alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NRC NEWS

 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

 Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200

 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov 

 Web Site: www.nrc.gov

No. 02-016 February 12, 2002

NRC PROPOSES ADDING NUHOMS-24PT1

STORAGE CASK DESIGN TO APPROVED LIST

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing to amend its regulations to add the

Standardized Advanced NUHOMS-24PT1 cask system to the list of several already approved cask

designs that utilities may use -- under a general license and without site-specific approval -- to store

spent fuel at their nuclear power plants.

Under the terms of an NRC general license, any nuclear power reactor operator can use a preapproved cask, if the company notifies the NRC in advance, meets the conditions of the caskís NRC

certificate of compliance, and complies with NRCís regulations. These regulations include a

requirement to ensure that the reactor site characteristics are within the scope of the caskís safety

analysis report and that potential site-boundary radiation doses are within federal safety limits. 

The 24-PT1 certificate would contain conditions for use that are similar to others for 

NRC-approved casks. However, the certificate for each cask design may differ in some specific 

areas, such as operating procedures, training and spent fuel specifications.

The NRC staff performed a detailed evaluation of the request for approval of the 24-PT1 cask

design and found that, if the conditions specified in the certificate of compliance are met, adequate

protection of public health and safety and the environment would be maintained. 

Interested persons are invited to submit written comments on the proposed amendments (which

are to Part 72 of the Commissionís regulations). Comments should be submitted by April 29. The

comments should be addressed to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. Comments may also be submitted

via the NRCís interactive rulemaking web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov .

###
#### Rose M. Myers, Respondent, v. City of New York, Appellant.

Ho opinion. Present—Close, P. J., Carswell, Johnston, Taylor and Lewis, JJ.
§ 113.44 Assent of sureties to an extension of a bond. ( a ) *Extension prescribed by law or regulations.* The assent of the sureties to any extension of the period prescribed in a bond is not necessary when the extension is authorized by law or regulations.
( b ) *Other extension.* The assent of the sureties must be obtained before any extension of the period prescribed in a bond other than an extension authorized by law or regulation, is allowed.
[T.D. 84-213, 49 FR 41171, Oct. 19, 1984, as amended by CBP Dec. 15-15, 80 FR 70167, Nov. 13, 2015]
FILED: July 27, 2016

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7279

SHAIDON BLAKE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL ROSS, Lt.,

Defendant – Appellee,

and

THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; STATE OF MARYLAND; 

M.R.D.C.C.; GARY MAYNARD, Sec.; MICHAEL STOUFFER, Comm.; 

JAMES MADIGAN,

Defendants.

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.

(S. Ct. No. 15-339)

Decided on Remand: July 27, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Remanded by unpublished order. Chief Judge Gregory directed 

entry of the order with the concurrence of Judge Traxler and 

Judge Agee.
2

ORDER

GREGORY, Chief Judge:

Having considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Ross v. 

Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016), we hereby remand this case to the 

district court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court noted 

that the parties “lodged” new materials, review of which is 

generally not within our province. See United States v. 

Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 392 (4th Cir. 1984) (“It is axiomatic 

that it is the role of the factfinder, not the appellate court, 

to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and judge 

the credibility of witnesses.”). Accordingly, on remand, the 

parties may augment the record so that it contains any pertinent 

evidence relating to whether or not the inmate remedies are 

“available.” See Blake, 136 S. Ct. at 1859. It will then be 

before the district court to address this question in the first 

instance.

REMANDED
#### John Deegan, an Infant, etc., Appellant, v. Homer C. Newton, Respondent.

The appellant has failed to show any merits, as required by the special rule of this court, adopted October 4, 1910. (See, also, *Schorr*v. *Weisfeld, ante,*p. 899, decided May 8, 1914.) Decision of the *962motion held for one week for the presentation of proper papers. Present — Jenks, P. J., Burr, Carr, Rich and Putnam, JJ.
§ 350.2 Definitions. As used in this part, the following terms are defined: ( a ) *Administrator* means the Administrator, FEMA, or designee;
( b ) *Regional Administrator* means a Regional Administrator of FEMA, or designee;
( c ) *Deputy Administrator* means the , National Preparedness Directorate, FEMA, or designee;
( d ) *FEMA* means the Federal Emergency Management Agency;
( e ) *NRC* means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
( f ) *EPZ* means Emergency Planning Zone.
( g ) *Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)* is a generic area around a commercial nuclear facility used to assist in offsite emergency planning and the development of a significant response base. For commercial nuclear power plants, EPZs of about 10 and 50 miles are delineated for the plume and ingestion exposure pathways respectively.
( h ) *Plume Exposure Pathway* refers to whole body external exposure to gamma radiation from the plume and from deposited materials and inhalation exposure from the passing radioactive plume. The duration of primary exposures could range in length from hours to days.
( i ) *Ingestion Exposure Pathway* refers to exposure primarily from ingestion of water or foods such as milk and fresh vegetables that have been contaminated with radiation. The duration of primary exposure could range from hours to months.
( j ) *Full participation* refers to an exercise in which: ( 1 ) State and local government emergency personnel are engaged in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the actions required by the accident scenario;
( 2 ) the integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant is tested; and
( 3 ) the implementation of the observable portions of State and/or local plans is tested.
( k ) *Partial participation* refers to the engagement of State and local government emergency personnel in an exercise sufficient to adequately test direction and control functions for protective action decisionmaking related to emergency action levels and communication capabilities among affected State and local governments and the licensee.
( l ) *Remedial exercise* is one that tests deficiencies of previous joint exercise that are considered significant enough to impact on the public health and safety.
( m ) *Local government* refers to boroughs, cities, counties, municipalities, parishes, towns, townships and other local jurisdictions within the plume exposure pathway EPZ when any of these entities has specific roles in emergency planning and preparedness in the EPZ.
( n ) *Site* refers to the location at which there is one or more commercial nuclear power plants. A nuclear power plant is synonymous with a nuclear power facility.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1043 

KA 15-00156 

PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JON ANDERSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (BARBARA J. DAVIES OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

MICHAEL J. FLAHERTY, JR., ACTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (DAVID A.

HERATY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Michael F.

Pietruszka, J.), rendered November 17, 2014. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a

controlled substance in the fifth degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his

plea of guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the

fifth degree (Penal Law § 220.06 [5]), defendant contends that his

waiver of the right to appeal was invalid. We reject that contention

inasmuch as the record demonstrates that the waiver was knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered (see People v Carson, 64 AD3d

1194, 1194, lv denied 13 NY3d 835; see generally People v Sanders, 25

NY3d 337, 341-342). Defendant’s valid waiver of the right to appeal

encompasses both his contention that County Court erred in denying his

suppression motion (see Sanders, 25 NY3d at 342), and his challenge to

the severity of his sentence (see People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 737).

Entered: November 10, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
NO. 07-10-0066-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL B 

MAY 27, 2010 

______________________________ 

ANTHONY LOCKETT, 

Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Appellee 

_______________________________ 

FROM THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; 

NO. 2009-422947; HON. JIM BOB DARNELL, PRESIDING 

_______________________________ 

Dismissal 

_______________________________ 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

 Appellant, Anthony Lockett, appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled 

substance, a first degree felony. By letter dated May 7, 2010, we informed appellant 

that it appeared his notice of appeal was untimely and he had until May 17, 2010, to 

provide us with any information that would be necessary to our determination of 

jurisdiction. Appellant filed a motion for this court to accept jurisdiction because even 
2 

though the notice of appeal and motion for new trial were not filed within thirty days after 

sentence was pronounced, they were filed timely after the written judgment was signed. 

This, according to appellant, “vests the Court with jurisdiction to hear issues regarding 

orders contained in the written judgment but not orally pronounced at trial.” Appellant 

further relies on the case of Bailey v. State, 160 S.W.3d 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) to 

support his argument. In Bailey, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a restitution 

order entered about a month after sentencing was pronounced was a continuation of 

the sentencing hearing because appellant’s punishment was not complete until the 

restitution was ordered. This is not the case here. Appellant admits that restitution was 

not ordered in this case nor has he pointed us to anywhere in the record to indicate 

punishment has not been completed. Nor does he suggest that anything is actually 

wrong with the judgment itself or that it encompasses punishment different from that 

orally pronounced. 

 Because appellant agrees that his motion for new trial and notice of appeal were 

not timely filed from the date sentence was pronounced, we find we lack jurisdiction 

over the matter.1

 

Accordingly, appellant’s appeal is dismissed. 

 Per Curiam 

Do not publish. 

 1

The appropriate vehicle for seeking an out-of-time appeal from a final felony conviction is by writ 

of habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp. 2009-2010).
Exhibit No.
32.1


Form
10-Q


Truewest
Corporation


File
No.  33-56574





Certification
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted


Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Truewest Corporation (the “Company”) on
Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Glenn A. Little,
Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:




(1)
            the Report fully complies
      with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
      Act of 1934; and


(2)
            the information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and results of operations of the
Company.







Date:
      July 1, 2009
                  By:
                  /s/
      Glenn A. LittleGlenn
      A. LittleChief
      Executive Officerand
      Chief Financial Officer


A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Truewest Corporation and will be retained by Truewest Corporation and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT

SOUTH ERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.20cv23287

LUIs M AN UEL RODRIGUEZ, M ARIA

TERESA RODRIGUEZ ZIV M ARIA

TERESA LANDA, ALFREDY RAMON

FORN S,etal.

Plaintiff(s),

IM PERIAL BRANDS PLC CORPOM CION

HABANOS, SA W PP èLC YOUNG &

RBUBRISCOANMCOHLENC&ylOdLFBECLWL LLC,a/k/a ,

Defendantts),

CLERK 'S NOTICE OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICES

InaccordancewithFederalRulesofCivilProcedureRule4,and/or28U.S.C.51608(a)(3)

or(b)(3)(B),theClerkcertifiesthatonthis7TH,dayofJanuac 2021,(summonsandcomplaint)

havebeenmailedviaInternationalSelwiceto:

CorporacionHabanos,S.A.

CentrodeNegociosM iramar

Defendant'. EdilkioHabana.3raPlanta

Avenida3raentre78y80,C.P.11300

10400HavanaCity

Countly; Cuba

Articlenumber: 834252 8412

DONE attheFederalCourthouseSquare,M iami,Florida,this7thday ofJanuary2021.

' .

AN G A E.'h' BL

Co Adm 'istrat C.lgrk ofCourt

.

r

: .

tyClerk

U.S.DistrictJudge

AIlcounselofrecord

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/12/2021 Page 1 of 2
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Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 60 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/12/2021 Page 2 of 2
#### § 191.43 Unused merchandise claim.

Rejected merchandise may be the subject of an unused merchandise drawback claim under 19 U.S.C. 1313(j)(1), in accordance with subpart C of this part, to the extent that the merchandise qualifies therefor.
#### § 142.39 How are civil penalties and assessments collected?

31 U.S.C. 3806 and 3808(b) authorize the Attorney General to bring specific actions for collection of such civil penalties and assessments including administrative offset under 31 U.S.C. 3716. The penalties and assessments may not, however, be administratively offset against an overpayment of federal taxes (then or later owed) to the defendant by the United States.
###### Editorial Note on Part 10

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 10 appear by CBP Dec. 16-26, 81 FR 93010, Dec. 20, 2016.

#### § 10.881 Filing of claim for tariff preference level.

A cotton or man-made fiber apparel good described in § 10.882 of this subpart that does not qualify as an originating good under § 10.873 of this subpart may nevertheless be entitled to preferential tariff treatment under the OFTA under an applicable tariff preference level (TPL). To make a TPL claim, the importer must include on the entry summary, or equivalent documentation, the applicable subheading in Chapter 99 of the HTSUS (9916.99.20) immediately above the applicable subheading in Chapter 61 or Chapter 62 of the HTSUS under which each non-originating cotton or man-made fiber apparel good is classified.
### §2086. Definition

As used in this part, the term "Member of the House of Representatives" means a Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress.

(Pub. L. 100–696, title VIII, §806, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4610.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was classified to section 188a–5 of former Title 40, prior to the enactment of Title 40, Public Buildings, Property, and Works, by Pub. L. 107–217, §1, Aug. 21, 2002, 116 Stat. 1062.
§ 162.77a Prepenalty notice for violation of section 593A, Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. ( a ) *When required.* If the appropriate Customs field officer has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of section 593A, Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1593a) has occurred, and determines that further proceedings are warranted, the officer will issue to the person concerned a notice of intent to issue a claim for a monetary penalty.
( b ) *Contents* — ( 1 ) *Facts of violation.* The prepenalty notice will: ( i ) Identify the drawback claim;
( ii ) Set forth the details relating to the seeking, inducing, or affecting, or the attempted seeking, inducing, or affecting, or the aiding or procuring of, the drawback claim;
( iii ) Specify all laws and regulations allegedly violated;
( iv ) Disclose all the material facts which establish the alleged violation;
( v ) State whether the alleged violation occurred as a result of fraud or negligence; and
( vi ) State the estimated actual or potential loss of revenue due to the drawback claim and, taking into account all circumstances, the amount of the proposed monetary penalty.
( 2 ) *Right to make presentations.* The prepenalty notice also will inform the person of his right to make an oral and a written presentation within 30 days of mailing of the notice (or such shorter period as may be prescribed under § 162.78) as to why a claim for a monetary penalty should not be issued or, if issued, why it should be in a lesser amount than proposed.
( c ) *Exceptions.* A prepenalty notice will not be issued for a violation of 19 U.S.C. 1593a if the amount of the proposed monetary penalty is $1,000 or less.
( d ) *Prior approval.* If an alleged violation of 19 U.S.C. 1593a occurred as a result of fraud, a prepenalty notice will not be issued without prior approval by Customs Headquarters.
[T.D. 00-5; 65 FR 3809, Jan. 25, 2000]
### **CHAPTER 10—COAL MINE SAFETY**

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Repeal of Chapter

Chapter repealed by Pub. L. 91–173, title V, §509, Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 803, on the operative date of sections 811 to 821 and 861 to 878 of this title, which became operative ninety days after the enactment of Pub. L. 91–173, approved Dec. 30, 1969, except that this chapter would continue to apply to any order, notice, decision, finding or any proceedings related to such order, notice, decision, or finding issued prior to the operative date of sections 811 to 821 and 861 to 878 of this title.
###### Editorial Note on Part 142

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 142 appear by CBP Dec. No. 16-26, 81 FR 93019, Dec. 20, 2016.

#### § 142.1 Definitions.

For definitions of “entry”, “entry summary”, “submission”, “filing”, “presentation”, “entered for consumption”, “entered for warehouse”, and “entered temporarily under bond”, as these terms relate to the entry of merchandise, see § 141.0a of this chapter.

(R.S. 251, as amended, secs. 623, as amended, 624, 46 Stat. 759, as amended (19 U.S.C. 66, 1623, 1624))

[T.D. 79-221, 44 FR 46821, Aug. 9, 1979, as amended by T.D. 84-213, 49 FR 41184, Oct. 19, 1984]
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                             9
<CURRENCY>                            US


<S>                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                         6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                     DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                        JAN-1-2000
<PERIOD-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                       1
<CASH>                                19,884,000
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                202,187,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                      14,100,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                      0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>           123,035,000
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                123,035,000
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                  123,035,000
<LOANS>                               206,371,000
<ALLOWANCE>                           (3,126,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                        376,114,000
<DEPOSITS>                            295,269,000
<SHORT-TERM>                          48,600,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                   1,820,000
<LONG-TERM>                           10,304,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<COMMON>                              9,879,000
<OTHER-SE>                            10,242,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>        376,114,000
<INTEREST-LOAN>                       9,859,000
<INTEREST-INVEST>                     4,568,000
<INTEREST-OTHER>                      49,000
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                      14,476,000
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                    3,770,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    5,679,000
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                 8,797,000
<LOAN-LOSSES>                         136,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                    (359,000)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                       7,266,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       1,805,000
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>            1,805,000
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                          1,436,000
<EPS-BASIC>                           .61
<EPS-DILUTED>                         .55
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                        8.74
<LOANS-NON>                           175,000
<LOANS-PAST>                          0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                      0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                       0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                      2,892,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                         13,000
<RECOVERIES>                          212,000
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                     3,126,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                  3,126,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                   0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>               0




</TABLE>
Exhibit 13.2





CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT


TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the annual report of Formula Systems (1985) Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Nir Feller, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, that to my knowledge:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:  April 29, 2010
/s/ Nir FellerNir FellerChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)