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40–509 PDF 2008

S. Hrg. 110–421 

PRIORITIZING MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTING 

CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICERS AT 

FEDERAL AGENCIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 13, 2007 

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

THOMAS RICHARDS, Professional Staff Member 

JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, Minority Staff Director 

THERESA PRYCH, Minority Professional Staff Member 

EMILY MARTHALER, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2007 

Hon. Clay Johnson III, Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management and Budget .................................................................................................. 4 

Hon. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States .................... 6 

Paul A. Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Business Transformatin, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................................... 9 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Brinkley, Paul A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Johnson, Hon. Clay III: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 23 

Walker, Hon. David M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25 

APPENDIX 

Background .............................................................................................................. 52 

GAO Report entitled ‘‘Organizational Transformation, Implementing Chief 

Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer Positions in Federal Agencies,’’ 

GAO–08–34, November 2007 .............................................................................. 58 

(1) 

PRIORITIZING MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTING 

CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICERS AT 

FEDERAL AGENCIES 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2007 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:17 a.m., in 

Room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. 

Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. This hearing will come to order. 

Good morning, everyone. I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses to this hearing on establishing a Chief Management Officer at Federal agencies to address human capital, business transformation, financial management, and strategic planning 

challenges across the Federal Government. 

Senator Voinovich and I have been working with agencies for 

years, and we have been working well together. He has been a 

champion, too, of human capital, and we are still trying to work 

some things out—and, of course, all of this with the hope that we 

can make things better for our country. 

We have been working together for years to resolve management 

challenges and encourage agency leaders to prioritize management. 

Hearing after hearing has shown that strong agency leadership 

that places a priority on management results in improved agency 

performance. 

An agency’s main focus must be its mission. However, agencies 

tend to overlook the importance of strong and sustained management in their operational goals. As a result, agencies often fail to 

meet their mission in the most efficient and effective way. 

Using the ongoing war in Iraq as an example, it is clear that 

strong leadership and efficient management are essential to supporting the war fighter. We also need strong leadership and efficient management throughout the Federal Government to support 

the critical efforts of agencies to meet their missions. 

2 

I believe that a CMO, a high-level official in charge of a department or agency’s business operations, can help improve overall effectiveness and enable the agency to better meet its mission. This 

would not complicate the existing bureaucracy; rather, I believe 

that elevating the issues of strategic planning, human capital, and 

business transformation to a higher level will provide management 

issues the priority they deserve, and this has become clear. In the 

past, people who have sought to assume that position at a lower 

level have not been able to make any difference. 

Last year, our Subcommittee asked the Government Accountability Office to evaluate how CMOs have been established in the 

public and private sector and to develop criteria and strategies for 

establishing CMOs across the Federal Government. As we will hear 

from the Comptroller General, establishing a CMO and providing 

them with the necessary authority can improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of any organization, especially large, complex departments. 

On September 18, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates designated Deputy Secretary for Defense Gordon England as the Chief 

Management Officer at the Department of Defense. I believe Secretary England is a strong leader and a good choice to serve as 

CMO. Also, I am pleased to see the Department elevate the importance of management to the deputy level. I look forward to seeing 

the progress made at DOD to improve its business operations. 

However, in a little more than a year, the Federal Government 

will face a Presidential transition, and Secretary Gates and Secretary England likely will leave their posts. We need to ensure that 

their management efforts do not disappear by making management 

part of the institutional framework at the Defense Department and 

other Federal agencies. Structures need to be developed that will 

stay in place from one Administration to the next. GAO recommends that the establishment of a CMO at Federal agencies be 

codified. I agree. Earlier this year, the President signed into law 

a provision to create a CMO at the Department of Homeland Security as part of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations bill. There 

is also a provision to codify a CMO and Deputy CMO at the Department of Defense included in the fiscal year 2008 defense authorization conference report. 

But these are just first steps in a long process of improving management accountability at agencies. 

The continuity of management and business operations is also 

critical. A CMO could be that link between Administrations. One 

of GAO’s recommendations is to have a 5- to 7-year term appointment so that management can remain a constant high-level focus 

of an agency outside the political process. I think this is an idea 

that we need to explore very seriously. 

GAO examined the impact, both positive and negative, that codifying such a position would have on the management of departments. I believe that GAO’s recommendations provide sound criteria for agencies to begin establishing CMOs. I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses on how they see the establishment of 

CMOs as part of the overall management strategy for the government. 

3 

And now I would like to call on our Ranking Member for his 

statement. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the things that I think the public does not comprehend 

when they see Democrats and Republicans in the Senate and it 

does not seem like they are able to get along with each other, is 

that there are some really wonderful things that are happening in 

the various committees of the U.S. Senate. I have been blessed 

with the partnership of Senator Akaka. We work together on an 

agenda and we are staying with some of the themes that we have 

been working on for years because we realized that if you do not 

continue to oversee them, you are not going to get the progress that 

you would like to get. 

I would like to thank David Walker for all of the cooperation and 

help that he has given to us this year; and Clay Johnson, who I 

think has done an outstanding job. Clay Johnson, when I came 

here, I said there was no ‘‘M’’ in OMB. You have brought ‘‘M’’ back 

to OMB. I think the fact that even though there may be differences 

of opinion on occasion between GAO and OMB, the two of you 

working together, particularly on strategic plans to remedy some of 

the management problems in our Federal Government. So I just 

want you to know how much I admire you and appreciate your 

service and what you have done and continue to do for our country. 

Mr. Brinkley, I know that our friend Gordon England would be 

here today, but he is overseas. We are pleased that you are here 

because you are the person that is really on the firing line in terms 

of transformation, and we are looking forward to hearing from you 

today. 

I think it is through strong partnerships, whether between Senator Akaka and myself or between the Executive and Legislative 

Branches, that we really achieve reform and transformation of the 

Federal Government for the benefit of the American people. And, 

again, a lot of the stuff that we do does not happen in these hearings. It is in meetings with you individually and our offices. In fact, 

sometimes, Senator Akaka, I would say that the meetings in the 

offices are better than the hearings. And I suspect maybe you feel 

the same way about that, too. 

Having focused intently the last few years on CMOs at the Department of Defense and at Homeland Security, Senator Akaka 

and I have asked General Walker to look at these positions. We focused on DOD and DHS because the management challenges of 

these large agencies are daunting. I think I have mentioned to Clay 

Johnson on occasion that if we went back and looked at the creation of DHS, mergin 22 agencies with over 200,000 people, on reflection that may not have been the best thing that we could have 

done at the time. And it has presented some unique management 

challenges, because of trying to bring these departments together 

and to create a different culture. It has been tough. 

I think it is well known that the Department of Defense has had 

challenges on the high-risk list for a long time—eight specific to 

the Department, and then six government-wide. The public expects 

us to work harder and smarter and do more with less. 

4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 23. 

There is no question in my mind that we really have some challenges in both the Department of Homeland Security and Defense. 

How well they function has a great deal to do with our main responsibility, securing our national and homeland defense. 

I would like to say that I applaud Secretary Gates for taking the 

steps to name a Chief Management Officer, the designation of the 

existing Deputy Secretary. But I do not think it gets the job done. 

I think if you really look at the responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary, it is not going to get the attention that it needs, particularly 

in an agency as vital to this country as the Defense Department. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 

I want to echo what the Senator has just said in gratitude to our 

witnesses, Paul Brinkley, Clay Johnson, and Comptroller General 

Walker, for the years that you have been here, your expertise, your 

experiences, and how you have helped us to try to think about 

what we are trying to do to improve the accountability and management of our systems. And so I, too, am very appreciative of that, 

I want you to know. It is good to have Mr. Brinkley here and joining our efforts with the Department of Defense in this. 

Let me then mention and introduce our witnesses this morning: 

Clay Johnson, Deputy Director for Management, White House Office of Management and Budget; David Walker, Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office; and Paul Brinkley, Deputy 

Under Secretary for Defense, Business Transformation, Department of Defense. 

As the three of you know, our rules require that all witnesses 

testify under oath, so would you please rise and raise your right 

hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 

give the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do. 

Mr. WALKER. I do. 

Mr. BRINKLEY. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let it be noted in the 

record that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Welcome again, and before we begin, I want you all to know that 

although your oral statements are limited to 5 minutes, your full 

written statements will be included in the record. So, Mr. Johnson, 

will you please proceed with your statement? 

TESTIMONY OF HON. CLAY JOHNSON III,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

FOR MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator Akaka, Senator Voinovich, thank you for 

having us. 

I would like to say that my whole job is focused on helping the 

Federal Government spend the taxpayers’ money effectively and 

better every year. The Executive Branch needs to do more towards 

this goal, as well as the Legislative Branch. 

We just issued Executive Order 13450 calling for this, declaring 

it to be the policy of the Federal Government, and calling for the 

head of the agency to set up certain functions within the agency 

to make this happen. This is something we need to make sure that 

5 

your staff understands because it might have some bearing and 

provoke some thinking about how to help all agencies become more 

effective. And we would be glad to share with you what the concept 

is and how we are going to go about implementing this. 

Let me be very clear. I do not believe that any agency, including 

DOD, needs a second Deputy to help it perform better. Let me add 

also that the majority of the participants in the forum on this subject that Mr. Walker and GAO held last spring felt the same way. 

There were present and past Deputy Secretaries of Defense. There 

were other management luminaries from the area. And the majority, a significant majority of the people felt like a second Deputy 

was not a good idea. 

I believe that the thing that needs to happen for DOD or any 

agency to get something done is the following four things: 

They need to have a very clear definition of what they are trying 

to accomplish. What is the definition of ‘‘success’’ for supply chain 

management at Defense, for financial management, for acquisition 

management? What is the plan for accomplishing it? What is a reasonably aggressive plan? What is the time frame for that? And, by 

the way, all of this needs to be agreed to by GAO, DOD, and the 

relevant people at OMB. So clear goals, a clear plan for getting 

there. It needs to be clearly defined who is accountable for each of 

the component parts of that plan. And then it needs to be really 

clear to everybody involved that this is important, that the head 

person, the Secretary, the President for that matter, and Congress 

really wants this to happen. Those four things. 

I do not believe that DOD needs a second Deputy to make these 

things happen. In fact, let me point out two facts that I think are 

relevant to this. 

Currently, without a second Deputy, DOD—Paul and Beth 

McGrath, and the Transformation Office—working with GAO, 

working with OMB, has developed acceptable—or is developing acceptable goals of definitions of success. What does supply chain 

management mean at DOD? What does good financial management 

mean at DOD? 

So they, without a second Deputy, have clear goals. They have 

developed clear action plans for accomplishing those goals in an appropriately aggressive time frame. 

They have defined who is accountable for accomplishing each of 

the component parts, not the Army, not this office, but Joe, Mary, 

whatever. 

And the Secretary has made it clear that this is important. So 

without a second Deputy, they have done, I think they are in the 

process or are accomplishing the four things that I say have to 

exist. 

The key—and I have expressed this to Gordon England—is how 

aggressively he holds the people involved accountable for doing 

what they say they are going to do, for implementing the plan as 

desired. 

The key in my mind, in terms of accountability, is how accountable are the career managers held. Right now, SES, the Senior Executive professionals at DOD and at all agencies, are help accountable. They are required to be held accountable and evaluated on 

the performance of their programs per the—I forgot what the name 

6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Walker appears in the Appendix on page 25. 

of the bill was called, but you all were instrumental in passing that 

legislation 5 years ago, 4 years ago or so. 

So there are mechanisms, there is legislation that says SES are 

to be evaluated on the performance of their programs. So the mechanisms exist, and it is now for the head of the agency—and if an 

additional support staff is required to make this happen, to help 

him or her do that, so be it. But this is happening at DOD. There 

are clear definitions of what they are trying to accomplish. There 

are clear plans for doing it. There is clear accountability, and it has 

been made clear to everybody that this is important, without a second Deputy. Now they have to do what they say they are going to 

do. 

The second relevant fact to this debate, to this hearing, is that 

all the termed positions that are referenced in GAO’s analysis are 

the heads of separate operating units. None of the positions that 

are termed—that are talked about in the analysis are involved in 

operational transformation across the board at an agency. So there 

is no precedent today in the Federal Government for what is embodied in the concept of a second Deputy at Defense focusing on 

how well the Defense Department is managed. And that to me 

should speak volumes. There might be a reason for that, which is 

over time people have not felt that was the way to go. DOD, every 

agency, Homeland Security, Interior Department, Labor Department, need to be held accountable for how effectively they spend 

the taxpayers’ money. We can hold—Congress can do a better job 

of holding them accountable. Senior management—the President 

can do a better job of holding senior management of every agency 

accountable. We do not need a second Deputy, in my opinion, to 

make that happen. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions at the end of 

everybody’s statements. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. Mr. Walker. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER,1 COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich. It is a pleasure to be back before you. 

Clay Johnson is a good friend, and we work together very constructively on 95 percent of the issues. And even areas where we 

disagree, we are not disagreeable when we do that. But I have to 

correct for the record a couple of things that Clay Johnson just 

said. 

One, two of the positions in the summary are Chief Operating 

Officer positions. They are not heads of separate business units. 

Two, the government is a lag indicator. The Federal Government 

is no model to be followed for economy, efficiency, effectiveness, 

ethics, and equity. And the mere fact that we do not have these positions now is part of the problem. We need to resolve that problem. 

Three, we did not take a vote at the forum on whether or not a 

majority of the people supported a second Deputy or not. There was 

a significant majority who supported the need for a CMO, but there 

7 

1GAO Report entitled ‘‘Organizational Transformation, Implementing Chief Operating Officer/ 

Chief Management Officer Positions in Federal Agencies,’’ GAO–08–34, November 2007 appears 

in the Appendix on page 58. 

is a different issue as to how you accomplish that, whether you designate an existing person or you create a new position, what you 

call that new position, what level that position is. 

So I just wanted to state that. Now, let me, if I can, summarize 

the key information that is in the report. 

We have released a report today that talks about the experiences 

of several organizations that have COOs and CMOs at the request 

of this Subcommittee in order to try to analyze different attributes 

associated with those positions.1 I believe very strongly that the 

Federal Government—not only because of existing high-risk areas 

but because of our clear, growing, and imprudent unsustainable fiscal path—needs to do things differently. We need to think about 

what the government ought to be doing, how it ought to be doing 

it, and who ought to be doing it. And we need to manage this government very differently than we have. 

The simple fact of the matter is that a vast majority of people 

who come into government do so to focus on policy issues, not operational issues. The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of 

people who come into government do not stay in government very 

long. And the fact of the matter is that a vast majority of the challenges that this government faces are basic management and operational issues that require professionals who can focus on it in a 

sustained manner, both within and in some circumstances between 

Administrations, because it will take years to be able to effectively 

address. 

Just yesterday morning, I spent time with one of the key executives at IBM who was in charge for IBM’s business transformation 

effort in the systems area. Phase 1 took 10 years. Let me restate 

that. Phase 1 of IBM’s systems and other transformation efforts 

took 10 years. Now they are working on Phase 2, which started in 

2003. So even in the private sector, you are talking about initiatives that are extremely complex and take a long time. 

In addition to the work that we did that is summarized in our 

report, we held a roundtable in 2002 to talk about the COO and 

CMO concept, and there were several key points that came out of 

that. There was a need to elevate attention on management issues 

and transformational change. There was a need to integrate various key management and transformation efforts. And there was a 

need to institutionalize accountability for addressing management 

issues and leading transformational change in government. 

Now, let me say I think every agency needs a CMO, but I think 

in most cases that CMO could be the Deputy Secretary or the Deputy Administrator, and so we are talking about looking at this 

issue on a facts and circumstances basis, applying those facts and 

circumstances in reaching different judgments about whether or 

not it is an existing position or person or a new one and what level 

it ought to be. 

Because each agency has its own unique set of characteristics 

and challenges and opportunities, the type of COO or CMO that 

each agency needs, I think, should vary, and here there are various 

criteria that I think should be considered: 

8 

First, the history of organizational performance, including the 

number of high-risk areas. 

Second, the degree of organizational change needed. 

Third, the nature and complexity of the agency’s or department’s 

mission. 

Fourth, the organization’s size and structure of the entity. 

And, fifth, the current leadership, talent, and focus, among other 

things. 

We also identified six key strategies that can be useful in implementing COO and CMO positions in the Federal Government, and 

those are: (1) to define the specific roles and responsibilities of the 

position; (2) to ensure that the position has a high level of authority and clearly delineated reporting relationships; (3) to foster good 

executive-level working relationships for maximum effectiveness; 

(4) to establish integration and transformation structures and processes in addition to merely having a COO or CMO; (5) to promote 

individual accountability and performance through specific job 

qualification requirements and effective performance management 

techniques, including performance contracts as appropriate; and (6) 

to provide for continuity of leadership in the COO and CMO position. 

Now, let me touch for a minute—if I may, Mr. Chairman, and I 

appreciate your indulgence—on DOD. Gordon England is one of the 

most capable executives I have ever met. This is not an issue of 

Gordon England. The problem is many of the debates have been focused on an individual. This is not about an individual. This is 

about an institution—the Department of Defense. 

We have no guarantees as to what type of individual the next 

Deputy Secretary of Defense will be. I am not going to mention any 

names, but there were a number of Deputy Secretaries of Defense 

over the past 20 years or 30 years that clearly were not CMOs and 

could not be CMOs and, quite frankly, did not give a hoot about 

business issues and transformation issues. We are talking about a 

serious challenge that faces this government, in particular DOD, 

DHS, and the intelligence community, and we need to start taking 

it seriously. 

A lot of people that have opinions on this, quite frankly, have a 

fundamental conflict of interest. That fundamental conflict of interest needs to be considered. I think it is unfortunate that this Administration has not looked at this as an opportunity to institutionalize and to perpetuate the many good management initiatives 

that it has undertaken. And I agree with that, this Administration 

has taken management seriously, and I want to compliment Clay 

Johnson and his colleagues on this. These represent opportunities 

to institutionalize and to perpetuate it, because let me tell you 

what is going to happen. A lot of these key management transformation positions are not going to get filled right away in the 

next Administration, whoever it is. We are going to lose momentum. And we do not know what kind of people are going to fill 

them. And I think it is incumbent upon not just the Executive 

Branch but the Legislative Branch to think about what can be done 

to maximize the chance that we can do things differently to improve performance, to assure accountability, and to discontinue billions and billions and billions of dollars of waste that occurs every 

9 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Brinkley appears in the Appendix on page 43. 

year just within the Defense Department alone. That is of critical 

importance, and it increases with the passage of time. 

And so I am more than happy to answer any questions that you 

might have. These are one of the few areas where we have a strong 

disagreement, but you know what they say, Mr. Chairman. It takes 

patience, persistence, and perseverance, and ultimately pain, before 

you prevail. Prevail we must. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker. Mr. 

Brinkley, your statement, please. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL A. BRINKLEY,1 DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. BRINKLEY. Yes, Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich, it 

is obviously an honor to be here today. I thank you for the time 

and the opportunity to speak to you regarding our efforts. 

I also want to acknowledge the honor to share the desk here with 

Mr. Walker and Mr. Johnson, whose passion you have already 

heard this morning for the subject matter. I benefit from that passion with great regularity in my private meetings with these individuals. They make their concern and their patriotic concern for 

the management of certainly the Department of Defense (DOD) 

clear to me with great clarity. 

I want to respond in my remarks to some of the things that have 

already been said so that we do not recap and perhaps buy back 

a little bit of time. 

The DOD and its mission, as you mentioned in your opening 

comments, has a primary objective to support our war fighters. 

Having spent a significant amount of time over the past 2 years 

in theater with our war fighters, I have seen firsthand where this 

really counts, making our business processes as nimble and agile 

as the business processes we as citizens now take for granted in 

our everyday lives but we do not see taking hold in government. 

An Information Age that has caused technology to evolve at a pace 

that is remarkable, government’s ability to move as quickly as 

change is taking place in the private world is absolutely critical. 

The enemies we face take advantage of Information Age technology 

every day. Our ability to adopt it, our ability to be nimble and agile 

in our business practices, has a very significant and immediate effect on national security. No one feels that more passionately than 

we do within the Department of Defense. 

I want to point out that over the past 2 years, sometimes this 

feels like we are moving to address these issues, and as Mr. Walker 

stated, he cited the IBM example. It took 10 years to transform 

IBM. If you asked someone from IBM, they will tell you that did 

not stop. They are still continuing to evolve every day. General 

Electric and other bellweather corporations that we admire as 

Americans, it takes years and years to transform into a modern entity. In the Department, the team that we have assembled in the 

Business Transformation Office, which was established at the beginning of 2005, we have worked diligently to put processes in 

place that create that same kind of concept and culture of continVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:45 Jun 26, 2008 Jkt 040509 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
10 

uous improvement, incremental progress so that when we report to 

Congress, it is not about a great thing that is going to happen 5 

years hence, but that there has been measurable, steady, incremental improvement. This is the way this works in industry. We 

have to find a way to embed that type of thinking in government. 

We have established, over the past 2 years, governance structures. Deputy Secretary England has been acting as the Chief 

Management Officer since he came. It was a very natural role for 

him to play within the Department, given his executive leadership 

roles in private industry. The established governance structures. 

The Defense Business Systems Management Committee, which 

was actually codified in the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), I believe, in 2005, has become a foundation of our management process within the Department of Defense. 

We have established in less than 2 years the Business Transformation Agency, a new entity that sits at the top of the Department to bring in world-class talent from outside and meld it with 

world-class talent from inside government, with expertise in business practices and systems to help accelerate the pace at which we 

can change longstanding ways of doing things in a government, 

and in an entity within government that has 200 years of proud 

history of delivering security to the people of the United States. 

Change is difficult when processes have been embedded for a long 

time. When those processes are embedded in an organization that 

has a proud successful history, change is even more difficult. 

So I cannot overstate that there are significant steps that have 

been taken in the past 2 years. Establishing a new Federal entity 

is not an easy thing to do. We have done that. It has delivered 

value. Programs that used to be poster children for difficulty, programs like the Defense Integrated Management of Human Resources System—DIMHRS—the Defense Travel System, these are 

programs that used to be front and center for hearings on why the 

Department cannot do things well. They are now becoming showcases for how the Department can do things well. 

We have melded non-system-related work, business process improvements, Lean Six Sigma, into the Business Transformation Office and the Business Transformation Agency—again, with Deputy 

Secretary England’s leadership. This is now driving process change, 

continuous incremental improvement. 

We deliver to the Congress an Enterprise Transition Plan. We do 

that every 6 months. We deliver an update with 6-month incremental, measurable objectives. We have hit on average 83 percent—over 80 percent of those objectives for the past 2 years. That 

is significant forward progress in our efforts. Our goal is to have 

that sustained. 

We believe we have taken steps to make this sustainable. The 

Business Transformation Agency is led by a career Senior Executive Service (SES) recruited to take on that job and carry it forward 

beyond this Administration. It is staffed with world-class people. 

We have worked with the services to embed these cultures into the 

services as well. 

Is this enough? As our overseers, you must judge this. I know 

Mr. Walker has a great deal of passion for this subject, as does Mr. 

Johnson, in terms of ensuring the progress that we have made, 

11 

which we do not argue is complete or adequate. It will never be 

adequate to the mission. Is it sufficient today, or are there additional organizational steps to be taken? And I am sure today we 

will have a good discussion about that. 

I thank you for your time, and I look forward to receiving your 

questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Brinkley. We do have 

questions for you, and right now, Senator Voinovich, I am looking 

forward to two rounds of questions. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. 

Senator AKAKA. So let me begin by directing this to Comptroller 

General David Walker. Management structures and challenges at 

all agencies are of concern to me and to many of us, not just those 

at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD. Can you 

discuss some of the challenges that you have encountered in your 

review that highlight the need for a Chief Management Officer 

(CMO) in agencies other than DHS and DOD? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. As I said before, I believe that every department and agency needs to have a designated CMO or COO. But I 

also believe that when you apply the individual facts and circumstances to the criteria that I outlined and that are included in 

the report, a significant majority of the agencies can just designate 

an existing official, for example, the Deputy Secretary. 

Now, I think it is important that when the President appoints 

Deputy Secretaries, that person keep in mind that if that is going 

to be the position that is going to be the COO/CMO position, it is 

to make sure that the person has the right type of background and 

qualifications in order to be effective and in order to be credible in 

the eyes of not just political appointees but career civil servants 

with regard to that categorization. 

I think there are some—and, in fact, I would argue a few—departments and agencies where the task is so great because of the 

number of high-risk areas, because of the complexity of the business transformation process, and because of other factors—and I 

guess one factor I would mention with regard to the Department 

of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence—is we are currently, ‘‘at 

war.’’ And we are likely to remain so for an indefinite period of 

time. And there are serious management challenges that have to 

be faced in those entities with very large stakes and consequences 

not with regard just to fiscal issues but human lives. And in most 

cases, you will find that the Deputy, whoever the Deputy is, has 

to be the alter ego to the Secretary, has to focus on some policy 

issues, and has some ceremonial duties. Deputy Secretary England 

is out of the country today, and I am sure for good reason. But the 

fact of the matter is that there are some situations where the 

stakes are so high, the risks are so great, that we need somebody 

focused. 

My view is it is not necessarily a Deputy Secretary. I think the 

Defense Business Board may have gotten it right—of which I sit 

on as an ex officio member and so does Clay Johnson. I think they 

may have gotten it right with regard to the Defense Department 

by saying a Principal Under Secretary of Defense, a Level 2 official 

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formation, with a Deputy CMO who would be there to work with 

them, I think they may have gotten it right. 

But those would be my thoughts, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson, accountability for management reforms at agencies 

is essential. I believe that it would be one of the benefits of having 

the responsibility for agency management placed in the hands of 

one CMO at a high level in a Federal agency. Do you believe that 

there is currently one person at a high level in each agency who 

is held accountable for management and transformation issues? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, and it varies by agency who that person is 

and at what level. The Department of Education, for instance, the 

person that is in charge of managing the Education Department is 

Secretary Spellings, and everybody understands how focused she is 

on it. There was a person that works for her who is not a PAS. He 

is, actually, I think a SES who used to work for Dell Computer, 

who runs all the management piece. He is a representative on the 

President’s Management Council, and everybody knows that he is 

focusing on management issues, the PMA part, performance improvement and so forth, on behalf of the Secretary. Everybody understands that. He does not need a title, he does not need Senate 

confirmation to have the stroke he needs at the Department of 

Education to get done what they need to get done. 

So it is a function of how committed the head of the agency is 

and is there somebody there to do the legwork, to pull the information together, to communicate, to make sure that those four things 

that I talked about exist, clear definitions of what we are trying to 

achieve, what our goals are—a clear plan, reasonably aggressive 

plan for getting there, time frames and so forth; clear accountability, who is responsible for which pieces; and clear reminders, 

consistent reminders that this is important, the Secretary, the head 

person wants this to happen. And Hudson LaForce is the person 

that does this. So he would be designated the Chief Management 

Officer, I guess, or what we would call the Performance Improvement Officer. 

There is somebody like that in every agency. One of the things 

that our Executive order that went out, unrelated to this hearing 

and these other considerations of a second Deputy at DOD, is to 

try to institutionalize a little bit the support structure that exists 

in every agency and try to clarify formally from the President what 

we expect every agency to do, what kind of capabilities that support structure is supposed to have. 

So we are in the process now of formalizing it, but it exists on 

an informal basis now in every agency. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Brinkley, DOD has been working hard at business transformation in its Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP). How will the 

designation of the Deputy Secretary as CMO improve the implementation of the ETP at the Department? 

Mr. BRINKLEY. Well, in the near term, as I mentioned, Deputy 

Secretary England has been acting as the CMO, so it is a bit of 

business as usual for the duration of this term. The new designation does not change his day-to-day engagement and drive, which 

has really made all the progress to date possible. 

13 

Our intent in that designation is that the next Deputy Secretary, 

there will be an enterprise transition that will be published in September 2008 that will include milestones and deliverables that will 

go through 2009 and 2010, and that this designation will help clarify that the next Deputy Secretary takes ownership. It is a handoff at that point, and the Congress and its oversight will be able 

to hold the next Administration accountable for things that are not 

political in nature but are simply ongoing management improvements. And so I believe the designation of CMO is more of a transitional support mechanism to ensure that there is not a dropped 

ball in that hand-off, and that was the intent. 

Senator AKAKA. Before I turn the questions over to Senator 

Voinovich, may I call on Mr. Walker for any further comment. 

Mr. WALKER. I would just like to quickly have a follow-up on Mr. 

Brinkley’s comments. I agree with what he said. The designation 

of Gordon England as CMO is business as usual. Now, don’t take 

me wrong. I think Gordon England has done a great job, and Paul 

Brinkley has done a commendable job. I think a number of people 

are doing very good work. But it is business as usual. It is form 

over substance. 

Second, Gordon England is gone at noon on January 20, 2009. 

And it would be interesting to know how many of the key players 

in Business Transformation are also gone on January 20 at noon 

in 2009. That is part of the problem. 

We need to recognize the reality that these are very challenging 

and difficult efforts that take years to be able to accomplish, and 

there has got to be a reasonable degree of continuity at the right 

level. 

The Defense Department is one of the most hierarchical organizations in the world. If you are in the military, you wear your rank 

on your shoulder or on your sleeve. If you are not in the military, 

your rank is known, whether you are a Presidential appointee, Senate confirmation; Presidential appointee; career civil servant; and 

if so, what level you are in the Executive Schedule. And, believe 

me, it makes a difference within the Pentagon. I have talked with 

many people that are there today and that have been there before. 

Rank matters. 

And, yes, having the Secretary’s support is critically important. 

But then, again, who is the next Secretary going to be? And are 

they going to care about management issues? We can go back to 

several past Secretaries over a number of Administrations. Some of 

them have cared about these issues, and some of them have not. 

And that is how it is likely to be in the future. 

Senator AKAKA. Before I call on Senator Voinovich, let me ask 

Mr. Johnson for any further comment. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Two comments in response to Mr. Walker’s comments. If the Secretary does not care about transforming the Department of Defense, it will never happen. I do not care whether 

you have got four deputies or eight deputies. I do not care who is 

the person under the Secretary. If the Secretary does not want it 

to happen, it is not going to happen. That is point one. 

Second, what is not gone on January 20, 2009, at noon, is the 

plan, the definition of success, the action steps and time frame by 

which the Defense Department is going to implement that plan to 

14 

achieve the goals, which are designed to be accomplished, achieved 

in some cases a couple years, in some cases 10 years, 8 years, 6 

years—the plan. And what is also not going to be gone on January 

20, 2009, is every SES manager involved in that transformation effort will have in their performance goals for that year, taken 

through the end of the fiscal year, September 30, 2009, their part 

of the implementation of the transformation plan. They will be 

evaluated by their career employees, by their career bosses, as to 

did they do this past year what they said they were going to do as 

part of their effort, the effort to transform the Department. 

So it is not true that all accountability, all focus on transformation at DOD stops on January 20, 2009. It is just not true. 

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I was mayor of Cleveland for 10 years and 

governor of Ohio for 8 years, and we undertook some significant 

systemic changes, and I can tell you it took 5 to 7 years for us to 

solve some of our key challenges. 

If you look at GAO’s high-risk list, wouldn’t you conclude, particularly at the Defense Department, so many issues on the highrisk list that someone ought to look at the way the Department is 

being managed to determine how the changes necessary are going 

to get made? 

Mr. Brinkley, how long have you been with the Defense Department? 

Mr. BRINKLEY. Since August 2004. 

Senator VOINOVICH. August 2004, and you will be one of those 

that will be gone on June 20? 

Mr. BRINKLEY. January 20, 2009. I believe noon, yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. It would seem to me that the Defense Department would want to do everything in their power to make sure 

that your good work and Ken Krieg’s good work continue and that 

the baton is not dropped during the transition. And Mr. Walker is 

right, hopefully Congress will pay more attention to the quality of 

the individuals nominated for key positions. But what I have observed is that there is sort of a revolving door, and if you would 

compare the way you run the Defense Department to IBM or some 

other major corporation, I think you would have to surmise that we 

are not designed to get the job done. That is why I think that having someone that has the qualities of Gordon England that would 

be signed off by both Republicans and Democrats and have a term. 

They would know they would have a term which would give them 

some confidence that they will have enough time to get the job 

done, which is real important when you hire someone. And you are 

going to need a pretty special person because they are probably giving up a job in the private sector that is paying them twice what 

they would get if they came to work for the Defense Department, 

someone that would command the respect of people who are in the 

civil service there. 

I fail to understand why you do not think it is good policy to have 

someone that would be in that position to guarantee that the work 

that you and Ken Krieg have done is carried out. 

Mr. BRINKLEY. Thank you, sir. Well, first of all, to your point, 

myself, my team, no one feels more strongly about making sure 

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derpinning of every decision we have made in terms of how we 

have structured reports, how we have structured management 

processes. It always is about how can we sustain given the constraints we operate with in government and given that, unlike the 

IBMs and the General Electrics and the companies of the world, we 

undergo no less than every 4 years a major turnover in many tiers 

of the leadership of the organization. That is a constraint that creates a huge amount of challenge for any Federal entity. 

And so the steps we have taken have been in many respects to 

try to create exactly what you have described. They are necessary 

steps. They were things that had we not done and a CMO or someone, a new appointee, had come in, I believe that person would 

have done as one of their first undertakings. 

The question about structure, there are many principled arguments about why creating a new structure, codifying it legislatively 

in this particular arena can be disadvantageous to the Department 

of Defense. I will only speak about the Department of Defense. 

They come on several fronts. The first is just the classic Executive 

Branch sense that we need the flexibility to structure ourselves according to the designations of the Cabinet Secretaries who are put 

in charge, and anything you do to create more structure legislatively removes flexibility in terms of their ability to organize. So 

there is an Executive Branch viewpoint that takes hold. 

The second is a managerial one, one that I tend to understand, 

and sometimes I swing back and forth in my agreement with. Business management, the best, most effective change you can drive is 

when the people who live with the operational outcome are very actively involved in the work. In the case of the Department of Defense, we have an Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization, Ken Krieg; we have a Finance organization, Under Secretary 

Jonas; a Personnel and Readiness organization, Under Secretary 

Chu. Those individuals, active, ongoing, sense of ownership, sense 

of responsibility for driving change in their space is extremely important to them. They feel that it is a part of their day-to-day operations. So one of the biggest concerns we have, which I think is 

somewhat legitimate among those organizations, is another management official who suddenly is responsible for change, strictly focusing on change, removes some of their sense of accountability for 

driving things. There is a tension, a healthy tension, between operational leaders driving change versus some central organization, 

headquarters function driving change. That is another aspect to 

this. 

So when you see the debate, it is not a resistance or a lack of 

understanding that we want to see our progress sustained. It is a 

debate about whether the steps that have been taken are sufficient. 

Are there additional steps that have to be taken? 

I will make my last comment on the high-risk list. I think you 

can divide the high-risk list into two categories: Things that we can 

justifiably look at and say these should be off the high-risk list at 

some point in the near future because we need to aggressively address the management shortcomings that place them here. Then 

there are some that I can tell you now I would be concerned as an 

American citizen if they ever come off the high-risk list. Supply 

chain management is going to evolve at a pace that will always 

16 

outstrip government. We will never see supply chain management 

in government, especially in the war-fighting arena, match what a 

world-class logistics company can do. There is a different set of objectives, a different set of performance measures, and a different 

pace. It always should be seen as high-risk. We always need to 

maintain a high degree of discipline on this. 

Weapons systems acquisition, business systems modernization, 

financial management—these are things that the pace of technology change is always going to outstrip government. Keeping a 

full court press, to use a sports metaphor, on these areas I think 

is something that is going to happen in an ongoing way. And so 

thinking of them this way I think is important as well. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to ask Mr. Walker to comment 

about what Mr. Brinkley just said. Is the Federal Government organized to take on our 21 Century challenges? Is the Senate organized to take on the challenges of the 21 Century? 

Obviously, the American people do not think that those of us 

that are in the Legislative Branch are doing a very good job. Our 

numbers are as low as they have ever been. So, mea culpa, we have 

to look at our own operations ourselves. But at the same time, we 

have an obligation to continue to push for good management in the 

Executive Branch. 

Mr. WALKER. First, I agree with Mr. Johnson that if you do not 

have a Secretary who is supportive of the transformation effort, 

you are not going to be successful. They may or may not have much 

interest in it. They may or may not have as much background in 

it. They may or may not spend much time on it. But they have to 

at least be supportive, and I think that is important. So I agree 

with that. 

Second, I believe that every person that Paul Brinkley mentioned 

by name is a Presidential appointee who will be gone at noon on 

January 20, 2009. 

Third, this Administration has a plan, and it should be commended for that plan. There is a lot of good work that Mr. Brinkley 

and others have done, Secretary England has done; they should be 

commended for that. But it is this Administration’s plan, and it is 

yet to be determined whether and to what extent the next Administration will accept that plan. Every Administration has had their 

management initiatives. The last Administration has Reinventing 

Government under the Vice President. That was not embraced. 

Then the Administration changed. Each Administration came up 

with their own approach, and this Administration came up with 

the President’s Management Agenda, and I think it is a very good 

approach. It has a lot of conceptual merit, and I think it has made 

a lot of progress. 

So one cannot presume that the plan is going to be embraced by 

the next set of players because you have a whole change in leadership. And, yes, there are incredibly capable career civil servants in 

the Defense Department and every agency of government, but they 

also know it is their job to take the lead from the political appointees. And we do not know who they are going to be. We do not 

know what background we are going to have. We do not know what 

interests they are going to have. We do not know how long it is 

going to take them to get appointed. And we do not know how long 

17 

they are going to stay, because I have been a Presidential appointee for President Ronald Reagan, President George Herbert 

Walker Bush, and President William Jefferson Clinton, and political appointees are temporary help. They are good people, but they 

are temporary help. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. First of all, let me respond to a couple of comments. Senator Voinovich, you were talking to Mr. Brinkley about 

why wouldn’t you want a second Deputy, a term position, whatever, who could guarantee this and that and so forth. No one person can guarantee anything, so I think it is unrealistic to expect 

that the silver bullet is this person, and then all of a sudden DOD 

starts working like a Swiss watch. 

You referred several times to that it has not gotten done yet. We 

are talking about this, but it has not gotten done yet. Well, let me 

say what has gotten done. There is for the first time ever, for each 

one of the DOD high-risk list items, a clear definition of success, 

a clean plan for accomplishing it, clear definitions of accountability, 

and it is being made clearer and more emphatic than ever before 

how important it is that we get this done. 

GAO has signed off on the plan, on the definitions of success. 

GAO has signed off on the action plans and the reasonable levels 

of aggressiveness for accomplishing them. Your staff has been involved in this. You have agreed, your staff has agreed on the definitions of success for these items and the time frame in which they 

are to be accomplished. 

So I do not know how much better those plans would be with the 

second term deputy than they are now. But that is new stuff. That 

has not existed before. It is because the current leadership, the current structure at DOD is committed to make it happen. The current ‘‘M’’ in OMB is committed to make it happen. And we have 

worked together to do so, to collaborate on this. 

You have talked about where there is no argument, there is no 

support for continuing to do it the way we have done it before. We 

are not doing it the way we have done it before. The organization 

that Paul and Beth McGrath and their team have at DOD has not 

existed before. The attention being paid to this at DOD has not existed before. I do not know what previous Presidents did within the 

DOD or within the ‘‘M’’ part of OMB, but they did not do a very 

good job of it; otherwise, we would not be working on what we are 

working on now. And I would suggest it was not—it is not because 

there was or was not—there was not a second deputy at DOD. I 

would suggest to you that nobody was ever held accountable. Congress never held DOD accountable, the ‘‘M’’ part of OMB never 

held anybody accountable for actually reducing the risk in these 

areas, for actually causing programs to be more effective. 

There are lots of mechanisms that exist to increase the level of 

accountability for addressing all these issues that we want addressed. A second deputy is not one of those significant pieces of 

the pie, slices of the pie that can ensure accountability. It has got 

to come from the head of the agency, and it has to come from Congress. 

You asked me one time, on January 20, is it going to be clear 

to you what DOD is working on, all agencies? And so when the 

18 

next bunch comes in here, are you going to have to start all over 

with them, or are they going to have a clear idea about what is in 

place and what the career staff is being held accountable for accomplishing? And I told you then—which is still true—there will be a 

clear definition of what all the career employees are working on at 

DOD to transform the Defense Department. And they will be committed to continue to work on those things for the 4 months, 6 

months, 8 months before their political leaders are in place. 

Momentum will not stop at noon on January 20. Effort will continue to take place. The new Administration can come in. They inherit that plan. They can change it. They can tell you they do not 

want to transform DOD. I bet you you do not let them. They can 

tell you they want to go slower than the current plan calls for. I 

bet you you do not let them. They have that option, but there is— 

and maybe they come in and they say, ‘‘I have got an even better 

plan. We should do this faster than that.’’ And I bet you you let 

them do that. But having a person there that says this is the plan, 

this is the only plan, and this is as good as this plan can get, to 

expect that that second deputy is going to be the insurance, the 

guarantee that the plan is absolutely the best that it can ever be, 

is unrealistic, I think, an unrealistic expectation for them. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I am sure there are other people that sat in 

your shoes, and Mr. Brinkley’s, and said the same thing 8 or 10 

years ago. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Ask GAO if the plans that exist now are to their 

satisfaction for the transformation of DOD. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, from my perspective, I would 

feel a lot more comfortable if I knew there was someone at DOD 

and DHS that would remain in place during and after the transition. We are not looking for that. We are looking for someone that 

can say to the team, ‘‘You guys have done a great job. I am here. 

We are going to work together. We are going to keep going on this 

thing.’’ And as the new people come in, talk to them about it, get 

their points of view about things. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. You are very welcome. 

Mr. Johnson, as the leader of President Bush’s transition team, 

you saw firsthand the difficulties of transitioning to a new Administration. Now, having a senior-level official that could overlap between Administrations by serving in a term appointment could be 

very helpful to the continuity of agency operations during these 

sometimes turbulent times. 

What harm do you see in establishing a term appointment for a 

CMO at a senior-level position? 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is a very good question. In other words, instead of why, why not? I can think of two things: One, what Paul 

Brinkley was talking about, which is you have Chief Financial Officer, Tina Jonas; you have the Chief Personnel person, David Chu, 

you have the Acquisition, Technology position, that was Ken Krieg; 

and I do not know the current person in that position. They have 

two bosses. They have the Secretary—the Deputy Secretary in 

terms of operational responsibility, and then they have another 

boss over here under the transformation responsibilities. And what 

if there is a conflict? What if they have a conflicting direction from 

those two people? How is that conflict resolved? It is lack of clarity, 

19 

which is problematic, significantly problematic, I believe. If David 

Chu is trying to reform—if Tina Jonas is trying to reform—do management of the financials of the Defense Department, and at the 

same time she is trying to work out budget matters and funding 

for the war and so forth and so on, what is she responsible for, 

what is this management person over here responsible for? It is 

lack of clarity, and lack of clarity is death in a large organization— 

in any size organization, but the larger it is, the more death-like 

it is. 

The second thing is that when you put a term position on somebody, it is like putting a term position on an Inspector General. I 

think you lessen the level of accountability, because if they are not 

performing up to speed and they cannot be removed except for committing a crime, that person is not held as accountable as the person that serves at the will of whomever. And we want the Management Officer in an agency to be really accountable. 

So those are the two reasons, the two problems that I think exist 

with the structure that is being proposed. I think the greater of 

those two is the one that Mr. Brinkley articulated well. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Walker, the provisions in the 9/11 Commission bill and the 

defense authorization conference report establishing CMOs at DHS 

and DOD do not require a term appointment. You discussed the 

importance of this issue at length in your testimony. What can 

agencies do to ensure that a CMO is still effective even if they are 

not in place for a term appointment of 5 to 7 years? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, you have to focus on the qualifications 

for the person. You have to make sure that you are picking the 

right type of person for the job. 

Second, clearly you need to have a plan, but authoritative literature for change management and transformation says that 90 

percent of success or failure is implementation. It is not having a 

plan. It is implementation of the plan, and that involves people, 

process, technology, and environment, among other things. 

So the person has to be the right kind of person with the right 

kind of skills and knowledge. There needs to be a plan. There need 

to be accountability mechanisms. And I would argue that one of 

those accountability mechanisms ought to be a performance contract. The whole purpose of this transformation leader is to improve performance, and so I think it is critically important that 

they and others have some type of performance contract. 

Let me mention one last thing on the term, Mr. Chairman. There 

are ways to deal with concerns that I have heard about the term 

appointment. It is one thing if you say you have a 5- or 7-year 

term. It is another thing to say that you cannot be removed except 

for certain reasons. Now, there are reasons why I think restrictions 

on removal from accountability slots make sense. That means the 

Comptroller General slot, which I have, or Inspector Generals, because a lot of people do not like accountability and you are supposed to be independent. 

So I think one could make an argument that there might be 

some grounds that would have to exist for removal for those types 

of slots. But for this slot I feel differently. For this slot, it is a management operational slot, and one could provide the ability to reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:45 Jun 26, 2008 Jkt 040509 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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move, for a variety of reasons—non-performance, incompatibility. 

The reason that you need a term is so that hopefully the person 

is making a commitment when they come in such that if everything 

works out okay, they can expect to stay that length of time, but 

possibly to be able to say that if for some reason they are not performing or for some reason there is incompatibility or some reason 

like that, just have an advanced notification to the Congress to say 

that the Secretary intends to terminate this person for the following reason. Just advance notification. 

I think that could end up bridging one of the concerns that we 

have heard expressed about a term appointment. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Brinkley, I have a lot of respect for Deputy 

Secretary England. I really do. No question he is a capable leader, 

and I am glad to see that DOD named him the Department’s CMO. 

His appointment brings accountability and priority of management, 

I believe, to the right level. 

However, Comptroller General Walker has testified that a second 

CMO position is needed because the Deputy Secretary already has 

too many other demands to focus the necessary attention on business transformation. 

How would you respond to that concern, Mr. Brinkley? 

Mr. BRINKLEY. Two thoughts. First, the empowerment present— 

and Mr. Walker outlined it earlier. The Department of Defense is 

a hierarchical organization. It is exceedingly attuned to where 

power resides and where authority resides, both in the civilian and 

in the uniformed military sides of the Department. And so it is the 

fact that the Deputy Secretary has such a weight of responsibility 

that gives him the authority people look to. If something serious is 

happening, the Deputy Secretary is behind it. Separating, creating 

a separate function, particularly a second deputy, I believe would 

cripple that area, management reform, in terms of having it have 

the perceived weight. 

The Department’s mission is to secure the Nation. One of the 

things we have tried to embed in the way the Department thinks 

and we see firsthand now in Iraq is the business operations of the 

Department service and support, and must service and support 

seamlessly, the war-fighting mission of the Department. 

Three years ago, when I joined the Department, it did not think 

that way. It was very hard to get people focused on the war-fighting mission of the Department to talk about the business mission 

of the Department. They were divided in separate mission areas. 

And you could see the most important, most powerful people in the 

Department focused their energy, necessarily, on the war-fighting 

mission of the Department. That is where the primary mission of 

the Department exists. 

Having this awareness, having the two be seen as uniform, integrated, economic effects that we are driving in Iraq today as a result of leveraging our business operations in support of troops on 

the ground, these are things that are causing these two mission 

areas to become seamlessly integrated. The concern is that if you 

create a second deputy, that implicit power structure that everyone 

looks to, they look above, where does power reside, where is the 

significance in terms of decisionmaking present, that understanding would be at least temporarily lost, perhaps could be reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:45 Jun 26, 2008 Jkt 040509 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
21 

created as management reform and a powerful individual were 

placed in the position. So that would be the concern on a second 

deputy. 

Another thought I would like to reflect on is regarding the point 

the Comptroller General made a moment ago, which is about a 

termed appointment or not. Honestly, I think the only argument 

that resonates with everyone that we all feel and I have shared 

with you is how do we ensure we sustain beyond. If the decisions 

about Chief Management Officers or Deputy Chief Management— 

whatever the decision is—does not include a structure that ensures 

a carryover between Administrations, then I think it loses, in my 

opinion, the only meritorious argument that exists. It is just creating another position inside the Department of Defense that is 

going to have to be staffed. That is my personal opinion. It loses 

a lot of weight and merit. That is my only comment. 

Senator AKAKA. Yes, Mr. Walker? 

Mr. WALKER. I think what Paul Brinkley is saying is the term 

may be one of the things that is necessary if you are going to have 

something. But, I do not know, he can speak for himself on that. 

Continuity is important, no matter what level the position is or 

what type of position. 

I have actually had dual deputies before. This is not some theoretical construct from my standpoint. I used to be head of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. I used to be head of the Employee Benefits Security Administration, and I had two deputies. 

One of them focused on policy and external matters. One of them 

focused on operations, enforcement, and internal matters. And it 

worked great, and there was not any confusion about who was responsible for what. 

In one case, the deputy that was focused on operational and internal matters was a political appointee; in one case, they were a 

career official. In both cases, they had the right type of professional 

qualifications in order to be capable and credible, if you will. 

Now, one of the concerns that I have, Mr. Chairman—and I will 

just leave it at this—is I think this has been overly focused on the 

Department of Defense. And as I said before—and I do not mean 

by you. I am just talking about the discussion that we have had. 

I have already acknowledged that I think that the Defense Business Board probably had it right. Don’t create another deputy. Create a Principal Under Secretary for Management and look at some 

of that, because just having dual deputies can create some confusion. 

At the same point in time, I think there is a bigger issue here 

that I would just like to put on the table for you to think about 

and we can cover later. I think there are three kinds of Presidential appointee positions in government right now, and we need 

to think about treating them differently. 

The first is a policy position, which clearly the President ought 

to have discretion who they appoint, the Senate might confirm, but 

they serve at the pleasure of the President because they are executing the President’s policy. 

The second is an operational management position where you 

want to pick somebody who is primarily based on their professional 

competence. It has got to be politically acceptable. It has got to go 

22 

through a process. But you are picking him primarily in professional competence, and in certain circumstances it may make sense 

for them to have a term appointment, but that is the exception to 

the rule. 

And the third is adjudication and oversight—judges, Inspectors 

General, the Comptroller General of the United States, etc., where 

you want to pick primarily for professional competence but you also 

have to make sure that you have independence. 

The thing I would put on the table for a separate discussion at 

a later date is to take a look at that, because we need to be focusing more than just the Department of Defense. We need to be focusing broader and not just on the CMO but a range of basic management positions that exist that frankly are not likely to get filled 

very quickly in the next Administration. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, I want to thank you very much for your 

comments and your statements. I know we can go on and discuss 

the subject today, but improving the management of human capital, financial management, and business transformation needs to 

be a higher priority throughout the Federal Government. Establishing CMOs may be a part of the answer. We may need to look 

at legislation that would establish CMOs at each Federal agency, 

not just DOD and DHS, and bring greater accountability and focus 

to strategic management issues. It might also be helpful to have a 

mechanism in place to allow CMOs to share best practices and 

work together through a coordinated effort by OMB to ensure effective management at Federal agencies and to set maybe a policy on 

this. 

So these are some things to think about, and as you say, Mr. 

Walker, at another time we can further discuss these. But I want 

to thank all of our witnesses so much for their testimony and their 

answers. We may have additional questions for the record, and I 

look forward to working with all of you on this important issue. 

I want to wish all of you happy holidays, and I look forward to 

seeing you again next year. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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