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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO.: 0:20-cv-61469-XXXX

AKAI CUSTOM GUNS, LLC,

a Florida Limited Liability Company,

and SHAY HOROWITZ, an Individual,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

KKM PRECISION, INC. a Nevada Corporation,

SHOOTERS CONNECTION, INC., a Kentucky

Corporation, CHARLES BRADLEY, an Individual

and Kentucky Resident, TIMOTHY MEKOSH,

an Individual and Kentucky Resident, and MICHAEL

DAME, a Canadian Citizen and Kentucky Resident.

Defendants.

_____________________________________________/

DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Defendants, KKM PRECISION, INC. (“KKM”), SHOOTERS CONNECTION, INC.

(“SHOOTERS”), CHARLES BRADLEY (“BRADLEY”), TIMOTHY MEKOSH (“MEKOSH”),

and MICHAEL DAME (“DAME”), (collectively, the “Defendants”) hereby file this Motion to 

Dismiss in response to the First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) filed by Plaintiffs, AKAI 

CUSTOM GUNS, LLC and SHAY HOROWITZ (“Plaintiffs”) [ECF No. 9-1] in accordance with 

the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in support thereof state as follows:

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs assert twenty-nine (29) counts in the Complaint against the Defendants. Simply 

put, Plaintiffs lawsuit stems from Plaintiffs allegations that KKM manufactured and SHOOTERS

sold Plaintiffs defective gun barrels which are allegedly failing to hold specifications and 

tolerances, and as a result, Plaintiffs are allegedly suffering for recall costs, lost revenue, damage 

to their reputation and loss of future revenue. See [ECF No. 9-1]. In addition, Plaintiffs assert 

counts for defamation, defamation per se, defamation by implication, commercial disparagement 

and civil conspiracy to commit commercial disparagement against the Defendants. For the reasons 

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detailed below, Plaintiffs’ complaint contains numerous deficiencies. Moreover, the court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over BRADLEY, DAME, and MEKOSH. Accordingly, this Court must

dismiss the Complaint. 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

I. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

a. Standard 

To satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a complaint must give the 

defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claims and the grounds upon which they rest. Swierkiewicz

v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move for dismissal of a claim that 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but must "give the 

defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 

In deciding whether to dismiss, the court must accept as true all allegations of the complaint and 

construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 235 (1974).

b. Counts I and II must be dismissed because Plaintiffs improperly and prematurely 

seek punitive damages.

“In a diversity case the Court applies the substantive law of Florida. And, federal courts 

have recognized that the right to punitive damages is a substantive right governed by Florida 

substantive law.” Hargrove-Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176385,

*3, 2018 WL 4963733 (M.D. Fla. 2018). Florida Statute § 768.72, states in pertinent part:

In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is 

a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which 

would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. The claimant may 

move to amend its complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by 

the Rules of Civil Procedure... 

In Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1995), the Supreme Court of Florida 

stated: “We read § 768.72 to create a substantive legal right not to be subject to a punitive damages 

claim and ensuing financial worth discovery until the trial court makes a determination that there 

is a reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of punitive damages.” As this Court is likely aware, 

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punitive damages are damages meant to "punish a defendant or to act as a deterrent." First 

Specialty Ins. v. Caliber One Indem. Co., 988 So.2d 708, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Here, Plaintiffs 

have failed to comply with the procedural requirements of §768.72; therefore, the Court should 

dismiss Counts I and II as Plaintiffs improperly assert a claim for punitive damages. See [ECF No. 

9-1 at ¶¶122, 123(e), 148, 149(e)]. 

c. Counts III-IX, XIII-XV, XXIII, and XXVII must be dismissed as Plaintiffs 

improperly lump multiple defendants together.

When a complaint indiscriminately lumps all defendants together, it fails to comply with 

Rule 8. See Lane v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt., Co., No. 04-60602 CIV, 2006 WL 4590705, at 

*5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2006) (“By lumping all the defendants together in each claim and providing 

no factual basis to distinguish their conduct, the [] Complaint fails to satisfy the minimum standard 

of Rule 8.”). While a complaint against multiple defendants may be “read as making the same 

allegation against each defendant individually,” the “factual allegations must give each defendant 

‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim and the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” George & Co., 

LLC v. Alibaba.com, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-719-FtM-29DNF, 2011 WL 6181940, at * 2 (M.D. Fla. 

Dec. 13, 2011) (citations omitted; see also Centrifugal Air Pumps Australia v. TCS Obselete, 

LLC, No. 6:10-cv-820-Orl-31 DAB, 2010 WL 3584948, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2010) (criticizing 

the practice of "lumping" when it rendered "the factual underpinnings of the [c]omplaint 

practically incomprehensible" and created a conflicting description of events).

Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX assert causes of action against both KKM and 

SHOOTERS. Further, Counts XIII, XIV, XV, XXIII, and XXVII assert causes of action against 

both BRADLEY and SHOOTERS. As evidenced upon a review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the 

allegations asserted against KKM, SHOOTERS and BRADLEY are vague, confusing and 

ultimately fail to hone in on the alleged conduct of each defendant. Further, the claims fail to 

articulate the factual basis for each defendants’ purported liability. As such, this Court should grant 

the instant motion and dismiss Counts III-IX, XIII-XV, XXIII, and XXVII because Plaintiffs 

improperly lump multiple defendants together in multiple counts and KKM, SHOOTERS and 

BRADLEY are unable to distinguish the allegations made against each defendant. Plaintiffs should 

be required to set forth their vague allegations with more specificity. 

d. Plaintiffs’ Complaint must be dismissed as Plaintiffs improperly plead fraud 

based on “information and belief.”

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Plaintiffs plead fraud in the Complaint, and they further state their allegations are upon 

“information and belief” approximately 322 times. See e.g., [ECF No. 9-1 at ¶¶781-782, 785, 1061-

1062]. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]n all averments of fraud 

or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." By 

pleading based on "information and belief" without adequately setting forth supporting facts on 

which the belief is founded, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard. 

United States v. Clausen, 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002) (When Rule 9(b) applies, 

"pleadings generally cannot be based on information and belief[.]") (citation omitted); see Ferrell 

v. Durbin, 311 Fed. App'x. 253, 259 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished decision) (finding several 

instances where the appellants, when pleading based on "information and belief," failed to allege 

with particularity any factual basis on which the information and belief was founded, and failed 

"to allege with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference" that the defendant intended to 

deceive the plaintiffs). Because Plaintiffs are alleging fraudulent conduct and statements, Plaintiffs 

must satisfy Rule 9(b), and because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not satisfy Rule 9(b), the Complaint 

must be dismissed. 

e. Count II must be dismissed as Plaintiffs’ misleading advertising count fails as it 

necessarily relies on the representations of another website.

The thrust of Plaintiffs’ misleading advertising claim rests in the theory that SHOOTERS, 

by relying on the Rockwell hardness specifications listed on KKM Precision’s website, 

SHOOTERS engaged in misleading advertising. This is incorrect. Under Florida law, to state a

cause of action under §814.41(1), the Plaintiff must allege (a) the representor made a

misrepresentation of material fact; (b) the representor knew or should have known the falsity of

the statement, (c) intention to induce another to rely, and (d) damages in justifiable reliance. Joseph 

v. Liberty Nat. Bank, 873 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (emphasis added). The definition of 

misleading advertising includes the requirement that the representor make or disseminate oral,

written or printed statements. Id.

Here Plaintiffs attempt to attribute statements made from KKM’s website to SHOOTERS, 

despite neither statements regarding Rockwell hardness (“RC”) nor any references to 416R gunbarrel steel on the Shooters’ Connection website. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege, “SCI

[SHOOTERS]...omits any material information regarding the type of steel the KKM barrels SCI

[SHOOTERS] sells are made of...forcing it customers to go to the KKM website to obtain KKM 

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barrel specification information.” [ECF No. 9-1 at ¶134]. Plaintiffs then further alleges, “SCI’s

[SHOOTERS’] misleading advertising viewed in conjunction with KKM’s misleading 

advertisement and claim that [the barrels were allegedly not the same quality].” [ECF No. 9-1 at 

¶136]. It follows then, as SHOOTERS has allegedly made neither representation regarding the 

steel quality nor Rockwell hardness, SHOOTERS cannot have “made a misrepresentation of

material fact.” It is in fact, Plaintiffs who are cross referencing both websites to create the alleged

misrepresentation. Furthermore, even if the barrels were allegedly not 416R or 42RC, SHOOTERS

cannot be said to have made an affirmative representation regarding these two characteristics.

Consequently, this count should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

f. Count IV must be dismissed as Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for fraudulent 

inducement. 

In Count IV of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint Plaintiff Horowitz, together with Plaintiff 

Akai, purports to assert a claim against KKM and SHOOTERS for fraudulent inducement. Count 

IV must be dismissed because Plaintiff Horowitz did not purchase any KKM-manufactured gun 

barrels and thus does not have standing to assert a claim for fraudulent inducement against KKM 

or SHOOTERS resulting from Akai’s purchase of KKM gun barrels.

The relevant facts upon which Plaintiffs’ claims in Count IV are based are contained in 

Paragraphs 37 through 40. In those Paragraphs the Plaintiffs alleged that between “August 2017 

until approximately October of 2019, AKAI purchased 188 KKM barrels. . . .” Amended 

Complaint at ¶ 37. Plaintiffs allege that “AKAI purchased 58 KKM barrels directly from KKM.” 

Id. at ¶ 38. “AKAI purchased an additional 115 KKM barrels directly from SCI [SHOOTERS].” 

Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiffs then allege that “none of the KKM barrels purchased by AKAI from KKM 

or SCI” had certain quality control information included. Id. at ¶ 40. In each substantive allegation 

the Plaintiffs allege that it was Akai, not Horowitz, which purchased the KKM-manufactured gun 

barrels. Conversely, nowhere in the substantive allegations of the Amended Complaint due the 

Plaintiffs allege that Horowitz himself purchased KKM-manufactured gun barrels.

Notwithstanding the fact that each of the subject gun barrels upon which the Plaintiffs’ 

claims are based were purchased by Akai, not Horowitz, Count IV has been asserted by both 

Plaintiffs jointly for alleged fraudulent inducement. It is axiomatic that to assert a claim for 

fraudulent inducement, one must have been induced into doing something. See e.g., Sena v. 

Pereira, 179 So. 3d 433, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)(explaining that one of the requisite elements of 

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a fraudulent inducement claim is that the plaintiff relied to his or her detriment on the false 

statement). In this case, the alleged reliance was purchasing KKM-manufactured gun barrels. See

Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 171 – 174. Since Plaintiff Horowitz does not allege that he purchased 

any KKM-manufactured gun barrels, he cannot state a claim for fraudulent inducement as he 

cannot prove the essential element of detrimental reliance on the alleged fraudulent 

misrepresentations, and Count IV of the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.

Further, Plaintiffs fail to identify any statements they allege KKM and/or SHOOTERS made 

which induced Plaintiffs to purchase the at-issue barrels. See Rule 9(b) ("[i]n all averments of fraud 

or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.").

Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory, unsupported and lack particularity; therefore, this Court 

should dismiss Count IV.

g. Count V must be dismissed as Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for strict 

liability.

In Count V of their Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs purport to assert a cause of action 

for strict liability against KKM and SHOOTERS. In support of that claim, Plaintiffs allege that 

the subject KKM-manufactured gun barrels “were made from a type of steel that was not 

reasonable or proper . . . rendering the barrels unfit for normal and customary use as 1911/2011 

pistols [sic] barrels . . . and as a result, would fail and destroy any pistol and causing [sic] possible 

injury or death. . . .” Amended Complaint at ¶ 179. Plaintiffs repeat that phrasing in Paragraph 

180, alleging that the KKM-manufactured gun barrels “would caus[e] possible injury or death.” 

(Emphasis added). Plaintiffs later claim that the alleged defects in the gun barrels “destroyed 

AKAI’s pistols.” Id. at ¶ 185. Plaintiffs assert that the damage to their pistols allegedly resulting 

from the gun barrels included “compacted surfaces, folded metal, or compacted metal on the hood 

and lugs, or any of the lock up surfaces.” Id. at ¶ 186. Conversely, nowhere in the Amended 

Complaint do the Plaintiffs allege any actual (as opposed to hypothetically possible) personal 

injury resulting from the KKM-manufactured gun barrels.

The seminal case discussing strict liability in Florida is West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 

336 So. 2d 80, 86 (Fla. 1976)(emphasis added). In West the Florida Supreme Court held that “strict 

liability should be imposed only when a product the manufacturer places on the market, knowing 

that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a 

human being.” (Emphasis added). In the instant case the only damage that the Plaintiffs claim to 

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have resulted from the KKM-manufactured gun barrels is damage to the product itself. Plaintiffs 

allege absolutely no personal injury. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for strict 

liability against KKM and/or SHOOTERS, and Count V must be dismissed. 

Plaintiffs’ strict liability claims are not saved by arguing that the alleged defects in the 

barrels caused damage to “other property.” In Count V Plaintiffs claim that alleged defects in 

KKM-manufactured gun barrels “destroyed AKAI’s pistols.” Amended Complaint at ¶ 185 

(emphasis added). Conversely, Plaintiffs do not allege any damage to other property than the Akai 

pistols in which the KKM-manufactured gun barrels were allegedly installed. Taking Plaintiffs’ 

allegations as true, KKM’s allegedly defective barrels only caused damage to “the other 

components of AKAI’s pistols.” Plaintiffs’ claim therefore fails, because “the other components 

of AKAI’s pistol’s” which they claim were damaged by the KKM barrels are not “other property” 

within the meaning of Florida’s strict liability jurisprudence.

The standard for injury to “other property” is not satisfied in cases where, as here, the 

“other” property damage claimed is only that caused by an allegedly defective component part to 

the end-product (i.e., the gun or other components contained therein). The case most on point is

American Universal Ins. Group v. General Motors Corp., 578 So. 2d 451, 453 – 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1991)(holding that since a manufacturer’s replacement oil pump was an integral or component part 

of its engine such that the engine’s destruction when the pump malfunctioned did not result in 

damage to “other property” that would support strict products liability recovery); see also Casa 

Clara Condo. Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 620 So.2d 1244, 1245 (Fla.1993) (economic loss 

doctrine bars claim against concrete provider for building where there was no damage to anything 

other than building itself); Turbomeca, S.A. v. French Aircraft Agency, Inc., 913 So.2d 714, 717

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (explaining that “[t]he airframe and engine are not two separate pieces of 

property-they are one product” and that “[c]ourts have refused to bifurcate products into parts 

where a component part harms or destroys the finished product”); Jarmco, Inc. v. Polygard, 

Inc., 668 So.2d 300 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (economic loss doctrine bars claim against distributor 

of boat resin where only damage was to boat itself); GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So.2d 350 (Fla. 

3d DCA 1984) (roofing contractor could not recover in tort against manufacturer of defective 

roofing materials incorporated by contractor in certain jobs). Because the Plaintiffs’ own 

allegations in the instant case only allege damage to “other components of AKAI’s pistols,” 

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Plaintiffs fail to allege the prima facie requirement of necessary damage to other property to 

maintain a claim for strict liability. Accordingly, Count V must be dismissed. 

h. Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX must be dismissed as Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy 

conditions precedent.

Counts VI, VII, and VIII of the Amended Complaint purport to assert claims against KKM 

and SHOOTERS for Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranty of 

Merchantability, and Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, respectively. 

Count IX purports to assert a claim for Revocation of Acceptance. Each of these claims must be 

dismissed for failure to satisfy a necessary condition precedent due to the Plaintiff’s refusal to 

return the subject gun barrels despite KKM’s request and failure to give adequate notice of 

revocation of acceptance.

Each of Counts VI through IX are governed by Article 2 of the UCC, found in Fla. Stat. 

Ch. 672. In those Counts, Plaintiffs allege that upon becoming aware of alleged defects in the 

KKM-manufactured gun barrels, Akai put KKM on notice of the alleged defects (Amended 

Complaint at ¶ 197) but that “KKM has refused to honor its express warranty to AKAI” (id. at ¶ 

200) which included the “repair and/or exchange of defective parts” (id. at ¶ 201) and that “KKM 

and SCI [SHOOTERS] have nevertheless refused to accept return of the barrels and refused to 

refund AKAI’s purchase price.” (Id. at ¶ 223). Plaintiffs reiterate that the terms of the alleged 

express warranty were such that KKM and SHOOTERS would “remedy within a reasonable time, 

any defects which had not been or could not have been discovered prior to acceptance.” Id. at ¶ 

204. Of course, for Defendants to have the opportunity to attempt to “repair” or “remedy” the 

alleged defects in the gun barrels, the Plaintiffs would have to return those gun barrels to KKM 

and/or SHOOTERS for inspection. The Plaintiffs admit that they refused to do so. See Amended 

Complaint at ¶ 60.

The Plaintiffs’ own allegations disprove the claims made in Counts VI through IX. 

Specifically, Para. 56 through 58 of the Amended Complaint discuss Plaintiffs’ notice to KKM 

and SHOOTERS of the alleged defects in the products. In describing the parties’ communications, 

Plaintiff alleged that “McIntire [of KKM] wanted HOROWITZ to send KKM the allegedly soft 

barrels so McIntire would advise how AKAI was testing the barrels wrong because KKM ‘was not 

in the business of giving away barrels for free.’” Id. at ¶ 58. Stated differently, Plaintiffs 

acknowledge that KKM requested a return of the allegedly defective product so that KKM could 

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determine if a material defect actually existed before replacing or refunding the product. Despite 

KKM’s explicit request to return the allegedly defective product, “HOROWITZ decided to retain 

all defective KKM barrels in its possession. . . .” Id. at ¶ 60. Plaintiffs’ allegation in Paras. 58 and 

60 acknowledging that KKM requested a return of the subject gun barrels but that Plaintiffs 

“decided to retain all defective KKM barrels in [their] possession” expressly negates the relevant 

allegations of Counts VI through IX. The allegations of Paragraphs 58 and 60 negate the 

subsequent allegation in Para. 223 that “KKM has refused to honor its express warranty to AKAI” 

and the allegations of Para. 200 that “KKM has refused to honor its express warranty to AKAI” 

(which Akai prevented KKM from doing by refusing to return the barrels). The allegations of 

Paras. 58 and 60 likewise negate the subsequent allegations of Para. 220 that “[a]fter numerous 

attempts by KKM to cure, it has become apparent that said non-conformities cannot be seasonably 

cured.” Not only do the allegations of Para. 58 and 60 negate the subsequent allegations, but the 

allegations of Paras. 200 and 220 are themselves directly inconsistent (which is the case: did KKM 

refuse to honor its warranty, or did it attempt to cure numerous times unsuccessfully, and if the 

latter, how did KKM attempt to cure numerous times if Plaintiffs decided to retain all allegedly 

defective barrels?). It is apparent that the Plaintiffs’ General Allegations constitute their statement 

of the facts, while the inconsistent allegations within Counts VI through IX are their attempt at 

rote application of the elements of the claims. This contradiction is further evidenced by Plaintiffs’ 

own exhibits attached to the Complaint which evidence SHOOTERS’ request to Plaintiffs to 

provide “a pair of bad barrels” and SHOOTERS would “forward them to Luke [of KKM] and ask 

him to take a look”—even where SHOOTERS offered to have the barrels shipped at its expense. 

See [ECF No. 9-1 at Ex. 3-7]; see also See Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F. 3d 1189 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (where allegations within a complaint conflict with exhibits, exhibits control). 

Akai alleges that it has particular knowledge, skill, and expertise with respect to the 

manufacture of custom firearms. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 15 – 22 (describing at length 

Akai’s expertise in this area as a “world-class gun builder” whose firearms are “used by some of 

the best competition shooters in the world,” “to win 3 National USPSA Championships,” and have 

been “featured in and used in the production of” feature films). As a part of its manufacturing 

process, Akai acquires pistol barrels from manufacturers and distributors for incorporation into its 

firearms. Id. at ¶ 23. Based upon the forgoing, Akai is deemed a “merchant” with respect to 

firearms and their components under Fla. Stat. § 672.104(1), which defines a “merchant” as “a 

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person who deals in goods of the kinds or otherwise by occupation holds himself or herself out as 

having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction. . . .” Thus, 

the sale of KKM-manufactured gun barrels to Akai would constitute a transaction “between 

merchants” under Fla. Stat. § 672.104(3).

If a merchant buyer desires to reject goods, the merchant buyer must comply with Fla. Stat. 

§ 672.603. That statute states, in pertinent part, that “when the seller has no agent or place of 

business at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after rejection of goods in 

her or his possession or control to follow any reasonable instructions received from the seller 

with respect to the goods and in the absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell 

them for the seller’s account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily.” Fla. 

Stat. § 672.603(1)(emphasis added). Only when the seller of the rejected goods “gives no 

instructions within a reasonable time after notification of rejection the buyer may store the rejected 

goods for the seller’s account or reship them to him or her or resell them for the seller’s account 

with reimbursement as provided in the preceding section.” Fla. Stat. § 672.604. The same 

principles apply to revocation of the purchase of goods as to rejection. Fla. Stat. § 672.608(3).

In the instant case, the Plaintiffs acknowledge that despite KKM and SHOOTERS’ request 

for a return of the gun barrels the Plaintiffs refused to do so. Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 58, 60. In 

refusing to return the barrels to KKM and/or SHOOTERS at their request, Plaintiffs have breached 

their duties under Fla. Stat. § 672.603 “to follow any reasonable instructions received from the 

seller with respect to the goods.” It is axiomatic that if a buyer of goods desires to make a warranty 

claim, the buyer must tender the goods to the seller to inspect and, if appropriate, repair or replace 

them.1 This principle is as old as Florida warranty law. See American Mfg. Co. v. A.H. McLeod 

& Co., 82 So. 802 (Fla. 1919)(holding that “[a] vendor who has sold goods which the purchaser 

claims are inferior to the goods bargained for may demand the return of the good. . . . If he does 

this and the purchaser refuses to return the goods, the purchaser will be held to the contract price, 

as he will be presumed to have waived the defects.”); C.F. &A.C. Mizell v. I.H. & W.L. Watson, 

49 So. 149 (Fla. 1909)(rejecting a warranty claim where the buyer refused offer to return an 

allegedly defective product).

 

1

Imagine buying a product from a retailer, being dissatisfied with its condition upon opening it at 

home, and then demanding a refund from the retailer while at the same time refusing to return it. 

Holiday exchange season would be forever changed.

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After rejection of goods, any exercise of ownership by the buyer is wrongful as against the 

seller. Fla. Stat. § 672.602(2)(a). Revocation of acceptance is not effective until the buyer notifies 

the seller of it, with notification a necessary precondition to imposing liability on the seller. Fla. 

Stat. § 672.608(2); Golden Needles Knitting and Glove Co., Inc. v. Dynamic Marketing 

Enterprises, Inc., 766 F.Supp. 421 (W.D. NC 1991)(applying Florida law). A merchant buyer is 

held to a higher standard than a consumer buyer with regard to the content of a notice of revocation. 

See Official Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-608. Plaintiffs detail their discussions with KKM and 

SHOOTERS in Paras. 56 through 62 of the Amended Complaint. Nowhere in those provisions do 

the Plaintiffs allege that they notified KKM and/or SHOOTERS that they were revoking 

acceptance of the gun barrels. See generally Counts VI through IX.

Because the Plaintiffs in the instant case have: (a) explicitly refused to return the subject 

gun barrels to KKM and/or SHOOTERS despite KKM and SHOOTERS’ requests that they do so 

and (b) have failed to give adequate notice of rejection as required by Fla. Stat. § 672.608, the 

Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy necessary conditions precedent to their UCC claims in Counts VI 

through IX, which must be dismissed.

i. Count VIII must be dismissed as Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for breach 

of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 

Count VIII of the Amended Complaint purports to state a claim against KKM and 

SHOOTERS for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Plaintiffs fail 

to state a claim in Count VIII, as Plaintiffs fail to allege how Akai’s use of the KKM-manufactured 

gun barrels are particular or unusual to it and different in any way from the purpose for which the 

gun barrels are ordinarily used.

A “particular purpose,” as that term is used in the Uniform Commercial Code provision 

governing the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,1differs from the ordinary 

purpose for which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is 

peculiar to the nature of his business, whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are 

those envisaged in the concept of merchantability and go to uses that are customarily made of the 

goods in question. See Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-315 (contrast this with the test for the 

merchantability of goods, which is that the goods be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 

goods are used). For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking upon ordinary 

ground, but a seller may know that a particular pair was selected to be used for climbing mountains, 

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and in that case an implied warranty would arise that the shoes are suitable for such purpose. See 

id. In contrast, no implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose arises in the sale of a copying 

machine where the buyer's expressed intent is simply to use it for photocopying. Royal Typewriter 

Co., a Div. of Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 37 

U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 429 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying Florida law). A complaint that fails to allege a 

particular or unusual use, different from the purpose for which the item sold is ordinarily used, 

does not state a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular 

purpose. Fred's Excavating & Crane Service, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 

4th DCA 1976).

Here, Akai alleges that it “manufactures custom 1911 and 2011 based pistols used 

primarily for shooting competitions in the United States and various countries throughout the 

world.” Amended Complaint at ¶ 15. Akai further alleges that “KKM manufactures barrels to be 

used in 1911 and 2011 pistol [sic].” Id. at ¶ 27. Akai alleges that it purchased the KKMmanufactured gun barrels that are the subject of this law suit “to manufacture 1911 and 2011 based 

pistols used primarily for shooting competitions in the United States and various countries around 

the world.” Id. at ¶ 214. Thus, Akai’s claims in Count VIII are that it purchased gun barrels that 

“KKM manufactures barrels to be used in 1911 and 2011 pistol[s]” for the unique purpose of . . . 

using them in 1911 and 2011 based pistols. Stated differently, Akai purchased the subject gun 

barrels for the ordinary purpose in which these gun barrels are used. The Amended Complaint 

fails to allege a particular or unusual use, different from the purpose for which the KKMmanufactured gun barrels are ordinarily used, and therefore it does not state a cause of action for 

breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose requiring dismissal of Count VIII.

j. Counts XI, XIV, XVII, and XX must be dismissed as it fails to properly plead a 

claim for defamation per se.

To successfully plead a claim for defamation per se, Plaintiffs must allege the "identity of 

the particular person to whom the remarks were made with a reasonable degree of certainty" to 

afford the defendant "enough information to determine affirmative defenses." Ward v. Triple 

Canopy, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115472, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 25, 2017) (citing Buckner v. 

Lower Fla. Keys Hosp. Dist., 403 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (additional citations and 

internal quotations omitted)). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the allegedly 

defamatory statements “[w]ere published via Facebook on the internet in this Circuit and the 

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County of Broward, domestically and internationally for the entire world to see and hear[].” See

[ECF No. 9-1 at ¶326] (emphasis added); see also [ECF No. 9-1 at ¶¶259, 514, 695]; Aflalo v.

Weiner, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110134, *13, 2018 WL 3235529 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (“Plaintiff's 

assertion that the Statement was put on Defendant's Facebook wall "for all to see" fails to identify 

those persons to whom the Facebook post was published with a reasonable degree of certainty. As 

such, it is also for this reason that the amended complaint should be dismissed with leave to 

amend.”). Accordingly, counts XI, XIV, XVII, and XX should be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail 

to sufficiently identify the person or entity that the allegedly defamatory statements were made to. 

II. Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction over BRADLEY, DAME, and MEKOSH. 

a. Standard

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), ‘[a] court must dismiss an action against 

a defendant over which it has no personal jurisdiction.’” Kennedy v. Heidi Motel Inc., No. 19-

60946-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104352, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2019) 

(quoting Verizon Trademark Servs., LLC v. Producers, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1323-24 (M.D. 

Fla. 2011)). “This Court must address Defendant’s claim that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction 

because ‘[a] court without personal jurisdiction is powerless to take further action.’” Bulpit, LLC 

v. Decanio, No. 13-14119-CIV-MOORE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202893, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 

2013) (quoting Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.6 (11th Cir. 1999)).

“A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if

both prongs of the two-part analysis are satisfied: (1) the court has jurisdiction over the defendant

under the state long-arm statute; and (2) sufficient minimum contacts exist between the defendant

and the forum state so as to satisfy the requirements of Due Process.” Kennedy, 2019 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 104352, at *5-6 (citing Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1990)). The Court 

must first “determine whether the Florida long-arm statute provides a sufficient basis for personal 

jurisdiction[,]” and if the Court “deem[s] jurisdiction appropriate under Florida law, the Court 

must then ascertain whether ‘sufficient minimum contacts exist between the defendants and the 

forum state so as to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Kennedy, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104352, at *6 

(quoting Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 1996)).

i. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute 

Florida Statute Section 48.193(1)(a) provides:

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A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an 

agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself 

and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of 

the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts:

1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture 

in this state or having an office or agency in this state.

2. Committing a tortious act within this state.

3. Owning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage or other lien on any real 

property within this state.

4. Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located within this state at the 

time of contracting.

5. With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of property 

in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an 

independent action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrimonial domicile 

in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant 

resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting 

during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement 

for filing an action for dissolution of marriage.

6. Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or 

omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, 

either:

a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this 

state; or

b. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the 

defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary 

course of commerce, trade, or use.

7. Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the 

contract to be performed in this state.

8. With respect to a proceeding for paternity, engaging in the act of sexual 

intercourse within this state with respect to which a child may have been conceived.

9. Entering into a contract that complies with § 685.102.

Fla. Stat. §48.193(1)(a)(1)-(9) (2019).

“‘Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law, 

federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court.’” Decanio, 2013 

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202893, at *6 (quoting Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel’s 

Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983); citing Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 357-

58 (5th Cir. 1981); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973)). The 

“Florida long-arm statute is to be strictly construed.” Id. “[T]he Florida long-arm statute . . . 

requires more activities or contacts to confer personal jurisdiction than those demanded by the 

Constitution.” Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 19543, 

at *12 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 1988) (citation omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving 

personal jurisdiction.” Decanio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202893, at *6 (citing Sculptchair, Inc., 94 

F.3d at 627). 

“Under Florida’s long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, a non-resident defendant can be 

subject to personal jurisdiction in two ways.” Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

33228, at *6. “First, a Florida court can exercise general personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction 

over any claims against a defendant, whether or not they involve the defendant’s activities in 

Florida—if the defendant engages in ‘substantial and not isolated activity’ in Florida.” Id. (citing 

Schulman v. Inst, for Shipboard Educ., 624 F. App’x 1002, 1005 (11th Cir. 2015)). “Second, a 

Florida court can exercise specific personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over suits that arise 

out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with Florida—if the claim asserted against the defendant 

arises from the defendant’s contacts with Florida, and those contacts fall within one of nine 

statutorily enumerated categories set forth in section 48.193(1)(a).” Id.

“Once a party has failed to meet the first prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis, the 

Court ‘need not reach the issue of whether . . . the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due 

process.’” Mar. Exec., LLC v. Larson Elecs, LLC, No. 17-60323-CIV-GAYLES, 2018 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 97742, at *12 (S.D. Fla. June 11, 2018) (quoting Maale v. Kirchgessner, No. 08-80131-

CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152444, at *21 n.9 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2010), aff’d 

sub nom. Maale v. Caicos Beach Club Charter, Ltd., 420 F. App’x 895 (11th Cir. 2011)). See also 

PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 807 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(“Because the federal courts are duty bound to avoid a constitutional question if answering the 

question is unnecessary to the adjudication of the claims at hand . . . we consider first whether 

Florida’s long-arm statute provided the district court with personal jurisdiction over any of the 

defendants.” (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 

F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006))).

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ii. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

The court applies a three-part due process test to determine whether a defendant has 

established sufficient minimum contacts to meet due process requirements, examining: (1) whether 

the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the 

forum; (2) whether the nonresident defendant’s contacts represent a “purposeful availment of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,” thereby invoking the benefits and 

protections of that state’s laws and making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s 

courts foreseeable, and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S. A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 

1339 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs, and if the plaintiff does so, "a 

defendant must make a 'compelling case' that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 1355 (citing Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v.

Food Movers Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010)).

b. Charles Bradley must be dismissed from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

As set forth in the affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, BRADLEY has zero 

connections to the state of Florida:

 BRADLEY is an individual who resides in Kentucky and is a citizen of Kentucky.2

 BRADLEY is the President of the business, Shooters Connection, Inc. 

(“SHOOTERS”), a Kentucky corporation with a principal place of business in 

Kentucky.3

 BRADLEY has never resided in Florida. 

 BRADLEY has never held any licenses in Florida.

 BRADLEY does not hold any certifications issued in Florida. 

 BRADLEY has never participated in a proceeding for alimony, child support, or 

division of property in Florida. 

 BRADLEY does not have any Florida phone number. 

 BRADLEY does not have any real estate, bank accounts or any other assets in Florida. 

 BRADLEY has never owned, used, possessed or held a mortgage or other lien on any 

real property within Florida. 

 BRADLEY has never committed a tortious act within Florida.

 

2 Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. See [ECF No. 9-1 at ¶6].

3 Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. See e.g., [ECF No 9-1 at ¶¶5, 289-290].

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In sum, BRADLEY in no way has availed himself of Florida’s privileges and protections. 

Thus, it would be unreasonable and improper to require BRADLEY to submit to the burdens of 

litigation in Florida. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges BRADLEY is subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida 

because “[h]e committed a tortious act(s) within this State.” See Ex. A at ¶11. However, there are

no allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint that any Florida resident accessed the allegedly defamatory

publications by BRADLEY and/or SHOOTERS; therefore, Plaintiffs allegations fail to establish

a “tortious act.” See Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 2010).

Moreover, BRADLEY denies he committed any tortious acts at any time within Florida. See Ex. 

A at ¶11.

Pertinently, BRADLEY does not personally own the Shooters Connection, Inc. Facebook 

page where Plaintiffs allege defamatory statements were published. Rather, BRADLEY is 

President of Shooters Connection, Inc., and it is Shooters Connection, Inc. that owns the page. See

Ex. A at ¶12. Plaintiffs must recognize that corporations can only act through people. Any

statements published by Shooters Connection Inc. on its Facebook page which Plaintiffs claim to

defame them—which BRADLEY and SHOOTERS expressly deny—while physically drafted

and/or posted by BRADLEY on behalf of Shooters Connection, Inc., were not made by

BRADLEY personally or in an individual capacity. See Ex. A at ¶14. This is evidenced by the fact

that no at-issue postings were made by an individual “Charles Bradley”, “Chuck Bradley”, or the

like. See Two Worlds United v. Zylstra, 46 So. 3d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (finding plaintiff failed

to establish personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant who did not personally own the

website or personally make any posts on the website relating to plaintiff). Rather, all postings by

Shooters Connection, Inc. on its Facebook account are statements by the corporation itself. See

Ex. A at ¶15. Additionally, any postings by Facebook accounts of “2011 Universe”, “USPSA 

UNOFFICIAL”, “CHIMPO”, “James Taylor”, “Mike Hoffer”, “Bagger”, “Team Doodie Project 

Uncensored” and “Double Alfalfa” were not made by BRADLEY, and BRADLEY does not have 

access to said Facebook accounts. See Ex. A at ¶¶18-19. For these reasons, the exhibits attached 

to Plaintiffs’ complaint conflict with the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint, specifically that 

BRADLEY committed a tortious act in Florida. See Irvin, 496 F. 3d at 1189 (“Where there is a 

conflict between allegations in a pleading and exhibits thereto, it is well settled that exhibits 

control.”). 

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Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint against BRADLEY as Plaintiffs

cannot meet the initial burden of setting forth BRADLEY committed a tortious act within Florida

or is otherwise subject to the Court’s jurisdiction by means of Florida’s long-arm statute.

Moreover, BRADLEY has not engaged in any activity—yet alone substantial and not isolated 

activity—in Florida. Further, even if Plaintiffs could evidence BRADLEY is subject to personal 

jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute, BRADLEY has no contacts with Florida; therefore, 

the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over BRADLEY would offend traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice. Therefore, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint against 

BRADLEY.

c. Michael Dame must be dismissed from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.

As set forth in the affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit “B,” DAME has zero connections to 

the state of Florida:

 DAME is an individual who resides in Kentucky and is a citizen of Kentucky.4

 DAME has never resided in Florida. 

 DAME has never held any licenses in Florida.

 DAME does not hold any certifications issued in Florida. 

 DAME has never participated in a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division 

of property in Florida. 

 DAME does not have any Florida phone number. 

 DAME does not have any real estate, bank accounts or any other assets in Florida. 

 DAME has never owned, used, possessed or held a mortgage or other lien on any real 

property within Florida. 

 DAME has never committed a tortious act within Florida.

 DAME is not an employee, agent, representative, or independent contractor of KKM

Precision, Inc., Shooters Connection, Inc., Luke McIntire, or Charles Bradley.

In sum, DAME in no way has availed himself of Florida’s privileges and protections. Thus, 

it would be unreasonable and improper to require DAME to submit to the burdens of litigation in 

Florida. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges DAME is subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida because 

“[h]e committed a tortious act(s) within this State.” However, there are no allegations in Plaintiff’s

complaint that any Florida resident accessed the allegedly defamatory publications by DAME;

therefore, Plaintiffs allegations fail to establish a “tortious act.” See Internet Solutions Corp. v. 

 

4 Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. See [ECF No. 9-1 at ¶8].

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Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 2010). Moreover, DAME denies he committed any tortious 

acts at any time within Florida. See Ex. B at ¶11.

Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint against DAME as Plaintiffs

cannot meet the initial burden of setting forth DAME committed a tortious act within Florida or is

otherwise subject to the Court’s jurisdiction by means of Florida’s long-arm statute. Moreover,

DAME has not engaged in any activity—yet alone substantial and not isolated activity—in Florida. 

Further, even if Plaintiffs could evidence DAME is subject to personal jurisdiction under the 

Florida long-arm statute, DAME has no contacts with Florida; therefore, the Court’s exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over DAME would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice. Therefore, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint against DAME.

d. Timothy Mekosh must be dismissed from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.

As set forth in the affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit “C,” MEKOSH has zero connections 

to the state of Florida:

 MEKOSH is an individual who resides in Kentucky and is a citizen of Kentucky.5

 MEKOSH has never resided in Florida. 

 MEKOSH has never held any licenses in Florida.

 MEKOSH does not hold any certifications issued in Florida. 

 MEKOSH has never participated in a proceeding for alimony, child support, or 

division of property in Florida. 

 MEKOSH does not have any Florida phone number. 

 MEKOSH does not have any real estate, bank accounts or any other assets in Florida. 

 MEKOSH has never owned, used, possessed or held a mortgage or other lien on any 

real property within Florida. 

 MEKOSH has never committed a tortious act within Florida.

 MEKOSH is not an employee, agent, representative, or independent contractor of

KKM Precision, Inc., Shooters Connection, Inc., Luke McIntire, or Charles Bradley.

In sum, MEKOSH in no way has availed himself of Florida’s privileges and protections. 

Thus, it would be unreasonable and improper to require MEKOSH to submit to the burdens of 

litigation in Florida. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges MEKOSH is subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida 

because “[h]e committed a tortious act(s) within this State.” However, there are no allegations in

Plaintiff’s complaint that any Florida resident accessed the allegedly defamatory publications by

MEKOSH; therefore, Plaintiffs allegations fail to establish a “tortious act.” See Internet Solutions 

 

5 Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. See [ECF No. 9-1 at ¶7].

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Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 2010). Moreover, MEKOSH denies he committed 

any tortious acts at any time within Florida. See Ex. C at ¶11.

Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint against MEKOSH as Plaintiffs

cannot meet the initial burden of setting forth MEKOSH committed a tortious act within Florida

or is otherwise subject to the Court’s jurisdiction by means of Florida’s long-arm statute.

Moreover, MEKOSH has not engaged in any activity—yet alone substantial and not isolated 

activity—in Florida. Further, even if Plaintiffs could evidence MEKOSH is subject to personal 

jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute, MEKOSH has no contacts with Florida; therefore, 

the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over MEKOSH would offend traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice. Therefore, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended 

Complaint against MEKOSH.

WHEREFORE, Defendants KKM PRECISION, INC., SHOOTERS CONNECTION, 

INC., CHARLES BRADLEY, TIMOTHY MEKOSH, and MICHAEL DAME respectfully 

request that this Court dismiss the Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 9-1], and grant 

such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted by:

/s/ Nicholas D. Freeman__________

NICHOLAS D. FREEMAN, ESQ.

Florida Bar No. 118620

Nicholas.freeman@wilsonelser.com

AMANDA QADRI, ESQ.

Florida Bar No. 1003108

Amanda.Qadri@wilsonelser.com 

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker 

LLP

111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1200

Orlando, FL 32801

(407) 203-7599 – Phone

(407) 648-1376 – Facsimile

Attorneys for Defendants, Shooters 

Connection, Inc. and Charles Bradley

/s/ Kevin P. Robinson

Kevin P. Robinson, Esquire

Florida Bar No.: 0014650

krobinson@zkslawfirm.com

jwenhold@zkslawfirm.com

service@zkslawfirm.com

ZIMMERMAN, KISER & SUTCLIFFE, P.A.

315 E. Robinson St., Suite 600 (32801)

P.O. Box 3000

Orlando, FL 32802

Telephone: (407) 425-7010

Facsimile: (407) 425-2747

Counsel for Defendants KKM Precision, Inc., 

Timothy Mekosh, and Michael Dame

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 25, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing is being 

served this day on all counsel of record or pro se parties identified on the following Service List 

in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by 

CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized 

to received electronically notices of Electronic Filing.

/Nicholas D. Freeman __________

NICHOLAS D. FREEMAN, ESQ.

Florida Bar No. 118620

Nicholas.freeman@wilsonelser.com

AMANDA QADRI, ESQ.

Florida Bar No. 1003108

Amanda.Qadri@wilsonelser.com 

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1200

Orlando, FL 32801

(407) 203-7599 – Phone

(407) 648-1376 – Facsimile

Attorneys for Defendants, Shooters Connection, Inc. 

and Charles Bradley

SERVICE LIST

LAW OFFICES OF FIATO

Richard J. Fiato

550 W. Merrill Street, Suite 200

Birmingham, MI 48009

Attorney for Plaintiffs

fiatolaw@gmail.com

rfiato@coniferinsurance.com

eyee@mmyelaw.com

ZIMMERMAN KISER SUTCLIFFE

Kevin P. Robinson

315 East Robinson Street, Suite 600

Orlando, FL 32801

Attorney for KKM, MEKOSH, DAME

krobinson@zkslawfirm.com

JWenhold@zkslawfirm.com

service@zkslawfirm.com

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COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A.

John A. Chiocca

Kir-Sheng Chen

222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 120

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Attorneys for BRADLEY and SHOOTERS

John.chiocca@csklegal.com

Kir-sheng.chen@csklegal.com

Stephanie.chiocca@csklegal.com

Susan.miller@csklegal.com

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