UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4218

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LORENZO PLEDGER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. James C. Dever 

III, Chief District Judge. (2:12-cr-00023-D-1)

Submitted: December 22, 2014 Decided: February 6, 2015

Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Seth A. Neyhart, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lorenzo Pledger appeals the 216-month sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine, in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 846 (2012). Before this court, 

Pledger asserts that the district court procedurally erred by

(1) departing upward under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(“USSG”) § 4A1.3, p.s. (2013); and (2) granting a downward 

departure under USSG § 5K1.1 but failing to state the extent of 

the departure or to depart below Pledger’s guidelines range. 

Pledger further asserts that these errors necessitate remanding 

for resentencing because his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. We 

disagree that resentencing is necessary, and affirm Pledger’s 

sentence.

We review a sentence for reasonableness applying “a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first review the sentence 

for “significant procedural error,” including improper 

calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration 

of the § 3553(a) factors, and inadequate explanation of the 

sentence imposed. Id. at 51. Any preserved claim of procedural 

error is subject to harmlessness review. United States v. Lynn, 

592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). “A Guidelines error is 
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considered harmless if we determine that (1) the district court 

would have reached the same result even if it had decided the 

guidelines issue the other way; and (2) the sentence would be 

reasonable even if the guidelines issue had been decided in the 

defendant’s favor.” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 

370, 382 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. 

denied, 135 S. Ct. 305, 384 (2014).

Where the district court procedurally errs in its 

Guidelines calculations but announces an alternative basis under 

the § 3553(a) factors for the sentence it imposed, we must give 

“due deference” to the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis. Id.

at 383. “When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence, we examine the totality of the circumstances to see 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding 

that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in 

§ 3553(a).” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Under USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1), a district court may depart 

upward from a defendant’s Guidelines range “[i]f reliable 

information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history 

category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the 

defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the 

defendant will commit other crimes.” Where, as here, a 

defendant’s criminal history category is VI, “the court should 
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structure the departure by moving incrementally down the 

sentencing table to the next higher offense level in Criminal 

History Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate 

to the case.” USSG § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B); see also United States v. 

Dalton, 477 F.3d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 2007). To satisfy this 

requirement, a district court, however, “need not . . . go 

through a ritualistic exercise in which it mechanically 

discusses each criminal history category or offense level it 

rejects en route to the category or offense level that it 

selects.” Dalton, 477 F.3d at 199 (alterations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

First, Pledger argues that the district court failed 

to apply an incremental approach when departing upward. The 

record demonstrates, however, that the district court clearly 

noted its responsibility under USSG § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B) and Dalton

to employ an incremental approach when departing. After 

mentioning the possibility of raising Pledger’s offense level to 

level thirty or thirty-one, the district court ultimately 

determined that level thirty-two appropriately accounted for 

Pledger’s under-represented criminal history. Finally, the 

district court sufficiently justified the extent of its 

departure by citing the violent nature of Pledger’s prior

offenses, the fact that Pledger did not take advantage of the 

repeated leniency he received when sentenced in state court, and 
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the high likelihood that Pledger would reoffend. See USSG 

§ 4A1.3 cmt. background. Accordingly, the district court did 

not procedurally err in determining the extent of its departure. 

Second, Pledger argues that under USSG § 1B1.1(a)(6), 

the district court erred by departing upward pursuant to USSG 

§ 4A1.3(a) after adjusting Pledger’s total offense level and 

Guidelines range based on Pledger’s career offender status under 

USSG § 4B1.1. However, we have approved of a district court’s 

ability to depart under USSG § 4A1.3 after adjusting a 

defendant’s Guidelines range in accordance with USSG § 4B1.1. 

See United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 188-89 n.8 (4th Cir. 

2010) (“[A] sentencing court, after finding that the Career 

Offender Provision overrepresented a defendant’s criminal 

history, was free to depart [under USSG § 4A1.3] to a lower 

level, a lower criminal history category, or both.”). In fact, 

as the extent of a departure under USSG § 4A1.3 may be limited 

by a defendant’s status as a career offender, see USSG 

§ 4A1.3(b)(3)(A), it would be impossible to accurately depart 

under USSG § 4A1.3 prior to determining whether a defendant is a 

career offender for purposes of USSG § 4B1.1. Accordingly, the 

district court did not procedurally err by departing under USSG 

§ 4A1.3(a) after adjusting Pledger’s offense level pursuant to 

USSG § 4B1.1.
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Whether the district court procedurally erred when 

departing under USSG § 5K1.1 is a closer question. But even 

assuming procedural error, we conclude that any such error was 

harmless. See United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 161-62 

(4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 

123-24 (4th Cir. 2011). Where a sentencing court “expressly 

state[s] in a separate and particular explanation that it would 

have reached the same result, specifically citing to SavillonMatute, Hargrove, and its review of the § 3553(a) factors,” it 

is apparent that the court would have imposed the same sentence 

absent the alleged error. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 383. 

Here, the district court unquestionably announced an alternative 

basis for its sentence pursuant to Savillon-Matute and Hargrove, 

stating that even if it erred when calculating Pledger’s 

Guidelines range, it would have imposed a 216-month sentence 

under the § 3553(a) factors. Therefore, the first prong of the 

harmless error test is satisfied and remand is only appropriate 

if the sentence imposed is substantively unreasonable.

Pledger contends that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable because the district court over-emphasized his 

criminal history in comparison to the other § 3553(a) factors. 

We disagree.

“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion 

when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) 
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factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 

2011). The district court acknowledged that Pledger was not a 

“huge dealer” but placed more weight on the fact that Pledger 

was “a relentless dealer” who “engaged, again, in a serious 

criminal offense,” involving “very harmful substances.” In 

imposing its sentence, the district court also relied on the 

need to protect society from Pledger because he was “a very 

violent, dangerous criminal” who would reoffend. Finally, the 

court noted Pledger’s lack of respect for the law evidenced by 

Pledger’s statement to the court. 

The mere fact that the district court weighed 

Pledger’s likelihood of recidivism and the need to protect the 

public more heavily than other § 3553(a) factors does not render 

the sentence substantively unreasonable. See United States v. 

Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 104-05 (4th Cir. 2012). The 

district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 216-

month sentence under the § 3553(a) factors where, after 

considering all the factors, it decided to focus on Pledger’s 

likelihood of recidivism and the need to protect the public 

given Pledger’s extensive criminal record, featuring twenty-four

years of serious offenses.

Because Pledger’s 216-month sentence is substantively 

reasonable under the § 3553(a) factors, the second prong of the 

harmless error test is satisfied. Accordingly, we affirm 
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Pledger’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED