COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Frank, Kelsey and Beales Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

KIMBERLY J. HOSIER MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0767-06-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY FEBRUARY 20, 2007 CHARLES S. HOSIER

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TH E CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH William R. O’Brien, Judge Cynthia L. Ewing (Domingo J. Rivera; The Ewing Law Firm, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. Jill Roseland Harris (Kaufman & Canoles, P.C., on brief), for appellee.

Appealing a final divorce decree, Kimberly J. Hosier argues that the decree undervalued her separate interest in the marital home. She also contends the trial court ordered a premature sale of real and personal property, miscalculated spousal and child support, abused its discretion in failing to award attorney fees , and unlawfully held her in cont empt of court. Finding these arguments either waived or meritless, we affirm.

I. On appeal, we consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reas onable inferences.” Congdon v. Congdon , 40 Va. App. 255, 258, 578 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2003) (citations omitted). “T hat principle requires us to discard the evidence of the appellant which conflicts, either directly or inferentially, with the evidence presented by the appellee at trial.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marked omitted).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - So viewed, the record shows Kimberly and Ch arles Hosier married in 1997 and separated in 2004. They had two children. A couple of ye ars into the marriage, wife contributed $19,159 of separate funds to the purchase of a home. She and husband financed the remainder of the $428,000 purchase price with first and second mortgages. The parties later increased and

refinanced that debt with an equity line of credit secured against the home. Prior to trial, husband submitted a proposed trial exhibit (exchanged between counsel pursuant to the pretrial scheduling order) assertin g that he, not wife, made the initial, separate contribution and that his separate interest should be calculated using the Brandenburg formula. 1 Wife submitted a similar exhibit claiming she ma de the initial contribution and should receive the benefit of the Brandenburg formula. About a week before trial, husband’s counsel received discovery responses providing documentary evidence proving the down payment came from wife’s separate funds. At trial, husband ac knowledged wife’s allegati on as accurate and argued that, under such circumstances, the home equ ity should be evenly divided between them. The trial court rejected wife’s argument for a Brandenburg calculation, concluding that it “would yield a result that is in equitable, unfair and unjust.” Th e court also refused to simply ignore wife’s separate contribution, as husband suggested with his request for a 50/50 split. Fashioning a classification and distribution remedy between the two competing positions, the court ordered the home sold and the appreciation in the value of the home apportioned between the parties pursuant to a “net percentage gain” fo rmula. Under this formula, the property would be listed with an agent agreed to by the parties within 10 days of the entry of this Decree. The ag ent will forthwith prepare a “good

1 We have held “that the Brandenburg formula is an acceptable method of tracing and determining the value of the ma rital and separate property com ponents of hybrid property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(3).” Hart v. Hart , 27 Va. App. 46, 66, 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (1998) (discussing the method employed and adopted in Brandenburg v. Brandenburg , 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)). It is not, however, the only acceptable method. See Keeling v. Keeling , 47 Va. App. 484, 490, 624 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2006).- 3 - faith” estimate of the net proceeds of the sale at its listed price. Either party may compel the othe r party to accept any offer which yields 95% of the projected net proceeds of the “good faith” estimate. Upon closing of the sa le, the actual net proceeds will be divided as follows: The parties will determine the “net gain percentage” by comparing the purchas e price to the net proceeds of the sale. Plaintiff’s [wife’s] pre-marital contribution of $19,159.00 would be increased by that per centage increase. That amount would be deducted from the net proc eeds and credited to Plaintiff. The remaining balance would be di vided equally on a 50-50 basis. Final Decree of Divorce, Mar. 8, 2006, at 4-5. The trial court also rejected wife’s request for time to put together a purchase plan to buy out husband’s interest in the home, thus allowing her and the children to continue to live there. The evidence, the trial court found, proved it “w ould be highly unlikely” she could raise the funds necessary to purchase husband’s interest and would be, in any event, “unnecessarily time consuming” to grant her request. At trial, the parties advised the court that a dispute over “about four items” of personal property would be addressed thr ough mediation. The trial court accepted this representation and included a provision in the final de cree giving the parties 60 days to mediate an agreed division of all disputed personal property. If mediation failed to resolve the contest, the decree ordered that the personal property be sold at public auct ion and the proceeds divided evenly between the parties. The trial court ordered that husband pay spous al and child support. The spousal support award would be for a defined duration, $2,500 per month for 30 months, because of the relatively short term of the marriage and wife’s ab ility to find employment in the future. The court heard conflicting evidence on husband’ s earning capacity, a problem caused by his employment as a pilot for a bankrupt airline. The final divorce decree required both parties to pay their own atto rney fees, rejecting

wife’s claim that she should be awarded fees for successfully bringi ng the divorce suit. In- 4 - denying this request, the trial court noted the pr ior “orders of the Court and the awards as granted” for the benefit of wife. Following the entry of the final divorce decree, the trial court found wife in contempt for violating the directive to sell the home through an agent “agreed to” by the parties. The court held that it had, at an earlier hearing conducte d on February 17, 2006, orally ordered wife to participate in the process for choosing an agen t and to submit two proposed names by February 20. Instead of complying, wife fired her counsel and refused to endorse an order prepared by

husband’s counsel.

II.

A. V ALUATION OF W IFE ’ S S EPARATE I NTEREST IN THE M ARITAL H OME On appeal, wife asserts two reasons for claiming the trial court undervalued her separate

interest in the marital home. We find neither persuasive. Equitable Estoppel . Asserting equitable estoppel princi ples, wife claims the trial court had no choice but to employ the Brandenburg formula because she relied to her detriment on husband’s submission of a pretrial exhibit employ ing that formula, albeit mistakenly, in his favor. We disagree. Absent proof of fraud or deception, equitable estoppel requires a showing that one party detrimentally relied on a representation made by another. See Waynesboro Village v. BMC Properties , 255 Va. 75, 82, 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1998). The only representation here was husband’s pretrial submission of an exhibit he might offer at trial. Nothing about that exhibit represented that, if the factua l assumption underlying it failed, hus band would still insist on its admission (directly contrary to his own interests) and thereby relieve wife from the advocacy task of persuading the trial court to use the Brandenburg formula.- 5 - Even if such a representation had been made , wife did not show any detrimental reliance on it. She advocated at trial for the Brandenburg formula, the most favorable legal theory

available to her. She could have done nothing better had she known before trial that husband would later withdraw his proposed exhibit. Perhaps so, wife argues, but she may have changed her litigation strategy if she had known husba nd would not concede the applicability of Brandenburg . She proffered no alternativ e stratagems to the trial court, however. Nor did she

ever ask for a recess of the trial or for leave to keep the evidence open so she could reconsider her litigation strategy. When asked at oral ar gument on appeal to hypothesize how her trial strategy might have changed, she could offer no an swer. No showing of detrimental reliance, therefore, has been made e ither at trial or on appeal. Under such circumstances, we hold that wife did not present to th e trial court “clear, precise and unequivocal evidence, ” Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc. , 42 Va. App. 628, 640, 593 S.E.2d 568, 574 (2004) (citation omitted), sufficient to require the application of the equitable estoppel doctrine. The doctrine “is applied rarely and only from necessity,” Webb v. Webb , 16 Va. App. 486, 495, 431 S.E.2d 55, 61 (1993) (citation om itted), and the trial court in this case did not err in finding it inapplicable here.

Intrinsic Fairness

. Wife also challenges the intrinsic fairness of the trial court’s decision. On this issue, we reject wife’s argument mostly because we disagree with her interpretation of the trial court’s decision. Wife reads the phrase “actual net proceeds” to mean the gross sale price reduced by both the transacti onal costs (closing costs, attorney fees, and the like) and the mortgage indebtedness. This interpre tation fails to take into account the trial court’s use of the phrase “projected net proceed s” one sentence earlier. The “projected net proceeds” differ from the “actual net proceeds” only in that the agent estimates the former based upon a hypothetical sale but calculates th e latter based upon an actual sale.- 6 - The trial court used the “projected net procee ds” concept to define the circumstances in

which either husband or wife could force the ot her to accept a third-party’s purchase offer. “Either party may compel the ot her party,” the court decreed, “t o accept any offer which yields 95% of the projected net proceeds of the ‘good faith’ estimate” made by the real estate agent based on the net proceeds of a sale at its list ed price. Under wife’s interpretation, the compulsory offer must yi eld 95% of the sellers’ equity (taking into account the various lienholder interests). We think the better interpretation is that the compulsory offer must yield 95% of the projected net proceeds of the sale without consid eration of any secured debt. A third-party buyer would not make a purchase price offer based on th e sellers’ equity, a highly variable figure which the buyer may or may not kno w anything about. Nor is it like ly the trial court intended to overly complicate the compulsory acceptance provision by separa ting the calculation of the nonequity portion of the net sales proceeds (for which only a 100% offer could suffice) from the equity portion of the net sales proceeds (for wh ich a 95% yield would suff ice). Rather, the trial court sought only to eliminate th e impact of a commonly negotiate d variable — the allocation of

transactional costs. For these reasons, we conclude wife’s chal lenge to the trial court’s valuation decision misinterprets the decision as being more disfa vorable than it actually is. Using a consistent meaning for the phrase “net proceeds,” the decree star ts the calculation of wife’s separate interest with the “actual net proceeds”

⎯ meaning the gross sale price less the sellers’ transactional costs. This figure would then be compared to the initial purchase pri ce paid by husband and wife to arrive at a “net gain percentage,” the home’s appreciation over the term of the marriage. That appreciation percentage would be applied to the wife’s sepa rate contribution of $19,159, giving it exactly the same return on investment she woul d have had if she had purchased another asset- 7 - worth $19,159 with a similar appreciation in value. Under the decree, wife’s separate interest would then be given to her directly out of the actual net proceeds at closing. 2 The remaining value (representing the marital interest less the li enholder debt balance) w ould be divided evenly between the parties. The trial court returned wife’s separate interest with the same percentage increase enjoyed by the total investment, t hus recognizing wife’s role in pur chasing the asset. The marital

interest in the home likewise received the benefi t of market appreciation, thus recognizing the costs associated with holding th e investment (a precondition to its appreciation) during the term of the marriage

⎯ including debt maintenance, which is mos tly interest in the early stages of the amortization schedule, as well as dur ational costs like insu rance premiums and real estate taxes. In this way, the trial court’s methodology prudently balanced the financia l expectancies related to capital acquisition costs (supported entirely by wife’s separate interest) and asset retention costs (supported entirely by marital interests).

The trial court thus determined wife’s se parate property, altho ugh commingled into newly acquired property, wa s adequately traced, see Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(e), and that she was

entitled to “the value of th e contributed property.” See Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(g). The court then found that the percentage increase in value fa irly attributable to wife ’s separate investment matched the percentage increase in the market value of the home. See Martin v. Martin , 27 Va. App. 745, 754, 501 S.E.2d 450, 454 (1998) (requiring trial courts to “calculate the increase in value” of the “separate property share of the marital residence”).

2 Given the appreciation in the value of the home, the net proc eeds of the sale will amply cover both wife’s separate share and any indebtedness owed to li enholders. Consequently, this case does not present a situation where the separate interest holder must compete with third-party lienors over insufficient funds.- 8 - The trial court’s decision, as we read it, ca nnot be fairly critici zed as an abuse of discretion. As the trial court observed, its discretion was not lim ited to applying the Brandenburg formula in cases in which doing so would produce an inequitable result. In taking this approach, the trial court’s reasoning presaged our holding in Keeling v. Keeling , 47 Va. App. 484, 624 S.E.2d 687 (2006), which eschew ed the common, but mistaken, view of Brandenburg as the exclusive method of valuing sepa rate interests in appreciating assets. 3

B. T HE T IMING OF THE S ALE OF THE M ARITAL H OME Wife also challenges the trial court’s findi ng that her “request to purchase the property would be highly unlikely and unnece ssarily time consuming.” On th is basis, the court ordered the home to be immediately sold on the open market. Under Code § 20-107.3(C), a trial court has wide discretion either to order the sale of marital property or to permit one of the parties to buy out the other’s share. We review the trial

court’s decision on this issue under the abuse-o f-discretion standard, wh ich “if nothing else, means that the trial judge’s ‘ruling will not be reversed simply because an appellate court disagrees.’” Thomas v. Commonwealth , 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Indisc retion About Discretion , 31 Emory L.J. 747, 754 (1982)), adopted upon reh’g en banc , 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005). Only on matters in which “reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Robbins v. Robbins , 48 Va. App. 466, 482, 632 S.E.2d 615, 623 (2006) (citation omitted).

3 Our interpretation of the trial court’s decision necessarily addresses wife’s assertion that the valuation model was arbitrarily manipulated by the refinancing and equity line-of-credit loans taken against the property duri ng the term of the marriage. As we construe it, the valuation model gave the debt/equity ratio no role in the calculation of wife’s separate interest. To the extent equity in the home was liquidated duri ng the marriage through refinancing or draws on secured lines of credit, this diminution a ffected the distributable equity value only after wife recovered her appreciated separate interest.- 9 - It cannot be said here that the trial court abused its disc retion. Despite wife’s stated desire to retain the marital home, she provided lim ited evidence in support of her ability to do so. At trial, she spoke of the possi bility of obtaining funds from he r mother who had expressed some willingness to help buy husband’s share of the home. “She is open to that,” wife testified, and “I would like for that to happen.” The trial cour t, however, understandably found this evidence vague and unpersuasive. Given the magnit ude of the indebtedness to be assumed, 4 the court acted within its factfinding disc retion in concluding wife did not possess the ability to purchase the home in a timely manner. It necessarily follow s that the court likewise did not err in ordering that the home be sold on the open market promptly after the entry of th e final divorce decree.

C. P UBLIC A UCTION OF P ERSONAL P ROPERTY The trial court’s final decree gave the parties, at their joint request, 60 days to mediate an agreed division of “about four items ” of disputed personal property. 5 If mediation failed to resolve the dispute, the decree or dered that the personal property be sold at public auction and the proceeds divided evenly between the parties. The only objection to this provisi on raised in the trial court was wife’s assertion that this topic was not “subject to the Cour t’s jurisdiction” because the part ies “agreed they would resolve such disputes through mediation or otherwise, an d therefore, that matter is decided.” Limiting

4 See generally Bomar v. Bomar , 45 Va. App. 229, 236, 609 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2005) (noting that “Code § 20-107.3(C) em powers the trial judge to order, as a condition of transferring jointly owned marital pr operty, that the receiving party ‘assu me any indebtedness secured by the property’” so as to “not leave the other party at ri sk of financial ruin if the receiving party is not financially responsible”).

5 Wife’s post-trial brief, accepted by the trial court as a substitute for closing argument, represented that the parties “ag reed” that they would “divide their personal property (household items, furniture, and equipment) through mediation . . . .” (Emphasis added). The trial court no doubt understood the expression “the ir” property to mean marital property. Likewise, the need to “divide” the property connotes an agreement on the distribution, not cl assification, of such property.- 10 - our answer to this question, 6 we hold that the issue does not pr esent a jurisdictional question of any kind. See generally De Avies v. De Avies , 42 Va. App. 342, 345, 592 S.E.2d 351, 352 (2004) ( en banc ) (explaining “the subtle, but crucial, di fference between the power of a court to adjudicate a specified class of cases, commonly known as ‘subject matter jurisdic tion,’ and the authority of a court to exercise that power in a particular case” (citation omitted)); see also Najera v. Chesapeake Div. of Soc. Servs. , 48 Va. App. 237, 241-42, 629 S.E.2d 721, 723 (2006). Whether or not the parties resolved the personal property issue “through mediation or otherwise,” the trial court re tained jurisdiction under Code § 20-107.3 to distribute marital personal property in the event the parties fa iled to accomplish that task voluntarily.

D. S POUSAL & C HILD S UPPORT C ALCULATIONS Wife challenges the trial court’s calculat ion of spousal and child support awards, claiming they rest upon an understated estimate of husband’s monthly income to be $11,092.14. Wife also contests the trial court’s spousal suppor t award, arguing the trial court failed to weigh properly the governing factors ou tlined in Code § 20-107.1(E). We find no merit in either argument. At a hearing after trial, but before issui ng the final decree, th e court took additional

evidence on husband’s income. This additional h earing was due to a renegotiated “Letter of Agreement” between the bankrupt airline and th e Air Line Pilots Association. Among other things, the new agreement included a 23.9% pay cut and the elimination of overtime pay. Even

6 In her appellate brief, wife argues that the trial court had no authority to order the public auction of the personal property because doing so (i) went bey ond the oral ruling delivered by the trial court at the equitable di stribution hearing, and (ii) violat ed the trial court’s preliminary duty, yet unfulfilled, to classify the personal proper ty. The record reveals that neither of these two assertions was made in the trial court and, thus, cannot be successfully raised for the first time on appeal. Under Rule 5A:18, we will not consider “an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial c ourt.” Budnick v. Budnick , 42 Va. App. 823, 843, 595 S.E.2d 50, 60 (2004) (citation omitted).- 11 - accepting this evidence at face value, wife argues, the “‘math’ adopted by the trial court does not add up.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Without argui ng income should be imputed to husband, wife argues simply that a 23.9% pay cut could not reduce a monthly income from $16,115 to $11,092.14. We disagree with wife’s implicit asserti on that the trial court needed to base the current income calculation on husband’s past income. Given the newly negotiated employment agre ement, the trial court started the income calculation from scratch. The court accepted husb and’s representation that he worked an average of 81 hours per month. The new employment ag reement set husband’s hourly rate at $136.94 and disallowed overtime pay. Mu ltiplying the hours times the rate, the court concluded husband’s anticipated monthly pay to be $11,092.14. 7 “If it changes in six months or three months or two years,” the trial court noted, then “there is action that ca n be taken by counsel to

take care of that.” “We will reverse the trial court only when its decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Northcutt v. Northcutt , 39 Va. App. 192, 196, 571 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2002) (quoting Moreno v. Moreno , 24 Va. App. 190, 194-95, 480 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1997)). Here, husband’s testimony and the terms of hi s new employment agreement support the trial court’s factual finding as to his income. Wife’s challenge to the trial court’s consid eration of the statutory factors governing spousal support under Code § 20-10 7.1 likewise fails. On this issu e, the court found wife had no income at the time of trial but was “receiving ed ucation to improve herself” pursuant to an understanding of the “parties pr ior to the separation.” A de fined-duration award, the court reasoned, was appropriate given the “good health and age of the wife and her ability to generate

7 This figure excludes husband’s per diem e xpense reimbursement paid at $1.85 per hour (averaging $389 per month).- 12 - income as a result of her education,” which in cluded a degree in architecture from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. The court also took into account the “relativel y short duration of the marriage.” The trial court thus id entified several subsect ion E factors as the “basis for the nature,

amount and duration” of the award. See Code § 20-107.1(F). As we have often said, “Whether and how mu ch spousal support wi ll be awarded is a matter of discretion for the trial court.” Congdon , 40 Va. App. at 262, 578 S.E.2d at 836 (citation omitted). The trial cour t is not “required to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to each of the statutory factors.” Miller v. Cox , 44 Va. App. 674, 679, 607 S.E.2d 126, 128 (2005) (quoting Woolley v. Woolley , 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986)). “On appeal, a trial court’s decision on this subject will not be reversed ‘unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’” Congdon , 40 Va. App. at 262, 578 S.E.2d at 836 (citation omitted). Given the evidence in this case, we ca nnot find the trial court’s support award to be an

abuse of discretion.

E. D ENIAL OF A TTORNEY F EES TO W IFE Whether to award attorney fees “is a matter submitted to th e sound discretion of the trial

court and is reviewable on a ppeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Smith v. Smith , 43 Va. App. 279, 290, 597 S.E.2d 250, 256 (2004) (quoting Kane v. Szymczak , 41 Va. App. 365, 375, 585 S.E.2d 349, 354 (2003)). “Given the unique equities of each case, our appellate review steers

clear of inflexible rules and fo cuses instead on ‘reasonableness unde r all the circumstances.’” Id. (citation omitted). Our review of the record reveals ample grounds for denying attorney fees to wife. Prior to trial, the court had to compel wife to repl y to discovery, to provide proof she had attended a court-ordered parent educati on seminar, and to attend a me diation orientation session in compliance with its mediation orde r. Just prior to trial, wi fe moved for a continuance — a- 13 - request the trial court denied. Wife also failed to comply wi th a pretrial scheduling order requiring counsel to “exchange 15 days before trial a list specifically identifying each exhibit . . . and a list of witnesses proposed to be introduced at trial.” Pretrial Order, Apr. 29, 2005, at 2. Given these circumstances, the trial court did no t abuse its discretion in denying wife an award of attorney fees.

F. O RDER F INDING W IFE IN C ONTEMPT Finally, wife asserts the trial court erred in finding her in contempt of court. The contempt finding stems from two orders: one deli vered orally from the bench, the other written

into the final divorce decree. The trial court i ssued an oral order at a hearing on February 17, 2006, directing wife to provide the names of two real estate agents to husband by 5:00 p.m. on February 20, 2006. Husband’s counsel, the court instructed, would then randomly select from wife’s two recommended agents and two others suggested by husband. 8 Instead of complying with the court’s directive, wife fired her c ounsel and refused to e ndorse the written order prepared by husband’s counsel for presentation to the court. Meanwhile, the trial court entered a final divo rce decree directing bot h parties, within 10 days of the decree, to list the home for sale “with an agent agreed to” by the litigants. At a later hearing on March 31, 2006, the court found wife in contempt for violating its previous order delivered from the bench on February 17

⎯ which placed her in further breach of the March 8 decree requiring the parties to list the property with the agent for sa le. The court also entered the written order previously circul ated, albeit unsuccessfully, to wife’s counsel for endorsement.

8 Wife suggests on brief that the deadline in the decree somehow superseded the earlier deadline (February 20) imposed by the court in its oral order of February 17. The deadlines, however, address two separate requ irements. The February 20 deadline required wife to provide husband’s counsel with a list of two suggested agents. The la ter 10-day deadline set by the decree required the parties to list the property for sale through the previously chosen agent.- 14 - Wife characterizes the court’s contempt finding as an improper nunc pro tunc ruling punishing her for “violating requirements that did not exist at the time of the ruling.” Appellant’s Br. at 26. By this , she apparently means that no contempt could logically exist because her allegedly contemptuous behavior pr eceded the March 31 written order. This argument, however, misapprehends the trial court’ s decision. The court found wife in contempt for violating its February 17 oral order (which required complianc e no later than February 20). This disobedience placed her in further contempt of the final decree issued on March 8. The trial

court did not find wife in contem pt for violating its March 31 writt en order, which simply put in print the oral order previously made from the bench. 9 Trial courts have authority to make oral orders from the bench. If sufficiently specific, an oral order may be enforced th rough the court’s contempt powers. 10 Contempt powers apply to a court’s “oral orders, commands and directions” no less than to its written orders. Robertson v.

Commonwealth , 181 Va. 520, 537, 25 S.E.2d 352, 359 (1943); see also Newell v. Dep’t of

Mental Retardation , 843 N.E.2d 1084, 1099 (Mass. 2006) (“Oral orders may, of course, support a contempt finding.”). The entry of a later writte n order does not affect the enforceability of an

oral order from the bench. See generally First Midwest Bank/Danville v. Hoagland , 613 N.E.2d 277, 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that, where a litigant understands an oral order to have immediate effect, he “may not escape punishment for contempt merely because the order was not

9 Wife also raises Rule 1:1, claiming the tria l court lacked jurisdiction to enter the March 31, 2006 nunc pro tunc order because more than 21 days ha d passed since the entry of the final divorce decree on March 8, 2006. Rule 1:1, however, does not apply to contempt findings after the entry of the final divorce decree. See Code § 20-107.3(K)(2).

10 In this respect, oral orders are no different than written orders for contempt purposes. “As a general rule, ‘before a pers on may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must be expressed rather than implied.’” Ange v. York/Poquoson Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 37 Va. App. 615, 627, 560 S.E.2d 474, 480 (2002) (citations omitted).- 15 - reduced to writing”); 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 113, at 489 (2004) (citing, inter alia , Robertson , 181 Va. at 537, 25 S.E.2d at 359). Were it ot herwise, a litigant c ould disobey an oral order with impunity and immunize himself from punishment by delaying the entry of the written order until after the contemptuous behavior has run its course. For these reasons, the trial cour t did not err in finding wife in contempt for violating its February 17 oral order, thus plac ing her in further contempt of the court’s final decree issued on

March 8. 11

III. In sum, we hold the trial court (a) reasonabl y calculated the value of wife’s separate interest in the marital home, (b) did not err in ordering the home sold on the open market, (c) had jurisdiction to require the sale of personal prope rty, (d) acted within its factfinding discretion in awarding child and spousal support, (e) properly declined wife’s re quest for an award of attorney fees, and (f) did not abuse its discre tion in finding wife in contempt.

Affirmed.

11 On brief, wife also suggests husband did not file an appropriate show-cause notice in advance of the hearing. Wife, however, did not object at the hearing on this ground. We do not address this contention. See Rule 5A:18; see also Hoagland , 613 N.E.2d at 287 (“An alleged contemnor may waive formal written notice by voluntarily appearing in court and defending against the charge.”).