United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Remy Floreal, Plaintiff,

v.

State Attorney / Prosecutor, 

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil Action No. 20-23360-Civ-Scola

Order

This matter is before the Court upon an independent review of the record 

and a screening of the complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff Remy Floreal, a pretrial detainee, has filed a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Defendant, an 

unnamed prosecutor, has violated his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights through an unlawful arrest and continued detention. (ECF No. 1.) The

Plaintiff has listed “State Attorney/Prosecutor” as the Defendant. (Id.) Although 

this matter was automatically referred to United States Magistrate Judge Lisette 

M. Reid pursuant to Administrative Order 2019-2, the Court sua sponte 

withdrew the referral on September 4, 2020.

I. Background

The Plaintiff is presently being held at the Miami-Dade County Pretrial 

Detention Center. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) On June 4, 2019, the Plaintiff was arrested 

for an armed robbery and remained in custody until July 8, 2019 when he was

released on his own recognizance. (Id. at 4.) According to the Plaintiff, the case 

was closed on July 15, 2019 for lack of evidence. (Id.) On July 24, 2019, 

unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, the charges were refiled. (Id.) The Plaintiff alleges 

that his attorney had no contact with him and conducted hearings without him. 

(Id.) On November 7, 2019, the Plaintiff was arrested for driving with an expired 

tag. (Id. at 5.) After his arrest, he was unable to “bond out” and was not told why. 

(Id.) He then learned that the armed robbery case had been refiled. (Id.)

Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages in the amount of $8 million from 

Defendant in his official capacity. (Id.) He claims to have “suffered mental 

anguish, psychological distress, deprivation of [his] freedom and emotional 

distress.” (Id.)

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), where a plaintiff is proceeding in 

forma pauperis, the complaint must be dismissed if the court determines that 

Case 1:20-cv-23360-RNS Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/23/2020 Page 1 of 4
the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Wright v. 

Miranda, 740 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018). Pursuant to Section 1915, a 

case is also subject to dismissal where a plaintiff seeks redress from the 

government if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

Id.

In reviewing the complaint under § 1915(e), the court takes the allegations 

as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Maps 

v. Miami Dade State Attorney, 693 F. App’x 784, 785 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). 

Complaints filed by pro se prisoners are held to “less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972)(per curiam). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), courts may dismiss as frivolous 

claims that are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or "whose 

factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 

(1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 

1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).

In order to “avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must 

contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.”

Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Waldman v. 

Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). Although a pro se 

pleading is liberally construed, it must still “suggest that there is some factual 

support for a claim.” Id.

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was 

deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Griffin 

v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Furthermore, the same standards govern dismissal for failure to state a 

claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and dismissal for failure to state a claim under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Thus, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court may dismiss a complaint that 

fails “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

Although federal courts give liberal construction to pro se pleadings, courts 

“nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. 

Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). 

Rule 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). There is no 

required technical form, but “each allegation must be simple, concise, and 

direct.” Id. at 8(d)(1). The statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what 

Case 1:20-cv-23360-RNS Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/23/2020 Page 2 of 4
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 550 U.S. 544 at 555

(quotation omitted) (ellipses in original). Additionally, each separate claim should 

be presented in a separate numbered paragraph, with each paragraph “limited 

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

“Precedent also teaches, however, that a court, of course, should not 

abandon its neutral role and begin creating arguments for a party, even an 

unrepresented one.” Sims v. Hastings, 375 F.Supp.2d 715, 718 (N.D. Ill. 2005)

(citing Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001)). When read 

liberally, a pro se pleading “should be interpreted ‘to raise the strongest 

arguments that [it] suggest[s].’” Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 

1996) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).

III. Discussion

The Plaintiff is only seeking punitive damages; therefore the complaint

should be dismissed because the Defendant has absolute immunity from § 1983 

suits for damages. A prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for all actions 

that he takes while performing his function as an advocate for the state or 

government. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 837B38 (11th Cir. 2010), 

affirmed by Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 132 (2012). A prosecutor is charged 

with initiation of criminal prosecution, appearance in judicial proceedings, and 

prosecutorial conduct before grand juries. Id. A prosecutor is not entitled to 

absolute immunity for fabricating evidence, as investigating and gathering 

evidence falls outside the prosecutorial function, though he may be entitled to 

qualified immunity for such conduct. Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 841. The prosecutor, 

however, is absolutely immune from suit for his actions in this case because his 

actions all related to his role as an advocate for the state. See Rehberg, 611 F.3d 

at 837B38; Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1279B80; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 

409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and presenting the state ’s case, 

the prosecutor is immune from civil suit for damages under ' 1983.”). Here, the 

complaint does not allege that the prosecutors engaged in misconduct outside 

the bounds of prosecutorial immunity. See Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 837B38, 841.

The only inferable action of the prosecutor is a decision to charge Plaintiff with 

armed robbery and to then refile the charges. These actions are clearly within 

the realm of initiating prosecution for which he is immune from suit.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the claim against the Defendant is dismissed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because the defendant is immune from suit (ECF No. 

1). Any pending motions are denied as moot. The Clerk is directed to close this 

case and mail a copy of this Order to the Defendant at the address listed below.

Case 1:20-cv-23360-RNS Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/23/2020 Page 3 of 4
Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on September 22, 

2020.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Copies, via U.S. Mail, to:

Remy Floreal

190166484

Miami-Dade County-PDC

Pretrial Detention Center

Inmate Mail/Parcels

1321 NW 13th Street

Miami, FL 33125

Case 1:20-cv-23360-RNS Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/23/2020 Page 4 of 4