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[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 814 Reported in Senate (RS)]

<DOC>

                                                        Calendar No. 49
117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 814

 To promote security partnership with Ukraine, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

               March 17 (legislative day, March 16), 2021

  Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Portman, Mr. Murphy, Mr. 
Barrasso, Mrs. Shaheen, and Mr. Graham) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

                             April 26, 2021

              Reported by Mr. Menendez, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To promote security partnership with Ukraine, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act may be cited as the ``Ukraine Security 
Partnership Act of 2021''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Throughout its history, Ukraine has 
        experienced several long periods of occupation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Between 1919 and 1991, Ukraine was brutally 
        ruled by the Soviet Union, whose policy of agricultural 
        collectivization caused the Holodomor of 1932-1933, a man-made 
        famine that resulted in the death of at least 3,000,000 
        Ukrainians by starvation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) During the Nazi occupation of Ukraine 
        accompanying World War II--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) approximately 3,500,000 Ukrainian 
                civilians and 3,000,000 soldiers were killed; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) approximately 1,500,000 Jews were 
                massacred.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Ukraine declared its independence from Moscow 
        in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the Russian 
        Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged 
        to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing 
        borders of Ukraine'' and ``refrain from the threat or use of 
        force against the territorial integrity or political 
        independence of Ukraine'' in exchange for Ukraine's surrender 
        of its nuclear arsenal.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) From November 2004 through January 2005, 
        thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to peacefully 
        protest electoral fraud and widespread corruption by the ruling 
        elite in the 2004 Presidential election, successfully 
        triggering a re-vote, in what became known as the Orange 
        Revolution.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) During Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity, 
        or Euromaidan, the pro-Russian government of President Viktor 
        Yanukovych was forced to resign after thousands of Ukrainians 
        peacefully protested Yanukovych's decision to reject a closer 
        relationship with the European Union and his continued systemic 
        corruption, and over 100 of those protestors were killed by 
        violent government suppression.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) Fearful of Ukraine's strengthened pro-Western 
        orientation after the Revolution of Dignity, the Government of 
        the Russian Federation, in violation of international law and 
        in contravention of its commitments in the Budapest 
        Memorandum--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) sent undisclosed military personnel 
                into Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 
                February 2014 and has illegally occupied the Crimean 
                Peninsula for the past six years;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) sent covert, unmarked military 
                personnel into the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and 
                Luhansk in April 2014, instigating and supporting a 
                still-ongoing conflict that has cost nearly 14,000 
                lives; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) provided the Buk missile system used 
                by those Russia-backed forces to shoot down Malaysian 
                Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014, 
                killing all 298 passengers and crew on board.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) Under Russian control, Crimean authorities 
        have kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured Crimean Tatars, 
        opposition figures, activists, and other minority populations, 
        and have persecuted religious minorities by pressing false 
        charges of terrorism and deregistering religious 
        centers.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) In September 2014, in an attempt to stop the 
        fighting that the Russian Federation had initiated in eastern 
        Ukraine, France, Germany, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the 
        Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), and Russia-
        backed forces from eastern Ukraine signed the Minsk 
        Protocol.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) In February 2015, after the failure of the 
        initial Minsk Protocol, the Russian Federation committed to the 
        Minsk II Agreement, the roadmap for resolving the conflict in 
        eastern Ukraine, signed by the Governments of Ukraine, Russia, 
        France, and Germany.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) Despite these agreements, the Government of 
        the Russian Federation continues to violate Ukrainian 
        sovereignty through--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) manipulation of Ukraine's dependence 
                on Russian natural gas, including cutting off access in 
                2014, which deprived Ukraine of its energy supply and 
                transit fees;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) espionage and clandestine 
                assassinations on Ukrainian territory;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) continuous cyber warfare against the 
                Government of Ukraine and Ukrainian businesses, such as 
                the NotPetya hack in 2017; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) seizure of Ukrainian property and 
                citizens, including the November 2018 seizure in the 
                Kerch Strait of three Ukrainian naval vessels and 24 
                Ukrainian officers on board those vessels.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) In July 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. 
        Pompeo issued the Crimea Declaration and reiterated in February 
        2020 on the sixth anniversary of Russia's illegal occupation 
        that ``Crimea is Ukraine''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) On February 26, 2021, President Joseph R. 
        Biden confirmed that Crimea is Ukraine and the United States 
        does not and will never recognize Russia's purported annexation 
        of the peninsula.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) Since April 2014, at least 4,100 Ukrainian 
        soldiers have died fighting for their country against the 
        Russian Federation and Russia-backed forces, while no less than 
        3,361 civilians have perished as a result of that 
        fighting.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) Despite Ukraine's tumultuous history and 
        neighborhood, in under 30 years it has risen from the collapse 
        of the Soviet Union to become a developing democracy, steadily 
        working to overcome its Soviet legacy of oppression, oligarchic 
        control, and corruption.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) Running on a strong anti-corruption platform, 
        Volodymyr Zelensky won the 2019 presidential election with 73 
        percent of the vote, and his political party, Servant of the 
        People, won a parliamentary majority in the Ukrainian 
        parliament.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (18) The OSCE confirmed the 2019 elections were 
        ``competitive and fundamental freedoms were generally 
        respected''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (19) Since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has 
        made difficult and substantial reforms in an effort to address 
        corruption and more closely align with the West, such as 
        slimming and decentralizing its bureaucracy, removing immunity 
        from prosecution for Members of Parliament, reforming its gas, 
        pension, and procurement systems, and working to adapt its 
        military to the standards of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization (NATO).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (20) Despite progress in reforming many areas of 
        Ukrainian governance, serious issues still remain, particularly 
        in the areas of corruption and rule of law.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (21) The United States Government has consistently 
        supported Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight against 
        Russia-backed forces by assisting its governance reform 
        efforts, maintaining robust and coordinated sanctions against 
        the Russian Federation alongside the European Union, and 
        providing the Ukrainian military with training and equipment, 
        including lethal defensive weaponry.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (22) In addition to the United States, the 
        European Union, European countries, and Canada have provided 
        substantial diplomatic, monetary, and military support for 
        Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight against Russia-
        backed forces in eastern Ukraine, and also have implemented and 
        maintained robust sanctions regimes against the Russian 
        Federation for its illegal occupation of Crimea and its active 
        destabilization of Ukraine.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (23) the Government of Ukraine has steadfastly 
        supported the United States and European allies by deploying 
        troops to Iraq, Afghanistan, and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), 
        allowing United States military planes to refuel on Ukrainian 
        soil, and trading billions of dollars' worth of goods and 
        services with the United States.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (24) NATO has recently decided to include Ukraine 
        in its Enhanced Opportunities Partnership in recognition of 
        Ukraine's contributions to NATO missions and efforts to reform 
        its military in line with NATO standards.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (25) Since the Russian Federation's 2014 invasion 
        of Ukraine, the United States Congress has demonstrated its 
        support for Ukraine through the passage of legislation, 
        including the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, 
        Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 
        (Public Law 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), the Ukraine 
        Freedom Support Act (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et 
        seq.), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative established 
        under section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068), the 
        Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public 
        Law 115-44), and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 
        2019 (Public Law 116-92, title LXXV), and the United States 
        Congress continues to demonstrate strong support for assisting 
        Ukraine in defending itself and deterring Russia.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Ukraine stands as a bulwark against the malign 
        influence of the Russian Federation in Europe, and robust 
        United States support for Ukraine is vital to United States 
        national security and demonstrates the commitment of the United 
        States to upholding a free and open international 
        order;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the 
        Government and people of Ukraine have made significant strides 
        towards improved governance, rule of law, anti-corruption 
        measures, and economic reforms;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Ukraine's long-term viability is directly 
        connected to its efforts to reduce corruption and build strong 
        democratic institutions that are able to defend against 
        internal and external corrupt actors;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the efforts and sacrifices of Ukrainian 
        citizens to determine their own fate after centuries of 
        oppression, through democratic representation and governance 
        reforms, is evidence of that country's dedication to a free, 
        independent, and democratic future;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Ukraine has proven itself to be a valuable 
        security partner of the United States, not simply a recipient 
        of assistance;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) it is in the national security interests of 
        the United States to continue and deepen its security 
        partnership with Ukraine, including through the provision of 
        both lethal and non-lethal assistance;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) the United States should continue to place 
        policy-based conditions on Ukraine's receipt of financial and 
        military assistance, as that mechanism has proven effective in 
        incentivizing reforms in Ukraine;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) the United States should use its voice and 
        vote at NATO to encourage the adoption of a policy by the 
        Alliance that all of its member states will refuse to recognize 
        the illegal attempted annexation of Crimea by the Russian 
        Federation;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) the United States should continue to bolster 
        the capacity of the Ukrainian Navy as it strives to fulfill the 
        goals it set out in its ``Strategy of the Naval Forces of the 
        Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035'';</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) the military-focused technical, training, 
        maintenance, and logistical assistance provided by the United 
        States to Ukraine is as essential as the military hardware 
        provided to the country;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) all security assistance provided to Ukraine 
        should continue to be subject to rigorous vetting requirements 
        under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
        U.S.C. 2378d) and security cooperation under section 362 of 
        title 10, United States Code, including assistance provided to 
        units in the National Guard of Ukraine as well as all units 
        falling under the authority of the Ministry of 
        Defense;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) the Office of Defense Cooperation at the 
        United States Embassy in Ukraine should be fully staffed with 
        officers who serve three-year terms in order to administer the 
        security assistance being provided to the country;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) the Secretary of Defense should conduct an 
        assessment of the staffing resources of the Office of Defense 
        Cooperation and strongly consider providing additional staff to 
        the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ukraine;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) the enduring partnership between the United 
        States and Ukraine, including bipartisan support for a 
        sovereign, democratic, and whole Ukraine through political, 
        monetary, and military assistance, remains strong and must 
        continue to be reaffirmed; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) the United States should continue to strongly 
        support Ukraine's ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic community 
        of democracies.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to refuse to recognize the attempted 
        annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, an action that 
        was taken in contravention of international law;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to utilize existing sanctions and other 
        authorities to deter malign actions by the Russian Federation 
        in Ukraine, including the mandates and authorities codified by 
        the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
        (Public Law 115-44);</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to work with our European allies to coordinate 
        strategies to curtail Russian malign influence in Ukraine; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to support democratic, economic, and anti-
        corruption reforms in Ukraine and the country's integration 
        into Euro-Atlantic institutions.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR 
              UKRAINE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report with a strategy on how 
the United States will work to diplomatically support Ukraine during 
fiscal years 2022 through 2026.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A description of how relevant departments and 
        agencies of the United States Government will work together to 
        collectively support efforts by the Government of Ukraine to 
        deter Russian aggression in the form of military incursions, 
        cyber attacks, the coercive use of energy resources, use of 
        passportization, and efforts to corrupt the Ukrainian political 
        and economic systems.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A description of the United States current 
        efforts and strategy to support Ukrainian diplomatic 
        initiatives when they align with United States 
        interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) A strategy on how the United States will use 
        its voice and vote at the United Nations, OSCE, Council of 
        Europe, NATO, and other relevant international bodies to 
        support Ukraine and its reform efforts.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) A strategy on how the United States will 
        assist Ukraine in bolstering its diplomatic, economic, energy, 
        and maritime relationships with key Black Sea countries, 
        including Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and Georgia.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) A strategy on how the United States will 
        engage with Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia to advance the 
        Normandy Format and Minsk Agreements.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) A strategy on how the United States will work 
        with allies to continue to engage Ukraine to ensure meaningful 
        progress on democratic, economic, and anti-corruption 
        reforms.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 6. UNITED STATES-EUROPE WORKING GROUP ON 
              UKRAINE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State should seek to 
establish a United States-Europe Working Group on Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Representation.--The United States-Europe Working 
Group on Ukraine should include high-level representatives from the 
European Union, its institutions, and relevant European governments, as 
appropriate, to jointly prioritize, evaluate and coordinate economic 
and policy reform assistance and support for Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Termination.--The authorities authorized under this 
section shall terminate on September 30 of the fifth fiscal year 
beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 7. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR UKRAINE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Establishment.--The President should appoint, by and 
with the consent of the Senate, a Special Envoy for Ukraine, who should 
report to the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and 
Eurasia.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Rank.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine shall have the 
rank and status of ambassador.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine 
should--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) serve as the United States liaison to the 
        Normandy Format, tasked with leading the peace process between 
        Ukraine and the Russian Federation;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) facilitate diplomatic outreach to and dialogue 
        with countries in the Black Sea region that, like Ukraine, are 
        faced with the impact of Russia's growing militarization of the 
        Sea;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission 
        in Ukraine;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) coordinate with the United States-Europe 
        Working Group on Ukraine established pursuant to section 
        6;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) coordinate with the OSCE Special Monitoring 
        Mission to Ukraine; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) provide the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
        the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives regular updates and briefings on the status of 
        peace negotiations.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Termination.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine position 
authorized under subsection (a) shall terminate 5 years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 8. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated for the Department of State for each of fiscal years 
2022 through 2026 $300,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
assistance to Ukraine to assist the country in meeting its defense 
needs.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Availability of Funds.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a), 
        not more than $150,000,000 shall be made available until the 
        Secretary of State makes the certification described in 
        paragraph (2) for such fiscal year, including a detailed 
        explanation justifying the certification with respect to each 
        of the categories listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of 
        such paragraph. The certification shall be submitted to the 
        appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form, but 
        may contain a classified annex.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Certification.--The certification described in 
        this paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government 
        of Ukraine has taken actions to--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) make defense institutional reforms, in 
                accordance with NATO standards;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) further strengthen civilian control of 
                the military;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) reform its state-owned arms production 
                sector;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) increase transparency and 
                accountability in defense procurement;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to 
                exercise oversight of the Ministry of Defense and 
                military forces; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) promote respect for the observation of 
                human rights as enshrined in the requirements of 
                section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
                U.S.C. 2378d) within the security forces of 
                Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before 
providing assistance or support under pursuant to subsection (a), the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a notification containing the following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A detailed description of the assistance or 
        support to be provided, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the objectives of such assistance or 
                support;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the budget for such assistance or 
                support; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the expected or estimated timeline for 
                delivery of such assistance or support.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A description of such other matters as the 
        Secretary considers appropriate.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
assistance provided under this section should--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) prioritize the procurement of vessels for the 
        Ukrainian Navy and other articles that bolster the capacity of 
        the Ukrainian Navy to counter Russian maritime aggression and 
        maintain the freedom of innocent passage throughout the Black 
        Sea; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) ensure adequate planning for maintenance for 
        any equipment provided.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Authority To Provide Lethal Assistance.--The Secretary 
of State is authorized to provide lethal assistance under this section, 
including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and 
ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, anti-tank weapons 
systems, anti-ship weapons systems, anti-aircraft weapons systems, and 
small arms and ammunition.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Transfer Authority.--The Secretary of Defense may 
transfer amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for 
assistance under section 333 of title 10, United States Code, to the 
Department of State to be made available for Foreign Military Finance 
assistance to Ukraine.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 9. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER 
              PROGRAM.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    During fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the delivery of 
excess defense articles to Ukraine shall be given the same priority as 
that given other countries and regions under section 516(c)(2) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FROM 
              ALLIES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in consultation with 
the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a classified strategy on how the United States will 
encourage third countries to donate excess defense equipment to 
Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A listing of all friendly and allied nations 
        that have excess defense material that may be compatible with 
        the needs and systems utilized by the Armed Forces of 
        Ukraine.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A description of the diplomatic efforts 
        undertaken by the United States Government to encourage allied 
        nations to donate their excess defense articles to Ukraine on 
        an expedited basis.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 11. IMET COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated to the Department of State $4,000,000 for each of 
fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) assistance for Ukraine. The assistance shall be made 
available for the following purposes:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Training of future leaders.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Fostering a better understanding of the United 
        States.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Establishing a rapport between the United 
        States Armed Forces and Ukraine's military to build 
        partnerships for the future.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Enhancement of interoperability and 
        capabilities for joint operations.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Focusing on professional military education, 
        civilian control of the military, and human rights.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Availability of Funds.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a), 
        not more than $3,000,000 may be made available until the 
        Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Defense, makes the certification described in paragraph (2) to 
        the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, 
        including a detailed explanation justifying the certification 
        with respect to each of the categories listed in subparagraphs 
        (A) through (G) of such paragraph. The certification shall be 
        submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in 
        unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
        annex.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Certification.--The certification described in 
        this paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government 
        of Ukraine has taken actions to--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) make defense institutional reforms, in 
                accordance with NATO standards;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) further strengthen civilian control of 
                the military;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) reform its state-owned arms production 
                sector;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) increase transparency and 
                accountability in defense procurement;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to 
                exercise oversight of the Ministry of Defense and 
                military forces; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) promote respect for the observation of 
                human rights as enshrined in the requirements of 
                section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
                U.S.C. 2378d) within the security forces of 
                Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before 
providing assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives a notification containing the following 
elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A detailed description of the assistance or 
        support to be provided, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the objectives of such assistance or 
                support;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the budget for such assistance or 
                support; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the expected or estimated timeline for 
                delivery of such assistance or support.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A description of such other matters as the 
        Secretary considers appropriate.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 12. STRATEGY ON IMET PROGRAMMING IN UKRAINE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United States IMET 
program, encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders to 
participate in the training, and promote successful graduates to 
positions of prominence in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a strategy for the implementation 
of the IMET program in Ukraine authorized under section 11.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation 
        with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of 
        Ukraine, for how the IMET program will be used by the United 
        States Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel 
        program graduates to positions of prominence in support of the 
        Ukrainian military's reform efforts in line with NATO 
        standards.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) An assessment of the education and training 
        requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear 
        recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by 
        the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of education 
        or training.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) An accounting of the current combat 
        requirements of the Ukrainian military and an assessment of the 
        viability of alternative mobile training teams, distributed 
        learning, and other flexible solutions to reach such 
        students.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) An identification of opportunities to 
        influence the next generation of leaders through attendance at 
        United States staff and war colleges, junior leader development 
        programs, and technical schools.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 13. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) as appropriate, the United States Government 
        should provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of 
        defense articles, defense services, and design and construction 
        services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further 
        development of Ukraine's military forces; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) such loans should be considered an additive 
        security assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign 
        Military Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security 
        Assistance Initiative programming.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 14. STRATEGY TO PROTECT UKRAINE'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY FROM 
              STRATEGIC COMPETITORS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should work with the Government of Ukraine to ensure 
strategic assets and companies in Ukraine's defense industry are not 
subject to foreign ownership, control, or undue influence by strategic 
competitors to the United States, such as the People's Republic of 
China (PRC).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Strategy Required.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and 
        the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the appropriate 
        committees of Congress a strategy to support Ukraine in 
        protecting its defense industry from predatory 
        investments.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Elements.--The strategy required under 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) A description of the efforts by 
                strategic competitors, such as the PRC, to acquire 
                strategic assets and companies in Ukraine's defense 
                industry in a predatory manner and the national 
                security implications for Ukraine, the United States, 
                and other NATO allies and partners.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) A description of vulnerable strategic 
                assets and companies in Ukraine's defense industry that 
                would benefit from foreign investments and joint 
                ventures.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) A description of the reforms to 
                Ukraine's defense industry and export controls that are 
                necessary to incentivize Western investments in 
                them.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) A strategy to promote, as appropriate, 
                United States direct investment in and joint ventures 
                with strategic companies in Ukraine's defense industry 
                to provide an alternative to PRC investments, and to 
                engage like-minded allies and partners on these 
                efforts.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Form.--The strategy required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be submitted in classified form.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 15. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional 
committees'' means--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ukraine Security Partnership Act of 
2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Throughout its history, Ukraine has experienced several 
        long periods of occupation.
            (2) Between 1919 and 1991, Ukraine was brutally ruled by 
        the Soviet Union, whose policy of agricultural collectivization 
        caused the Holodomor of 1932-1933, a man-made famine that 
        resulted in the death of at least 3,000,000 Ukrainians by 
        starvation.
            (3) During the Nazi occupation of Ukraine accompanying 
        World War II--
                    (A) approximately 3,500,000 Ukrainian civilians and 
                3,000,000 soldiers were killed; and
                    (B) approximately 1,500,000 Jews were massacred.
            (4) Ukraine declared its independence from Moscow in 1991, 
        after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
            (5) In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the Russian 
        Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged 
        to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing 
        borders of Ukraine'' and ``refrain from the threat or use of 
        force against the territorial integrity or political 
        independence of Ukraine'' in exchange for Ukraine's surrender 
        of its nuclear arsenal.
            (6) From November 2004 through January 2005, thousands of 
        Ukrainians took to the streets to peacefully protest electoral 
        fraud and widespread corruption by the ruling elite in the 2004 
        Presidential election, successfully triggering a re-vote, in 
        what became known as the Orange Revolution.
            (7) During Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity, or 
        Euromaidan, the pro-Russian government of President Viktor 
        Yanukovych was forced to resign after thousands of Ukrainians 
        peacefully protested Yanukovych's decision to reject a closer 
        relationship with the European Union and his continued systemic 
        corruption, and over 100 of those protestors were killed by 
        violent government suppression.
            (8) Fearful of Ukraine's strengthened pro-Western 
        orientation after the Revolution of Dignity, the Government of 
        the Russian Federation, in violation of international law and 
        in contravention of its commitments in the Budapest 
        Memorandum--
                    (A) sent undisclosed military personnel into 
                Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea in February 
                2014 and has illegally occupied the Crimean Peninsula 
                for the past seven years;
                    (B) sent covert, unmarked military personnel into 
                the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in April 
                2014, instigating and supporting a still-ongoing 
                conflict that has cost nearly 14,000 lives; and
                    (C) provided the Buk missile system used by those 
                Russia-led forces to shoot down Malaysian Airlines 
                Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014, killing 
                all 298 passengers and crew on board;
            (9) Under Russian control, Crimean authorities have 
        kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured Crimean Tatars, opposition 
        figures, activists, and other minority populations, and have 
        persecuted religious minorities by pressing false charges of 
        terrorism and deregistering religious centers.
            (10) In September 2014, in an attempt to stop the fighting 
        that the Russian Federation had initiated in eastern Ukraine, 
        France, Germany, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the 
        Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), and Russia-
        led forces from eastern Ukraine signed the Minsk Protocol.
            (11) In February 2015, after the failure of the initial 
        Minsk Protocol, the Russian Federation committed to the Minsk 
        II Agreement, the roadmap for resolving the conflict in eastern 
        Ukraine, signed by the Governments of Ukraine, Russia, France, 
        and Germany.
            (12) Despite these agreements, the Government of the 
        Russian Federation continues to violate Ukrainian sovereignty 
        through--
                    (A) manipulation of Ukraine's dependence on Russian 
                natural gas, including cutting off access in 2014, 
                which deprived Ukraine of its energy supply and transit 
                fees;
                    (B) espionage and clandestine assassinations on 
                Ukrainian territory;
                    (C) continuous cyber warfare against the Government 
                of Ukraine and Ukrainian businesses, such as the 
                NotPetya hack in 2017; and
                    (D) seizure of Ukrainian property and citizens, 
                including the November 2018 seizure in the Kerch Strait 
                of three Ukrainian naval vessels and 24 Ukrainian 
                officers on board those vessels.
            (13) In July 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 
        issued the Crimea Declaration and reiterated in February 2020 
        on the sixth anniversary of Russia's illegal occupation that 
        ``Crimea is Ukraine''.
            (14) On February 26, 2021 President Joseph R. Biden 
        confirmed that Crimea is Ukraine and the United States does not 
        and will never recognize Russia's purported annexation of the 
        peninsula.
            (15) Since April 2014, at least 4,100 Ukrainian soldiers 
        have died fighting for their country against the Russian 
        Federation and Russia-led forces, while no less than 3,361 
        civilians have perished as a result of that fighting.
            (16) Despite Ukraine's tumultuous history and neighborhood, 
        in under 30 years it has risen from the collapse of the Soviet 
        Union to become a developing democracy, steadily working to 
        overcome its Soviet legacy of oppression, oligarchic control, 
        and corruption.
            (17) Running on a strong anti-corruption platform, 
        Volodymyr Zelensky won the 2019 presidential election with 73 
        percent of the vote, and his political party, Servant of the 
        People, won a parliamentary majority in the Ukrainian 
        parliament.
            (18) The OSCE confirmed the 2019 elections were 
        ``competitive and fundamental freedoms were generally 
        respected''.
            (19) In March and April 2021, the Russian Federation 
        amassed over 75,000 troops on its border with the Eastern 
        Ukraine and in the occupied territory of Crimea.
            (20) Since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has made 
        difficult and substantial reforms in an effort to address 
        corruption and more closely align with the West, such as 
        slimming and decentralizing its bureaucracy, removing immunity 
        from prosecution for Members of Parliament, reforming its gas, 
        pension, and procurement systems, and working to adapt its 
        military to the standards of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization (NATO).
            (21) Despite progress in reforming many areas of Ukrainian 
        governance, serious issues still remain, particularly in the 
        areas of corruption and rule of law.
            (22) The United States Government has consistently 
        supported Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight against 
        Russia-led forces by assisting its governance reform efforts, 
        maintaining robust and coordinated sanctions against the 
        Russian Federation alongside the European Union, and providing 
        the Ukrainian military with training and equipment, including 
        lethal defensive weaponry.
            (23) In addition to the United States, the European Union, 
        European countries, and Canada have provided substantial 
        diplomatic, monetary, and military support for Ukraine's 
        democratic transition and its fight against Russia-led forces 
        in eastern Ukraine, and also have implemented and maintained 
        robust sanctions regimes against the Russian Federation for its 
        illegal occupation of Crimea and its active destabilization of 
        Ukraine.
            (24) the Government of Ukraine has steadfastly supported 
        the United States and European allies by deploying troops to 
        Iraq, Afghanistan, and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), allowing 
        United States military planes to refuel on Ukrainian soil, and 
        trading billions of dollars' worth of goods and services with 
        the United States.
            (25) NATO has recently decided to include Ukraine in its 
        Enhanced Opportunities Partnership in recognition of Ukraine's 
        contributions to NATO missions and efforts to reform its 
        military in line with NATO standards.
            (26) Since the Russian Federation's 2014 invasion of 
        Ukraine, the United States Congress has demonstrated its 
        support for Ukraine through the passage of legislation, 
        including the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, 
        Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 
        (Public Law 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), the Ukraine 
        Freedom Support Act (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et 
        seq.), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative established 
        under section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068), the 
        Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public 
        Law 115-44), and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 
        2019 (Public Law 116-92, title LXXV), and the United States 
        Congress continues to demonstrate strong support for assisting 
        Ukraine in defending itself and deterring Russia.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) Ukraine stands as a bulwark against the malign 
        influence of the Russian Federation in Europe, and robust 
        United States support for Ukraine is vital to United States 
        national security and demonstrates the commitment of the United 
        States to upholding a free and open international order;
            (2) since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the Government 
        and people of Ukraine have made significant strides towards 
        improved governance, rule of law, anti-corruption measures, and 
        economic reforms;
            (3) Ukraine's long-term viability is directly connected to 
        its efforts to reduce corruption and build strong democratic 
        institutions that are able to defend against internal and 
        external corrupt actors;
            (4) the efforts and sacrifices of Ukrainian citizens to 
        determine their own fate after centuries of oppression, through 
        democratic representation and governance reforms, is evidence 
        of that country's dedication to a free, independent, and 
        democratic future;
            (5) Ukraine has proven itself to be a valuable security 
        partner of the United States, not simply a recipient of 
        assistance;
            (6) it is in the national security interests of the United 
        States to continue and deepen its security partnership with 
        Ukraine, including through the provision of both lethal and 
        non-lethal assistance;
            (7) the United States should continue to place policy-based 
        conditions on Ukraine's receipt of financial and military 
        assistance, as that mechanism has proven effective in 
        incentivizing reforms in Ukraine;
            (8) the United States should use its voice and vote at NATO 
        to encourage the adoption of a policy by the Alliance that all 
        of its member states will refuse to recognize the illegal 
        attempted annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation;
            (9) the United States should support at the highest level 
        and take an active part in the Ukrainian ``Crimean Platform'' 
        initiative to ensure that the international community's 
        attention remains focused on--
                    (A) the unacceptable violation of Ukraine's 
                territorial integrity in Crimea; and
                    (B) working towards the reversal of such violation;
            (10) the United States should continue to bolster the 
        capacity of the Ukrainian Navy as it strives to fulfill the 
        goals it set out in its ``Strategy of the Naval Forces of the 
        Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035'';
            (11) the military-focused technical, training, maintenance, 
        and logistical assistance provided by the United States to 
        Ukraine is as essential as the military hardware provided to 
        the country;
            (12) all security assistance provided to Ukraine should 
        continue to be subject to rigorous vetting requirements under 
        section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
        2378d) and security cooperation under section 362 of title 10, 
        United States Code, including assistance provided to units in 
        the National Guard of Ukraine as well as all units falling 
        under the authority of the Ministry of Defense;
            (13) the Office of Defense Cooperation at the United States 
        Embassy in Ukraine should be fully staffed with officers who 
        serve three-year terms in order to administer the security 
        assistance being provided to the country;
            (14) the Secretary of Defense should conduct an assessment 
        of the staffing resources of the Office of Defense Cooperation 
        and strongly consider providing additional staff to the Office 
        of Defense Cooperation in Ukraine;
            (15) the United States should continue to support Ukraine's 
        NATO aspirations, including through work towards a Membership 
        Action Plan;
            (16) the enduring partnership between the United States and 
        Ukraine, including bipartisan support for a sovereign, 
        democratic, and whole Ukraine through political, monetary, and 
        military assistance, remains strong and must continue to be 
        reaffirmed; and
            (17) the United States should continue to strongly support 
        Ukraine's ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic community of 
        democracies.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to refuse to recognize the attempted annexation of 
        Crimea by the Russian Federation, an action that was taken in 
        contravention of international law;
            (2) to utilize existing sanctions and other authorities to 
        deter malign actions by the Russian Federation in or intended 
        to harm Ukraine, including the mandates and authorities 
        codified by--
                    (A) the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
                Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.); and
                    (B) the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 
                2019 (title LXXV of Public Law 116-92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 
                note);
            (3) to work with our European allies to coordinate 
        strategies to curtail Russian malign influence in Ukraine;
            (4) to work with our allies and partners to conduct more 
        frequent multinational freedom of navigation operations in the 
        Black Sea in order to demonstrate support for Ukraine's 
        internationally-recognized maritime boundaries, to safeguard 
        the unimpeded traffic of lawful commerce, and to push back 
        against excessive Russian Federation claims of sovereignty;
            (5) to work with our allies and partners to demonstrate 
        support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, including its 
        internationally-recognized land borders; and
            (6) to support democratic, economic, and anti-corruption 
        reforms in Ukraine and the country's integration into Euro-
        Atlantic institutions.

SEC. 5. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report with a strategy on how 
the United States will work to diplomatically support Ukraine during 
fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A description of how relevant departments and agencies 
        of the United States Government will work together to 
        collectively support efforts by the Government of Ukraine to 
        deter Russian aggression in the form of military incursions, 
        cyber attacks, the coercive use of energy resources, the 
        disruption of lawful commerce and traffic to Ukrainian ports, 
        use of passportization, and efforts to corrupt the Ukrainian 
        political and economic systems.
            (2) A description of the United States' current efforts and 
        strategy to support Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives when they 
        align with United States interests.
            (3) A strategy on how the United States will use its voice 
        and vote at the United Nations, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, 
        and other relevant international bodies to support Ukraine and 
        its reform efforts.
            (4) A strategy on how the United States will assist Ukraine 
        in bolstering its diplomatic, economic, energy, and maritime 
        relationships with key Black Sea countries, including Bulgaria, 
        Romania, Turkey, and Georgia.
            (5) A strategy on how the United States will engage with 
        Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia to advance the Normandy 
        Format and Minsk Agreements.
            (6) An assessment of Ukraine's recent progress on anti-
        corruption reforms and a strategy on how the United States will 
        work with allies to continue to engage Ukraine to ensure 
        meaningful progress on democratic, economic, and anti-
        corruption reforms.
    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 6. UNITED STATES-EUROPE WORKING GROUP ON UKRAINE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State should seek to establish a 
United States-Europe Working Group on Ukraine.
    (b) Representation.--The United States-Europe Working Group on 
Ukraine should include high-level representatives from the European 
Union, its institutions, and relevant European governments, as 
appropriate, to jointly prioritize, evaluate and coordinate economic 
and policy reform assistance and support for Ukraine.
    (c) Termination.--The authorities authorized under this section 
shall terminate on September 30 of the fifth fiscal year beginning 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 7. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR UKRAINE.

    (a) Establishment.--The President should appoint, by and with the 
consent of the Senate, a Special Envoy for Ukraine, who should report 
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia.
    (b) Rank.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine shall have the rank and 
status of ambassador.
    (c) Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine should--
            (1) serve as the United States liaison to the Normandy 
        Format, tasked with leading the peace process between Ukraine 
        and the Russian Federation;
            (2) facilitate diplomatic outreach to and dialogue with 
        countries in the Black Sea region that, like Ukraine, are faced 
        with the impact of Russia's growing militarization of the Sea;
            (3) coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission in 
        Ukraine;
            (4) coordinate with the United States-Europe Working Group 
        on Ukraine established pursuant to section 6;
            (5) coordinate with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to 
        Ukraine; and
            (6) provide the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives regular updates and briefings on the status of 
        peace negotiations.
    (d) Termination.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine position authorized 
under subsection (a) shall terminate 5 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 8. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of State for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2026 $300,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
assistance to Ukraine to assist the country in meeting its defense 
needs.
    (b) Availability of Funds.--
            (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a), 
        not more than $150,000,000 shall be made available until the 
        Secretary of State makes the certification described in 
        paragraph (2) for such fiscal year, including a detailed 
        explanation justifying the certification with respect to each 
        of the categories listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of 
        such paragraph. The certification shall be submitted to the 
        appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form, but 
        may contain a classified annex.
            (2) Certification.--The certification described in this 
        paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government 
        of Ukraine has taken actions to--
                    (A) make defense institutional reforms, in 
                accordance with NATO standards;
                    (B) further strengthen civilian control of the 
                military;
                    (C) reform its state-owned arms production sector;
                    (D) increase transparency and accountability in 
                defense procurement;
                    (E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to exercise 
                oversight of the Ministry of Defense and military 
                forces;
                    (F) promote respect for the observation of human 
                rights as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M 
                of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) 
                within the security forces of Ukraine; and
                    (G) support the work of Ukraine's anti-corruption 
                bodies, including the High Anti-Corruption Court, 
                National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and the Special Anti-
                Corruption Prosecutor's Office.
    (c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before providing 
assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of 
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
notification containing the following:
            (1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to 
        be provided, including--
                    (A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
                    (B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
                    (C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery 
                of such assistance or support.
            (2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary 
        considers appropriate.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that assistance 
provided under this section should--
            (1) prioritize the procurement of vessels for the Ukrainian 
        Navy and other articles that bolster the capacity of the 
        Ukrainian Navy to counter Russian maritime aggression and 
        maintain the freedom of innocent passage throughout the Black 
        Sea; and
            (2) ensure adequate planning for maintenance for any 
        equipment provided.
    (e) Authority To Provide Lethal Assistance.--The Secretary of State 
is authorized to provide lethal assistance under this section, 
including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and 
ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, anti-tank weapons 
systems, anti-ship weapons systems, anti-aircraft weapons systems, and 
small arms and ammunition.

SEC. 9. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER PROGRAM.

    During fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the delivery of excess 
defense articles to Ukraine shall be given the same priority as that 
given other countries and regions under section 516(c)(2) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FROM ALLIES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a classified strategy on how the United States will 
encourage third countries to donate excess defense equipment to 
Ukraine.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A listing of all friendly and allied nations that have 
        excess defense material that may be compatible with the needs 
        and systems utilized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
            (2) A description of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by 
        the United States Government to encourage allied nations to 
        donate their excess defense articles to Ukraine on an expedited 
        basis.

SEC. 11. IMET COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State $4,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2026 for International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) assistance for Ukraine. The assistance shall be made 
available for the following purposes:
            (1) Training of future leaders.
            (2) Fostering a better understanding of the United States.
            (3) Establishing a rapport between the United States Armed 
        Forces and Ukraine's military to build partnerships for the 
        future.
            (4) Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for 
        joint operations.
            (5) Focusing on professional military education, civilian 
        control of the military, and human rights.
    (b) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before providing 
assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of 
State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a 
notification containing the following elements:
            (1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to 
        be provided, including--
                    (A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
                    (B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
                    (C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery 
                of such assistance or support.
            (2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary 
        considers appropriate.

SEC. 12. STRATEGY ON IMET PROGRAMMING IN UKRAINE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United States IMET 
program, encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders to 
participate in the training, and promote successful graduates to 
positions of prominence in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
    (b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a strategy for the implementation 
of the IMET program in Ukraine authorized under section 11.
    (c) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation with the 
        Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 
        for how the IMET program will be used by the United States 
        Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel program 
        graduates to positions of prominence in support of the 
        Ukrainian military's reform efforts in line with NATO 
        standards.
            (2) An assessment of the education and training 
        requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear 
        recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by 
        the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of education 
        or training.
            (3) An accounting of the current combat requirements of the 
        Ukrainian military and an assessment of the viability of 
        alternative mobile training teams, distributed learning, and 
        other flexible solutions to reach such students.
            (4) An identification of opportunities to influence the 
        next generation of leaders through attendance at United States 
        staff and war colleges, junior leader development programs, and 
        technical schools.
    (d) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 13. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) as appropriate, the United States Government should 
        provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of defense 
        articles, defense services, and design and construction 
        services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further 
        development of Ukraine's military forces; and
            (2) such loans should be considered an additive security 
        assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign Military 
        Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security Assistance 
        Initiative programming.

SEC. 14. STRATEGY TO PROTECT UKRAINE'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY FROM STRATEGIC 
              COMPETITORS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should work with the Government of Ukraine to ensure strategic 
assets and companies in Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector are not 
subject to foreign ownership, control, or undue influence by strategic 
competitors to the United States, such as the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). These efforts will require support from across the 
Executive Branch and should leverage all available tools and 
authorities.
    (b) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the 
        Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and in 
        consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the heads 
        of other relevant Departments and agencies as the President may 
        determine, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
        Congress a strategy to support Ukraine in protecting its 
        aerospace and defense industry from predatory investments.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                    (A) An assessment of the efforts by strategic 
                competitors, such as the PRC, to acquire strategic 
                assets and companies in Ukraine's aerospace and defense 
                sector and the national security implications for 
                Ukraine, the United States, and other NATO allies and 
                partners.
                    (B) An assessment of the vulnerabilities that 
                strategic competitors of the United States exploit to 
                acquire strategic assets in the Ukrainian aerospace and 
                defense sector, Ukraine's progress in addressing them, 
                and United States initiatives to support these efforts 
                such as assistance in strengthening Ukraine's 
                investment screening and national security vetting 
                laws.
                    (C) An assessment of Ukraine's efforts to make 
                reforms necessary to incentivize Western investment in 
                Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector and United 
                States support for these efforts.
                    (D) A strategy to--
                            (i) promote, as appropriate, United States 
                        direct investment in Ukraine's aerospace and 
                        defense sector;
                            (ii) better leverage tools like debt 
                        financing, equity investments, and political 
                        risk insurance to incentivize greater 
                        participation by United States firms;
                            (iii) provide an alternative to PRC 
                        investments; and
                            (iv) engage like-minded allies and partners 
                        on these efforts.
            (3) Form.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in classified form.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 15. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
Department of State $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 
through 2026 for the purposes described in subsection (b) with respect 
to Ukraine.
    (b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) 
may only be used--
            (1) to strengthen Ukraine's cyber security, cyber 
        resilience and intellectual property enforcement, including 
        expanding the United States Transnational and High Tech Crime 
        Global Law Enforcement Network through International Computer 
        Hacking and Intellectual Property Advisor or Intellectual 
        Property Law Enforcement Coordinators to provide training and 
        capacity building related to cyber crime and intellectual 
        property crime;
            (2) to provide support and training in Ukraine for--
                    (A) sectoral reforms related to banking and public 
                finance management reform;
                    (B) the privatization of state-owned enterprises;
                    (C) regulatory independence;
                    (D) subsidy reform;
                    (E) land reform;
                    (F) corporate governance; and
                    (G) foreign investment screening;
            (3) to combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and 
        otherwise strengthen independent legal institutions, including 
        by--
                    (A) expanding regional anti-corruption training and 
                exchanges among Ukrainian Ministry officials, law 
                enforcement officers, judges, and prosecutors to build 
                peer support, share best practices, maintain reform 
                momentum, and protect reforms from capture;
                    (B) supporting regional training of United States 
                Embassy personal responsible for supporting anti-
                corruption and the rule of law to improve their 
                effectiveness in supporting the consolidation and 
                expansion of reform;
            (4) to respond to the humanitarian crises caused or 
        aggravated by the invasion and occupation of Ukraine by the 
        Russian Federation, including by supporting internally 
        displaced persons and communities in conflict-affected areas;
            (5) to improve participatory legislative processes in 
        Ukraine, including through--
                    (A) engagement with members of the Verkhovna Rada;
                    (B) training on government oversight, legal 
                education, political transparency and competition, and 
                compliance with international obligations; and
                    (C) supporting the development of professional 
                legislative staff to advise and assist member of the 
                Verkhovna Rada and committees in the execution of their 
                duties and build legal and policy expertise within the 
                Verkhovna Rada; and
            (6) to further build the capacity of civil society, 
        independent media, human rights, and other nongovernmental 
        organizations in Ukraine, with an emphasis on--
                    (A) building capacity outside of Kyiv; and
                    (B) regional civil society training and exchange 
                programs.

SEC. 16. DETERMINATION OF WHETHER NORD STREAM 2 AG AND ASSOCIATED 
              CONSTRUCTION VESSELS MEET CRITERIA FOR IMPOSITION OF 
              SANCTIONS UNDER PROTECTING EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY ACT 
              OF 2019.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 15 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report 
that includes the following:
            (1) The determination of the President with respect to 
        whether Nord Stream 2 AG meets the criteria for the imposition 
        of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act 
        of 2019.
            (2) The determination of the President with respect to 
        whether the following vessels and entities meet the criteria 
        for the imposition of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's 
        Energy Security Act of 2019:
                    (A) Akademik Cherskiy.
                    (B) Umka.
                    (C) Errie.
                    (D) Yuri Topchev.
                    (E) Mentor.
                    (F) DP Gezina.
                    (G) Krebs GEO.
                    (H) Vladislav Strizhov.
                    (I) Glomar Wave.
                    (J) Finval.
                    (K) Katun.
                    (L) Venie.
                    (M) Murman.
                    (N) Baltiyskiy Issledovatel.
                    (O) Artemis Offshore.
                    (P) Havila Subsea.
                    (Q) Russian Maritime Register of Shipping.
                    (R) LLC Insurance Company Constanta.
                    (S) TUV Austria Holding AG.
            (3) A detailed explanation for each determination made 
        under paragraph (1) or (2), including with respect to any 
        determination that the criteria for the imposition of sanctions 
        under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019 were 
        not met with respect to a vessel or entity.
    (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Protecting Europe's 
Energy Security Act of 2019'' means the Protecting Europe's Energy 
Security Act of 2019 (title LXXV of Public Law 116-92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 
note), as amended by section 1242 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 
116-283).

SEC. 17. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
                                                        Calendar No. 49

117th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 814

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To promote security partnership with Ukraine, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             April 26, 2021

                       Reported with an amendment
```