a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2005 SOUTHEAST ASIA

Better Human Rights 

Reviews and Strategic 

Planning Needed for 

U.S. Assistance to 

Foreign Security 

Forces

GAO-05-793
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-793.

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and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

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Highlights of GAO-05-793, a report to 

congressional committees 

July 2005

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Better Human Rights Reviews and 

Strategic Planning Needed for Assistance 

to Foreign Security Forces 

The United States allocated about $265.7 million in assistance from fiscal 

years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security forces in the Philippines, 

Thailand, and Indonesia. 

U.S. law restricts the provision of funds to units of foreign security forces 

when the Department of State has credible evidence that the unit has 

committed gross violations of human rights. Agency guidance extends these 

restrictions to individuals of foreign security forces and requires posts to 

establish procedures to vet candidates for U.S. sponsored training for 

possible violations. However, we found no evidence that U.S. officials vetted

an estimated 6,900 foreign security trainees—about 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 

Filipino, and 1,700 Thai police—trained by Justice with State law 

enforcement assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004. These 

candidates included a total of 32 Indonesian individuals trained over time 

from a notorious special-forces police unit previously prohibited under State 

policy from receiving U.S. training funds because of the unit’s prior human 

rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in training programs 

managed by DOD. State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to 

improve the human rights vetting process and establish a database of human 

rights abuse allegations. 

Foreign Police in U.S. Law Enforcement Training 

Source: GAO.

State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance 

strategy that meets objectives that Congress urged State to address in 2000 

legislation. As a result, State and Congress may be deprived of the 

information needed to make future decisions about these programs. State’s 

2003 strategy met only two of nine objectives in the law. Among other 

shortfalls, the strategy did not identify how programs would be combined at 

the country level to achieve objectives or be coordinated with other U.S. 

government agencies. Several State and DOD planning documents, while not 

collectively providing a complete national security assistance strategy, 

address some of the legislation’s objectives. 

The executive branch has bolstered 

assistance to the Philippines, 

Indonesia, and Thailand to 

contribute to U.S. foreign policy 

and security goals. To further 

human rights goals, Congress 

restricts certain security assistance 

funds from being provided to any 

units of foreign security forces 

when credible evidence exists that 

units have committed gross 

violations of human rights. GAO (1) 

describes the nature and extent of 

U.S. assistance to foreign security 

forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, 

and Thailand, (2) assesses the 

controls used to achieve 

compliance with human rights 

restrictions on U.S. funding to 

foreign security forces in these 

countries, and (3) assesses the U.S. 

government’s national security 

assistance strategy. 

What GAO Recommends

The Secretary of State should (1) 

strengthen management controls 

for vetting foreign security forces 

by clarifying existing guidance to 

posts and (2) develop and 

periodically report to Congress an 

integrated strategic plan for all U.S. 

government assistance that 

provides training and equipment 

for foreign security forces. State 

commented that its briefing to 

Congressional staff fully satisfied 

legislative objectives. While an oral 

briefing is a good first step, a 

written plan is needed for wider 

distribution and tracking progress. 
Page i GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in the Philippines, 

Indonesia, and Thailand Provided through Three Agencies under 

at Least 12 Programs 9

Weak Management Controls on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security 

Forces Allowed Violations of State’s Policy on Human Rights 

Restrictions to Occur 18

U.S. Government Lacks an Integrated National Security Assistance 

Strategy Covering All U.S. Training and Assistance Provided to 

Foreign Security Forces 28

Conclusion 35

Recommendations for Executive Action 36

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42

Appendix II: Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security 

Forces 45

Appendix III: State Department National Security Assistance Strategy 

Briefing 52

Appendix IV: Other State and DOD Documents Address Some Objectives 

of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 68

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense 69

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State 70

GAO Comments 79

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 84

Tables Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in the Philippines, 

Fiscal Years 2001- 2004 14

Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Indonesia, Fiscal 

Years 2001-2004 16

Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Thailand, Fiscal 

Years 2001-2004 17

Table 4: Estimated Number of Foreign Law Enforcement Trainees 

Not Vetted, Fiscal Years 2001-2004 21
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 5: GAO Sample of Trainees for Vetting at Three Posts, Fiscal 

Years 2001- 2004 21

Table 6: Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 

Addressed by State’s National Security Assistance 

Strategy 29

Table 7: Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) 45

Table 8: Drawdown 46

Table 9: Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 46

Table 10: Economic Support Fund (ESF) 47

Table 11: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 47

Table 12: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(INCLE) 48

Table 13: International Military Education and Training (IMET) 48

Table 14: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) 49

Table 15: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 49

Table 16: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program 

(CTFP) 50

Table 17: DEA Training 50

Table 18: FBI Training 51

Figures Figure 1: U.S. Allocations to Train and Equip Security Forces in the 

Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001- 

2004 10

Figure 2: State, DOD, and Justice Allocations to Security Forces in 

the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 

2001- 2004 11

Figure 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces by Program, Fiscal 

Years 2001- 2004 13

Figure 4: State and DOD Strategic Planning Documents 34
Contents

Page iii GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Abbreviations

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance 

CTFP Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

E-IMET Expanded-IMET

EDA Excess Defense Articles 

ESF Economic Support Fund 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FMF Foreign Military Financing 

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance 

Program

IMET International Military Education and Training 

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PACOM U. S. Pacific Command

PKO Peacekeeping Operations 

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Page 1 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 29, 2005 Letr

Congressional Committees

The executive branch has considered Southeast Asia as the “second front” 

in the war on terrorism and has thus bolstered security assistance1

 to 

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand to help deal with this threat. This 

assistance contributes to several U.S. foreign policy and security goals, 

such as supporting the global war on terror, promoting stronger bilateral 

relationships, strengthening self-defense capabilities, and promoting 

greater respect for democracy and human rights. However, to further 

human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds 

from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible 

evidence exists that units have committed gross violations of human 

rights.2

 

To address congressional concerns about the coordination, planning, and 

impact of security assistance programs, Congress passed the Security 

Assistance Act of 2000.3

 The Act encourages the Department of State 

(State), in consultation with other agencies, to establish an annual 

multiyear plan identifying overarching security assistance objectives, the 

way programs will be combined at the country level to achieve objectives, 

and the coordination of security assistance programs with other U.S. 

government agencies. 

This report, completed under the Comptroller General’s Authority is being 

addressed to you because of your committee’s interest and jurisdiction. 

The report (1) describes the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign 

security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand; (2) assesses the 

1

For the purposes of this report, we defined security assistance as U.S. government 

assistance aimed at training or equipping foreign security forces (military and police). 

2

This restriction, commonly referred to as the “Leahy amendment,” first appeared in the 

1997 Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) 

and only applied to funds appropriated to State’s International Narcotics Control program. It 

was broadened in fiscal year 1998 to apply to all funds appropriated under the 1998 Foreign 

Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-118). In fiscal year 

1999, a similar provision appeared in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 

(P.L. 105-262), which applied to funds appropriated under the act. The two provisions have 

appeared each year since in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts and the 

Department of Defense Appropriations Acts, respectively.

3

See P.L. 106-280, 22 §USC 2305. 
Page 2 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

management controls used to achieve U.S. agency compliance with the 

human rights restrictions on funding provided to foreign security forces in 

the three countries; and (3) assesses the U.S. government’s national 

security assistance strategy.

To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent State, Defense, and 

Justice planning, funding, and evaluation documents, and related policies 

and procedures. We focused on State, DOD, and Justice programs or 

activities providing assistance to foreign security forces in the absence of 

an agreed-upon definition of security assistance within the U.S. 

government. We also interviewed senior program officials from the 

Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and Justice in Washington, D.C.; 

Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We 

discussed these programs with officials of foreign governments and 

nongovernmental organizations. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials 

at the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Honolulu, Hawaii. We reviewed 

relevant statutes and implementing guidelines, including the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, the Arms Export Control 

Act (P.L. 90-629), as amended, the Security Assistance Act of 2000, the fiscal 

years 2001 to 2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and the 

Department of Defense Appropriations Acts, and the DOD Security 

Assistance Management Manual. To assess how the U.S. government 

provides funding in compliance with human rights restrictions, we 

inspected program files maintained at the U.S. embassies in Bangkok, 

Jakarta, and Manila. We conducted this review from July 2004 to June 2005 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief The United States allocated4

 about $265.7 million in assistance from fiscal 

years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security forces in the Philippines, 

Indonesia, and Thailand through 12 programs and activities managed by 

the Departments of State, Defense, or Justice. This assistance comprises a 

mix of appropriated funds used for procuring training and equipment as 

well as nonappropriated assistance, such as transfers of excess military 

equipment taken from U.S. stocks. State, DOD, and Justice collectively 

allocated $179.6 million (67.6 percent) to the Philippines; $47.5 million 

(17.9 percent) to Indonesia; and $38.6 million (14.5 percent) to Thailand. 

Among the three agencies, State provided most (80.2 percent) of the 

4

We use this term to describe the broad mix of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance 

being provided to foreign security forces in these three countries. 
Page 3 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

assistance in the three countries from fiscal years 2001 to 2004. These 

countries used U.S. assistance to acquire a variety of equipment, training, 

and related services. For example, the Philippines acquired C-130 aircraft 

and UH-1 helicopters to enhance the mobility of its armed forces, and also 

used some U.S. assistance to support its defense reform program; Thailand 

acquired UH-1s to enhance its ability to combat terrorism; and Indonesia 

trained its security forces in civil-military relations, civilian police 

authority, and human rights issues. 

Weak management controls resulted in lapses in human rights vetting for 

individual trainees at the three posts we visited and within headquarters 

units. Recent foreign operations and DOD annual appropriations acts 

restrict the provision of funds provided under the acts to units of foreign 

security forces when there is “credible evidence” that the unit has 

committed “gross violations” of human rights. Additionally, State and DOD 

guidance extends these restrictions to individuals as well as to units of 

foreign security forces, and requires posts to establish vetting procedures 

to ensure compliance with these restrictions. However, we found no 

evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an estimated 6,900 law 

enforcement officials—approximately 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and 

1,700 Thai officials—trained as individuals with State’s law enforcement 

assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004.5

 The trainees included 

32 Indonesian individuals trained over time from a notorious special-forces 

police unit that was previously prohibited from receiving U.S. training 

funds under State policy because of the unit’s prior human rights abuses. 

We found better evidence of vetting in other training programs managed by 

DOD. For example, in the Philippines, we randomly sampled 107 DOD 

trainee files and estimated that 87 percent of the trainee files would contain 

some evidence of vetting, while 13 percent would contain no evidence of 

vetting. We also found evidence of vetting for all 35 DOD trainee files that 

we randomly sampled in the other two countries, although these results are 

not projectable. Vetting did not occur because of weaknesses in some 

agencies’ management controls. First, State and Justice headquarters units 

did not assign clear roles and responsibilities for human rights vetting, nor 

did they clearly communicate these responsibilities in writing to all 

employees, particularly law enforcement officials. Second, two of the three 

posts did not establish written policies and procedures covering all the 

agency representatives involved in the vetting process prior to 2004, nor 

5

An estimated 9,470 foreign security officials were trained under State and DOD programs 

during this period. 
Page 4 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

did they specify the documentation and records retention requirements for 

these entities. Third, neither State headquarters nor the three posts 

established systems to monitor compliance with vetting requirements. 

State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the 

efficiency of the human rights vetting process. State announced that it had 

established a new human rights database to be a clearinghouse of 

information of alleged human rights abuses.

In examining the U.S. government’s assistance to foreign security forces in 

these countries, we found that State has not produced a coherent national 

security assistance strategy that meets the objectives that Congress 

encouraged State to include in this strategy. The national security 

assistance strategy that State issued in 2003 addressed only two of the nine 

objectives included in the Security Assistance Act of 2000. Among other 

shortfalls, the plan does not identify the allocation of resources to 

accomplish objectives, the ways in which programs would be combined at 

the country level to achieve objectives, or the coordination of these 

programs with other U.S. government agencies. State and DOD annually 

develop various country, regional, and national strategy and planning 

documents that address many of the Acts’ objectives; these could be used 

as the basis for developing an annual national security assistance strategy. 

As a result of these strategic planning weaknesses, it may be difficult for 

State and Congress to assess the contribution the U.S. assistance makes to 

broader U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as stemming terrorism, 

promoting regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human rights. 

In addition, the lack of a clear and coherent strategy may inhibit Congress’ 

ability to effectively allocate resources and deprive it of the information it 

needs for future decisionmaking on these programs.

We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, strengthen management 

controls on vetting security forces by issuing consolidated written 

guidance to posts and headquarters offices. This guidance should assign 

clear roles and responsibilities for post and headquarters offices and 

establish monitoring systems to verify that required procedures are being 

carried out. We also are recommending that the Secretary of State, in 

coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, 

jointly develop an integrated strategic plan for all U.S. government 

assistance programs that provide training and equipment for foreign 

security forces (military and police). 
Page 5 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State, 

and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. We received 

written responses from the Secretaries of Defense and State. The Secretary 

of Defense concurred with the report’s findings in principle. Neither the 

Secretaries of Defense nor State commented on the recommendations. The 

Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Attorney General also provided 

us technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

The Secretary of State acknowledged the need for continued improvement 

on human rights vetting procedures but stated that it is operating its 

assistance programs in full compliance with the law. State commented that 

any vetting of individuals is done as a matter of State policy and practice, 

not as a matter of law. We agree with State’s comment. However, in 

reviewing State’s application of its policy on human rights vetting of 

individuals, we found significant weaknesses that resulted in an estimated 

6,900 individuals receiving U.S. training assistance without any evidence 

that they had first been vetted for gross violations of human rights. 

Therefore, we recommended in our report that State strengthen 

management controls on vetting to meet its stated policy goal of not 

providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human rights violators. 

State also asserted that it has fully complied with congressional intent 

regarding a national security assistance strategy. State disagreed with our 

finding that the national security assistance strategy met only two of nine 

objectives of the law. It stated that our findings are based on incomplete 

information because many of the objectives were met and discussed in a 

May 2003 oral briefing to selected congressional committee staff. State also 

commented that its briefing to congressional committees fully satisfied the 

committees represented at the time, and that the absence of further 

requests for a briefing relieved it of further reporting responsibilities. We 

disagree with State’s comments. The briefing was a good first step, but a 

detailed written plan is needed for wider distribution, and for providing 

documentation for tracking progress in moving forward.

Background As a foreign policy tool, the U.S. government provides assistance to 

security forces (military and police) in more than 150 countries around the 

world, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. State provides 

assistance to foreign security forces through at least six programs and 

activities. Appendix II provides additional details on these programs.
Page 6 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

• Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) is used to train foreign security forces in 

anti-terrorism and terrorism response tactics.

• Economic Support Fund (ESF)is used primarily for economic 

assistance to promote political or economic stability; however, some 

ESF is allocated for training foreign security forces. 

• Foreign Military Financing (FMF)is used to provide grants and loans for 

the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training by 

foreign governments. This assistance is aimed at improving defense 

capabilities and fostering stronger military relationships between the 

United States and recipient nations.

• International Military Education and Training (IMET) is used to train 

and educate foreign military forces and related civilian personnel. 

Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), a variant of the regular IMET program, 

focuses on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights training and 

education.

• International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) is used 

primarily to support counter-narcotics, intelligence, border patrol, and 

interdiction activities. 

• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports multilateral peacekeeping 

and regional stability operations that are not funded through the United 

Nations.

DOD provides a mix of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance to 

foreign security forces through at least four programs or activities. 

Appendix III provides additional details on these programs.

• Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are nonappropriated assistance in the 

form of excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. The 

President is authorized to transfer, with limitations, defense articles 

declared as excess by the military departments to foreign governments 

in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. 

• Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that the President is 

authorized to draw down from the stocks of any U.S. government 

agency for emergencies, disasters, counternarcotics, refugee assistance, 

peacekeeping, anti-terrorist activities, and nonproliferation.
Page 7 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

• Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a 

DOD program used to provide funding to foreign military and related 

civilian officials to attend U.S. military education institutions and 

selected regional centers for nonlethal training.

• Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special 

operations forces to train with foreign military forces, provided that the 

training primarily benefits U.S. forces. The host nation’s security forces 

also derive a benefit.

The Department of Justice provides assistance to foreign security forces 

through at least two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) training activities in foreign countries. DEA 

trains law enforcement officials and police to carry out special counternarcotics operations. The FBI also trains law enforcement officials and 

police in these countries.

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Philippines and Indonesia 

became central to the U.S. government’s antiterrorism efforts in Southeast 

Asia due to their strategic importance, Muslim populations, and insurgency 

movements that use terrorist tactics. The U.S. government has been 

concerned with radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly 

those in Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries that are known to 

have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. For more than a decade, Al 

Qaeda has penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training 

Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and 

cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. According to the 

Congressional Research Service,6

 Indonesia and the southern Philippines 

have been particularly vulnerable to anti-American Islamic terrorist groups. 

A spate of violence in Thailand’s Muslim provinces in early 2004 intensified 

the focus on Islamic extremism in southern Thailand. The violence has 

forced Thai authorities to publicly re-evaluate the threat of a Muslim 

separatist insurgency with financial and operational ties to international 

Islamic terrorist groups.

6

Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 

Terrorism in Southeast Asia, RL31672 (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2004). 
Page 8 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

According to the State Department’s 2004 Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices, the three countries we reviewed face several human 

rights challenges.7

• The Philippines. According to State’s human rights report for the 

Philippines, the government generally respected the human rights of its 

citizens. However, some elements of the country’s security forces were 

responsible for arbitrary, unlawful and, in some cases, extrajudicial 

killings, disappearances, and torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention.

• Indonesia. State’s human rights report for Indonesia stated that the 

Indonesian government made progress in its transition from three 

decades of repressive and authoritarian rule to a more pluralistic and 

representative democracy. The government’s human rights record 

remained poor, however, and it continued to commit serious abuses. For 

example, the report stated that “[S]ecurity force members murdered, 

tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of 

separatist movements, especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent in 

Papua. Some police officers occasionally used excessive and sometimes 

deadly force in arresting suspects and in attempting to obtain 

information or a confession. Retired and active duty military officers 

known to have committed serious human rights violations occupied or 

were promoted to senior positions in the Government and the 

(military).”

• Thailand. According to State’s human rights report, the government of 

Thailand generally respected the rights of its citizens, but there were 

significant problems in some areas. For example, separatist violence in 

southern Thailand resulted in the deaths of more than 180 persons at the 

hands of security forces. In addition, no progress was reported in 

investigations into the extrajudicial killings of approximately 1,300 

suspected drug traffickers during the Thai government's 3-month “War 

on Drugs” campaign from February through April 2003. However, the 

Thai government maintains that the deaths were the result of disputes 

between those involved in the drug trade.

7

For Indonesia, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41643.htm. For the Philippines, 

see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41657.htm. For Thailand, see 

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41661.htm.
Page 9 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Assistance to Train and 

Equip Security Forces 

in the Philippines, 

Indonesia, and 

Thailand Provided 

through Three 

Agencies under at 

Least 12 Programs

U.S. assistance to security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and 

Thailand was provided through at least 12 programs and activities managed 

by State, DOD, and Justice. This assistance comprises a mix of 

appropriated funds used for procuring training and equipment, as well as 

nonappropriated assistance such as transfers of excess military equipment 

taken from U.S. stocks. The Philippines was the largest beneficiary of this 

assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004. U.S. assistance to security forces 

in the Philippines largely supported the Philippines Defense Reform—a 

comprehensive defense assessment to develop a multi-year defense 

strategy, enhance mobility, and build defense capacity. Restrictions on 

Indonesia prohibited it from receiving military equipment; however, 

Indonesia received funding to train its security forces. U.S. assistance to 

Thailand is used for procuring equipment and training for such activities as 

counter narcotics and antiterrorism.

State, DOD, and Justice 

Provide Assistance to 

Security Forces in the 

Philippines, Indonesia, and 

Thailand

State, DOD, and Justice allocated8 a total of approximately $265.7 million to 

train and equip security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia 

in fiscal years 2001 to 2004. This amounted to $179.6 million for the 

Philippines, $47.5 million for Indonesia, and $38.6 million for Thailand. 

Figure 1 shows a comparison of U.S. assistance for each of the three 

countries and illustrates that the United States provided the Philippines 

with significantly more assistance than Indonesia and Thailand.

8

We use the term “allocations” to describe the broad mix of appropriated and 

nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security forces in these three 

countries. State and DOD appropriations accounted for 83.8 percent of the total; 

nonappropriated assistance in the form of Excess Defense Articles and drawdowns from 

DOD stocks accounted for 13.4 percent of the total; and DOD and Justice expenditures 

accounted for 3.9 percent of the total. Expenditures data were used for DOD’s JCET 

program and Justice’s DEA and FBI training activities because separate appropriations and 

country allocation data do not exist. 
Page 10 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Figure 1: U.S. Allocations to Train and Equip Security Forces in the Philippines, 

Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001- 2004

Note: See footnote 8.

State allocated most of the assistance, $212.9 million (80.2 percent), while 

DOD allocated $52.2 million (19.6 percent), and Justice allocated $518,000 

(less than 1 percent). Figure 2 shows a comparison of assistance by agency, 

illustrating that State allocated most of the assistance to train and equip 

security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.

0

50

100

150

200

Thailand Philippines Indonesia

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
Page 11 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Figure 2: State, DOD, and Justice Allocations to Security Forces in the Philippines, 

Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001- 2004

Note: See footnote 8.

This assistance was provided through at least 12 programs and was used 

for procuring a variety of equipment, training, and services within each 

country. Figure 3 shows a comparison of U.S. assistance by program for 

50

100

150

200

250

 

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

 State DOD Justice 

Dollars in millions 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
Page 12 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

each of the three countries. The FMF allocation for the Philippines 

represented the largest single program across all three countries.
Page 13 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Figure 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces by Program, Fiscal Years 2001- 2004

Note: See footnote 8.

Dollars in millions 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Philippines

Indonesia

Thailand

20

40

60

80

100

120

0

2

4

6

8

10

DEA

training

FBI

training

FMF INCLE IMET ESF ATA PKO EDA CTFP Drawdowns JCET
Page 14 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Assistance to the Philippines 

Helped Support Defense Reform

State, DOD, and Justice assistance to train and equip security forces in the 

Philippines in fiscal years 2001 to 2004 totaled about $179.6 million and 

helped support the Philippines Defense Reform-- a comprehensive defense 

assessment to develop a multi-year defense strategy, enhance mobility, and 

build defense capacity. Table 1 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity, 

allocations, and some examples of how the assistance was used. 

Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in the Philippines, Fiscal Years 2001- 

2004 

Dollars in millions

Agency Program/activity Allocations Examples of how assistance was used

State FMF $115.8 Maintenance support for C-130s, UH-1s, 

fast patrol craft, M-35 trucks; 

counterterrorism training for maritime, 

ground, and air forces; support for 

Philippine Defense Reform in fiscal year 

2004. 

PKO $15.0 Refurbish UH-1 helicopters, procure spare 

parts for UH-1s and combat engineering 

spares and support.

IMET $8.6 Train in amphibious warfare, combat 

strategies and intelligence, security 

assistance management, defense 

resources management, and logistics held 

at U.S. military bases and other 

institutions, such as the U.S. Army War 

College.

INCLE $2.0 Support training to develop an effective 

civilian police force in the autonomous 

Muslim Region of Mindanao. Some INCLE 

funding was used for an FBI assessment of 

the Philippines fingerprint and processing 

system as part of a worldwide effort to 

develop an international terrorist database.

ATA $1.9 Train in terrorist crime scene investigation, 

hostage negotiation, and mass casualty 

medical issues.

DOD EDA $19.5 Provide cargo trucks and UH-IH 

helicopters, armored personnel carriers, 

rifles, and magazine cartridges--to be 

drawn from DOD stocks.

Drawdown $10.0 Provide defense articles and services from 

U.S. Navy stocks for delivery to the 

Philippines Ministry of Defense.
Page 15 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data.

a

Total may not correspond to the sum of the column due to rounding.

Note: See footnote 8.

Assistance to Indonesia 

Supported Training for Police 

Forces 

State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about $47.5 million in 

assistance to train Indonesian security forces in fiscal years 2001 to 2004; 

however, various congressional funding restrictions limited Indonesia’s 

eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training over this period. State 

provided $43.3 million (91 percent of the country total), including $23.2 

million (49 percent) of the country total in police training through the 

Economic Support Fund. DOD provided military training through its 

Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). 

Indonesia is the single largest recipient of this assistance worldwide. Table 

2 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations, and some 

examples of how the assistance was used. 

JCET $4.7 Provide joint training for U.S. Special 

Operations Forces and the Philippines’ 

security forces.

CTFP $2.0 Provide courses in combating terrorism 

and preparedness and consequence 

management to train military forces in 

counterterrorism techniques and to work 

with other relevant agencies.

Justice DEA & FBI $0.1 Train law enforcement and police in 

counter narcotics, money laundering, and 

other criminal activities and assets 

forfeiture techniques.

Total $179.7a

(Continued From Previous Page)

Dollars in millions

Agency Program/activity Allocations Examples of how assistance was used
Page 16 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Indonesia, Fiscal Years 2001-2004 

Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data.

Note: See footnote 8.

Assistance to Thailand Largely 

Supported Law Enforcement and 

Military Training

State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about $38.6 million in 

assistance for Thai security forces to procure a variety of defense articles, 

services, and training supporting activities such as counter narcotics, 

military training, antiterrorism, and force modernization. The largest share 

of the money was used for training law enforcement officials in counter 

narcotics operations and for providing the Thai military with advanced 

training. Table 3 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations, 

and some examples of how assistance was used. 

Dollars in millions 

Agency Program/activity Allocations Examples of how assistance was used

State ESF $23.2 Train Indonesia’s police forces in 

management initiatives, administrative 

justice and maritime enforcement, 

seaport and waterway security, human 

rights issues and the rule of law, 

anticorruption, and in reconstituting 

civilian police authority.

ATA $14.8 Support counterterrorism training facilities 

in Megamendung; conduct training 

courses in crisis response and explosive 

incidents countermeasures; and support 

the formation of the National-Level 

Counterterrorism Task Force known as 

“Task Force 88.”

INCLE $4.0 Assist with the transition of the Indonesia 

police to a civilian-led police force since 

the separation of the police forces from 

the national military, including technical 

assistance and human rights training.

Expanded-IMET $1.3 Train in civil-military relations, resources 

management, and international defense 

management to Indonesia’s military 

forces (variant of the regular IMET 

program).

DOD CTFP $4.2 Train to educate military forces about 

combating terrorism, the laws of war, 

resource management and budgeting, 

international defense management, and 

preparedness and consequence 

management.

Total $47.5
Page 17 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001-2004 

Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data.

a

Total may not correspond to the sum of the column due to rounding.

Note: See footnote 8.

Dollars in millions

Agency Program/activity Allocations Examples of how assistance was used

State INCLE $13.8 Supports law enforcement investigations 

and prosecution of narcotics traffickers as 

well as efforts to suppress illicit drug 

trafficking and retail sales.

IMET $7.9 Trains military forces in courses such as 

advanced supply management, 

amphibious planning, combat strategies 

and intelligence training, international 

defense management, joint combined war 

fighting, and military police training.

FMF $4.2 Used toward the procurement of military 

equipment such as communications 

equipment and small arms.

PKO $0.5 To purchase equipment for Thai military 

peacekeeping and counterterrorism units.

DOD EDA $6.0 Approved and to be drawn from DOD 

stocks including Cobra helicopters and 

utility helicopters.

JCET $5.0 Training for U.S. Special Operations 

Forces and Thai security forces.

CTFP $0.8 Combating terrorism training courses for 

Thai military forces.

Justice DEA and FBI $0.4 Training for security forces in 

counternarcotics and anti-criminal tactics.

Total $38.6a
Page 18 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Weak Management 

Controls on U.S. 

Assistance to Foreign 

Security Forces 

Allowed Violations of 

State’s Policy on 

Human Rights 

Restrictions to Occur

We found no evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an estimated 

6,935 law enforcement officials trained with State assistance between fiscal 

years 2001 and 2004.9

 The trainees included 32 Indonesian police from a 

notorious special-forces police unit that was prohibited from receiving U.S. 

training funds under State policy because of the unit’s prior human rights 

abuses. We found better evidence10 of vetting in DOD-implemented training 

programs. For example, in the Philippines, we randomly sampled 107 DOD 

trainee files and estimated that 87 percent of the trainee files contained 

some evidence of vetting, while 13 percent contained no evidence of 

vetting. We also found evidence of vetting for all 35 DOD trainee files that 

we randomly sampled in the other two countries, although these results are 

not projectable. Vetting did not occur because of weaknesses in some 

agencies’ management controls. First, State and Justice headquarters units 

did not assign clear roles and responsibilities for vetting foreign security 

forces, nor did they clearly communicate these responsibilities to all 

employees involved in the process, especially to law enforcement officials 

at posts. Second, prior to 2004, two of the three posts did not establish 

written policies and procedures for all of the offices involved in the vetting 

process, or specify the documentation and records retention requirements 

for these units. Third, neither State headquarters nor the three posts 

established systems to periodically monitor compliance with vetting 

requirements. 

Laws and State Policy 

Restrict U.S. Assistance to 

Foreign Security Forces 

Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has 

included a provision, commonly referred to as the “Leahy Amendment,” 

that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any 

foreign security unit for which State has determined there is credible 

9

This number includes approximately 4,000 Indonesian, 1,175 Filipino, and 1,760 Thai law 

enforcement officials out of an estimated 9,470 total foreign security forces at the three 

posts. 

10For purposes of our review, we said that we found “some evidence” of vetting when we 

found documents indicating that the political affairs office was involved in the post vetting 

process. 
Page 19 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

evidence11 that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights, 

unless certain conditions have been met.12 DOD’s appropriations acts have 

contained a similar restriction on DOD-funded training since fiscal year 

1999.13

To implement these legislative restrictions, in June 1999 and February 2003, 

State directed all posts involved in providing security assistance to foreign 

security forces to have procedures in place to ensure compliance with the 

restrictions. Between 1999 and 2004, DOD and State issued specific 

instructions to the posts on implementing these restrictions for DODmanaged training programs. While the provisions restrict funding to “any 

unit of the security forces of a foreign country,” State policy applies the 

restrictions to individual members of security forces, as well. State and 

DOD guidance reflects this policy.

11“Credible evidence” was not defined in the appropriations provisions. However, with 

regard to the meaning of “evidence,” State directed the posts to report language 

accompanying the fiscal year 1999 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act that indicated 

that the conferees do not intend that the evidence must be admissible in a court of law. As to 

the definition of “credible,” while State retains authority for all final decisions, State 

directed that posts should apply a rule of reason and that State seeks information deserving 

of confidence as a basis for decisionmaking.

12Specifically, the most recent provision in the Foreign Operations Export Financing and 

Related Appropriations Act for 2005 (P.L. 108-447, §553) states that: “None of the funds 

made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign 

country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross 

violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees 

on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring 

the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.” The provision has also 

appeared in prior Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts. See P.L. 105-118, §570 (FY98); 

P.L. 105-277, §568 (FY99); P.L. 106-113, § 564 (FY2000); P.L. 106-429, §563 (FY2001); P.L. 107-

115, §556 (FY2002); P.L. 108-7, § 553 (FY2003); P.L. 108-199, § 553 (FY2004)).

13The most recent provision in the DOD Appropriations Act for 2005 states that: “None of the 

funds made available by this Act may be used to support any training program involving a 

unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received 

credible information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross 

violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.” (P.L. 108-

287 §8076) Similar provisions have also appeared in prior DOD appropriations acts. See P.L. 

105-262, §8130 (FY1999); P.L. 106-79, §8098 (FY2000); P.L. 106-259, §8092 (FY2001); P.L. 107-

117, §8093 (FY2003); P.L. 107-248, §8080 (FY2003); P.L. 108087, §8077 (FY2004).
Page 20 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Vetting candidates for human rights concerns commonly would include the 

following steps, according to post officials, State headquarters officials, 

and State guidance.14 First, the office at the post sponsoring the training 

reviews biographical and service information provided by the host 

government to determine if the individual or unit has been involved in gross 

violations of human rights. Second, the sponsoring office forwards the 

name to the political affairs office at the post for its independent review. 

The political affairs office or sponsoring office also circulates the 

candidate’s name to other relevant offices within the post.15 As part of this 

second step, the human rights officer or a foreign service national assigned 

to the political office typically searches newspaper articles or the Internet 

for evidence of the candidate’s involvement in gross violations of human 

rights. The political office may also consult human rights nongovernmental 

organizations in-country or national commissions on human rights for any 

information they have on the candidate. Other offices at the post to whom 

the candidate’s name is sent are expected to review any information they 

have and report the results of their search to the political office. Finally, the 

post sends the candidate’s name to State headquarters to be distributed to 

relevant bureaus for final review and approval. 

Foreign Security Officials 

Not Always Vetted for 

Possible Human Rights 

Violations 

At the three posts we visited, we found lapses in human rights vetting for 

foreign security forces, particularly in law enforcement training programs. 

Table 4 shows the estimated number of law enforcement personnel that 

U.S. officials estimated had received training but for whom no vetting had 

occurred. U.S. officials based these estimates on the sizes of the groups 

trained in each country for particular programs.

14This describes the general process of human rights vetting. There are slight differences in 

details depending on whether the assistance involves units or individuals and on whether 

funding is from the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act or DOD Appropriations Act for 

DOD training.

15In technical comments on this report, DOD stated that at Embassy Jakarta, the sponsoring 

office, not the political affairs office, circulates candidate information to other offices at 

post for their review. However, DOD also offered contradictory information when it stated 

that there is no difference in the details of the process whether the funding source is Foreign 

Operations Appropriations Act or DOD Appropriations Act for DOD training. In fact, DOD 

has additional procedures to cable candidate information for DOD-funded training 

programs (e.g., JCETS and CTFP) to State headquarters, DOD headquarters, and the Pacific 

Command. 
Page 21 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 4: Estimated Number of Foreign Law Enforcement Trainees Not Vetted, Fiscal 

Years 2001-2004

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

a

Trainees were trained under Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance 

program.

b

This number was derived by adding an estimated 1,439 trainees under State’s Narcotics Affairs 

Section and about 300 in-country trainees under State’s ATA program.

In addition, table 5 shows the results of a sample of trainee names that we 

reviewed at each post to identify evidence of human rights vetting. 

Table 5: GAO Sample of Trainees for Vetting at Three Posts, Fiscal Years 2001- 2004

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Country

Estimated number of law

enforcement trainees not vetted

Philippinesa 1,175

Indonesiaa 4,000

Thailandb 1,760

Total 6,935

Sample Results

Implementing 

agency/country

Number of

trainees identified

by post

GAO sample

size by

program/

country

Some vetting

documented

No vetting

documented

DOD

 Philippinesa 787 107 93 14

 Indonesiab 353 10 10 0

 Thailandc 795 25 25 0

State

 Indonesiad 297 7 2 5

 Thailande

 144 15 13 2

Philippines 

Subtotal 787 107 93 14

Indonesia 

Subtotal 650 17 12 5

Thailand 

Subtotal 939 40 38 2

Grand total 2,376 164 143 21
Page 22 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

a

We selected only DOD-managed programs and activities (IMET and FMF) for our sample because 

the number of law enforcement trainees was not available at the time of our visit to the post.

b

This number is composed of trainees for CTFP, E-IMET, Asia-Pacific Center, and other miscellaneous 

DOD-managed programs and activities.

c

This number is composed of trainees for DOD-managed, IMET, FMS, CTFP, and other miscellaneous 

programs.

d

This number is composed of trainees for State’s ATA program. 

e Total number of trainees under State’s Thailand ATA program was 708, which included 144 trainees 

sent to the United States for training. We removed the 243 trainees from the ATA total that were not 

security forces and thus not subject to human rights vetting. We also removed 321 in-country trainees 

from the total. These 321 are accounted for in table 4.

The Philippines. We found no evidence that any of the estimated 1,175 

Filipino police forces receiving training under Justice’s International 

Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP)16 in fiscal 

year 2004 were vetted for evidence of gross violations of human rights. A 

post official said that a foreign service national in his office responsible for 

ICITAP performed some vetting on these candidates, but could not 

document the important step of coordinating with the political affairs 

office as required by State guidance until late 2004. In addition, we 

reviewed 107 randomly selected trainee files from an estimated total of 787 

trainees in the DOD-implemented programs17 and found some evidence of 

vetting in most instances (93 files). The remaining 14 files contained no 

evidence that vetting had occurred. 

Indonesia. We found no evidence that an estimated 4,000 Indonesian law 

enforcement officials who received training under Justice’s ICITAP were 

vetted for possible human rights violations prior to October 2004. These 

trainees include 32 police from a notorious unit ineligible for such training 

under the ICITAP, according to State officials. In addition, our review of 10 

randomly selected DOD trainee files from an estimated total of 353 trainees 

showed some evidence of vetting in all instances. Files for DODimplemented training generally included evidence that the Political Affairs 

Office was included in the vetting process, indicating a more inclusive and 

independent post-wide review. Post officials said that they had 

implemented new post-wide procedures in late 2004 to improve the vetting 

process, and now vet candidates for all post programs in accordance with 

earlier State guidance. 

16ICITAP is funded by State’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

program, but implemented by Justice.

17These programs all involved training under IMET, FMF, or CTFP. 
Page 23 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Thailand. We found no evidence that the approximately 1,760 Thai law 

enforcement officials who received training under the Foreign Operations 

Appropriations Act-funded law enforcement training programs were vetted 

for possible human rights violations. In contrast, our review of 25 randomly 

selected DOD trainee files from an estimated total of 795 trainees in the 

DOD-implemented programs18 showed some evidence of vetting. For 

example, DOD training files generally included an initialed and dated 

checklist returned from the Political Affairs Office, indicating the status of 

the post-wide review. 

However, the DOD official in Thailand responsible for IMET training said 

that his office did not submit names of individuals to receive in-country 

IMET training to the country team for vetting because officials were not 

aware of this responsibility. According to 1999 DOD guidelines, all 

individuals and units scheduled for in-country DOD-implemented training 

should be vetted. Officials and post estimates indicated that about half of 

the 795 trainees were trained in-country between fiscal years 2001 and 

2004. In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the 

post is now vetting all in-country military training, but provided no 

evidence to support this.

Agencies Do Not Have 

Controls in Place to Help 

Ensure Compliance with 

Human Rights Funding 

Restrictions

Lapses in vetting occurred because the agencies did not assign clear roles 

and responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; departments and posts 

lacked clear and consistent vetting procedures; and State and posts did not 

establish a system to monitor compliance with these procedures. GAO’s 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government prescribes 

basic standards for management controls19 in the federal government. 

Internal control is an integral part of an organization’s management that 

provides reasonable assurance that an entity achieves (1) effectiveness and 

efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of financial reporting, and (3) 

18The programs included FMF, IMET, and CTFP.

19See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-

21.3.1, Nov. 1999). 
Page 24 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

compliance with applicable laws and regulations.20 As a result, U.S. 

agencies did not always vet foreign security forces for derogatory human 

rights information before providing them with U.S.-funded training 

opportunities.

Vetting Process Lacks Clearly 

Defined Roles and 

Responsibilities

Neither State headquarters nor the three posts we visited had clear roles 

and responsibilities established for vetting foreign security forces receiving 

State funding from fiscal years 2001 and 2004 or for monitoring posts’ or 

State headquarters’ compliance with vetting procedures. As a result, 

officials at the posts we visited expressed confusion over their vetting roles 

and responsibilities, especially those related to law enforcement training 

programs. 

According to GAO’s internal control standards, an organization should 

establish a positive control environment, including an organizational 

structure and clearly defined roles and responsibilities conducive to sound 

management controls. However, State guidance did not establish a single 

bureau to be responsible for implementing the vetting process or for 

monitoring posts’ compliance with vetting procedures. This was an 

important omission because four State bureaus are involved in either 

establishing policy or managing State-funded training programs: Bureau of 

Political-Military Affairs; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the 

Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. 

20Under these standards, management control is defined as consisting of five interrelated 

components: (1) Control environment. Management should establish a supportive 

environment for internal control and assign authority and responsibility clearly throughout 

the organization and clearly communicate this to all employees. (2) Risk Assessment. 

Management needs to formulate an approach for assessing risk and decide upon the internal 

control activities required to mitigate those risks and achieve efficient and effective 

operations, reliable financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations. (3) 

Control activities. Policies and procedures are needed to help ensure that management’s 

directives to mitigate risks are carried out. These activities include accurate and timely 

recording of transactions and events. (4) Information and communication. Relevant and 

reliable information should be recorded and communicated to management and others 

within the agency who need it and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to 

carry out their responsibilities. (5) Monitoring. Internal control monitoring assesses the 

quality of performance over time and ensures that the findings of audits and other reviews 

are promptly resolved.
Page 25 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

State Lacks Clear Policies and 

Procedures for Vetting Foreign 

Security Forces 

State lacked clear policies and procedures for human rights vetting in 

several areas: (1) only the Manila post established postwide procedures, as 

required, prior to 2004; (2) State established no documentation and record 

retention requirements regarding vetting documents; (3) the posts did not 

conduct a comprehensive review of all candidates for assistance through a 

central focal point, such as the political affairs office, before 2004; (4) State 

headquarters did not specify whether posts needed to submit candidates’ 

names to State headquarters for additional review and approval. According 

to GAO’s internal control standards, policies and procedures help enforce 

management directives and are integral to achieving effective results. 

State’s June 1999 and 2003 guidance directed all posts to establish 

procedures to implement the human rights restrictions for all Foreign 

Operations Appropriations Act-funded aid to security forces and DODfunded training. According to our internal control standards, policies and 

procedures help enforce management directives and are integral to 

achieving effective results. However, only Embassy Manila established 

written procedures for human rights vetting as required prior to 2004. 

Guidance issued in 1999 directed that posts report their procedures to the 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor by a certain date, but a 

Bureau official believed that posts had not done so. Nonetheless, prior to 

2004, two of the three posts did not establish written policies and 

procedures for the vetting process. Two of the three posts we visited—

Manila and Jakarta—established new written procedures for human rights 

vetting in the fall 2004; the Bangkok post had not yet established written 

procedures at the time of our visit in March 2005. In contrast, DOD and 

State issued more detailed supplemental guidance to DOD officials at posts 

for DOD-funded training, including criteria to apply in screening candidates 

and checklists to track vetting processes. 

State’s 1999 and 2003 guidance also did not specify documentation and 

record retention requirements for the documents used at posts or 

headquarters in the human rights vetting process for Foreign Operations 

Appropriations Act-funded assistance. As a result, the Jakarta post was 

unable to provide us with any documentation of post vetting conducted for 

ICITAP between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. By contrast, documentation for 

vetting candidates for DOD-implemented training generally was more 

complete, and included check-lists, approving signatures, and biographical 

information on nominees in separate folders. DOD documentation was 

generally better because DOD had established criteria and procedures for 

screening candidates in the programs it manages. These procedures 
Page 26 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

include a records retention requirement of at least 10 years for specific 

programs. 

State’s guidance to the posts also stated that each post should designate an 

embassy point of contact, such as political counselor, to coordinate a 

comprehensive review of candidates for assistance by relevant members of 

the country team. However, we found that such coordination had not 

occurred before 2004 for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded 

law enforcement training. For example, post officials in Manila and Jakarta 

stated that designated embassy points of contact began receiving names of 

candidates for law enforcement training only in early 2004. 

We found that the three posts did not consistently cable names of all 

candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded training to 

State headquarters for vetting by bureaus because State had not yet written 

this procedure into guidance. Officials at State headquarters said this 

procedure was required. During our efforts to clarify whether this was a 

requirement, we asked State officials to identify the written guidance 

specifically requiring posts to cable candidate names back to Washington 

for further vetting. However, these officials could not identify any specific 

language prior to February 2005 when State headquarters issued new 

instructions to the posts. Officials at the Embassy in Jakarta said they were 

not aware of this procedure, did not cable names of candidates for Foreign 

Operations Appropriations Act-funded training back to State headquarters, 

and wrote to State criticizing this as a burdensome new procedure in 2005.

Monitoring System Not 

Established to Assess Posts’ 

Compliance with State Policies 

We found that no headquarters office within State currently is charged with 

the responsibility of monitoring the posts’ compliance with State’s human 

rights vetting procedures. However, our internal control standards state 

that an organization should continually monitor as part of ongoing 

operations to assess the quality of performance over time. 

State and post officials are uncertain which office has the overall 

responsibility for monitoring human rights vetting activities. Some officials 

said that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor had this 

responsibility, while others cited the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs or 

the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Officials in each bureau were 

unaware of which office had this responsibility. We found that State’s 

guidance to the posts between 1997 through 2005 contained no provision 

that accorded this role and responsibility to any office. State provided no 

evidence that any unit at State headquarters was fulfilling this function.
Page 27 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Without a monitoring system in place, State could not identify instances 

where a post was not complying with required procedures or instances 

where confusion about requirements existed. 

• In Indonesia, 32 members from a brigade associated with prior human 

rights abuses were trained on six separate occasions under ICITAP 

between July 2002 and March 2003. However, in testimony to the House 

International Relations Committee in March 2003, then-Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said that no such 

brigade members “currently participate in the ICITAP police program,” 

at the time when such individuals were participating in this training. 

State sought to correct this situation by issuing written guidance to the 

post in November 2003.

• No one at State headquarters was aware that the three posts did not 

consistently cable names of all candidates for Foreign Operations 

Appropriations Act-funded training to State headquarters for vetting by 

bureaus, although officials at headquarters said this was required. In 

reviewing cable traffic related to human rights vetting from the three 

posts, we found that the Jakarta Embassy had not cabled State 

headquarters with names of any candidates for further vetting. 

State Issued New Guidance 

to Improve Vetting Practices 

in February 2005

State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the 

efficiency of the human rights vetting process. State announced that it had 

established a new human rights database, the Abuse Case Evaluation 

System (ACES), to be a clearinghouse for information on alleged human 

rights abuses. According to the guidance, data will come from sources 

currently used for human rights vetting, such as post reporting, press, 

nongovernmental organizations, national human rights commissions, and 

other sources. Users at posts and at State headquarters will be able to enter 

a comment on allegations, and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor will check information for completeness and accuracy. As ACES 

becomes populated with data, it could become an important tool for posts 

and State to make human rights vetting more efficient and effective, as well 

as to facilitate human rights monitoring and reporting in general, according 

to the guidance. The guidance stated that posts will enter incidents of 

alleged human rights abuses into ACES whenever they occur or are 

reported to post. This step will replace the requirement that posts report 

alleged abuses via cable and keep track of allegations at post. Finally, the 

guidance established some roles and responsibilities for offices at main 
Page 28 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

State, particularly when differences arise over credibility of evidence or the 

response to such evidence.

However, this new system does not address all the deficiencies that we 

found at the three posts and adds an additional resource concern. For 

example, the guidance does not assign a monitoring role to any main State 

office or procedures to ensure posts’ compliance with vetting procedures. 

In addition, because ACES will be a classified system, foreign national 

employees at posts will not be allowed access to it. Foreign nationals 

currently play an important role in entering and maintaining the available 

human rights vetting data at posts but would not be allowed to do so using 

the ACES database. Consequently, the new system might require cleared 

U.S. post officials to assume database duties that could not be conducted 

by foreign nationals. To date, State guidance has not addressed the 

potential for either shifting responsibilities from foreign to U.S. employees 

at posts or adding more U.S. personnel for this task.

U.S. Government Lacks 

an Integrated National 

Security Assistance 

Strategy Covering All 

U.S. Training and 

Assistance Provided to 

Foreign Security 

Forces

The U.S. government lacks a clear and coherent multiyear national security 

assistance strategy, making it difficult to assess progress in achieving 

stated U.S. foreign policy goals, such as stemming terrorism, promoting 

regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human rights. State’s 

National Security Assistance Strategy, provided to Congress in May 2003, 

meets two of nine objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. The 

strategy does not, however, identify how resources will be allocated to 

accomplish objectives, how programs will be combined at the country level 

to achieve objectives, or how security assistance programs will be 

coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. In addition, the strategy 

fails to discuss performance measures that are necessary to track the 

achievement of goals and objectives. State and DOD have produced a 

variety of other national, regional, and country-level strategic planning 

documents, but these documents do not collectively satisfy the act’s 

objectives. 
Page 29 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

State’s National Security 

Assistance Strategy 

Addresses Two of Nine 

Objectives of the Security 

Assistance Act of 2000

State’s National Security Assistance Strategy meets two objectives of the 

Security Assistance Act of 2000; it is consistent with the U.S. National 

Security Strategy21 and identifies overarching security assistance objectives 

(see table 6). State’s strategy, however, does not cover the other seven 

objectives of the act. 

Table 6: Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 Addressed by State’s 

National Security Assistance Strategy

Source: GAO analysis of State document.

21The U.S. National Security Strategy is prepared by the President, through the National 

Security Council. Its purpose is to define a strategy for maintaining U.S. security. It centers 

on the core national security objectives of preserving peaceful relations with other states, 

political and economic freedom, and respect for human dignity. 

Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives

Addressed by State’s 

2003 National Security 

Assistance Strategy 

Multiyear plan for security assistance programs? No

Consistent with the National Security Strategy of the U.S.? Yes

Coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff?

No

Prepared in consultation with appropriate agencies? No

Identifies overarching security assistance objectives and how 

programs will contribute to achieving these objectives?

Yes

Identifies primary and secondary security assistance 

objectives for individual countries?

No

Identifies how resources (time, employees, funds) will be 

allocated to accomplish primary and secondary objectives?

No

Addresses how security assistance programs will be 

combined at the country level to achieve objectives?

No

Details how security assistance programs will be coordinated 

with other U.S. government assistance programs managed 

by DOD and other agencies?

No
Page 30 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

The Security Assistance Act of 2000 was designed to address previous 

shortcomings22 in security assistance planning by providing Congress with 

a clear and coherent multiyear plan for security assistance programs, on a 

country-by-country basis. The act urged State to submit to Congress a plan, 

prepared in consultation with other agencies, that identified overarching 

security assistance objectives, the role specific programs would play in 

achieving them, and resource allocations for each country. Further, the 

Security Assistance Act of 200223 required State to brief Congress on its 

plans and progress in formulating and implementing the strategy, and to 

provide a description on the actions taken to include such programs as 

IMET, FMF, and EDA, as well as other assistance programs to foreign 

security forces in the strategy. 

In response to the acts of 2000 and 2002, State prepared a 16-page 

PowerPoint document entitled, “National Security Assistance Strategy 

Briefing” and used it to brief selected congressional committees in May 

2003 (see app. III for the briefing). State officials in the Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs said that the briefing constitutes State’s current National 

Security Assistance Strategy and that, through negotiations with 

congressional committee staff, State was exempted from annually updating 

the strategy, as urged in the law. We reviewed the briefing to determine the 

extent to which the strategy addresses the nine objectives of the acts and 

found the following. 

• The strategy is not a multiyear plan since it was prepared only once and 

does not discuss outyear program plans.

• The strategy was not prepared in coordination with the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A State official 

reported that the briefing was given together with representatives from 

DSCA and OSD and provided us with OSD’s six-page briefing on “DOD 

Security Cooperation.” However, in reviewing State’s strategy, we did 

22The Conference Report attached to the 2000 Security Assistance Act expressed concern 

that the prior planning process had been “entirely insufficient and...run on an ad hoc basis,” 

without a “clearly articulated organizing principle” or a “coherent set of benchmarks or 

measurements against which the success of individual programs with various countries can 

be measured.” See House Conference Report No. 106-868, accompanying the Security 

Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-280). 

23P.L. 107-228, §1501.
Page 31 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

not find evidence that it was coordinated with OSD or the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. 

• Despite congressional direction, the strategy was not prepared in 

consultation with other appropriate agencies. The briefing indicates that 

the coordination process begins at the country level, includes DOD 

priorities, occurs through State roundtables and an excess defense 

articles coordinating committee, and through “day-to-day coordination.” 

However, State does not further detail whether it coordinates with other 

appropriate agencies that provide assistance to foreign security forces, 

such as Justice. 

• The strategy does not discuss specific security assistance objectives for 

each program on a country-by-country basis. Key countries such as 

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (among others) are identified 

but the strategy does not identify which programs and security 

assistance tools are being implemented in those countries.

• The strategy does not discuss the resources needed or used for the 

various programs and how they will be combined at the country level to 

achieve objectives. The outline accompanying the briefing asserts that 

State’s bureau and mission performance plans discuss how military 

assistance tools contribute to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals at the 

regional and country level, respectively. However, the strategy does not 

incorporate key activity and resource information from these 

documents;

• Although the strategy lists key countries, it does not address how the 

various programs are to be combined within each country to achieve 

objectives. As mentioned, we identified at least 12 programs that 

provide assistance to foreign security forces in Indonesia, the 

Philippines, and Thailand. However, the strategy does not discuss how 

programs funded by State’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control 

and Law Enforcement in Thailand, for example, are combined with 

DOD’s in-country counternarcotics activities.

• Finally, the strategy does not detail how security assistance programs 

will be coordinated with other U.S. government assistance programs 

managed by DOD and other agencies. Specifically, it does not identify all 

other forms of assistance provided to foreign security forces under at 

least three different funding sources—State, Defense, and Justice. State 

officials said they are aware of related programs funded by DOD and 
Page 32 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Justice that provide assistance to foreign security forces, but that they 

do not consider those programs “security assistance” and would not 

include them in a National Security Assistance Strategy. 

In addition, the strategy fails to discuss the performance measures24 that 

can be used to assess progress towards achieving goals. Our prior work has 

emphasized that agencies should link strategic planning to performance 

measures, and that performance measures can better inform—or justify—

how resources should be allocated to accomplish program objectives. 

Officials in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand acknowledged that it is 

difficult to generate quantitative performance measures for some security 

assistance programs, but highlighted several qualitative measures, or “big 

wins” in the region that help illustrate the effectiveness of U.S. security 

assistance programs. For example, a senior U.S. official in Thailand stated 

that Thai security forces are very supportive of the U.S. government’s war 

on terrorism and of reducing the demand for drugs. In the Philippines, U.S. 

government officials highlighted the positive impact U.S. government 

security assistance programs have had on the Philippine Defense Reform 

effort. 

Although not reflected in State’s strategy, some efforts have been made to 

develop more quantifiable measures. For example, State’s Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs includes quantitative 

measures for programs in its official interagency or intergovernmental 

agreements with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Also, the Office 

of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool 

(PART)25 uses performance measures to evaluate some of State’s programs 

that provide assistance to foreign security forces (and other federal 

government programs). As part of the executive budget formulation 

process, PART evaluators assess programs by applying 25 questions under 

four broad topics: (1) program purpose and design, (2) strategic planning, 

(3) program management, and (4) program results (i.e., whether a program 

24Performance measures provide a succinct and concrete statement of expected 

performance for subsequent comparison with actual performance. In general, performance 

measures are a tabulation, calculation, recording of activity or effort, or assessment of 

results compared with intended purpose, that can be expressed quantitatively or in another 

way that indicates a level or degree of performance. 

25PART was developed as a key element of the President’s Management Agenda and is 

intended to assess and improve program performance so that the federal government can 

achieve better results. 
Page 33 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

is meeting its long-term and annual goals).26 The 2004 PART reviews of 

State’s ATA program and Security Assistance Programs to the Western 

Hemisphere were rated as “effective” and “moderately effective,” 

respectively.27 However, we found that the latter review has limitations 

because it identifies multiple programs, but rates them as one unit of 

analysis. We reported in January 2004 that inherent challenges exist in 

assigning a single rating to programs that have multiple purposes and goals. 

In addition, the report cited that PART has merit but remains “a work in 

progress that needs considerable revisions to be an objective, evidencebased assessment tool.”28 

DOD’s unified commands operate a Theater Security Cooperation 

Management Information System (TSCMIS) to track training and other 

activities with foreign security forces in their regional areas of 

responsibility. Officials can use the system to assess the effect of DOD 

events on country-level goals and objectives. U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM) officials reported that TSCMIS captures and stores key program 

data, but due to resource constraints, they are uncertain whether 

information is consistently entered into the system or maintained. In 

addition, the assessments are conducted by activity managers and country 

directors and are therefore not independent reviews of programs.

Related State and DOD 

Documents Address 

Selected Objectives of the 

Security Assistance Act of 

2000

State and DOD annually develop various country, regional, and national 

strategy and planning documents that address some objectives of the 

Security Assistance Act of 2000. Figure 4 illustrates how these documents 

relate to each other. Appendix IV contains a detailed analysis of how other 

State and DOD planning documents address objectives of the act. Although 

none of these documents constitute a single, multiyear national security 

assistance strategy that covers all agency programs, we found that they 

offer the potential for developing the comprehensive assistance strategy 

called for in the act. 

26Additional questions are unique depending on the type of program (e.g., competitive grant, 

regulatory based, direct federal, etc.). 

27PART uses five rating categories to assess programs: (1) effective, (2) moderately effective, 

(3) adequate, (4) ineffective, and (5) results not demonstrated. 

28GAO. Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB’s Program Assessment 

Rating Tool for the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget, GAO-04-174 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2004). 
Page 34 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Figure 4: State and DOD Strategic Planning Documents

Note: The U.S. National Military Strategy is guided by the goals and objectives contained in the 

President’s “National Security Strategy” and serves to implement the Secretary of Defense’s 2004 

“National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.” 

We found that some State planning documents address certain objectives 

of the act. For example, State develops annual Mission Performance Plans 

(MPP) for each of its overseas posts. The 2006 MPPs for Indonesia, the 

Philippines, and Thailand address some objectives of the Security 

Assistance Act because they contain information on some programs that 

provide assistance to foreign security forces, are generally consistent with 

the National Security Strategy of the United States, and are prepared in 

consultation with appropriate agencies at each post. State also prepares 

annual regional level Bureau Performance Plans (BPPs) that are consistent 

with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and to some 

extent, address how combining resources and programs will achieve 

regional objectives. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD documents.

DOD STATE

National Military

Strategy

OSD Security

Cooperation

Guidance (SCG)

Theater Security

Cooperation Plan

(TSCP)

State Strategic

Plan

Bureau Performance

Plans (BPP)

Country level

Regional level

Global level

U.S. National Security

Strategy (President)

Security Assistance

Plans (SAP)

Mission Performance

Plans (MPP)
Page 35 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

DOD also produces annual country and regional planning documents that 

address some objectives of the Security Assistance Act. For example, 

DOD’s annual country-specific security assistance plans for the Philippines, 

Indonesia, and Thailand meet some objectives of the act because they are 

consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, include 

some discussion of DOD-implemented assistance to foreign security forces 

and how the assistance will be combined and contribute to achieving 

certain “end states.” Similarly, DOD’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans 

(TSCP) are prepared by DOD’s unified commands and include regional 

security assistance and other activities for the current year, plus the next 2 

fiscal years.29 PACOM’s fiscal year 2004 TSCP addresses selected objectives 

of the act. It is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy, is 

coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

includes discussion of certain security cooperation activities.

In commenting on a draft of this report, State observed that our report does 

not include information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot project, 

which State said has the potential to become a useful tool for security 

assistance strategic planning. We were not informed in the course of our 

review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be developed and 

deployed.

Conclusion U.S. agencies do not have adequate assurance that U.S. training funds are 

being used to train and equip only foreign security forces with good human 

rights backgrounds. Because they have weak internal controls, the 

agencies inconsistently apply human rights vetting requirements. Improved 

internal controls would provide greater assurance that all individuals are 

properly vetted for human rights issues before receiving U.S. assistance. 

State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance 

strategy meeting the objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. As a 

result, it may be difficult for Congress to assess the contributions that U.S. 

security assistance programs make to broader U.S. foreign policy 

objectives and to have assurance that the programs’ objectives are being 

met. Without an integrated strategy for U.S. security assistance that, at a 

minimum, addresses the nine elements of the Security Assistance Act of 

2000, the potential exists for uncoordinated approaches, duplication of 

efforts, or gaps in coverage. As a result, State and Congress will be 

29We reviewed TSCP’s for four of DOD’s nine unified commands—U.S. Central Command, 

European Command, Joint Forces Command, and Pacific Command. 
Page 36 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

deprived of an important source of information for making future resource 

allocations and program decisions. Since a number of related State and 

DOD strategic planning processes are already in place, the agencies could 

use the plans produced under these related processes as the basis for 

producing a new strategy that fully meets the objectives of the Security 

Assistance Act of 2000. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To help provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security 

assistance programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and State 

policies on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in 

consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Justice take the following 

three actions to strengthen management controls by issuing new 

consolidated guidance for vetting foreign security units. As part of these 

new controls, posts and headquarters units should establish

• the roles and responsibilities of posts and headquarters units for vetting 

foreign candidates for human rights consideration;

• written policies and procedures covering all entities involved in the 

vetting process at posts, including documentation and record retention 

policies specifying what documentation is needed and where and how 

long vetting files should be maintained; and 

• monitoring mechanisms and a central focal point to verify that these 

procedures are being carried out properly. 

To help provide both State and Congress with the information needed on 

how U.S. security assistance programs help support U.S. foreign policy and 

security objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the 

following actions using existing plans and strategies within State and DOD 

as the basis for developing an integrated strategic plan for all U.S. 

government assistance programs that provide training, equipment, or 

technical assistance to foreign security forces (military and police). This 

multiyear plan should be periodically reported to Congress in response to 

the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which urged the Secretary of State to 

develop a multiyear security assistance plan. In addition, the strategy 

should

• be coordinated with the Departments of Defense and Justice and any 

other agencies providing assistance to foreign security forces; 
Page 37 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

• identify all federal agency programs providing assistance to foreign 

security forces, regardless of their funding source;

• describe all related resource allocations used to support program goals, 

and; 

• incorporate quantitative and qualitative performance measures 

designed to determine the extent to which country programs contribute 

to broader U.S. foreign policy and security objectives.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State 

and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. We received 

written responses from the Secretaries of Defense and State that are 

reprinted in appendixes V and VI. The Secretaries of Defense and State and 

the Attorney General also provided us with technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

The Secretary of Defense concurred with our report in principle. However, 

in technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD asserted that our 

report states that DOD assistance programs in Indonesia and Thailand are 

“100 percent compliant” with human rights vetting requirements. We 

disagree with DOD’s comment because our report did not conclude that 

DOD programs in Indonesia and Thailand were “100 percent compliant.” 

Instead, our draft report stated that all 35 of the limited sample of trainee 

files we reviewed in these two countries showed some evidence of human 

rights vetting. The small sample size of the DOD-sponsored trainees 

relative to the much larger sample of law enforcement trainees precluded 

us from projecting our findings to the entire universe of DOD-sponsored 

trainees. Furthermore, DOD later acknowledged in its comments on the 

draft report that in-country trainees in Thailand—about half of the 795 

trainees for fiscal years 2001 to 2004—were not vetted during the period we 

reviewed. 

The Secretary of State acknowledged the need for continued improvement 

on human rights vetting procedures but stated that it is operating its 

assistance programs in full compliance with the law. State commented that 

any vetting of individuals is done as a matter of State policy and practice, 

not as a matter of law. We agree with State’s comment. However, in 

reviewing State’s application of its policy on human rights vetting of 

individuals, we found significant weaknesses that resulted in an estimated 

6,900 individuals receiving U.S. training assistance without any evidence 
Page 38 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

that they had first been vetted for gross violations of human rights. 

Therefore, we recommended in our report that State strengthen its 

management controls on vetting to meet its stated policy goal of not 

providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human rights violators. 

State also commented that it has fully complied with congressional intent 

regarding a national security assistance strategy. State disagreed with our 

finding that the national security assistance strategy met only two of nine 

objectives of the law. It said that our findings are based on incomplete 

information because many of the objectives were met and discussed in a 

May 2003 oral briefing with selected Congressional staff, and that the 

absence of further requests for a briefing on the national security 

assistance strategy or additional requirements relieved it of further 

obligations. We disagree with State’s comments. The documents, which 

State identified as representing a national security assistance strategy, met 

only two of nine objectives that the law urged State to address in crafting 

this strategy. The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan 

is needed for wider distribution, and for providing documentation for 

tracking progress in moving forward. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, and the Secretaries of Defense, Justice, and State. We will also 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 39 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8979 or at christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix VII.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph A. Christoff

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 40 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar

Chairman

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mitch McConnell

Chairman

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Lantos

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles H. Smith

Chairman

The Honorable Donald M. Payne

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights,

and International Operations

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jim Leach

Chairman

The Honorable Eni F. H. Faleomavaega

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives
Page 41 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

The Honorable Jim Kolbe

Chairman

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing,

and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 42 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To identify the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security 

forces in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, we met with officials of 

the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice in Washington, D.C., 

responsible for administering various aspects of U.S. assistance programs 

to foreign security forces. We also met with U.S. Pacific Command officials 

in Honolulu, Hawaii; and U.S. Embassy and foreign government officials in 

Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We also 

obtained the statutory authorizations for these programs from program 

officials and from our independent legal searches. We obtained data on the 

nature and extent of the activities funded by these programs in Indonesia, 

the Philippines, and Thailand from program officials and State and DOD 

Web sites. We reviewed the reliability of funding data provided by State and 

DOD by comparing it with similar data obtained from other sources to 

check for completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We also 

interviewed program officials responsible for managing the data to assess 

how it was developed and maintained. We found the data sufficiently 

reliable for representing the nature and extent of program funding.

To assess the extent to which the three posts included in our review 

complied with human rights vetting requirements from 2001 to 2004, we 

reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State and DOD officials 

in Washington, D.C., and at the three posts, and how these procedures were 

implemented at each post. We also interviewed relevant officials in 

Washington, PACOM, and the three posts, and discussed vetting 

requirements and processes. At each post, we asked the relevant post 

officials to identify the total number of foreign security officials trained 

under all programs provided under the Foreign Operations Appropriations 

Act and DOD appropriations act subject to the Leahy restrictions from 2001 

to 2004. We then randomly selected and reviewed program files for those 

officials. We reviewed the files for compliance with human rights vetting 

requirements as set forth in legislation and State policy guidance. To 

conduct the file review, we used a data collection instrument to 

systematically capture whether key steps in the post’s human rights vetting 

process occurred, such as whether the political affairs office at each post 

was involved.

We were able to estimate that 87 percent of files for DOD trainees in the 

Philippines had some documentation subject to a sampling error of plus or 

minus 10 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval surrounding this 

estimate ranges from 80 percent to 92 percent. However, due to small 

sample sizes for the other agencies in the other countries, we were unable 

to make other reliable estimates about the percentage of files for which 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

some vetting occurred. The small sample sizes occurred because, after we 

had drawn our sample, U.S. officials told us that no files existed for several 

large groups of trainees, including approximately 4,000 trainees under the 

ICITAP program in Indonesia and 1,439 trainees from the Narcotics Affairs 

Section in Thailand. In addition, after we had drawn our sample, we were 

told about other groups of trainees that had not been vetted. As a result, 

our estimates for the numbers of trainees for which no vetting occurred are 

based on officials' estimates of the numbers of trainees that had taken the 

training that should have been vetted, not the file review we conducted. To 

assess the reliability of the estimates on trainees that had not received 

training, we interviewed officials, and compared the estimates they 

provided with other available information. While we found that some of the 

components in the estimates were less precise than others, we determined 

that these estimates were sufficiently reliable to indicate that many 

thousands of trainees had not been vetted.

In addition, to obtain a general understanding of the human rights situation 

in each country, we also met with State human rights officers, national 

commissions on human rights in each country, as well as representatives of 

nongovernmental organizations involved with human rights issues. 

Specifically, in the Philippines we met with Task Force Detainees; in 

Indonesia, we met with The Commission for Involuntary Disappearance 

and Victims of Violence, Voice of Human Rights in Indonesia, and the 

National Forum for the Commission on Human Rights in Papua; and in 

Thailand we met with Forum Asia and Human Rights Watch. In addition, 

we met with nongovernmental organizations in Washington, D.C., to 

understand the general human rights situation on countries included in our 

review: Amnesty International, East Timor Action Network, Human Rights 

Watch, and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights.

To assess the U.S. government’s national security assistance strategy, we 

met with State, DOD, and Justice officials in Washington, D.C., responsible 

for managing and administering U.S. assistance to foreign security forces. 

We also met with U.S. Pacific Command officials in Honolulu, Hawaii; and 

U.S. Embassy officials in Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and 

Bangkok, Thailand. We analyzed key planning documents from State and 

DOD to determine the extent to which they addressed the nine strategic 

objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000, that urged State to 

develop a multiyear National Security Assistance Strategy. As part of this 

assessment, we analyzed State’s Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plans 

for each post we visited, and the Bureau Performance Plan for the Bureau 

of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. We also assessed PACOM’s Theater 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 44 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Security Cooperation Plan, reviewed three other unified command’s 

theater security cooperation plans, and assessed security assistance plans 

for the three countries included in our review. To address the extent to 

which State and DOD have performance measures for programs that train 

and equip foreign security forces, we interviewed agency officials, 

reviewed OMB’s 2004 and 2005 Performance Assessment Rating Tool 

assessments, DOD’s Theater Security Cooperation Management 

Information System, and Justice’s Letters of Agreement with other agencies 

and with the three countries included in our review.

We conducted this review from June 2004 to June 2005 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 45 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Appendix II

Descriptions of Assistance Programs to 

Foreign Security Forces ApendxiI

We use the term “allocations” to describe the broad mix of appropriated 

and nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security forces 

in these three countries. State and DOD appropriations accounted for 83 

percent of the total; nonappropriated assistance in the form of Excess 

Defense Articles and drawdowns from DOD stocks accounted for 13 

percent of the total; and DOD and Justice expenditures accounted for 4 

percent of the total. Expenditures data were used for the DOD’s JCET 

program and Justice’s DEA and FBI training activities because separate 

appropriations and country allocation data does not exist. 

Table 7: Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Managing unit(s) The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of 

Antiterrorism Assistance implements and manages ATA with policy 

guidance from the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

Description of 

activities

The ATA program supports a variety of activities to help fight terrorism 

by building the capacity of key countries abroad to fight terrorism; 

establishing security relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to 

strengthen cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; sharing modern effective 

anti-terrorism techniques; and leading training courses covering such 

areas as law enforcement, protection of national leadership, control of 

borders, protection of critical infrastructure, crisis management.

ATA by country 

(fiscal years 

2001 to 2004)

Indonesia: $14,786,000

Philippines: $1,939,000

Thailand: $0

Legal authority 

for the program

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195, as amended, 22 USC 

§2349a.
Appendix II

Descriptions of Assistance Programs to 

Foreign Security Forces

Page 46 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 8: Drawdown

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

a

Funds are not appropriated for drawdown. 

Table 9: Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

a

Funds are not appropriated for drawdown. 

Managing unit(s) The Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

(DSCA) is the agency tasked to execute DOD drawdown. DSCA 

coordinates Defense, State, the National Security Council, and others 

to develop drawdown packages. DSCA works with the military services 

to identify available defense articles and services and monitors the 

progress of deliveries.

Description of 

activities

Drawdown is the transfer of in-stock defense articles and services from 

the inventory of the DOD, as well as any agency of the U.S. 

government, to foreign countries and international organizations in 

response to unforeseen military emergencies, humanitarian 

catastrophes, peacekeeping needs, or counternarcotics requirements.

Drawdown by 

country (fiscal 

years 2001 to 

2004)a

Philippines: $10,000,000

Indonesia: $0

Thailand: $0

Legal authority 

for the program

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC §§2318 and 

2348a

Managing unit(s) The military departments determine excess defense articles and 

recommend an allocation of excess assets to the Excess Defense 

Articles Coordinating Committee. The Committee is co-chaired by the 

DOD’s DSCA and State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of 

Regional Security and Arms Transfers. The Coordinating Committee 

approves allocation of EDA and the military departments work with the 

foreign government to execute the transfer. 

Description of 

activities

EDAs are nonappropriated assistance in the form of excess U.S. 

defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. Defense articles declared as 

excess by the military departments can be offered to foreign 

governments. 

EDA by country 

(fiscal years 

2001 to 2004)a

Philippines: $19,504,000

Thailand: $5,972,000

Indonesia: $0

Legal authority 

for the program

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC §2321j
Appendix II

Descriptions of Assistance Programs to 

Foreign Security Forces

Page 47 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 10: Economic Support Fund (ESF)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Table 11: Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Managing unit(s) U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) administers the 

program in foreign countries. USAID transfers some ESF funds to 

State for administering certain activities.

Description of 

activities

The ESF promotes economic and political stability in strategically 

important regions where the U.S. has special security interests. The 

funds are generally provided as grants or loans provided on a grant 

basis and are available for a variety of economic purposes, such as 

infrastructure and development projects.

ESF by country 

(fiscal years 

2001 to 2004)

Indonesia: $23,200,000

Philippines: $0

Thailand: $0

Legal authority 

for the program

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC §2346 et. seq.

Managing unit(s) Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the implementing agency.

Description of 

activities

FMF provides grants and loans to foreign governments and 

international organizations for the acquisition of U.S. defense 

equipment, services, and training. FMF assists the militaries of friendly 

countries to promote bilateral, regional, and multilateral coalition 

efforts, notably in the global war on terrorism; improve military 

capabilities to contribute to international crisis response operations, 

including peacekeeping and humanitarian crises; contribute to the 

professionalism of military forces to include the rule of law and military 

subordination to civilian control; enhance interoperability of military 

forces, maintain support for democratically elected governments; and 

to support the U.S. industrial base by promoting the export of U.S. 

defense-related goods and services. 

FMF by country 

(fiscal years 

2001 to 2004)

Philippines: $115,745,000

Thailand: $4,171,000

Indonesia: $0

Legal authority 

for the program

Arms Export Control Act of 1976, P.L. 90-629, as amended, 22 USC 

§2763.
Appendix II

Descriptions of Assistance Programs to 

Foreign Security Forces

Page 48 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 12: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Table 13: International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Managing unit(s) Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL) administers the program. INL uses 

interagency agreements with 16 other U.S. government agencies, 

including USAID, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Defense, DEA, 

FBI, and the Coast Guard, to carry out INCLE activities. 

Description of 

activities

Development and coordination of U.S. international drug and crime 

policies and programs through bilateral, regional, and global initiatives 

that build law enforcement capabilities of foreign governments. These 

efforts center on two primary goals: (1) ensuring that international 

trafficking in drugs, persons, and other illicit goods are disrupted and 

criminal organizations dismantled; and (2) encouraging states to 

cooperate internationally to set up and implement antidrug and 

anticrime standards.

INCLE by 

country (fiscal 

years 2001 to 

2004)

Thailand: $13,795,000

Indonesia: $4,000,000

Philippines: $2,000,000

Legal authority 

for the program

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC §2291. 

Managing unit(s) Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has authority 

over the program; DSCA is the implementing agency.

Description of 

activities

The IMET program provides training to military and related civilian 

personnel. IMET training exposes foreign students to U.S. military 

organizations and procedures and the manner in which military 

organizations function under civilian control. IMET aims to strengthen 

democratic and civilian control of foreign militaries, improve their 

understanding of U.S. military doctrine and operational procedures, 

and to enhance interoperability. IMET facilitates the development of 

professional and personal relationships, which aim to provide U.S. 

access and influence to foreign governments.

IMET by country 

(fiscal years 

2001 to 2004)

Philippines: $8,561,000

Thailand: $7,940,000

Indonesia: $1,275,000

Legal authority 

for the program

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC §2347. 
Appendix II

Descriptions of Assistance Programs to 

Foreign Security Forces

Page 49 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 14: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Table 15: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Managing unit(s) Department of Defense, Special Operations Command

Description of 

activities

JCET activities involve training U.S. Special Operations Forces with 

foreign forces to ensure readiness regarding language, culture, 

knowledge of foreign environments, combat and combat support, and 

instructor skills. Training ranges from land navigation, first aid, basic 

rifle marksmanship, leadership techniques, and special operations 

techniques and tactics. The primary purpose of JCET is to train U.S. 

Special Operations Forces. Benefits to the host nation forces are 

incidental.

JCET by country 

(fiscal years 

2001 to 2004)

Thailand: $5,040,000

Philippines: $4,730,00

Indonesia: $0

Legal authority 

for the program

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, as 

amended, (P.L. 102-190), 10 U.S.C. §2011.

Managing unit(s) Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has authority 

over the program and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the 

implementing agency.

Description of 

activities

PKO funding supports multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability 

operations that are not funded through the UN. PKO funding enhances 

the ability of other countries to participate in voluntary peacekeeping 

and humanitarian operations and supports regional peacekeeping 

operations for which neighboring countries take primary responsibility. 

PKO by country 

(fiscal years 

2001 to 2004)

Philippines: $15,000,000

Thailand: $500,000

Indonesia: $0

Legal authority 

for the program

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC §2348. 
Appendix II

Descriptions of Assistance Programs to 

Foreign Security Forces

Page 50 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 16: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Table 17: DEA Training

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Managing unit(s) Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low-intensity Conflict

Description of 

activities

The CTFP provides education and training to foreign military officers, 

ministry of defense civilians, and other foreign security officials 

involved in combating terrorism. Foreign students attend U.S. military 

educational institutions and selected regional centers for non-lethal 

training. CTFP is used to bolster the capacity of friendly foreign nations 

to detect, monitor, and interdict or disrupt the activities of terrorist 

networks ranging from weapons trafficking and terrorist-related 

financing to actual operational planning by terror groups. 

CTFP by country 

(fiscal years 

2001 to 2004)

Indonesia: $4,200,00

Philippines: $2,000,000

Thailand: $769,000

Legal authority 

for the program

Defense Appropriations Acts of 2002 (P.L. 107-117) and 2004, (P.L. 

108-87).

Managing unit(s) Drug Enforcement Administration, International Training Section

Description of 

activities

DEA’s International Training Section offers basic and advanced drug 

enforcement seminars, International Narcotics Enforcement Managers 

Seminars, specialized training including training for Special 

Investigations Units, and offers instruction at the International Law 

Enforcement Academies. These activities aim to improve law 

enforcement capabilities of foreign law enforcement agencies to 

encourage and assist them in developing self-sufficient counter 

narcotics programs. 

DEA training by 

country (fiscal 

years 2001 to 

2004)

Thailand: $398,000

Indonesia: $61,000

Philippines: $51,000

Legal authority 

for the program

Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 

2002 (P.L. 107-77.

Consolidated Appropriation Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7).

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199).
Appendix II

Descriptions of Assistance Programs to 

Foreign Security Forces

Page 51 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Table 18: FBI Training

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Managing unit(s) Federal Bureau of Investigation International Training Assistance

Description of 

activities

The FBI’s international training assistance includes several activities: 

country capabilities/needs assessments; training of foreign officials 

carried out in foreign countries; training of foreign officials conducted in 

the United States; FBI instructor development; training at International 

Law Enforcement Academies in Budapest, Hungary and Bangkok, 

Thailand; and through the Mexican/American Law Enforcement 

Training Initiative and the Pacific Rim Training Initiative.

FBI training by 

country (fiscal 

years 2001 to 

2004)

Philippines: $109,000

Thailand: $11,000

Indonesia: $0
Page 52 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing ApendxiI
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 53 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 54 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 55 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 56 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 57 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 58 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 59 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 60 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 61 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 62 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 63 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 64 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 65 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 66 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Appendix III

State Department National Security 

Assistance Strategy Briefing

Page 67 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia
Page 68 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Appendix IV

Other State and DOD Documents Address 

Some Objectives of the Security Assistance 

Act of 2000 ApendxiIV

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents.

State documents DOD documents

Objectives

State 

strategic 

plan

Bureau 

performance 

plans

Mission 

performance 

plans

Theater security 

cooperation 

plans 

Security 

assistance/

country 

implementation 

plans

1. Multiyear plan (for security 

assistance programs)

2. Must be consistent with the 

U.S. National Security 

Strategy XX X X X

3. Coordinated with the 

Secretary of Defense and 

the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff X X

4. Coordinated with all 

appropriate agencies X X

5. Identify overarching 

objectives and how programs 

will meet them X X

6. Identify primary and 

secondary objectives for 

each country 

7. Identify how resources will 

be allocated to meet 

objectives 

8. Address how combining 

resources and programs will 

achieve objectives in each 

country X X

9. Details how State security 

assistance programs are 

coordinated with DOD and 

other agencies’ security 

assistance programs
Page 69 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiV
Page 70 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 71 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

See comment 1.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 72 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 73 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

See comment 4.

See comment 5.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 74 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 75 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

See comment 10.

See comment 11.

See comment 12.

See comment 13.

See comment 14.

See comment 15.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 76 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

See comment 15.

See comment 15.

See comment 16.

See comment 17.

See comment 18.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 77 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

See comment 19.

See comment 20.

See comment 21.

See comment 15.

See comment 7.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 78 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

See comment 22.

See comment 23.

See comment 6.
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 79 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State letter dated 

July 12, 2005.

GAO Comments 1. State commented that the Leahy provisions apply only to units, not 

individuals, of foreign security forces, and said that applying human 

rights restrictions at the individual level is a matter of policy. State also 

asserted that it takes additional measures to avoid the provision of U.S. 

assistance to individuals suspected of gross human rights violations, 

whether inside or outside the security unit setting. However, our work 

showed that State’s policy is not being effectively implemented. We 

found that an estimated 6,900 individuals received U.S. training 

assistance without any evidence that they had first been vetted for 

gross violations of human rights. Therefore, we recommended in the 

report that State strengthen its management controls to meet its stated 

policy goal of not providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human 

rights violators. 

2. State said that U.S. embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, and 

Thailand reviewed their human rights vetting procedures and brought 

them into compliance with Department guidance. We agree that 

embassies in Manila and Jakarta wrote their human rights vetting 

procedures during the course of our review to bring them into 

compliance with State guidance. However, Embassy Bangkok does not 

have written procedures and is not in compliance with State guidelines. 

More importantly, State lacks a system for monitoring compliance with 

its guidelines. As discussed in our report, we found that no 

headquarters office within State is currently charged with the 

responsibility of monitoring the posts’ compliance with State’s human 

rights vetting procedures and recommended that such a monitoring 

mechanism be established to verify that these procedures are being 

carried out properly. Such a system would help eliminate the major 

gaps in vetting we found at the three posts we visited. 

State further commented that the State-run International Law 

Enforcement Academies and Philippines ATA programs have been fully 

incorporated in human rights vetting procedures since 1999. However, 

this comment is not relevant to our main finding that we found no 

evidence that about 6,900 foreign security forces were vetted for human 

rights concerns before receiving U.S. law enforcement training under 

ICITAP. 
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 80 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

3. State acknowledged the need for continued improvement, especially 

concerning better oversight of the implementation of posts’ 

procedures. It noted that some oversight is provided through the 

periodic Inspector General inspections. State said that it purposely 

allows the posts flexibility in deciding vetting guidelines. We contacted 

the State Inspector General and found that their periodic post 

inspections have not included assessments of State’s human rights 

vetting process at any of the three posts. We found that State had 

conducted an inspection at only one post--Embassy Bangkok--between 

fiscal years 2001 through 2004. 

4. We disagree with State’s comments that (1) central oversight of posts’ 

compliance with vetting requirements in a single office is not needed, 

and (2) its new database system will mitigate the need for 

centralization in one bureau. As stated in our report, no office within 

State is charged with the overall responsibility of monitoring posts’ 

compliance with human rights vetting requirements, which has led to 

lapses in the vetting process across all three posts. Currently, four 

different bureaus within State share some responsibility for 

implementing these requirements. This has resulted in confusion in the 

field and gaps in implementing departmental vetting policies. State’s 

guidance issued to the posts between 1997 through 2005 did not assign 

this role and responsibility to any one office. A central focal point 

would help identify instances where a post was not complying with 

required procedures or instances where confusion about requirements 

existed. The new database, alone, will not solve the vetting problems 

we identified or replace the need for designating an office with the 

express responsibility of monitoring how posts implement their human 

rights vetting requirements.

5. We disagree with State’s statement that our decision to include a full 

range of programs and activities supporting foreign military and police 

forces within the scope of our review undermined our assessment of 

State’s compliance with the Security Assistance Act. As officials with 

State’s Bureau of Legal Affairs repeatedly stated, there is no statutory 

definition of “security assistance,” or even a commonly agreed-upon 

definition within the federal government. In the absence of a legal 

definition, and for the purposes of our report, we defined security 

assistance as U.S. government assistance to train and equip foreign 

security forces (military and police). Although State officials indicated 

that it traditionally considers security assistance to include FMF, IMET, 

EDA, and PKO programs, the Security Assistance Act of 2002 states 
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 81 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

that FMF, IMET and EDA as well as other similar training programs 

to foreign security forces shall be included in State’s briefing on the 

strategy. It will be difficult for State to craft a comprehensive security 

assistance strategy, as called for in our report, without including at least 

the 12 related programs and activities described in our report.

6. We disagree that the absence of further requests for a briefing on the 

national security assistance strategy somehow changed the intention of 

the Security Assistance Act of 2000 to have an annual report to 

Congress. The Security Assistance Act of 2000 urged State to provide an 

annual strategy while the 2002 act mandated a status briefing on the 

development of that strategy. We understand that State fulfilled its 

requirement to brief the committees on the progress of the strategy, as 

called for in the 2002 act, but we disagree that a lack of request for 

additional briefings altered the intention of the 2000 act, which urged 

State to provide an annual National Security Assistance Strategy to 

Congress. 

7. The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan is needed 

for wider distribution, and for providing documentation for tracking 

progress in moving forward. 

8. We agree with State’s observation that our report does not include 

information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot project, which 

State said has the potential to become a useful tool for security 

assistance strategic planning. Although we were not informed in the 

course of our review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be 

developed and deployed, we support all State efforts to develop better 

strategic planning tools for U.S. security assistance programs. We have 

revised the report to reflect this new information.

9. We have made changes in the body of the report to reflect State’s 

comment that the draft incorrectly referred to IMET and FMF as DOD 

programs, when they are Foreign Operations Appropriations Actfunded programs. 

10. The draft report already reflected the distinction between State policy 

and the law.

11. We have updated the report to reflect State’s comment. 
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 82 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

12. We agree with State’s comment that Embassy Manila had written 

procedures for human rights vetting prior to 2004 and made changes in 

the report to reflect this comment. However, we disagree with State’s 

comment that Embassy Manila provided us with all relevant documents 

during our visit in March 2005, including an October 2000 cable 

outlining post human rights vetting procedures. In fact, the post 

provided us only with the procedures in effect since late 2004. 

13. We have revised the graphic to reflect State’s comment that no EDA 

articles were transferred to Indonesia. 

14. We have revised the graphic to correct the value for CTFP. 

15. State commented that ATA allocations should be $7.8 million, rather 

than $1.9 million, for the Philippines; $19.1 million, rather than $14.8 

million, for Indonesia; and $4.2 million, rather than zero, for Thailand. 

In subsequent discussions with State officials, they said that these 

figures represent “either obligations or expenditures,” and not 

allocations, as we requested. We could not verify the numbers that they 

provided through agency comments and State was not able to provide 

us with corrected values for the allocations. As a result, we made no 

changes to the report and reported the available ATA country 

allocations as presented in State’s Congressional Budget Justifications.

16. We revised our report language to reflect State’s comment.

17. State misinterpreted our generic description of the human rights 

vetting process, which was not intended to imply that all State officials 

share a common understanding of vetting policies and procedures. 

During our fieldwork at the three posts, we found major gaps in the 

implementation of State’s vetting procedures. 

18. We have changed the report to reflect State’s comment that it is the 

responsibility of the initiating office in Jakarta, not the political section, 

to obtain clearances from all other sections. 

19. State asserts that some of the 300 ATA in-country trainees in Thailand 

who were not vetted were not members of the security forces and thus 

should be excluded from the table. However, we carefully separated 

out non-security forces from our review before assessing compliance 

with human rights vetting procedures. Our numbers were based on our 

file review in Embassy Bangkok and discussion with the ATA Program 
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 83 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Director. This analysis showed that of 708 ATA trainees between 2001 

and 2004; 144 were security forces sent to the United States, 321 were 

security forces trained in Thailand, but not vetted; and 243 were nonsecurity forces trained in Thailand for whom vetting was not required.

20. We disagree with State’s comment that the number of Indonesian 

trainees from 2001 through 2004 is 705. We revised the incorrect figure 

(210) in our report to reflect the number (297) provided by the post in 

its “DS/ATA Indonesia Summary Sheet.” 

21. We disagree with State’s comment that we may be implying a 

relationship between the ATA program and all security assistance 

programs to the western hemisphere, based on our discussion of PART 

ratings in our draft report. We did not intend to imply a relationship 

between the two programs. As stated in our draft report, the 2004 PART 

conducted two separate reviews. One review was for the ATA program, 

which it rated as “effective.” The other review was for all security 

assistance programs to the Western Hemisphere, which were rated as 

“moderately effective.”

22. State contends that the National Security Assistance Strategy is a 

multiyear plan because the Bureau Performance Plans are multiyear 

documents. The Bureau Performance Plans are different documents 

and serve a different purpose as indicated in our report. We 

acknowledge in the report that the Bureau Performance Plans are 

consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and 

to some extent address how combining resources and programs will 

achieve regional goals as called for in the act. However, the Bureau 

Performance Plans do not constitute a National Security Assistance 

Strategy.

23. State said that it coordinated development of the National Security 

Assistance Strategy with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and other appropriate agencies. We acknowledge that State’s 

annual roundtables and other communications are useful in developing 

and “fine-tuning” security assistance goals and objectives. However, we 

did not find anyone in those offices who participated in developing the 

National Security Assistance Strategy —the briefing slides, outline, and 

oral presentation. One State official earlier had said that DOD officials 

were involved only in presenting a briefing on EDA as part of State’s 

Strategy briefing and a separate briefing on DOD’s security cooperation 

efforts. 
Page 84 GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia

Appendix VII

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Stephen M. Lord, Assistant 

Director; Jeffrey D. Phillips; Ann M. Ulrich; Jonathan Ban; Matthew Helm; 

Lynn Cothern; Mary Moutsos; and Sidney Schwartz made key contributions 

to this report.

(320284)
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