OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

October 29, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION, U.S. ARMY 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMANDIRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

COMMANDER, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY 

SUBJECT: Review of the Use of Contractors in Managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Projects (SIGIR-08-003) (Project 7013) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit in 

accordance with our statutory duties under Public Law 108-106, as amended. The law requires 

that we produce independent and objective audits of—as well as leadership, coordination, and 

recommendations on—policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in 

the administration of programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. 

We received comments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division on a draft 

of this report, which were considered when preparing the final report. The comments are 

addressed in this report, where applicable, and are discussed in the Management Comments 

section of the report. 

SIGIR appreciates the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Frank Slayton (frank.slayton@iraq.centcom.mil / 703-343-7924); or me at 

(glenn.furbish@sigir.mil /703-428-1058). For the report distribution, see Appendix C. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

Award Fee Process Was Not Effectively Used to Assess Contractor Performance 4

Senior Officials Assessments of Contractor Performance Are Inconclusive 7

Other Weaknesses in Required Contract Administration Practices 13

Conclusion and Lessons Learned 15

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 16 

B. Acronyms 18 

C. Report Distribution 19 

D. Audit Team Members 21 
Review of the Use of Contractors in 

Managing Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Projects 

SIGIR-08-003 October 29, 2007

Executive Summary 

In formulating the Iraq reconstruction program, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 

examined several options for program-management. One option considered was to have the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) manage the entire program. However, USACE officials 

believed that the agency lacked the capacity in Iraq to oversee such a large program and could 

not rapidly assemble sufficient staff. Similarly, the CPA found that the U.S. Agency for 

International Development and the Iraqi ministries lacked the organizational capacity to manage 

a large, infrastructure-focused program. Seeking a solution, the CPA developed a concept paper 

that proposed forming a new program-management office that would rely on contractors for both 

the management and the execution of the reconstruction program; technical contractors would be 

used to design, plan, build, and complete projects and another group of contractors would 

provide program management. The CPA administrator accepted that proposal, and in August 

2003, approved formation of the Program Management Office (PMO) to execute that plan. 

To manage its projects, the PMO established six sector program-management offices (SPMOs) 

organized by work sector, such as electricity and public works/water. These offices were led by 

government employees. To provide program-management support services for these offices, 

however, the Pentagon Reconstruction Program, which served as the contracting office, awarded 

seven cost-plus-award-fee contracts–one for the PMO and each of the six sector offices. These 

contracts were awarded in March 2004. The contractors awarded these contracts were known as 

Sector Program Management Office Contractors (SPMOCs). Over the next few years, there were 

several changes in project management and contract administration. 

In May 2004, National Security Presidential Directive 36 replaced the PMO as the program 

manager with a new program management office called the Project and Contracting Office 

(PCO). As a result, the SPMOs became the Sector Project and Contracting Offices (SPCOs), and 

the contractors who supported them became known as Sector Project and Contracting Office 

Contractors (SPCOC). In October 2006, USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD) replaced the PCO 

as the project manager. In this report, SIGIR refers to the government offices responsible for 

contract administration as the sector project and contracting offices (SPCOs), and the contractors 

as Sector Project and Contracting Office Contractors (SPCOCs), regardless of the timeframe.

i
The Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) is also involved in Iraq reconstruction projects and 

is responsible for coordinating and overseeing all non-security assistance for the Chief of 

Mission.1

The overall objectives of this audit were to determine the roles and responsibilities assigned to 

the SPCOCs and the extent to which the U.S. government benefited from the services provided 

by the SPCOCs. Specifically, SIGIR’s reporting objectives for this report were to (1) assess 

contractor performance in managing another contractor, and (2) review the effectiveness of the 

government in managing the contracts. 

Results 

As of June 7, 2007, the U.S. government had obligated approximately $527.5 million for 

contracted program-management support services, and $41.8 million in award-fees have been 

authorized. These support services covered thousands of projects. Because of weaknesses in the 

implementation of required contracting policies SIGIR was unable to conclusively assess how 

well the practice of using contractors to manage other contractors worked. Each contractor’s 

performance was assessed and documented through an award-fee process. However, award-fee 

results offer only limited information on each contractor’s performance and do not provide a 

sufficient basis to assess the practice of using contractors to manage contractors. A review of the 

award-fee scores alone, however, suggests that the SPCOs were very satisfied with the 

performance of four of the contractors and slightly less satisfied with one. 

To gain further insight on the contractors’ performance, SIGIR interviewed senior GRD officials 

who worked with the contractors, as well as senior ITAO officials who were knowledgeable 

about each sector’s programs. These interviews provided more details on contractor 

performance, but the views expressed were decidedly mixed and inconclusive. GRD officials 

generally endorsed the contractors as effective and ITAO officials more often expressed 

dissatisfaction with them. For example, in the water sector, the GRD sector lead stated that the 

contractor performed high-quality work, although the ITAO senior consultant believed that the 

contractor sidestepped the role of “watchdog” and did not aggressively oversee the design-build 

contractor’s processes. 

SIGIR also identified other contract administration practices that were not being accomplished as 

required. These include inappropriate obligations of award fees, contract administration transfer, 

and information disclosure practices. 

Further, SIGIR is continuing to examine possible issues related to conflicts of interest between 

any of the contractors involved in these seven contracts. To the extent appropriate SIGIR will 

report separately on these matters. 

 

1

 By Executive Order No. 1343, dated May 9, 2007, the President created the Iraq Transition Assistance Office as 

the successor organization to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). 

ii
Lessons Learned 

Because work on these program-management support contracts has ended, or soon will, SIGIR 

makes no recommendations. However, SIGIR provides the following lessons learned: 

• The award-fee process can be an effective tool for creating incentive for contractors to 

strive for superior results. Properly documenting contractor performance in accordance 

with award-fee criteria is essential to making appropriate award-fee judgments. 

• The success of any contractual relationship depends heavily on the quality of the 

direction and oversight given the contractor by the government. When government 

oversight is lax, the risk of problems increases. 

• A prerequisite for assessing the viability of any contract management approach, such as 

using contractors to provide management support, requires the effective implementation 

of existing contract administration practices and polices. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division provided technical comments on a 

draft of this report. Those comments have been incorporated in the report where appropriate. A 

senior JCC-I/A official also stated that JCC-I/A was addressing the award-fee issues discussed in 

the report. 

iii
Introduction 

Background 

In formulating the Iraq reconstruction program, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 

examined several options for program-management. One option was to have the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (USACE) manage the entire program. However, USACE did not believe it 

had sufficient capacity in Iraq to exercise oversight of such a large enterprise and could not 

quickly secure enough staff to manage the massive program. USACE’s primary expertise is 

construction management and execution, not the kind of planning, programming, and budgeting 

inherent in the reconstruction. According to USACE officials, the government did not possess 

the ability to manage such a large reconstruction program without additional contractor support. 

It could not have mobilized personnel with the specialties and expertise needed. The CPA also 

determined that neither the U.S. Agency for International Development nor the Iraqi ministries 

possessed the organizational capacity to manage a large, infrastructure-focused program. 

Looking for a solution, CPA developed a concept paper that proposed formation of a new CPA 

program-management office that would rely on contractors for both management and execution 

of the reconstruction program; technical contractors would be used to design, plan, build, and 

complete projects and another group of contractors would provide program management. 

Contractors would be able to provide more continuity than government personnel because 

contractor personnel would turn over less frequently than government personnel. That concept 

was accepted and in August 2003, the CPA Administrator approved establishment of the 

Program Management Office (PMO) for that purpose. 

To manage its projects, the PMO established six sector program-management offices (SPMOs) 

organized by work sector, such as electricity and public works/water. These offices were 

manned by government employees. To provide program-management support for these offices, 

however, the Pentagon Reconstruction Program, which served as the contracting office, awarded 

seven cost-plus-award-fee contracts for program management-support services–one for the PMO 

and each of the six sector offices. These contracts were awarded in March 2004. The contractors 

that were awarded these contracts were known as Sector Program Management Office 

Contractors (SPMOCs). 

The program management offices supported by these contracts have changed over time. In May 

2004, the PMO was replaced by the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), and in October 2006, 

the PCO was replaced by the Gulf Region Division (GRD). As the offices changed, the names 

of the program management offices changed too. The SPMOs became the Sector Project and 

Contracting Offices (SPCOs), and the contractors who supported them became known as Sector 

Project and Contracting Office Contractors (SPCOC). In this report, SIGIR refers to the sector 

program management offices as the SPCOs, and the the program management contractors as the 

SPCOCs, regardless of the timeframe.

According to the acquisition strategy plan, the contractors for both the PCOC and SPCOC 

program-management support contracts were to be capable of providing a range of services such 

1
as program integration and coordination, requirements management, monitoring and reporting, 

acquisition, procurement, and logistics support, and quality assurance. 

In March 2004, seven cost-plus-award-fee type contracts were awarded to provide programmanagement support services for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and Economic Support 

Fund projects. The seven contracts are shown in Table 1. 

Table 1—Program Management Support Contracts 

Contract Number Services Contractor 

W914NS-04-C-0001 PCO Support ATC Services, Inc. 

Iraq Power Alliance Joint 

Venture (JV) 

W914NS-04-C-0002 Electrical Sector 

CH2M Hill/Parsons Water 

Infrastructure JV 

W914NS-04-C-0003 Public Works/Water Sector 

W914NS-04-C-0004 Security/Justice Sector Berger/URS JV 

W914NS-04-C-0005 Buildings/Health/Education Sector Berger/URS JV 

W914NS-04-C-0006 Communication/Transportation 

Sector 

Berger/URS JV 

W914NS-04-C-0007 Oil Sector Foster Wheeler 

Source: SIGIR analysis of GRD and JCC-I/A data 

In March 2005, the three contracts awarded to Berger/URS Joint Venture were combined into 

one, W914NS-04-C-0004. All of the contracts shown in Table 1 were for a base year with two 

option years. Under a cost-plus-award-fee contract, all allowable costs are reimbursed, and 

contractors earn a base fee of 3 percent of budgeted cost of the project. Contractors also were 

eligible to earn an award-fee of 9 to 13 percent. 

The Award-Fee Process is the Primary Tool to Evaluate 

Effectiveness 

Contractor performance is evaluated through implementation of award-fee plans built into the 

contracts. The plans state that contractors will be evaluated based on a set of factors, such as 

program management, capacity development, contract acquisition strategies, technical 

management, and participation of small businesses, coalition partners, Iraqi companies, and Iraqi 

women-owned businesses. While there are some small differences in the award-fee plans for 

these seven contracts, the award-fee process is basically the same. Contractors begin each 

evaluation period with zero percent of the available award-fee and work up to the evaluated fee 

for each evaluation period. The award-fee pool is the total dollars that can be earned for each 

evaluation period. Award-fee determinations are based on subjective performance evaluations 

provided by an award-fee evaluation board (AFEB) and an Award-fee Determining Official 

(AFDO). Performance monitors provide continuous evaluation and assessment of each 

contractor’s daily performance. Performance monitors are prohibited from membership on the 

award-fee board. 

2
Typically, membership on an AFEB includes the sector lead, the contracting officer, and other 

sector staff. The award-fee evaluation board is responsible for reviewing the performance 

monitors’ evaluations, the contractor’s self-evaluation, and any other information available in 

order to arrive at an overall objective and impartial position on the contractor’s performance. 

The task is then to decide how well the contractor performed in each area using the metrics 

provided in the award-fee plan. Voting members individually score contractor performance in 

writing. These individual reports are then submitted to an assigned individual for consolidation 

into a single award-fee score. Finally, scores are converted into an award-fee amount. 

The AFDO is independent of the AFEB, and makes the final decision on the amount of awardfee earned. The AFDO becomes involved only after the evaluation board has met and agreed on 

a recommended award-fee score. The determining official’s decision must be documented and 

provided to the contractor within five days after the decision and simultaneous with the contract 

modification signed by the contracting officer to obligate the fee amount. The contractor can 

then immediately submit an invoice for the earned fee. 

Feedback is provided to the contractor at periodic meetings (usually monthly) that identify 

negative performance trends and give the contractor an opportunity to take corrective action. 

Meetings should be attended by the contractor, performance monitors, and members of the 

AFEB. Informal evaluation reports that document the feedback provided should be prepared and 

then used when the evaluation board convenes for its formal evaluation. 

Objectives 

The overall objectives of this audit were to determine the roles and responsibilities assigned to 

the SPCOCs and the extent to which the U.S. government benefited from the services provided 

by the SPCOCs. Specifically, SIGIR’s reporting objectives for this report were to (1) assess 

contractor performance in managing another contractor, and (2) review the effectiveness of the 

government in managing the contracts. 

3
Award-fee Process Was Not Effectively Used to Assess 

Contractor Performance 

There has been improvement in award-fee documentation for these contracts over the past few 

years. However, the existing documentation and award-fee results have too many weaknesses to 

be relied on to assess how well the process of using contractors for program management support 

services worked. Our current review found problems with (1) written monthly performance 

feedback to the contractors; (2) documentation of award-fee scoring by the award-fee board; and 

(3) award-fees that did not match with award-fee board ratings. The award-fee scores alone, 

however, indicate that the SPCOs were very satisfied with the performance of four of the 

contractors and slightly less satisfied with one. 

Monthly Feedback Documentation Was Not Always Well Prepared 

Written feedback to the contractor on its performance to include information on its strengths, 

areas needing improvement, and deficiencies is an important tool for documenting contractor 

performance. Further, it is required by all seven of these program-management contracts. 

However, while some sectors did a good job of evaluating performance a few sectors did a poor 

job of preparing the required documentation. 

All of the award-fee plans for these contracts required monthly written feedback to the contractor 

except the award-fee plan in the electricity sector, which required quarterly feedback. Quarterly 

feedback is inconsistent with JCC-I/A award-fee board policy, which requires monthly meetings 

and informal monthly evaluation reports. 

SIGIR’s review found that the electric sector did not conduct monthly feedback meetings 

because, according to a senior electric sector official, monthly meetings were considered too 

cumbersome. Moreover, he stated that GRD provides verbal feedback to the contractor almost 

every day as well as a Saturday meeting at which issues are discussed. Regardless of this 

alternative requirement, however, we could only find documentation of semi-annual feedback to 

Iraq Power Alliance JV through the award-fee period ending March 9, 2007. The formal 

feedback provided by the electric sector was quite detailed, with comments and 

recommendations under each factor and sub-factor from individual performance monitors, but 

semi-annual feedback is not enough to assure effective monitoring of the contractor. 

SIGIR also found little documentation of meaningful feedback to two of the other contractors; 

the oil sector contractor and the PMO contractor. The oil sector had little documentation 

supporting the ratings other than some Award-fee Determining Official (AFDO) letters. On one 

occasion, the text of the AFDO letter contradicted the score. For example, in one award-fee 

period the AFDO wrote that his evaluation “reflects less than excellent performance for the 

entire period.” Nonetheless, the oil contractor was granted an award-fee in the “Outstanding” 

range. SIGIR did not find written monthly assessments of the performance of ATC Services, the 

PMO contractor. 

4
Conversely, SIGIR found good documentation of written monthly feedback in the other two 

sectors. For example, the water sector had good documentation for 17 of the 20 months (85 

percent) from July 2005 through March 2007. The documents contained detailed feedback for 

each rating factor and sub-factor in the award-fee plan. Similarly, the facilities and 

transportation sector had good documentation for 15 of the 24 months between March 2005 and 

March 2007. 

The absence of formal written feedback to the contractor creates problems for the government. 

For example, during the first performance period the oil sector contractor was given a low score 

and no award-fee was recommended. The contractor protested, citing the government’s failure 

to provide the prescribed monthly feedback. As a result, the AFEB raised the score for the 

period, and the contractor received about half of the potential award-fee. Even after this 

incident, SIGIR found little evidence that feedback was provided for subsequent periods. 

Award-fee Score Sheets Were Incomplete 

SIGIR found incomplete award-fee documentation. Given the lack of information SIGIR was 

unable to confirm the basis for the award-fee decisions reached by the AFEB in many cases. 

SIGIR’s review of the 45 cumulative award-fee boards held for the seven sectors before June 

2007, found individual scoring sheets for only six of the 45 boards (13 percent). Consolidated 

score sheets were found for some boards, but these are not as useful as the individual scoring 

sheets for assessing contractor performance. The JCC-I/A award-fee board policy requires 

voting members to individually score contractor performance in writing, and these individual 

score sheets are then consolidated into a single weighted and rated recommendation for awardfee. The score sheets allow board members to assign a numeric value for each factor and subfactor that is evaluated and would show how each award-fee board member assessed the 

contractors’ performance in each rated performance award-fee period. The GRD sector leads 

who chaired the award-fee boards told us that members did prepare their own scoring sheets as 

prescribed by the award-fee plan but the board did not include the individual scoring sheets in 

the contract files. 

For example, SIGIR reviewed the results of nine award-fee boards for the water sector. Seven 

boards gave the contractor scores in the “Outstanding” range, (between 91 and 100) and two 

boards gave the contractor scores in the “Excellent” range (between 81 and 90). As stated, 

SIGIR found very good documentation of monthly feedback from March 2005 to March 2007. 

However, SIGIR found only three consolidated score sheets that supported the recommendation 

and no individual scoring sheets. As a result, there is little information about the specific 

strengths of the contractor’s performance. Similarly, in the electricity sector SIGIR found 

consolidated score sheets from five of six award-fee boards, but only a few individual score 

sheets from one board. 

Inconsistencies with Award-fee Board Ratings 

SIGIR’s assessment of contractor performance was also impacted by award-fee decisions that 

seem contradictory to the document record. For example: 

5
• On July 28, 2006, the AFEB for the water-sector contract recommended to the AFDO a 

score of 93.7 for the award-fee period ending July 9, 2006, resulting in a proposed awardfee of $1,627,013. On July 31, the AFDO issued a decision stating that the award-fee 

percentage earned had been adjusted to 85.7 percent. The recalculated fee authorized 

was $1,488,100. The document was signed by both the AFDO and the contracting 

officer. However, on September 19, 2006, the contract was modified to show a higher 

award-fee pool for the period and to authorize a revised award-fee of $1,612,858, an 

increase of $124,758. GRD financial data indicates that the higher amount was paid. 

There was no AFDO Decision Document in the contract records explaining why the 

award-fee was revised. 

• The AFDO reduced the award-fee performance score for the electric sector contract for 

the period between September 9, 2005, and March 8, 2006. According to the AFDO 

determination letter the score was reduced because several members of the board were 

not present during the rating period. Accordingly, the award-fee was “reflective of the 

overall accomplishments of the Iraqi Power Authority versus the specific objectives 

established for the performance period.” 

• The oil-sector contractor’s performance for the period from September 11, 2004 to March 

10, 2005, was rated as “less than excellent” in written comments by the AFDO. 

However, the contractor was given a score of 93.51 percent, which is in the 

“Outstanding” range (91-100). There is no explanation in the contract record of why the 

contractor was given the higher award. 

Award-fees Indicate Customer Satisfaction 

The scores from the AFEBs show that GRD and PCO were very satisfied with the performance 

of four of the contractors and only slightly less satisfied with one. Four contractors received 

average evaluation scores ranging from 91.5 to 94.1 out of 100 (in the “Outstanding” range), 

while the fifth received a score of 71.4 (in the “Very Good” range). Table 2 shows the AFEB 

score range for the contracts. 

Table 2—Award-fee Score Range for Program Support Contractors

Contractor Period AFEB Score Range 

ATC Services May. 2004 to Sep. 2006 88.0 to 95.0 

Iraq Power Alliance Joint Venture Mar. 2004 to Mar. 2007 86.4 to 98.7 

CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint Venture Mar. 2004 to Nov. 2006 84.0 to 98.0 

Foster Wheeler Mar. 2004 to Mar. 2007 90.0 to 95.0 

Berger/URS Joint Venture1 Mar. 2004 to Jun. 2007 61.8 to 96.3 

1

Includes contracts W914NS-04-C-0005 and W914NS-04-C-0006 

Source: AFDO letters for the periods indicated. 

6
Senior Officials Assessments of Contractor 

Performance Are Inconclusive 

Our interviews with knowledgeable senior officials and reviews of available documentation 

provided further information on each contractor’s performance. However, this information also 

does not provide a basis to assess how well the process of using contractors for contract 

management support services worked. For example, the officials’ views varied on some 

contracts and in one case the official lacked detailed knowledge of the program management 

element of the contract. 

Overall Program Management – ATC Services, Inc. 

SIGIR did not find written assessments of the performance of ATC Services, Inc. which was 

awarded a one year, $21.6 million contract (W914NS-04-C-0001) for program management and 

support services to the PMO. While the official with whom SIGIR spoke was generally satisfied 

with the company’s performance, he admitted he lacked visibility over all activities thereby 

questioning the thoroughness of his assessment. 

The original contract called for the contractor to provide support services to the PMO, including 

coordinating the activities of the SPCOCs and preparing reports for the CPA and the U.S. 

government. ATC Services was asked to perform tasks other than program management, 

however, and a new statement of work was issued through modification P00007 in January 2005. 

The new statement more sharply defined the contract requirements, including elements unrelated 

to reconstruction program management, such as life support and facilities management. In 

March 2005 the contract’s first option year was executed and the scope of work was again 

modified to require ATC Services to define and implement a PCO change management plan. 

The plan was to include a synchronized reduction in support provided by PCO in the areas of 

program and project management, life support, and security and administration. At the same 

time, facilities operation and maintenance for the PCO became a more heavily weighted factor in 

the award-fee plan. 

In March, 2006 the second option year on the contract was executed; however, in February a new 

life-support arrangement was made with another contractor, and the ATC Services contract 

ended in July of that year. The former AFEB chairman, expressed a positive opinion regarding 

ATC Service’s performance. He noted the change to another contractor was made to achieve 

greater efficiencies following the absorption of PCO into GRD and was not related to 

performance by ATC Services. The former AFEB Chairman stated that ATC Services did a good 

job on the life-support and facilities management elements of the contract, including work 

relating to building improvements. However, he admitted that he was unfamiliar with the 

program management element of the contract. 

Electricity-Sector – Iraq Power Alliance Joint Venture 

The Iraq Power Alliance Joint Venture was the only contractor which received consistent and 

positive assessments in both written evaluations and oral assessments for its one year $43.4 

7
million contract to provide support services in the electricity sector. The information available 

therefore strongly suggests that the U.S. government in this case received value for its money 

spent. 

Contract W914NS-04-C-0002 was awarded to the Iraq Power Alliance Joint Venture (IPA-JV), a 

joint venture comprising Parsons Energy and Chemicals Group and Parsons-Brinckerhoff, Ltd. 

The contract was to provide program-management support services in the electricity sector for 

one year at an estimated cost of $43.4 million. The contract had two option years. Parsons 

Energy and Chemicals Group provides design, engineering, procurement, construction, and 

project management services in the oil and gas, refining, chemical and petrochemical, and power 

industries. Parsons-Brinkerhoff provides program management, engineering, and construction 

management services for infrastructure. 

Written assessments and officials’ opinions provide evidence of the success of IPA-JV. Overall, 

assessments and opinions point to a contractor that is committed to its job, adaptable to changing 

circumstances, has high quality staff and communicates well with U.S. and Iraqi organizations. 

For example, 

• In May, 2006 the AFDO wrote, in part, “(t)he IPA-JV has continued to demonstrate that 

overall it is an outstanding organization committed to the rebuilding of Iraq through the 

quality construction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s electric infrastructure. Above all, IPA-JV 

has been a tremendous steward of government resources. The firm fixed price 

contracting initiatives have resulted in cost savings in the millions of dollars to the U.S. 

government. IPA-JV emphasizes capacity development by constantly working with the 

Ministry of Electricity and ensuring their personnel are trained and ready to carry on the 

task of completing the rebuilding of their Nation’s electric infrastructure.” 

• The AFEB evaluation of the “Scope, Tracking Funds, Planning and Scheduling” subfactor for the six-month award-fee period ending in March 2005 stated “as the program 

has evolved under the pressures of funding constraints and sub-par performance of 

certain design/build contractors, IPA-JV immediately reconfigured and adapted to fill in 

the void and keep the entire Electricity reconstruction program on track, all within the 

very real constraints of time, headcount and budget.” 

Top officials were also uniform in their praise. A senior GRD official in the sector stated that 

IPA did a very good job, adapting to various and changing strategies that had been pursued in the 

sector. Noting that electricity is a technologically challenging field in which expertise is in high 

demand globally, he found it impressive that IPA-JV had built such a good team. He also 

praised the contractor’s almost-daily meetings with GRD, ITAO representatives, and the 

Ministry of Electricity. ITAO representatives also endorsed IPA-JV’s work. An ITAO official 

stated IPA-JV and ITAO worked very well together and the quality of work performed by the 

contractor was excellent. He also stated that all of the IPA-JV staff were very professional and 

had a lot of expertise in electricity. 

8
Oil Sector – Foster Wheeler 

U.S. officials’ assessments of Foster Wheeler’s performance varied significantly making it 

difficult to conclude how well the company achieved the goals set out in its $8.4 million contract 

to provide program management services in the oil sector. GRD officials believe that the 

company performed in an outstanding manner. However, ITAO senior consultants criticized the 

contractor’s performance. 

Foster Wheeler, an engineering and construction company providing services and products to a 

broad range of industries and based in the United Kingdom, was awarded contract W914NS-04-

C-0007 to provide program management and support services in the oil sector at an estimated 

cost of $8.4 million. The contract had two option years. 

The contractor suffered a rocky start due to its slowness in mobilizing because of concerns about 

security. In April 2004, the contracting officer issued a notice to Foster Wheeler demanding 

mobilization. A senior ITAO official stated that the contract was within two hours of being 

terminated. Foster Wheeler finally did mobilize and, as SIGIR stated earlier, even received an 

award-fee, after being denied one, in the first fee period. The ITAO official stated that Foster 

Wheeler did not mobilize enough people or have the right people for the job and created an 

excessive leave schedule that resulted in a need for many more personnel. 

ITAO officials also criticized the sector’s approach to reconstruction in the oil sector. The 

officials stated that contractors hired to refurbish the oil well sites would shut down the plants for 

extended periods of time to perform repairs and maintenance, which contravened the normal 

industry practice of setting up “work-arounds” to keep the plant running. As a result, the Iraqi 

government lost millions of dollars and had to purchase more oil outside of Iraq to meet demand. 

The officials criticized Foster Wheeler for not effectively monitoring the contractors’ procedures, 

resulting in substantial schedule-slippage. That resulted in higher administrative costs in the 

design-build contracts, which were cost-plus award-fee contracts. 

One requirement of the contract’s scope of work was to coordinate and manage the development 

of individual Task Orders, ensuring that project-definition packages and cost proposals provided 

by the design/build contractors sufficiently defined scope in line with requirements. A senior 

ITAO consultant stated that Foster Wheeler lacked the background to develop task orders and the 

experience to manage them; the company, in his opinion, should have hired consultants who 

were technical experts in various specialties. A senior Foster Wheeler official responded that it 

worked closely with the U.S. government agencies until mid-2006, but when the new IRMO 

senior consultant arrived, communications broke down. Another Foster Wheeler representative 

stated that ITAO officials did not have visibility of the contract and that sometimes Foster 

Wheeler was obliged to operate beyond its area of expertise. 

In contrast, on June 14, 2007 the outgoing GRD sector lead stated that he had full confidence in 

Foster Wheeler. He said that the oil sector ran a lean organization limiting the number of 

personnel and had the right people for the job. According to this source, the cost of Foster 

Wheeler management was approximately four percent of the total cost of the program, not 

including government provided life support, and that was good value. 

9
All of the award-fee scores for Foster Wheeler through September, 2006, reached 90 or above, in 

the “Excellent” or “Outstanding” range. However, as SIGIR has noted there is scarce 

documentation supporting these ratings other than the AFDO letters, which cite strengths and 

areas for improvement. 

Water Sector – CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint Venture 

As with the oil sector, SIGIR found major disagreement between the ITAO senior consultant and 

the GRD and JCC-I/A officials in the sector regarding CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint Venture’s 

performance. The contract was for program management-support services in the water sector for 

one year at an estimated cost of $28.5 million. GRD and JCC-I/A personnel stated that the 

contractor did a good job. But the ITAO consultant stated that the CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint 

Venture did not effectively monitor the design-build contractors. 

Contract W914NS-04-C-0003 was awarded to a joint venture comprising CH2M Hill, a water 

resources development firm, and Parsons Water Infrastructure Inc. A senior official of CH2M 

Hill/Parsons Joint Venture stated that CH2M Hill had program management background in water 

treatment, irrigation, water supply, and sewage, while Parsons’ expertise was in construction. 

The GRD sector lead stated in June 2007 that CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint Venture was performing 

good-quality work. This opinion appears to be supported in monthly feedback documents which 

identified some successes in contract performance. For example, the reports concluded: 

• “At the recently completed Erbil Water Treatment Plant, SPCOC personnel are on-site, 

providing effective coordination and start-up activities.” (Period ending June 9, 2006); 

• “Uses a very effective document control system to insure that all submittals and 

assessments reviewed are done in a timely manner especially when comments are 

required.” (Period ending September 9, 2005); 

• “Utilizes a combination of field personnel and home office subject matter experts to 

conduct design reviews saving time and money on the program and allowing field 

personnel to concentrate on immediate action requirements in an outstanding manner.” 

(Period ending April 9, 2006); 

• “Routinely recognized for exceptional responses to data calls. There have been repeated 

programmatic changes, changed project conditions, and a high frequency of data calls 

that require the SPCOC to complete its task within a tight schedule.” (Period ending 

April 9, 2006); 

• “Received a letter of congratulation from Her Excellency the Minister of Municipalities 

and Public Works commending highly effective seminars for women.” (Period ending 

September 9, 2005). 

The GRD sector lead did note some problems. He stated that the contractor’s rest and relaxation 

leave schedule had been an on-going issue. For example, feedback for the month ending 

September 9, 2005, said that “SPCOC does not always provide adequate coverage during rest 

and relaxation periods. SPCOC needs to insure that adequate staff is available at all times to 

conduct the mission.” 

10
The ITAO senior consultant in the water sector took a decidedly more negative view of the 

contractor, noting that CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint Venture did not actively take on the role of 

“watchdog” for the U.S. government and did not aggressively oversee the design-build 

contractors’ processes. Furthermore, she stated that CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint Venture was not 

forthcoming in its dealings with ITAO. She said it was hard to get information from the 

contractor and the contractor was not effective in keeping the sector’s contractors on schedule. 

She also stated that deliveries were frequently delayed and that sometimes the wrong equipment 

was purchased. For example, wrong equipment was purchased for the Mosul Dam project, at a 

cost of $30 million. She further said that CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint Venture was not active in 

pursuing solutions. 

CH2M Hill/Parsons Joint Venture took issue with the negative assessment. A senior CH2M 

Hill/Parsons Joint venture official stated that he believed that the program has been successful. 

He identified several projects as examples, including the Erbil water treatment plant. He said 

that capacity has been increased, although operational problems hamper production. The official 

cited a lack of electricity to operate pumps, an inconsistent supply of laborers, and illegal taps on 

water pipelines. 

Facilities and Transportation Sector – Louis Berger/URS Joint 

Venture 

Ratings and other assessments for the performance of the Louis Berger/URS Joint Venture 

varied making it difficult to determine whether the U.S. government received value for the 

contract. The contract cost was about $27.7 million. Award-fee Board written feedback ran the 

gamut from “good” to “excellent”. However, overall Louis Berger received award-fee board 

scores in the “Good” range. 

Contracts W914NS-04-C-0004, W914NS-04-C-0005, and W914NS-04-C-0006 were awarded to 

Louis Berger/URS Joint Venture (Berger/URS), a combine comprised of Louis Berger Group, 

Inc. and URS Group, Inc., both of which are large engineering-services firms. The contract was 

to provide program management support services in the Security and Justice; Buildings, Health, 

and Education; and Transportation and Communication sectors, for one year at an estimated cost 

of $27.7 million. The contract had two option years. To reduce costs the contracts were 

consolidated after the first year into a single contract; W914NS-04-C0004 in one sector called 

“Facilities and Transportation.” 

SIGIR reviewed 12 award-fee periods for contract W914NS-04-C-0004, between March 2004 

and June 2007. The ratings for those periods included one “Excellent,” four “Very Good,” and 

five “Good.” Two periods had no rating. SIGIR also reviewed the two award-fee periods for the 

two contracts that were consolidated (W914NS-04-C-005, and W914NS-04-C-006). The scores 

for all four were “Outstanding.” Overall, the AFEB scores for Berger/URS were lower than 

those for the SPCOCs in the other sectors, but still mostly in the “Good” range. 

The Facilities and Transportation sector incurred two significant contract failures by design-build 

contractor in the sector, and of 70 task orders executed under the contracts, 15 were partially or 

fully terminated. One contract failure resulted in the termination of three task orders to construct 

11
150 Primary Healthcare Centers.2

 The failure had multiple causes. However, Louis Berger/URS 

Joint Venture had the responsibility for overseeing the budgets and schedules and for alerting the 

U.S. government when the healthcare center project was faltering. 

The disparity in the assessments came to a head in January 2006, when the AFEB chairman 

made the award-fee board presentation to the AFDO for the period September 10, 2005, to 

December 9, 2005. The AFEB recommended a score of 68.48 percent, in the “Good” range. 

The presentation stated that Berger/URS’ strengths were in the areas of reporting and project 

controls especially in the quality of its reports and completion of required tasks. The AFEB 

noted in particular Berger/URS’ efforts and performance in implementing the internal weekly 

program management reviews and the continued drive to create an integrated Facilities and 

Transportation Sector. 

In discussing problem areas, the presentation stated that the overall management of sector design 

build contractors needed a more deliberate focus to avoid repeat problems such as the health 

program. It also needs to continue to guard against establishing unrealistic expectations in 

project award schedules and execution durations. 

The AFDO, however, summarily rejected the AFEB chairman’s assessment of performance. 

Instead, the AFDO issued a letter on January 28, 2006, denying any award-fee and stating that 

Berger/URS’ performance for the period was determined to be in the “Poor-Inadequate” range. 

The letter stated, “(d)uring this period Berger/URS has demonstrated unsatisfactory performance 

in its ability to convert its analysis of design build performance into meaningful and substantive 

recommendations, most notably the Primary Healthcare facilities and prisons. These problems 

resonated throughout most aspects of this award-fee period. Berger/URS has been dilatory in it’s 

obligation to this process. Although Berger/URS is not responsible for the performance of the 

design build contractors, it is responsible for the reporting of deficiencies and making timely 

recommendations to the PCO for corrective actions. Program/project management in this area 

has been conspicuously absent.” 

Six months later, on June 10, 2006, the Chief of the Facilities and Transportation sector issued a 

Letter of Concern to Berger/URS and cited five program management deficiencies. The letter 

also voiced concern that Berger/URS’ performance concerns continue. The letter stated, as one 

of the deficiencies, that Berger/URS had failed to provide well developed execution plans, and 

had especially lagged in its overall program management responsibilities. In particular, the letter 

said, that the government leads feel that Berger/URS’ overall facilities and transportation sector 

Program Manager is not as engaged as he should be despite being in charge of the program for 

14 months. 

Nevertheless, discrepancies in evaluation persisted. On August 20, 2007, GRD facilities and 

transportation sector officials and Berger/URS representatives stated that Berger/URS had 

achieved its purpose in Iraq. A GRD official in the sector identified the primary healthcare 

project as a success; the sector, she said, plans to complete all of the remaining centers, despite 

security issues.

 

2

 SIGIR 06-011 “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Project”, April 29, 2006. 

12
Other Weaknesses in Required Contract 

Administration Practices 

SIGIR found other weaknesses in the implementation of required contract administration 

practices: 

• Funds were obligated for award-fees prior to the determination of the award 

• The contracting officer did not formally transfer authority on the contracts when it 

changed administrative contracting officers 

• The U.S. government agencies did not consistently maintain copies of required 

“Restriction Against Disclosure” statements that all contractor and sub-contractor 

employees must sign under section H-7 of the contracts. 

• Performance monitors participated as voting members in the award-fee boards 

Award-fees Were Obligated Prior to Determination of the Fee 

For the PCOC and SPCOC contracts, SIGIR found that the contracting officers were usually 

obligating the full amount of the award-fee pool on the program management contracts before 

determination of the fee. Chapter 8 of Defense Financial Accounting Service - Indianapolis 

regulation 37-1 states that award-fee-funds should be obligated after determination of the awardfee. In addition, the Army Contracting Agency Award-fee Guide states, “The base fee will be 

budgeted as part of the total contract budget and should be obligated under the basic contract. 

However, the award-fee is a bonafide need of the year in which the ‘decision to pay’ was made. 

Therefore funds for the award-fee are not obligated on the contract until a determination has 

been made by the AFDO that an amount is payable. This results in payment for performance and 

base fee from one fiscal year and payment of part or the entire award-fee with the following 

fiscal year’s funds.” 

Administrative Contracting Authority Was Not Clearly Assigned 

Administrative Contracting Officer authority for the program management contracts was not 

clearly reassigned after the departure of the first administrative contracting officer. 

Administrative contracting officer authority was initially assigned to the Defense Contract 

Management Agency (DCMA) on October 1, 2004. The agreement called for the agency to 

provide contract administration services as described in part 42 of the FAR and further defined 

by the delegation of authority issued by the procuring contracting officer for each delegated 

contract. The contract modification provided a matrix to identify the contract administration 

functions that would be provided by the PCO, the DCMA home offices, and a DCMA team in 

Iraq. According to the Contracting Officer, JCC-I/A later replaced DCMA as the administrative 

contracting officer, but there were no documents in the contract file supporting the delegation. 

The lack of a formal delegation of authority could create a misunderstanding about who is 

responsible for what, particularly given the high rate of turnover of personnel in Iraq. 

13
Disclosure Restriction Statements Were Not Signed and Maintained 

SIGIR also found JCCI/A did not consistently maintain copies of the “Restriction Against 

Disclosure” statements that the contract requires all contractor and sub-contractor employees to 

sign. Section H-7 of the contract contains a clause restricting disclosure of government 

information by contractor and subcontractor employees. The clause requires that the contractor 

keep all information provided by the government or developed by the contractor in relation to a 

project in the strictest confidence, as the information is the sole property of the government. The 

requirement also pertains to sub-contractors. The requirement is necessary because a program 

management contractors’ responsibility includes developing independent government estimates 

and managing government information that should not be disclosed to potential bidders during 

the solicitation process. 

SIGIR found a total of 31 signed non-disclosure statements in the Berger/URS contract file, but 

none in the other contract files. The failure of JCC-I/A to maintain copies of the statements on 

file increases the risk that sensitive project information will be improperly disclosed and the 

solicitation process compromised. 

Performance Monitors Participated in AFEBs 

SIGIR identified several instances in which performance monitors participated as voting 

members in AFEBs, which is a violation of JCC-I/A policy. 

The JCC-I/A award-fee board policy states that performance monitors and other technical 

experts serve in advisory capacity only and may not participate during AFEB discussions.

Performance monitors are deemed not to be members of the AFEB. Nonetheless, SIGIR found 

that some sectors have performance monitors who sit on the board and vote on the ratings. For 

example, senior GRD officials in the electricity sector told SIGIR in July of this year that they 

had allowed performance monitors to sit on award-fee boards in the electricity sector because 

there were only four GRD personnel in the sector. As a result, they had no independent 

personnel they could assign the task. A similar situation also existed in the water sector. 

14
Conclusion and Lessons Learned 

Conclusion 

SIGIR was unable to conclude how well the approach of using contractors to manage contractors 

worked. Our ability to make this assessment was inhibited by the weaknesses in the 

implementation of the contract administration process, particularly with regard to the award-fee 

process. 

The award-fee scores for the program management-support contractors indicate that the 

SPCOC’s were very satisfied with the performance of four of the contractors and slightly less 

satisfied with one. Since SIGIR last reviewed the award-fee process for these contracts in 2005, 

there have been improvements. However, the existing documentation and award-fee results still 

offer only limited conclusions about each contractor’s performance and senior official’s views on 

contractor performance were inconclusive as well. GRD officials generally endorsed the 

contractors as effective and ITAO officials more often expressed dissatisfaction. 

Further, SIGIR noted some weakness in government oversight beyond the award-fee 

documentation issue. These include (1) creating an improper obligation; (2) not formally 

transferring administrative contracting-officer responsibilities for the contracts; and (3) not 

maintaining contractor-signed information disclosure restriction statements in the contract file. 

Lessons Learned 

Because work on these program-management support contracts has ended, or soon will, SIGIR 

make no new recommendations. However, SIGIR provides the following lessons learned: 

• The award-fee process can be an effective tool for creating incentive for contractors to 

strive for superior results. Properly documenting contractor performance in accordance 

with award-fee criteria is essential to making appropriate award-fee judgments. 

• The success of any contractual relationship depends heavily on the quality of the 

direction and oversight given the contractor. When government oversight is lax, the risk 

of problems increases. 

• A prerequisite for assessing the viability of any contract management approach, such as 

using contractors to manage contractors, requires the effective implementation of existing 

contract administration practices and policies. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division provided technical comments on a 

draft of this report. These comments have been incorporated in the report where appropriate. 

A senior JCC-I/A official also stated that JCC-I/A was addressing the award-fee issues discussed 

in the report 

15
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

In March 2007, SIGIR initiated the audit. The overall objectives of this audit were to determine 

the roles and responsibilities assigned to the SPCOCs and the extent to which the U.S. 

government benefited from the services provided by the SPCOCs. Specifically, our reporting 

objectives for this report were to (1) assess contractor performance in managing another 

contractor, and (2) review the effectiveness of the government in managing the contracts. 

SIGIR obtained copies of the seven contract files, which included the contracts, associated 

modifications, and other relevant documentation from the electronic contract files and the hardcopy contract files at JCC-I/A. Some award-fee documentation came from files in the GRD 

sectors. SIGIR reviewed these documents to gather information on the planning and solicitation 

of the contracts during the period of the Coalition Provisional Authority. 

To determine the cost of the SPCOC contracts, SIGIR reviewed financial data obtained from the 

Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) provided by GRD. 

To determine measurements of SPCOC performance, SIGIR interviewed knowledgeable 

personnel from GRD, JCC-I/A, ITAO, and the contractors. SIGIR also reviewed the relevant 

award-fee plans, performance evaluations, award-fee ratings sheets, AFEB recommendations, 

AFDO letters, and contract modifications. In addition, SIGIR reviewed JCC-I/A AFEB policy. 

SIGIR performed this audit from March 30 through September 10, 2007, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

SIGIR reviewed financial data relating to SPCOC contract costs provided by GRD from 

CEFMS. SIGIR did not audit CEFMS3

. 

Prior Coverage 

Prior reports related to program management and award-fees issued by the Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) can accessed on our website 

http://www.sigir.mil. 

• “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management”, (SIGIR), March 

2007 included a history of program management during Iraq reconstruction and found 

that the reconstruction effort required, but did not initially receive, consistent and 

effective oversight. The report also found that policy shifts meant that program managers 

not only met with long periods of uncertainty, but also had to adjust to new systems, 

procedures, and reporting requirements. 

 

3

 For more information on the reliability of data drawn from CEFMS, see GAO report 02-589, “Corps of Engineers 

Making Improvements but Weaknesses Continue”, June, 2002. 

16
• “Award-fee Process for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction” (SIGIR 05-017) 

October 25, 2005 included a review of 18 cost-plus award-fee type contracts funded with 

IRRF and found that the award-fee plans did not include required criteria with definable 

metrics. The review also found that the AFEB recommendations and determinations of 

fees were not documented in sufficient detail to show that the integrity of the award-fee 

process was maintained. 

• “Interim Briefing to the Project and Contracting Office – Iraq and the Joint Contracting 

Command – Iraq on the Audit of the Award-fee Process” (SIGIR 05-010) July 26, 2005 

included an effort to determine if award-fees are adequately reviewed, properly approved, 

and awarded according to established standards. The review found that although policies 

and procedures were established, they were not consistently applied. 

• “Defense Contract Management – DOD’s Lack of Adherence to Key Contracting 

Principles on Iraq Oil Contract Put Government at Risk” (GAO-07-839) July 2007 

included a review to determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DD) paid 

award-fees for the Restore Iraqi Oil contract and followed the award-fee process. The 

finding: DOD did not conduct a formal award-fee board until almost all work was 

complete and did not provide the contractor with formal award-fee feedback. 

• “Defense Acquisitions – DoD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless 

of Acquisition Outcomes” (GAO-06-066) December 2005 included a review to determine 

if award and incentive fees have been used effectively as a tool to achieve DoD’s desired 

acquisition outcomes. The review found that the power of monetary incentives to 

motivate excellent contractor performance and improve acquisition outcomes is diluted 

by the way the department structures and implements incentives. 

• “Program Management in Support of Iraq Reconstruction” (A-2005-0194-ALA) May 

26, 2005 included a review to determine if the Army and PCO had controls and sound 

business processes to provide acquisition and program management support with respect 

to Iraq reconstruction. The review found that additional controls were needed to reduce 

the risk associated with contractors performing inherently governmental functions, real or 

perceived conflicts of interest with contractors overseeing contractors, and award-fee 

plans. 

• “Contractors Overseeing Contractors: Conflicts of Interest Undermine Accountability in 

Iraq” (Joint Report4

) May 18, 2004 examined conflicts of interest in two oversight 

contracts issued by the CPA. The report found that the oversight contractors have close 

business relationships with the construction contractors that they have been hired to 

oversee. 

 

4

 The joint report was prepared for the House Of Representatives Committee on Government Reform and Senate 

Democratic Policy Committee 

17
Appendix B—Acronyms 

ACO Administrative Contracting Officer 

AFEB Award-fee Evaluation Board 

AFDO Award-fee Determining Official 

CEFMS U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

DOD Department of Defense 

GRD Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

IPA-JV Iraq Power Alliance Joint Venture 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan 

JV Joint Venture 

PCO Project and Contracting Office 

PCOC Project and Contracting Office Contractor 

PMO Program Management Office 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SPCO Sector Project and Contracting Office 

SPMO Sector Program Management Office 

SPCOC Sector Project Contracting Office Contractor 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

18
Appendix C—Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for International 

Development 

 Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction 

 Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer, 

 Bureau of Resource Management 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

19
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and 

the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

20
Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, 

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to this report include: 

Benjamin Comfort 

Nadia Shamari 

William Shimp 

Frank Slayton 

Roger M. Williams 

21
SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle 

Director for Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

22