[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13480

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

SCHYLER HARRIS, 

by and through his Guardian as next friend Tracy Davis, 

TRACY DAVIS, 

individually, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

RICHARD AUTRY, et al., 

Defendants, 

ANTONIO CAMMON, 

individually and in his official capacity as a paraprofessional, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13480

and as an employee of RCPS, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-01197-JPB

____________________

Before LUCK and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

Five-year-old Schyler Harris and his grandmother, Tracy 

Davis, sued Antonio Cammon, a teacher’s aide at his school, for 

assault and battery, false imprisonment, and violations of Harris’s 

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42

U.S.C. section 1983.1 The district court dismissed their complaint 

* This opinion is being entered by a quorum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

1 Harris also brought various state constitutional claims, a claim for negligent 

hiring and retention, and claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 

Harris abandoned his claim for negligent hiring and retention and his claim 

under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in the district court. The 

district court dismissed the remaining state and federal counts for failure to 

state a claim, and Harris does not appeal the dismissal. 

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20-13480 Opinion of the Court 3

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 

HISTORY 

Harris was a student at Shoal Creek Elementary in Rockdale 

County, Georgia. Harris suffered from a disability and was placed 

in special-needs classes. When Harris enrolled in 2015, Davis gave 

Harris’s teacher her phone number in case she needed to be contacted about Harris. Davis said that Harris was “prone to disabilityrelated outbursts” and she should be called if one occurred. Harris’s teacher assured Davis that she would be contacted if Harris 

had an outburst. 

In January 2016, Davis started to notice that Harris’s outbursts had become more frequent and more intense. On April 28, 

2016, the school’s principal called Davis and said that there had 

been “a little problem” with Harris, but he had calmed down after 

“one of his outbursts” and “would be ok.” After Harris returned 

home from school, Davis asked Harris why he had “acted up.” 

Harris said that he had been crying because Cammon, a paraprofessional at the school, “hung” him from the chalkboard. Harris explained to his grandmother that he had kicked his book bag across 

the floor, so Cammon “picked [him] up and hung [him] from the 

chalkboard.” When Cammon lifted him, Harris said that his head 

struck a desk and almost “cracked open.” 

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The following day, Davis confronted the school’s principal 

about the incident. The principal admitted that he had witnessed 

Harris hanging from the chalkboard. Harris’s teacher also admitted in a written statement that she saw Harris hanging from the 

chalkboard and told Cammon to “unhook” him. One of the students in the classroom reported that this was not the first time 

Cammon had hung Harris from the chalkboard. 

Later, the principal said in a written statement that he heard 

screaming coming from Harris’s classroom on the morning of the 

incident. The principal peered through a window in the classroom 

door and saw Harris “hanging from the bulletin board by his pant 

belt loop.” The principal entered the classroom and told Cammon 

to take Harris down. The principal wrote in his statement that 

Harris’s teacher and the other students in the room were laughing 

at Harris. The principal had previously received emails from parents accusing Cammon of abusing or mistreating disabled students. 

Cammon said in a written statement that the hanging incident was “nothing different than the other times.” Cammon dealt 

with Harris “differently,” he wrote, because Harris “like[d] to get 

physical when we were on the same plane.” Cammon also said in 

his report that he “always lifted [Harris] above [him]” and “used to 

lift him up and hold him but that got exhausting.” 

Cammon prepared a second written statement for the 

county sheriff. Cammon said that on the day of the incident he had 

received a call to go to Harris’s classroom. When Cammon walked 

into the classroom, Harris was on the ground “screaming and 

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defiant.” Cammon “picked [Harris] up from the floor and went to 

the board and elevated him.” According to Cammon, this was just 

the “normal procedure” for calming Harris down. 

The school launched an investigation and concluded that 

Cammon had failed to use proper deescalation techniques and had 

violated school policy. The school’s social services case manager 

determined in a report that Cammon had “emotionally abused” 

Harris. After the incident, Harris entered therapy and was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder. 

Harris2 sued the school district and various school employees in their official and individual capacities, including Cammon, in 

state court. He brought state law claims for assault and battery, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment, 

and section 1983 claims for violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants removed the case 

to federal court. 

Every defendant—besides Cammon—either successfully 

moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, successfully moved for a judgment on the pleadings, or was voluntarily 

dismissed. But Cammon took no action in the case and didn’t file 

any responsive pleadings. The district court found that Cammon 

2 Even though Harris and Davis were both plaintiffs, for ease of reference, we 

will refer to Harris to mean both of them. 

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had been properly served and directed the clerk to enter a default 

against him. 

Harris moved for a hearing to determine damages as to 

Cammon’s default. The district court denied the motion because 

Harris had not moved for a default judgment. A default judgment

motion was necessary, the district court explained, because “a defaulted defendant is deemed to admit the plaintiff’s well-pleaded 

allegations of fact” but is “not held to admit facts that are not wellpleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” 

Harris then filed a motion for default judgment. The district 

court denied the motion because it provided no “analysis or argument” regarding “the legal sufficiency of the claims against Cammon.” The district court gave Harris one “last opportunity” to file 

a sufficient motion for default judgment. 

Harris filed a second motion for default judgment. The district court denied this motion because, like the first one, it was “devoid of any analysis” showing that the complaint’s allegations were 

legally sufficient. The district court ordered Harris to show cause 

as to why his complaint against Cammon should not be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim. Harris filed a brief arguing that his

claims against Cammon withstood rule 12(b)(6), entitling him to 

default judgment. 

The district court entered an order dismissing all but one of 

the claims against Cammon. As to the state claims, the district 

court concluded that the assault and battery claim failed because 

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the complaint alleged only “conclusory statements.” The false imprisonment claim failed, the district court concluded, because the 

complaint didn’t allege that Harris’s detention or restraint was unlawful. But the district court concluded that the complaint did state 

a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

As to Harris’s federal claims, the district court concluded 

that Cammon couldn’t be sued in his official capacity because the 

state entity employing him—the school district—had been a party 

to the suit. The district court then concluded that the section 1983 

Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims against Cammon in his individual capacity failed because a claim of excessive corporal punishment has to be brought under the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment and not under the Fourth or Eighth 

Amendments. Finally, the section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment 

substantive due process claim failed, the district court concluded, 

because Cammon acted with a “pedagogical objective” and his use 

of force wasn’t obviously excessive. 

The district court entered default judgment against Cammon as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 

The district court then held a hearing on damages and awarded 

Harris $267,140.02. Harris now appeals from the district court’s 

dismissal of the other claims in his complaint. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review de novo the district court’s sua sponte dismissal 

of a complaint for failure to state a claim. Am. United Life Ins. Co. 

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v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). A “complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Our review has two steps: 

we (1) “eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely 

legal conclusions”; and (2) for any “well-pleaded factual allegations, 

we assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna 

Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Harris contends that the district court erred by stepping into 

Cammon’s shoes and making legal arguments on his behalf. And 

Harris argues that his complaint plausibly stated claims against 

Cammon for assault and battery, false imprisonment, and violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in 

Cammon’s official and individual capacity. 

The District Court’s Application of Rule 12(b)(6)

Harris first argues that the district court improperly 

“stepped into the shoes” of Cammon and made legal arguments on 

his behalf after he failed to answer the complaint. 

Where a defendant has been properly served and defaults, a 

plaintiff is not automatically entitled to entry of judgment. Rather, 

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the plaintiff “must apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). “While a defaulted defendant is deemed to admit the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, he is not held to 

admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of 

law.” Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). “Entry of default judgment is only warranted when there is ‘a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.’” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 

1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston 

Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). 

We have interpreted this “sufficient basis in the pleadings” 

standard “as being akin to that necessary to survive a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id.; see also Chudasama v. 

Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] 

default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a 

claim.”). Thus, “a motion for default judgment is like a reverse 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,” requiring the district 

court to assess the legal sufficiency of the claims. Id. Because the 

district court was required to determine whether Harris’s complaint stated a claim for relief before it could enter a default judgment, it didn’t err in applying the standards of rule 12(b)(6) to his

complaint. 

Assault and Battery

The district court dismissed Harris’s claim for assault and 

battery because his complaint “fail[ed] the threshold requirement 

of alleging the elements of [these] torts” and alleged only 

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“conclusory statements.” Harris argues that he stated a claim for 

assault and battery because Cammon “repeatedly hanged [Harris] 

from a hook in front of students” and was later convicted of battery.3 

Under Georgia law, a “cause of action for battery will lie for 

any unlawful touching, that is, a touching of the plaintiff’s person, 

even if minimal, which is offensive.” Lawson v. Bloodsworth, 722 

S.E.2d 358, 360 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). “An offensive touching is one 

which proceeds from anger, rudeness, or lust. The test is what 

would be offensive to an ordinary person not unduly sensitive as 

to his dignity.” Ellison v. Burger King Corp., 670 S.E.2d 469, 473 

(Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (cleaned up). An assault, on the other hand, is 

the “apprehension” of an imminent violent injury. Capitol T.V. 

Serv., Inc. v. Derrick, 293 S.E.2d 724, 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). 

Here, Harris alleged in his complaint that Cammon battered 

Harris by “lifting [Harris] above his head, hanging him on a chalk 

board by his pants[,] and preventing him from moving,” which 

“constitute[d] [a] battery.” Although the title to this count also referred to a “physical assault,” the body of the count didn’t allege 

that an assault occurred. Nor did this count allege that Harris was 

in “apprehension” of imminent violent or offensive contact. Thus, 

Harris failed to state a claim for assault. See id.

3 Cammon was convicted in state court of misdemeanor battery. That fact,

which was not alleged in the complaint, has no bearing on our analysis or the 

sufficiency of Harris’s allegations.

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On the other hand, the complaint did allege that a battery 

occurred when Cammon touched Harris by “lifting” him and 

“hanging” him “by his pants.” Although Harris didn’t allege that 

this touching was “offensive,” we can plausibly infer from these allegations that lifting an elementary school student and hanging him 

by his pants in front of his laughing peers would be “offensive to an 

ordinary person not unduly sensitive as to his dignity.” See Ellison, 

670 S.E.2d at 471, 473 (holding that, because of “the relatively low 

threshold required to prove battery,” a battery claim raised a jury 

question where a restaurant manager put her hands around the 

plaintiff’s neck and shook her three times). 

But that’s not the end of the matter. Under Georgia’s constitution, official immunity “protects an officer from personal liability arising from his performance of ‘official functions’ as long as 

the officer did not act with ‘actual malice’ or ‘actual intent to cause 

injury.’” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1304 (11th Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, para. IX(d)). The doctrine of official 

immunity “applies to an officer’s ‘discretionary actions taken 

within the scope of his official authority.’” Id. (quoting Cameron v. 

Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344 (Ga. 2001) (alteration adopted)). A complaint fails to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6), and official immunity applies, where “[n]one of the facts alleged in the complaint support a plausible claim that” the defendant “acted with actual malice 

or an actual intent to injure” the plaintiff. Id. at 1305. We conclude 

that, as to the battery claim, Harris’s complaint failed to plausibly 

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allege that Cammon acted with actual malice or the actual intent 

to cause injury. 

Actual malice is the “deliberate intention to do wrong.” Adams v. Hazelwood, 520 S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. 1999) (citation omitted). Establishing actual malice to overcome official immunity is a 

high bar; it’s “not established merely by showing that the defendant 

acted with ‘ill will.’” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1304. “Nor does actual 

malice encompass merely the reckless disregard for the rights and 

safety of others.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). And

“the phrase ‘actual intent to cause injury’—as used in Georgia’s official immunity provision—means ‘an actual intent to cause harm 

to the plaintiff, not merely an intent to do the act purportedly resulting in the claimed injury.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, in using force on Harris in a botched attempt to control his behavior, Cammon was performing a discretionary action 

within the scope of his official authority. See Griswold v. Collins, 

734 S.E.2d 425, 427 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“As a teacher, Collins was 

required to exert discipline, control and supervision over the students in her classroom, acts that this Court has held constitute discretionary acts involving the exercise of personal deliberation and 

judgment.”). Thus, the question is whether Harris plausibly alleged that Cammon acted with actual malice or an actual intent to 

injure him. See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1304.

“None of the facts alleged in the complaint support a plausible claim that [Cammon] acted with actual malice or an actual 

intent to injure [Harris], as those terms have been defined by the 

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Georgia Supreme Court.” See id. Rather, Harris’s complaint established that Cammon hung him up from the chalkboard in a misguided attempt to restore order to the classroom. Cammon told 

the police that because Harris was “on the floor screaming and defiant,” he “elevated” Harris “to calm him down.” According to the 

complaint, another school employee said that Harris “was having 

a really hard time following instruction[s] and calming down,” and 

was upset and “throwing his chair across the room.” And Harris 

himself, his complaint alleged, said that Cammon lifted him up because he “was acting bad.” If anything, these allegations establish 

a lack of malice; Harris alleged that Cammon hoisted him to discipline him and calm him down, not to deliberately do wrong and

harm him. 

Perhaps Cammon acted with “reckless disregard for the 

rights and safety of others,” but that’s not enough to establish malice and overcome official immunity. See id. (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). Because Harris didn’t plausibly allege that Cammon acted with actual malice or the actual intent to injure him, the

doctrine of official immunity barred his claim. We therefore affirm 

the district court’s dismissal of Harris’s battery claim. 

False Imprisonment

Harris argues that the district court erred by dismissing his

claim for false imprisonment because his complaint “adequately 

plead[ed] details” to make out this count. Under Georgia law, the 

tort of false imprisonment “is the unlawful detention of the person 

of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived 

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of his personal liberty.” Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1330 (11th 

Cir. 2019) (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20). 

Here, the complaint conclusorily alleged that Cammon 

falsely imprisoned Harris “by unlawfully restraining him” but did 

not allege or explain why this restraint was unlawful. All that Harris alleged in his complaint was a legal conclusion and that isn’t 

enough. See Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 

2006) (“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts 

or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Because the complaint didn’t plausibly allege that Harris’s detention was unlawful, 

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim. 

Official Capacity

The district court dismissed the section 1983 claims against 

Cammon in his official capacity because the school district, Cammon’s employer, was a party to the lawsuit. Harris argues that the 

district court erred in doing so because the school district had 

knowledge of Cammon’s “violent propensities,” Cammon used his 

position as a paraprofessional to abuse Harris, and he “conspired” 

with Harris’s teacher to punish the child. 

Where a state official is sued under section 1983 in his or her 

official capacity, “the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which [the state official] is an agent.” See 

Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted). These types of actions are 

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therefore just “suits directly against” the municipality that employs 

the state official. Id. “Because suits against a municipal officer sued 

in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are 

functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local government units can be sued directly[.]” Id. 

Here, because Harris sued the school district, Cammon’s 

employer, his section 1983 claims against Cammon in his official 

capacity were “functionally equivalent” to his claims against the 

school district. See id. But the district court dismissed the section 

1983 claims against the school district, and Harris doesn’t appeal 

the dismissal of those claims. It was therefore appropriate to also 

dismiss the section 1983 claims against Cammon in his official capacity. See id. (affirming directed verdict in favor of officers sued 

in their official capacity where the municipality was also a party to 

the case). 

Harris also argues that because Cammon’s actions were malicious, he wasn’t entitled to qualified immunity and official immunity under state law. But the fact remains that the section 1983 

claims against him in his official capacity were redundant because 

Harris brought these same claims against the school district. The 

district court therefore correctly dismissed the section 1983 claims 

against Cammon in his official capacity. 

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Section 1983 Fourth and Eighth Amendment Claims

Harris argues that the district court erred by dismissing his

section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim because Cammon’s actions 

were outrageous, exceeded the bounds of corporal punishment, 

and therefore amounted to an illegal search and seizure. He similarly argues that his section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim 

shouldn’t have been dismissed because Cammon’s actions 

“shock[ed] the moral sense of the community.” 

But when “public school teachers or administrators impose 

disciplinary corporal punishment,” the “pertinent constitutional 

question is whether the imposition is consonant with the requirements of due process.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 

(1977) (concluding that “when public school teachers or administrators impose disciplinary corporal punishment, the Eighth 

Amendment is inapplicable”); Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. 

of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[E]xcessive corporal 

punishment, at least where not administered in conformity with a 

valid school policy authorizing corporal punishment as in Ingraham, may be actionable under the Due Process Clause when it is 

tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and conscience-shocking behavior.”). As we said in Neal, this approach to school corporal punishment claims “ensure[s] that students will be able to state a claim 

only where the alleged corporal punishment truly reflects the kind 

of egregious official abuse of force that would violate substantive 

due process protections in other, non-school contexts.” Id. at 1076. 

Because we analyze a corporal punishment claim through the lens 

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of due process, we affirm the dismissal of the Fourth and Eighth 

Amendment section 1983 claims. 

Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment Substantive 

Due Process Claim

Harris argues that the district court erred by dismissing his

section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim. He argues that his

complaint stated a substantive due process claim because hanging 

a disabled child from a chalkboard “stretched far beyond the concept of corporal punishment” and amounted to egregious and outrageous conduct. 

Due process “protects individuals against arbitrary exercises 

of government power, but only the most egregious official conduct 

can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” T.W. ex rel. 

Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 

2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Executive action is 

arbitrary in the constitutional sense when it “shocks the conscience.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 

(1998). Both we and the Supreme Court have “said repeatedly that 

the Fourteenth Amendment is not a ‘font of tort law’ that can be 

used, through section 1983, to convert state tort claims into federal 

causes of action.’” Neal, 229 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. 

at 848). 

“[E]xcessive corporal punishment” can violate due process 

“when it is tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and conscienceshocking behavior.” Id. To state this claim, “the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that (1) a school official intentionally used 

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an amount of force that was obviously excessive under the circumstances, and (2) the force used presented a reasonably foreseeable 

risk of serious bodily injury.” Id. “In determining whether the 

amount of force used is obviously excessive, we consider the totality of the circumstances. In particular, we examine: (1) the need 

for the application of corporal punishment, (2) the relationship between the need and amount of punishment administered, and 

(3) the extent of the injury inflicted.” Id. Whether a school employee’s use of force was “obviously excessive” is an “objective 

matter”; we ask whether “the use of force was objectively reasonable,” without regard to “the subjective intent of the school official.” See Wilson, 610 F.3d at 599–600 (citation omitted). Here, 

because we conclude that Cammon’s use of force wasn’t obviously 

excessive, we don’t consider whether it “presented a reasonably 

foreseeable risk of serious bodily injury.” See id. at 602. 

Our decision in Wilson is illustrative. There, a fourteenyear-old student named T.W. suffered from “developmental and 

behavioral problems” and an anxiety disorder. 610 F.3d at 593. He 

was placed in a class for students with autism. Id. at 594. T.W.’s 

teacher “used physical force” and “restrained” the students when 

disciplining them. Id. In one incident, this teacher (who weighed 

300 pounds) “forced T.W. to the floor and pulled his right leg up 

against the back of his left leg. [The teacher] held T.W. in this position for two to three minutes.” Id. at 595. In another incident, 

the teacher “pulled T.W. up from his chair without sliding his chair 

away from the table, which caused T.W.’s legs to hit the edge of 

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the table.” Id. The teacher then “forced T.W. against the table, 

held his arms behind his back, and placed her weight against his 

back to hold him in that position. [The teacher] held T.W. in that 

position for about three minutes, even though T.W. told [the 

teacher] more than once that she was hurting him.” Id. 

We concluded that, although the teacher’s actions were 

“troubling,” T.W.’s substantive due process claim failed as a matter 

of law. Id. at 593. As to the need for corporal punishment, we said 

that the teacher’s use of force was “capable of being construed as 

an attempt to restore order, maintain discipline, or protect T.W. 

from self-injurious behavior.” Id. at 600 (quotation marks omitted). As to the “relationship between the need for the use of force 

and the amount of force administered,” we said that “the amount 

of force at issue here was not totally unrelated to the need for the 

use of force.” Id. at 601. Finally, as to the extent of the child’s injuries, “T.W. suffered only minor physical injuries,” we explained, 

even though the teacher’s actions “aggravated T.W.’s developmental disability, exacerbated his behavioral problems, and caused 

symptoms of [posttraumatic] stress disorder.” Id. We concluded 

that this discipline “was not so arbitrary and egregious as to support 

a complaint of a violation of substantive due process.” Id. at 602. 

We reach the same conclusion here. As to the need for the 

use of force, Cammon saw that Harris was “on the floor screaming 

and defiant.” Another school employee confirmed that Harris 

“was having a really hard time following instruction[s] and calming 

down,” and was “upset and throwing his chair across the room.” 

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Harris himself told his grandmother that “I was acting bad, I was 

kicking my book bag across the floor.” These circumstances establish that Cammon’s use of force was “capable of being construed as 

an attempt to serve [the] pedagogical objectives” of “restor[ing] order” and “maintain[ing] discipline.” See id. at 600 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Next, as to the relationship between the need for the use of 

force and the amount of force used, “we cannot say that the 

amount of force at issue here was totally unrelated to a need for 

punishment.” See Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1337, 1340 

(11th Cir. 2007) (concluding there was a relationship between the 

force used and the need for punishment where a teacher choked a 

“defiant” student). Harris “defiantly disobeyed” his teacher’s instructions leading up to the incident. See id. As noted, he was 

“throwing his chair across the room” and “kicking [his] book bag 

across the floor.” Although the disciplinary measures Cammon resorted to were “inappropriate” and “we do not condone them,” we 

cannot say that these measures were “totally unrelated” to the need 

for order. See id.

Finally, as to the extent of the injuries, this “important factor” weighs heavily against Harris. See Wilson, 610 F.3d at 601. 

Unlike Wilson, where the student suffered “minor physical injuries” like “bruises,” id., the complaint doesn’t allege that Harris suffered any physical injuries. Although Harris told his grandmother 

that he hit his head when Cammon lifted him, she checked his head 

“but didn’t see any bruises.” And there is no allegation that Harris 

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“received medical treatment for any physical injuries.” See id. In 

the absence of physical injuries, we cannot say that Cammon’s actions were obviously excessive. See Peterson, 504 F.3d at 1337 

(concluding that choking a student until he lost his breath and sustained bruises and a scratch on his neck “was not obviously excessive” because “the extent of the student’s bodily injury was not serious.”). 

We are sensitive to the fact that Harris was diagnosed with 

posttraumatic stress disorder. But even this “psychological injury” 

and the “symptoms of [posttraumatic] stress disorder” that Harris 

suffers from don’t alter our conclusion “that [Cammon’s] conduct 

was not so arbitrary and egregious as to support a complaint of a 

violation of substantive due process.” See Wilson, 610 F.3d at 602. 

This case is simply not like those where we’ve held that corporal punishment was obviously excessive. We have said that destroying a student’s eyeball by smashing a heavy metal object into 

his skull shocks the conscience. See Neal, 229 F.3d at 1071 (holding 

that a student stated an excessive corporal punishment claim where

a coach hit him in the head with a “weight lock,” knocking his eye 

“completely out of its socket” and leaving it “destroyed and dismembered.”). So does beating a student repeatedly with a metal 

cane. See Kirkland ex rel. Jones v. Greene Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 347 

F.3d 903, 904 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of qualified immunity where a principal struck a student “with a metal cane in the 

head, ribs and back, leaving a large knot on his head and causing 

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22 Opinion of the Court 20-13480

him to suffer continuing migraine headaches.”). We cannot say the 

same about briefly suspending a child in the air by his beltloop. 

We reiterate that we “do not condone the use of force 

against a vulnerable student.” See Wilson, 610 F.3d at 602. But, as 

we have said, section 1983 does not convert the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment into a “font of tort law.” See 

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848. Our decision in this case “comports with 

the Supreme Court’s mandate to remain vigilant in policing the 

boundaries separating tort law from constitutional law.” Nix v. 

Franklin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 311 F.3d 1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 2002). Because “no reasonable jury could conclude that [Cammon’s] use of 

force was obviously excessive in the constitutional sense,” we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Harris’s substantive due process section 1983 claim. See Wilson, 610 F.3d at 602.

IV. CONCLUSION 

We affirm the district court’s order dismissing Harris’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 

AFFIRMED. 

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