.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 

1 August 2007
 

BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-3 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 1 AUGUST 2007 

OPR: HQ AFDDEC/DD 

Certified by: HQ AFDDEC/CC (Maj Gen Allen G. Peck) 

Pages: 103 

Accessibility: Publications are available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for 

 downloading 

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication 

Approved by: T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, General, USAF 

 Chief of Staff 
 

FOREWORD 

 Our nation is at war. Warriors must plan and orchestrate irregular warfare as 

joint, multinational, and multi-agency campaigns, beginning with the first efforts of 

strategy development and concluding with the achievement of the desired endstate. 

As Airmen, we have a unique warfighting perspective shaped by a century-long quest to 

gain and maintain the high ground. We must be able to articulate Air Force capabilities 

and contributions to the irregular warfare fight, with its unique attributes and 

requirements. Employed properly, airpower (to include air, space, and cyberspace 

capabilities) produces asymmetric advantages that can be effectively leveraged by joint 

force commanders in virtually every aspect of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is 

sufficiently different from traditional conflict to warrant a separate keystone doctrine 

document. While the fighting experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan should weigh heavily 

in the development of our doctrine, we intend this doctrine document to be broad, 

enduring, and forward-looking, rather than focusing on any particular operation, current 

or past. 

 

 T. MICHAEL MOSELEY 

 General, USAF 

 Chief of Staff 
 iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................vi

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ............................................................. viii

CHAPTER ONE—Understanding Irregular Warfare (IW) ............................................... 1

IW Defined .................................................................................................................. 1

IW Model..................................................................................................................... 4

IW ‘Truths’ for Airmen.................................................................................................. 8

Counterinsurgency (COIN) ‘Truths’ for Airmen.......................................................... 10

Insurgency and Terrorism ......................................................................................... 11

Countering Insurgency and Terrorism....................................................................... 12

CHAPTER TWO—Air Force Applications in IW............................................................ 14

The Value of Air Force Capabilities in IW.................................................................. 14

Minimal Intrusiveness ............................................................................................ 15

Rapid Response .................................................................................................... 15

Rapid Mobility...................................................................................................... 16

Rapid Engagement.............................................................................................. 16

Improved Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Situational Awareness................... 16

IW Activities............................................................................................................... 18

Support to Insurgencies......................................................................................... 18

COIN and Support to COIN ................................................................................... 19

Provide Security .................................................................................................. 20

Help Alleviate Root Causes................................................................................. 21

Limit an Adversary’s Conventional Options and Flexibility .................................. 22

Disrupt Enemy Movement ................................................................................... 22

Target Insurgent Leaders and Active Supporters................................................ 23

Air and Ground Coordination............................................................................... 24

Shaping and Deterring........................................................................................... 25

Counterterrorism.................................................................................................... 25

CHAPTER THREE—Air Force Capabilities In IW......................................................... 27

Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)......................................................................... 27

Assess, Train, Advise, and Assist.......................................................................... 28

Combat Aviation Advisory Mission ...................................................................... 29

BPC and COIN ...................................................................................................... 30

Intelligence ................................................................................................................ 30

Analysis and Targeting .......................................................................................... 31

All Source Intelligence......................................................................................... 32

Collection............................................................................................................... 32

Non-traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ......................... 33

Human Intelligence.............................................................................................. 33

Counterintelligence.............................................................................................. 34

Distributed Operations ........................................................................................... 34

Intelligence Collaboration .................................................................................... 35

Foreign Disclosure .............................................................................................. 35

Information Operations.............................................................................................. 36
 iv 

Network Warfare Operations ................................................................................. 36

Electronic Warfare ................................................................................................. 37

Influence Operations.............................................................................................. 37

Psychological Operations.................................................................................... 37

Military Deception................................................................................................ 38

Counterpropaganda ............................................................................................ 38

Public Affairs ....................................................................................................... 39

Operational Security............................................................................................ 39

Air Mobility................................................................................................................. 40

Combat Deployment .............................................................................................. 40

Combat Sustainment ............................................................................................. 41

Integrating Mobility and Special Operations .......................................................... 41

Agile Combat Support (ACS) .................................................................................... 41

ACS Operations in IW............................................................................................ 42

Civil Engineering ................................................................................................. 42

Medical Evacuation / Medical Teams .................................................................. 43

Precision Engagement .............................................................................................. 44

Command and Control (C2) ...................................................................................... 45

CHAPTER FOUR—Strategy and Planning................................................................... 47

Strategy Considerations............................................................................................ 47

Strategy Differences in IW ..................................................................................... 48

Long View Versus the Quick Decisive Victory..................................................... 48

Center of Gravity ................................................................................................. 48

Focus on Stability ................................................................................................ 49

Operational Environment........................................................................................... 49

Failed States.......................................................................................................... 51

Cooperative Governments..................................................................................... 51

Non-Cooperative Governments ............................................................................. 52

Theater Security Cooperation Plan ........................................................................... 53

Security Assistance ............................................................................................... 53

Building Partner/Regional Capacity to Counter IW Threats ................................... 54

Persistent Presence............................................................................................... 54

Strategy Development............................................................................................... 54

Understanding the Environment and History of the Region ................................... 55

Integration With Political and Other Interagency Organizations............................. 55

Planning Considerations ........................................................................................... 56

Commander’s Estimate Art.................................................................................... 56

Operational Art....................................................................................................... 56

Legal Considerations ............................................................................................. 58

Operational Phases ............................................................................................... 58

Shaping and Deterring Operations ........................................................................ 60

Counterterrorism.................................................................................................... 61

Support to COIN .................................................................................................... 61

Indirect Support................................................................................................... 61

Direct Support not Involving Combat................................................................... 61

Direct Support Involving Combat......................................................................... 62
 v 

COIN...................................................................................................................... 63

Support to Insurgency............................................................................................ 63

Preparation of the Operational Environment ....................................................... 64

Supporting Unconventional Warfare Activities..................................................... 64

Supporting Massed Forces.................................................................................. 64

Assessment............................................................................................................... 65

CHAPTER FIVE—IW Operations ................................................................................. 66

Command and Control .............................................................................................. 66

C2 Planning ........................................................................................................... 66

Geographical Considerations................................................................................. 69

Continental United States Basing........................................................................ 69

Theater-based Forces ......................................................................................... 70

Basing Inside the Joint Operations Area ............................................................. 70

Environment for Employment .................................................................................... 71

Force Presentation ................................................................................................ 72

Supporting the Partner Nation (PN)..................................................................... 72

Supporting Insurgencies...................................................................................... 73

Force Protection in IW......................................................................................... 73

Executing Operations................................................................................................ 74

Airspace Control .................................................................................................... 74

Operation Cycles ................................................................................................... 75

Enabling PN Capabilities..................................................................................... 75

Conducting Direct Operations ............................................................................. 76

Transitioning from Direct Operations................................................................... 76

Sustaining the PN................................................................................................ 76

SUGGESTED READINGS............................................................................................ 77

APPENDIX—Understanding Insurgencies.................................................................... 79

Insurgent Motivations ................................................................................................ 79

Political .................................................................................................................. 79

Cultural .................................................................................................................. 80

Religious................................................................................................................ 80

Economic............................................................................................................... 80

Radical Extremism................................................................................................. 81

Organization.............................................................................................................. 81

Operations................................................................................................................. 82

Non-violent Operations .......................................................................................... 83

Violent Operations ................................................................................................. 84

Support .................................................................................................................. 84

Strategies Used By Insurgents.................................................................................. 85

Coup d’etat ............................................................................................................ 86

Military Focused Movement................................................................................... 86

Popular Protracted War ......................................................................................... 86

Urban Focused ...................................................................................................... 88

Glossary........................................................................................................................ 89
 vi 

In this type of war you cannot – you must not – measure the 

effectiveness of the effort by the number of bridges destroyed, buildings 

damaged, vehicles burned, or any of the other standards that have been 

used for regular warfare. The task is to destroy the effectiveness of the 

insurgent’s efforts and his ability to use the population for his own ends. 

―General Curtis E. Lemay 

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, establishes 

operational-level doctrinal guidance for irregular warfare (IW). IW is not a lesserincluded form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW encompasses a spectrum of 

warfare where the nature and characteristics are significantly different from 

traditional war. IW presents unique challenges to military forces requiring 

innovative strategies for employing Air Force capabilities. Effectively combating 

and conducting IW is critical to protecting the US and its vital interests. 

APPLICATION 

 This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian 

personnel, including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and 

members. Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the 

full range of operations. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular 

situation when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, 

and practice it. Due to the political nature of IW, Airmen must be able to 

articulate Air Force capabilities to civilian leadership and decision makers. 

SCOPE 

 This doctrine focuses on the operational and strategic aspects of IW and 

differences in the application of force from traditional warfare. Understanding the 

strategic context of IW is the first step in determining how best to employ forces. 

The document describes Air Force capabilities and operations required to 

effectively defend and counter adversaries. Effectively employing these 

capabilities relies on the development of coherent strategies and plans providing 

the appropriate force at the appropriate time. The complex nature of IW requires 

the combined capabilities of all military Services, government agencies, and 

partner nations. While this document focuses on Air Force doctrine, IW is 

inherently a joint and interagency fight. 
 vii 

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology 

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the Air Force 

prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air 

Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and 

space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component 

commander while the term ”JFACC” refers to the joint component-level 

operational commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will 

normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are 

different, and should be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control/ 

administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through a 

Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air and 

space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC). 

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a 

combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the 

air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in 

joint or combined operations is correctly known as a JAOC or CAOC. Since 

nearly every operation the US conducts will involve international partners, this 

publication uses the terms CFACC and CAOC throughout to emphasize the 

doctrine’s applicability to multi-national operations. 
 viii 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon 

which AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports 

these statements. 

 Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW 

favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and 

other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches in order to erode an 

adversary's power, influence, and will. (Page 1) 

 IW is not a lesser-included form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW 

encompasses a spectrum of warfare where the nature and characteristics are 

significantly different from traditional war. (Page 3) 

 Traditional warfare and IW are not mutually exclusive; both forms of warfare 

may be present in a given conflict. (Page 3) 

 Military power alone cannot bring decisive victory in COIN. (Page 4) 

 The Air Force must be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and 

traditional warfare operations. (Page 8) 

 Legitimacy and influence are the main objectives. (Page 10) 

 The Air Force provides valuable and unique capabilities in IW. In many 

cases, these capabilities provide flexible and persistent options for dealing 

with IW challenges by providing a less intrusive force that can respond quickly 

and improve commanders’ overall situational awareness. (Page 14) 

 In any phase of operation, the Air Force can be employed with varying 

degrees of intensity and visibility. (Page 19) 

 The protracted approach that adversaries may use in IW requires a long-term 

strategy for victory. Winning a protracted war is all about winning the struggle 

of ideas, undermining the legitimacy of a competing ideology, addressing 

valid grievances, reducing an enemy’s influence, and depriving the enemy of 

the support of the people. (Page 48) 

 In irregular operations, commanders should understand that the application of 

military force is in support of other instruments of national power, and that 

traditional joint force organizational relationships may not be as effective for 

irregular operational environments. (Page 58) 

 Each IW contingency is different, and no single planning template can be 

applied to every operation. (Page 68) 
 1 

CHAPTER ONE 

UNDERSTANDING IRREGULAR WARFARE 

 The United States’ overwhelming dominance in recent conventional wars 

has made it highly unlikely that most adversaries will choose to fight the US in a 

traditional, conventional manner. Thus, for relatively weaker powers (including 

non-state entities) irregular warfare (IW) has become an attractive, if not more 

necessary, option. IW presents different challenges to our military and to the Air 

Force. This document highlights Air Force capabilities and outlines how they 

should be employed. It will also increase Airmen’s understanding of the different 

nature inherent in IW. 

 The Air Force’s ability to operate in the air, space, and cyberspace 

domains provides our fighting forces with a highly asymmetric advantage over IW 

adversaries. Command of the air prevents adversaries from conducting 

sustained operations in this domain while allowing US and coalition forces to 

exploit numerous advantages. 

 While our IW adversaries have their own asymmetric capabilities such as 

suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the cover of civilian 

populations, they lack and cannot effectively offset unfettered access to the high 

ground that superiority in air, space, and cyberspace provides. Exploiting altitude, 

speed, and range, airborne platforms can create effects without the impediments 

to movement that terrain imposes on ground forces. 

 The unique perspective that Airmen bring to a conflict is as relevant in IW 

as in past traditional conflicts. Innovation and adaptation are hallmarks of 

airpower. Innovative, forward-thinking Airmen must continue to adapt tactics, 

techniques, procedures, and equipment to counter a thinking, adaptive enemy. 

 US airpower in its myriad forms is capable of operating simultaneously in 

multiple theaters, producing invaluable combat and enabling effects across a 

wide spectrum of operations. When properly integrated, Air Force capabilities 

have been—and will continue to be—integral to the success of US military 

power. 

IW DEFINED 

 The US has struggled to understand the threats posed by what has been 

referred to at various times as IW, low-intensity conflict, insurgency, small wars, 

and indirect aggression. For the purpose of this document, IW is defined as a 

violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric 

approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 

capabilities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. 

Rather than seeking to impose societal change from the outside by a decisive 
 2 

defeat of the population’s military and security forces, proponents of IW seek a 

change from within by delegitimizing the institutions and ideologies of the 

targeted state, and eventually winning the support of the population (or at least 

acquiescence) for their cause. However, because IW is a complex and nuanced 

type of warfare, it does not lend itself easily to a concise universal definition. 

 IW is not a new concept; organizations have clashed for political control 

for thousands of years. Today, changes in the international environment due to 

rapid global communications, near instantaneous 24-hour world news coverage, 

increasingly interdependent global commerce, and the proliferation of 

technologies and weapons of mass destruction/disruption make ensuring US 

security more of a challenge. Adversaries, unable to defeat the US in 

conventional warfare, continue to resort to and develop new IW capabilities and 

tactics. Air Force forces play an important role in IW, but just as with more 

traditional operations, their most effective employment requires careful study of 

the environment and appreciation for the unique characteristics of the conflict. 

 The following definitions highlight some key differences between IW and 

traditional warfare, and conventional and unconventional warfare. Understanding 

these differences allows Airmen to have a common frame of reference when 

discussing these types of warfare. 

 Traditional warfare—A confrontation between nation-states or 

coalitions/alliances of nation-states (Joint Publication [JP] 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States). This confrontation typically involves 

force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of 

conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, 

space, and cyberspace domains. The objective may be to convince or coerce 

key military or political decision makers, defeat an adversary’s armed forces, 

destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in 

order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. 

 Irregular warfare—A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 

legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. 

 Conventional warfare—A broad spectrum of military operations conducted 

against an adversary by traditional military or other government security 

forces that do not include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

(CBRN) weapons. 

 Unconventional warfare (UW)—A broad spectrum of military and 

paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted 

through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, 

trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external 

source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, 

sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. (JP 1-

02, Department of Defense [DOD] Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms) 
 3 

Figure 1.1. Contrasting Traditional and Irregular Warfare

 

 IW is distinguished from traditional warfare primarily by the approach and 

strategy used to achieve the effects desired. Figure 1.1 contrasts traditional and 

irregular warfare. Traditional warfare seeks a change in the policies and 

practices, if not in the outright existence, of a government by coercing key 

government leaders or defeating them militarily. IW, conversely, seeks to 

undermine a group, government, or ideology by influencing the population, which 

is often the center of gravity. The focus of IW is not primarily on the military or 

destructive capability of an adversary (state or non-state). 

 The terms conventional and unconventional, on the other hand, refer to 

the weapons and forces conducting operations. Thus, IW may be conducted by 

conventional or unconventional forces or both depending on the circumstances 

and the operational environment. 

 IW is not a lesser-included form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW 

encompasses a spectrum of warfare where the nature and characteristics 

are significantly different from traditional war. It includes, but is not limited 

to, activities such as insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism, and 

counterterrorism. 

Traditional warfare and IW are not mutually exclusive; both forms of 

warfare may be present in a given conflict. Airmen should understand that 

the nature of war will often change in the course of a conflict. This is especially 

true in IW where the conflict is often protracted. Traditional warfare can rapidly 

Desired effect: 

Isolate from conflict

Military Military

Government

Population

Desired effect: 

 Influence or topple 

 government 

Traditional Warfare

Focus

Desired effect: 

Defeat military

Government

Population

Irregular Warfare

Desired effect: 

 Influence 

Desired effect: 

Gain or erode support

Desired effect: 

Render irrelevant

Focus
 4 

 Figure 1.2. Describing Irregular Warfare 

evolve into an irregular war and vice versa, requiring the military force to adapt 

from one form to the other. 

 There are several ways of describing IW further, as shown in Figure 1.2. 

One description can be based solely on the actors or the methods used. In this 

description, non-state actors 

engaged in violent actions 

could be considered 

conducting an irregular war. 

The methods used can also 

describe a conflict as such. 

Ultimately, the conflict should 

first be described based on 

its strategic purpose and its 

effect on the relevant 

population. However, 

analysis of the actors and 

methods may also have a 

greater impact on the 

development of an overall 

strategy than in the past. 

 IW encompasses a multitude of activities covering a broad range, but at its 

core lies insurgency and COIN. An insurgency seeks to change or reduce the 

influence of the existing body that has political control, while COIN attempts to 

maintain the current system against an internal threat. The appropriate 

application of military power has been and will remain a central challenge for 

policymakers seeking to define an effective COIN strategy. Military power 

alone cannot bring decisive victory in COIN. However, history has 

demonstrated that the military instrument of power is vital in most 

counterinsurgency operations and should be used to buttress domestic security 

as well as political and informational programs. Therefore, police, civilian 

security, public information, and intelligence forces should be critical in a state’s 

use of persuasive instruments for conducting COIN. 

IW MODEL 

 While the strategic context will be unique for any operation, the following 

construct, illustrated in Figure 1.3, provides a guide for how Airmen can view IW. 

 The Air Force provides critical capabilities to achieve effects in IW for the 

joint force commander (JFC) through the 17 Air Force functions. For more 

detailed information on the Air Force functions, see AFDD 1, Air Force Basic 

Doctrine. The key capabilities listed in Figure 1.3 will most likely be employed 

when the military is called upon to engage in the activities at the top of the 

diagram. While not listed, and often assumed, potential threats to air superiority 
 5 

should be considered before employing airpower to conduct the activities listed in 

Figure 1.3. 

Figure 1.3. Irregular Warfare Model 

 These activities include, but are not limited to: shaping and deterring, 

counterterrorism, COIN, support to COIN, and, where permissible under 

international law or United Nations (UN) mandate, support to insurgency. The 

majority of operations should focus their effect on the relevant population. The 

ultimate goal should be to enhance the legitimacy of the current government or 

marginalize the insurgents and terrorists when conducting COIN, support to 

COIN, or counterterrorist activities. When supporting an insurgency the goal is to 

marginalize the occupying power and enhance the legitimacy of the insurgents in 

the eyes of the population. This struggle for legitimacy requires Airmen to have a 

different mindset and exploit these capabilities in innovative ways. The battle of 

arms works in harmony but is surpassed in importance by the battle for influence. 
 6 

Support to Insurgency as discussed in this document pertains to those 

operations against an “illegitimate” or occupying power (e.g., Vichy French in 

World War II) or the Taliban in Afghanistan). It is important to note that 

supporting an insurgent movement against a legitimate government is 

authorized when conducted for national defense (e.g., Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM [OEF] against the Taliban in Afghanistan) or when in accordance 

with a United Nations Security Council mandate. 

 

 Shaping and deterring operations, as well as counterterrorism, are 

continuous in nature and may occur independently or in conjunction with COIN, 

support to COIN, or support to insurgency operations. The diagram also 

highlights an important difference between COIN and support to COIN. 

 Support to COIN is defined as support provided to a government in the 

military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic action it 

undertakes to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). Implicit in this definition is a 

legitimate partner nation (PN) government in power with some capacity to direct 

and conduct COIN operations. This sets the foundation for building partnership 

capacity (BPC). Foreign internal defense (FID) activities in the form of 

assessing, advising, training, and assisting the PN’s combat support and combat 

activities is an important part of BPC. The role of the Air Force in BPC is to 

provide expertise and assistance that supports the overall IW strategy of the US 

government in assisting the PN address an insurgency. Ensuring PN military 

institutions can provide security for their citizens and government is a key priority 

in any BPC effort. 

 Support to COIN can include indirect support, direct support (not involving 

combat) and direct support (involving combat). Using this construct, the level of 

US involvement tends to increase as operations move from indirect to direct. 

BPC is the primary means for providing indirect support. BPC also plays a vital 

role as operations move to direct support. Direct support involves any or all of 

the following: 

 US forces conducting operations by, through, and with the PN using the PN’s 

assets (these operations may or may not involve combat operations). 

 US forces using US assets to support PN combat operations (does not 

involve combat operations and may include intelligence, mobility, and 

command and control [C2], and information operations [IO] capabilities to 

name a few). 

 US forces using US assets to support PN combat operations (includes, but is 

not limited to, kinetic precision strikes, combat search and rescue [CSAR], 

and other capabilities which may employ lethal force). 
 7 

 It is important to note that transitioning between these different levels of 

operations require Presidential or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval. 

When these transitions are authorized, commanders need to be aware of the 

implications on C2 and force commitment. Regardless of the support provided, 

when conducting support to COIN the strategic initiative must rest with the PN. 

See AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, for a detailed discussion on these 

operations. 

 In extreme cases, COIN operations may require all aspects of the 

counterinsurgency strategy and subsequent operations be planned and 

conducted by US and coalition forces and governments. COIN is defined as 

those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions 

taken by a government to defeat insurgency. This is largely the result of military 

intervention in failed states where either no viable government is in power or the 

existing government no longer has the capacity to govern or has been removed 

from power. Lack of governance or failing states often create an environment 

where terrorists and insurgents are able to establish sanctuaries in these 

ungoverned areas allowing recruitment and training to progress relatively 

unabated. An interagency approach using diplomatic, informational, military, and 

economic (DIME) means is essential to promote stability and security in these 

areas. These extreme cases require great patience and a high level of effort. 

 Large applications of US military force in COIN operations should be 

limited when possible and forces should perform such roles as restoring order or 

seizing the initiative. COIN operations present a difficult challenge in establishing 

a legitimate government instead of supporting or legitimizing an existing 

government. This subtle difference often has significant implications. In order to 

maintain the legitimacy of the new PN government, the primary responsibility for 

maintaining order must shift to the PN as rapidly as practical. This is particularly 

important as the long term presence of a large foreign force often exacerbates 

the situation by implying the PN government either remains incapable of this 

responsibility or is seen as an extension of the foreign force. The principal 

function of external forces will be to assist the PN by buying it time to develop 

autonomous ability to provide security and stability. Ultimately, the PN must 

defeat the insurgency by either attritting all the insurgents, gaining their support 

or acquiescence by reconciling the differences that spawned the insurgency, or 

discrediting the insurgent ideology by offering the population better alternatives. 

 As with the relationship between IW and traditional warfare, these 

activities are not mutually exclusive. US forces may find themselves conducting 

shaping and deterring, support to COIN, and COIN operations simultaneously. 

Airmen may also be engaged in operations supporting an insurgency in another 

area. Thus, the model not only depicts potential changes in the level of effort 

required, it also generalizes the operational environment forces are entering. In 

IW, it is typically most advantageous to shape and deter insurgencies and 
 8 

terrorist groups before they mature to the point where they pose an increased 

threat or require the large introduction of US forces. 

IW “TRUTHS” FOR AIRMEN 

 Across the range of IW scenarios there is a set of overarching concepts 

that provide the foundation for planning and employing Air Force capabilities. 

These “truths” do not apply to all conceivable situations; however, they do 

represent broad concepts that Airmen should consider. These overarching 

concepts either reflect a best practice in evolving IW concepts or base 

themselves on significant lessons learned from operations that failed to meet 

expectations. 

 The Air Force must be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and 

traditional warfare operations. The nature of a single conflict can easily 

shift between types of warfare. Failure to understand or anticipate these 

shifts often leads to fighting the wrong type of war, or focusing on the wrong 

effects for a given conflict. IW and traditional warfare are not mutually 

exclusive and both are often present in the same conflict. Finding a critical 

balance in capabilities is essential to overall success in both conflicts. 

 IW is a different form of warfare and not a lesser form of conflict within 

traditional warfare. The struggle for legitimacy and influence over a 

relevant population is the primary focus of operations, not the coercion 

of key political leaders or defeat of their military capability. In conducting 

operations, adversaries commonly use tactics to provide asymmetric 

advantages that erode the US population’s support for the conflict. These 

tactics often diminish the effectiveness of traditional military modes of attack. 

Therefore, while many IW tactical-level airpower applications may not be 

distinguishable from traditional operations, the desired effects at the 

operational and strategic levels may require a different mindset in order to 

better plan, understand, and coordinate Air Force capabilities. 

 IW is intelligence-intensive. Providing actionable intelligence is challenging. 

The ability to hide among the population, the tactics employed, and the 

distributed nature of insurgent organizations make finding, identifying, and 

engaging targets difficult. Intelligence efforts may focus on non-traditional 

areas such as cultural, social, political, and economic issues rather than 

military capabilities and key leaders. Fusing information obtained from 

multiple sources, methods, and levels is required to provide timely, accurate, 

and relevant intelligence to all levels. 

 Unity of effort across all instruments of power is essential to overall 

strategic success. Success in IW depends on a high degree of integration 

of the military with other elements of national power within a national security 

strategy. Organizationally, the instruments of national power—DIME—should 

operate in close cooperation among joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 
 9 

In situations where IW operations are distributed among multiple 

distinct environments, a single, theater-level commander of Air Force 

forces/joint force air component commander (COMAFFOR/JFACC) 

commanding airpower may not always provide the adequate degree of 

situational awareness and flexibility in rapidly evolving operations. In 

some cases, the COMAFFOR/JFACC may delegate some aspects of 

planning and decision-making to subordinate Airmen positioned at lower 

levels within the theater air control system (TACS). Increasing the role 

and authority of subordinate Airmen may provide more innovative and 

effective uses of Air Force capabilities. 

In other situations, the JFC may establish a subordinate JTF for a 

given operation involving the attachment of certain Air Force assets. 

Operational control (OPCON) of these forces should be delegated by the 

JTF commander to the attached COMAFFOR. While this C2 arrangement 

may enhance flexibility and responsiveness, the theater-level COMAFFOR 

should consider the theater-wide impact of attaching Air Force forces to a 

given JTF. 

Ultimately, as the US military becomes involved in more IW 

operations, critical mission analysis should be used in order to determine 

the appropriate C2 arrangements to provide the most effective and 

efficient use of Air Force capabilities. 

and multinational (JIIM) organizations. In some circumstances, Airmen 

should be prepared to assume non-traditional roles until other JIIM 

organizations are able to assume these roles. Providing security, basic 

services, and other forms of development needs to be coordinated and 

integrated. 

 Integrated C2 structures enable flexibility at all levels and are vital to 

successful counterinsurgency operations. The complex operating 

environment of IW requires rapid, adaptive application of capabilities at the 

operational and tactical levels. Conducting multiple, separate operations 

against different IW adversaries in a single theater may require that the 

combatant commander (CCDR) establish multiple joint task forces (JTFs). It 

must be emphasized that key assets, especially intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR), special operations forces (SOF), and all other low 

density/high demand (LD/HD) systems, are scarce resources and their use 

must be prioritized to those efforts that most directly affect the achievement of 

the CCDR’s or JFC’s strategic objectives. This prioritization decision is best 

accomplished through centralized control and decentralized execution. 

 Effective working relationships between people and organizations are 

key to success in IW. Coordinated effort across the spectrum of operations 

is vital and success often hinges on effective interpersonal relationships. IW 

operations often use small teams of integrated airpower functional experts 
 10 

working in concert with PN forces, as well as acting as liaisons to the PN, to 

integrate and bring together the full range of Air Force capabilities. 

 Operational effectiveness can be very difficult to measure; thus, 

feedback through a strong operations assessment and lessons learned 

process is essential to strategic success. Complex localized conditions 

and issues require an adaptive strategy and assessment process. Measuring 

effectiveness of lethal and non-lethal operations is challenging. Determining 

which operations are effective and modifying those that are not are critical to 

adjusting strategy. 

 The adversary may be highly complex and adaptive. The adversary often 

adopts a decentralized, broadly networked organization that operates semiindependently, taking advantage of local issues and conflicts that can be 

radically different in adjacent locales. Additionally, adversaries are adept at 

operating within the seams of military and political boundaries. To counter 

these tactics, military operations must be timely, precise, and coordinated. 

This often necessitates that military planning and intelligence processes be 

conducted and aggregated at a much lower level than in traditional warfare, 

but still requires operational level guidance from the JFC. Ultimately, the 

management of scarce resources to generate the most appropriate effects 

against a highly adaptive adversary remains critical to overall success. 

COIN “Truths” for Airmen 

 Legitimacy and influence are the main objectives. Whether conducting 

COIN, support for COIN, or shaping and deterring operations, the legitimacy 

of the PN government is critical. Legitimacy ultimately rests with influencing 

the perception of the relevant population and often is a function of the 

government’s ability to maintain security while addressing valid grievances of 

that population. In most conflicts, the center of gravity is the population and 

establishing or maintaining the legitimacy of their government is often the 

effect desired. While the government must maintain legitimacy, insurgents 

can diminish the popular support of the government by addressing the 

population’s grievances, real or perceived, or by eroding the government’s 

ability to maintain security. Recognition of tools at the insurgents’ disposal, 

like coercion and terrorism, is important due to their use as a way to erode 

popular support for the legitimate government. 

 The Air Force provides critical capabilities that enable joint force 

operations in COIN. The COMAFFOR enables the JFC to achieve key 

objectives. Often, the effects desired in COIN will directly support ground 

operations (military and civilian) requiring proper integration and coordination. 

In other situations, Air Force capabilities may be used to achieve effects 

interdependently. Airmen should identify new and innovative ways to use 

those capabilities and advocate them to the JFC. 
 11 

 Military actions are a necessary part of any COIN strategy; military 

actions that affect the adversary’s will or capability must be integrated 

with the JFC’s objective to influence the populace. In order to achieve 

the JFC’s strategic and operational objectives, traditional approaches to 

warfare must often be reversed, first weighing the impact on the relevant 

population and then determining the impact of operations on an adversary’s 

will and capability. There may be times when a conscious decision not to 

respond to enemy provocation may be more effective toward achieving 

strategic goals. In COIN, strategic success is defined by successfully 

discrediting the hostile ideology rather than by achieving military tactical 

victories. 

 A key adversary strength is the ability to hide within the populace—

countering many key advantages of traditional military power. 

Interpersonal relationships built through sustained interaction with the 

populace and partner operations with indigenous forces are critical to 

understanding the nature of the conflict and ultimate victory in the IW fight. 

Developing these relationships can effectively strip the insurgency of its most 

valuable asset—the support of the population. The inability to distinguish 

insurgents from the general population allows adversaries the freedom to 

organize and attack while creating a dilemma for counterinsurgency forces 

trying to identify insurgents. Cooperation of the general population provides 

valuable intelligence on the whereabouts of insurgents. This intelligence 

enables counterinsurgency forces to identify insurgents, making them easier 

to identify and target. 

 COIN is a protracted affair. While traditional war has tended to become 

shorter in duration due to technology and lethality, COIN has remained 

protracted in nature. Insurgencies can last for years, even decades. 

Insurgents and terrorists often use time as a primary weapon in order to 

develop capabilities and build popular support. Protracting the conflict gives 

insurgents greater latitude in determining where and when operations will 

take place. They also use time as a weapon to undermine support for a 

government (either the established government they are trying to overthrow 

or popular support for an intervening government). Every day an insurgent or 

terrorist organization exists threatens the stability of the status quo. Time is 

typically on the side of the insurgents because they can often achieve their 

goal simply by surviving and exhausting government efforts, resources, and 

national/coalition political will. Time is also required to establish and develop 

a PN’s capacity to conduct COIN. 

INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM 

 The purpose of an insurgency is to overthrow and replace an established 

government or societal structure, or to compel a change in behavior or policy by 

the government or societal structure. Terrorism is a tactic which may be used to 

achieve an insurgency’s objectives. 
 12 

 An insurgency may extend beyond the borders of a single threatened 

state. Non-state actors such as transnational terrorist and criminal organizations 

often represent a security threat beyond areas they inhabit. Some pose a direct 

concern for the United States and its partners. Non-state actors often team with 

insurgents to profit from a conflict. 

 Insurgencies can expand to include local, regional, and global entities. 

This requires the US to employ forces not only to help defeat an insurgency in a 

single country, but also to defeat small extremist cells operating in other 

countries or ungoverned areas. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) and the ability to affect international commerce give small, non-state 

organizations potentially disproportionate capabilities. As such, 

counterinsurgency strategies should be tailored to the threat and environment, 

precipitating a more direct and drastic approach. The way insurgencies are 

inspired, organized, and perpetuated should be of principal interest to Airmen. 

For more detailed information on insurgencies, see Appendix A. 

COUNTERING INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM 

 Countering insurgencies is largely dependent on the capabilities of the PN 

government, its perceived legitimacy, indications of dissatisfaction or discontent 

in a portion of the population, and evidence of an active or forming insurgency or 

terrorist organization. While the maturity of an insurgency or terrorist 

organization is often difficult to ascertain in its early phases, other characteristics 

may indicate environments ripe for organizations to foster support. 

 Often, by the time a government becomes aware that a significant 

insurgency exists, insurgents hold the strategic initiative and generally are the 

first to conduct violent actions. Normally, as the government prepares to 

respond, the insurgency matures. If the government is incapable of responding 

or if involvement by essential coalition forces is delayed, the level of violence and 

disorder will tend to intensify. US forces supporting a PN’s COIN operations will 

most likely have significant disadvantages. These include: 

 Insurgents will likely have better knowledge of the physical, cultural, religious, 

and social environment, as well as the political landscape 

 Non-indigenous forces often “stand out” and present lucrative targets 

 Non-indigenous forces often do not understand the language and lack widearea situational awareness in a high threat environment. Additionally, air 

forces may lack critical “ground truth” to find targets and avoid collateral 

damage or unintended consequences. 

 Security concerns often force US and coalition forces to mass, preventing 

smaller, less intrusive exposure to the civilian population. 
 13 

 The level of violence and the state of a government’s infrastructure 

(political, economic, informational, and military) will determine the type of JIIM 

military force required. An effective counterinsurgency campaign will need to: 

 Take the strategic initiative as soon as possible. An integrated campaign of 

information and action must be perceived as shaping and controlling the 

course of events toward achieving the campaign objectives. 

 Provide security for the population. 

 Address root causes of the insurgency and provide alternatives to valid 

grievances. 

 Target or render ineffective insurgent leaders and active supporters. 

 Gain a population’s support and consent to the government’s rule. 
 14 

Downplayed, taken for granted, or simply ignored, air power is 

usually the last thing that most military professionals think of when the 

topic of counterinsurgency is raised. 

―Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era,

RAND Corporation Report, 2006 

CHAPTER TWO 

AIR FORCE APPLICATIONS IN IW 

 The crosscutting characteristics of IW may shape how the Air Force 

should organize, train, and equip to provide ready and relevant forces to JFCs. 

 IW is about influencing the relevant population. Understanding the social 

dynamics that influence local politics, networks, and religious and cultural views 

is critical. Success depends on building relationships and partnerships, often at 

a local level. In most cases, military success against insurgents and terrorists 

sets the conditions for other aspects of the DIME to produce the desired strategic 

effects. For the insurgent or terrorist, military victory may often be irrelevant. 

The Air Force provides valuable and unique capabilities in IW. In 

many cases, these capabilities provide flexible and persistent options for 

dealing with the IW challenges by providing a less intrusive force that can 

respond quickly and improve commanders’ overall situational awareness. 

In certain situations, Air Force capabilities provide non-lethal alternatives that 

produce desired effects versus lethal applications and their subsequent effects. 

THE VALUE OF AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES IN IW 

 The speed, range, flexibility, versatility, and unique persistence of air, 

space, and cyberspace capabilities allow operations over vast denied areas and 

provide a critical portfolio of options for dealing with the challenges across the 

spectrum of IW. These tenets and characteristics require Airmen to possess a 

unique operational-level perspective when conducting operations. 

 The Air Force provides a wide range of effects from minimal, discrete, and 

precise effects to overwhelming power as required. Due to the dynamic nature of 

IW, any of these effects may be required at any time. The ability of the Air Force 

to quickly provide these effects allows JFCs to adapt to changes in the 

environment and respond appropriately. The Air Force provides a critical joint 

capability which offers an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries. Properly 

integrating all the functions of the Air Force enables flexibility in the development 

of strategy, operational plans, and employment. 
 15 

 Air Force capabilities can be employed to counter insurgencies and 

terrorists, as well as support insurgencies against occupying powers. Support to 

insurgencies will often involve extensive use of clandestine and covert 

instruments and methods, while the Air Force’s involvement in COIN may often 

be overt. The following ideas and concepts apply to all operations in IW. 

Minimal Intrusiveness 

 Air Force capabilities can deliver a variety of effects from great distance 

without increasing force presence in a region or country. The ability to mobilize, 

deploy, employ, and redeploy US forces and capabilities allows airpower to 

deliver timely effects while minimizing our footprint and not highlighting US 

involvement when required. These effects can be lethal or non-lethal. In 

addition, these effects can be sustained for a long period with less risk to military 

forces. 

 Air Force forces often present a smaller military footprint when deployed 

and may reduce the total number of forces visible to local populations, thereby 

reducing potential resentment. This is especially true when Air Force forces are 

based outside the supported government’s borders or when employing small 

aviation detachments that provide the supported government valuable air, space, 

and cyber capabilities. 

 The introduction of a large foreign force may exacerbate the local situation 

while providing adversaries a new target set for attacks and propaganda. The 

minimal footprint of Air Force forces allows the application of military force with 

relatively little exposure to adversaries and populations. In some situations, the 

visible presence of coalition forces may bolster security and reassure the 

population, thus bolstering PN legitimacy; in other cases, such a visible presence 

may be detrimental. By providing an ability to collect information, move and 

sustain personnel, and simultaneously engage multiple targets, Air Force 

capabilities allow commanders the flexibility to shift forces quickly to better exploit 

fleeting opportunities. 

Rapid Response 

 Air Force capabilities provide commanders an asymmetric advantage by 

providing desired effects over great distances. Control of air and space allows 

forces to reposition by air more quickly and at less risk than by ground transport. 

Airpower’s responsiveness can be used to transport ground forces, provide 

surveillance on emerging “hot spots,” and simultaneously provide precise 

firepower when required. This serves as an enormous force multiplier by moving 

either air assets or other forces to the areas of greatest need. This presents a 

constant, credible, and unpredictable threat of detection and response that can 

significantly complicate the enemy’s planning and execution. Air- and space-
 16 

MQ Predator with Hellfire Missile 

borne sensors can be rapidly retasked to focus on emerging targets and key 

terrain. Cyberspace capabilities can often be employed in seconds. 

Rapid Mobility 

 Because IW may not be limited by borders, the Air Force provides rapid 

mobility not only by airlifting forces in a timely manner to the immediate area of 

concentration, but also by resupplying those forces already in place. Air refueling 

extends the distance of long-range strike missions and allows the persistence for 

close air support and ISR. 

 Rapid repositioning of small teams through the air allows for a greater 

chance of tactical surprise across great distances and difficult terrain. Air 

mobility permits leaner ground-based operations, improving force protection 

during transport. Aeromedical evacuation allows for the rapid transport of injured 

personnel and civilians, not only shrinking the critical time between injury and 

focused medical care, but also reducing the footprint of medical facilities within 

the immediate area of operations (AO). Mobility decreases the insurgent’s 

inherent tactical and strategic initiative by allowing timely government response 

and multiplying the government’s reach for conducting security operations. 

Rapid Engagement 

 In addition, speed and range reduce the find-fix-track-target-engageassess (F2T2EA) “kill chain” when engaging time-sensitive and high-value 

targets. Applying lethal and non-lethal options at certain times may dramatically 

influence the outcome of operations on the ground. 

 The dynamic nature of IW 

requires an adaptable C2 structure 

to maintain situational awareness 

and initiative permitting timely action 

against adversary forces, especially 

emerging terrorist targets. Timely 

decisions and situational 

responsiveness are keys to 

compressing the “kill chain,” 

exploiting fleeting opportunities, and 

providing operational adjustments to 

negate adversary resourcefulness. 

Improved Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Situational 

Awareness 

 The nature of IW presents significant challenges to Airmen as they seek to 

understand the operating environment. IW threats span the globe and require a 

patient and persistent approach in order to gather actionable intelligence. The 
 17 

Real-time situational awareness

level of situational awareness needed to execute effective operations in IW often 

takes time to acquire. Emerging threats may appear in areas where the US has 

not invested significantly in either resources or cultural expertise. In order to 

increase overall situational awareness, information should be fused from multiple 

sources and disseminated to appropriate levels. Often local security forces and 

the affected population are the best source of information. The air and space 

operations center (AOC) often provides a robust capability that can link and 

disseminate this information. 

 The Air Force provides the ability to 

monitor, map, and survey large areas quickly 

and cover focused areas for long durations. By 

detecting and tracking adversary movement, 

Air Force capabilities (specifically ISR) can 

identify an adversary’s safe havens, assembly 

points, and potential avenues of attack, as well 

as immediate threats to coalition forces. The 

balanced use of air, space, and cyber 

capabilities provides commanders with 

increased situational awareness at all levels. 

 Timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence should be gathered and 

analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force. 

Because of the dispersed nature of COIN operations, counterinsurgents’ own 

actions are a key generator of intelligence. A cycle develops where operations 

produce intelligence that drives subsequent operations. Reporting by units, 

members of the country team, and associated civilian agencies often cues 

specialized intelligence assets. Fusing these inputs together often provides a 

more comprehensive operating picture. These factors, along with the need to 

generate a favorable tempo (rate of military operations) require the production 

and dissemination of intelligence at the lowest practical level. 

 Air Force surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities provide 

commanders additional situational awareness of events and the physical 

disposition of insurgent forces. Integration of human intelligence (HUMINT) 

(often derived from SOF and counterintelligence [CI] operations), and other forms 

of intelligence, through the all source fusion process, often provides a 

commander a more complete picture of the environment. See Chapter 3 for a 

more detailed discussion on Air Force intelligence capabilities. 

 Space capabilities add a unique dimension to the joint force's ability to 

posture quickly. Space capabilities enhance IW operations through satellite 

communication (SATCOM); surveillance and reconnaissance; accurate 

positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); and blue force tracking (BFT). 

Surveillance and reconnaissance products may aid in mission planning, and onorbit assets can provide predetermined effects in response to operational 
 18 

Integrating Space-based 

Capabilities

The capabilities and effects we 

provide from and through 

space are an enormous 

advantage to our American 

and coalition forces. When 

you integrate space into our 

military operations on the 

ground, in the air or on the 

sea, you significantly increase 

combat effectiveness while 

decreasing the number of 

American and coalition troops 

you put in harm’s way. Thanks 

to space, our forces are able to 

move faster and fight smarter 

and more precisely. 

―General Lance W. Lord, 

Commander, Air Force 

Space Command, 2002-2006 

priorities and events. In unique cases, 

offensive counterspace operations may 

deny the adversary access to 

communications and other space 

capabilities critical to their IO. 

 These capabilities enable highly 

accurate, adverse weather weapon 

system employment and rapid operational 

tempo information superiority. For 

example, the integration of space-based 

PNT capabilities with airborne platforms 

has expanded military precision-strike 

capabilities. Also, where communication 

lines cannot be laid, or when terrain and 

other line-of-sight radio frequency 

limitations hamper terrestrial-based 

communications, space communications 

keep forward and rear echelons in 

contact. In denied areas of the world, 

intelligence derived from space 

capabilities often fills critical gaps. The 

ability to pinpoint the location of friendly 

forces in an unpredictable environment is 

also of importance. BFT reduces friendlyfire incidents and coordination time, and 

provides rapid information critical in personal recovery missions. For additional 

information on space capabilities and considerations, see AFDD 2-2, Space 

Operations. 

IW ACTIVITIES 

Support to Insurgencies 

Various US government organizations are postured to recruit, organize, 

train, and advise indigenous guerrilla or partisan forces. These operations 

usually consist of supplying equipment, training, and advisory assistance to nonstate actors. They may also involve US direct-action operations supporting 

specific campaign goals. 

 The UW role includes such actions as insertion, extraction, and resupply 

of ground contact teams, direct-action forces, surface-force advisors/trainers, and 

guerrilla/partisan forces. Air Force capabilities may also be employed to support 

escape and evasion networks and intelligence networks; provide aerial delivery 

and resupply to US and indigenous/surrogate forces; carry out reconnaissance 

and surveillance; provide C2 platforms; and furnish aerial cover and fire support 

for specific contingencies. Information and influence operations may also be 
 19 

employed as force multipliers for military actions, or for tactical cover and 

deception activities. 

 

 UW falls mainly within the special operations area of expertise; the skills 

needed are very sophisticated and extensive. US Army Special Forces are the 

principal DOD resource for conducting UW when the mission requires interaction 

with friendly ground counterpart forces. While a variety of Air Force resources 

can be brought into play in UW, Air Force SOF offer capabilities and resources 

that are ideally suited or have distinct application in the UW realm. 

 SOF may conduct unconventional assisted recovery (UAR), a subset of 

non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR). UAR operations are conducted to 

seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected 

personnel as they move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas 

under friendly control. Air Force elements working with foreign air forces are 

uniquely capable of supporting UAR plans and operations. 

 Given certain risk factors and political considerations, the Air Force may 

help non-US aviation assets conduct special air operations supporting 

indigenous/surrogate surface forces. In some UW operations, the use of US 

military aircraft may be inappropriate, tactically or politically. In those cases, 

training, advising, and assisting the aviation forces of insurgent groups, 

resistance organizations, or third-country nationals may be the only viable option. 

COIN and Support to COIN 

 US national interests will likely be affected by destabilization in 

strategically important areas, especially those that affect trade routes, resources, 

and chokepoints. Additionally, those areas that may not be strategically 

important in terms of geography or resources can still directly affect national 

interests by providing sanctuary to radical organizations that oppose the US and 

its policies. The unique characteristics of the Air Force make its incorporation 

and integration into the CCDR’s or JFC’s plan essential. 

 Insurgencies typically require time and space to foment and to develop 

their support structure. While it is often difficult to determine the level to which an 

insurgency has matured, it is invariably beneficial to counter this threat as early 

as possible. In any phase of operation, the Air Force can be employed with 

varying degrees of intensity and visibility.

 While the capabilities the Air Force brings to bear in any conflict will 

usually exceed the PN’s capability, Airmen should ensure their employment 

enhances the US’ and PN’s long-term strategy and, most importantly, that the PN 

does not become reliant on Air Force capabilities. Over-reliance on US 

capabilities can be detrimental to the legitimacy of the PN and might require the 

US to maintain a large or extended air presence. Therefore, BPC which 

increases the PN’s air force capability and reduces reliance on US capability is 
 20 

the desired long-term strategy. BPC increases legitimacy, but is also a 

precautionary and preventative activity. Even a marginal PN airpower capability 

allows COIN forces to exploit its unique characteristics. 

 The maturity of an insurgency and the PN’s capabilities will significantly 

affect the level of effort required by US and coalition forces. The Air Force will be 

called upon to deliver multiple effects. These effects will generally affect the 

following areas of a PN’s counterinsurgency strategy. 

Provide Security 

 Security provides the foundation for all subsequent counterinsurgency 

operations. Security allows non-military agencies to conduct operations to 

further gain support from the general population. Additionally, the local people’s 

willingness to risk their lives by helping the security forces may be contingent on 

the security forces’ ability to protect the people. Therefore, providing security 

allows the PN to address underlying grievances but also exploit valuable 

intelligence from the populace, moving them away from supporting the 

insurgency. Protracted COIN operations are hard to sustain. Maintaining 

security in an unstable environment is resource-intensive. In contrast, a small 

number of highly motivated insurgents with simple weapons, good operations 

security, and limited mobility can undermine security over a large area. Thus, 

successful COIN operations often require a large number of security forces in 

order to protect the population. The effort requires a firm political will and 

substantial patience by both US and PN governments. 

 Airpower can help alter this equation. A sizeable ground force engaged 

in protracted COIN operations can inflame the populace against the COIN forces 

and can wear down the political will of the US government and the local 

populace. Air Force capabilities bring many advantages, including an “economy 

of force” that enables the US to have a smaller ground force, which reduces the 

problems associated with a large “footprint” on the ground. These capabilities 

can help provide presence and security for critical areas, lines of communication, 

infrastructure, and borders. 

 Applied in the early stages of an insurgency, Air Force operations can help 

shape the situation on the ground. There may still be scenarios in which the 

general conditions on the ground have deteriorated to the point where an 

increased ground presence (foreign or indigenous) is required. During these 

situations, finding the right balance between directly supporting ground forces 

and employing Air Force capabilities in other operational areas may be critical to 

achieving the desired end state. 

 The Air Force’s unique characteristics allow US and PN forces to exploit 

key terrain and counter some of the adversary’s advantages. Control and 

exploitation of this key terrain allow friendly forces to see around obstacles, track 
 21 

 Combat Controller 

While on patrol providing security for a bridge opening ceremony, 

a small SOF team supporting a 20-man Afghan National Army force 

came under heavy and accurate fire. At this time, the joint terminal attack 

controller attached to the team quickly requested air assets to his 

position. Employing A-10, B-1B, U-2, and Predator aircraft, the team was 

able to move from contact. Additionally, the controller was able to 

request, coordinate and control the medical evacuation of two team 

members and an Afghan soldier wounded during the engagement. The 

precise and effective employment of air capabilities provided the smaller 

coalition force with the firepower advantage to successfully finish the 

patrol into previously denied areas. The Afghan National Army soldiers 

gained a tremendous amount of confidence and pride in the success of 

the mission. This patrol, as well as subsequent patrols, opened new 

villages up to communication and free commerce. 

and maneuver over large distances more rapidly, and respond quickly with force 

when required. When partnered effectively with a ground force, airpower can 

negate many of the enemy’s advantages and reduce vulnerabilities to the joint 

force. 

 In a much broader context, the use of the full range of Air Force 

capabilities can significantly reduce the ability of our adversaries to overwhelm 

ground forces. Acting as a force multiplier, these capabilities allow a smaller 

force to have more firepower for protection, more maneuverability, and broader 

situational awareness. The use of airpower may also reduce the total number of 

forces deployed forward and enable forces to concentrate their military capability 

quickly with minimal risk. The combination of these two factors allows ground 

forces to focus their efforts where and when needed by relying on airpower to 

monitor areas where fewer ground forces are available. 

Help Alleviate Root Causes 

 Failure to address underlying grievances that are perceived as valid by the 

general population often leads to a strategic defeat for COIN forces. The PN 

government may be able, for a limited time, to provide the security necessary to 

limit insurgent operations; however, unless valid grievances are addressed, 

draconian rules (which typically amplify these grievances) will have to be 

enforced to maintain law and order in the long run. Insurgents often disrupt basic 

government services and subsequently use the situation to assist the local 

populace and thereby gain support. Only by addressing valid grievances can the 

government hope to sway the populace to support the government as it will be 

seen as legitimate and fair. 
 22 

 In addition to performing combat operations that directly counter 

insurgents and provide security, the Air Force can also conduct activities that 

enhance the legitimacy of the PN government. Transporting PN government 

officials with humanitarian supplies to outlying regions underscores the 

willingness of the PN government to provide essential services to the population. 

In doing so, Airmen should remember that it is generally better for the PN to lead 

such activities, with US forces playing a supporting role. This remains true as 

long as the PN is capable of performing the activity even if not as effectively as 

US forces. 

 Successfully using Information operations is largely contingent upon 

addressing valid grievances and may play a large role in helping the PN gain 

legitimacy. The Air Force enables psychological operations (PSYOP) and 

strategic communication (SC) through the dissemination of messages and leaflet 

drops allowing the PN to relay its message to the populace and insurgents. See 

Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion on IO capabilities. 

Limit an Adversary’s Conventional Options and Flexibility 

 Airpower constrains an adversary’s conventional options at all levels of 

war. It can monitor large areas of open terrain, disrupt an adversary’s freedom of 

movement, and reduce his ability to mass forces for training or employment 

without detection. Historically, airpower has been most effective against targets 

in open terrain; however, current capabilities provide a wide array of options for 

achieving effects in urban and complex terrain. Therefore, airpower may prevent 

forces from massing and perhaps prevent the conflict spreading to conventional 

options. This capability allows friendly forces to operate in small units or be 

stationed in isolated areas without risk of being overwhelmed by a large 

insurgent force. In short, Air Force capabilities make it difficult for insurgents to 

shift to a conventional phase. The goal is to suppress the insurgents to a level 

that the supported PN’s security forces can respond to. Once the insurgents 

have been reduced, PN forces should be visibly in the lead for all kinetic 

operations. 

Disrupt Enemy Movement 

 Air Force capabilities can be leveraged to locate, fix, and target 

insurgents and terrorists. They can also help reduce the flow of personnel and 

material support to insurgents and terrorists from outside the affected state (e.g., 

help to police the borders, etc.). Leveraging their theater perspective, Airmen 

can monitor ground operations for emerging threats in one region, quickly bring 

firepower to bear in another, and provide surveillance of critical border areas in 

yet another.

 These capabilities prevent the enemy from sustaining and operating in 

massed formations often requiring the enemy to disperse. However, as the 
 23 

Airpower in Vietnam

The capability of airpower to deter the threat of conventional attack 

in IW was demonstrated by the example of American airpower in Vietnam. 

In the midst of “Vietnamization” in early 1972, indications of an imminent 

North Vietnamese conventional invasion of South Vietnam prompted a 

massive redeployment of US air assets under Operations COMMANDO 

FLASH and BULLET SHOT 1. In response to North Vietnamese 

conventional attack across the demilitarized zone on 29 March, B-52s 

attacked North Vietnamese base camps and troop concentrations and F-4s 

used laser-guided bombs to drop bridges in advance of the tanks, slowing 

the advance of the invasion. US airpower continued to forestall the 

conventional takeover of South Vietnam until May 1973. 

Non-lethal Targeting

Most are familiar with the role of 

airpower in kinetic strikes against 

insurgent leaders, as demonstrated by the takedown of Abu 

Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq. 

However, insurgent leaders can be 

targeted through non-kinetic 

means as well (e.g., PSYOP), and 

often with greater effectiveness 

when the leaders are captured, 

exploited for intelligence, or turned 

to support the government. 

enemy disperses, interdiction of the limited supplies needed to sustain these 

small groups often becomes more difficult. 

 The Air Force has unique capabilities to deliver non-kinetic effects against 

insurgent leaders and sanctuaries throughout the operating environment, even 

when ground forces are unavailable for integrated joint operations. These 

capabilities can be used to detect and monitor insurgent activity, deliver precise 

or wide area messaging, and conduct disruption or assurance operations through 

shows of presence and shows of force. Combining various elements of air and 

ground maneuver can keep the enemy leadership off balance and force 

insurgents to concentrate more on their own security than attacking the 

government or populace. 

Target Insurgent Leaders and Active Supporters 

 Air Force capabilities also play 

an important role in targeting an 

insurgency’s leadership and active 

supporters. Despite addressing valid 

grievances that may reduce the 

insurgents’ popular support, the 

leadership and active participants may 

persist in their efforts. Additionally, the 

anonymity of these two groups may 

allow them to operate even without 

tacit support from the population, or 

even in the face of public opposition if 

their activities and identities are not 

detected. Since these groups often 

contain the most committed and 

potentially radical members, military 
 24 

Operation Enduring Freedom

 On 26 March 2006, an Air Force combat controller attached to a US 

Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha team in Afghanistan 

orchestrated one of numerous examples of a successful joint air-ground 

operation in support of the Afghan National Army. Shortly into their 

mission, the team made contact with a large enemy force—and rapidly 

assessed that they were surrounded on three sides by up to one hundred 

anti-coalition militants. While taking heavy and accurate enemy fire, the 

combat controller made radio contact with numerous aircraft and quickly 

talked them onto enemy positions and directed precise air strikes that 

enabled the team to break contact. Over the next six hours, the combat 

controller requested, integrated, and controlled A-10, B-52, Predator, AH64, and CH-47 aircraft in support of the Afghan National Army and special 

operations mission. The professionalism and expertise of an embedded 

Airman and the precision and lethality of airpower, turned a potentially 

devastating blow to a maturing Afghan National Army unit into both a 

tactical and strategic success. 

operations may have to focus directly on their capability. Air, space, and 

cyberspace capabilities, ranging from lethal to non-lethal, can target these 

groups directly and indirectly. 

 The Air Force’s ability to conduct time sensitive targeting (TST) provides a 

unique capability when targeting leadership and active participants. The ability of 

the AOC to gather, combine, and disseminate intelligence to operating forces in a 

timely manner provides the joint force with a quick-reaction capability critical in 

engaging leadership and active supporters. 

Air and Ground Coordination 

 Working as a joint team, air and ground forces produce capabilities able to 

achieve effects far beyond their individual strengths. Often the most effective 

way to achieve the needed close coordination between air and ground forces is 

through trained battlefield Airmen embedded with tactical ground teams. This 

teaming requires a long-term commitment of all assets to establish the trust and 

understanding both inside the team and between the team and the local 

population. The situational awareness provided by long-term relationships with 

the indigenous populace takes away the ability of the enemy to blend into the 

population, enabling air forces to positively identify targets, and discriminate 

between suitable and unsuitable targets, a distinction often impossible from the 

air. The reach, speed, persistence, and lethality of airpower can then be 

employed for defensive and offensive actions, including the reach necessary to 

deny the adversary the ability to establish safe havens based on remote or 
 25 

A-10 

distant locations that are difficult to attack successfully with large groups of 

ground forces. 

 Air and ground coordination 

should start as early as possible in the 

joint planning process to ensure the 

operational requirements for Air Force 

capabilities can be balanced and 

prioritized across the theater. By 

being involved as early as possible, 

Air Force planners can deconflict 

other requirements in the theater, 

ensure the right mix and allocation of 

assets to provide the desired effects, 

optimize scheduling, and prepare 

collateral damage estimates for areas 

of preplanned or anticipated kinetic 

requirements in order to reduce the 

possibility of unintended harm to noncombatants or friendly forces. During 

execution, extensive use of joint fires observers (JFOs) can greatly extend the 

reach of joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), especially in cases where 

ground units operate in large numbers of small-size teams. This requires 

pushing real-time information down to the JTAC. Improving the linkage of 

information between the air and ground force at the tactical level may result in 

more effective joint operations. 

Shaping and Deterring 

 Shaping and deterring operations require an integrated effort across all 

instruments of power. The Air Force can anticipate being continuously engaged 

in these operations. Military operations may include BPC, humanitarian relief, 

IO, and ISR. These operations are critical in setting the stage for potential future 

operations and may prevent the emergence of an insurgent or terrorist group. 

Counterterrorism 

 Transnational terrorists with radical ideologies and tactics present a 

significant threat to the US. These groups are adept at using IW to further their 

cause. Countering these groups that are very adaptive and loosely organized 

requires close cooperation with US partners and allies. Often these groups’ 

objectives are extreme, thus their willingness to compromise is minimal. Military 

forces should be proactive in targeting these groups. Air Force capabilities 

provide effects quickly across great distances critical to countering terrorist 

threats. 

 Terrorist organizations often find safe havens in states that either support 

their cause or are unable or unwilling to conduct operations against their 
 26 

organizations. The threat of airpower can often be used to try and coerce the 

sponsor state using traditional means and methods. When coercion or 

deterrence fails, the airpower presents a significant capability to the JFC to use 

either for quick strikes or persistent operations. Air, space, and cyberspace 

capabilities can be used to monitor and gather information on otherwise 

inaccessible areas and often lead to actionable intelligence that can be used for 

future operations. 

 Countering terrorists in states where the PN is either unable or unwilling to 

target these groups also presents unique challenges. When the PN is incapable, 

US forces may be called upon to aid them in conducting operations. BPC and 

providing other critical capabilities are often necessary. The US must weigh the 

advantages of integrating operations with the PN, conducting them unilaterally, or 

supporting the PN’s efforts in countering the terrorists. The considerations 

involved are often similar to those when conducting support to COIN operations. 

 When PNs are unwilling to target these groups, understanding the 

reasons for their hesitancy may often reveal ways in which other means can be 

used to target these groups indirectly. Often PNs are reluctant to target such 

groups when there is a significant portion of the population that may be 

sympathetic to the insurgents’ cause. PN operations may alienate the population 

from the government and increase its vulnerability to potential adversaries. In 

such situations PN governments may need to address potential grievances with 

the population and undermine the legitimacy or ideology of the terrorist 

organization. Support from US forces may need to be covert in nature. IO, ISR, 

and other airpower capabilities may be employed without highlighting US 

involvement. 
 27 

Maximum advantage should be taken of friendly air capabilities 

since insurgents generally lack this source of military power. 

—Air Force Manual 1-1, 

14 August 1964 

CHAPTER THREE 

AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES IN IW 

The Air Force has significant air, space, and cyberspace capabilities that 

are well suited for IW situations. Many of these capabilities are already 

described in detail in AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, and its sub-publications. The main 

focus of this document is to describe how the Air Force re-orients these 

capabilities from a focus on traditional warfare to how they may be employed 

during IW. 

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY 

 Successful efforts to combat IW threats require international cooperation 

and commitment. BPC is the best strategy for achieving this. BPC is described 

as targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the 

DOD and its partners. BPC encompasses security assistance (SA), foreign 

military sales (FMS), and FID activities. In conducting BPC activities, the US 

works by, with, or through others: Enabling allied and PN capabilities, building 

their capacity, and developing collaborative mechanisms to share the decisions, 

risks, and responsibilities of today’s complex security challenges. The objective 

of BPC is to develop partners and improve collective capabilities and 

performance to prevent internal security risks from becoming transnational 

threats of US security interests. 

 Successful collaboration, requiring Airmen to have detailed knowledge of 

the local culture, society, language, and threat, may foster enduring relationships. 

If operations against a regional IW threat escalate, these relationships can 

provide considerable political weight for support ranging from overflight rights to 

basing. Overflight rights may allow the joint force more direct access to airspace 

that minimizes transit time, distance, and threat to assets. Basing rights may 

enable the joint force to base airpower assets closer to an IW threat than would 

otherwise be possible. 

 At the same time, the resources and tactical skills needed to locate, 

identify, and destroy irregular threats often do not exist or are limited in many 

developing countries. This is particularly true in the case of airpower. PN law 

and our own political, cultural, economic, and military considerations require that 
 28 

El Salvador

In El Salvador during the 

1980s, indigenous US-trained 

and equipped aviation forces 

gave the PN government 

unmatched mobility, ISR 

capability, and the ability to 

destroy drug-related cash 

crops that the insurgency 

relied upon for income. 

PNs take a great deal of responsibility for their own security and function as 

viable partners. 

 Working within a PN’s internal defense and development (IDAD) plan, Air 

Force special and general purpose forces provide a wide range of capabilities 

that can be employed in indirect support, direct support not including combat, 

and combat operations. Often the distinction between these operations is not 

clear; however, transition between each of these requires Presidential- or 

SecDef-level approval. Successful PN airpower development is a complex 

undertaking that requires close integration with Department of State country 

teams and other elements and agencies of the US government. The inherent 

flexibility and versatility of Air Force capabilities provide unique capabilities that 

can be applied in unilateral, multilateral, and joint IW operations. 

 Stable, long-term efforts to effectively conduct BPC require judicious 

application of SA law and close integration of Air Force security cooperation 

strategy and the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP) across many US 

agencies. As a subset of BPC, FID involves complex operations, often operating 

over long periods of time, and requires extensive integrated planning among 

many agencies of the US and foreign governments. It also requires involvement 

and integration of both general purpose forces and SOF. For more detailed 

discussion on FID activities, the importance of well-integrated and synchronized 

IDAD planning, and other important information, see AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign 

Internal Defense. 

 Additionally, FMS programs support BPC and other activities that may 

contribute to IW efforts. The FMS program is the government-to-government 

method for selling US defense equipment, services, and training. Responsible 

arms sales further national security and foreign policy objectives by 

strengthening bilateral defense relations, supporting coalition building, and 

enhancing interoperability between US 

forces and militaries of friends and allies. 

 BPC should be a critical part of the US 

strategy to defeat transnational terrorist 

activities. Using an indirect approach to 

leverage partner nation capabilities may 

potentially reduce terrorist activity down to 

intra-national criminal levels. BPC enables 

the airpower to ensure partner nation 

airpower capabilities support this effort to 

eliminate transnational terrorism. 

Assess, Train, Advise, and Assist 

In terms of increasing the PN’s capability, FID functions to provide 

improved capability and increased capacity for PN air forces. The best way to 
 29 

apply airpower in IW is often by, with, and through the PN’s air force, allowing 

other capabilities to be applied as required in support of PN operations. Direct 

application of US Air Force forces should be reserved for those instances where 

employment provides the only capability to produce the desired effects, for 

instance when PN efforts have been unsuccessful or lacking. 

 In conducting BPC activities, the Air Force and its coalition partners 

should first assess the capability of an affected PN in order to develop an allencompassing strategy involving all the elements of indigenous power. 

Assistance ranges from strategic airpower assessments that address the overall 

capability of a nation to apply and sustain airpower through tactical–level 

instruction based on US tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Using this 

information to identify gaps in the PN’s capabilities, the Air Force can determine 

the scope and level of effort required to help the PN meet its security objectives. 

 Airpower can promote a wide range of lethal and nonlethal solutions that 

fit within the technical, financial, and professional capacity of a PN in ways that 

allow PN forces to ultimately assume responsibility for air operations. In those 

instances where a PN has an operational air force, the Air Force can provide the 

necessary technical and professional skills to enhance operational capacity and 

effectiveness. In situations where an indigenous air force does not exist or is in 

decay, the Air Force, through US government channels and subject to fiscal law 

restraints, can help the PN obtain the materiel and financial support it needs to 

build, equip, train, and sustain a viable airpower capability. The Air Force should 

maintain the ability not only to conduct IW operations, but to assist and train 

partners, enabling them to resolve internal challenges at all stages of 

development. The key to BPC is not finding high or low-tech answers, but the 

right mix of technology, training, and support that provides a PN with affordable, 

sustainable, and capable airpower. 

 BPC requires personnel with the relevant organizational, logistical, and 

warfighting skills who are specifically trained and prepared with cultural and 

language skills to assist PNs in building airpower capabilities where required. 

Combat Aviation Advisory Mission 

 

Combat aviation advisors assess, train, advise, and assist foreign units in 

airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration in three interrelated 

mission areas of FID, UW, and coalition support. Air Force combat aviation 

advisors operate as an integral part of foreign units. Aviation advisors influence 

planning, sometimes to a great degree at very senior levels, and execute 

mutually supportive operations with or without a significant US military presence. 

Fundamentally, combat aviation advisors focus on accomplishing tactical and 

operational level objectives to improve the combat capacity of PN forces. 
 30 

BPC and Counterinsurgency 

 Airpower provides critical capabilities to a counterinsurgency which 

typically entails supporting civil law enforcement agencies, military surface 

forces, as well as government administrative mechanisms. The most commonly 

employed functions include air mobility, ISR, personnel recovery (PR), and C2. 

However, all airpower capabilities should be considered when developing 

strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Developing these objectives 

requires Airmen to have an understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine and the 

local social, political, legal, and economic conditions the insurgency exploits. 

 It is important to understand the concepts of direct and indirect support 

within IW. Many of the stand-off nonlethal capabilities of the Air Force can be 

applied across the spectrum of IW. Through comprehensive planning, 

coordination, integration, and authorization, these capabilities can accomplish 

things typically considered direct application of conventional airpower, while 

supporting both direct and indirect support categories of FID. 

 Commanders should carefully weigh all available options and be aware 

that the strategic level of IW is often best supported by directly assisting the PN 

to conduct operations, even if their capabilities are less than those normally 

accepted by US risk assessment standards. 

 Direct assistance activities represent the essence of working with, by, and 

through PN forces to assist them in realizing their security objectives. Such 

activities, including those that involve hostile conditions, represent an indirect 

approach to applying US airpower capabilities in a direct assistance role. For 

example, it is often better for a PN to use 12 sorties to transport supplies and 

troops in their aircraft with our assistance than use Air Force assets to do the 

same mission in two sorties. In all cases, the strategic initiative must remain with 

the PN. Broad analysis of PN capacities and capabilities conducted on a 

regional basis that is integrated with detailed country analysis is essential in the 

development of clear plans to achieve BPC objectives. 

INTELLIGENCE 

 While often an enabler of other operations, intelligence may constitute the 

primary function of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities in IW. Joint 

intelligence preparation of the operational environment, which builds 

understanding of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and 

informational (PMESII) systems, as well as the cultural factors in a conflict, 

enable friendly forces to target for specific effects within the operational 

environment. Intelligence products should provide the commander with the 

fullest possible understanding of all entities involved in the conflict. Near-real 

time ISR and precision location also help build commanders’ situational 

awareness even if they are not used directly in targeting. 
 31 

Accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence is critical for setting the 

conditions for success. ISR provides situational awareness by fusing traditional 

and nontraditional sources of information. Of primary importance is cultural 

intelligence which may require innovative collection and analysis methods. Thus, 

operations are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change 

relevant behaviors or reduce capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes. 

Analysis requires that data from all the intelligence disciplines be brought 

together to the right people on a timely basis. This has proven in the past to be a 

substantial challenge because of technical problems associated with sharing 

data and security requirements. This challenge needs to be overcome during IW 

given the likelihood of joint, coalition, or interagency organizational integration. 

All-source fusion helps overcome the inherent limitations of a single source to 

provide adequate information. However, IW environments may require more 

flexibility in the use of single-source intelligence given timeliness and 

inaccessibility. 

Analysis and Targeting 

 In the IW realm, intelligence analysis often looks more at social structures 

such as tribal, religious, and personal relationships within populations than at 

traditional information on military systems such as orders of battle. Analysts are 

faced with a problem they have not usually dealt with in the past: providing 

“traditional” targeting information on small groups and individuals. In many 

situations, determining appropriate targeting parameters requires close 

integration with SOF, CI, and other HUMINT sources, as well as with multisensor fused collection from ISR assets. Air and space ISR assets can pinpoint 

information such as transmission sources and locations, and this has led to an 

ability to conduct remote strikes without relying on forward air controllers. 

 Intelligence provides commanders with increased situational awareness of 

the entire operational environment and information that can help them to 

determine the best courses of action (COAs) for defeating insurgents. For 

example, security might be obtained temporarily in a key area with precision 

lethal strikes, but might be secured long-term by providing social or economic 

programs. Such analysis requires thorough fusion of intelligence of all types 

from all possible sources, especially during the prelude to operations. 

 Intelligence personnel should think differently and be proactive in their 

collection, analysis, and planning by breaking from the traditional warfare 

mindset when engaged in IW. Intelligence personnel should provide decision 

makers with accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence pertaining to local civilian 

attitudes, culture, demographics, infrastructure, conflict dynamics, economics, 

religion, and social and political aspects of the operating environment. This 

intelligence helps US forces gain insight to the local populace, while helping 

identify enemy networks, their motivations, objectives, leadership, intentions, and 

locations. 
 32 

MQ Predator

Analytical efforts should not be locked into set processes, but should 

encourage creative thinking to develop competing hypotheses in regards to IW 

problems. External expertise and open source material (such as a PN’s 

“classical” and popular literature) may provide invaluable insights and should be 

understood. This improves intelligence efforts against foreign denial and 

deception techniques and improves understanding of the situation. 

All Source Intelligence 

Intelligence personnel must fuse, analyze, validate, and distribute timely, 

relevant, and accurate information (not just data) from all sources. All source 

intelligence includes the traditional intelligence disciplines of open-source 

intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signal 

intelligence (MASINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), HUMINT, and CI. In 

addition, coordination with law enforcement, diplomatic, and medical agencies, 

along with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other international 

organizations should be sought. The entire joint force should integrate this 

information through standardized reporting formats, common data links and 

databases, and improved capability to conduct data mining to improve 

integration. In IW, intelligence dissemination should be focused for the primary 

customers at the lowest level. Understandable and usable ISR products should 

be disseminated to these forces in a timely manner. 

Collection 

 ISR operations can survey areas of interest with sufficient frequency to 

observe changes, deter enemy movement, validate HUMINT information, and 

enable other ground and maritime operations aimed at doing the same. ISR also 

has a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness to emerging IW requirements, 

to include intelligence collection, C2, indications and warning, and target 

acquisition. ISR provides specific advantages to theater commanders. The 

presence, real or perceived, of ISR over the adversary’s operational environment 

may have multiple influencing effects: Instilling fear, creating perception that he 

has no place to hide, or forcing him to use resources and time to improve his 

denial and deception techniques. 

This influencing effect may have a 

very significant impact on the 

outcome of IW operations and should 

be a major consideration in an effectsbased approach to operations 

(EBAO). 

 Overhead ISR assets are 

typically in short supply and should be 

centrally controlled to ensure the most 

critical aspects of a JFC’s operational 
 33 

needs are covered. The highly distributed nature of IW can exacerbate this 

problem, requiring a high degree of integration between all parts of the 

joint/coalition team in the planning process. In order to reduce the gap between 

demand and capacity, efficient use of assets and streamlined processes are 

required. In addition, using systems and products that are compatible and 

releasable to the supported PN government is essential. For more detailed 

information on the intelligence process see AFDD 2-9, Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance Operations. 

Non-Traditional ISR (NTISR)

 NTISR assets (fighter and other aircraft equipped with sensors but whose 

primary function is not intelligence related) can be used when necessary to fill 

gaps in ISR coverage, but this use should be weighed against any negative 

impact on the primary mission. NTISR can increase effective ISR persistence 

and coverage in the operational environment by accessing denied areas and 

targets with focused surveillance. NTISR assets can fulfill intelligence 

requirements or provide real-time imaging. For example, battlefield Airmen now 

provide ground commanders beyond-line-of-sight awareness with a remote 

operations video enhanced receiver (ROVER), which links to aircraft targeting 

pods and unmanned aircraft systems. This allows NTISR assets and armed ISR 

platforms to directly communicate with ground forces in order to engage highvalue targets based on this real-time intelligence. However, commanders should 

ensure NTISR-provided intelligence is fused with other analytical efforts in order 

to maintain the appropriate situational awareness. 

Human Intelligence

 Targets are often found, identified, fixed, and tracked by means other than 

technical sensor systems. The nature of IW―close contact with a populace that 

is often partially hostile in difficult terrain like urban settings―creates a high 

degree of dependence on HUMINT. HUMINT helps provide the pulse of the local 

populace and may even penetrate adversary networks. ISR collection and 

intelligence analysis leverages HUMINT to neutralize enemy forces’ 

effectiveness, while continually assessing their capabilities. These are critical 

considerations in any effort to develop an accurate assessment of the operational 

environment. 

 HUMINT also helps cross-cue technical ISR sensors to potential targets. 

Effectively integrated, HUMINT may become the lead cueing mechanism for air 

and space assets, which can bring more ISR capability to bear on a leadership 

target or isolate it for engagement. The integration of HUMINT with other ISR 

elements helps eliminate seams in IW operations and shortens the sensor to 

shooter “kill chain.” 
 34 

Counterintelligence 

 CI is defined as the gathering of information or “activities conducted to 

protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 

assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments...foreign 

organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.” (JP 1-02) 

 CI counters or neutralizes threats through HUMINT source operations, 

collections, counterintelligence investigations, operations, analysis and 

production, and technical service programs. During IW, the main Air Force CI 

capability resides in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). 

Commanders may also receive counterintelligence support from other Services 

or agencies, both US and coalition. 

 Air Force counter threat operations (CTO) are the AFOSI's capability to 

find, fix, track, and neutralize the enemy in order to create a sustained permissive 

environment for military forces, as well as provide a safe and secure operating 

environment. CTO are critical in detecting, assessing, denying, and responding 

to threats impacting Air Force operations. These operations facilitate the 

identification and neutralization of enemy and terrorist threats and are critical in 

providing force protection. 

Distributed Operations 

 Distributed operations are those conducted by independent and 

interdependent nodes that operate as a team. Distributed operations allow for 

greater connectivity, not only between sensors and shooters, but also between 

those with execution authority and more senior decision-makers at all echelons 

up the chain of command. Additionally, distributed operations allow for a 

reduced forward footprint of personnel minimizing intrusiveness within the PN 

while providing a robust ISR capability. For further information on distributed 

operations, see AFDD 2-8, Command and Control. 

 The AOC integrates information from multiple sources and greatly 

improves management of ISR data collection. If certain sensors cannot 

communicate directly with one another, their product can be fused through 

information links in the AOC. The AOC is also tied into a robust global ISR 

architecture (e.g., the distributed common ground system [DCGS]) that includes 

ISR operators, multi-source sensor suites, fusion engines, detailed and up-todate databases, beyond-line-of-sight data links, and analysts. This multiplicity of 

interlinked and mutually supporting systems enables a greatly increased 

refinement of ISR input in support of IW. Multiple sources of information can be 

merged and channeled to forces ready to act upon it. Many of the systems that 

provide intelligence data are not dedicated ISR resources or systems, requiring 

flexibility in integration. ISR–derived information can be used in a variety of ways 

to support situational awareness, intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment, target intelligence, and assessment. 
 35 

 In addition, the Air Force has integrated ISR with lethal precision attack 

capabilities to conduct dynamic targeting. The Air Force also has the capability 

to provide broad-area persistence by networking a variety of sensors, including 

SIGINT, MASINT, GEOINT, OSINT, and HUMINT. This network facilitates an 

understanding of the operational environment, the adversary, and other relevant 

populations and forces. 

Intelligence Collaboration 

Effective intelligence collaboration, collection, and analysis should: 

 Maximize ISR data fusion. 

 Establish and maintain shared situational awareness. 

 Share collection priorities. 

 Deconflict activities and operations. 

 Collaborate on analysis and ISR concepts of operation. 

 Develop targets. 

 Share results of operations. 

 Assess effectiveness. 

Foreign Disclosure 

Commanders and staffs should coordinate intelligence collection, and 

analysis with foreign militaries, foreign and US intelligence services, and other 

organizations. Every attempt should be made to sanitize information to the most 

releasable level possible to encourage the sharing of intelligence within a 

multinational environment. However, the sharing of US intelligence is a sensitive 

issue to be evaluated and approved by a foreign disclosure office based on the 

circumstances of each situation. 

 Sharing intelligence with PN security forces and government personnel is 

an important and effective means of supporting IW efforts. However, PN 

intelligence services may not be well developed. It is essential for Air Force 

intelligence personnel to evaluate PN intelligence capabilities, reliability, and offer 

training as required. When sharing intelligence with the PN, it is important to 

understand the likelihood of infiltration by insurgents or foreign intelligence 

services. US sources and methods must be protected. Refer to JP 2-0, Doctrine 

for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, for further guidance on Intelligence. 
 36 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

 IO are the integrated employment of the capabilities of influence 

operations, electronic warfare (EW) operations, and network warfare operations 

(NW Ops), in concert with specified integrated control enablers, to influence, 

disrupt, corrupt, destroy, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision 

making while protecting our own. While IO are conducted across the range of 

military operations (ROMO), they are particularly instrumental in IW. For more 

detailed information, see AFDD 2-5, Information Operations. 

 The military goal of IO is to shape the information environment, while 

simultaneously assuring worldwide freedom of operation in the air, space, and 

cyberspace domains. IO are used typically to support the commander’s 

decision-making and employment of force in traditional war; however, in IW, Air 

Force capabilities may be primarily used to support IO. IO are at the heart of IW 

and are crucial to shaping the relevant population’s attitudes and actions. IO 

may require higher prioritization of ISR, NTISR, and physical attack support than 

in traditional warfare. 

 Considerations for IW operations are inherently and distinctly different 

from traditional warfare. While a state may start a counterinsurgency with a large 

force advantage, insurgents usually start with a truly asymmetric information 

advantage over the state; they know where the state is while the state often 

doesn’t know where the insurgents are. This advantage leaves the insurgency 

with the ability to choose when and where it will fight. Additionally, non-state 

actors, insurgents, or terror groups are not hampered by political, legal, and 

moral restraints. 

 Due to IO’s potential impact on all other joint operations, coordination in 

the joint IO cell is vital. IO should be synchronized, integrated, and coordinated 

with other JIIM operations. In some situations, IO may lead other operations and 

be the first choice for commanders in confronting an emerging crisis. 

Network Warfare Operations 

 NW Ops are composed of offensive, defensive, and supporting activities 

that achieve desired effects across the interconnected network portions of the 

operational environment. NW Ops are conducted in the cyberspace domain via 

the combination of hardware, software, data, and human interaction. The conduct 

of NW Ops will usually require an extensive interagency approach. Examples of 

networks include, but are not limited to, radio nets, satellite links, tactical digital 

information links, telemetry, digital track files, telecommunications, and wireless 

communications networks and systems. 

 Use of the internet and other electromagnetic means provides insurgents 

with a robust capability to recruit, train, and direct operations. US and coalition 

forces use cyberspace to not only enable their operations but also conduct direct 
 37 

operations against adversaries. Degrading the adversary’s use of cyberspace 

can be detrimental to their operations. Network attack destroys, disrupts, 

corrupts, denies, delays, or degrades information that resides in telephone and 

data service networks. Attacking the networks will not only influence the 

adversary’s decision making, but can also affect the target audience of the 

networked information. 

Electronic Warfare 

 EW comprises integrated planning, employment, and assessment of 

military capabilities to achieve effects across the electromagnetic spectrum 

(EMS), which includes radio, visible, infrared, microwave, directed energy, and all 

other frequencies. Planners and operators are responsible for coordination and 

deconfliction of PN and coalition EW assets employed to control the adversary’s 

use of the EMS. EW can deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, or destroy 

communication nodes of the adversary by using electromagnetic, directed 

energy, and high-powered microwave systems. For this reason, EW is an 

important coordination element, especially as current and future uses of the EMS 

multiply. 

 Control of the EMS can have a major impact on success across the full 

ROMO. EW assists air and space forces in gaining access to and operating 

without prohibitive interference from adversary systems. A joint EW coordination 

cell (EWCC) should be established to centralize EW planning and coordination 

efforts. 

Influence Operations 

 Influence operations affect behaviors, protect operations, communicate 

commander’s intent, and project information to achieve desired effects. The 

military capabilities of influence operations are PSYOP, military deception 

(MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), CI, counterpropaganda, and public 

affairs (PA). For more information on CI, see the intelligence section in this 

chapter. 

Psychological Operations 

 PSYOP seeks to induce, influence, or reinforce the perceptions, attitudes, 

reasoning, and behavior of foreign leaders, groups, and organizations in a 

manner favorable to friendly national and military objectives. 

 Air Force PSYOP is an integral part of joint operations and is extensively 

coordinated throughout the joint and interagency force. PSYOP may be 

employed through a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF); therefore, 

the air component neither plans nor conducts independent PSYOP operations. 

PSYOP is designed to augment joint methods, practices, and objectives in the 

larger context of theater influence operations. 
 38 

Malaya (1948 – 1960)

In the successful counterinsurgency in Malaya (1948-1960), 

airpower was the key enabler for a psychological campaign designed to 

convince the local people of the legitimacy and efficacy of the government. 

Leaflet drops were used extensively to deliver safe conduct passes, parody 

insurgent leaders, report insurgent setbacks, and even to offer pregnant 

female insurgents the use of government hospitals in order to have their 

babies in greater safety. Aerial loudspeaker operations were used to 

rapidly produce time sensitive messages and deliver them to specific 

audiences, targeting specific insurgents by name with messages designed 

to reduce their morale and hurt recruiting. Insurgent captives revealed in 

later interrogations that the loudspeaker aircraft were highly effective in 

influencing their decision to surrender. 

 PSYOP can be employed in IW to help counter terrorist threats, protect 

forces, dissuade or preempt hostile actors, and support counterpropaganda 

efforts. 

Military Deception 

 MILDEC misleads or manages the perception of adversaries, causing 

them to act in accordance with friendly objectives. While MILDEC is conducted 

at all levels, commanders should coordinate deception efforts and actions to 

preclude “information fratricide” or inadvertent disclosure, compromise, or 

invalidation of other influence operation initiatives. 

 When formulating the deception concept, particular attention should be 

placed on defining how commanders would like the adversary to act, or not act, 

at critical points. The desired effect is to cause adversary action, not just shape 

his perceptions. Effective deception efforts require a thorough understanding of 

adversary cultural, political, and doctrinal perceptions and military decisionmaking processes. 

Counterpropaganda 

 Counterpropaganda counters or redirects hostile foreign messages and 

themes. Counterpropaganda should be addressed by aggressive influence 

operation efforts in an offensive mindset rather than be reactionary to enemy 

efforts. Gaining and maintaining the information initiative in IW can be a powerful 

weapon to defeat propaganda. The actor who takes the initiative in 

disseminating information most likely will set the overall context and frame the 

public debate. These actions help to disarm adversary propaganda and 

eliminate the adversary’s ability to exploit tactical mistakes. 
 39 

Strategic Communication

 SC is a focused US government effort to understand and engage key 

audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to 

the advancement of US government interests, policies, and objectives. SC 

integrates programs, plans, themes, messages, and products with the actions 

of all the elements of national power. 

 SC shapes perceptions at the global, regional, and national level, 

helping link government actions with message. SC is inherently linked to the 

IO capabilities of PA and defense support to public diplomacy. Air Force 

operations can, when appropriate, play a significant role in the larger US 

government effort to communicate policy and demonstrate US commitment. 

Effects created through IO employment should always be consistent with 

overall SC objectives. 

 Commanders at all levels should understand the authority delegated to 

them to disseminate counterpropaganda messages. However, the need to get 

the story out quickly should be balanced against the need to avoid cultural faux 

pas which could damage US and PN credibility. 

Public Affairs 

 In addition to being the first line of defense against adversary propaganda 

and disinformation, PA operations are also comprised to analyze and help shape 

the international public information environment with proactive engagement. 

Public affairs, while a component of influence operations, is predicated on its 

ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences 

 Integrating PA operations during the strategy development and planning 

phases of an operation enhances the chance of seizing and maintaining the 

information initiative for the duration of the campaign. This integration is 

especially crucial as phase transitions occur in the campaign. PA operations can 

define public perception and shape local reaction by clearly and properly 

articulating military objectives, helping provide context for the military operations. 

In the longer term, PA activities can help garner support for US efforts in nation 

building or other stability operations supporting US objectives in the country or 

region. 

OPSEC 

 OPSEC should be employed to help counter any threat to operational 

information and to protect forces by not allowing the adversary to gain the 

information required to effective plan against deployed forces. 
 40 

C-130 

Only the USAF can bring to bear prompt, scalable delivery 

capabilities that can avoid insecure land routes and rapidly move people, 

equipment, and supplies into remote and dangerous areas at (relatively) 

low risk. 

―Shaping the Future Air Force, 

RAND Corporation 

2006 Technical Report 

AIR MOBILITY 

Air mobility is essential when conducting IW operations, supporting US 

ground forces, and enabling PN capabilities. Air mobility operations may 

increase the PN government’s capacity to govern and administer through 

presence and persistence in otherwise inaccessible regions of the country. They 

also physically extend the reach of public policy and information programs. Air 

mobility provides a means of rapidly transporting personnel and supplies to 

forward areas. Air mobility-focused Airmen, integrated with ground forces, often 

increases the effectiveness of air mobility and re-supply operations, as well as 

mitigating risk in those operations. 

Combat Deployment 

Through mobilization and national assistance, air transportation can be 

used to access remote regions and deliver resources and personnel to address a 

wide variety of problems and issues. For instance, air mobility can be used to 

rapidly deploy, sustain, and reinforce ground forces as part of security and 

neutralization operations. Air mobility has even been used successfully to 

support political goals by extending the electoral process to rural groups. 

Logistics tasks are enabled through air landing, airdrop, and aerial extraction of 

equipment, supplies, and personnel. 

Fixed wing and verticallift airlift provide a crucial 

capability in IW. In the military 

realm, fixed-wing transports 

are best suited for carrying 

ground assault forces into 

forward staging areas for 

insertion. Vertical-lift platforms 

are ideal for carrying ground 

assault teams to remote sites unable to support fixed wing operations. In 

addition, casualty evacuation should be integral to any operation involving the 

employment of personnel in hostile-fire situations. Vertical-lift assets are best 

suited for this task because of their retrieval capability. 
 41 

Air Drop 

Combat Sustainment 

Combat sustainment operations reinforce and 

resupply units engaged in many aspects of IW. Once 

delivered to the target area, an inserted force may be 

totally dependent upon airlift for sustainment, 

movement, withdrawal, redeployment, or aeromedical 

evacuation of casualties. Combat sustainment planning 

usually assumes that operational requirements and 

assessed threats allow little or no flexibility in the 

delivery times, locations, and load configurations. 

Combat requirements and cargo handling limitations at 

forward operating locations drive flight schedules and 

load plans. Combat sustainment employs both air 

landing and airdrop delivery methods. 

Integrating Mobility and Special Operations 

IW, unlike traditional warfare, usually requires a wider use of SOF. 

Specifically trained Air Force airlift forces provide unique air, land, and airdrop 

support to special operations. Since there are a limited number of airlift assets 

dedicated to this mission, the principle of economy of force is particularly 

important. When performing these missions, airlift crews normally act as integral 

members of a larger joint package. Because these missions routinely operate 

under austere conditions in hostile environments, extensive planning, 

coordination, and training are required to minimize risk. Airlift used in a special 

operations role provides commanders the capability to create specific effects, 

which may not be attainable through more traditional airlift practices. 

Commanders may also consider using indigenous aviation forces to support 

ground special operations forces in hostile or denied territory with air mobility and 

resupply, insertion and extraction, casualty evacuation, PR, ISR, and close air 

support (CAS). Indigenous capabilities should be adaptive, fluid, and responsive 

to asymmetric or irregular threats and circumstances. For additional information, 

see AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations; AFDD 2-7, Special Operations; and 

AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense. 

AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT (ACS) 

 ACS is the unique support capability of the Air Force to support 

operations. ACS produces the effects necessary to create, prepare, deploy, 

employ, sustain, protect, and redeploy Air Force and the PN’s similar capabilities 

when required by the JFC’s operational plan. These effects do not occur 

sequentially. Rather, they are continuous, iterative, and adaptable. Failure to 

incorporate ACS early in any operation may result in the inability to bring the 

desired effects to bear. Additionally, failure to incorporate ACS in planning for 

potential future operations may result in the inability to adequately support and 

sustain the necessary operations tempo due to an ill-prepared or ill-equipped 
 42 

operating location. For more detailed information on ACS, see AFDD 2-4, 

Combat Support. 

ACS Operations in IW 

 ACS operations in IW may be designed to support US-only or 

multinational operations, enable PN airpower capabilities against irregular 

threats, or a combination thereof. ACS may transition from an Air Force support 

role to the primary application of military force. The complexity and 

unpredictability of IW operations and activities present challenges to 

commanders, who should consider the different risks associated with employing 

ACS in IW: 

 Operating in austere environments with limited infrastructure. 

 Increased combat readiness for surviving and operating in increased threat 

environments to include CBRN environments. 

 Increased security and force protection requirements. 

 Extended logistical lines. 

 Communications limitations. 

 Multiple distributed operations. 

 ACS leadership may be required to assess a PN’s ACS feasibility and 

capability as well as develop training and education plans to ensure full mission 

capability. ACS capabilities may set the conditions for achieving the JFC’s 

objectives by supporting non-military instruments of power during IW operations. 

As such, ACS should be responsive and sufficient to sustain the operational 

requirements of IW. This includes the ability to rapidly develop and test new 

capabilities or modifications to assets to meet existing or future needs. 

Civil Engineering 

Air Force civil engineering forces provide design, construction, repair, and 

force protection of air and space power facilities, as well as protection of Air 

Force and PN personnel through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), fire, and 

emergency management functions. Civil engineers also provide Rapid Engineer 

Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE) teams 

capable of large airfield infrastructure and base public works efforts. These 

capabilities can be used in a secondary capacity to support the PN government 

through repairing or establishing utility infrastructure, roads, and facilities to 

support local communities such as schools, clinics, civic meeting centers, etc., as 

well as during natural and manmade disaster recovery operations. 
 43 

Airmen save lives in Africa with 

medical team visit 

People line up to receive

healthcare during a Combined Joint

Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

medical civic action program (MEDCAP) 

in Kenya. CJTF-HOA Servicemembers

conducted the MEDCAP in the villages

of Shimbir and Balich through a

partnership with the Kenyan department

of defense, which provided additional

medical providers and logistical support.

More than 1,000 people received

healthcare as part of the project. 

 In IW, commanders should generally give priority to projects most in need 

of a particular type of support, rather than what could be most efficient. For 

example, if the PN can accomplish the same work using labor vice heavy 

equipment, this might be preferable since it provides jobs and community 

involvement. Conversely, if a PN project is at a standstill waiting for a special 

capability (e.g., a crane), and one day’s RED HORSE activity will put dozens of 

people back to work, such a project would be a natural priority. 

 Civil engineering personnel bring technical, procedural, and organizational 

expertise that can be leveraged to advise PN engineering efforts. Traditional civil 

engineering craftsmen can provide advice and training for PN personnel on 

construction and engineering topics. 

 In addition, EOD, fire, and emergency management personnel may serve 

as advisors to support existing or emerging PN emergency service teams. For 

all specialties, a careful review of the PN request and the proposed level of 

assistance should be made to ensure security and safety regulations are not 

violated. Where a mature emergency response PN capability exists, the use of 

EOD, fire, and emergency management personnel to serve as liaisons can 

provide great benefits and improve safety by deconflicting efforts and ensuring 

safe areas of responsibility. However, the direct training of PN personnel can 

lead to numerous safety, security, and qualification issues which need to be 

addressed. In all efforts, EOD, fire, and emergency management personnel’s 

main focus will be on the protection of US and PN direct support personnel from 

EOD, fire, and CBRN hazards. 

Medical Evacuation / Medical teams 

 Air Force medical teams are generally smaller than their counterparts in 

other Services, since the Air Force units they support are smaller. Medical 

evacuation of PN military or civilians can build good will among the population 

and create a positive message. Such messages should emphasize the US role 

as a friend and avoid emphasis on providing capabilities that the PN lacks. 
 44 

 Proper use of medical support and humanitarian relief can go a long way 

in achieving the overall goal of legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace, while 

failure to provide such support often opens the door to the adversary to enhance 

its position with local civilians. 

PRECISION ENGAGEMENT 

 Precision engagement includes the full spectrum of capabilities that can 

be brought to bear to precisely achieve effects in support of the desired end 

state. Precision engagement in IW may be conducted by the same assets and 

functions used in more traditional operations. Since IW is a struggle for the 

population’s allegiance, the effect of any engagement operation on the 

population should be carefully considered. In determining the appropriate 

capability to achieve the desired effect, planners should look at effect, duration, 

and consequences to ensure the not only the direct but the longer term indirect 

effects that may result from use of a capability are anticipated. 

 Considering COIN in particular, a primary objective for the US and PN is 

to restore the rule of law. A second-order effect of executing strike operations is 

that they remind the population that this objective has not been achieved. There 

is potential for collateral damage from the smallest weapons, even those 

employed from the ground. If US forces conduct the strike, there may be the 

perception that the PN government is dependent for its survival on foreign forces. 

Combined, these may have the indirect effect of delegitimizing the PN 

government in the public’s perception. Nevertheless, strike operations have a 

place in COIN, since the ability to hold targets at risk throughout the AO helps the 

US and PN set the tempo of operations and seize the initiative from insurgent 

forces. The precision and lethality of airpower often provide the most 

discriminating application of firepower to COIN forces. 

 Precision engagement should be designed to employ PN airpower 

resources to the greatest extent possible. Properly trained and structured teams 

of Air Force experts, ranging from planning liaison to tactical operations 

personnel, offer potential for PN unilateral and US/PN combined actions against 

high-value targets. Use of these options serves to enhance the legitimacy of the 

PN government while achieving important US security objectives. 

 Just as in traditional warfare, attacks on key nodes usually reap greater 

benefits than attacks on dispersed individual targets. For this reason, effective 

strike operations are inextricably tied to the availability of persistent ISR and are 

the result of detailed target systems analysis that identifies and fully 

characterizes the targets of interest (networks, people, objects, entities). 

Persistence in IW is critical since it will never be known in advance when a key 

node will be identified or how long it will remain in place. In IW, planners may 

consider more use of airborne alert than they would during traditional operations. 
 45 

Strike 

 The C2 relationships established for engagement operations should 

consider both the need for flexibility and the training level of forces to be 

employed. For precision engagement in IW, training and competency go beyond 

basic warfighting skills; Airmen should 

understand why they are accomplishing a 

task before they can choose how best to 

accomplish it. Commanders determining 

how to conduct precision strike should 

consider that a highly responsive C2 

arrangement that potentially allows the 

employment of the wrong weapon at the 

wrong place or time may be worse for the 

overall effort than a more rigid structure 

that causes delays. 

 Air Force forces have historically provided capability to coalition ground 

forces with CAS only where a qualified terminal attack controller is available. In 

some circumstances, a ground-based controller embedded with PN forces may 

be required to determine the situation and ensure compliance with the rules of 

engagement. 

 Precision engagement should not include only physically lethal 

capabilities. The cyberspace domain may present numerous opportunities to 

directly target insurgents or to positively influence the population. Like air 

operations, cyber operations can strike directly at nodes of interest. For 

example, computer network attack may hinder or disrupt insurgent operations, or 

at least require them to expend resources defending their cyberspace assets. 

 Likewise, IO can access a connected population directly, without filters. 

For both attack and defense, a PN’s barrier to entry for some network warfare 

capabilities is relatively low. A PN may actually be able to employ certain 

capabilities more effectively than US forces, since they will not have the same 

language barriers and may operate under different legal restrictions. However, 

this does not alleviate US forces from following the law of armed conflict (LOAC) 

and the applicable rules of engagement (ROE). The PN may better understand 

culturally how to present a case and may have more credibility with the 

population. To benefit from this arrangement, campaign planners should ensure 

Airmen conducting lethal and non-lethal operations can quickly communicate 

their activities and results. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

 Employing air, space, and cyberspace capabilities theater-wide in 

traditional warfare requires a robust C2 architecture. The COMAFFOR’s theater 

air control system (TACS) provides such a capability. The speed in which the 

TACS is able to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence provides a critical 
 46 

Using satellite communications 

capability in IW. The ability to fuse 

multiple bits of information from 

multiple sources in a timely manner 

provides the commander options 

which may otherwise not have been 

presented. The ability to act on this 

information quickly is also critical 

due to the dynamic nature of IW. C2 

is not only critical to Air Force 

operations but it is also critical for 

BPC. The ability of PNs to more 

effectively command and control 

operations both on the ground and in 

the air often leads to more effective 

operations. 

 When conducting BPC it is important to note that the PN will rarely, if ever, 

require the same scope and technological sophistication of C2 as the US. Some 

IW operations will not use the TACS for C2 and instead rely on PN capabilities. It 

is important to ensure the right level and scope of the C2 be developed based on 

the requirements of the PN. 
 47 

CHAPTER FOUR 

STRATEGY AND PLANNING 

 Military leaders create strategy, campaigns, and plans using the entire 

spectrum of military capabilities. In IW, success requires a mindset that focuses 

on how these capabilities will positively influence the population to support the 

indigenous leadership. Airmen should understand the nature of IW by looking at 

the differences between IW and traditional warfare, as well as the operational 

environments. This understanding provides the foundation for the development 

and conduct of strategy and planning. 

STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS 

 Traditionally, strategy has been associated with the integration of the 

national and military objectives (ends); national policies and military concepts 

(ways); and national resources, military forces, and supplies (means) to 

accomplish given objectives in a defined campaign. However, this narrow view 

may mislead Airmen to believe that strategy begins and ends with the 

development and oversight of a campaign plan. Airmen should look beyond the 

achievement of milestones and military end state toward the ultimate political and 

cultural endstate, while understanding the implications of US action on potential 

future campaigns and operations. 

 Strategy development is iterative, relying on feedback to evolve and adapt 

to the dynamic environment in which it operates. Assessment becomes the 

critical ingredient that provides feedback for the development and modification of 

strategy. Understanding what actions have taken place and their subsequent 

effects allows strategists to evolve their strategy. 

...to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a 

knife. 

―T. E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt

All wars are fought for political purposes, but the political element of IW 

permeates its conduct down to the lowest tactical level....Influencing 

governments and populations is a complex...activity. In IW, military leaders 

need to think politically as well as militarily—and their civilian counterparts 

need to think militarily as well as politically. 

―IW Joint Operating Concept 
 48 

Strategy Differences in IW 

 Airmen need to understand the differences between IW and traditional 

warfare. Understanding the current operational environment not only requires 

analyzing the present strategic context, but also the effect of past operations. 

Campaign strategies involve more than just the use of armed forces. They must 

also take into account the economic, political, diplomatic, military, and 

informational instruments that might be used to promote a nation’s interest or 

secure a state from IW adversaries. The military portion of the theater strategy is 

only a part of the strategy, and should not be a sole course of action in itself, but 

rather should set the conditions for the other instruments of national power to 

operate. Within the context of IW, many campaigns and operations may not be 

led by the military. The effect of these strategies may not be readily apparent, 

requiring years and even decades before tangible results are evident. 

Long View Versus the Quick Decisive Victory 

The protracted approach that adversaries may use in IW requires a 

long-term strategy for victory. Winning a protracted war is all about 

winning the struggle of ideas, undermining the legitimacy of a competing 

ideology, addressing valid grievances, reducing an enemy’s influence, and 

depriving the enemy of the support of the people. IW requires patience and 

adaptation. The long view requires Airmen to consider personnel rotations, 

equipment wear and tear, and the impact on training and education early on in 

the operational design process. 

Center of Gravity 

 Strategy development for IW requires a realization that an insurgency or 

terrorist organization exists and requires coordinated action by political and 

military leaders to determine the insurgency’s characteristics and centers of 

gravity (COGs). The COG for both the counterinsurgency and the insurgency is 

usually some segment of the relevant population. Effects on the population may 

be relatively less tangible, consisting of ideas and perceptions (such as the 

enemy’s influence or legitimacy). 

 While the COG remains largely unchanged, an insurgency’s 

vulnerabilities often shift as an insurgency develops. Early in its development, 

the leadership of any organization is critical. Leaders provide the strategic 

direction for the organization. Another key aspect lies with underlying grievances 

within the population. If the PN’s government fails to address “valid” grievances 

in a timely manner, the population will continue to be disaffected. If these 

grievances have some level of tacit support from the population, an insurgency 

may be able to develop more freely and aggressively expand. If not, the 

organization may remain largely covert in its development. 
 49 

 The ability to find, identify, and separate targeted individual leaders from 

non-targeted individuals will most likely be difficult. In addition, depending on the 

location of the target, the effects desired are often “soft” and may require nonlethal means. Lethal targeting opportunities, when they emerge, are fleeting, and 

collateral damage restrictions will be challenging. 

 Additionally, the characteristics of the population will not be homogenous 

in all areas of the PN. Cultural, geographical, religious, and economic differences 

within a state or region will often motivate the population differently. Thus, 

grievances in one area may be different than others, requiring different 

operations and effects to be achieved. 

Focus on Stability 

 If a national government is weak, corrupt, incompetent, or if the governing 

authority is absent, a triggering shock can exacerbate an already difficult 

situation, producing widespread suffering, growing popular dissatisfaction, and 

civil unrest, all of which can be intensified by several interrelated factors. The 

absence of key government functions, competing ideology, widespread 

lawlessness, poor economic performance, pronounced economic disparities, 

and, in some cases, a serious external threat all influence the strategic context of 

any operation. 

 The primary focus of US military forces, civilian government agencies, 

multinational partners, and, in some cases, NGOs, will likely be helping severely 

stressed governments avoid failure or enabling the rebuilding of a new 

government after internal crisis or transfer of power. First and foremost, US 

forces should establish and maintain a safe, secure environment for the 

population and government. 

 The Air Force, through its functions and capabilities, provides the JFC key 

enablers to maintain a safe and secure environment. In providing security, the 

majority of military operations should focus on stability and deterrence. This 

requires early involvement in fragile states. The Air Force brings a flexible force 

for such operations. Rapid mobility, ISR capabilities, as well as the ability to 

deter external involvement through traditional deterrence of other state actors 

provides a more conducive environment for PN governments to develop and 

stabilize. 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

 Proponents of irregular warfare realize that they cannot achieve their 

desired ideological or political objectives through conventional force and seek to 

achieve public support for their cause (or at minimum acquiescence to their 

presence) by creating problems and instability that can be blamed on the 

government. Disinformation and propaganda campaigns targeting the populace 
 50 

are very effective means of achieving these goals, especially when tribal, ethnic, 

and religious affiliations can be leveraged or played against each other. 

 All operations should be integrated and synchronized to promote 

governmental legitimacy. As no single Service component has a monopoly on 

the information realm, a joint approach integrated with governmental and civilian 

efforts is absolutely essential. This ensures that the cumulative psychological 

effect of operations is working towards defeating the ideologies of a 

government’s potential opponents and not sending conflicting messages to the 

populace or fueling the insurgents’ disinformation and propaganda campaigns. 

Some IW operations are likely to be conducted in austere, remote regions that 

are under-governed or on the fringes of PN government control. The 

characteristic of remoteness affects the communications and logistics reachback 

capability of deployed friendly forces. It also affects force protection requirements 

including situational awareness enablers and self-defense measures. Small force 

size plus limited reachback capability may expose deployed forces to higher 

threat levels and increased risk. This is especially true of Air Force trainers and 

advisors embedded for extended periods of time at forward locations with PN 

forces. 

 Nations most susceptible to lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency are 

characterized by various forms of social, economic, and political fragmentation 

and by a lack of a unifying national identity within population groups who resist or 

are denied integration into the national community. Some factors which 

contribute to this fragmentation include religion, political and ethnic alienation, 

separatism, lack of accessibility to government resources by certain groups, poor 

income distribution among social classes, poor economic opportunities, and 

disenfranchisement or lack of other political rights. Situations most likely to 

involve Air Force IW activities are prevalent in developing nations where public 

services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are relatively primitive 

by Western standards. For additional information, see AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign 

Internal Defense. 

 IW will occur in many different operational environments. Adversaries are 

likely to operate in and from states that can be considered as failed, cooperative, 

or non-cooperative (see Figure 4.1). The environment influences the types of 

actions to be taken as well as the ability to conduct these actions. Adversaries 

are likely to operate within and from non-cooperative states that will limit or 

restrict joint force access. They will exploit state boundaries and other political, 

economic, and tribal seams in order to seek sanctuary from conventional military 

capabilities, complicating coalition planning. Operations in these environments 

will either support or target state and non-state actors. Once the general 

environment is determined, Airmen should understand the PMESII context in the 

area or state of interest to develop a more comprehensive picture of the strategic 

problem. Finally, operating environments are typically influenced by external 

states that may have an interest in the conflict. 
 51 

COIN

Shape / Deter 

Operations

Irregular Warfare 

Operating Environments

Support to 

Insurgency

Support to

COIN

Cooperative 

Government

Non-Cooperative 

Government

Failed State

Shape / Deter 

Operations

Shape / Deter 

Operations

COIN 

(as required) Environments can 

influence each other

Figure 4.1. Irregular Warfare Operating Environments 

Failed States 

 Executing IW against non-state adversaries operating within failed states 

is a challenge. Denied or non-governed areas may provide potential sanctuary 

for transnational terrorist networks and other non-state adversaries. These areas 

may be under the direct control of insurgents. In most cases, Air Force 

personnel will find themselves in austere locations in developing or 

underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, the locations from which they will work 

and live will not likely be able to provide adequate security, health standards, and 

C2 networks. Given these issues, Airmen may be responsible for their own 

security, communications, and well-being. There may be a degree of 

lawlessness and disorder. In such scenarios, the US may be the primary actor 

and be primarily responsible for both military and political actions. Thus, a large 

force may be necessary to bring security to such regions. 

Cooperative Governments 

 Support to COIN operations occurs with PNs that either require or request 

US participation. This environment enables the US to employ many different 

forms of support including SA and FID. The level of US involvement will likely 

depend on the capabilities and level of threat to the PN government as well as 

US strategic goals. Operations in this environment may range from small unit 
 52 

involvement to larger force requirements if a crisis deteriorates to the point that 

the PN cannot maintain security on its own. Careful consideration is required 

when the decision to move from support to COIN to COIN operations as this 

often not only changes the commitment required but also the perception of the 

people regarding the credibility and legitimacy of their government. 

Non-Cooperative Governments 

 Executing IW against or within a non-cooperative state involves UW and 

other indirect approaches applied in conjunction with other diplomatic or 

economic actions such as blockades or sanctions. While UW has been a 

traditional core mission of SOF, executing UW as part of a larger IW effort may 

be more common in the future. UW has traditionally confined itself to operations 

against a single hostile state or occupying power. Many of the activities took 

place either within the hostile or occupied state or in the neighboring countries 

that either directly or tacitly supported efforts against the hostile state. This 

construct is changing as non-cooperative states have ever-increasing global 

linkages and interests. The increasingly global nature of IW may require joint 

forces to plan and execute IW against a non-cooperative state’s decisive points 

or vital interests that may reside outside the borders of the state itself. These 

interests may include offshore banking and financial assets, businesses, and 

other strategic resources, production operations, and facilities. Action against 

these interests provides the JFC with additional pressure points that can 

indirectly influence the hostile state adversary without entering the adversary’s 

sovereign territory. Some of these non-cooperative states may be supporters or 

sponsors of our non-state adversaries; others will be unwilling or unable to take 

effective action against non-state adversaries operating within their borders. 

 Operations in this environment normally require extensive coordination 

between SOF and those conventional Air Force forces that are assigned or 

attached to the geographic CCDR. This coordination can be expedited by the 

use of coordinating authority and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) between 

SOF and conventional Air Force forces. 

Air Force forces can also support operations against a non-cooperative 

state in a variety of manners. If the operation is covert in nature, a limited 

footprint or no footprint is often required. Use of ISR for intelligence and 

information in this context becomes increasingly important. If the IW campaign 

includes UW, there may be more Air Force involvement. Airlift will be 

instrumental in the insertion, extraction, and resupply of SOF and unconventional 

forces. Aeromedical evacuation and forward-based medical facilities provide 

critical support for UW operations. In the later stages of an insurgency a forward 

operating base may be needed or desired to support air operations; Air Force 

airbase opening capabilities may require augmentation (from joint or coalition 

partners) depending upon the threat and organic capability of the airbase. As the 

situation changes, the Air Force must be ready to deliver a variety of capabilities 

to support the effort and to lead some aspects of it. 
 53 

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLAN 

The TSCP provides the direction and effort of US military forces for each 

geographic CCDR. This plan combines the effort of each of the individual 

Service component commanders and PN’s forces. US interests are best served 

when countries are internally secure, regions are stable, and other countries are 

willing and their military forces are able to contribute effective capabilities to 

regional, national, and international operations. Each COMAFFOR should 

ensure that his/her forces’ capabilities are considered and incorporated into the 

geographic CCDR’s TSCP. Properly developed and executed TSCPs can 

significantly shape the environment for future efforts against IW adversaries. 

 This will require day-to-day involvement with Department of State (DOS) 

country teams and other interagency organizations to help shape the TSCP. 

Regional specialists, operational planners, defense attaches, component 

numbered Air Forces, and CCDR staff elements should all engage in this 

process. The following information describes some of the ways in which the Air 

Force aids in the TSCP. 

Security Assistance 

 SA is the provision of defense articles, military training, and other defenserelated services in furtherance of national policies and objectives. SA is an 

important instrument of national security policy. Within the law and policy 

considerations, Air Force personnel can train and equip friendly foreign forces. 

DOD and other government agencies train foreign militaries and law enforcement 

personnel through several different programs, some funded by accounts within 

the Pentagon's budget and others by DOS-administered foreign aid budget. SA 

fosters interoperability between United States forces and our allies. 

 SA is designed to help selected countries meet their internal defense 

needs and to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive 

institutions. The JFC must understand the distinction between personnel 

performing mission activities under the C2 of a combatant commander and 

personnel performing those activities under the laws, regulations, and funding 

applicable to Title 22, United States Code (U.S.C.), Foreign Relations and 

Intercourse. 

 Delivery of foreign military sales items can be performed in conjunction 

with combined operations and contingencies or with other training programs 

conducted by the geographic combatant commands. These operations may also 

be conducted by various departments and agencies of the US government. 
 54 

Building Partner/Regional Capacity to Counter IW Threats 

 Insurgencies rely on IW to devalue US and other pro-democratic efforts. 

Building partnerships with allied and coalition forces comprises an important 

defense against adversaries using IW. Regional partnerships serve the strategic 

purpose of reducing instability, preventing terrorist attacks, and reducing the 

potential for expanded conflict. Forward planning in constructing partnerships 

enables US forces, when the need arises, to rely on these states’ indigenous 

forces. 

 In some instances, the best solution may be to work with strong allied 

partners to increase their capability and capacity to work with less capable PNs. 

This approach is especially important in regions where historical post-colonial 

relationships and regional balance-of-power influences provide strong allied 

partners who have greater access and influence than the US. This approach 

may also reduce the political stigma associated with US assistance efforts in 

some countries and regions. The US government may still need to make 

equipment and training available to the PN and its allies. Ultimately, BPC efforts 

should enable a PN to assume primary responsibility for deterring and preventing 

security challenges to itself and US national interests. 

Persistent Presence 

Persistence is key to effective operations in IW. The joint force needs a 

persistent regional presence to understand and affect the operational 

environment and our adversaries. Periodic short-duration deployments to at-risk 

states may be an inadequate operational approach because the short-term 

results of these deployments may be reversed quickly by adversary 

countermeasures and by the inertia common in failed and failing states. This 

continuity of effort may depend on the ability of joint force members to establish 

and maintain long-term interpersonal relationships with their counterparts in the 

relevant US missions and with foreign governments, traditional political 

authorities, and security forces. 

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 

 Because of the diversity of IW threats, goals, objectives, and constraints, 

strategy development should be region- and situation-dependent. This IW 

strategy development process should always, with the exception of UW, begin 

with the context and groundwork established by the TSCP. Strategies may 

require a more dynamic force allocation and presentation process to provide the 

flexibility and adaptability to counter numerous threats in multiple areas. To be 

effective, strategy should use an effects-based approach to operations that uses 

lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Within EBAO all military operations are 

designed to produce certain outcomes and to avoid effects that are undesirable. 
 55 

Emerging Concept

 Many capabilities associated 

with network warfare and electronic 

warfare often have high level 

authorization requirements. Plans 

that include employing these 

capabilities should be coordinated 

early in the process. The Air Force 

has done a lot to facilitate the 

employment cyber capabilities, 

including resolution of legal issues, 

primarily Titles 10/50, U.S.C., 

distinctions. Constitutional 

protections are always preserved. 

Understanding the Environment and History of the Region 

 Understanding the environment and history of the region is a prerequisite 

to effective strategy development in any conflict. The environment, historical 

processes, and events that spawn insurgencies and counterinsurgencies shape 

the goals, objectives, and strategies of regional adversaries. This in turn will 

determine adversary capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures (e.g., 

terrorism, criminal activities, and propaganda). The environment and history also 

determine the capabilities and needs of the counterinsurgent or insurgent forces 

the US is supporting. Friendly forces should develop a combined strategy that 

exploits the respective strengths of the friendly forces and attacks the 

weaknesses of the adversaries. 

 Understanding the culture is indispensable to making effective decisions 

and avoiding costly mistakes. National and sub-national cultures may have 

different priorities of concerns or expectations of government. Without a 

thorough understanding of their culture, commanders may expect the population 

of the PN to hold the same values and expectations the US considers important. 

This “mirror-imaging” is often counterproductive and frequently leads to 

ineffective strategies that may have disastrous results. 

 While fundamental principles remain, the specifics of each situation are 

unique. It is unlikely that a universal template using previous IW experience will 

be appropriate for a new conflict. 

Integration with Political and Other Interagency Organizations 

Strategy development is affected by the organizational construct 

developed by the JFC or supported governmental organization. For example, 

Airmen may find themselves in support of a joint interagency task force (JIATF), 

JTF, military assistance group, or 

embassy team. Regardless of the 

organizational construct, political 

considerations remain central to any 

strategy. Airmen should be involved at 

every level to properly present Air Force 

capabilities and limitations, and 

integrate these into the overall strategy. 

The JFC level normally integrates 

and deconflicts military IW strategy 

development with the plans and 

operations of interagency organizations, 

international organizations, and NGOs. 

The JFACC then develops the air 

component’s strategy to meet the JFC’s 

IW objectives. While still an emerging 
 56 

The solution of this problem requires imagination, professional 

skill, and a fine sense of judgment by the commander of the counterinsurgency forces. He must protect the population and at the same time 

destroy insurgent elements within it. He must understand the population 

and the conditions which dictate the political operations of government. 

Tactical success may compromise strategic goals. 

―General Curtis E. Lemay 

concept, cyberspace integration should not be overlooked. 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

 Unity of effort during the strategy development and throughout the 

planning phases is instrumental to formulating a coherent achievable plan. The 

role of ongoing activities such as Air Force security cooperation, theater security 

cooperation, US aid to international development operations, and embassy team 

initiatives is applicable and all associated elements of national power should be 

integrated during the early stages of planning. Air planners should begin the 

planning process with a firm understanding of the strategic context and the 

mission of the JFC. 

Commander’s Estimate 

 Due to the vast differences between IW and traditional warfare as well as 

the spectrum of activities within IW, some unique considerations should be 

addressed. The complex nature of irregular threats presents a broad and 

extensive set of interconnected problems that typically extend beyond the 

political boundaries of a single state. To systematically account for and 

understand the problems associated with this type of warfare, the commander’s 

estimate should begin with the grand strategy and account for the multitude of 

different planning and participating organizations that hold a stake in the overall 

operation. In IW, the initial focus of the commander’s estimate is on 

understanding the environment and the problem it presents. It is often harder to 

define the problem than to solve it. Therefore, it is imperative for commanders to 

use all available resources (time and personnel permitting) to understand the 

strategic context of the current situation. Failure to comprehend the current 

situation may often lead to the implementation of a COA that was developed to 

solve “the wrong problem.” Once the crisis or problem is understood, 

commanders can determine the appropriate COA. 

Operational Art 

 “Operational art represents the essential link between the overall strategy 

for the operation or campaign and the tactical details of its conduct. It 

encompasses the processes of planning, conducting, sustaining, assessing, and 

adapting operations and campaigns to meet strategic and operational objectives. 
 57 

Operational art determines what will be accomplished in the battlespace; it is 

guided by the “why” from the strategic level and implemented by the “how” at the 

tactical level.” (AFDD 2, Operations and Organization) 

 Operational art requires an effects-based methodology that uses the full 

range of capabilities available and considers innovative ways to employ them. 

Operational art and design bridge the gap between the overall strategy and the 

executable plan. When feasible, plans should encourage and support PN 

solutions to their problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency to reduce 

the possibility of direct US military involvement. This requires an emphasis on 

efforts to develop and sustain self-sufficiency. The Air Force provides capability 

from building partnership capacity to direct combat operations. 

 As with strategy development, operational art and design are iterative. IW 

requires repeated assessments from different perspectives to see the various 

factors and relationships that affect operations. Assessment and learning enable 

incremental improvements to the plan. 

To achieve operational effects, planners develop strategies responsive to 

the JFC’s objectives. Since the JFC provides guidance and direction during 

strategy development, it is essential that the air component be represented to 

articulate its capabilities in this phase of operational design. A large portion of 

the air component’s missions in IW combat operations is likely to provide 

capability to ground forces (e.g., airlift, ISR, and CAS) which require the 

development of integrating plans based on an understanding of the objectives, 

strategies, and constraints of the ground forces. In this case, strategy should be 

developed in close coordination with the ground commanders’ process to assure 

that the air component’s capabilities are effectively exploited and limitations are 

understood and minimized. 

The air component may operate independently in other types of IW 

operations such as in air-related FID or shaping and deterrence operations. 

Additionally, the air component may be in the lead role for wide area surveillance 

and security, which may allow friendly ground forces to better concentrate their 

operations or operate in small dispersed elements. Monitoring significant border 

areas and other grey areas requires a close coordinated effort ensuring limited 

assets provide maximum effect. ISR and strategic attack are also critical in 

targeting high-value or time-sensitive targets such as terrorist leaders and 

WMDs. In these air-centric IW missions, overarching strategy development is 

conducted by the air component through the appropriate AOC and requires close 

coordination with other joint and government agencies. 

 Commanders should understand that the contributions of the Air Force in 

many IW situations are designed principally to apply indirect effects to influence 

relevant populations. While lethal operations and the application of traditional 

military force may be necessary, commanders should examine all air, space, and 
 58 

cyberspace capabilities and select those most appropriate to achieve the effects 

required over what may be a protracted time period. In irregular operations, 

commanders should understand that the application of military force is in 

support of other instruments of national power, and that traditional joint 

force organizational relationships may not be as effective for irregular 

operational environments. 

Legal Considerations 

IW missions may be governed by unclear or emerging international law. 

As a matter of policy, US forces comply with the LOAC during all armed conflicts, 

however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations. 

Since IW contingencies may develop very rapidly and in locations where US 

forces have not traditionally operated, arrangements that might otherwise be in 

place, such as a status-of-forces agreement, may not exist. The legal constraints 

on the use of US funds, equipment, and supplies to directly support non-US 

personnel may be complicated. Contingency contracting and the employment of 

local laborers may also present legal challenges. ROE for IW are often 

constrained and sensitive to the political and social conditions surrounding the 

operation. 

If operations progress from BPC in a shaping and deterring activity to 

support to COIN operations, the commander should anticipate changing the 

ROE. Potentially employing forces in harm’s way, especially in situations where 

the US is conducting direct support (not involving combat), the ROE should be 

clearly understood by all operating forces. In addition, operations conducted in 

such close proximity to the civilian population also present LOAC and ROE 

challenges. Commanders should be aware of the potential of rapidly changing 

ROE and the need to inform subordinates as these changes occur. Ensuring 

Airmen understand the commander’s intent and ROE may often reduce the 

chance of a small tactical error resulting in a strategic setback. 

Operational Phases 

 Campaign plans should typically outline the general phases of the 

operation. Phasing assists the JFC to organize operations by integrating 

subordinate operations and helps him/her visualize and think through the entire 

operation or campaign. There are generally five planning phases: deter, seize 

the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. Each phase 

represents a subdivision of the campaign’s intermediate objectives during which 

a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in 

similar or mutual supporting activities. Phasing may not be as clear-cut in IW. 

The JFC may find himself entering an insurgency in something other than the 

shaping phase. The Air Force may find itself directly involved in phase II (seize 

the initiative) and phase III (dominate). JFCs should be aware that shaping 

operations may take place during all five phases and any actions taken to win 

phases II and III may significantly affect subsequent phases (positively or 
 59 

negatively). Especially in COIN operations, JFCs may also find themselves in 

different phases, in different countries, with different campaigns at the same time. 

 Therefore, the operational environment and military involvement in COIN 

may not follow the traditional phasing model (Figure 4.2). Operations may solely 

concentrate on shaping and deterring aggression. Additionally, active 

participation in a PN’s COIN efforts may have different types of phases. Since 

COIN campaigns are not small versions of big wars, the classic six levels of 

phasing an operation may not be appropriate. Refer to the counterinsurgency 

phases discussion for the differences between the possible phases of a COIN 

compared to traditional operational phases. 

Figure 4.2. Phasing Model 
 60 

Shaping and Deterring Operations 

 Shaping and deterring operations should normally be outlined in a TSCP. 

During shaping, US and interagency forces, in concert with the PN, conduct 

activities to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and ensure or solidify 

relationships with friends and allies. Shaping operations should be designed to 

positively affect the perceptions of the PN government and influence the behavior 

of both adversaries and allies. 

 Planning for these operations may be typified by small unit deployments to 

cooperative states. These forces will most likely work with and rely on the PN for 

COUNTERINSURGENCY PHASES

First Phase (Defensive in nature) - Prepare and Consolidate 

This initial phase consists of analysis and planning with the PN, preparation and 

deployment of the COIN forces along with the commensurate FID programs and 

IDAD resources to deter the insurgents. Initiatives by the PN’s government require 

all instruments of national power to be combined into a single, integrated IDAD 

program using both military and civilian resources. The IDAD strategy needs to be 

implemented early enough to prevent an insurgency but can also be employed to 

counter an insurgency that has already matured. The use of indigenous forces is 

fundamental to the success of this phase. This phase is typified by holding and 

consolidation activities in order to deter the insurgents and allow time for the COIN 

strategy to begin working. 

Second Phase (Offensive in nature) - Seize the Initiative/Dominate the Battlespace 

The Offensive phase includes the application of indirect military actions with the aim 

of defeating the enemy by destroying his will to fight and winning the “hearts and 

minds” of the populace. In this phase, the PN’s (not the US’) capability to secure and 

safeguard the populace is increased while other aspects of the COIN strategy resolve 

social and political grievances. The PN government must reoccupy contested areas 

in order to de-legitimize the insurgents and deny them the support of the populace or 

environment for their operations. 

Third Phase – Transition, Conciliation, and Re-integration 

This phase is typified by stabilizing the situation and enabling civil authorities of the 

PN government. The PN is no longer severely threatened, good government and 

rule of law exist; and social grievances are resolved. This phase is similar to normal 

stability operations. 

Fourth and Final phase - Long-term Nation-building 

―Operationalizing COIN, 

Joseph D. Celeski, 

 JSOU Report 05-2, September 2005 
 61 

basic logistical support (billeting, basing, and food) and be supported by the 

COMAFFOR for those resources the PN cannot provide. Operations will tend to 

be long-term in duration requiring coordination for force rotations and 

sustainment. 

 Shaping and deterring operations may also include limited precision 

engagements. Air strikes on known training camps or sanctuaries in noncooperative states may be conducted. These operations typically have well 

defined military targets and a short duration, and will most likely be planned and 

executed similar to traditional warfare. These operations often play a large role 

in countering terrorist organizations. 

Counterterrorism 

 Counterterrorism operations should also be outlined in the TSCP. In most 

cases counterterrorism operations require the long-range employment of certain 

Air Force assets. Conducting operations against these loosely-networked 

organizations may require significant time for the level of intelligence capabilities 

to mature. BPC aids in this process. 

 As more actionable intelligence is gathered, US forces may be called upon 

to conduct indirect and direct operations. Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities 

provide a range of options for the JFC when deciding how and when to strike a 

potential terrorist target set. Plans beyond the steady-state operations are 

normally short in duration and may rely heavily on the Air Force’s lethal and nonlethal capabilities. The ability to generate operations quickly and deliver precise 

effects is critical as terrorist targets are often fleeting. 

Support to COIN 

 Supporting PN’s COIN operations may present the greatest challenge for 

air planners. The maturity of the insurgency, the magnitude of operations 

conducted by the PN, PN capabilities, and US policy will significantly impact US 

involvement. 

Indirect Support 

 Indirect support emphasizes Air Force efforts to develop and sustain hostnation self-sufficiency. Security assistance, appropriately supplemented by 

joint/multinational exercises and other joint initiatives, constitutes the primary Air 

Force contribution to indirect support FID operations. 

Direct Support Not Involving Combat 

 When it is impractical for a PN air force to develop self-sufficiency in time 

to counter the threat, the Air Force may be tasked to provide direct support that 

does not commit US personnel to combat. Such support encompasses Service-
 62 

funded activities that improve PN Air Force effectiveness without duplicating or 

replacing SA efforts to create or maintain PN capabilities. Air Force activities 

should emphasize the PN’s combat role. These support activities may include: 

 

 Command and control—create a tailored AOC that integrates PN capabilities 

and leadership. 

 Communications—open channels to use Air Force communications assets. 

 Positioning, navigation and timing aids—provide equipment and training. 

 Intelligence collection and analysis—apply Air Force ISR to defeating irregular 

networks. 

 Aerial photography and cartography—ensure National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency (NGA) products are available to PN. 

 Air mobility and logistics—provide training and fly in conjunction with PN 

forces. 

 Logistics support—provide theater experts and reachback to US logistics 

pipeline. 

 Civil-military operations assistance—civil affairs, IO personnel, humanitarian 

assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and military civic action. 

Direct Support Involving Combat

 On order, the Air Force may engage in combat operations to meet PN and 

US objectives. Planners should determine requirements based on the PN’s 

IDAD strategy. Supporting a PN’s COIN efforts will most likely present limitations 

and constraints not often found in traditional warfare. In addition, the need to 

maintain the PN’s legitimacy and their role in COIN may result in less efficient 

tactical employment of airpower, but should ultimately be more effective (e.g., 

flying more sorties using PN capability rather than one US sortie). 

 Support to COIN will most likely be a long-term commitment. Planning 

should determine a sustainable operations tempo as well as the appropriate 

force requirements. The long-term nature requires close coordination between 

the COMAFFOR’s AOC and A-staff. Plans need to consider the effect of 

sustained operations on assets and personnel. Force rotation plans should be 

coordinated and understood between both organizations. The level of effort may 

change as the conflict evolves requiring the ability to surge when and where 

required. Understanding that the nature of the conflict may change multiple 

times requires planners to continually rely on feedback and assessment in order 

to shape operations and modify existing plans. 
 63 

COIN 

 COIN operations will most likely require the greatest commitment of 

assets and personnel. The US will most likely conduct COIN operations when 

the PN is incapable of conducting any substantial operations, the situation has 

deteriorated significantly (approaching a failed state environment), or when there 

is no effective government in power (failed state). When there is no legitimate 

government in power, coalition partners and the US will most likely be 

responsible for all aspects of the COIN strategy. Thus, some of the restrictions 

and limitations on employment that occurred while providing capabilities to a 

PN’s COIN effort may be reduced. However, creating a legitimate government 

will often be far more difficult in this situation. The Air Force will not only be 

called upon to conduct military operations but also execute missions for other 

agencies. Tremendous demands for Air Force capabilities may be placed on the 

air component. 

Support to Insurgency 

 UW should not be seen as merely defensive in nature. It may also include 

offensive operations as well. UW operations can be used to exploit a hostile 

power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerability by 

developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US and coalition 

strategic objectives. UW is defined as a broad spectrum of military and 

paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted 

through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, 

equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It 

includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence 

activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. (JP 1-02) 

 While traditionally a SOF responsibility, UW is an operating arena of 

growing significance to Air Force general purpose forces. In a conflict 

environment characterized by rogue states, radical nationalism, terrorism, and 

asymmetric warfare, the ability to successfully apply air, space, and cyberspace 

in joint and combined UW operations is critical to US defense needs. The joint 

special operations air component commander, in particular, should be aware of 

current Air Force capabilities and employment methods to deal with threats that 

do not readily yield to other conventional solutions. UW operations are usually 

conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory 

across the operational continuum. 

 Support to insurgency is usually a long-term effort focused on achieving 

strategic aims directly, i.e., the insurgency or partisan resistance movement 

results in the fall of the incumbent government. While armed force may be 

employed, the focus of insurgency and support to insurgency should promote 

political mobilization and legitimacy. 
 64 

 Planning efforts for UW are normally conducted by SOF elements. UW 

may follow some of the insurgent strategies described in Appendix A. Air Force 

capabilities provide unconventional forces with significant capabilities for 

preparing the operational environment, supporting UW activities, and supporting 

massed forces during the latter stages of an insurgency. Since the line between 

lawful support for an insurgency and a “use of force” under the United Nations 

Charter can be thin, planners should carefully coordinate these activities that 

cause direct effects when integrated with indigenous forces. 

Preparation of the Operational Environment 

 UW operations may be carried out by, with, and through indigenous and 

paramilitary forces to prepare a combat operating arena prior to the introduction 

of main battle forces. When UW operations support conventional operations, the 

focus may shift to primarily military objectives. Indigenous/surrogate forces delay 

and disrupt hostile military operations, neutralize key targets, destroy enemy 

lines of communication, disrupt/isolate enemy resources and C2 nets, develop 

intelligence collection sources and methods, and establish networks and contacts 

for unconventional assisted recovery operations. Integrating traditional Air Force 

capabilities provide significant advantages to these UW forces. 

 The Air Force provides critical ISR, IO, and mobility capabilities for UW 

forces. Low signature assets can provide timely intelligence on an adversary’s 

movements and forces as well as insert and extract critical liaison elements to 

provide IO support. 

 When UW operations are not in support of a larger traditional campaign, 

Air Force assets may have to play a more covert or clandestine role. Planning 

efforts and operations will tend to be on a much smaller scale than other IW 

operations. UW will most likely require long-term sustained support. 

Supporting UW Activities 

 During the early stages of a UW campaign, using and incorporating Air 

Force architectures for gathering, analyzing and disseminating timely intelligence 

information can significantly contribute to UW operations. Providing UW support 

requires in-depth knowledge of the operational environment. It is unlikely that a 

single UW campaign will be the only ongoing operation in an area of 

responsibility (AOR). A small, dedicated planning staff may be needed to identify 

and integrate UW requirements with other air operations. 

Supporting Massed Forces 

 As an insurgency matures to the point where direct confrontation with the 

adversary’s government begins, airpower plays a larger, more traditional role. 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM provides one such example of the effect of 
 65 

overwhelming support of unconventional forces. The incorporation of air, space, 

and cyberspace capabilities will follow more traditional planning and execution 

models. Using airpower with indigenous forces allows other US forces to 

concentrate, reducing the need for large force requirements. 

 Once US or coalition forces have removed the regime and the insurgency 

becomes the legitimate government, a transition from UW operations to stability 

operations may take place. The failure to identify and plan for this transition may 

have an adverse effect on US stabilization operations and the new PN’s IDAD 

strategy. 

ASSESSMENT 

 The principal objective in IW operations must be to outthink, outperform, 

and adapt faster than the enemy locally, regionally, and globally in order to deny 

him the ability to set conditions favorable to his goals. Local commanders within 

the IW operational area should continually assess employment and support 

activities to determine the effects and implications of their actions while following 

the JFC’s overall intent. The ambiguities resident within IW require frequent 

adjustment of operational plans to ensure desired effects are achieved while 

avoiding specifically designated or unintended negative consequences. 

 Continuous operational assessment and adjustment are best achieved at 

the lowest appropriate operational level. Operations should be flexible and 

integrate both civil and military activities, to include the supported government 

and coalition partners. Significant C2 interoperability challenges in joint, 

interagency, and multinational operations typically involve incompatible 

equipment and standards, language barriers, differing C2 procedures, lack of PN 

experience, and inadequate PN logistics infrastructures to maintain modern 

communications equipment. Commanders should be fully cognizant of these 

limitations and structure processes for transmitting information and orders 

appropriately. 

 In most forms of IW, operational assessment (OA) will be more subjective 

than in traditional warfare. When there is not a large enemy fielded force and 

clear supporting infrastructure, there will be far fewer metrics available that can 

be easily quantified. Since a large part of the desired effects deal with feelings 

and perceptions among the local civilian populace, rather than with more 

conventional measures such as percentage reduction in combat power, OA 

personnel should train to deal with more intangible metrics. Likewise, 

commanders should be ready to make decisions based on inputs from their OA 

teams that may be subjective and incomplete. 
 66 

CHAPTER FIVE 

IW OPERATIONS 

 Irregular warfare demands continuous, flexible, integrated interagency and 

international planning and execution with the goal of preventing or, when 

necessary, responding to challenges within coherent global and regional 

strategies. The key to success in such a protracted conflict is the ability to adapt 

to meet the imperatives of the operational environment and develop JIIM 

capacity for IW and properly integrate and apply force capabilities at the right 

place and time. The imprecise nature of IW dictates that both force presentation 

and C2 relationships be tailored to the demands of the operational environment. 

See AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, for more detailed information. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

 Air Force forces deploy and employ under the command of a single 

Airman, the COMAFFOR. These forces, including personnel and equipment, are 

presented in the normal air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) structure. 

The AETF presents a scalable, tailorable organization with three elements: a 

single COMAFFOR, appropriate command and control mechanisms, and tailored 

and fully supported forces. The AETF presents the JFC with a task-organized, 

integrated package with the appropriate balance of capabilities, sustainment, 

control, and force protection. Regardless of the size, composition, or command 

structure established for conducting an IW campaign, commanders should still 

adhere to the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution. However, 

while these principles are valid for all force employment, their application may be 

different in the operational environments of IW. 

C2 Planning 

 The determination of the capabilities required and the establishment of C2 

structures and command relationships of the forces that execute missions are of 

utmost importance in the planning process. Planners and leaders should 

understand that command structures for IW activities will most likely be different 

than our current military construct. 

 Air Force planners may have to adapt and develop creative C2 

relationships to facilitate successful mission accomplishment and optimize the 

tenet of centralized control/decentralized execution. Due to the localized nature 

of most IW enemies and specifically insurgencies, decentralized execution is vital 

to the successful integration of airpower. 

 Most operations in IW will be multinational and interagency in nature. 

Variables affecting the C2 arrangement include the type of operation, type of 
 67 

Air Operations in Malaya 

 The problem of reconciling 

decentralized control of ground 

operations with centralized control of air 

operations presented many difficulties. 

A number of experiments were tried out 

with the object of trying to decentralize a 

measure of control of air operations in 

parallel with the break-down of control 

of ground operations, but the fact that 

air effort is indivisible invariably 

undermined these arrangements in 

practice. Eventually, after a good deal 

of trial and error, a workable 

compromise was reached whereby the 

local State and District War executives 

were able to call upon the services of a 

mobile team of Air Staff Planners, 

established on the Air Headquarters, 

whilst control of air operations remained 

centralized under the Air Officer 

Commanding. 

―Air Operations in Malaya, 

Group Captain K.R.C. Slater 

forces, specific mission objectives, the existing PN C2 infrastructure, and the 

participation of multinational partners or intergovernmental organizations. At a 

minimum, C2 planning should ensure that Air Force planners are integrated into 

the appropriate level of planning for distributed operations and that Airmen 

command Air Force forces at all appropriate levels. 

 The TACS is a good 

example of an Air Force 

organization that can be adapted or 

modified by the commander to 

meet the challenges of IW. The 

current TACS organization is 

optimized for a theater-level 

traditional warfare with the AOC as 

the senior C2 element and focal 

point for all Air Force operations. 

During COIN operations, the 

preponderance of planning and 

integration of other Services occurs 

at lower distributed echelons. 

These distributed operations, which 

may not be mutually supporting at 

the tactical level, should be fully 

coordinated between commanders 

at the component level. Often the 

tactical or local situation drives the 

appropriate response and the 

situation in one area may be vastly 

different from numerous other 

areas. The level of success in one 

area may also progress at a 

different rate than another. 

 Certain operations require 

planning at the operational level while other operations may need to be 

developed at lower echelons. The air support operations center (ASOC) may aid 

in this effort. The ASOC provides the JFACC a vital link between air and ground 

operations. The ASOC will normally have more insight and situational awareness 

of ground operations conducted at the corps level and below. As operations 

become more dynamic, early air planning conducted at the corps level by Airmen 

may result in more timely, effective, and efficient uses of Air Force assets prior to 

ground forces submitting their requests. IW requires a planning structure that is 

equally focused at the local level and attuned to the dynamic environment. 

Airmen appropriately positioned at the lower levels with respective input and 

reachback to the AOC may allow more effective use of airpower at the tactical 

level freeing other assets to conduct other operational level operations. 
 68 

 Since Air Force capabilities can transition from one operational area to 

another, it is imperative that there is only one airspace control authority and one 

airspace control plan per joint force operation, and ideally only one per theater. 

There may be several locally executed IW engagements within a theater of 

operations requiring the coordination of all distributed planning activity and 

operations that may impact airspace control. By allowing some aspect of 

planning to occur at these lower levels and coordinating them at the operational 

level, the JFACC maintains the flexibility to better allocate his resources while still 

ensuring proper airspace control is applied. 

Each IW contingency is different, and no single planning template 

can be applied to every operation. Commanders and planners should 

consider the objectives, duration, environment, and forces when developing 

plans determining their requirements. A key planning consideration is that IW 

enemies evolve over time; commanders and their staffs should recognize that an 

operation that begins with a particular characteristic may turn into something else 

with different political objectives, threats, and requirements. The ability to change 

and adapt in IW often requires intimate knowledge of the local conditions in 

which operations take place. Commanders should balance the ability to centrally 

plan at the operational level with the potential need to rapidly plan and execute at 

those lower echelons. “A reluctance to delegate decisions to subordinate 

commanders slows down C2 operations and takes away the subordinates’ 

initiative.” (AFDD 2-8) 

 

 IW requires protracted intelligence and operational preparation activities, 

BPC of state and non-state partners, and integration of interagency and 

multinational IW activities with US missions. Given that success in IW generally 

requires political initiatives, current JTF organizations reporting directly to the 

CCDR may not facilitate critical interagency and multinational coordination. The 

requirement for extensive coordination between these groups in IW may require 

the establishment of alternative command structures. While the CCDR will still 

provide prioritization and force allocation across broad AOR activities, the 

COMAFFOR may present Air Force forces to smaller joint task forces in a 

supporting role or as specifically attached AETFs. US military groups with 

expanded operational authorities within the traditional country team construct and 

operating under direct guidance of a chief of mission or other non-traditional C2 

structure may be developed to meet specific circumstances. However, the 

theater level COMAFFOR, through a theater-level air control system, may still 

provide the best means for prioritization and provision of limited strategic assets 

in support of coordinated IW activities. These new structures necessitate 

development of appropriate planning, coordination, allocation, and deconfliction 

liaison elements. 
 69 

Geographical Considerations 

 Each IW operation is dynamic and unique. The location of operations, 

bases, and the general geography in the operational area may present the 

COMAFFOR with other C2 alternatives. The assets and capabilities inherent in 

the Air Force allow operations to originate from continental US (CONUS)-based 

and regional locations, or from in the operational area. IW operations may have 

assets originating from all three locations simultaneously. The diffuse nature of 

ongoing operations is particularly challenging as the COMAFFOR provides 

critical support to both air and ground forces throughout the theater. These 

capabilities should be flexible enough to achieve the desired effect that the IW 

mission warrants. 

CONUS Basing 

 The ability to project influence across large distances is a great benefit in 

IW. The most important aspect of this is to get the right people, supplies, and 

needed reachback to the region where IW is being conducted. Intertheater airlift 

and aerial refueling enables the US to conduct IW operations across the globe. 

In some cases, cyberspace and space-based capabilities allow the US to 

conduct global operations without leaving their permanent base, while global 

strike operations may be generated from and return to CONUS bases. 

 These global capabilities are available simultaneously to multiple 

geographic CCDRs. As such, prioritizing these capabilities is increasingly 

important. In order to provide effective and timely support to the CCDR, these 

capabilities are presented through the COMAFFOR. The high demand for these 

capabilities may dictate that a supporting/supported relationship be established. 

For more discussion on supporting relationships, see AFDD 2. 

Emerging Concept

 IW will require the joint force to conduct protracted IPE and OPE 

[intelligence preparation and operational preparation of the environment] 

efforts, build the IW capability of state and non-state partners, and plan, 

coordinate, synchronize, and integrate interagency IW activities with US 

Missions around the world. The current use of Joint Task Forces reporting 

directly to Geographic Combatant Commanders does not facilitate any of 

these critical interagency and multinational IW activities. In the future, 

combatant commanders will have alternative C2 mechanisms for conducting 

and supporting IW when a JTF is not required to conduct large-scale combat 

operations. Some of the alternatives will require changes to current 

authorities. 

―IW Joint Operating Concept 
 70 

Theater-based Forces

 Theater or regional basing allows the Air Force to provide greater 

capability and flexibility in IW. With regional basing, transit times for aircraft and 

unmanned aircraft (UA) are shortened, allowing longer on-station and loiter 

times. Airlift operations and aeromedical evacuation operations are also more 

responsive and timely. Theater basing allows commanders the flexibility to surge 

and divert forces in order to influence operations in multiple AOs. 

 However, the complexity of IW may make this wholesale interoperability of 

forces less effective. Due to the diffuse and local nature of IW, in-depth 

understanding of the tactical situation in each of these locations is essential. The 

situation, requirements, and effects required in one area may be drastically 

different from another. Thorough understanding of the operating environment 

requires time and experience. 

 When the majority of forces available to the COMAFFOR are, in general, 

regionally based, C2 at the theater AOC may provide the most efficient C2 

arrangement in order to achieve the JFC’s objectives. Centralized planning of 

LD/HD assets using a theater perspective is required to meet the competing 

demands from multiple operational areas. In this situation, it is imperative for the 

COMAFFOR to receive clear guidance as to the JFC’s prioritized effort. 

Understanding the JFC’s main effort will allow the COMAFFOR to make more 

informed decisions and shape operations accordingly. When supporting ground 

forces in different AOs, direct supporting relationships between specific units may 

enhance air forces’ situational awareness of the local conditions and effects 

required. Direct supporting relationships provide the COMAFFOR with the 

flexibility to shift focus and mass forces from one operational area to another 

while still allowing subordinate units to focus and enhance their knowledge on 

certain AOs. 

Basing Inside the Joint Operations Area (JOA) 

 Basing Air Force assets within the JOA can provide unique advantages 

compared to CONUS or theater basing. Almost every aspect of airpower is more 

effective by being based closer to the JOA. Inside-the-JOA basing (near-basing) 

should increase Airmen’s understanding of the operating environment and 

 Experience in one location cannot be assumed to apply to the 

environment of another. Over-emphasis on experience gained in a particular 

operation and environment can lead to inaccurate conclusions about the 

requirements and capabilities needed elsewhere, and could result in 

conceptual inflexibility in both hardware and general support. 

—Air Force Manual 2-5, 

10 March 1967 
 71 

Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in Vietnam 

FACs conducted visual reconnaissance in the same area every day. 

They became familiar with the terrain and regular activity in their sector and 

would notice if any big changes took place. Based with the Army units they 

supported, the forces in action below them were not strangers. FACs had a 

divided command structure. They lived with the Army, and their mission 

orders came through a different chain. The FACs' operational boss was an air 

liaison officer attached to an Army headquarters. 

—Multiple sources 

increase capabilities. Near-basing will increase loiter time while reducing transit 

and response time. Possible negatives of basing inside the JOA include force 

protection concerns due to an increased footprint and increased logistical and 

communication requirements. Generally speaking, the closer airpower gets to 

the JOA, the greater the risk, yet the greater the utility. 

 Just as basing inside the JOA provides potential advantages, delegating 

command authorities to subordinate Airmen may do the same. In IW, multiple 

JOAs may be established within an AOR. Assets based in a particular JOA may 

routinely be tasked to create effects for that specific JOA. Increasing the role of 

subordinate C2 nodes (such as the ASOC) may enhance integration and 

increase airpower’s effectiveness. That said, the JFACC must retain the 

flexibility to shift airpower capabilities throughout the theater when needed, 

based on the JFC’s priorities. To be successful, subordinate nodes should be 

provided unambiguous statements of the JFC’s and JFACC’s intent, ROE, and 

operational guidance. 

 It is important to note that when supporting an insurgency, Air Force 

assets will most likely be unable to base within the JOA and may be required to 

base further away from the area of operations. This may result in additional ACS 

and operational considerations. Also, care should be given to ensuring 

operational security to avoid compromising mission success or involving third 

party nations. 

Environment for Employment 

 In IW, small unit employment of forces from remote locations may become 

more prevalent. This is especially true when conducting early shaping and 

deterring operations through BPC. Operating in remote areas has numerous 

implications. It can increase requirements to live off the local economy and affect 

the types of communications equipment used by deployed IW forces when they 

are operating without benefit of large fixed-base communications structures. 
 72 

 Major environmental factors affecting planning and execution include 

physical and psychological pressures from hostile elements, social 

fragmentation, political instability, and economic impoverishment. Difficult 

terrain, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed 

infrastructures often will impede counterinsurgency and insurgency operations. 

Air Force capabilities are inherently flexible and can overcome many of these 

obstacles. 

 Given such environmental features as poor infrastructures, limited reachback, and increased risk, it is essential that Air Force personnel functioning as 

small units (e.g., embedded trainers and advisors for either UW or FID) are 

specifically organized, trained, and equipped to operate and survive for extended 

periods of time independent of traditional C2 and support structures. Experience 

indicates that personal safety and performance are maximized when personnel 

are organized into teams with mutually supporting, interdependent skill sets. 

These teams should be capable of operating autonomously with maximum self 

sufficiency, which in turn supports reduced presence and logistics signature while 

deployed. 

 However, the potential for larger scale operations in IW is equally likely. 

Commanders still need to support and provide for Air Force forces operating from 

multiple areas at once. The requirements for support may be drastically different 

for each operating area. This will create increased demand for airlift throughout 

the theater. All of these factors emphasize the importance of clearly stated 

command relationships and chain of command. 

Force Presentation 

 Although forces are presented through the AETF construct, they may be 

tailored differently from traditional warfare operations. Two considerations that 

should be taken into account when tailoring and sizing AETFs for IW are (1) the 

overall US strategic aim, and (2) the US’ relationship with the PN country. 

Supporting the PN 

Air Force forces are tailored to provide capabilities for conducting activities 

in support of the PN government to bolster its legitimacy and influence over the 

relevant population. These activities include, but are not limited to, FID, 

counterterrorism (CT), military civic action (MCA), civil-military operations (CMO), 

and military support to PN COIN activities. Forces should be tailored to support 

the PN government’s IDAD plan by providing capabilities that can address 

deficiencies in PN security and governance. If the security situation in the PN is 

particularly dire and PN capabilities are lacking or inadequate, US forces may be 

required to assume the lead for COIN operations during certain times and in 

specific locations; this will most likely require a large AETF. AETFs should be 

properly sized, keeping in mind that a large US military presence in the PN 

creates a significant logistical, political, and cultural footprint. Basing forces in a 
 73 

neighboring cooperative country may or may not be a viable option, depending 

on operational or political considerations. 

 Minimal PN support can be expected from a state where the government 

is unable to conduct its own operations. This will require AETFs to possess 

robust capabilities for self-sustainment, combat support, reachback, and force 

protection. In such cases operations from theater bases may be warranted. 

However, due to political sensitivity or operational considerations, IW activities 

may require that Air Force forces operate in a covert or clandestine manner that 

may impose strict limits on the overall size of the AETF. 

Supporting Insurgencies

 Air Force forces are also tailored to provide capabilities to insurgencies. 

This includes, but is not limited to, capabilities that provide support to indigenous 

resistance movements and other related UW activities. Due to political or 

operational considerations, UW typically requires that US forces operate with 

limited visibility. 

 For IW operations supporting insurgencies, AETFs should be based in a 

neighboring cooperative country in which the same considerations discussed 

above apply. Air Force elements conducting IW activities within the affected 

state itself (e.g., battlefield Airmen embedded with indigenous resistance forces) 

should be tailored so that they possess reachback capability for limited logistics 

support, intelligence, communications, and air mobility. 

Force Protection in IW 

 Force protection requirements in IW are driven by the operational tasks 

that flow from the IW campaign plan, the US relationship with the affected 

country, and the operational environment. For IW campaigns in support of a 

cooperative state, Air Force forces will often be required to live and operate as 

embedded elements attached to PN forces. These forces may be tasked to 

conduct widely dispersed operations in very austere operating environments, far 

removed from secure main operating bases. Cooperating with PN forces for 

force protection can be valuable, given their local knowledge and the ability to 

interact with the indigenous population and move among them. However, 

commanders should continually assess the capabilities of PN security forces to 

determine if they can satisfy US force protection requirements. Force protection 

is a paramount responsibility for all Airmen and should not be viewed as a task 

falling solely to Air Force Security Forces, AFOSI, or PN forces. This may 

require that forces involved in IW receive additional combat training prior to 

deployment. 

 Force protection during IW can be a significant challenge, and advance 

planning for force protection is essential. Distributed operations with reduced 
 74 

footprints may require Airmen to provide creative solutions to maintain adequate 

force protection. Small elements may be deployed to many locations requiring 

PN support. To the extent possible, commanders should consider using incountry and host nation resources. If additional resources are required, they 

should be assigned to centrally located positions to provide maximum benefit. 

However, larger force deployments may require larger support facilities and 

bases which present a more lucrative target for adversaries. Force protection 

assessments should include threats from CBRN weapons as well as from 

conventional means. See AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection, for more detailed 

information. 

EXECUTING OPERATIONS 

 The most critical part of developing the planning for and employment of Air 

Force forces is to correctly assess the environment. The analysis should focus 

on the relevant population as well as the enemy order of battle. The analysis 

should be a complete and comprehensive country PMESII study. The 

culmination of the analysis should provide the CCDR or JFC with multiple options 

to choose and select the correct military force structure. From those options, the 

Air Force component should be ready to apply personnel, assets, processes, and 

technology to provide an integrated capability to create the desired effects. 

 As with traditional warfare, each operational area is unique. Operational 

level Air Force component command directorates, action officers, and staff 

members should be completely versed in their AOR and understand air 

component requirements for US capability and potential PN capability. The 

operational components are the key entities that tie Air Force TSCPs, combatant 

command TSCPs, and BPC requirements together to build interoperable 

capability across the AOR. This requires a great degree of detailed knowledge of 

populations, their motivations, culture, and how they are influenced. This is a key 

difference between preparing for and executing traditional warfare and IW. A 

traditional approach to conflict concentrates more on affecting the enemy’s 

leadership and military capabilities while isolating the population. In IW, this 

approach should be reversed; operations should seek to influence the population 

first, then concentrate on isolating the enemy’s leadership and influence over the 

population. 

Airspace Control 

 As with all conflict, airspace control in IW presents the JFACC numerous 

challenges in integrating military and civilian air operations. In traditional warfare 

military operations will often take priority or are conducted without the presence 

of civilian operations. In IW, especially when conducting BPC operations or 

providing support to COIN through indirect or direct operations (not involving 

combat), the JFACC should consider allowing airspace control over the operating 

area to be maintained by the PN air traffic control if it is capable of doing so. As 

the level of effort increases or if, upon direction, the joint force is tasked to 
 75 

conduct combat operations, the JFACC should assume airspace control 

authority. 

Operation Cycles 

 Within the context of a campaign plan or in conjunction with the combatant 

commander’s intent (when there is no military campaign), the goal of Air Force 

operations should be directed toward the stability and security of the PN. 

 Properly assessing the situation will lead to the sequencing of operations. 

Traditionally, sequencing implies linear time or event phasing. In IW, the enemy 

will use this predictive operational planning and execution paradigm against US 

forces by shifting their weight of effort in such a way as to disrupt operations. In 

the context of IW, sequencing can be based on time, events, relationships, 

intended consequences, or unintended consequences. 

 Employment of US forces and execution in IW generally follows a cycle of 

operations. This cycle includes: 

 Assessing PN capabilities. 

 Enabling PN (BPC). 

 Conducting direct operations (may or may not involve combat). 

 Reducing Air Force involvement in direct operations. 

 Sustainment. 

 This process is iterative and US involvement may not necessarily evolve 

to direct operations. By definition, IW is non-linear in nature, so commanders 

may have to rethink operations. It may be more useful for commanders to think 

of IW in terms of cycles of operations instead of sequencing. Effective 

operational assessment and continual reassessment of the situation is critical to 

effective IW operations. 

Enabling PN Air Capabilities 

 Part of the Air Force’s mission prior to an IW campaign or in an effort to 

avoid an IW campaign, should be to enable a PN’s airpower capability to include 

personnel training; building infrastructure for logistics, support, and sustainment; 

and platforms to conduct air operations. When conducting operations against a 

non-cooperative state, campaign planning should include a COA to leave 

airpower infrastructures intact as much a possible. Airmen should be an integral 

part of the reconstruction planning team. 

 When supporting cooperative states, executing even the most modest air 

force capabilities can provide significant contributions to IW in the form of 
 76 

delivering humanitarian aid, transportation of political leaders, government 

presence, ISR capabilities, and border security. 

 In the absence of any PN air force capability, Air Force and SOF forces 

may be tasked with assisting in building this capability. A capable and competent 

air force is not built overnight. Some capability requires infrastructure which 

requires forethought, planning, and partnership with the PN. The Air Force is 

prepared to build this capability but early identification of requirements makes the 

realization of capability happen at a faster pace. 

Conducting Direct Operations 

 Depending on the capability of the PN, direct operations may be 

conducted solely by US forces or in conjunction with PN forces. Direct 

operations will most likely be integrated with ground force operations. It is vital 

that US and PN air and ground forces be interoperable. US involvement in direct 

operations should be minimized. PN executing operations on their own behalf 

help provide legitimacy to the PN forces. 

Transitioning from Direct Operations 

 Ideally, US forces should not become involved in direct combat 

operations, but should provide indirect support to PN in an IW conflict. Whether 

the US becomes involved directly or indirectly in IW, a properly conducted IW 

campaign may take years or even decades. 

 Realizing that IW is non-linear in nature, commanders should expect that 

a reduction in presence will be non-linear as well. Some aspects of airpower will 

mature more quickly than others and the Air Force will be able to divest itself 

sooner from some aspects of employment than others. As a rule of thumb, 

Airmen should be involved in direct operations as long as US ground forces are 

conducting direct operations. Even when US ground forces cease direct 

operations, it is likely that Airmen will remain in the PN to facilitate building and 

sustaining PN air forces, since building this capability can be a lengthy process. 

Sustaining the PN 

 In providing a PN an air and space capability, it is important that Air Force 

leaders coordinate with all the partners in the interagency process. 

Understanding the capabilities that the PN can sustain is vital for long-term 

success. 

AT THE VERY HEART OF WARFARE LIES DOCTRINE...
 77 

SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications 

(Note: All AFDDs are available at https://www.doctrine.af.mil, and 

AFOTTPs at 

https://505ccw.hurlburt.af.mil/505og/505os/afottplibrary.htm) 

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

AFDD 2, Operations and Organization

AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare

AFDD 2-1.8, Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Operations

AFDD 2-2, Space Operations

AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense

AFDD 2-4, Combat Support 

AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection

AFDD 2-5, Information Operations

AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations

AFDD 2-7, Special Operations

AFDD 2-8, Command and Control

AFOTTP 2-1.1, Air and Space Strategy

Joint Publications 

JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal 

Defense 

JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support

JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations

JP 3-17, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Air 

Mobility Operations

JP 3-18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations

JP 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations

Other DOD Publications 

US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, 

Counterinsurgency

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (USMC) 12-15, Small Wars Manual

US Marine Corps. April 1987 

Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 07-6, Southern Afghanistan 

COIN Operations, US Army, October 2006 
 78 

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0, July 2007, DOD 

Other Publications 

Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting 

Insurgents and Terrorists, University Press of Kansas, 2003. 

Drew, Dennis M., “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military 

Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals,” CADRE Paper (Air University Press), March 

1988. 

Drew, Dennis M., “U.S. Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to 

Confusion,” The Journal of Military History, Vol 62, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 809-

832. 

Kiras, James D., “Terrorism and Irregular Warfare,” in Strategy in the 

Contemporary World, An Introduction to Strategic Studies, edited by James 

Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colin S. Gray. (New York: Oxford 

University Press) 2002, pp. 208-232. 

Postgate, Malcolm, Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 

1948-1960, HMSO Books, London, United Kingdom, 1992. 

Vick, Alan J.; Adam Grissom; William Rosenau; Beth Grill; Karl P. Mueller, Air 

Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF 

Advisory and Assistance Missions, Rand Corporation Report, 2006. 
 79 

APPENDIX 

UNDERSTANDING INSURGENCIES 

 While not all insurgencies are the same, they share common 

characteristics. Understanding the motivation, organization, and support 

structure of an insurgency provides the insight needed to defeat it. 

INSURGENT MOTIVATIONS 

 An insurgency is defined as an organized movement aimed at the 

overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed 

conflict. (JP 1-02) Insurgencies tend to form in situations where the local 

population is suffering from relative deprivation of basic services, perceived 

grievances, or outright oppression. These conditions are often cultivated from 

political, cultural, or religious differences, and perpetuated by insurgents who 

deliberately orchestrate an IO campaign. Unable to make significant change in 

the system that has brought about these conditions, insurgents attempt to 

modify, replace, or separate from the government through violent means. 

 Additionally, there are movements that do not seek to change some 

aspect of the existing system, but seek to destroy it. Such extremists tend to be 

religiously motivated; others embrace a fanatical ideology that seeks to destroy 

the current system. To these groups destruction may be an end in itself or it may 

compel a revolutionary change worldwide. 

 The motivations discussed below describe the strategic direction and 

objectives that an insurgency is ultimately trying to achieve. From the 

government’s perspective, as the insurgents’ goals become more drastic or 

radical, the less likely minor concessions to underlying grievances will solve the 

crisis. In those cases where motivations support separation, overthrow, or 

destruction of the existing government, responses and counterinsurgent methods 

tend to intensify. Understanding insurgents’ motivations and objectives should 

aid commanders in determining a course of action. 

Political 

 In general, insurgencies ultimately have political objectives. The source of 

political motivation results from perceived grievances with the government’s 

policies. Historically, politically based insurgencies tend to use latent, underlying 

social and economic grievances to incite the emotions of the population. They 

highlight the government’s inability or lack of desire to address or change these 

grievances. As an insurgency matures, the organization postures itself as the 

means to remedy these grievances. Ultimately, the insurgents offer alternatives 

to the populace usually in the form of either overthrowing the government or 

separating from it. Nationalist or separatist objectives normally draw upon other 
 80 

motivational factors as well as cultural and religious differences. For some 

groups political and religious motivations are often the same. 

Cultural 

 Insurgencies may spawn from cultural or ethnic differences between 

groups in a state. These types of insurgencies often form because of oppressive 

regimes that persecute a given group. Such insurgencies may take on 

nationalist overtones if the group seeks autonomy from the PN. 

Religious 

Economic 

 While insurgents can be motivated by economic grievances, this is usually 

done under the premise of countering political policies that have created the 

perceived grievance. Economic motivations discussed here result from power 

and money themselves. Criminal organizations may use IW in this regard to 

terrorize or influence a specific area in order to exploit it for their purpose. Not 

only do these profits support the insurgency, they may also be used to 

supplement and influence the local populace. The most obvious example is the 

international drug trade and associated money launderers. More importantly, 

other insurgencies and terrorist organizations, including radical extremists, may 

depend on the funds generated from these illegal activities. 

 Economic insurgencies or terrorist groups rarely seek to overthrow or 

promote change in the existing government. It is to their benefit if the 

government is incapable of supporting or governing the areas they wish to 

exploit. By providing basic services or through the use of brute terror, these 

organizations effectively control outlying areas, providing the freedom for them to 

 Insurgent groups often employ religion as a basis to portray their 

movement favorably and mobilize followers in pursuit of their political goals. 

For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army frequently used Roman 

Catholic iconography in its publications and proclamations, although many of 

its members were not devout Catholics. In other cases, a religious ideology 

may be the source of an insurgent group’s political goals. This is the case in al 

Qaeda’s apparent quest to reestablish a worldwide Muslim Caliphate. For 

many Muslims, this invokes the golden age of Islamic civilization and helps 

mobilize support for al Qaeda among some of the most traditional Muslims 

while concealing the fact that al Qaeda’s leaders envision the “restored 

Caliphate” as a totalitarian state similar to the pre-2002 Taliban regime in 

Afghanistan. 

—Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
 81 

carry out illegal activities. Being economically motivated, such organizations will 

remain as long as there is a profit to be made. 

Radical Extremism 

 Radical extremist insurgents frequently hold an all-encompassing 

worldview; they are ideologically rigid and uncompromising. Radical secular and 

Marxist movements have many characteristics similar to religious extremists. 

Belief in an extremist ideology fortifies the will of believers. Religious extremists 

think of themselves as “true believers” and brand those they consider to be “nonbelievers” as enemies. Some ideologies, such as those underlying the culture of 

martyrdom, maintain that dying for the cause will be rewarded. 

 Religious extremists may believe that pluralism and secular government 

are unacceptable and that the destruction of their ideological opponents is 

inevitable. Religion is absolute and violent extremists are often willing to use 

whatever means necessary, even violence against their own followers, to meet 

their political goals. Nevertheless, some are highly pragmatic and pursue more 

limited goals. They may form alliances of necessity in order to achieve their 

goals. Ultimately extremists see the need for revolutionary and not evolutionary 

change to the existing political system. 

 In this light, commanders should consider the presence of extremism in 

any insurgents’ ideology when evaluating possible friendly and enemy courses of 

action. While most insurgencies will often have extremist elements, they usually 

are held in check by the objectives of the organization. However, when 

extremism is the objective, insurgents resist changing their worldview; for 

religious extremists, religion is a very deeply held belief, and coexistence or 

compromise is often unacceptable. Dialog and negotiation may well prove 

unproductive and operations focused on establishing good will among such a 

populace are unlikely to be effective. 

ORGANIZATION 

 During early stages of development and maturation, most insurgencies 

display some of the following organizational elements: 

 Leaders of the organization. Typically, the leadership provides the strategic 

direction to break the ties between the people and the government and to 

establish credibility for their movement. Leaders may hold their positions 

based on their personality; power of ideas; promotion through the 

organization; or by religious, clan, or tribal authority. Though these leaders 

may not be visible, their existence and identities usually are known. 

 Active participants. These are the executors of the organization’s strategy. 

They conduct attacks, train recruits, and mobilize support. While this group is 

not as identifiable, its operations may expose it to the government. This group 
 82 

may be subdivided into “combatants” and “political cadre,” with the former 

involved in violent actions, and the latter in non-violent actions. 

 Active supporters. This group sympathizes with the insurgency cause and 

provides valuable support. This group is largely unknown to the government 

and difficult to identify. It performs such services as storing weapons and 

supplies, and providing information, funding, sanctuary, and other services. 

 Mass Base. The mass base consists of the followers of the insurgent 

movement—the supporting portion of the populace. These members may 

continue in their normal positions in society. While most do not provide 

specific services, their general support provides the resource base (financing 

and manpower) for recruiting future active supporters and participants. (FM 3-

24) 

 Population. The final element in an insurgency is the population. How the 

general population views an insurgency and reacts to it can either impede or 

promote its development. When an organization’s goals are not popular with 

the majority of society, that organization will find it difficult to mature in highly 

populated areas. This limits operations and support. However, when the 

population is indifferent, this provides an advantage for the insurgents. 

Indifference allows more operations to take place among the general 

population, making identifying, tracking, and targeting active members and 

leaders more difficult. Thus, in an urban environment with an indifferent 

population, those forces conducting counterinsurgency operations will be 

highly vulnerable. This is why the relevant population is almost always 

considered the center of gravity in IW. 

 Unlike traditional state versus state conflicts, IW pits the government of 

political states that are hierarchically organized against organizations that tend to 

be networked and loosely structured. Due to the secretive nature of 

insurgencies, especially in the early stages of development, the leadership and 

active participants tend to adopt a flat, networked structure making the 

identification of leaders difficult. Flat structures result in a movement that rarely 

functions as a single entity. However, these organizations are capable of inflicting 

substantial casualties and damage. Loose networks usually have difficulty in 

forming a viable counter state and often have infighting as different “nodes” may 

hold slightly different views; they therefore have great difficulty seizing political 

power. However, flat, loose networks are very hard to destroy and can continue 

to create instability, even when degraded. It usually takes very little coordination 

to disrupt most states. The level of decentralization of responsibility and authority 

drives the insurgency’s structure and operational procedures. 

OPERATIONS 

 The conflict in IW centers around two basic arenas: The first is the 

struggle for political legitimacy or influence and the second violent conflict. In this 

sense, insurgents have a dual advantage. Insurgents win when they prevail in 
 83 

only one of these two struggles; the government, on the other hand, must win 

both struggles or they lose. 

 Insurgents conduct operations for generally two purposes: to influence the 

population that their cause is worthy and that they will win; and to affect the 

political will of the PN government and coalition support. If insurgents are 

successful in garnering support, the movement continues to mature, potentially 

becoming strong enough to reach its goals. Subsequently, by breaking the 

coalition’s will, the insurgents then only have to defeat the PN government that, 

because intervention of coalition forces was required, is probably incapable of 

dealing with the insurgent threat and will be forced to acquiesce unless its 

capability has been increased through FID and other programs. 

 The methods used by each group are largely political and can take any 

number of forms, including violent resistance, terrorism, guerrilla war, or 

revolutionary war. For both sides, the ultimate goal in IW is to produce a positive 

psychological effect on the affected population in order to obtain support and 

weaken support for the opposing group. 

 Leaders in an insurgency generally set the strategic goals for the 

organization and allow active participants the autonomy to conduct operations. 

Thus, tactical level operations may not readily support other tactical operations 

conducted in other areas, but all operations support the strategic goal. 

Insurgents use non-violent and violent means to accomplish these goals. 

Non-violent Operations 

 Insurgents will exploit news media and the internet for communications, 

propaganda, funding, recruiting, and training. They function more like a tribal 

group, crime syndicate, or extended family than like a military or paramilitary 

organization. Using the internet, insurgents can now link virtually with allied 

groups throughout a state, a region, and even the entire world. 

 Insurgents will often use any underlying grievance that the population may 

have and use it to further fuel their cause. Thus, if there are widespread 

grievances, the organization in local areas carries out activities to satisfy them 

and attributes any solutions to the insurgency. As insurgencies mature, they tie 

all sorts of problems to larger issues requiring drastic measures. They must 

develop, build, and sustain an attractive message demonstrating moral 

superiority over the government and justification for their actions. 

 The proliferation of technology and information tools increases the amount 

of power available to insurgents and non-state actors. Individuals and 

organizations that were once contained in a particular region now have the ability 

to connect and recruit beyond state borders by collaborating and exchanging 

information virtually. Information age tools can magnify the desired effects of 

these groups and help propagate their message and cause. 
 84 

Violent Operations 

 Violent operations are performed to seek psychological effects and are 

used to support IO. In most situations, an insurgency will not have developed to 

the point where it can counter a government’s capabilities. Early operations tend 

to focus on gaining the support of the populace, furthering support, gaining 

resources, and providing a base of operations from which to achieve their 

objectives. 

 Operations often use guerilla tactics, not necessarily to win but to avoid 

losing. Guerillas fight at the times and places of their choosing, attack small or 

isolated elements of the government, and then disperse in order to blend back 

into the population. Small units that operate in a dispersed fashion can avoid 

presenting targeting opportunities to a technologically superior foe. Guerilla 

tactics also involve operating close to civilians to offset surveillance and 

firepower advantages of a stronger adversary. These tactics help the insurgent 

organization discredit, embarrass, and frustrate the government, divert attention 

away from the larger effort to garner political support, and cause the government 

to divert resources to countering the attacks. 

 IW may also involve terrorist tactics. Terrorism and counterterrorism are 

activities conducted as part of IW and are frequently elements of insurgency and 

counterinsurgency. However, terrorism may also stand alone when its purpose 

is to coerce or intimidate governments or societies without overthrowing them. 

Insurgents often aim to deliberately create and exploit fear through violence or 

the threat of violence to obtain their political goals. Terrorist tactics can create 

powerful psychological effects among the target population. 

Support 

 For either side, popular support is the source of power that provides moral 

or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. The support of the people 

ultimately determines which side prevails in IW. Thus, both attempt to convince 

the population that they should fight for their cause. 

 Insurgencies generally receive support from two critical sources: internal 

and external. Internal support is received from local active supporters and the 

mass base that either directly or indirectly supports insurgent goals and 

operations. Support is often linked to the perception of the organization’s 

legitimacy. The degree of acceptance from the mass base typically determines 

the level of support that can be garnered from them. Additionally, few 

insurgencies or terrorist campaigns succeed without some form of external 

support from another state or non-state actor. 

Internal Support. Internal support provides an insurgency with medical 

assistance, supplies, intelligence updates, and training for new recruits. 

Traditional lines of communication and supply are not as apparent in IW. Instead 

of a flow of supplies from rear areas toward front lines, insurgent organizations 

obtain supplies from within the population. The lack of a distinctive logistics tail 
 85 

 Historically, sanctuaries in neighboring countries have provided 

insurgents places to rebuild and reorganize without fear of counterinsurgent 

interference. Modern target acquisition and intelligence-gathering 

technology make insurgents in isolation, even in neighboring states, more 

vulnerable than those hidden among the population. Thus, contemporary 

insurgencies often develop in urban environments, leveraging formal and 

informal networks for action. Understanding these networks is vital to 

defeating such insurgencies. 

 The meaning of the term sanctuary is evolving. Sanctuaries 

traditionally were physical safe havens, such as base areas, and this form 

of safe haven still exists. Today, insurgents can also draw on “virtual” 

sanctuaries in the internet, global financial systems, and the international 

media. These virtual sanctuaries can be used to make insurgent actions 

seem acceptable or laudable to internal and external audiences. 

—FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency

along with the insurgent’s ability to get by with relatively few supplies when 

compared to a conventional force complicates traditional attempts to isolate 

insurgents. 

 The ability to gather and transmit accurate intelligence is a critical 

characteristic of a successful IW operation. Well-placed agents functioning 

within the local population bolster this intelligence network. As an organization 

expands and integrates with a local population, it increases opportunities to 

obtain more manpower and supplies critical for recruitment and further 

operations. As the insurgents gain more influence within the population their 

ideas can expand and penetrate every aspect of a society, making it very difficult 

to dismantle or isolate. Because insurgents are often embedded in an existing 

government, they have many opportunities to impede and discredit the conduct 

of that government. Finally, the existence of a shadow government can challenge 

the legitimacy of the established regime by its announced agenda and its 

persistence and control of certain areas. Such an organization can also serve as 

a conduit for sympathetic external support. 

External Support. Access to external resources and sanctuaries 

influences the effectiveness of insurgencies. While support from neighboring 

states is often evident, such assistance is not limited to these countries. 

Countries from outside the region seeking political or economic influence can 

also support insurgencies. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal 

elements for funding or use the internet to create a support network among 

NGOs. Ethnic or religious communities in other states may also provide a form of 

external support and sanctuary, particularly for transnational insurgencies. 

STRATEGIES USED BY INSURGENTS 
 86 

 Governments can be overthrown in a number of ways. Additionally, 

insurgents may seek first to remove or expel an occupying foreign force whether 

or not this foreign force is integral to the existing government’s capabilities or 

acts in lieu of such government. Understanding some of the more common 

strategic approaches to insurgency provides a framework for Airmen to aid in the 

development of an overall strategy to counter these movements. Insurgent 

strategies, or approaches, include, but are not limited to, the following: 

 Coup d’etat. 

 Military focused—(Foco) movement. 

 People focused—protracted popular war. 

 Urban focused. 

Coup d’etat 

 Coup d’etat is characterized by the quick and violent overthrow of an 

existing government. This approach usually involves a few key leaders and 

military members in the existing government. These members make up the 

“vanguard” of the movement remaining highly secretive until the time is ripe for 

them to seize power. While this “vanguard” can often set the conditions for their 

operation, they often rely on other events to provide the catalyst for action. The 

results of a coup usually become apparent quickly. Either the coup is successful 

or the “vanguard” incorrectly assessed the situation and their level of support 

within the government, which quickly puts down the movement. Due to their 

secretive nature and small organization, coup members typically do not have 

time to rally support if the attempted coup is unsuccessful. Thus, once a coup 

begins, the results have largely been predetermined. Coups typically rely on the 

support of a large conventional force. 

Military Focused – (Foco) Movement 

 Users of military focused approaches aim to create revolutionary 

possibilities or seize power primarily by applying military force. For example, the 

focoist approach, popularized by figures like Che Guevera, asserts that an 

insurrection itself can create the conditions needed to overthrow a government. 

A foco is a single armed cell, which emerges from hidden strongholds. In theory, 

this cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. While the 

Cuban revolution occurred in this manner, subsequent attempts patterned on it in 

Latin America and Africa have mostly failed. However, this approach has been 

used in combination with others and should not be discounted out of hand. 

Popular Protracted War 

The use of popular protracted war is well documented. The Chinese 

Communists used this approach to conquer China after World War II. The North 
 87 

Vietnamese and Algerians adapted it to fit their respective situations. This type 

of insurgency usually progresses through an evolutionary process marked by a 

series of phases corresponding to major transitions in the revolutionary 

movement. Although insurgencies can take many forms, these phases are 

common to many. Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted war outlined a threephased, politico-military approach including a pre-hostility or incipient phase, a 

guerrilla warfare phase, and a conventional confrontation phase. 

 Phase I–Strategic Defensive corresponds to infrastructure development 

plus initial recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping of combat 

elements. During this phase, insurgents may engage the government in 

open political confrontations like public demonstrations, labor strikes, and 

boycotts. Insurgents often establish secure base areas for military 

command elements and guerrilla operations during this phase. Politicalideological cadres focus on indoctrination of civilians and armed 

revolutionaries. 

 Phase II–Guerilla Warfare is the first level of armed violence. Irregular 

forces engage in sabotage, interdiction of communication and logistics 

links, assassination, and selective attacks against government forces. 

Insurgents expand their secure base areas and, where possible, link them 

to form strategic enclaves of political autonomy. 

 Phase III–Strategic Counteroffensive marks the transition from guerrilla 

actions to operations incorporating the tactics, techniques, and procedures 

of conventional fire and maneuver. 

 The reference to conflict phases is only a means of identifying critical 

shifts in the scope and intensity of insurgent activity. Phases may not signify a 

clean break between one kind of activity and another, and may not apply in every 

conflict. For example, infrastructure development is a continuous process of 

expanding administration, command and control, training, and employing 

mobilized resources. Mobilization of insurgent combat forces must continuously 

expand to carry the insurgency from one phase to the next. Similarly, guerrilla 

operations in Phase II may carry over into the strategic counteroffensive phase 

as a force multiplier. Also, an insurgency does not have to progress through all 

three phases to succeed. A critical combination of political, economic, 

psychological, and military pressures may be sufficient to precipitate a 

government's collapse or persuade a government’s foreign backers to withdraw 

at any stage of a conflict. In Afghanistan’s war against Soviet occupation, 

operations essentially started in Phase II and never progressed to Phase III 

before Soviet forces withdrew and the government they supported collapsed. 

 This type of insurgency is most vulnerable to government 

countermeasures during the initial build-up phase, before the insurgent develops 

military forces. Once the insurgency takes up armed combat, government 

countermeasures become far more complicated and difficult to apply. Insurgent 
 88 

warfare is, however, reversible. Reversibility can work to the advantage of either 

side in the conflict. If an insurgency fails militarily in one phase, it can revert to a 

lower phase, thus securing its survival while generating or reinforcing combat 

capabilities. The government, on the other hand, may be able to capitalize on 

reduced levels of military activity to focus on solutions aimed at rooting out the 

infrastructure and eliminating economic and political grievances that may fuel the 

revolution. Therefore, the strategic environment may be defined by multiple 

operations, operating at different phases in different areas. 

Urban Focused 

 Urban focused insurgencies may become more prevalent and effective as 

societies become more and more urbanized. This strategy uses terrorist tactics 

in urban areas to accomplish the organization’s goals requiring small cells with 

little to no popular support operating among the urban population. Historically, 

such activities have not generated much success without wider rural support, but 

they remain very difficult to counter. Urban strategies may typically provide 

excellent means of conducting tactical operations, but increasing public support 

is often difficult. 
 89 

Glossary 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

ACS agile combat support 

AETF air and space expeditionary task force 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations 

AO area of operations 

AOC air and space operations center 

AOR area of responsibility 

ASOC air support operations center 

BFT blue force tracking 

BPC building partnership capacity 

C2 command and control 

CAS close air support 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CI counterintelligence 

CMO civil-military operations 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COIN counterinsurgency 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CONUS continental United States 

CT counterterrorism 

CTO counter threat operations 

DCGS Distributed Common Ground/Surface System 

DIME diplomatic, informational, military, and economic 

DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOS Department of State 

EBAO effects-based approach to operations 

EMS electromagnetic spectrum 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EW electronic warfare 

EWCC electronic warfare coordination cell 

F2T2EA find, fix, track, target, engage, assess 

FID foreign internal defense 

FM field manual 

FMS foreign military sales 
 90 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IDAD internal defense and development 

IO information operations 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IW irregular warfare 

JFACC Joint force air and space component commander 

[USAF] 

JFC joint force commander 

JFO joint fires observer 

JIATF joint interagency task force 

JIIM joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force 

JTAC joint terminal attack controller 

JTF joint task force 

LD/HD low density/high demand 

LOAC law of armed conflict 

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence 

MCA military civic action 

MILDEC military deception 

NAR non-conventional assisted recovery 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NTISR non-traditional intelligence surveillance and 

reconnaissance 

NW Ops network warfare operations 

OA operational assessment 

OPCON operational control 

OPSEC operations security 

OSINT open-source intelligence 

PA public affairs 

PMESII political, military, economic, social, infrastructure 

and informational 

PN partner nation 
 91 

PNT positioning, navigation, and timing 

PR personnel recovery 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RED HORSE Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational 

Repair Squadron, Engineer 

ROE rules of engagement 

ROMO range of military operations 

ROVER remote operations video enhanced receiver 

SA security assistance 

SC strategic communication 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SOF special operations forces 

TACON tactical control 

TACS theater air control system 

TSCP theater security cooperation plan 

TST time sensitive targeting 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

UA unmanned aircraft 

UAR unconventional assisted recovery 

U.S.C. United States Code 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

UW unconventional warfare 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

Definitions 

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or 

other organizations in respect to administration and support, including 

organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel 

management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, 

demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational 

missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-

02) 

air and space power. The synergistic application of air, space, and information 

systems to project global strategic military power. (AFDD 1) 

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of 

individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and 

containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02) 
 92 

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, 

freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02) 

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed 

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 

procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also 

called C2. (JP 1-02) 

counter threat operations. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations’ 

capability to find, fix, track, and neutralize the enemy in order to create a 

sustained permissive environment for military forces, as well as provide a safe 

and secure operating environment. Also called CTO. (AFMD 39) 

counterguerrilla warfare. Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, 

paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas. (JP 1-02) 

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 

psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. 

Also called COIN. (JP 1-02) 

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to 

prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02) 

cyberspace. A domain characterized by the use of electronics and the 

electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange data via networked 

information systems and associated physical infrastructures. (National Military 

Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, 2006) 

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements 

thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but 

requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02) 

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, 

lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02) 

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held 

or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW.

See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 

government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 
 93 

insurgent. Member of a political party who rebels against established 

leadership. (JP 1-02) 

intelligence preparation of the environment. Tactical intelligence activities 

conducted to gain understanding of the physical, military, and civil characteristics 

of potential operational areas. Also called IPE. (IW Joint Operating Concept) 

irregular forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the 

regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02) 

irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 

legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. (JP 1, page I-1; 

AFDD 2-3) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and 

coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may 

be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority 

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing 

commander. Also called JFACC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02) 

[The joint air and space component commander (JFACC) uses the joint air and 

space operations center to command and control the integrated air and space 

effort to meet the joint force commander’s objectives. This title emphasizes the 

Air Force position that air power and space power together create effects that 

cannot be achieved through air or space power alone.] [AFDD 2] {Words in 

brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

operational art. The application of creative imagination by commanders and 

staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, 

campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. 

Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 

1-02) 

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and 

influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of 

the commander. (JP 1-02) 

strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of 

national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, 

national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02) 

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence 

to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in 
 94 

the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary 

operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or 

by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, 

supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but 

is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, 

and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of 

destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers 

of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, 

biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of 

transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and 

divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02) [The Military Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD), 13 February 2006, 

deletes “high-yield explosives” from this definition and changes the language 

“transporting or propelling the weapon” to “delivery of weapons.”] {Words in 

brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}