___________ No. 96-1701

___________ Charles Gordon Long, * * Appellant, * * v. * * County of Goodhue, a political * subdivision of the State of * Minnesota; Forest M. * Wipperling, individually and * as Sheriff of Goodhue County; * Dean Albers, individually and * as Chief Deputy of the * Goodhue County Sheriffs * Department; Rick Olander, * individually and as Lieutenant * Appeal from the United States of the Goodhue County Sheriffs * District Court for the Department; Don Skillstad, * District of Minnesota. individually and as Sergeant * of the Goodhue County Sheriffs * [UNPUBLISHED] Department; Hermann Von * Knobelsdorff, individually and * as Sergeant of the Goodhue * County Sheriffs Department; * Doe, One; Doe, Two, * individually and as jailer of * the Goodhue County Sheriffs * Department, jointly and * severally, * *

Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: January 6, 1997 Filed: January 10, 1997

___________ Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

### The Honorable Michael James Davis, United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report an d recomm endationof the Honorable John M. Mason, United State s Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. Charles Gordon Long appeals from the district court's orde r 1 dismissing this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We affirm.

Long, a pretrial detainee confined in the Goodhue County Jai l beginning December 24 , 1994, brought this section 1983 action against the Countyof Goodhue, and its sheriff and deputies, contesting policies and practices at the coun ty jail. Long claimed that defendants individually, and in conspiracy, intentionally violated his constitutional rights b y subj ecting him to certain jail conditions. He sought injunctive an d declaratory relief, damages, and a jury trial.

Defend ants answered, and moved to dismiss or alternatively fo r summaryjudgment. Defendants argued that Long did not allege any actual injury or pain, that he failed to state an actionable Eighth Amendment or FourteenthAmendment claim, and that defendants were immune. Defendants attached affidavits in support.
The magistrate judge granted Long's request for an extension of time to respond to allow him to research case law. In his response to th e summary judgment moti on, Long argued that because the time for completing discovery had not pas sed, the only issue properly before the court was an
ass ertion of qualified immunity by defendants in their individua l capacities, but that there was a genuine issue o f material fact as to each alleged violation. Long further asserted that damages for these violation s could be presumed. L ong also moved to strike the affidavits and exhibits from defendants' summary judgment motion.
The magistrate judge recommended "dismissal" of the complaint b ecause Long had "not satisfied his burden of setting fo rth specific facts showing that there [was] a genuine issue for trial."

### -3-

(Appellee's Addendum at 5.) With respect to Long's motion to strike, the magistrate judge concluded that defendants had not failed to comply with Federal Ru le of Civil Procedure 12 by filing their motion after thei r
answer , and that their affidavits and exhibits were relevant an d adm issible. The district court, conducting de novo review, adopted th e magistrate judge's re port over Long's objections, and granted defendants' "motion to dismiss," denied Long's motion to strike, and dismissed th e complaint with prejudice.

Alth oughthe magistrate judge and the district court's orde r contai ned "dismissal" language, it is apparent that the district cour t considered evidence presented outside the pleadings, properly converted th e motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, a nd resolved the case using the summary judgment standard. Under the plain language of Rule 12(c), a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought after the pleadings ar e closed, and should be treated as a motion for summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are presented. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). This is precisely what occurred here.

We kno w of no requirement that summary judgment must await th e deadline for completi on of discovery. Had Long been unable to respond to the su mmary judgment motion because he needed additional discovery, th e proper procedure would have been to seek a continuance under Rule 56(f). When Long moved for an extension of time to respond to the summary judgmen t motion, he made no mention of a need for additional discovery; he stated that he needed more time to research case law an d that he intended to move for leave to amend his complaint to add causes o f action arising after the date of hi s complaint. In addition, Long had not indicated what fact s discoverywould yield, only that it was possible discovery could turn up a factual dispute, an d that he should have been granted leave to amend to incorporate those add itional facts. Thus, we conclude the district court committed no procedural error.

### -4- We need not address the merits of the summary judgment motion b ecause Long has not argued the merits in his appellate brief; arguments no t briefed are considered abandoned. See Fed. R. A pp. P. 28(a); Primary Care Investors, Seven, Inc. v. PHP Healthcare Corp. , 986 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1993) (appellate review of issue waived where appellants' brief faile d to provide legal supp ort); Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp. , 765 F.2d 736, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1985)(same).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.