Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Whiting,*

 Lacy, 

Hassell and Keenan, JJ. 

VIRGINIA BUILDERS' SUPPLY, INC. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 

v. Record No. 941686 September 15, 1995 

BROOKS & CO. GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 

 In this creditors' rights controversy, the question 

presented is whether a garnishee, after being served with the 

summons in garnishment, may commence arbitration with the 

judgment debtor while excluding the judgment creditor from the 

arbitration, obtain default relief against the judgment debtor, 

and then bind the judgment creditor to the result of the 

arbitration. We answer that query in the negative, and will 

reverse the judgment of the trial court. 

 The facts are undisputed. On June 29, 1993, appellant 

Virginia Builders' Supply, Inc., a wholesale supplier of building 

materials, obtained a judgment in the court below against 

DeGaetani & Sons Drywall, Inc., a drywall subcontractor, in the 

principal sum of $49,614.17. The judgment order provided for 

immediate rights of execution. Code § 8.01-466. 

 On July 8, 1993, a summons in garnishment in the amount of 

the judgment, plus interest and costs, was issued in behalf of 

the judgment creditor against the judgment debtor naming appellee 

 

 *Justice Whiting participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

August 12, 1995. 
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Brooks & Co. General Contractors, Inc., garnishee, returnable 

October 1, 1993. The garnishee was served on July 19, 1993. The 

judgment creditor sought to obtain from the garnishee sums 

believed to be due from the garnishee to the judgment debtor 

under several written contracts on construction projects in which 

the judgment debtor was the garnishee's subcontractor. Those 

contracts contained clauses providing for resolution of any 

disputes between the contracting parties by mandatory arbitration 

under the "Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the 

American Arbitration Association." 

 On September 1, 1993, the garnishee invoked the dispute 

resolution process by filing a Demand For Arbitration against the 

judgment debtor. The garnishee alleged that the judgment debtor 

owed the garnishee more money than it owed the judgment debtor. 

On or about September 27, the garnishee filed a motion in the 

trial court seeking a stay of the garnishment proceeding pending 

completion of the arbitration. 

 On October 1, the return day of the garnishment, attorneys 

for the judgment creditor and garnishee appeared in the trial 

court; the judgment debtor, although served, never responded to 

the garnishment summons. The judgment creditor did not object to 

the stay, and the court continued the garnishment proceeding 

generally. 

 Subsequently, the judgment creditor sought to intervene in 

the arbitration. A representative of the American Arbitration 
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Association advised it had no procedure to allow intervention 

absent consent of the garnishee or a court order. The garnishee 

refused to allow the judgment creditor to participate in the 

arbitration. Later, the garnishee presented proof to an 

arbitrator in the absence of the judgment creditor and judgment 

debtor, and obtained an award dated November 19, 1993 deciding 

that it owed the judgment debtor nothing. 

 In December 1993, the judgment creditor sought a hearing in 

the trial court to present evidence on the amount of the 

garnishee's liability under the garnishment. In February 1994, 

the garnishee filed a motion to dismiss the garnishment upon the 

ground that it owed nothing to the judgment debtor according to 

the arbitration award. 

 Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, 

ruling "that the garnishee owes nothing to the judgment debtor, 

in view of the arbitration results; and that accordingly, the 

garnishee has no obligation to the" judgment creditor. We 

awarded the judgment creditor this appeal from the trial court's 

July 1994 dismissal order to consider the foregoing question. 

 On appeal, the judgment creditor points out that it sought 

to determine, through the garnishment proceeding, the amount owed 

by the garnishee to the judgment debtor, and that the garnishee, 

through the arbitration proceeding, also sought a ruling on this 

issue. The judgment creditor states that before the results of 

one proceeding can be binding in another, there must be an 
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identity of parties between the two actions. Here, according to 

the judgment creditor, there is no identity of parties, and hence 

no preclusion of issues or claims, because the garnishee excluded 

the judgment creditor from the arbitration. 

 The judgment creditor says that the garnishment summons acts 

as an involuntary assignment of the judgment debtor's rights to 

the judgment creditor. See Crane v. Standard Lumber & Mfg. Co., 

87 S.E. 1018, 1020 (W. Va. 1916). Continuing, the judgment 

creditor argues that if the garnishee already had obtained the 

arbitration award before service of the garnishment summons, then 

the rights assigned from the judgment debtor to the judgment 

creditor would have been previously liquidated by the binding 

arbitration. According to the judgment creditor, because res 

judicata and collateral estoppel apply to the parties and their 

privies, the judgment creditor as assignee of a previously 

determined claim would, as a successor in interest, be subject to 

claim preclusion. 

 But here, points out the judgment creditor, the garnishee 

did not commence the arbitration until after the garnishment 

summons had been served. Thus, the argument continues, the 

judgment debtor's unliquidated claim for money became the 

property of the judgment creditor on July 19, 1993, the date the 

garnishee was served, and the garnishee "could not hope to bind" 

the judgment creditor to an arbitration award without serving it 

with the arbitration demand and allowing it the opportunity to 
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defend the garnishee's claims. 

 Finally, the judgment creditor states it is not asking for a 

ruling that parties in the garnishee's position must always 

permit the garnishing creditor to participate in the arbitration. 

 Rather, the judgment creditor says, it "merely asks for a narrow 

holding that if the garnishee elects to proceed after service of 

a garnishment summons without the judgment creditor's 

participation, then the judgment creditor will not be bound to 

the arbitration result." The judgment creditor contends that, as 

between the garnishee and the judgment debtor, the arbitration 

result is binding; as between the judgment creditor and the 

garnishee, it is not. 

 The garnishee contends that if the garnishment summons acts 

as an involuntary assignment of the judgment debtor's rights to 

the judgment creditor, it should have sought the judgment 

debtor's consent to participate in the arbitration on the 

judgment debtor's behalf; if the judgment debtor refused, then 

the judgment creditor should have asked the trial court to order 

the judgment debtor to consent to the judgment creditor's 

participation. The garnishee says the judgment creditor "did 

nothing and thus has waived its rights." 

 Additionally, the garnishee contends that the time when it 

proceeded to determine what it owed the judgment debtor is not 

important because there was a lawful, binding contract requiring 

that any dispute be settled by arbitration. Thus, the garnishee 
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argues, the trial court correctly dismissed the garnishment. We 

do not agree. 

 Under Virginia's statutes, Code §§ 8.01-511 through -525, 

garnishment is a "proceeding to enforce the lien of a writ of 

fieri facias on a liability of any person other than the judgment 

debtor"; the "action substantially is a proceeding by the 

judgment debtor in the name of the judgment creditor against the 

garnishee." Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Blofeld, 234 Va. 395, 399, 

362 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1987). Upon proof of any debt owed by the 

garnishee to the judgment debtor, the court may enter judgment in 

favor of the judgment creditor against the garnishee in the 

amount of such debt. Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 520, 84 

S.E.2d 419, 422 (1954). See Code § 8.01-519. 

 In the present case, the garnishee contends the debt issue 

was finally decided in its favor in the arbitration proceeding, 

and says that issue may not be revisited in the garnishment 

proceeding. But the judgment creditor was not a party to the 

contracts between the garnishee and the judgment debtor, and the 

record fails to show that the judgment creditor was a third party 

beneficiary of those contracts. 

 When, as here, the garnishee commenced arbitration with the 

judgment debtor after being served with the garnishment summons, 

and excluded the judgment creditor from the arbitration, the 

judgment creditor may employ the garnishment court procedure to 

determine the extent of the debt owed by the garnishee to the 
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judgment debtor. The fact that the debt was created by contracts 

containing an arbitration clause does not require a stranger to 

the contracts to follow the contracts' "procedural mechanisms for 

dispute resolution." United States v. Harkins Builders, Inc., 45 

F.3d 830, 834 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying Virginia's garnishment 

law). 

 And the garnishee will not be heard to argue that the 

judgment creditor has waived its rights by failing to intervene 

in the arbitration, when it was the garnishee who refused the 

judgment creditor's request to be allowed to participate. Once 

the garnishee withheld consent, the judgment creditor was not 

obligated to seek intervention through the defaulting judgment 

debtor or to seek a court order allowing intervention. Nothing 

in the garnishment statutes, or in Virginia's statutes dealing 

with arbitration, Code §§ 8.01-577 through -581.016, requires 

such action by a judgment creditor. 

 Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in 

dismissing the garnishment. We will reverse the court's 

dismissal order and remand the case to the trial court for 

further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded.