NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZACHARY WAYNE SNOW, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CORIZON HEALTHCARE, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-35520 

D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00305-DCN 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2021**

Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.

Idaho state prisoner Zachary Wayne Snow appeals pro se from the district 

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from a failure to disclose all side effects 

of his medication. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 25 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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novo. Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 

(9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We vacate 

and remand. 

The district court properly dismissed Snow’s action because Snow failed to 

allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim against Corizon under any 

potentially applicable standard. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must 

present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also 

Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 

(discussing requirements to establish liability under Monell v. Department of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 

1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (a private entity is liable under § 1983 only if the entity acted 

under color of state law and a constitutional violation was caused by the entity’s 

official policy or custom); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(requirements for establishing supervisory liability). 

However, dismissal without leave to amend of Snow’s Fourteenth 

Amendment claim was premature because it is not “absolutely clear” that any 

deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (leave to amend should be given unless the 
 3 20-35520 

deficiencies in the complaint cannot be cured by amendment). Snow alleged that 

he filled out an Inmate Concern Form asking whether there were any side effects 

of his medications not listed on the medication consent form, and a staff member 

responded that the consent form included all side effects. Subsequently, Snow 

experienced serotonin syndrome, a rare but severe side effect that left him 

hospitalized for about one month. The prison then indicated that it would amend 

the consent form to make clear that not all side effects are listed in order to provide 

patients with an opportunity to ask questions regarding those additional side effects 

and obtain information on them as needed. With notice of the deficiencies from 

the district court, Snow may be able to allege a claim against Corizon or individual 

medical providers or prison officials for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 

right to refuse medical treatment. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 17 F.3d 1202, 1212 

(9th Cir. 2012) (before dismissing a pro se complaint, the district court must 

provide the litigant notice of the deficiencies to allow the litigant an opportunity to 

amend effectively); cf. Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The 

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects a person’s 

rights . . . to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and to receive sufficient 

information to exercise these rights intelligently.” (citations omitted)). We vacate 

the judgment and remand for the district court to provide Snow with an opportunity 

to amend his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
 4 20-35520 

Snow’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry No. 3) is denied. 

However, we recommend that the district court consider appointing pro bono 

counsel to assist Snow in alleging his Fourteenth Amendment claim. 

The Clerk will file the opening brief submitted at Docket Entry No. 5. 

VACATED and REMANDED.