UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 20-20185-CR-WILLIAMS(s)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MARIO RENE DE LA TORRE,

a/k/a “Mario R. Delatorre,”

Defendant.

______________________________ /

UNITED STATES’ SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

The United States of America, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States 

Attorney, hereby files this sentencing memorandum, and states:

I. Mario De La Torre’s Advisory Guideline Range of Imprisonment

Mario De La Torre’s advisory guideline range of imprisonment should be 33 to 41 months, 

based on his total offense level of 20, and his criminal history category of I with zero criminal 

history points. (See PSI (DE 132) at pp. 11-12, ¶¶ 39-54; Second Addendum to PSI (DE 132-2) at 

p. 1.) Based on De La Torre’s provision of some substantial assistance regarding the 

investigation of other persons believed to have committed federal criminal offenses, the United 

States requests that the Court depart down and impose a term of 30 months’ imprisonment. (See

United States’ Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline 

Section 5K1.1 (DE 141).)

Further, the United States requests, and Mario De La Torre stipulates to, an order that De 

La Torre pay restitution in the amount of $2,129,392.35 to Summit Aerospace, Inc.

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II. Section 3553(a) Sentencing Factors

Regardless of Mario De La Torre’s advisory guideline range of imprisonment, and his 

provision of assistance, the United States recommends that the Court sentence him to a term of 30

months’ imprisonment, based on the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors discussed below.

1. The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

The first Section 3553(a) sentencing factor weighs heavily in favor of a term of 30 months’ 

imprisonment. Mario De La Torre stands convicted of perpetrating an elaborate, decade long, 

mail fraud and wire fraud scheme. From August 2008, and continuing through October 2018, De 

La Torre used his position as Senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing for Summit Aerospace, 

Inc. (“Summit”), to fraudulently embezzle approximately $2.1 million of Summit’s funds; which 

he then split with his co-defendant, Joe Lewis McHomes. Moreover, De La Torre evaded the 

payment of income tax on his ill-gotten gains, by laundering the fraud proceeds and filing false and 

fraudulent income tax returns.

To perpetrate the fraud scheme, De La Torre enlisted McHomes to pose as a sales 

consultant, who supposedly obtained aircraft part repair work for Summit, from Al-Raha Group 

for Technical Services (“RGTS”) in Saudi Arabia. De La Torre created fake invoices purportedly 

issued by McHomes’ fictitious consulting firm, “J-CONN Solutions,” for commissions McHomes 

purportedly earned for selling Summit’s services to RGTS. But McHomes did not obtain the 

repair work that Summit performed for RGTS and was not entitled to any compensation from 

Summit. Knowing this, De La Torre submitted the fake J-CONN invoices to Summit’s accounts 

payable department, which would issue checks payable to J-CONN. Significantly, De La Torre 

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would create J-CONN invoices in amounts below $10,000 and cause Summit to issue a separate 

check for each invoice. Summit would then send a set of checks to Joe McHomes, via FedEx. 

De La Torre’s generation of Summit checks for amounts below $10,000 was an important

feature of the fraud scheme, designed to enable him, and McHomes, to launder their fraud 

proceeds. When McHomes received a set of Summit checks, he would cash them at a check 

cashing store rather than a bank; and he would structure his cashing so that he didn’t cash more 

than $10,000 of checks on the same day. In this manner, McHomes would convert the checks to 

cash, without causing the check cashing store (a financial institution) to file a cash transaction 

report (“CTR”) with the Treasury Department. McHomes would then kick back fifty percent of 

the cash proceeds to De La Torre by depositing the cash in De La Torre’s Bank of America account 

no. 8988 or delivering the cash to De La Torre. When depositing cash in De La Torre’s account, 

McHomes would structure the deposits to avoid generating a CTR.

Mario and Yumet De La Torre used the fraud proceeds deposited in Mario De La Torre’s

Bank of America account no. 8988 to pay family expenses, including, among other things:

American Express credit card bills; Yumet De La Torre’s Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus credit 

card bills; and their daughter’s expenses at Stetson University, and Colorado State University. 

(See Exhibit 1, Bank of America checks, signed by Yumet De La Torre; Exhibit 2, Payment to 

Nordstrom; Exhibit 3, Payment to Neiman Marcus; Exhibit 4, Payments to Stetson University; 

Exhibit 5, Payment to Colorado State University.)

2. The need for the sentence to (A) reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote 

respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense, and (B) 

afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

The sentencing factors set forth in Section 3553(a)(2)(A), and (B), weigh heavily in favor 

of a term of 30 months’ imprisonment. Mario De La Torre’s offenses are very serious. Again, 

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De La Torre used his position as a trusted senior executive of Summit to defraud his employer of 

$2.1 million. He received half of the fraud proceeds and spent them on himself and his family; 

and he paid no income tax. Thus, a custodial sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment is necessary 

to reflect the seriousness of De La Torre’s offenses, promote respect for the law, provide just 

punishment, and afford adequate general deterrence. A shorter term of imprisonment would be 

contrary to these sentencing objectives. Moreover, a non-custodial sentence would not punish De 

La Torre and would only encourage similarly situated persons to steal from their employers.

In his sentencing memorandum, Mario De La Torre argues that his advisory guideline 

range of imprisonment overstates the seriousness of his crimes; however, his argument only 

displays his lack of genuine remorse and the need for a guideline term of imprisonment. In 

particular, De La Torre blames his victim and invites the Court to find that he was entitled to 

the money he stole. He declares that he devised the fraud scheme “amid Summit Aerospace’s 

refusal to pay him the full salary and commissions he was entitled to as senior vice president of 

sales and marketing” (Sentencing Memorandum (DE 140) at p. 7); and he asserts the loss of $2.1 

million “pales in comparison” with the millions of dollars Summit earned from its contracts with 

RGTS – “agreements Summit was only able to secure because of Mr. De La Torre’s sourcing and 

sales work.” (Id. at pp. 7-8.) But there is no evidence that Summit refused to pay De La Torre 

his salary and commissions to which he was entitled; and De La Torre doesn’t explain why he 

remained at Summit during the years he defrauded the company. Besides, even assuming De La 

Torre’s allegation is true, his remedy was to find another job and sue Summit for his unpaid salary 

and commissions. He was not entitled to perpetrate a fraud scheme as self-help.

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Mario De La Torre also excuses his conduct as aberrant. He quotes family members who 

describe him as “humble, loyal, principled, and an ‘inherently good man,’” and he declares that his 

offenses were “entirely out of character and borne of his desire to fund his daughters’ college and 

post-graduate educations.” (See Sentencing Memorandum (DE 140) at p. 6.) But De La Torre 

certainly wasn’t loyal to his employer, and his offense conduct certainly wasn’t aberrant. For ten 

years, he deliberately perpetrated a complex fraud scheme against his employer. Moreover, De 

La Torre didn’t defraud Summit of $2.1 million solely “to fund his daughters’ college and 

post-graduate educations.” Bank records disclose that De La Torre transferred approximately 

$70,532 to Stetson University, and $14,152 to Colorado State University. Thus, he used the 

lion’s share of his fraud proceeds to provide himself and his family with many other things he

would not otherwise have been able to afford. His crimes were borne of his sense of entitlement.

In addition to minimizing his offense conduct, Mario De La Torre argues that he should not 

be accountable for money he stole before 2017. (See Sentencing Memorandum (DE 140) at p. 8.) 

This is another frivolous argument that displays a lack of remorse and is inconsistent with 

acceptance of responsibility. De La Torre was timely indicted of the offenses for which he stands 

convicted; and, the evidence proves his offense conduct prior to 2017 and the loss of $2.1 million. 

Therefore, there are no grounds for the Court to disregard De La Torre’s pre-2017 conduct and to 

do so would be entirely arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.

3. The sentencing range established for the offense and defendant pursuant to 

the Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), and the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who 

have been found guilty of similar conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

Post-Booker, consideration of the defendant’s advisory guideline range of imprisonment 

remains important, because the guidelines are an indispensable tool in helping courts achieve 

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Congress’s mandate to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated 

defendants. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1217 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing 

United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2006)). A sentencing court should give 

“real weight” to the advisory guideline range. Id. (downward variance was unreasonable where 

court gave no real weight to advisory guideline range) (“Even though not bound by the guidelines, 

a sentencing court may not give them so little consideration that it amounts to ‘not giv[ing] any 

real weight to the Guidelines range in imposing the sentence.’”) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 

515 F.3d 1179, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008)).

WHEREFORE, the United States requests that the Court sentence the defendant Mario De 

La Torre to a term of 30 months’ imprisonment, and order that he pay restitution in the amount of 

$2,129,392.35 to Summit Aerospace, Inc.

Respectfully submitted,

MARKENZY LAPOINTE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

By: Dwayne Williams

DWAYNE E. WILLIAMS

Assistant United States Attorney

Florida Bar No. 0125199

99 Northeast 4th Street

Miami, Florida 33132-2111

Tel: (305) 961-9163

Fax: (305) 530-6168

Dwayne.Williams@usdoj.gov

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing United States’ 

Sentencing Memorandum was filed with the Clerk of the Court, via CM/ECF, this 25th day of June

2024.

Dwayne Williams

DWAYNE E. WILLIAMS

Assistant United States Attorney

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