometimes so you 

can put low-risk separately, as we have in Washington State on 

I–5. 

We should separate FAST trucks and low-risk individuals in passenger cars before they get to the plaza. Those are the three key 

issues. 

So it is the technology to utilize RFID-type documents, it is the 

ability to add some staff, some people, to man the booths when 

they need to be, and third is infrastructure changes both in the 

plaza, in the facility itself, and in the approach roads. 

Those would be the three things I would comment on. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I would agree with that. I have the benefit of getting to cross the California-Mexican border and the biggest problem 

is always the approach and the infrastructure and getting in the 

right lane and people don’t even know what lane they should be 

getting into, and we have something like 29 lanes there or something. 

If you end up on the wrong side of the bridge you are never going 

to get over to your FAST track or anything else. So I think better 

signage and more open to be able to get into the right lane is definitely critical from that standpoint. 

Yes, Ms. Luce. 

Ms. LUCE. In the State of Washington, at the Blaine border, 

there is a priority lane for the NEXUS traveler and it seems to me 

that the pass card is going to have the RFID chip and the EDL will 

have the RFID chip. 

Not all passports will, because they won’t be brand new, but that 

those that do have an RFID chip, it would be great if they could 

all use the NEXUS lane and, that way, you could take the low-risk 

away and allow the border patrol officers to spend more time with 

those people who they can’t verify as quickly. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Can I just make one point, please? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You all get your chance, sorry. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Just to clarify. RFID, there are two kinds of RFID. 

There is proximity and vicinity. 

Unfortunately, because of ICAO rules in the world globally, all 

passports have to have a proximity chip, which means you have to 

take the passport, give it to an officer, he has to put it physically 

on a reader, and that is what takes 28 minutes, under the reality 

test of that. That is a proximity chip. 

Everything else is a vicinity chip and that is the one that takes 

8 minutes, and NEXUS, of course, is faster than that. 
62 

The key here is we envision three lanes at a border, a passport 

lane, an RFID vicinity lane, and a NEXUS lane. You don’t want 

to mix the passports and the new vicinity chips in the same lane 

or else anybody with an EDL is going to be sitting behind passport 

people and it takes, again, 8 minutes versus 26, almost 3.5 times 

to do a passport lane. 

So that is part of the change that we have to think about as we— 

and CBP is thinking about that as they develop it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Kephart. 

Ms. KEPHART. Well, I just wanted to add on something that could 

be done, because I have actually seen this done and it is very, very 

interesting. 

You can actually do real-time tactical modeling and simulation at 

the land ports of entry, where you are not only measuring how fast 

it takes to get through the border, but you can actually put the 

cameras up and depending on the traffic flows and the number of 

inspectors you have and a number of other factors, you can actually 

make a software model to have it tell the CBP officers who are on 

duty where they should be allocated, what lanes should be open, 

how many should be open for certain types of trusted traveler programs at the time or regular lanes or whatever, as long as they 

have the technology there. 

You make your border so much more efficient, depending on 

what kind of traffic you have coming in and what personnel you 

have at the time. 

So you can really help. The issues that have been traditional at 

the border with personnel and infrastructure not being sufficient, 

you can really help make that more efficient if you use real-time 

modeling and simulation models. 

So I would just throw that out there. I don’t know if you have 

heard that before. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. CBP has that and it is called the ‘‘Wizard’’ and 

they use that. It is very true. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

I would like to ask, Ms. Luce, can you talk a little bit about the 

relationship your State has with DHS and getting the EDL okay’d 

and are there any particular challenging requirements of the program that you think are going to be are the most difficult for 

States to meet the mandate and platform that they have? 

Ms. LUCE. Our actual experience with the Department of Homeland Security has been an absolutely fabulous one. 

In my testimony, I mention how they came out to the State to 

meet with us and not only did they meet with us, but they worked 

with us for pretty much a solid week and when we understood— 

and, actually, before they had come, they did not have an idea of 

how we produced a driver’s license. 

So when they saw what we did and the interview technique that 

we have, I think that was something that really helped them to 

make them more comfortable with what we are doing. 

Then as we found out what the minimum requirements were for 

Homeland Security, we were able to see how we could modify what 

we do so we can meet their needs. 

So I think right now, when we did it, we have tried to keep our 

eye on REAL ID so that we didn’t just spend a bunch of money as 
63 

a State that later on probably we wouldn’t be able to say that the 

EDL could be used for REAL ID. 

So that right, I think, is the biggest challenge, to have Secretary 

Chertoff say it is REAL ID plus, and yet we are unable to have 

that solidified in writing. It is a little frustrating. 

But you know what? We like working with Homeland Security 

and I think it is just a matter of us having a few more conversations. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Let me ask you, have you talked with DHS at all 

about what type of oversight, what type of auditing, what type 

of—— 

Ms. LUCE. Yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. Structure they are going to have to 

ensure that your card isn’t counterfeited or isn’t—have you already 

begun that discussion even though you don’t have in writing that 

actually it meets their standard of REAL ID? 

Ms. LUCE. Not for REAL ID, but when we came up with the 

EDL, yes, we had to find out what kinds of things we were going 

to do. Like I mentioned, we had to have our employees have a Federal background check. They have never had that before. 

They had to go through document training. Then we had a series 

of things that we had to meet and they come out and they do audit 

us, and we have right now about 25,000 appointments. We have 

issued over 9,000 licenses, and this since February 1. 

So there is a demand out there and we are happy to help our citizens have a low-cost easy way to cross the border and keep good 

relations with our Canadian neighbors and still have economy and 

trade to occur. 

So we are real pleased. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Well, as somebody who comes from a State 

that has a border, that is—— 

Ms. LUCE. Yes. We have been actually in conversation with the 

California DMV. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great, because it is always important to not reinvent the wheel and use lessons learned and best practices and 

that is why I am asking you and getting these answers for the 

record, because we want to implement, as soon as possible, in the 

safest manners possible, all of these cards and issues. 

Mr. Phillips, I have a question for you. 

It is important that DHS and the State Department do not implement WHTI without consulting local communities. 

What type of discussion has your organization had with DHS? Do 

you feel that they have incorporated your ideas or thoughts or concerns and that they were considered in and are reflected in the 

final rule? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Yes, ma’am. From the beginning, I was involved in 

the April 5, 2005 announcement of the Western Hemisphere Travel 

Initiative and right after that, we began to interact with both DHS 

and State Department, and I can factually report to you that 

Frank, who was here earlier today, and Woody have come up to the 

northern border, from east to west. 

We have had DHS from Alaska to Washington State all the way 

over to the eastern end of New York State. Whenever we have 

asked them to come and hear our concerns, discuss things, we sup-
64 

port—I head up the border work group for PENWA on the western 

end of the country. 

We support what Liz has been doing. Liz came to Anchorage. 

DHS is there. Michael Chertoff came up himself in one instance. 

So I find them very open to discussion. My biggest concern, Congresswoman, was the fact that I think the press tended to hijack 

this announcement and made it sound like it was for the bad guys 

and it is a passport and it is a bad thing, and it should have been 

and should be today a public outreach that says this is an intent 

to take low-risk people, give them a secure document and facilitate 

their ability to cross the border into Mexico-United States and into 

Canada-United States. 

That is the bottom line. The misperception out there is very still 

a bit negative, although we are beginning to go positive, I think. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In respect to the final rule, Department of Homeland Security estimates its foregone border crossing, attributable to 

WHTI, is less than 1 percent impact on the regional economy. 

Do you agree with that analysis? In other words, once we get 

WHTI done and everything, that it is going to have less than 1 percent impact? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. The perception here is that when it started, the 

concern you have is will people stop traveling and, again, this 

misperception has caused a very terrible disconnect in tourism and 

visitation since 2005. 

People don’t understand. They thought they had to have a passport to cross the land border when the air rule started. So there 

has been a disconnect. There has been negativism, more serious 

than one could understand. 

But once it is implemented, it is not going to be a negative. It 

is going to be a positive for the local economies and I believe that 

this passage of time I just talked about—think about 65 minutes 

to 8 minutes, the gas that is saved, the gallons, thousands, millions 

of gallons of gas, the time of the public, the fact that the bad guys 

are going to be more caught than they are today, and the fact that 

trade and purchasing and buying and visitation and tourism will 

be enhanced. 

I think it is going to be a positive effect. When you do your posteconomic study, I believe that if you look at WHTI in 2010 and 

2011, you are going to find a very positive effect, not a negative 

one, in my belief. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Kephart, do you have any comments on that? 

Ms. KEPHART. On what WHTI’s effects on the local economy? My 

belief has always been, coming out of the Commission, our emphasis was always on facilitation of the low-risk traveler and maximizing our ability to catch the high-risk or the terrorist or the 

criminal. 

In terms of the effect on the local economy, I think I have to 

agree with Mr. Phillips that once you start a very much more efficient process, remember, we have had serious inefficiencies on our 

borders for two decades. 

Once we get technology that can work together better and we 

have programs where people can enroll and make their way 

through the borders quicker—and DHS just rolled out this past 
65 

week the new global entry, which will be an expedited traveler for 

the international traveler, the U.S. citizen. 

These programs all go a long way to really, I think, helping us 

be efficient in our border control. There is nothing more important 

to us than giving the border inspector time to inspect the people 

that really need to be inspected. 

So I think these are good things all around. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Thank you. 

Well, those are the questions that I have had. I am sure that the 

members who were not here are going to have some questions for 

you and they will be submitting them in writing to you. I hope that 

you will get to them quickly and turn them around to us. 

I thank you for your valuable testimony and your time today. 

Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(67) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN LORETTA SANCHEZ FOR KATHLEEN KRANINGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, SCREENING COORDINATION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. In your testimony, you stated that the Western Hemisphere Travel 

Initiative (WHTI) land and sea final rule reflects extensive consultation with stakeholders including border communities. What are the major differences between the 

Proposed Rule and the Final Rule published last month? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Without RFID readers at the hundreds of other ports of entry into 

the United States, most of the WHTI-compliant cards would essentially be flash 

passes. What is the schedule for providing RFID readers to our ports of entry? What 

is the process for reviewing a traveler’s documents if the RFID readers are unavailable? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. Both the Departments of Homeland Security and State are launching 

robust communications campaigns for WHTI implementation at land POEs. Can you 

describe specifically what you have planned and what you are doing different to prevent the mass confusion about the immediate need for passports that occurred during implementation of WHTI for air travel? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. The success of WHTI will be contingent, in part, on the ability of the 

Department to carry out a number of activities in the year leading up to full implementation on June 1, 2009. With the change of administrations occurring in the 

near future, many policies and procedures might change at the Department. What 

guidance do you have in place to ensure a successful transition for WHTI? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. The committee has been informed by both information technology specialists and privacy advocates that the RFID technology used in some of the WHTIcompliant documents is vulnerable to ‘‘skimming’’ and other security breaches. 

Nonetheless, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has certified this technology to meet or exceed the relevant security standards and best 

practices as specified in statute. What certifications made by NIST demonstrate that 

WHTI-compliant travel documents are not vulnerable to ‘‘skimming’’? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN LORETTA SANCHEZ FOR ROBERT JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR, TRAVELER SECURITY AND FACILITATION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER

PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. In your testimony, you stated that the Western Hemisphere Travel 

Initiative (WHTI) land and sea final rule reflects extensive consultation with stakeholders including border communities. What are the major differences between the 

Proposed Rule and the Final Rule published last month? 

Answer. As stated in the Proposed Rule, the Department was very interested in 

comments on alternative approaches for specific groups of travelers. The policy decisions in the Final Rule reflect the input DHS received from the public and stakeholders. The changes for specific groups of travelers include: the full development 

of special provisions for children under 16 years of age and groups of children under 

19 years of age. In the final rule, U.S. and Canadian children under 16 will be required to present only proof of citizenship. Groups of children, ages 18 and under, 

who are traveling with parental consent with public or private school groups, religious groups, social or cultural organizations, or teams associated with youth sport 

organizations that arrive at U.S. sea or land ports-of-entry in an official group and 

accompanied by an adult affiliated with the organization, will only be required to 
68 

present proof of citizenship. DHS also committed in the final rule to work with federally recognized Native American tribes and communities on the development of 

a WHTI-compliant enhanced tribal card. DHS also agreed to accept the INAC (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) card issued by the government of Canada when 

presented by Canadians seeking to enter the United States. Additionally, DHS will 

work with the States and Canadian provinces on the development of enhanced driver’s licenses as WHTI-compliant documents. 

Question 2. Without RFID readers at the hundreds of other ports of entry into 

the United States, most of the WHTI-compliant cards would essentially be flash 

passes. What is the schedule for providing RFID readers to our ports of entry? What 

is the process for reviewing a traveler’s documents if the RFID readers are unavailable? 

Answer. Currently, CBP has technology in place at virtually all air, land and sea 

ports of entry that will read any travel document with a machine-readable zone, including passports, border crossing cards, trusted traveler cards and the new passport card. All CBP officers are currently trained in the use of this technology. This 

means our ports of entry can accept passports, passport cards and all WHTI-compliant documents today. 

In preparation for full implementation, DHS awarded a contract on January 10, 

2008, to begin the process of deploying vicinity RFID facilitative technology and infrastructure to 354 vehicle primary lanes at 39 high-volume land ports, which process 95 percent of land border traveler crossings. Site surveys will be completed by 

the end of May 2008. This summer, we will begin construction at land border locations with the installation of the integrated solution commencing shortly thereafter. 

Deployment will continue with completion scheduled for spring 2009. 

Question 3. Both the Departments of Homeland Security and State are launching 

robust communications campaigns for WHTI implementation at land POEs. Can you 

describe specifically what you have planned and what you are doing different to prevent the mass confusion about the immediate need for passports that occurred during implementation of WHTI for air travel? 

Answer. DHS is keenly aware of the impact these very important issues have on 

local communities and their economies. CBP remains committed to ensuring a 

smooth transition and mitigating any negative impact on legitimate trade and travel. DHS has moved aggressively to ensure that key audiences are aware of the new 

policies, and of the rationale behind them as part of our ongoing effort to make 

America’s borders even more secure and to ensure that commerce is not unnecessarily impeded by these important changes. 

The outreach initiative will accelerate and expand in the coming weeks and 

months. We are mindful that WHTI can represent a significant social and cultural 

change for border communities, and that it is in our best interest to use this change 

as an opportunity to encourage trade and travel, which are vital to the economic 

interests of the United States as well as our neighbors. 

On February 4, 2008, CBP awarded a Public Relations Contract to Elevation, 

LTD., to alert and educate audiences in both the United States and Canada about 

upcoming modifications. The Public Relations firm will create a comprehensive plan 

to proactively communicate the new requirements and document options to the traveling public. We estimate the contract to be worth $10–$15 million over the next 

several years. 

CBP will utilize a variety of tools in this sustained campaign, including paid advertising, public service announcements, press conferences and grassroots outreach, 

and consumer-friendly materials as well as leverage existing stakeholder partnerships. The design and execution of this campaign will raise traveler awareness 

across the Nation about secure and standard documents with facilitative technologies, and while ultimately soliciting compliance and ensuring a smooth transition to full WHTI requirements. 

The immediate strategy of the communications plan is to conduct border events 

in summer 2008 with a ‘‘Know Before You Go’’ summer travel theme, including advertising WHTI-compliant documents and advising border communities of planned 

radio frequency identification (RFID) infrastructure construction. As we know, increased summer travel can produce increased wait times. Our intent through this 

program (as we have done in past years) is to remind the traveling public of that 

fact and encourage them to take steps that help minimize any potential delays— 

while also demonstrating that CBP is moving aggressively to make the process 

smoother, and less time-consuming, in future years while also greatly enhancing 

border security. 

An advertising campaign will be launched later this year to reach the broader national audience that includes infrequent or would-be travelers. Joint press conferences will also be conducted with various States as enhanced driver’s licenses be-
69 

come available, beginning with New York in August 2008. Communication activities 

will be planned in coordination with the Department of State and the production 

of the passport card, and will be shared with Canadian counterparts to ensure that 

messages are aligned. 

Moreover, when assessing efforts by DHS and CBP to ensure a smooth transition 

of these critical changes on our borders, the following factors must be considered: • DHS published the land and sea rule more than 1 year in advance of the implementation date to give the public ample notice and time to obtain the WHTIcompliant documents they will need to enter or re-enter the United States on 

or after June 1, 2009. • The WHTI air implementation in January 2007, and the change in land and 

sea travel document procedures that went into effect January 31, 2008, has 

demonstrated the traveling public’s willingness to obtain the proper documents. 

DHS and CBP have applied lessons learned, including the need to disperse demand more evenly for travel documents, as well as the production of two additional document options—the enhanced driver’s license and the passport card 

specifically designed for land and sea travel. • DHS and CBP are confident that the passport card, with more than 290,000 applications received by the Department of State, and the enhanced driver’s licenses being offered or to be offered by several States, will serve as the costeffective, convenient alternatives that were requested throughout the rulemaking process. 

Question 4. The success of WHTI will be contingent, in part, on the ability of the 

Department to carry out a number of activities in the year leading up to full implementation on June 1, 2009. With the change of administrations occurring in the 

near future, many policies and procedures might change at the Department. What 

guidance do you have in place to ensure a successful transition for WHTI? 

Answer. DHS and the Department of State have put many steps in place to ensure the complete implementation of WHTI by June 1, 2009. 

WHTI is the plan to implement both a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission 

and Section 7209 of the IRTPA, passed by Congress and signed by the President. 

Implementing WHTI is a law—one that the change of administration will not impact. When the new administration takes office in January 2009, the air phase of 

WHTI will have been in place for 2 years (since January 2007). There has been little, if any, negative impact on travel as a result of its implementation and there 

is no doubt that the passport requirement for air travelers entering the United 

States will remain in place. Likewise, steps have been taken, and additional actions 

will continue, to ensure the June 1, 2009 deadline will be met for WHTI in the land 

and sea environments. WHTI is necessary to increase security at our borders and 

facilitate travel and trade. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is ensuring that multiple types of 

WHTI-compliant documents will be available in ample time for U.S. and Canadian 

citizens to obtain them before June 1, 2009; CBP has the infrastructure in place to 

read passports, passport cards, and WHTI-compliant documents; and we have a 

communications plan underway to educate the public over the next year about what 

documents they will need, and when they will need them. 

At a higher level, both DHS and CBP have transition plans in place to ensure 

that all of our operations continue without impediment into the new administration. 

DHS senior-level career executives have already been identified as successors until 

Presidential appointees are named. As the transition between administrations is a 

period when there is typically an increase in possible terrorist activity, the continued implementation of a program that provides additional security at our borders, 

such as WHTI, is imperative. 

Question 5. The committee has been informed by both information technology specialists and privacy advocates that the RFID technology used in some of the WHTIcompliant documents is vulnerable to ‘‘skimming’’ and other security breaches. 

Nonetheless, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has certified this technology to meet or exceed the relevant security standards and best 

practices as specified in statute. What certifications made by NIST demonstrate that 

WHTI-compliant travel documents are not vulnerable to ‘‘skimming’’? 

Answer. The NIST certification applies only to the security and privacy of the 

card architecture, as specified in statute. NIST paid special attention to the privacy 

recommendations from the Data Privacy & Integrity Advisory Committee to the Secretary and Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Security. As a result, recommendations from the NIST analysis have been incorporated into the 

passport card design, which include permalocking of the RFID chip to prevent alteration of data contained within the chip itself, and the issuance of an RFID attenuation sleeve to prevent unauthorized reading (or ‘‘skimming’’) of a WHTI-compliant 
70 

RFID enabled travel document. The Sandia National Laboratories conducted tests 

on the effectiveness of the RFID attenuation sleeve in accordance with the NIST 

certification. 

The NIST analysis concluded that the Department of State passport card neither 

has, nor requires, a security objective to prevent counterfeiting of the RFID chip in 

isolation. It should be noted that in the unlikely event a card is ‘‘skimmed’’ by an 

unauthorized RFID reader, the following data would be made available as a result: 

00101100001010000011010100111101010110010100101[ . . . ] 

The above series of ‘‘zeros and ones’’ represents actual real data contained within 

a WHTI-compliant RFID enabled travel document; simply translated, the data represents a number. There is no personal identifying information contained within the 

chip, and unlike the e-passport implementation, there is no photo, no biometric, no 

name or any other biographic information about the holder; simply a series of zeros 

and ones, meaningless to anyone trying to obtain personal information. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN LORETTA SANCHEZ FOR DERWOOD K. STAEBEN, 

SENIOR ADVISOR, WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Question 1. Several reports in the media recently called into question the overseas 

component of the supply chain and manufacturing process for passports. Can you 

discuss what protocols you have in place so that our CBP officers know they are 

looking at an authentic American passport? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. It is my understanding the passport cards will contain RFID technology and microchips similar to passports. What is the manufacturing process for 

the passport cards? Will the passport cards also be partly manufactured overseas? 

If so, what type of oversight will the State Department have over the process to ensure the security and integrity of the cards? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. In anticipation of increasing demand for passports and passport cards 

due to WHTI implementation, does the fiscal year 2009 budget request include the 

necessary resources to ensure that both passports and passport cards are processed 

within the normal 6-week timeframe? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. What formal plans are in place by the State Department to disseminate information to the traveling public regarding the final implementation requirements for WHTI at land and sea ports? What resources are included in the State 

Department’s fiscal year 2009 budget request to fully inform the traveling public 

about these document changes? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. News reports indicated that the initial contract for the PASS cards 

was awarded to General Dynamics but was later terminated and given to L–1. What 

caused the change in contractors? Is there a difference in services provided by the 

two contractors? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 6. During the hearing, you told Ms. Christensen that ‘‘none of the final 

offers included an optical memory strip for testing.’’ It is our understanding that one 

of the cards proposed by General Dynamics did include an optical stripe. Did General Dynamics propose a card with an optical stripe? If so please reconcile this with 

your statement. 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 7. You further told Ms. Christensen that ‘‘you submitted all the test 

cards to a full battery of tests at Sandia National Labs.’’ Please explain in detail 

the tests conducted by Sandia and their purpose. 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 8. Did any person, company, or organization other than Sandia conduct 

adversarial or other testing to evaluate the various cards’ security features? If so, 

what cards were tested, who conducted this testing, and what where the findings 

and recommendations? 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 

Question 9. Are you aware of any testing suggesting that optical memory stripe 

(OMS) technology interferers with or otherwise impedes the performance of Radio 

Frequency Identification Technology? If so, please tell us who conducted this testing, 

what the results showed. 

Answer. No response was received at the time of publication. 
71 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN LORETTA SANCHEZ FOR ELIZABETH LUCE, DIRECTOR, 

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING

Question 1. What advice do you have for other States that have entered or may 

be entering into a MOU with the Department of Homeland Security for the development of enhanced drivers’ licenses (EDLs)? 

Answer. Each State should review the DHS minimum requirements, conduct a 

gap analysis of capacity compared to DHS requirements and negotiate exceptions 

to problematic requirements with DHS. The State should make sure DHS fully understands the State’s license issuance process to ensure informed decisionmaking at 

the Federal level. 

Question 2. The requirements of REAL ID are imposing a significant financial 

burden on States. What type of resources and funding is the State of Washington 

dedicating to its EDL program? 

Answer. At this time, we have requested and received funds through our legislature to utilize transportation funds to cover the costs of the EDL program. We received $12 million in funding to develop the program and offer the EDL program 

in 14 of Washington’s 60 licensing service offices. There is no State-level grant funding available for the EDL or WHTI programs. 

Question 3. Can you describe the level of personnel training and infrastructure 

investment the State of Washington underwent to make the EDL program possible? 

Answer. Our staff received 2 weeks of training including AAMVA certified fraudulent document training, interview technique training, and DHS–ICE Division conducted a mini-session on fraudulent document training. Another added component 

for staff processing and issuing Enhanced Drivers Licenses is Federal criminal background checks. Organizationally, we moved staff around and hired contractors to assist with information system programming. In total, we invested 33,000 hours of 

programming changes and nearly as many hours of management and logistical planning. 

We included a component of facial recognition biometrics to screen and compare 

applicant photos to others in our database to ensure we have one-driver and one 

record in Washington. An investment also was made in document authentication 

software to help screen foundational documents that customers present. 

Question 4. Looking back on the State of Washington’s experience with the EDL 

program, are there any components that you think are particularly challenging for 

States to meet or that you would like to see changed? 

Answer. Overall, the EDL program has been successful. What was helpful in the 

development of the program was conducting a gap analysis and working closely with 

DHS to help them understand our processes. We are strongly of the opinion that 

the EDL/ID is one of the most secure licensing documents in the country. Consequently, we are at a loss to understand why DHS has not identified all EDL/ID’s 

as acceptable forms of identity for all Federal purposes. 

Question 5. Now that you are moving forward with your EDL program, has DHS 

described the type of oversight that you will be subject to? What type of internal 

auditing system do you have in place to maintain the security of the cards and integrity of the personnel? 

Answer. Per discussion and agreement, DHS will conduct an independent audit 

of the program sometime after implementation. Within DOL, we have a unit that 

conducted an internal audit of the program and will provide continued support and 

feedback to look at best practices and opportunities for the Department. 

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