U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

39–011 2005

109th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 109–13 

REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF 

AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING 

COMMUNICATION 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, 

PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 107–108 22 U.S.C. 2291–4 

MARCH 3, 2005.—Referred to the Committee on International Relations 

and ordered to be printed 


E:\Seals\Congress.#13
(1) 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Consistent with the authorities relating to official immunity in 

the interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking (Public 

Law 107–108, 22 U.S.C. 2291–4), and in order to keep the Congress 

fully informed, I am providing a report prepared by my Administration. This report includes matters relating to the interdiction of 

aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking. 

GEORGE W. BUSH. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 2, 2005. 

(3) 

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT

ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING

Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. § 2291–4 in calendar 

year 2004. The President signed Presidential Determination 2004– 42 on August 17, 2004, for Colombia and Presidential Determination 2005–03 on October 16, 2004, for Brazil. In doing so, the President certified that: (1) interdiction of aircraft reasonably suspected 

to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking in Colombia’s and 

Brazil’s airspace is necessary because of the extraordinary threat 

posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of Colombia 

and Brazil; and (2) Colombia and Brazil have appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent loss of life in the air and 

on the ground in connection with such interdiction, which shall at 

a minimum include effective means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force is directed against the aircraft. 

COLOMBIA

(A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program in 

Colombia began operations. In making a second certification for Colombia in August 2004, the President determined that 

narcotrafficking continued to pose an extraordinary threat to Colombia’s national security on the basis of several factors, including: 

Colombia is still the world’s largest producer of cocaine and a supplier of high quality heroin; Colombia faces a growing cocaine 

abuse problem; Colombian drug trafficking officials suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed groups to protect their organizations; illegal revenue from the Colombian drug trade disrupts the 

licit Colombian economy; and narcotrafficking presents a corrosive 

threat to the democratic institutions of government and law enforcement. Significantly, drug trafficking also serves as the primary 

source of funding for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC) and an important source of funding for the Colombian 

United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), all of which are classified as Foreign Terrorist 

Organizations by the Department of State. 

As is indicated in section (D) below, the Government of Colombia 

(GOC) observed over 500 unidentified flights in its airspace in CY 

2004. This aerial activity further supports the concerns raised in 

the President’s determination for Colombia. 

(B) United States Government safety oversight of Colombia’s 

ABD program includes approved procedures, as outlined in a Bilateral Letter of Agreement signed April 28, 2003; a safety checklist; 

and three primary United States Government safety monitors: a 

ground safety monitor (GSM), an air safety monitor (ASM), and a 

Joint Interagency Task Force—South (JIATF–S) ABD watch officer. These three safety monitors are known as the ABD safety 

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triad. All three entities in the safety triad must be involved in all 

events in which Phase I, II, and III actions (as described below) are 

taken against an unidentified, assumed suspect (UAS) flight in the 

air. The basic procedures for intercepting a UAS flight are as follows: • Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the GOC detects 

or is informed of an aircraft operating in a defined zone of control 

that is a candidate for possible ABD action (a ‘‘track of interest’’), 

information on that aircraft shall be gathered by the GOC from all 

reasonably available sources, including radar systems, radio and 

visual contact with the aircraft, electronic systems (which help determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed flight plan and 

what type of plane it is), and relevant air traffic control centers, to 

begin to determine whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to 

be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. That determination 

shall be made by the Battle Command Officer (BCO) in the Colombian Air Force’s Command and Control Center, based upon certain 

factors set out elsewhere in the Agreement, in conjunction with 

other information provided to GOC and United States Government 

participants in the ongoing action. • Monitoring. If the GOC determines or has preliminary reasons 

to believe that an aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that aircraft shall be tracked and monitored. If tracking is 

intermittent, positive reidentification shall be made with reasonable certainty before the ABD event may continue. If the GOC has 

been unable to identify the track of interest as a legitimate track, 

the aircraft shall be considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force 

(CAF) under CAF procedures and may be intercepted. • Phase I—Interception. The interception phase (Phase I) includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft by radio and, if 

necessary, by visual signals in order to determine the identity of 

the pilot or intercepted aircraft. If, during this Phase, the GOC determines that the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily 

engaged in illicit drug trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the CAF may order the intercepted aircraft to land 

at a designated place suitable for a safe landing. If, after being 

intercepted, the aircraft does not comply with the procedures and 

instructions given by the CAF, the pilot may request permission to 

proceed to Phase II. 

• Phase II—Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists of the firing 

of warning shots, using ammunition containing tracer rounds, in 

order to demonstrate to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft that he 

must comply with the interceptor’s order. If all of the procedures 

required under the Agreement have been followed, if the information gathered continues to indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and 

if the aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor’s order to land, the 

GOC may, in accordance with the following, move to Phase III. 

• Phase III—Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the Air. 

If, after warning shots are fired under Phase II, the intercepted 

aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor’s directions, 

the Colombian interceptor aircraft may only fire weapons at the 

intercepted aircraft if he requests and receives permission to do so 

(Phase III). The Commander of the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) 

must review all such requests. The COCAF may approve such reVerDate Aug 04 2004 20:17 Mar 04, 2005 Jkt 039011 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HD013.XXX HD013
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quest after verifying that all procedures required under the Agreement have been followed. Upon receipt of the authorization, the interceptor aircraft shall warn the intercepted aircraft, using ICAO 

radio communications procedures and using the appropriate frequencies, that it will be fired upon if it refuses to comply. 

The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in an attempt 

to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable opportunity to obey the 

previously issued orders to land before the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to follow the interceptor’s directions. It is 

acknowledged that even the minimum level of force could result in 

loss of life. If the intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot 

down, the interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate notice to the Colombian Air Force Command and Control 

Center of the location of the intercepted aircraft. 

The Agreement requires similar identification and warning procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft has been located 

on the ground. Further, the Agreement contains additional strictures on the use of force, including a prohibition on the use of force 

against state or commercial aircraft, aircraft that have filed and 

are not significantly deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely 

appear to be under duress. 

The United States Government initially trained the GOC’s pilots 

and sensor operators to operate the Citation aircraft involved in 

the program. Pilot and crew refresher training as well as training 

of new Colombian personnel are ongoing as the program matures. 

Semiannual reviews of the program address any issues that arise 

in the program’s implementation. Further, the United States Government receives weekly and monthly reports on program events. 

(C) United States Government assistance to the ABD Program in 

Colombia consists of the following: 

The United States Government provides a number of positions to 

Colombia’s ABD program. These positions include a DOD JIATF–

S Tactical Commander and Command Duty Officer; a Ground Safety Monitor in the Colombian Air Force Command and Control Center (CAFCCC); Air Safety Monitors on board GOC tracking aircraft; 

and a Host Nation Rider Assistant on board U.S. tracking and detection/monitoring aircraft. Both Monitors and the Host Nation 

Rider Assistant are fluent in Spanish. 

JIATF–S, as Tactical Commander, exercises command and control of U.S. ABD assets through JIATF–S’s Joint Operations Center 

(JOC). The JIATF–S Command Duty Officer is the Tactical Commander’s senior watch officer at the JOC. The Ground Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative at the CAFCCC during ABD operations. The Air Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative on GOC 

tracking aircraft and is available to observe decisions made by 

GOC personnel, communicate with the U.S. Ground Safety Monitor 

and the JIATF–S Command Duty Officer, and report to them 

whether the agreed-upon procedures are being followed. The Host 

Nation Rider Assistant is a U.S. representative who assists the 

Host Nation Rider. The Counter Drug Operation and Coordination 

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Center, which is located in the CAFCCC, assists in coordination, 

information exchange, and analysis between JIATF–S and 

CAFCCC. An employee of the Narcotics Affairs Section in the U.S. 

Embassy in Bogota ́ is devoted exclusively to overseeing implementation of this program. 

The United States Government has provided five Citation aircraft to the GOC on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD program, and provides ongoing radar information and intelligence. Additional United States Government assets (both aircraft and personnel) from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security 

can provide support for this program under the conditions contained in the Agreement. Further, the GOC has agreed that the 

five United States Government-supported ground-based radars and 

the Peace Panorama System (which is the airspace management 

system linking ground-based radars in Colombia to a central radar 

picture) constitute United States Government support for ABD. 

(D) From January 1, 2004, until December 31, 2004, the GOC, 

with the assistance of the United States Government as described 

in section (C), identified over 500 Unidentified Assumed Suspect 

(UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Over 150 of these unidentified flights were determined to be legal flights. The GOC was in 

a position to act upon approximately 100 of the remaining UAS 

flights. The GOC forced 15 suspect drug trafficking aircraft to land, 

destroyed 13 of those aircraft on the ground, damaged one aircraft 

and impounded three aircraft in Colombia. Another eight aircraft 

with 2.8 metric tons of cocaine were impounded in Central America 

as a result of Colombian coordination with JIATF–S and Central 

American authorities on flights departing Colombian airspace 

heading towards Central America. The United States Government 

is unaware of any deaths or injuries resulting from these actions. 

BRAZIL

(A) In making a certification for Brazil pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 

§ 2291–4, the President determined that narcotrafficking poses an 

extraordinary threat to Brazil’s national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of this threat, as demonstrated by 

radar surveillance confirming that narcotraffickers are making 

widespread use of aerial routes to bring cocaine and other narcotics 

into Brazil. The amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 

metric tons of cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to onehalf of it remaining in-country. In addition, there are suspected ties 

between drug traffickers and those involved in illegal arms trafficking. The resulting domestic drug trade has fueled widespread 

urban violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 

as organized criminal gangs fight to control a share of the lucrative 

enterprise. 

(B) The Government of Brazil (GOB) possesses an infrastructure 

that is capable of independently implementing its aerial interdiction program. The goal of Brazil’s interdiction program is to facilitate the safe landing of intercepted aircraft so that law enforcement personnel may take control of the aircraft on the ground. As 

a last resort, however, the Brazilian Air Force Commander may authorize the use of lethal force to bring down the aircraft if it refuses 

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to respond to the full range of program actions taken by the Brazilian Air Force. The GOB has established a multi-stage procedure 

to identify, intercept, warn, and, if necessary, take action against 

an aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit 

drug trafficking. The basic procedures are as follows: • Identification. When the GOB detects an aircraft that displays 

irregular air traffic traits, it will consider that aircraft to be ‘‘unidentified’’ and a candidate for possible aerial interception. The 

GOB will proceed to gather information on that aircraft to determine whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily 

engaged in illicit drug trafficking. If the GOB is unable to identify 

the aircraft as legitimate, the aircraft will be considered ‘‘suspect’’ by the Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted. • Interception. During interception, the GOB will attempt to determine with greater certainty the identity of the intercepted aircraft. The tracker or interceptor aircraft will take all reasonable 

measures to identify the intercepted aircraft by visual or electronic 

observation of the nationality markings, registration number, license number, or identifying features of the intercepted aircraft. 

The GOB will further attempt to gather information regarding the 

intercepted aircraft that may help determine whether the intercepted aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in 

illicit drug trafficking. The tracker or interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish communications with the intercepted aircraft 

through radio communications or visual signals and order the 

intercepted aircraft to change its routing or to land if factors continue to support a determination that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. • Warning Shots. The GOB will move to the firing of warning 

shots to demonstrate to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft that he 

must comply with the interceptor’s order if the gathered information continues to indicate that an aircraft is suspect and the aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor’s order to land. Warning 

shots may only be ordered and authorized by the Airspace Defense 

Senior Authority or the Air Operations Commander after 

verification that all requisite procedures have been satisfied The 

intercepting aircraft will fire the warning shots from abeam of the 

intercepted aircraft, in a position that will permit the intercepted 

aircraft to see the intercepting aircraft but that will avoid damage 

to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted aircraft that comply with 

the orders of the interceptor aircraft after warning shots have been 

fired will be escorted to land at a designated airfield, where law enforcement authorities will subject it to ground control measures. 

• Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the Air. If, after 

warning shots are fired, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor’s directions, the aircraft will be designated as ‘‘hostile’’ and will, after appropriate authorization from 

Brazilian authorities, be subject to being shot down. The Brazilian 

Air Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal 

force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted aircraft 

will be as brief as possible and preferably without using ammunition capable of causing a tank explosion. After the first burst of 

fire, the pilot of the intercepting aircraft will relay information reVerDate Aug 04 2004 20:17 Mar 04, 2005 Jkt 039011 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HD013.XXX HD013
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garding the effect of the fire to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief 

and try to contact the intercepted aircraft again, if possible, before 

requesting authorization to fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft 

lands, the Brazilian federal police will attempt to take control of 

the aircraft for law enforcement purposes. 

(C) Brazil’s interdiction program differs from Colombia’s in that 

Brazil independently administers its program. The GOB is solely 

responsible for all actions relating to each aerial interdiction event, 

but has committed to share pertinent operational information 

about such events after the fact with the United States in a timely 

and transparent manner. Although the GOB neither requires nor 

has requested a direct U.S. role in support of its program, various 

agencies of the United States Government currently provide assistance to Brazil that could be relevant to the Brazilian interdiction 

program, such as cooperative law enforcement programs, intelligence-sharing, and approvals of military sales. Additionally, U.S. 

companies such as Raytheon are positioned to provide relevant assistance in the future. 

(D) According to open source information, Brazil’s interdiction 

program has produced a deterrent effect, with the number of unauthorized flights in the border areas reported to have decreased by 

as much as 60 percent since the program became operational on 

October 17, 2004. The number of irregular flights (flights without 

a registered flight plan) in Brazilian airspace decreased by 32 percent after implementation of the interdiction program. In 2004, before the program came into force, the Brazilian Airspace Command 

registered a total of 3,585 irregular flights with a daily average of 

12.3. In the first thirty days of the program, the daily average fell 

to 8.3. The United States Government is unaware of any incidents 

of lethal force being used against aircraft under Brazil’s interdiction program or any deaths or injuries resulting from other program actions. The GOB has shared its official statistics for the operation of its interdiction program between October 17 and December 31 with the United States Government on the condition that 

the information is treated confidentially. This data is not included 

in this report, but can be made available upon request to Members 

and staff. 

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