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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

CASE NO. 20:CV-23287-DPG

FRANCISCO R. RODRIGUEZ, et al., Miami, Florida

Plaintiffs, September 23, 2020

vs. 10:15 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.

IMPERIAL BRANDS, PLC, et al., Pages 1 to 39

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________

STATUS CONFERENCE and MOTION HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DARRIN P. GAYLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.

PAULINO A. NUNEZ, JR., ESQ.

RODRIGUEZ TRAMONT & NUNEZ

255 Alhambra Circle

Suite 1150

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

-andJAMES L. BERENTHAL, ESQ.

DAVID W. BERENTHAL, ESQ.

BERENTHAL & ASSOCIATES

777 Third Avenue, Suite 22D

New York, New York 10017

FOR DEFENDANT IMPERIAL BRANDS:

MARK F. RAYMOND, ESQ.

NELSON MULLINS BROAD and CASSEL

2 S Biscayne Boulevard

One Biscayne Tower - 21st Floor

Miami, Florida 33131

-andANDREW RHYS DAVIES, ESQ.

JUSTIN L. ORMAND, ESQ.

ALLEN & OVERY, LLP

1221 6th Avenue

New York, New York 10020

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FOR DEFENDANT IMPERIAL BRANDS:

JONATHAN ETRA, ESQ.

BROAD & CASSEL

2 S. Biscayne Boulevard

One Biscayne Tower - 21st Floor

Miami, Florida 33131

FOR DEFENDANTS WPP PLC,

BCW LLC & YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC:

NAIM SURGEON, ESQ.

PEDRO FREYRE, ESQ.

AKERMAN LLP

BRICKELL CITY CENTRE

98 SE 7th, St #1100

Miami, Florida 33131

-andCHRISTOPHER DAVIES, ESQ.

JESSICA LUTKENHAUS, ESQ.

TICO ALMEIDA, ESQ.

WILMER HALE

1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20006

STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED BY:

PATRICIA DIAZ, FCRR, RPR, FPR

Official Court Reporter

United States District Court

400 North Miami Avenue

11th Floor

Miami, Florida 33128

(305) 523-5178

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(Call to the Order of the Court.)

COURTROOM DEPUTY: Calling Rodriguez, and all versus

Imperial Brands, PLC, and all.

Counsel, please make your appearance.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, this is Frank R. Rodriguez for the

plaintiffs. Also on the call is my partner Paulino A. Nunez.

We are from the law firm of Rodriguez Tramont & Nunez.

Also on the call on behalf of the plaintiffs are our

co-counsel James L. Berenthal and David W. Berenthal from the

law firm of Berenthal & Associates.

The Court should also know, in addition, I am also a

party in the case.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. RAYMOND: Good morning, Judge, Mark Raymond, along

with partner Jonathan Etra from the law firm of Broad & Cassel

on behalf of Imperial, and I am joined by our co-counsel,

Andrew Rhys Davies and Justin Ormand. And Mr. Davies will be

taking the lead on our argument, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. SURGEON: Good morning, this is Naim Surgeon from

Akerman, and my partner Pedro Freyre is also appearing. With

us are our co-counsel from Wilmer Hale, Christopher Davies and

Jessica Lutkenhaus. Also appearing is Tico Almeida, and we are

on behalf of WPP PLC, Young & Rubicam, LLC and BCW, LLC.

THE COURT: All right.

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Okay. Good morning. I originally set this down for a

status conference because I wanted to make sure that the

parties are aware that Mr. Surgeon is one of my former law

clerks. I don't think it's going to have -- I know it's not

going to have any bearing on my decisions in this matter. It's

not the first case where Mr. Surgeon has appeared before me or

any of my former law clerks. It has been years since he

clerked for me, but especially as to the plaintiffs, I just

wanted to make you aware to see if -- well, to see if you had

any objection and to give you an opportunity to file whatever

motion you thought appropriate, but I just wanted to make sure

you are aware.

I am not necessarily expecting a response now but,

Mr. Rodriguez, I am prepared to deal with these motions that

are pending today. If you prefer not to proceed today, this

will be the time to let me know or we can proceed with the

scheduling issues and deal with perhaps the more substantive

issues later.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: This is Frank Rodriguez, Your Honor, I

think that's the way to go. I think we should proceed now.

I don't anticipate there is going to be any issues.

I'd like to discuss it internally before we respond and Your

Honor has allowed that courtesy, but I think we should proceed

today. If Your Honor had on your agenda to deal with these

motions, which I understood was the case, I think we should

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deal with the motions.

THE COURT: Okay. So we are here for a few motions.

They are interrelated, the plaintiff's motion -- well, the

defendants -- defendant Imperial Brands' motion for a limited

stay, which is joined by the codefendants in this case, as well

as Imperial Brands' motion to extend time to respond to the

complaint while the Court considers the motion to stay, and the

plaintiffs' motion to strike the declaration of Andrew Rhys

Davies, which was submitted in support of the motion to stay.

So why don't we simply start with the motion to stay

and I can -- I will consider arguments regarding the

declaration along with that motion. So Mr. Raymond.

MR. RAYMOND: Judge, as I mentioned, my co-counsel,

Andrew Davies, will be making the argument on behalf of our

team, please.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Thank you, Your Honor. This is

Andrew Rhys Davies. All of this is subject to the jurisdiction

of the defenses but we are here on this motion to stay because

under EU law as interpreted by the European Commission --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, he is breaking up. I

don't know if he is breaking up for others as well.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: This is Rodriguez, he is breaking up.

MR. SURGEON: Yes, I am noticing that as well.

MR. RHYS DAVIES: My apologies, is this any better?

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THE COURT REPORTER: No, I cannot understand what he is

saying.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: No, I cannot understand anything you

are saying.

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Can we try having everyone on mute?

THE COURT: Well, this is Judge Gayles. Everyone not

speaking, if you can put your phone on mute, and Mr. Rhys

Davies, if you are using the speaker feature on your phone,

maybe if you take that off, maybe that might help him speak

directly into the receiver.

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Judge, I hope this is better.

THE COURT: It's still a little choppy but why don't

you proceed and we will see how it goes.

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Thank you, Judge. We are here on the

same option because under EU law as interpreted by the European

Commission, Imperial Brands cannot respond to the complaint

without authorization. This is somewhat frustrating to the

Imperial Brands because this is a case that should be

dismissed, but given EU law and the risk to Imperial Brands

which is criminal liability for violating the requirement, we

are asking for this very limited relief for a limited stay to

give the European Commission time to decide this request for

authorization.

In essence, what we are asking is that the Court follow

the approach that Judge Scola took in the Iberostar case and

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grant that kind of limited stay.

We think that that's required by considerations of

comity. As Judge Scola said in the Iberostar case, the

European Commission has a strong interest in evaluating its own

rules and regulations, and then when we look at the next

factor -- I am talking here about the stay factors from the

Turner case from the Eleventh Circuit.

When we look to the fairness to the parties element, we

think that those very strongly support a stay. On the

plaintiff's side, you know, there is no prejudice. All we are

asking for is a short delay, no impact on their substantive

rights or their claim. In fact, if they still haven't taken

steps to issue a summons as to one of the defendants and so

they really have no plausible argument about any prejudice from

delay. Also, they are only seeking money damages so there is

no emergent relief being sought.

On the other side of the scale, Imperial faces the risk

of criminal prosecution and an unlimited fine if it responds to

the complaint without authorization. As Judge Scola said in

the Iberostar case, you know, any EU company really does face

immediate and concrete harm if it moves to dismiss without

authorization. And, actually, Imperial's position is worse

than the defendant in the Iberostar case because Imperial faces

an unlimited criminal fine as distinct from the Iberostar

defendant which faced a fixed penalty per violation.

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And then on the third Turner factor, judicial

efficiency, here, as Judge Scola said, there is no reason to

presume the EC is unlikely to render a prompt decision on the

request for authorization. Also, granting the short stay will

avoid the need for a necessary default proceedings and also the

risk of criminal proceedings in the U.K.

Then, finally, if the stay we are asking for is not

immoderate, as the Eleventh Circuit said, we can't have

immoderate stays, what we are asking for is a stay that ends on

the earlier of 25 days after the authorization is granted with

a long stop date of February 9th, 2021, and that's five months

after the original deadline, which is the same amount of time

it took the plaintiffs to serve that complaint after they first

threatened to do so.

So I don't know if the Court has questions about any of

that or any of the other points. That's really what I wanted

to say to the Court about the stay motion.

THE COURT: So you say the latest date would be the

February 9, 2021, date and is that a date certain by which you

would expect to receive a response or -- where do you get that

date I guess is my question?

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Well, Your Honor, we hope to have a

decision long before February 9, 2021. You recognize we needed

to pick an outside date. That date is five months after the

original deadline to respond to the complaint.

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I will add, in case it's helpful, that December 31 is

the end of the transitional period as the United Kingdom leaves

the European Union, so as of January 1, decision-making

authority reverts from the European Commission to the British

government. So in the event, we hope unlikely event, but in

the event the European Commission hasn't made a decision by

December 31, the deadline we propose will give the British

government a few weeks to make that decision post January 1.

So that was our thinking, Your Honor.

THE COURT: One of the issues raised by the plaintiff

is certain SEC filings made by Imperial, and the plaintiff

suggests that perhaps the position you were taking with the SEC

is different than the position you are taking in this case.

Can you address that issue?

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Yes, Judge. There is no

inconsistency. All that the SEC filing says is that Imperial

Brands takes us to comply with international sanctions to the

extent they are applicable. And that goes on to say, one of

the facets of that is that there may be limitations of the

nationalities of the employees who can be involved in certain

parts of the business.

You know, there is no inconsistency between that and

what we are asking for here. I mean, certainly, no one could

seriously suggest that this European regulation requires

Imperial to find U.S. employees and to have them involved in

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sanctioned countries. That seems to be the argument. There is

just no basis for that.

Imperial is subject to the law to the extent it is

subject to it and takes the steps it has to take to make sure

its employees are not subject to criminal prosecution but there

is no inconsistency at all.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Surgeon on behalf of the

co-defendants because you are joining in the request to stay --

so you want the same stay. If I grant a stay for Imperial, you

want the same stay. Is that what you are asking for?

MR. SURGEON: Yes, Your Honor, that's correct.

THE COURT: Can you just elaborate on that? Is it

because of discovery, because your cases are tied together

factually? What is exactly the reason why your clients would

need a concurrent stay along with Imperial?

MR. SURGEON: Your Honor, as we set forth in the motion

to join, the facts are intertwined with respect to Imperial and

our clients, and as we note in the motion, in terms of how our

clients became involved, it was -- we were involved because

Imperial essentially hired our clients and so the relationship

between our clients evolved and Imperial isn't something that

can be separated out and, therefore, we think that if the case

is to proceed it should proceed with both defendants

participating. You know, to the extent you also would like to

comply with the Court's notice of court practice, I would

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certainly think that there would be joint issues that both

parties would want to address. So in light of all the factors,

we think that a stay that is coextended with any stay the Court

grants to Imperial would make the most sense and also favor

judicial economy under the circumstances.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rodriguez.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

Judge, let's take a look at what defendants are asking

and the basis of their ask. It's a European Union, what they

refer to as a blocking statute, Regulation 227196, and let me

read from 227196, Article 4 specifically, Judge. It's

Document 14-B in Your Honor's docket.

Article 4 says that no judgment of a Court located

outside the community giving effect directly or indirectly to

the laws specified in the Annex, and the Annex specifically

addresses the Helms-Burton law, which is the basis of this

lawsuit, shall be recognized or be enforceable in any manner.

There is also an attachment to the motion to stay which

is Document 14-C in the docket, and that's a European

Commission document that is called a guidance note. It's a Q

and A on this particular European Union regulation, and there

is a specific question, how does the blocking statute protect

EU operators?

And the response in this European Commission Guidance

Note is in bold, and in bold it says, "The blocking statute

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nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign decision,

including court rulings or arbitration awards based on the

listed extraterritorial legislation or the acts and provisions

adopted pursuant to them," again, referring to Article 4. So,

you know, let's call it what it is.

What in effect Imperial is asking for is for this

Court, apparently on the basis of international comity, to give

deference to a statute that's not -- it's not really a blocking

statute but a nullification statute, a statute that on its face

unequivocally states that it will never recognize any ruling by

this Court.

I mean, look, comity is a two-way street, Your Honor, I

would respectfully submit, and we want to refer the Court to a

case that was cited both by the defendants in their motion and

I believe their reply and also by the plaintiffs in its

opposition memo.

It is a Societe Nacional case. It's cited in page

eight of the plaintiff's opposition memo and this is what it

says about comity. It says, "Comity in the legal sense is

neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor

of mere courtesy or good will, upon the other. But it is the

recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the

legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation."

Well, you know, in effect, Imperial is asking for, you

know, for the Court to give deference to this very statute

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that, again, on its face is basically saying we are not going

to abide by anything that this Court is going to do.

Now, going into the defendants' reply, they make a

couple of arguments related to this. They say, well, the Court

should accord what they refer to in quotes due respect to the

EU Commission's position that prohibit EU companies from moving

to dismiss Title III actions without authorization, and they

cite the Societe Nacional case that I cite to, Judge, on page

two of the reply. And they also argue that the Court has an

obligation to take every reasonable precaution to avoid

subjecting Imperial to, quote, different legal commands of

separate sovereigns. And it cites to In Re: Grand Jury

Proceedings, again, page three of its reply.

Now, those cases, Judge, deal -- those are blocking

statutes. You know, they deal with blocking statutes. Those

are cases involving production of evidence, production of

documents and how do you do it.

Okay. It's a totally different circumstance than what

we have before this Court. It is not -- these are truly

blocking statutes, are you going to produce evidence this way

or are you going to deal with producing evidence that way?

It is not -- it's not what we have here where you are

dealing with a statute that where the defendants want this

Court to give deference to a statute that is basically saying

we don't care what you do because we are not going to recognize

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anything that you do.

So, again, these are not nullification statutes. These

are blocking statutes, and I would respectfully submit they

have no application to the issues before the Court before

today.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Rodriguez, I mean, you do concede

that -- well, from your argument, that these blocking statutes

do exist. Right?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, the blocking statutes, absolutely,

yes.

THE COURT: What I am wondering is if your argument

goes more to what might happen down the road as opposed to

where we are procedurally now because it seems to me that

Imperial is simply asking for time to seek permission. It may

be granted. It may be denied, but your arguments seem to go to

what will happen ultimately down the road. So either -- well,

there are a bunch of scenarios, right.

So, you know, Imperial could proceed with litigation

and prevail or it cannot proceed in the litigation and either

have a default entered against it or lose. And in those latter

two scenarios where if Imperial loses, whether or not it's

recognized by the European Union, that's a whole different

issue than whether or not I give them an opportunity to find

out if they can defend themselves I guess is the point that I

am making. I believe that we are talking right now about

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something more procedural than the ultimate issue.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Let me -- I'm sorry, Judge, I didn't

mean to interrupt.

THE COURT: You didn't.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: May I respond?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Rhetorically, rhetorically, what

happens if the Court grants the stay and the European Union

Commission allows the defendant, Imperial, to file and litigate

a motion to dismiss and the motion is denied?

You know, I mean, are they going to get another stay so

they can seek to file an answer?

I mean, they have -- first of all, I'd like to see what

this is that they filed. I think that it's very relevant and

it's very important. What was their ask of the European Union

Commission. They are asking for, you know, something that's

not insignificant from this Federal District Court, and I think

we are entitled to see what it is that they have asked.

You know, in their papers they are saying, well, you

know, this is confidential and -- that's nonsense. I mean, the

specific article that they reference is not -- it doesn't say

that it's confidential. What it says is, if the European Union

Commission itself were -- you know, gets confidential

information, it will keep it confidential, unless the party

that submits the information allows it to, you know, disclose.

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But that's not an issue here. Let's see what it is

that they have asked because we could be chasing our tail for

quite a long time. I mean, if they go ahead and -- I mean,

first of all, I would submit to Your Honor -- and Your Honor, I

mean, look, if somebody asked for relief and the relief that

they ask is, hey, let me litigate this case or at a minimum let

me respond to the motion to dismiss, that is akin to, you know,

when you are dealing with somebody and you are trying to sell

something and you say, well -- they ask you, how much do you

want for your widget. Well, I want either a hundred dollars or

$200.

They stop listening at a $100, because that's what --

well, we all know that. It's a human condition. So, here,

they have asked the European Union let me at least respond to

the motion to dismiss.

Where does that get us? I mean, do they have the

audacity -- are they telling this Court, well, we are going to

win on the motion to dismiss. I think that's a little

premature for them to take that position. So, I am not -- I

don't know where -- I am not sure that this relates to, you

know, something down the road because, you know, first of all,

I think we are entitled to see what it is that they filed. I

think that we -- I'd be in a better position to respond to your

question if I knew exactly what it is they filed.

You know, they claim that, no, it's not -- the best

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evidence rule doesn't apply here because, you know, we are just

asking for authority. Well, no. You know, Mr. Rhys Davies

filed an affidavit and he said, we asked specifically for

authority to litigate and to respond to the motion to dismiss

and when you get to that level of specificity, there is no

reason why we shouldn't see what it is that they filed before

the EU Commission.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, sir, perhaps there is a better

question for Mr. Rhys, but I am sure you have probably done

your own research.

These applications, do you know whether or not they are

public or confidential?

I am assuming if they were public you probably would

have gotten your hand on it already, but the argument, as I

understand it in the pleadings, was that the defendants don't

want to divulge what's in the application because that's

information that could be used against them, so I am assuming

that's confidential.

Do you know? Counsel?

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Your Honor, this is Andrew Rhys

Davies. They are confidential. They are not public.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, this is Rodriguez, just for

the court reporter's benefit.

You would think that something that significant would

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have already been set forth in their papers at this point that

these inherently, especially based on our argument that these

things are -- just all of them are confidential if you make the

application case. That's the first time I am hearing that.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Rodriguez, just kind of considering

all of these issues, the kind of central issue that I kept

coming back to was what is the prejudice to the plaintiff for a

limited stay in this case?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, the premise of your question,

Your Honor, respectfully, I don't think I agree with because I

don't think it would be a limited stay. It's sort of an

unlimited stay. You know, it's a let's see what happens kind

of stay. So I, respectfully, want to push back a little bit on

the premise of your question. I don't think it's limited,

number one. So that has all kinds of room for prejudice.

The best-case scenario, if it is limited, let's say to

sometime in February, which is -- you know, that's already

several months down the road. We could be back in a position

where they may or may not be authorized to proceed. They may

only be authorized to respond to the motion to dismiss and I am

not sure that puts us in a great place because if we prevail,

which I think we will, in the motion to dismiss, we are back

in -- you know, they may have to ask for another stay.

Another issue, Judge, that I would, respectfully, like

to inject in this, which we set forth in our papers is, how

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credible is the likelihood of -- I mean, the whole premise of

their position is we are going to get prosecuted either civilly

or criminally if we go forward with this.

You know, I haven't seen it and they have not stated

any party -- this has been in the books since 1996.

Helms-Burton was passed in '96. I am not aware of anybody ever

being prosecuted, and there is a case, Photochromic Lens, cited

again by both parties and it was cited in page six of

plaintiff's opposition memo, and Photochromic deals with this

French blocking statute and the production of documents.

And the Court in Photochromic stated that, "Although

the risk of criminal prosecution weighs heavily against

ordering production, courts have discounted this risk when

considering the French blocking statute. The legislative

history of the statute indicates that it was not intended to be

enforced against foreign subjects, rather it was intended to

provide foreign subjects with leverage in foreign courts.

It's exactly what this statute is doing, providing

leverage, you know, in foreign courts.

If you go to the -- going back to the document that I

referenced, I think it's 14-C in the docket, the first question

is, what is the blocking statute, and as part of their response

is -- its main purpose -- well, it says, the blocking statute

aims at countering the unlawful effects of third country

extraterritorial sanctions on the natural and legal persons

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specified in Article 11, hereinafter referred to as EU

operators.

Its main purpose is, thus, to protect EU operators

engaging in lawful international trade and/or movement of

capital as well as related commerce activities with third

countries in accordance with EU laws.

The whole purpose of this is to protect the EU

operators and give them leverage. They are not going to face

any civil prosecution. Nobody has faced it up to now. So, you

know, I think the whole premise of their ask of this Court is

flawed because they haven't produced any evidence of --

THE COURT: I just want to point out one thing, though,

counsel. Although the statute was passed many years ago, the

Helms-Burton Act, people couldn't sue under that and these

circumstances until last year. Correct?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: That's true. They couldn't sue until

18 months ago. I am not sure -- I'm not sure that they -- by

the way, besides Cuba and the Helms-Burton, there is Iran and

Libya mentioned. I mean, it's been around, Judge.

I mean, I suspect strongly, and unless they, you know,

produce any evidence, I am not sure that there is any

legitimate liability.

THE COURT: As the parties both mention in the

pleading, Judge Scola took up this similar issue in Canto Marti

versus Iberostar, case numbers 20-CV-20078-Scola, and he

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granted initially the motion to stay prior to receiving a

response, it appears, and then there is a motion for

reconsideration. And then he again -- or actually there was a

motion to vacate the stay and he denied the motion to vacate

the stay in a more detailed order considering all these issues

that are presented here in this case, and his order denying the

motion to vacate the stay came on September 15th, which I think

is after the parties had largely briefed these issues.

But why is his analysis wrong? It's essentially the

same analysis I have to make in this case.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: If I may, Your Honor, this is Rodriguez

for the court reporter's benefit.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Judge, first of all, Judge Scola, I

have known him for over 30 years, and he is an excellent judge

but, you know, we don't know what was argued specifically and

what he considered. All I can go by is his order, and I can

tell you that his order, there is no indication that he

considered -- he viewed this as a blocking statute, so it's

like the other blocking statute.

There is no indication that the argument was made to

him, Judge Scola, this is not a blocking statute, this is a

nullification statute, and unlike the blocking statute and the

analysis done in the blocking statute, which is essentially

international comity -- I mean, Judge Scola's entire opinion is

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based upon an analysis of international comity and,

respectfully, Judge, this international comity would -- because

of the nullification nature of this statute as opposed to a

blocking statute, it doesn't deserve the respect and deference.

There is no indication in Judge Scola's opinion or his

order that he considered this. I mean, you know when you have

a statute that basically says, hey, I don't care what you do in

your courts regarding Helms-Burton, we are not going to

recognize anything you do, I think it's a different dynamic

than a blocking statute. That's number one.

There is no indication that there was any discussion or

that there was any acknowledgment or that Judge Scola

considered the argument that I made that there is really no

real threat of any impending sanctions. This is actually

something intended to protect, you know, entities like Imperial

and to sit -- I think it's very naive to think that they are

going to be prosecuted.

You know, if they are, you know, dragged into a lawsuit

and it's not their choosing and they are faced with the

prospect of either defending or defaulting, I just can't see

any realistic liability, unless they can show me otherwise

where that has occurred.

Then, the other thing is, there is no indication that

Judge Scola considered what we discussed which is the

possibility of these multiple stays and addressing this in a

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piecemeal fashion, and the difference between asking, which is

what they should have done. Respectfully, what they should

have done is gone to the European Union Commission and say,

hey, let me litigate this case. Not let me litigate, oh, and

by the way, let me respond to the motion to dismiss. There is

no indication that Judge Scola considered these matters.

So, respectfully, Judge, I don't have to tell you, Your

Honor, a lot depends on -- and when you consider the issues

before you, a lot depends on what's argued and what's put forth

in front of you. So, you know, that's the difference.

THE COURT: Finally, I mean, I want to circle back to a

question I asked earlier with regard to prejudice. I mean, I

agree, I can't indefinitely stay the case if I decide that a

stay is warranted but let's say it is a stay until

February 9th, what substantial prejudice is there to the

plaintiffs in this case because the plaintiff is seeking

damages and an injunction. How would this put the plaintiff in

a worse position if a stay is granted?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, there is a very compelling

basis and that is that my family members are implicated here.

This all stems from a company and a property that was owned by

my grandfather, who is also my Godfather, who passed away in

1962. His name is Ramon Rodriguez.

He had five children. My father was one of the five

children. Two of his children are still alive and those two

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are Luis Rodriguez, who is my uncle, and Maria Rodriguez, my

aunt. Both of them are in their 90s, in their 90s.

We have had recent decisions, and we don't have to get

into a great detail here but recent decisions by Judge Scola

regarding who has a claim. You have to have -- according to

Judge Scola, this is very preliminary, but if in '96 when

Helms-Burton was passed at that point you had to have been an

American citizen to have a claim, and you have to have the

claim. There is some question about assignability, if you can

leave it in your will. These are all in question.

Okay. So, yes, my uncle is, I believe -- Luis is 94, I

believe. They are both in their 90s, their mid 90s, so, yes,

delay does matter because it's possible that their claims can

be extinguished.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else on behalf of yourself,

the plaintiff?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, no, not at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. For counsel for the defendants, in

no particular order, what about that issue of prejudice that

crucial witnesses are in their 90s and a delay of several

months could substantively prejudice the plaintiff?

I guess starting with the counsel for Imperial, how do

you respond to that issue?

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Your Honor, this is Andrew Rhys

Davies. It took these plaintiffs more than 16 months after

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Title III went into effect to bring this lawsuit, so it's not

really consistent with the idea that there is great urgency to

preserve evidence that they took all of that time. It then

took them five months after threatening to file the lawsuit to

actually serve Imperial.

Now we are seeking this short stay and the risk to

Imperial of potential criminal liability far outweighs the risk

that's being identified, even if that risk were credible at all

given the way that the plaintiffs have conducted this lawsuit

in this very slow way to date.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, if I may respond, this is

Rodriguez, you know, in order -- on behalf of the Rodriguez

family, my -- these law firms filed a Title IV claim with the

State Department, which we are certainly are authorized to do

under the Helms-Burton Act and also Title III litigation.

It was incredibly time consuming initially to -- you

know, there is a lot of moving parts when you have five

branches of the family and a lot of documentations to compile,

documents to compile in order to make these presentations that

we did first with the State Department and then in filing this

action in the Federal District Court.

The five months that they are referring to we sent a

demand letter that we have to wait 30 days after the demand

letter under Helms-Burton. We then identified other

defendants. We sent an additional demand letter and, you know,

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we -- there was no dilatory conduct here. Okay. We are where

we are now and we have -- you know, I couldn't believe I heard

this that their prejudice to them outweighs the prejudice -- I

mean, these folks could die and possibly their claims

extinguish with them.

I would hope not, and I think there is very viable

arguments to be made as to why that wouldn't happen but, you

know, I suspect they are going to argue that that is the case.

So in addition to you have in the case of my uncle, Luis,

actually worked at the factory in question, that's the property

in question, and has very, very significant testimony and would

be a very important witness. That's an issue. My aunt as

well, but there is also the issue of at least the potential

that they are going to -- are they going to stipulate that they

won't make that argument later on that the claims are

extinguished if these folks pass?

I mean, they are in their 90s, for goodness sake. I

mean, days matter, months matter, and there is no indication

that this is going to be resolved any time in February.

THE COURT: Mr. Rhys Davies, I know what you are

expressing as far as your limitations from making arguments but

either you or maybe Mr. Surgeon can deal with that issue. I

mean, is that a real danger that if those family members die

during the stay that the claims may -- the plaintiff may no

longer be able to proceed on those claims and is there an

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alternative?

What I am also wondering is, I know that the

codefendants are seeking a similar stay for the reasons

previously stated but is the preservation of their testimony by

the other defendants during a stay something that is possible?

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Your Honor, this is Andrew Rhys

Davies again. These points are being raised for the first time

on the call and so I am very reluctant to address them, first

of all, without speaking to the client but also bearing in mind

the limitation to which Imperial is subject.

But just to reemphasize there is still a defendant as

to whom they have not issued a summons, so these claims about

urgency ring very hollow in light of their conduct. I

understand that isn't a direct answer to your question, Your

Honor, but I just feel a little bit reluctant to weigh into

that having heard these issues for the first time now.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: If I may respond, Your Honor, there is

a simple answer to that. The defendant that I believe

Mr. Davies is referring to is Cuba. The only way to serve Cuba

is via DHL. DHL is telling me that Cuba is not letting them go

in. Because of the pandemic, Cuba isn't receiving any DHL

packages. That's what DHL is telling me.

So that's the reason we haven't served Cuba. I am

assuming that's what Mr. Davies is referring to.

MR. RHYS DAVIES: I was referring to the defendant

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Habanos, not Cuba.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Habanos is a Cuban government-owned

entity. We have to serve them in that manner as I expressed,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Okay. Having considered everything, I am going to

grant the Imperial Brands' motion to stay as well as the joint

motion to stay by the codefendants.

I am going to deny the motion, plaintiff's motion to

strike the declaration of Mr. Rhys Davies.

With regard to the stay, I am going to grant a stay of

limited duration. Like Judge Scola, I considered the factors

set forth in Trujillo vs. Conover & Co. Communications,

Incorporated at 221 F.3d 1262, an Eleventh Circuit opinion from

2020 and Turner Entertainment Company versus Degeto Film, GmbH,

cited at 25 F.3d 1512, an Eleventh Circuit opinion from 1994

where the Court noted factors that should be considered when

judging abstention pursuant to international comity, including

the proper level of respect for the acts of a foreign nation,

the fairness to the litigants in the efficient use of scarce

judicial resource.

One issue that wasn't specifically before Judge Scola

but I think it's also important here is, we are here talking

about not the substantive issue regarding comity and perhaps

whether this Court, how this Court proceeds if Imperial is not

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allowed to defend itself. What we are talking about here is

the more procedural issue of do I give them an opportunity to

get a determination on whether they can properly defend

themselves.

The ultimate question is still to come, what happens,

and so without prejudging it, I mean, Mr. Rodriguez may be

ultimately right that my decisions in this case or this Court's

decisions in this case are not dependent upon the European

Union. The decision issue, rather, in this limited

circumstance is, do I give Imperial an opportunity to first

find out what limitations, if any, they have on their ability

to defend themselves in this case, and considering those

procedural issues, I do think a stay is warranted.

Obviously, it's going to take some time and I am

mindful of the potential prejudice to the plaintiffs, as they

identified, as two or more crucial witnesses are of advanced

age. I think perhaps one way to work around that is to have an

exception to the stay to allow at least the other defendants

and the plaintiff to proceed with compelling testimony of those

specific people that were identified by Mr. Rodriguez because

of their age. Of course, Imperial won't be able to participate

in such a deposition now but the deposition can occur again

with Imperial, if necessary.

So having considered those factors outlined in the

Turner case and, of course, the Court's inherent power to

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control its docket and to decide whether or not a stay is

warranted, I do find that a limited stay is appropriate.

The stay will not exceed past February 9th of 2021

because we cannot proceed or wait indefinitely for an answer

regarding these issues.

Like Judge Scola, I am going to direct the parties to

file joint status reports every 30 days to advise the Court

where we are with regard to -- well, actually, it should -- I

guess the status should be from Imperial to advise the Court

where they are regarding the application.

I am denying the motion to strike Mr. Rhys Davies'

declaration for a number of reasons they outlined in their

response to the motion. The motion to strike is for pleadings.

It's not a pleading, and the Court can simply weigh what's in

the affidavit and accept what it thinks is appropriate in any

event.

A declaration is actually not needed in this instance.

I don't think a declaration was filed in Judge Scola's case.

Mr. Davies, Rhys Davies, is an officer of the Court.

The attorney simply could have argued the issue with no reason

to doubt his truthfulness as far as the fact that the

application was filed. I accept his representation that it is

a confidential document, the application, and it is not subject

to disclosure under the circumstances and so I don't find the

best evidence rule to be applicable here.

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31

I will issue an order to that effect.

Is there anything else we need to take up today

starting with Mr. Rodriguez?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Nothing from the plaintiffs, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: And as to Imperial, Mr. Rhys Davies?

MR. RHYS DAVIES: Nothing further, Your Honor, thank

you.

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Surgeon, as to the

other defendants?

MR. SURGEON: As to the WPP defendants, Your Honor,

nothing else.

THE COURT: All right. Then we will be in recess.

Thank you.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. RAYMOND: Thank you, Judge.

(Proceedings were concluded at 11:00 a.m.)

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32

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the foregoing is an

accurate transcription of the proceedings in the

above-entitled matter.

Please note: This hearing occurred during the

COVID-19 pandemic and is therefore subject to the

technological limitations of reporting remotely.

September 30, 2020 /s/Patricia Diaz _____

DATE PATRICIA DIAZ, FCRR, RPR, FPR

Official Court Reporter

United States District Court

400 North Miami Avenue, 11th Floor

Miami, Florida 33128

(305) 523-5178

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2020 Page 32 of 39
#

#1100 [1] - 2:9

$

$100 [1] - 16:12

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'

'96 [2] - 19:6, 24:6

/

/s/Patricia [1] - 32:13

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A

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attachment [1] -

11:18

attorney [1] - 30:20

audacity [1] - 16:17

aunt [2] - 24:2, 26:12

authority [3] - 9:4,

17:2, 17:4

authorization [7] -

6:17, 6:23, 7:19, 7:22,

8:4, 8:10, 13:7

authorized [3] -

18:19, 18:20, 25:14

Avenue [5] - 1:18,

1:25, 2:13, 2:17,

32:15

avoid [2] - 8:5, 13:10

awards [1] - 12:2

1

aware [4] - 4:3, 4:9,

4:12, 19:6

B

based [3] - 12:2,

18:2, 22:1

basis [5] - 10:2, 11:9,

11:16, 12:7, 23:20

BCW [2] - 2:6, 3:24

bearing [2] - 4:5,

27:9

became [1] - 10:19

BEFORE [1] - 1:10

behalf [7] - 3:8, 3:16,

3:24, 5:14, 10:7,

24:15, 25:12

benefit [2] - 17:24,

21:12

BERENTHAL[3] -

1:16, 1:17, 1:17

Berenthal [3] - 3:9,

3:10

best [3] - 16:25,

18:16, 30:25

best-case [1] - 18:16

better[4] - 5:25,

6:11, 16:23, 17:8

between [3] - 9:22,

10:21, 23:1

Biscayne [4] - 1:21,

1:22, 2:3, 2:3

bit [2] - 18:13, 27:15

blocking [21] -

11:10, 11:22, 11:25,

12:8, 13:14, 13:15,

13:20, 14:3, 14:7,

14:9, 19:10, 19:14,

19:22, 19:23, 21:19,

21:20, 21:22, 21:23,

21:24, 22:4, 22:10

bold [2] - 11:25

books [1] - 19:5

Boulevard [2] - 1:21,

2:3

branches [1] - 25:18

BRANDS[3] - 1:7,

1:19, 2:1

Brands [5] - 3:3,

6:16, 6:18, 6:19, 9:17

Brands' [3] - 5:4, 5:6,

28:7

breaking [3] - 5:21,

5:22, 5:23

BRICKELL [1] - 2:9

briefed [1] - 21:8

bring [1] - 25:1

British [2] - 9:4, 9:7

Broad [1] - 3:15

BROAD [2] - 1:21,

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2020 Page 33 of 39
2:2

bunch [1] - 14:17

Burton [8] - 11:16,

19:6, 20:14, 20:18,

22:8, 24:7, 25:15,

25:24

business [1] - 9:21

BY [1] - 2:15

C

cannot [5] - 6:1, 6:3,

6:16, 14:19, 30:4

Canto [1] - 20:24

capital [1] - 20:5

care [2] - 13:25, 22:7

CASE[1] - 1:2

case [34] - 3:12, 4:6,

4:25, 5:5, 6:18, 6:25,

7:3, 7:7, 7:20, 7:23,

9:1, 9:13, 10:22,

12:14, 12:17, 13:8,

16:6, 18:4, 18:8,

18:16, 19:7, 20:25,

21:6, 21:10, 23:4,

23:13, 23:16, 26:8,

26:9, 29:7, 29:8,

29:12, 29:25, 30:18

cases [3] - 10:13,

13:14, 13:16

Cassel [1] - 3:15

CASSEL [2] - 1:21,

2:2

central [1] - 18:6

CENTRE [1] - 2:9

certain [3] - 8:19,

9:11, 9:20

certainly [3] - 9:23,

11:1, 25:14

certify [1] - 32:3

chasing [1] - 16:2

children [3] - 23:24,

23:25

choosing [1] - 22:19

choppy [1] - 6:12

Christopher[1] -

3:22

CHRISTOPHER [1] -

2:11

circle [1] - 23:11

Circle [1] - 1:14

Circuit [4] - 7:7, 8:8,

28:14, 28:16

circumstance [2] -

13:18, 29:10

circumstances [3] -

11:5, 20:15, 30:24

cite [2] - 13:8

cited [5] - 12:14,

12:17, 19:7, 19:8,

28:16

cites [1] - 13:12

citizen [1] - 24:8

CITY [1] - 2:9

civil [1] - 20:9

civilly [1] - 19:2

claim [6] - 7:12,

16:25, 24:5, 24:8,

24:9, 25:13

claims [6] - 24:13,

26:4, 26:15, 26:24,

26:25, 27:12

clerked [1] - 4:8

clerks [2] - 4:4, 4:7

client [1] - 27:9

clients [5] - 10:14,

10:18, 10:19, 10:20,

10:21

Co [1] - 28:13

co [5] - 3:9, 3:16,

3:22, 5:13, 10:8

co-counsel [4] - 3:9,

3:16, 3:22, 5:13

co-defendants [1] -

10:8

codefendants [3] -

5:5, 27:3, 28:8

coextended [1] -

11:3

coming [1] - 18:7

Comity [1] - 12:19

comity [9] - 7:3,

12:7, 12:12, 12:19,

21:25, 22:1, 22:2,

28:18, 28:24

commands [1] -

13:11

commerce [1] - 20:5

Commission [13] -

5:20, 6:16, 6:22, 7:4,

9:4, 9:6, 11:20, 11:24,

15:9, 15:16, 15:23,

17:7, 23:3

Commission's [1] -

13:6

Communications [1]

- 28:13

community [1] -

11:14

companies [1] - 13:6

Company [1] - 28:15

company [2] - 7:20,

23:21

compelling [2] -

23:19, 29:19

compile [2] - 25:18,

25:19

complaint [5] - 5:7,

6:16, 7:19, 8:13, 8:25

comply [2] - 9:17,

10:25

concede [1] - 14:6

concluded [1] -

31:17

concrete [1] - 7:21

concurrent [1] -

10:15

condition [1] - 16:13

conduct [2] - 26:1,

27:13

conducted [1] - 25:9

CONFERENCE [1] -

1:10

conference [1] - 4:2

confidential [9] -

15:20, 15:22, 15:23,

15:24, 17:12, 17:18,

17:21, 18:3, 30:23

Conover[1] - 28:13

consider[2] - 5:11,

23:8

considerations [1] -

7:2

considered [10] -

21:17, 21:19, 22:6,

22:13, 22:24, 23:6,

28:6, 28:12, 28:17,

29:24

considering [4] -

18:5, 19:14, 21:5,

29:12

considers [1] - 5:7

consistent [1] - 25:2

consuming [1] -

25:16

control [1] - 30:1

Coral [1] - 1:15

correct [2] - 10:11,

20:15

counsel [9] - 3:4,

3:9, 3:16, 3:22, 5:13,

17:19, 20:13, 24:18,

24:22

countering [1] -

19:24

countries [2] - 10:1,

20:6

country [1] - 19:24

couple [1] - 13:4

course [2] - 29:21,

29:25

COURT [33] - 1:1,

3:13, 3:19, 3:25, 5:2,

5:16, 5:21, 6:1, 6:6,

6:12, 8:18, 9:10, 10:7,

10:12, 11:6, 14:6,

14:11, 15:4, 15:6,

17:8, 17:22, 18:5,

20:12, 20:23, 21:13,

23:11, 24:15, 24:18,

26:20, 28:5, 31:6,

31:9, 31:13

Court [35] - 2:16,

2:17, 3:1, 3:11, 5:7,

6:24, 8:15, 8:17, 11:3,

11:13, 12:7, 12:11,

12:13, 12:25, 13:2,

13:4, 13:9, 13:19,

13:24, 14:4, 15:8,

15:17, 16:17, 19:11,

20:10, 25:21, 28:17,

28:25, 30:7, 30:9,

30:14, 30:19, 32:14,

32:15

court [4] - 10:25,

12:2, 17:24, 21:12

Court's [3] - 10:25,

29:7, 29:25

courtesy [2] - 4:23,

12:21

COURTROOM [1] -

3:2

courts [4] - 19:13,

19:17, 19:19, 22:8

COVID-19 [1] - 32:8

credible [2] - 19:1,

25:8

criminal [7] - 6:20,

7:18, 7:24, 8:6, 10:5,

19:12, 25:7

criminally [1] - 19:3

crucial [2] - 24:20,

29:16

Cuba [7] - 20:18,

27:19, 27:20, 27:21,

27:23, 28:1

Cuban [1] - 28:2

D

damages [2] - 7:15,

23:17

danger[1] - 26:23

DARRIN [1] - 1:10

DATE[1] - 32:14

date [8] - 8:11, 8:18,

8:19, 8:21, 8:24,

25:10

David [1] - 3:9

DAVID [1] - 1:17

DAVIES[14] - 1:23,

2:11, 5:17, 5:25, 6:5,

6:11, 6:14, 8:22, 9:15,

17:20, 24:24, 27:6,

27:25, 31:7

Davies [18] - 3:17,

3:22, 5:9, 5:14, 5:18,

6:8, 17:2, 17:21,

24:25, 26:20, 27:7,

27:19, 27:24, 28:10,

2

30:19, 31:6

Davies' [1] - 30:11

days [4] - 8:10,

25:23, 26:18, 30:7

DC [1] - 2:13

deadline [3] - 8:12,

8:25, 9:7

deal [8] - 4:14, 4:17,

4:24, 5:1, 13:14,

13:15, 13:21, 26:22

dealing [2] - 13:23,

16:8

deals [1] - 19:9

December[2] - 9:1,

9:7

decide [3] - 6:22,

23:13, 30:1

decision [7] - 8:3,

8:23, 9:3, 9:6, 9:8,

12:1, 29:9

decision-making [1]

- 9:3

decisions [5] - 4:5,

24:3, 24:4, 29:7, 29:8

declaration [6] - 5:8,

5:12, 28:10, 30:12,

30:17, 30:18

default [2] - 8:5,

14:20

defaulting [1] - 22:20

defend [4] - 14:24,

29:1, 29:3, 29:12

DEFENDANT[2] -

1:19, 2:1

defendant [7] - 5:4,

7:23, 7:25, 15:9,

27:11, 27:18, 27:25

defendants [15] -

1:8, 5:4, 7:13, 10:8,

10:23, 11:8, 12:14,

13:23, 17:15, 24:18,

25:25, 27:5, 29:18,

31:10, 31:11

DEFENDANTS[1] -

2:6

defendants' [1] -

13:3

defending [1] - 22:20

defenses [1] - 5:19

deference [4] - 12:8,

12:25, 13:24, 22:4

Degeto [1] - 28:15

delay [4] - 7:11, 7:15,

24:13, 24:20

demand [3] - 25:23,

25:25

denied [3] - 14:15,

15:10, 21:4

deny [1] - 28:9

denying [2] - 21:6,

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2020 Page 34 of 39
30:11

Department [2] -

25:14, 25:20

dependent [1] - 29:8

deposition [2] -

29:22

DEPUTY[1] - 3:2

deserve [1] - 22:4

detail [1] - 24:4

detailed [1] - 21:5

determination [1] -

29:3

DHL [4] - 27:20,

27:21, 27:22

Diaz [1] - 32:13

DIAZ [2] - 2:16,

32:14

die [2] - 26:4, 26:23

difference [2] - 23:1,

23:10

different [5] - 9:13,

13:11, 13:18, 14:22,

22:9

dilatory [1] - 26:1

direct [2] - 27:14,

30:6

directly [2] - 6:10,

11:14

disclose [1] - 15:25

disclosure [1] -

30:24

discounted [1] -

19:13

discovery [1] - 10:13

discuss [1] - 4:22

discussed [1] -

22:24

discussion [1] -

22:11

dismiss [10] - 7:21,

13:7, 15:10, 16:7,

16:15, 16:18, 17:4,

18:20, 18:22, 23:5

dismissed [1] - 6:19

distinct [1] - 7:24

DISTRICT [3] - 1:1,

1:1, 1:11

District [4] - 2:17,

15:17, 25:21, 32:15

DIVISION [1] - 1:2

divulge [1] - 17:16

docket [4] - 11:12,

11:19, 19:21, 30:1

Document [2] -

11:12, 11:19

document [3] -

11:20, 19:20, 30:23

documentations [1]

- 25:18

documents [3] -

13:17, 19:10, 25:19

dollars [1] - 16:10

done [4] - 17:9,

21:24, 23:2, 23:3

doubt [1] - 30:21

down [5] - 4:1,

14:12, 14:16, 16:21,

18:18

dragged [1] - 22:18

due [1] - 13:5

duration [1] - 28:12

during [3] - 26:24,

27:5, 32:7

dynamic [1] - 22:9

E

EC [1] - 8:3

economy [1] - 11:5

effect [6] - 11:14,

12:1, 12:6, 12:24,

25:1, 31:1

effects [1] - 19:24

efficiency [1] - 8:2

efficient [1] - 28:20

eight [1] - 12:18

either[6] - 14:16,

14:19, 16:10, 19:2,

22:20, 26:22

elaborate [1] - 10:12

element [1] - 7:8

Eleventh [4] - 7:7,

8:8, 28:14, 28:16

emergent [1] - 7:16

employees [3] -

9:20, 9:25, 10:5

end [1] - 9:2

ends [1] - 8:9

enforceable [1] -

11:17

enforced [1] - 19:16

engaging [1] - 20:4

entered [1] - 14:20

Entertainment [1] -

28:15

entire [1] - 21:25

entities [1] - 22:15

entitled [3] - 15:18,

16:22, 32:5

entity [1] - 28:3

especially [2] - 4:8,

18:2

ESQ [13] - 1:13, 1:13,

1:16, 1:17, 1:20, 1:23,

1:24, 2:2, 2:7, 2:8,

2:11, 2:11, 2:12

essence [1] - 6:24

essentially [3] -

10:20, 21:9, 21:24

et [2] - 1:4, 1:7

Etra [1] - 3:15

ETRA [1] - 2:2

EU [13] - 5:20, 6:15,

6:19, 7:20, 11:23,

12:1, 13:6, 17:7, 20:1,

20:3, 20:6, 20:7

European [19] - 5:20,

6:15, 6:22, 7:4, 9:3,

9:4, 9:6, 9:24, 11:9,

11:19, 11:21, 11:24,

14:22, 15:8, 15:15,

15:22, 16:14, 23:3,

29:8

evaluating [1] - 7:4

event [4] - 9:5, 9:6,

30:16

evidence [8] - 13:16,

13:20, 13:21, 17:1,

20:11, 20:21, 25:3,

30:25

evolved [1] - 10:21

exactly [3] - 10:14,

16:24, 19:18

exceed [1] - 30:3

excellent [1] - 21:15

exception [1] - 29:18

executive [1] - 12:23

exist [1] - 14:8

expect [1] - 8:20

expecting [1] - 4:13

expressed [1] - 28:3

expressing [1] -

26:21

extend [1] - 5:6

extent [3] - 9:18,

10:3, 10:24

extinguish [1] - 26:5

extinguished [2] -

24:14, 26:16

extraterritorial [2] -

12:3, 19:25

F

F.3d [2] - 28:14,

28:16

face [4] - 7:20, 12:9,

13:1, 20:8

faced [3] - 7:25,

20:9, 22:19

faces [2] - 7:17, 7:23

facets [1] - 9:19

fact [2] - 7:12, 30:21

factor[2] - 7:6, 8:1

factors [5] - 7:6,

11:2, 28:12, 28:17,

29:24

factory [1] - 26:10

facts [1] - 10:17

factually [1] - 10:14

fairness [2] - 7:8,

28:20

family [4] - 23:20,

25:13, 25:18, 26:23

far[3] - 25:7, 26:21,

30:21

fashion [1] - 23:1

father[1] - 23:24

favor[1] - 11:4

FCRR [2] - 2:16,

32:14

feature [1] - 6:8

February [7] - 8:11,

8:19, 8:23, 18:17,

23:15, 26:19, 30:3

Federal [2] - 15:17,

25:21

few [2] - 5:2, 9:8

file [5] - 4:10, 15:9,

15:12, 25:4, 30:7

filed [8] - 15:14,

16:22, 16:24, 17:3,

17:6, 25:13, 30:18,

30:22

filing [2] - 9:16,

25:20

filings [1] - 9:11

Film [1] - 28:15

finally [2] - 8:7,

23:11

fine [2] - 7:18, 7:24

firm [3] - 3:7, 3:10,

3:15

firms [1] - 25:13

first [13] - 4:6, 8:13,

15:13, 16:4, 16:21,

18:4, 19:21, 21:14,

25:20, 27:7, 27:8,

27:16, 29:10

five [7] - 8:11, 8:24,

23:24, 25:4, 25:17,

25:22

fixed [1] - 7:25

flawed [1] - 20:11

Floor [4] - 1:22, 2:3,

2:18, 32:15

FLORIDA [1] - 1:1

Florida [7] - 1:4,

1:15, 1:22, 2:4, 2:10,

2:18, 32:16

folks [2] - 26:4,

26:16

follow [1] - 6:24

FOR [4] - 1:13, 1:19,

2:1, 2:6

foregoing [1] - 32:3

foreign [6] - 12:1,

19:16, 19:17, 19:19,

28:19

former[2] - 4:3, 4:7

3

forth [5] - 10:16,

18:1, 18:25, 23:9,

28:13

forward [1] - 19:3

FPR [2] - 2:16, 32:14

FRANCISCO [2] -

1:4, 1:13

Frank [2] - 3:5, 4:19

French [2] - 19:10,

19:14

FREYRE [1] - 2:8

Freyre [1] - 3:21

front [1] - 23:10

frustrating [1] - 6:17

G

Gables [1] - 1:15

Gayles [1] - 6:6

GAYLES[1] - 1:10

given [2] - 6:19, 25:9

GmbH [1] - 28:15

Godfather[1] - 23:22

goodness [1] - 26:17

government[3] -

9:5, 9:8, 28:2

government-owned

[1] - 28:2

Grand [1] - 13:12

grandfather[1] -

23:22

grant [4] - 7:1, 10:9,

28:7, 28:11

granted [4] - 8:10,

14:15, 21:1, 23:18

granting [1] - 8:4

grants [2] - 11:4,

15:8

great [3] - 18:21,

24:4, 25:2

guess [4] - 8:21,

14:24, 24:22, 30:9

guidance [1] - 11:20

Guidance [1] - 11:24

H

Habanos [2] - 28:1,

28:2

Hale [1] - 3:22

HALE [1] - 2:12

hand [2] - 12:20,

17:14

harm [1] - 7:21

heard [2] - 26:2,

27:16

HEARING [1] - 1:10

hearing [2] - 18:4,

32:7

heavily [1] - 19:12

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2020 Page 35 of 39
Helms [8] - 11:16,

19:6, 20:14, 20:18,

22:8, 24:7, 25:15,

25:24

Helms-Burton [8] -

11:16, 19:6, 20:14,

20:18, 22:8, 24:7,

25:15, 25:24

help [1] - 6:9

helpful [1] - 9:1

hereby [1] - 32:3

hereinafter[1] - 20:1

hired [1] - 10:20

history [1] - 19:15

hollow [1] - 27:13

Honor [29] - 4:19,

4:23, 4:24, 5:17, 8:22,

9:9, 10:11, 10:16,

11:7, 12:12, 16:4,

17:20, 17:23, 18:10,

21:11, 23:8, 23:19,

24:17, 24:24, 25:11,

27:6, 27:15, 27:17,

28:4, 31:5, 31:7,

31:11, 31:15

Honor's [1] - 11:12

HONORABLE [1] -

1:10

hope [4] - 6:11, 8:22,

9:5, 26:6

human [1] - 16:13

hundred [1] - 16:10

I

Iberostar[6] - 6:25,

7:3, 7:20, 7:23, 7:24,

20:25

idea [1] - 25:2

identified [4] - 25:8,

25:24, 29:16, 29:20

III [3] - 13:7, 25:1,

25:15

immediate [1] - 7:21

immoderate [2] -

8:8, 8:9

impact [1] - 7:11

impending [1] -

22:14

IMPERIAL [3] - 1:7,

1:19, 2:1

Imperial [38] - 3:3,

3:16, 5:4, 5:6, 6:16,

6:18, 6:19, 7:17, 7:23,

9:11, 9:16, 9:25, 10:3,

10:9, 10:15, 10:17,

10:20, 10:21, 11:4,

12:6, 12:24, 13:11,

14:14, 14:18, 14:21,

15:9, 22:15, 24:22,

25:5, 25:7, 27:10,

28:7, 28:25, 29:10,

29:21, 29:23, 30:9,

31:6

Imperial's [1] - 7:22

implicated [1] -

23:20

important [3] -

15:15, 26:12, 28:23

including [2] - 12:2,

28:18

inconsistency [3] -

9:16, 9:22, 10:6

Incorporated [1] -

28:14

incredibly [1] - 25:16

indefinitely [2] -

23:13, 30:4

indicates [1] - 19:15

indication [7] -

21:18, 21:21, 22:5,

22:11, 22:23, 23:6,

26:18

indirectly [1] - 11:14

information [3] -

15:24, 15:25, 17:17

inherent [1] - 29:25

inherently [1] - 18:2

inject [1] - 18:25

injunction [1] - 23:17

insignificant [1] -

15:17

instance [1] - 30:17

intended [3] - 19:15,

19:16, 22:15

interest [1] - 7:4

internally [1] - 4:22

international [7] -

9:17, 12:7, 20:4,

21:25, 22:1, 22:2,

28:18

interpreted [2] -

5:20, 6:15

interrelated [1] - 5:3

interrupt [1] - 15:3

intertwined [1] -

10:17

involved [4] - 9:20,

9:25, 10:19

involving [1] - 13:16

Iran [1] - 20:18

issue [19] - 7:13,

9:14, 14:23, 15:1,

16:1, 18:6, 18:24,

20:24, 24:19, 24:23,

26:12, 26:13, 26:22,

28:22, 28:24, 29:2,

29:9, 30:20, 31:1

issued [1] - 27:12

issues [13] - 4:17,

4:18, 4:21, 9:10, 11:1,

14:4, 18:6, 21:5, 21:8,

23:8, 27:16, 29:13,

30:5

itself [2] - 15:23,

29:1

IV [1] - 25:13

J

JAMES[1] - 1:16

James [1] - 3:9

January [2] - 9:3, 9:8

Jessica [1] - 3:23

JESSICA [1] - 2:11

join [1] - 10:17

joined [2] - 3:16, 5:5

joining [1] - 10:8

joint [3] - 11:1, 28:7,

30:7

JONATHAN[1] - 2:2

Jonathan [1] - 3:15

JR [1] - 1:13

judge [2] - 11:8,

21:15

Judge [35] - 3:14,

3:18, 5:13, 6:6, 6:11,

6:14, 6:25, 7:3, 7:19,

8:2, 9:15, 11:11, 13:8,

13:14, 15:2, 18:24,

20:19, 20:24, 21:14,

21:22, 21:25, 22:2,

22:5, 22:12, 22:24,

23:6, 23:7, 24:4, 24:6,

28:12, 28:22, 30:6,

30:18, 31:16

JUDGE [1] - 1:11

judging [1] - 28:18

judgment [1] - 11:13

judicial [4] - 8:1,

11:5, 12:23, 28:21

jurisdiction [1] -

5:18

Jury [1] - 13:12

Justin [1] - 3:17

JUSTIN [1] - 1:24

K

keep [1] - 15:24

kept [1] - 18:6

kind [4] - 7:1, 18:5,

18:6, 18:12

kinds [1] - 18:15

Kingdom [1] - 9:2

known [1] - 21:15

L

largely [1] - 21:8

last [1] - 20:15

latest [1] - 8:18

latter[1] - 14:20

law [11] - 3:7, 3:10,

3:15, 4:3, 4:7, 5:20,

6:15, 6:19, 10:3,

11:16, 25:13

lawful [1] - 20:4

laws [2] - 11:15, 20:6

lawsuit [5] - 11:17,

22:18, 25:1, 25:4,

25:9

lead [1] - 3:18

least [3] - 16:14,

26:13, 29:18

leave [1] - 24:10

leaves [1] - 9:2

legal [3] - 12:19,

13:11, 19:25

legislation [1] - 12:3

legislative [2] -

12:23, 19:14

legitimate [1] - 20:22

Lens [1] - 19:7

letter[3] - 25:23,

25:24, 25:25

letting [1] - 27:20

level [2] - 17:5, 28:19

leverage [3] - 19:17,

19:19, 20:8

liability [4] - 6:20,

20:22, 22:21, 25:7

Libya [1] - 20:19

light [2] - 11:2, 27:13

likelihood [1] - 19:1

limitation [1] - 27:10

limitations [4] - 9:19,

26:21, 29:11, 32:9

limited [11] - 5:4,

6:21, 7:1, 18:8, 18:11,

18:14, 18:16, 28:12,

29:9, 30:2

listed [1] - 12:3

listening [1] - 16:12

litigants [1] - 28:20

litigate [5] - 15:9,

16:6, 17:4, 23:4

litigation [3] - 14:18,

14:19, 25:15

LLC [4] - 2:6, 3:24

LLP [2] - 1:24, 2:8

located [1] - 11:13

look [5] - 7:5, 7:8,

11:8, 12:12, 16:5

lose [1] - 14:20

loses [1] - 14:21

Luis [3] - 24:1,

24:11, 26:9

Lutkenhaus [1] -

3:23

4

LUTKENHAUS[1] -

2:11

M

main [2] - 19:23,

20:3

manner[2] - 11:17,

28:3

Maria [1] - 24:1

Mark [1] - 3:14

MARK [1] - 1:20

Marti [1] - 20:24

matter[6] - 4:5,

12:20, 24:13, 26:18,

32:5

matters [1] - 23:6

mean [23] - 9:23,

12:12, 14:6, 15:3,

15:11, 15:13, 15:20,

16:3, 16:5, 16:16,

19:1, 20:19, 20:20,

21:25, 22:6, 23:11,

23:12, 26:4, 26:17,

26:18, 26:23, 29:6

members [2] - 23:20,

26:23

memo [3] - 12:16,

12:18, 19:9

mention [1] - 20:23

mentioned [2] - 5:13,

20:19

mere [1] - 12:21

MIAMI [1] - 1:2

Miami [8] - 1:4, 1:22,

2:4, 2:10, 2:17, 2:18,

32:15, 32:16

mid [1] - 24:12

might [2] - 6:9, 14:12

mind [1] - 27:9

mindful [1] - 29:15

minimum [1] - 16:6

money [1] - 7:15

months [9] - 8:11,

8:24, 18:18, 20:17,

24:21, 24:25, 25:4,

25:22, 26:18

morning [3] - 3:14,

3:20, 4:1

most [1] - 11:4

motion [36] - 4:11,

5:3, 5:4, 5:6, 5:7, 5:8,

5:9, 5:10, 5:12, 5:19,

8:17, 10:16, 10:18,

11:18, 12:14, 15:10,

16:7, 16:15, 16:18,

17:4, 18:20, 18:22,

21:1, 21:2, 21:4, 21:7,

23:5, 28:7, 28:8, 28:9,

30:11, 30:13

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2020 Page 36 of 39
MOTION [1] - 1:10

motions [4] - 4:14,

4:25, 5:1, 5:2

movement[1] - 20:4

moves [1] - 7:21

moving [2] - 13:6,

25:17

MR [41] - 3:5, 3:14,

3:20, 4:19, 5:13, 5:17,

5:23, 5:24, 5:25, 6:3,

6:5, 6:11, 6:14, 8:22,

9:15, 10:11, 10:16,

11:7, 14:9, 15:2, 15:5,

15:7, 17:20, 17:23,

18:9, 20:16, 21:11,

21:14, 23:19, 24:17,

24:24, 25:11, 27:6,

27:17, 27:25, 28:2,

31:4, 31:7, 31:11,

31:15, 31:16

MULLINS [1] - 1:21

multiple [1] - 22:25

mute [2] - 6:5, 6:7

N

Nacional [2] - 12:17,

13:8

Naim [1] - 3:20

NAIM [1] - 2:7

naive [1] - 22:16

name [1] - 23:23

nation [3] - 12:22,

12:23, 28:19

nationalities [1] -

9:20

natural [1] - 19:25

nature [1] - 22:3

necessarily [1] -

4:13

necessary [2] - 8:5,

29:23

need [3] - 8:5, 10:15,

31:2

needed [2] - 8:23,

30:17

NELSON [1] - 1:21

never[1] - 12:10

New [4] - 1:18, 1:25

next [1] - 7:5

NO [1] - 1:2

nobody [1] - 20:9

nonsense [1] - 15:20

North [2] - 2:17,

32:15

note [3] - 10:18,

11:20, 32:7

Note [1] - 11:25

noted [1] - 28:17

nothing [3] - 31:4,

31:7, 31:12

notice [1] - 10:25

noticing [1] - 5:24

nullification [4] -

12:9, 14:2, 21:23,

22:3

nullifies [1] - 12:1

number[3] - 18:15,

22:10, 30:12

numbers [1] - 20:25

Nunez [2] - 3:6, 3:7

NUNEZ [2] - 1:13,

1:14

NW [1] - 2:13

O

objection [1] - 4:10

obligation [2] -

12:20, 13:10

obviously [1] - 29:14

occur[1] - 29:22

occurred [2] - 22:22,

32:7

OF [1] - 1:1

officer[1] - 30:19

Official [1] - 32:14

official [1] - 2:16

One [2] - 1:22, 2:3

one [13] - 4:3, 7:13,

9:10, 9:18, 9:23,

12:20, 12:22, 18:15,

20:12, 22:10, 23:24,

28:22, 29:17

operators [4] -

11:23, 20:2, 20:3,

20:8

opinion [4] - 21:25,

22:5, 28:14, 28:16

opportunity [4] -

4:10, 14:23, 29:2,

29:10

opposed [2] - 14:12,

22:3

opposition [3] -

12:16, 12:18, 19:9

option [1] - 6:15

Order[1] - 3:1

order[9] - 21:5, 21:6,

21:17, 21:18, 22:6,

24:19, 25:12, 25:19,

31:1

ordering [1] - 19:13

original [2] - 8:12,

8:25

originally [1] - 4:1

ORMAND [1] - 1:24

Ormand [1] - 3:17

otherwise [1] - 22:21

outlined [2] - 29:24,

30:12

outside [2] - 8:24,

11:14

outweighs [2] - 25:7,

26:3

OVERY [1] - 1:24

own [2] - 7:4, 17:10

owned [2] - 23:21,

28:2

P

packages [1] - 27:22

page [4] - 12:17,

13:8, 13:13, 19:8

Pages [1] - 1:7

pandemic [2] -

27:21, 32:8

papers [3] - 15:19,

18:1, 18:25

part [1] - 19:22

participate [1] -

29:21

participating [1] -

10:24

particular[2] -

11:21, 24:19

parties [7] - 4:3, 7:8,

11:2, 19:8, 20:23,

21:8, 30:6

partner[3] - 3:6,

3:15, 3:21

parts [2] - 9:21,

25:17

party [3] - 3:12,

15:24, 19:5

pass [1] - 26:16

passed [4] - 19:6,

20:13, 23:22, 24:7

past [1] - 30:3

PATRICIA[2] - 2:16,

32:14

PAULINO [1] - 1:13

Paulino [1] - 3:6

Pedro [1] - 3:21

PEDRO [1] - 2:8

penalty [1] - 7:25

pending [1] - 4:15

Pennsylvania [1] -

2:13

people [2] - 20:14,

29:20

per[1] - 7:25

perhaps [5] - 4:17,

9:12, 17:8, 28:24,

29:17

period [1] - 9:2

permission [1] -

14:14

persons [1] - 19:25

phone [2] - 6:7, 6:8

Photochromic [3] -

19:7, 19:9, 19:11

pick [1] - 8:24

piecemeal [1] - 23:1

place [1] - 18:21

plaintiff [9] - 9:10,

9:11, 18:7, 23:16,

23:17, 24:16, 24:21,

26:24, 29:19

plaintiff's [5] - 5:3,

7:10, 12:18, 19:9,

28:9

plaintiffs [10] - 3:6,

3:8, 4:8, 8:13, 12:15,

23:16, 24:25, 25:9,

29:15, 31:4

Plaintiffs [1] - 1:5

PLAINTIFFS[1] -

1:13

plaintiffs' [1] - 5:8

plausible [1] - 7:14

PLC [4] - 1:7, 2:6,

3:3, 3:24

pleading [2] - 20:24,

30:14

pleadings [2] -

17:15, 30:13

point [4] - 14:24,

18:1, 20:12, 24:7

points [2] - 8:16,

27:7

position [9] - 7:22,

9:12, 9:13, 13:6,

16:19, 16:23, 18:18,

19:2, 23:18

possibility [1] -

22:25

possible [2] - 24:13,

27:5

possibly [1] - 26:4

post [1] - 9:8

potential [3] - 25:7,

26:13, 29:15

power [1] - 29:25

practice [1] - 10:25

precaution [1] -

13:10

prefer[1] - 4:15

prejudging [1] - 29:6

prejudice [11] - 7:10,

7:14, 18:7, 18:15,

23:12, 23:15, 24:19,

24:21, 26:3, 29:15

preliminary [1] -

24:6

premature [1] -

16:19

premise [4] - 18:9,

18:14, 19:1, 20:10

5

prepared [1] - 4:14

presentations [1] -

25:19

presented [1] - 21:6

preservation [1] -

27:4

preserve [1] - 25:3

presume [1] - 8:3

prevail [2] - 14:19,

18:21

previously [1] - 27:4

procedural [3] -

15:1, 29:2, 29:13

procedurally [1] -

14:13

proceed [13] - 4:15,

4:16, 4:20, 4:23, 6:13,

10:23, 14:18, 14:19,

18:19, 26:25, 29:19,

30:4

proceedings [4] -

8:5, 8:6, 31:17, 32:4

Proceedings [1] -

13:13

proceeds [1] - 28:25

produce [2] - 13:20,

20:21

produced [1] - 20:11

producing [1] -

13:21

production [4] -

13:16, 19:10, 19:13

prohibit [1] - 13:6

prompt [1] - 8:3

proper[1] - 28:19

properly [1] - 29:3

property [2] - 23:21,

26:10

propose [1] - 9:7

prosecuted [3] -

19:2, 19:7, 22:17

prosecution [4] -

7:18, 10:5, 19:12,

20:9

prospect [1] - 22:20

protect [4] - 11:22,

20:3, 20:7, 22:15

provide [1] - 19:17

providing [1] - 19:18

provisions [1] - 12:3

public [3] - 17:12,

17:13, 17:21

purpose [3] - 19:23,

20:3, 20:7

pursuant [2] - 12:4,

28:18

push [1] - 18:13

put [3] - 6:7, 23:9,

23:17

puts [1] - 18:21

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2020 Page 37 of 39
Q

questions [1] - 8:15

quite [1] - 16:3

quote [1] - 13:11

quotes [1] - 13:5

R

raised [2] - 9:10,

27:7

Ramon [1] - 23:23

rather[2] - 19:16,

29:9

Raymond [2] - 3:14,

5:12

RAYMOND [4] -

1:20, 3:14, 5:13,

31:16

Re [1] - 13:12

read [1] - 11:11

real [2] - 22:14,

26:23

realistic [1] - 22:21

really [6] - 7:14,

7:20, 8:16, 12:8,

22:13, 25:2

reason [5] - 8:2,

10:14, 17:6, 27:23,

30:20

reasonable [1] -

13:10

reasons [2] - 27:3,

30:12

receive [1] - 8:20

receiver[1] - 6:10

receiving [2] - 21:1,

27:21

recent [2] - 24:3,

24:4

recess [1] - 31:13

recognition [1] -

12:22

recognize [4] - 8:23,

12:10, 13:25, 22:9

recognized [2] -

11:17, 14:22

reconsideration [1] -

21:3

reemphasize [1] -

27:11

refer[3] - 11:10,

12:13, 13:5

reference [1] - 15:21

referenced [1] -

19:21

referred [1] - 20:1

referring [5] - 12:4,

25:22, 27:19, 27:24,

27:25

regard [3] - 23:12,

28:11, 30:8

regarding [6] - 5:11,

22:8, 24:5, 28:24,

30:5, 30:10

Regulation [1] -

11:10

regulation [2] - 9:24,

11:21

regulations [1] - 7:5

related [2] - 13:4,

20:5

relates [1] - 16:20

relationship [1] -

10:20

relevant[1] - 15:14

relief [4] - 6:21, 7:16,

16:5

reluctant [2] - 27:8,

27:15

remotely [1] - 32:9

render[1] - 8:3

reply [4] - 12:15,

13:3, 13:9, 13:13

REPORTED [1] -

2:15

REPORTER [2] -

5:21, 6:1

Reporter[2] - 2:16,

32:14

reporter's [2] -

17:24, 21:12

reporting [1] - 32:9

reports [1] - 30:7

representation [1] -

30:22

request [3] - 6:22,

8:4, 10:8

required [1] - 7:2

requirement [1] -

6:20

requires [1] - 9:24

research [1] - 17:10

resolved [1] - 26:19

resource [1] - 28:21

respect [4] - 10:17,

13:5, 22:4, 28:19

respectfully [8] -

12:13, 14:3, 18:10,

18:13, 18:24, 22:2,

23:2, 23:7

respond [14] - 4:22,

5:6, 6:16, 8:25, 15:5,

16:7, 16:14, 16:23,

17:4, 18:20, 23:5,

24:23, 25:11, 27:17

responds [1] - 7:18

response [6] - 4:13,

8:20, 11:24, 19:22,

21:2, 30:13

reverts [1] - 9:4

rhetorically [2] -

15:7

RHYS [13] - 1:23,

5:17, 5:25, 6:5, 6:11,

6:14, 8:22, 9:15,

17:20, 24:24, 27:6,

27:25, 31:7

Rhys [14] - 3:17, 5:8,

5:18, 6:7, 17:2, 17:9,

17:20, 24:24, 26:20,

27:6, 28:10, 30:11,

30:19, 31:6

rights [1] - 7:12

ring [1] - 27:13

risk [8] - 6:19, 7:17,

8:6, 19:12, 19:13,

25:6, 25:7, 25:8

road [4] - 14:12,

14:16, 16:21, 18:18

Rodriguez [19] - 3:2,

3:5, 3:7, 4:14, 4:19,

5:23, 11:6, 14:6,

17:23, 18:5, 21:11,

23:23, 24:1, 25:12,

29:6, 29:20, 31:3

RODRIGUEZ [24] -

1:4, 1:13, 1:14, 3:5,

4:19, 5:23, 6:3, 11:7,

14:9, 15:2, 15:5, 15:7,

17:23, 18:9, 20:16,

21:11, 21:14, 23:19,

24:17, 25:11, 27:17,

28:2, 31:4, 31:15

room [1] - 18:15

RPR [2] - 2:16, 32:14

Rubicam [1] - 3:24

RUBICAM [1] - 2:6

rule [2] - 17:1, 30:25

rules [1] - 7:5

ruling [1] - 12:10

rulings [1] - 12:2

S

sake [1] - 26:17

sanctioned [1] - 10:1

sanctions [3] - 9:17,

19:25, 22:14

scale [1] - 7:17

scarce [1] - 28:20

scenario [1] - 18:16

scenarios [2] -

14:17, 14:21

scheduling [1] - 4:17

Scola [15] - 6:25, 7:3,

7:19, 8:2, 20:24,

21:14, 21:22, 22:12,

22:24, 23:6, 24:4,

24:6, 28:12, 28:22,

30:6

Scola's [3] - 21:25,

22:5, 30:18

SE [1] - 2:9

SEC [3] - 9:11, 9:12,

9:16

see [10] - 4:9, 6:13,

15:13, 15:18, 16:1,

16:22, 17:6, 18:12,

22:20

seek [2] - 14:14,

15:12

seeking [4] - 7:15,

23:16, 25:6, 27:3

seem [1] - 14:15

sell [1] - 16:8

sense [2] - 11:4,

12:19

sent [2] - 25:22,

25:25

separate [1] - 13:12

separated [1] - 10:22

September[3] - 1:5,

21:7, 32:13

seriously [1] - 9:24

serve [4] - 8:13,

25:5, 27:19, 28:3

served [1] - 27:23

set [5] - 4:1, 10:16,

18:1, 18:25, 28:13

several [2] - 18:18,

24:20

shall [1] - 11:17

short [3] - 7:11, 8:4,

25:6

show [1] - 22:21

side [2] - 7:10, 7:17

significant [2] -

17:25, 26:11

similar[2] - 20:24,

27:3

simple [1] - 27:18

simply [4] - 5:10,

14:14, 30:14, 30:20

sit [1] - 22:16

six [1] - 19:8

slow [1] - 25:10

Societe [2] - 12:17,

13:8

sometime [1] - 18:17

somewhat [1] - 6:17

sorry [3] - 5:21, 15:2,

17:8

sort [1] - 18:11

sought [1] - 7:16

SOUTHERN [1] - 1:1

sovereigns [1] -

13:12

speaker[1] - 6:8

speaking [2] - 6:7,

6

27:9

specific [3] - 11:22,

15:21, 29:20

specifically [5] -

11:11, 11:15, 17:3,

21:16, 28:22

specificity [1] - 17:5

specified [2] - 11:15,

20:1

St [1] - 2:9

start [1] - 5:10

starting [2] - 24:22,

31:3

State [2] - 25:14,

25:20

STATES[2] - 1:1,

1:11

States [2] - 2:17,

32:15

states [1] - 12:10

status [3] - 4:2, 30:7,

30:9

STATUS[1] - 1:10

statute [27] - 11:10,

11:22, 11:25, 12:8,

12:9, 12:25, 13:23,

13:24, 19:10, 19:14,

19:15, 19:18, 19:22,

19:23, 20:13, 21:19,

21:20, 21:22, 21:23,

21:24, 22:3, 22:4,

22:7, 22:10

statutes [7] - 13:15,

13:20, 14:2, 14:3,

14:7, 14:9

stay [49] - 5:5, 5:7,

5:9, 5:10, 5:19, 6:21,

7:1, 7:6, 7:9, 8:4, 8:7,

8:9, 8:17, 10:8, 10:9,

10:10, 10:15, 11:3,

11:18, 15:8, 15:11,

18:8, 18:11, 18:12,

18:13, 18:23, 21:1,

21:4, 21:5, 21:7,

23:13, 23:14, 23:18,

25:6, 26:24, 27:3,

27:5, 28:7, 28:8,

28:11, 29:13, 29:18,

30:1, 30:2, 30:3

stays [2] - 8:9, 22:25

stems [1] - 23:21

STENOGRAPHICA

LLY [1] - 2:15

steps [2] - 7:13, 10:4

still [5] - 6:12, 7:12,

23:25, 27:11, 29:5

stipulate [1] - 26:14

stop [2] - 8:11, 16:12

street [1] - 12:12

strike [4] - 5:8,

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2020 Page 38 of 39
28:10, 30:11, 30:13

strong [1] - 7:4

strongly [2] - 7:9,

20:20

subject [7] - 5:18,

10:3, 10:4, 10:5,

27:10, 30:23, 32:8

subjecting [1] -

13:11

subjects [2] - 19:16,

19:17

submit [3] - 12:13,

14:3, 16:4

submits [1] - 15:25

submitted [1] - 5:9

substantial [1] -

23:15

substantive [3] -

4:17, 7:11, 28:24

substantively [1] -

24:21

sue [2] - 20:14, 20:16

suggest [1] - 9:24

suggests [1] - 9:12

Suite [2] - 1:15, 1:18

summons [2] - 7:13,

27:12

support [2] - 5:9, 7:9

Surgeon [1] - 3:20

SURGEON [6] - 2:7,

3:20, 5:24, 10:11,

10:16, 31:11

surgeon [5] - 4:3,

4:6, 10:7, 26:22, 31:9

suspect [2] - 20:20,

26:8

T

tail [1] - 16:2

team [1] - 5:15

technological [1] -

32:9

terms [1] - 10:18

territory [1] - 12:22

testimony [3] -

26:11, 27:4, 29:19

THE [34] - 1:10, 1:13,

3:13, 3:19, 3:25, 5:2,

5:16, 5:21, 6:1, 6:6,

6:12, 8:18, 9:10, 10:7,

10:12, 11:6, 14:6,

14:11, 15:4, 15:6,

17:8, 17:22, 18:5,

20:12, 20:23, 21:13,

23:11, 24:15, 24:18,

26:20, 28:5, 31:6,

31:9, 31:13

themselves [3] -

14:24, 29:4, 29:12

therefore [2] - 10:22,

32:8

thinking [1] - 9:9

thinks [1] - 30:15

third [3] - 8:1, 19:24,

20:5

Third [1] - 1:18

threat [1] - 22:14

threatened [1] - 8:14

threatening [1] -

25:4

three [1] - 13:13

Tico [1] - 3:23

TICO [1] - 2:12

tied [1] - 10:13

Title [4] - 13:7, 25:1,

25:13, 25:15

today [5] - 4:15,

4:24, 14:5, 31:2

together[1] - 10:13

took [6] - 6:25, 8:13,

20:24, 24:25, 25:3,

25:4

totally [1] - 13:18

Tower[2] - 1:22, 2:3

trade [1] - 20:4

Tramont [1] - 3:7

TRAMONT[1] - 1:14

transcription [1] -

32:4

transitional [1] - 9:2

true [1] - 20:16

Trujillo [1] - 28:13

truly [1] - 13:19

truthfulness [1] -

30:21

try [1] - 6:5

trying [1] - 16:8

Turner[4] - 7:7, 8:1,

28:15, 29:25

two [6] - 12:12, 13:9,

14:21, 23:25, 29:16

two-way [1] - 12:12

U

U.K [1] - 8:6

U.S [1] - 9:25

ultimate [2] - 15:1,

29:5

ultimately [2] -

14:16, 29:7

uncle [3] - 24:1,

24:11, 26:9

under [7] - 5:20,

6:15, 11:5, 20:14,

25:15, 25:24, 30:24

understood [1] -

4:25

unequivocally [1] -

12:10

Union [10] - 9:3,

11:9, 11:21, 14:22,

15:8, 15:15, 15:22,

16:14, 23:3, 29:9

united [1] - 2:17

UNITED [2] - 1:1,

1:11

United [2] - 9:2,

32:15

unlawful [1] - 19:24

unless [3] - 15:24,

20:20, 22:21

unlike [1] - 21:23

unlikely [2] - 8:3, 9:5

unlimited [3] - 7:18,

7:24, 18:12

up [6] - 5:21, 5:22,

5:23, 20:9, 20:24,

31:2

urgency [2] - 25:2,

27:13

V

vacate [3] - 21:4,

21:7

versus [3] - 3:2,

20:25, 28:15

via [1] - 27:20

viable [1] - 26:6

viewed [1] - 21:19

violating [1] - 6:20

violation [1] - 7:25

vs [2] - 1:6, 28:13

W

wait [2] - 25:23, 30:4

warranted [3] -

23:14, 29:13, 30:2

Washington [1] -

2:13

weeks [1] - 9:8

weigh [2] - 27:15,

30:14

weighs [1] - 19:12

whole [4] - 14:22,

19:1, 20:7, 20:10

widget [1] - 16:10

Wilmer[1] - 3:22

WILMER [1] - 2:12

win [1] - 16:18

witness [1] - 26:12

witnesses [2] -

24:20, 29:16

wondering [2] -

14:11, 27:2

worse [2] - 7:22,

23:18

7

WPP [3] - 2:6, 3:24,

31:11

Y

year[1] - 20:15

years [3] - 4:7, 20:13,

21:15

York [4] - 1:18, 1:25

Young [1] - 3:24

YOUNG [1] - 2:6

yourself[1] - 24:15

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2020 Page 39 of 39