Interim Decision #3174 

MATTER OF RAHMAN 

In Exclusion Proceedings 

A-70105032 

Decided by Board May 12, 1992 

(I) An immigration judge's discretion to change venue in exclusion and deportation 

proceedings is subject to the existence of good cause for such a change, and good cause 

is determined by balancing the relevant factors, including administrative convenience, 

expeditious treatment of the case, location of witnesses, cost of transporting witnesses 

or evidence to a new location, and factors commonly associated with the alien's place 

of residence. 

(2) While factors commonly associated with an applicant's place of residence are 

relevant to the question of proper venue, the mere fact that an applicant in exclusion 

proceedings allegedly resides or wishes to reside in another city, without a showing of 

other significant factors associated with such residence, is insufficient cause to 

outweigh the Immigration and Naturalization Service's opposition to a motion for 

change of venue, particularly where the Service has demonstrated that it would be 

prejudiced by such a change. 

(3) The Government is not required to accommodate the applicant's choice of a distant 

attorney and his acquisition of an interpreter by changing venue at considerable 

expense, especially where there is no showing that local counsel is unavailable or that 

an interpreter cannot otherwise be obtained. 

(4) An immigration judge's order changing the venue of the hearing dues nut necessarily 

affect the place where the alien may be detained, because an immigration judge has no 

authority over the place of detention. 

(5) An immigration judge may grant a change of venue only upon motion by one of the 

parties and only after the other party has been given notice and an opportunity to 

respond. 

EXCLUDABLE: Act of 1952—Sec. 212(a)(5)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)]—No 

valid labor certification 

Sec. 212(a)(6)(C)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)]— 

Fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact 

Sec. 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(1)]— 

No valid immigrant visa 

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: 

David L. Amkraut, Esquire 

201 North Figueroa Street, Suite 700 

Los Angeles, California 90012 

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Dean A. LeVay 

District Counsel 

David M. Dixon 

Appellate Counsel 

4R(1 
Interim Decision #3174 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members 

On November 7, 1991, an immigration judge ordered that venue in 

this case be changed from Phoenix, Arizona, to Los Angeles, California. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has appealed.' The 

appeal will be sustained, and the record will be remanded to the 

immigration judge. 

This appeal is interlocutory. In order to avoid a piecemeal approach 

to the many issues that may arise in the course of an exclusion or 

deportation proceeding, this Board does not ordinarily entertain 

interlocutory appeals. See Matter of Ruiz-Campuzano, 17 I&N Dec. 

108 (BIA 1979); Matter of Ku, 15 I&N Dec. 712 (BIA 1976); Matter of 

Sacco, 15 I&N Dec. 109 (BIA 1974). However, we have on occasion 

ruled on the merits of an interlocutory appeal where we deemed it 

necessary to address important jurisdictional questions regarding the 

administration of the immigration laws, or to correct recurring 

problems in the handling of cases by immigration judges. See, e.g., 

Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 1990, 1991), and cases cited 

therein. In the instant case, the Service has shown the existence of 

many similar cases involving a recurring problem in the handling of 

certain motions to change venue in exclusion cases. We find consideration of this appeal appropriate. 

The applicant in this case arrived at a port of entry to the United 

States in Los Angeles, California, on September 7, 1991, with an 

altered passport. He was issued a charging document, the Notice to 

Applicant for Admission Detained for Hearing Before Immigration 

Judge (Form 1-122), alleging that he had no valid entry documents, 

that he had committed fraud in an attempt to procure entry, and that 

he intended to enter the United States to perform labor without proper 

authorization. 

In the judgment of the district director, there was insufficient 

detention space available to detain the applicant in the Los Angeles 

area. Therefore, the Service transferred the applicant and a number of 

others to a detention facility in Florence, Arizona, and filed the 

charging document with the Office of the Immigration Judge in 

Phoenix, Arizona. 

Later, the applicant, through counsel, filed a motion to change 

venue to Los Angeles. The motion stated that the applicant's counsel 

of choice, his witnesses, and an interpreter would be available in Los 

Angeles, but not in Arizona. However, no witnesses were specified, nor 

I The Service's request to consolidate the appeal with seven similar cases is denied for 

reasons of administrative convenience peculiar to the cases. 

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Interim Decision #3174 

was the nature of their possible testimony specifically indicated, nor 

was there any allegation that the applicant was unable to obtain 

counsel to represent him in Phoenix, Arizona. The motion did include 

an address in Los Angeles where the applicant could be reached, as the 

regulations required. 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(c) (1991). 2The address given, 

however, was simply that of the applicant's attorney. There was no 

evidence that the applicant himself had ever resided anywhere in the 

United States, and there was apparently no specific indication of where 

he might reside if released. In any event, at the time of the motion, he 

was still detained in the custody of the Service. 

The Service opposed the applicant's motion. Counsel for the 

Government argued that there was no good cause for the change of 

venue, and that granting the motion would require the Service either 

to transport the applicant, under guard, for hundreds of miles to his 

hearing and back again at considerable expense or, in the alternative, 

to release him on parole under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1991), with little or 

no assurance that he would later appear for his hearing. The Service 

presented specific evidence of prior cases in which similar changes of 

venue had been substantially prejudicial to the Government due to 

transportation and detention costs and the risk of flight from custody 

involved in such an operation. 

However, the immigration judge granted the applicant's motion 

and, in a brief form order, ordered a change of venue to Los Angeles, 

"in order to permit respondent [sic] to defend himself/herself in the 

area in which he/she resides." The Service represents that the 

immigration judge also stated his reasons orally as follows: "The 

Applicant landed at Los Angeles, has no connections at Florence, 

Arizona [the place of detention], and wants to go to Los Angeles." 

On appeal, the Service argues that the immigration judge erred by 

changing venue in this case without a proper finding of good cause, 

where the Government had demonstrated that it would be prejudiced 

by such a change. We agree. 

An immigration judge's discretion to change venue in both exclusion and deportation cases is subject to the existence of good cause for 

such a change. 57 Fed. Reg. 11,568, 11,572 (1992) (to be codified at 8 

C.F.R. § 3.20) (interim Apr. 6, 1992) (an immigration judge may 

change venue for good cause only upon motion by one of the parties 

and only after the other party has been given notice and an 

opportunity to respond). 3Good cause is determined by balancing the 

2This requirement is retained under newly revised regulations governing changes of 

venue. See 57 Fed. Reg. 11,568, 11,572 (1492) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.20) 

(interim Apr. 6, 1992). 

3Prior regulations in effect at the time of the order below authorized an immigration 

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Interim Decision #3174 

factors we have found relevant to the venue issue. See Matter of 

Rivera, 19 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 1988); Matter of Velasquez, 19 I&N 

Dec. 377 (BIA 1986) (relevant factors include administrative convenience, expeditious treatment of the case, location of witnesses, and 

cost of transporting witnesses or evidence to a new location); see also 

Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1989); La Franca v. 

INS, 413 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1969). 

In the instant case, the immigration judge's order was perfunctory 

and showed no evaluation or balancing of the factors we have found 

relevant to a finding of good cause for a change of venue. We note that 

a brief statement of the reasons for an immigration judge's decision to 

grant or deny a change of venue over the objection of one of the parties 

would assist this Board in reviewing the decision and determining 

whether good cause exists. We have required such a statement in other 

contexts. See, e.g., Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984) 

(immigration judge should state reasons for denial of motion to reopen 

to allow meaningful review by the Board); Matter of Daryoush, 18 I&N 

Dec. 352 (BIA 1982) (district director should provide reasons for bond 

determination to facilitate meaningful review). Here, no statement 

showing a balancing of the relevant factors was given, despite the 

Service's oral and written opposition to the motion and its showing of 

prejudice, as noted above. Upon review, we must conclude that no 

good cause for a change of venue existed. 

Moreover, the reasons the immigration judge expressed for his 

order were not altogether appropriate under the circumstances. First, 

the place where an applicant happens to attempt to enter the United 

States, in and of itself, may have little, if any, significance to the 

question of where venue should lie in an exclusion proceeding. The 

alien cannot select a venue by deciding where to attempt to enter the 

United States. The venue question is rather entrusted in the first 

instance to the discretion of the district director, who files the charging 

document in the venue selected. Matter of Vtctorino, 18 I&N Dec. 259 

(BIA 1982); 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(n)(I) (1992). Thereafter, the presiding 

immigration judge should not order a change of venue without a 

proper finding of good cause, as we have observed above. 

Second, the immigration judge's order in this case focused upon the 

applicant's lack of connections to the place where he was detained. 

However, the question of where the applicant should be detained was 

not at issue. The issue upon a motion to change venue is rather where 

future hearings in the case shall take place. Accordingly, an order 

changing venue in a given case does not require the Service to change 

judge to change venue for good cause either upon motion by one of the parties or upon 

his own authority, and notice to the other party was not specifically required. 

483 
Interim Decision #3174 

the place where the applicant is detained. The place of detention is a 

subject over which the immigration judge has no authority in an 

exclusion proceeding. 4 

Third, there was no evidence in this case that the applicant actually 

resided in Los Angeles, contrary to what the immigration judge's form 

order suggests. Moreover, while the factors commonly associated with 

the applicant's place of residence may be relevant to the question of 

proper venue, the mere fact that an applicant allegedly resides or 

wishes to reside in another city, without a showing of other significant 

factors associated with such residence, is insufficient cause to outweigh 

the Service's opposition to a motion for change of venue, particularly 

where the Service has demonstrated that it would be prejudiced by 

such a change. See Matter of Rivera, supra; cf. Chlomos v. INS, 516 

F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1975) (deportation proceedings; residence already 

established prior to arrest). 

Finally, there is no specific evidence in this case that the applicant 

himself would be prejudiced by proceeding with his hearing in 

Phoenix, Arizona. He argued, through counsel, that his counsel of 

choice and an interpreter would not be available in Phoenix. However, 

there is no evidence of any longstanding attorney-client relationship 

here, nor is there any persuasive evidence that the applicant could not 

have retained counsel and made arrangements for an interpreter to 

assist him in Phoenix. As the Service points out, Phoenix is a 

metropolitan area of about 2 million residents, with an experienced 

immigration bar. The Government is not required to accommodate 

the applicant's choice of a distant attorney and his acquisition of an 

interpreter by changing venue at considerable expense, especially 

where there is no showing that local counsel is unavailable or that an 

interpreter cannot otherwise be obtained. See section 292 of the Act, 8 

U.S.C. § 1362 (1988) (alien may select attorney of choice, but at no 

expense to the Government); see also El Rescate Legal Services v. 

EOIR, 959 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreters); Sasso v. Milhollan, 

735 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Fla. 1990). We note that for purposes of the 

4The immigration judge can change the venue of the hearing in cases where the alien 

is detained. Matter of Dobere, 20 I&N Dec. 188 (B1A 1990_ However, the place of 

detention is a separate question entrusted to the sound discretion of the Service, the 

agency explicitly charged with the statutory duty to control and guard the boundaries of 

the United States. See section 103(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988); see also 8 

C.F.R. §§ 212.5, 235.3(b) (1992); Sasso v. Milhollan, 735 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Fla. 1990); 

Committee of Central American Refugees v. INS, 682 F. Supp- 1055 (N.D. Cal. 1988); 

Ledesma-Valdez v. Sava, 604 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. 

Supp. 973, 983-84 n.27 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, sub nom. Jean v. 

Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 

484 
Interim Decision #3174 

hearing itself, interpreters are provided by the Government. See 

Matter of ExtIvs, 18 I&N Dec. 276 (BIA 1982). 

In view of the foregoing, the interlocutory appeal will be sustained. 

ORDER: The appeal by the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service is sustained, and the order of the immigration judge is vacated. 

FURTHER ORDER The record is remanded to the immigration judge. 

485