COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

HARRY EMELL DEAN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3074-97-3 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 DECEMBER 29, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

Jonathan M. Apgar, Judge 

 Anna M. Bagwell (Office of the Public 

Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard B. Campbell, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Harry Emell Dean appeals his conviction of driving after 

being declared an habitual offender. He argues that the trial 

court erred when it ruled that the order declaring him an 

habitual offender was in effect when he drove. Finding that the 

trial court correctly interpreted the order, we affirm the 

conviction. 

 On February 3, 1997, Roanoke city police stopped the 

defendant for a traffic infraction and arrested him after 

determining that he was an habitual offender. A circuit court 

had declared the defendant an habitual offender on July 7, 1983. 

 The order stated that the defendant was not to drive "for a 

period of ten (10) years from this date and the privilege of the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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defendant to operate a motor vehicle in this State has been 

restored by an order of a Court of record as provided by 

statute." (Emphasis added.) The Commonwealth introduced the 

order at trial. 

 The defendant argues the order revoked his privilege to 

drive for ten years but is not clear that the revocation stayed 

in effect after that period. He contends the language is 

ambiguous, but he concedes that the order would be clear had the 

word "until" appeared after "and" before "the privilege." We 

disagree that the lack of the word "until" renders the order 

unclear. 

 In 1983, the code provided that the defendant remained an 

habitual offender for ten years and until the privilege to 

operate had been restored. See Code § 46.1-387.7 (now Code 

§ 46.2-357). In Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 246, 249, 402 

S.E.2d 711, 713 (1991), the order revoked the license to drive 

for ten years. It contained no provision that the revocation 

continued until a court restored the privilege. This Court held 

that Davis's privilege to drive had been restored once the period 

of years had passed. The present case is not analogous. 

 The order in this case states that Dean is not permitted to 

drive for ten years. However, it continues "and the privilege of 

the defendant . . . has been restored by an order of a Court of 

record . . . ." Unlike Davis, the coordinate conjunction "and" 

links the clause revoking for ten years to a second clause. 
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"And" is "a conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing 

the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with 

the first." Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990). Both 

conditions stated in the order must be met; ten years must pass, 

and a court must restore the defendant's privilege to drive. 

 Finding that the order gave the defendant notice that his 

license was suspended for ten years and until restored by a court 

of record, we affirm his conviction. 

 Affirmed.