On July 25, 2005, this testimony was reposted to the Web because 

the legend on page 9 was incorrect and the electronic version has 

been corrected. 

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, July 21, 2005 HOMELAND SECURITY

Agency Resources Address 

Violations of Restricted 

Airspace, but Management 

Improvements Are Needed 

Statement of Davi M. D’Agostino, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

GAO-05-928T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-928T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Davi M. 

D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431, 

dagostinod@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-928T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Government 

Reform and Oversight, House of 

Representatives 

July 2005

HOMELAND SECURITY

Agency Resources Address Violations of 

Restricted Airspace, but Management 

Improvements Are Needed 

The Federal Aviation Administration reported about 3,400 violations of 

restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of 

which were committed by general aviation pilots. Violations can occur 

because (1) pilots may divert from their flight plan to avoid bad weather, 

(2) the Administration may establish newly restricted airspace with little 

warning, and pilots in the air may be unaware of the new restrictions, or 

(3) pilots do not check for notices of restrictions, as required. Also, 

terrorists may deliberately enter restricted airspace to test the government’s 

response or carry out an attack. 

Federal agencies have acted individually or have coordinated to enhance 

aviation security. For example, the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) established a national operations center that disseminates 

operational- and intelligence-related information, and has enhanced 

passenger and checked baggage screening, secured cockpit doors, and 

assessed the risk to some, but not all, commercial airports. Also, few 

general aviation airport owners have conducted risk assessments. The 

North American Aerospace Defense Command’s mission was expanded to 

include monitoring domestic air traffic and conducting air patrols. 

Collectively, the agencies are operating the National Capital Region 

Coordination Center to secure the National Capital Region. 

GAO identified gaps in the simultaneous, time-critical, multi-agency 

response to airspace violations. While it may not be possible to prevent all 

violations or deter all attacks, GAO identified some gaps in policies and 

procedures. Specifically, the agencies were operating without (1) an 

organization in the lead, (2) fully developed interagency policies and 

procedures for the airspace violations response teleconferencing system, 

(3) information sharing protocols and procedures, or (4) accepted 

definitions of a violation. As a result, opportunities may be missed to 

enhance the security of U.S. aviation. 

Depiction of a Potential Restricted Airspace Violation 

Original flight plan

Threatening

Flight deviation

Deviation

Flight restriction zone

Protected target

Threatening deviation

Nonthreatening

deviation

Source: GAO. 

Securing and defending U.S. 

airspace is an interagency mission 

that depends on close interagency 

coordination and information 

sharing. GAO was asked to review 

(1) the threat assessment for U.S. 

aviation, (2) violations of restricted 

airspace since September 11, 2001, 

(3) agencies’ individual or 

coordinated steps to secure U.S. 

aviation, and (4) interagency 

policies and procedures to manage 

the response to restricted airspace 

violations. GAO will issue a 

classified report responding to this 

request later this year. To keep this 

testimony unclassified, GAO 

focused on the latter three 

questions. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommended that the 

Secretaries of Defense, 

Transportation, and Homeland 

Security strengthen the interagency 

process for managing the response 

to violations of restricted airspace 

by determining whether an 

organization should be in charge, 

developing interagency policies 

and procedures, information 

sharing protocols, and common 

definitions. DHS and DOD 

disagreed that one agency should 

be in charge, largely from 

command and control concerns. 

DHS concurred or partially 

concurred with the other 

recommendations; DOD 

nonconcurred with most of the 

rest. The Department of 

Transportation concurred with 

GAO’s recommendations. 
Page 1 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

Chairman Davis and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to provide results of GAO’s 

work on violations of restricted airspace and the interagency response. 

Specifically, I will discuss the unclassified results from our classified 

report on violations into restricted airspace that we will issue in 

September 2005. 

As you know, because of intelligence assessments since the September 11, 

2001, attacks, the United States has established additional temporary flight 

restrictions over important sites such as selected governmental 

operations, national events, and critical infrastructure.1

 Established by the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), temporary flight restrictions and 

other special use airspace measures are national airspace management 

tools used to restrict flights into protected airspace. The intent of 

establishing restricted airspace is to reduce the number of flights in that 

airspace to only those authorized so that the FAA, the Department of 

Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and other agencies can 

more readily identify an unauthorized aircraft and, if needed, take actions 

to deter or defeat it. 

Intelligence agencies believe that terrorists remain highly interested in 

attacking U.S. aviation with commercial or general aviation aircraft, in 

attacking an airport, or in using aircraft to attack targets. Intelligence 

agencies differ in their assessments of how significant the threat is from 

the use of certain general aviation aircraft in an attack. Our prior work has 

shown that the success of interagency efforts depends on melding multiorganizational efforts through central leadership, an overarching strategy, 

effective partnerships, and common definitions.2

 Securing and defending 

U.S. airspace is a key example of an interagency mission that depends on 

close coordination and information sharing between and among the 

agencies that share this mission. As many as 7 key government 

organizations can be simultaneously involved in responding to a violation 

of restricted airspace. TSA is responsible for ensuring that only authorized 

 1

 Critical infrastructure is defined as systems or assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital 

to the nation that the incapacity or destruction of them would have a debilitating impact on 

national economic security, national public health, or safety. 

2

 GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains, GAO-02-610 (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002). 
Page 2 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

pilots, cabin crewmembers, or passengers gain access to an aircraft. Once 

airborne, FAA becomes the lead agency and is responsible for managing 

traffic entering into or operating in U.S. airspace to ensure safe operations 

by monitoring aircraft movements using radar and maintaining 

communications with the pilots. Either DOD’s North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD) or DHS is called in to enforce airspace 

security if TSA or FAA cannot prevent someone from taking control of an 

aircraft without authorization or flying into restricted airspace without 

authorization. During a violation, these agencies carry out their 

responsibilities simultaneously. This was the case during the incursions 

into the National Capital Region restricted airspace during May 2005. 

Today I will provide our findings on (1) violations of restricted airspace 

since September 11, 2001, (2) agencies’ individual or coordinated steps to 

secure U.S. aviation, and (3) interagency policies and procedures to 

manage the response to violations of restricted airspace. I will also 

summarize our recommendations and the agency comments. 

The FAA reported about 3,400 violations of restricted airspace nationwide 

from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of which were 

committed by general aviation pilots. Violations can occur because (1) 

pilots may need to divert from their planned flight path to avoid bad 

weather and may consequently enter restricted airspace; (2) the FAA may 

establish the restricted airspace with little warning, and pilots already in 

the air may be unaware of the new restrictions; and (3) pilots may not 

check FAA notifications of new restrictions, as required.3

 Also, terrorists 

might deliberately enter restricted airspace to observe the government’s 

response or to carry out an attack. Most violations of restricted airspace 

occur in the eastern United States due to heavy air traffic in the area and 

the large amount of restricted airspace. Moreover, most violations of 

restricted airspace in the eastern United States occur in the National 

Capital Region. General aviation accounts for about 88 percent of all 

violations nationwide. We did not review the actions taken by FAA against 

pilots who violate restricted airspace, although we do describe the actions 

FAA can take. 

 3

 “Each person shall, before conducting any operation under the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 C.F.R. Chapter 1), be familiar with all available information concerning 

that operation, including Notices to Airmen issued under §91.139,” 14 C.F.R. pt. 91, SFAR 

No. 60 – Air Traffic Control Emergency Operation. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

Since September 11, 2001, federal agencies have acted individually or have 

coordinated to secure U.S. airspace and address the threat: 

• TSA secured commercial aircraft, limited potential access to commercial 

aviation aircraft and facilities, and conducted risk assessments of some 

facilities. 

• FAA has increased its use of temporarily restricted airspace for national 

security purposes and has issued over 220 Notices to Airmen4

 to identify 

the location of restricted airspace. In addition, the FAA established the 

Domestic Events Network,5

 an interagency teleconferencing system that 

permits the agencies to communicate about and coordinate their response 

to violations of restricted airspace. 

• NORAD increased air patrols and improved airspace monitoring. 

• Collectively, the agencies were operating the National Capital Region 

Coordination Center to bring key agencies together to secure the airspace 

over the National Capital Region. 

We identified gaps in the management of the interagency response to 

airspace violations. Individual agency and interagency progress and 

coordination to secure airspace is noteworthy. However, we recognize 

that it may not be possible to prevent all violations of restricted airspace 

or deter all attacks. Airspace security measures could be challenged. 

Moreover, in some cases pilots do not check on airspace restrictions, as 

they are required to do. Such challenges, along with the complexity of 

several agencies simultaneously carrying out their respective agency 

responsibilities, highlight the need for clear policies and procedures and 

optimal interagency coordination for the most timely and effective 

management of the nation’s airspace security and violations of restricted 

airspace. Nevertheless, potential gaps remain: 

• TSA officials told us that the agency has conducted risk assessments6 at 

some but not all of the commercial airports in the United States.7

 4

 Pilots are required to check Notices to Airmen before beginning their flights to avoid any 

temporary flight restricted zones during their flights. These notices contain the specific 

locations and times that airspace is restricted. 

5

 While our report discusses management of restricted airspace violations, the mission of 

the Domestic Events Network also includes managing the response to hijackings, 

suspicious activities, and other events. 

6

 Risk assessments involve assessing a facility’s threats, vulnerabilities, and critical assets 

to determine where resources should be targeted to reduce risk. 
Page 4 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

• While each agency commands and controls its own resources, no one 

organization leads the interagency response to airspace violations. TSA, 

FAA, and DOD officials told us that at the National Capital Region 

Coordination Center no one organization is in the lead because, depending 

on the nature of the airspace violation, each of the agencies 

simultaneously carries out its responsibilities during the phases of the 

violation. TSA is the executive agent for the Center, but TSA officials said 

that they only resolve or “deconflict” agency issues and do not see 

themselves as being in charge. 

• The agencies have not developed policies and procedures over who has 

access to the Domestic Events Network, and FAA personnel told us that 

under certain circumstances, they could be cut out of conferences if these 

conferences go above a certain security classification and different 

communication systems are used. 

• As threat conditions warrant, the agencies may take additional steps to 

secure the airspace outside the National Capital Region but they have not 

begun to develop an overarching plan for such airspace.8

 As a result, 

interagency coordination may be hampered. 

• Agency database records documenting violations were not routinely 

shared among FAA, NORAD, or TSA, or with FAA’s Strategic Operations 

Security Manager, because the agencies have not established information 

sharing requirements and protocols. We reviewed FAA data and identified 

information we believe agencies could use to better secure U.S. airspace. 

Because data are not routinely shared, these agencies may miss 

opportunities to enhance security. 

• The potential for confusion about what constitutes an airspace violation 

exists among the agencies because they do not have a common definition 

of an airspace violation. As a result, the agencies may be unaware of the 

scope and magnitude of the problem, making it more difficult to allocate 

resources efficiently. 

We made several recommendations to DHS, DOD, and the Department of 

Transportation to strengthen the interagency process for managing the 

response to violations of restricted airspace. DHS and DOD nonconcurred 

with our recommendation that the three secretaries should determine 

whether one agency should manage the interagency process of responding 

to violations of restricted airspace, primarily because of concerns about 

command and control. DHS and Transportation concurred or partially 

 7

 On this review, we did not evaluate the adequacy of TSA’s risk assessment tools; however, 

in other reviews GAO is assessing various aspects of TSA’s risk management approaches. 

8

 Airspace outside the National Capital Region is protected for National Security Special 

Events and Presidential movements, and when intelligence warrants protection. 
Page 5 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

concurred with most or all of our recommendations. DOD nonconcurred 

with most of our recommendations. 

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, 

federal agencies took immediate steps to secure U.S. airspace. FAA 

grounded all air traffic and DOD ordered Air Force fighter jets to fly 

patrols over selected U.S. cites to deter and respond to any additional 

attacks. In the months after the attacks, the President developed certain 

national strategies and directives, and Congress established TSA and gave 

it the responsibility to provide security for all modes of transportation. 

Congress also later passed and the President signed legislation to protect 

the homeland against air, land, and maritime threats, including creating 

the DHS to coordinate and lead the national homeland security effort. 

After the attacks, interagency coordination increased as FAA, NORAD, 

TSA, their parent cabinet departments, and other agencies with homeland 

air defense or security roles and missions worked together to meet the 

overall goal of protecting U.S. airspace. 

NORAD and the FAA have historically been the main contributors to 

protecting U.S. airspace. FAA’s primary mission is to safely manage the 

flow of air traffic in the United States, but it contributes to air security 

through its control of U.S. airspace. About 17,000 FAA controllers monitor 

and manage airspace, support the coordination of security operations, and 

provide information to military and law enforcement agencies when 

needed. Within NORAD, Continental North American Aerospace Defense 

Command Region personnel monitor radar data on aircraft entering and 

operating within continental U.S. airspace. NORAD also conducts air 

patrols in U.S. airspace. 

According to FAA, the agency divides airspace into four categories: 

controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other.9

 Controlled airspace may 

include special flight restrictions and will have specific defined 

dimensions, including altitude ranges, or vertical boundaries, and surface 

area, or horizontal boundaries. Any aircraft operating within controlled 

airspace must comply with rules governing that airspace or be subject to 

enforcement action. Controlled airspace is further divided into classes 

ranging from A through E. Each class of airspace has its own level of Air 

 9

 14 C.F.R. pt. 99 (2005). 

Background 

Different Classes and Use 

of Airspace 
Page 6 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

Traffic Control services and operational requirements that pilots must 

follow in order to enter and operate in it. For example, to operate in class 

A airspace, pilots must have air traffic controller clearance to enter and 

must have communication equipment on board to permit communication 

with air traffic controllers. In lesser-restricted airspace, pilots can navigate 

by landmarks. Controlled airspace can be further classified with special 

flight restrictions. In uncontrolled airspace, class G, air traffic controllers 

have no authority or responsibility to control air traffic. 

FAA also reserves airspace for special purposes, called Special Use 

Airspace, which is normally established to protect important 

infrastructure, including military installations. An Air Defense 

Identification Zone10 is restricted airspace in which the ready notification, 

location, and control of aircraft are required for national security reasons. 

FAA’s other airspace category includes national security areas, military 

training routes, and temporary flight restriction areas. A temporary flight 

restriction typically restricts flights over specified areas for a specified 

period of time. These zones can be established over critical infrastructure, 

military operations areas, National Security Special Events, and United 

States Secret Service protectees (e.g. such as the President, whose 

airspace is protected as he moves throughout the United States). 

FAA notifies pilots of temporary flight restrictions through its Notices to 

Airmen program. Pilots are required to check for notices before beginning 

their flights to avoid any temporary flight restriction zones during their 

flights. If pilots violate such a zone, FAA can take actions against them 

ranging from suspending the pilot’s certificate to fly in response to a onetime, first-time violation to revocation of the certificate when the violation 

is deliberate or otherwise shows a disregard for the regulations. 

Temporary flight restrictions are one component of a tiered security 

aviation system. The system includes ground procedures, such as TSA 

passenger screening procedures, and in-flight security procedures, 

including reinforced cockpit doors and Federal Air Marshals on selected 

domestic and international flights. Temporary flight restrictions are 

considered passive air space control measures intended to keep the flying 

public out of the protected airspace so that agencies can more readily 

identify and respond to pilots exhibiting hostile intent. A temporary flight 

 10 14 C.F.R. pt. 71 (2005). 
Page 7 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

restriction alone will not prevent pilots from entering the protected 

airspace. 

FAA monitors national airspace traffic to ensure safety and has 

established triggers to help identify suspicious aircraft and pilots. 

According to FAA procedures, FAA controllers are to advise the pilots to 

change their course or altitude if they are on a course toward prohibited or 

restricted airspace without authorization, or if they are circling or loitering 

over a sensitive area. Sensitive areas include airspace over dams, nuclear 

and electrical power plants, chemical storage sites, the location of the 

President, or military facilities. Various forms of suspicious pilot and 

aircraft activity are being monitored. 

If a violation is imminent or underway, responding agencies have only 

limited time in which to decide what actions to take. Nonetheless, the 

agencies need sufficient time to try to determine the pilot’s intent and, if 

necessary, to order, scramble, and launch DOD or DHS aircraft to 

intercept the violator. 

The response to a violation is managed using a process of recognition, 

assessment and warning, interdiction, recovery, and follow-up; which 

agency takes these actions depends on the specific nature of the violation. 

FAA can report a violation of restricted airspace based on radar tracking. 

If the offending aircraft deviates from its planned flight path but is not 

heading directly toward the protected asset, FAA may monitor the aircraft 

and try to contact the pilot but not interdict the aircraft. Conversely, if 

NORAD or FAA perceives the aircraft to be a threat based on its speed, 

direction, or other information, NORAD can alert its aircraft and attempt 

to intercept the violator. If successfully diverted away from the protected 

asset or restricted airspace, Secret Service, FAA, TSA, or local law 

enforcement officers may meet the aircraft and interview the pilot upon 

landing, to identify any hostile intent. On the other hand, if the offending 

pilot does not divert and proceeds to operate in a manner perceived as 

threatening, the NORAD pilot can be ordered by the appropriate 

authorities to engage the violating aircraft. Figure 1 shows an aircraft 

deviating from its planned flight path and shows more highly threatening 

and, conversely, less threatening violations of restricted airspace. 
Page 8 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

Figure 1: A Potential Restricted Airspace Violation 

Our review of an FAA database found about 3,400 reported violations of 

restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most 

of which were committed by general aviation pilots. According to FAA, 

violations occur because (1) pilots may divert from their planned flight 

path to avoid bad weather, or may make navigational errors and 

consequently enter restricted airspace; (2) FAA may establish airspace 

restrictions with little warning, and pilots already in the air may be 

unaware of the new restrictions; or (3) pilots may not check for notices of 

new restrictions as required by FAA and may consequently enter restricted 

airspace without authorization. In addition, terrorists might deliberately 

enter restricted airspace to observe the government’s response or to carry 

out an attack. FAA investigates pilot deviations into restricted airspace to 

Violations of 

Restricted Airspace 

Source: GAO.

Original flight plan

Threatening

Flight deviation

Deviation

Flight restriction zone

Protected target

Threatening deviation

Nonthreatening

deviation
Page 9 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

determine the reasons for an incident and to determine whether the pilot’s 

certificate should be temporarily suspended or permanently revoked. 

As the scope of restricted airspace increases, the number of violations 

generally also increases. In addition, a greater concentration of air traffic, 

such as in the eastern United States, would affect the number of violations. 

FAA has worked with the aviation community to inform them of the 

additional restricted areas. Figure 2 shows the percentage of violations of 

restricted airspace by area of the United States. 

Figure 2: U.S Map With Percentages of Violations by FAA Area September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2004 

Factors That Contributed 

to Incursions 

The New England, Eastern, and Southern areas

The Great Lakes, and Central and Southwest areas

The Alaskan, Western Pacific, and Northwest Mountain areas

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.

National Capital Region,

including Camp David

43 percent in 

National Capital Region; 

22 percent in remainder

of Eastern Area 

FAA areas

65 percent

12 percent

23 percent
Page 10 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

General aviation aircraft pilots accounted for about 88 percent of all 

violations of restricted U.S. airspace between September 12, 2001, and 

December 31, 2004. Figure 3 shows the percentage of incursions by type of 

aircraft. 

Figure 3: Violations by Type of Aircraft 

Note: Data rounded to the nearest percent. FAA records a violation as unknown when it is unable to 

identify the offending aircraft. Unknown aircraft may include aircraft that depart from the restricted 

airspace before authorities can identify them. 

According to FAA data, pilot error is the biggest contributor to restricted 

airspace violations. Pilots may not check for FAA Notices to Airmen that 

indicate the location of restricted airspace, or FAA may establish such 

airspace with little warning, and pilots may consequently enter the 

airspace. Airspace restrictions can move, such as when the President 

travels. Notices on the location of newly restricted airspace may be issued 

quickly, and pilots may already be in their aircraft or in the air when the 

restriction is announced and implemented. Moreover, pilots may fly 

around bad weather or may experience equipment problems and 

consequently enter restricted airspace to maintain safe operations. 

To reduce violations, FAA has conducted safety seminars, provided a tollfree number for pilots to call and check for restricted airspace, identified 

88%

7%

General aviation

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.

U.S. military

4%

Unknown/other

1%

Large air carrier/air taxi
Page 11 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

the location of restricted airspace on its Web site, and encouraged pilots to 

check for and be attentive to notices on restricted airspace.11

When a pilot enters restricted airspace without authorization, FAA 

investigates and decides what actions to take against the pilot. After the 

September 2001 attacks, FAA strengthened the actions that it could take. 

For example, FAA no longer issues warning notices or letters of correction 

to pilots. Instead, FAA will now suspend a pilot’s certificate for 30 to 90 

days for a single, inadvertent, first-time violation of a temporary flight 

restriction area that was established with a notice. The temporary 

suspension’s length depends on the degree of danger to other aircraft and 

persons or property on the ground, the pilot’s level of experience, prior 

violations record, and certain other factors. If a pilot deliberately enters 

restricted airspace without authorization, FAA will revoke the pilot’s 

certificate. 

Federal agencies have undertaken individual and coordinated initiatives to 

secure U.S. aviation by trying to ensure that only authorized personnel 

gain access to aircraft or airports, expanding efforts to educate pilots 

about the location of restricted airspace and the circumstances under 

which they may enter such airspace, improving the monitoring of domestic 

airspace, enhancing their ability to enforce airspace restrictions, and 

trying to effectively coordinate a response to each restricted airspace 

violation in the event that prevention fails. TSA, FAA, and DOD have 

individually and in a coordinated way directed resources to mitigate the 

risk of terrorists using commercial aircraft as weapons or targets.12 Some 

of the most publicly visible changes are the advent of TSA operations at 

over 400 airports, which include more rigorous passenger screening 

procedures. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted November 2001, 

authorized TSA to secure all modes of transportation.13 Since then, TSA 

has established the Transportation Security Operations Center, a national 

 11 We did not evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts. 

12 The resources discussed are not meant to be all-inclusive, but are used to highlight some 

of the resources that have been provided. Providing an all-inclusive list was beyond the 

scope of our review. 

13 Pub. L. No. 107-71 (2001). 

FAA Actions to 

Temporarily Suspend or 

Permanently Revoke Pilot 

Certificates 

Federal Agencies 

Have Taken Individual 

and Coordinated 

Actions to Mitigate 

the Terrorist Threat to 

U.S. Aviation 

TSA Has Acted to Secure 

Aviation 
Page 12 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

center that operates around the clock and analyzes and disseminates 

operational- and intelligence-related information for all modes of 

transportation. TSA has also enhanced passenger and checked baggage 

screening, expanded the Federal Air Marshal Service to place more 

marshals on international and domestic commercial flights, and secured 

cockpit doors to prevent unauthorized entry to the flight decks of 

commercial airliners.14 In addition, the Federal Flight Deck Officers 

program is training pilots on commercial passenger and cargo aircraft in 

how to use lethal force against an intruder on the flight deck. In addition, 

TSA has expanded background checks for more of the aviation workforce. 

TSA is also working to fully implement a risk management approach that 

would include risk assessment tools for targeting resources to improve 

security. For example, the tool might indicate the level of preparedness of 

a facility, given probable threat scenarios. The tool may show that, based 

on a particular threat scenario, a facility’s physical security may be 

vulnerable, or access controls to the facility may be weak. Based on the 

findings from use of the tool, owners and operators could take actions to 

reduce these risks. 

After September 11, 2001, FAA established additional temporary flight 

restrictions over sensitive sites in the United States and established a 

teleconferencing system to coordinate the nation’s response to violations 

of restricted airspace. Many of the additional temporary flight restrictions 

were established over selected critical infrastructures. Prior to the attacks, 

temporary flight restrictions were rarely used for national security 

purposes. Since the attacks, FAA has issued over 220 Notices to Airmen 

identifying temporary flight restrictions. In addition, the amount of 

airspace associated with some temporary flight restrictions has increased 

both vertically and laterally. For example, presidential temporary flight 

restrictions around the President have increased laterally from 3 to 30 

nautical miles and vertically from 3,000 feet to 18,000 feet. 

To alert DOD, TSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other 

agencies of suspicious activities or potential violations of protected 

airspace, FAA established the Domestic Events Network after the 

September 11, 2001, attacks. As discussed earlier, FAA also increased the 

sanctions against pilots who enter restricted airspace without 

 14 In November 2003, the Federal Air Marshal Service was transferred to Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement. 

FAA Has Taken Steps to 

Monitor Airspace and Support 

a Coordinated Interagency 

Response to Violations 
Page 13 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

authorization, and it has continued to educate pilots about restricted 

airspace. 

After the September 2001 attacks, NORAD’s mission was expanded 

beyond defending just external airspace to include domestic airspace. 

NORAD also committed more fighters, refueling, and early warning 

aircraft to support its expanded mission. These aircraft are part of DOD’s 

Operation Noble Eagle15 and conduct air patrols over Washington, D.C., 

New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, and other cities based on the threat 

level and threat intelligence received and analyzed. NORAD continually 

evaluates such information and directs operations such as that of ordering 

fighters to patrol airspace over these and other cities as appropriate. 

NORAD can also expand its overall national air defense response levels 

and commit additional resources according to the threat level. 

To facilitate its current domestic military mission, NORAD expanded its 

ability to monitor domestic airspace. Prior to the September 2001 attacks, 

NORAD did not monitor domestic airspace. However, following the 

attacks and the expansion of NORAD’s mission to include domestic air 

defense, the command gained access to FAA’s domestic airspace radar 

system, with a software upgrade. During our review, NORAD was testing 

replacement software that would allow it to achieve efficiencies in 

securing domestic airspace. However, air defense-sector radar operations 

crews we interviewed expressed concerns about the new software. We 

briefed NORAD officials on these concerns, and the officials responded 

that they would not accept the software until air defense personnel were 

satisfied with its performance. Moreover, in addition to normal software 

development meetings that NORAD had conducted with the users, NORAD 

also held special meetings to address the air defense-sector personnel’s 

concerns. System testing was scheduled through 2005. 

NORAD is also trying to improve the data that it collects and records on 

violations of restricted airspace. Our review found discrepancies in the 

numbers of violations of restricted airspace recorded between the air 

defense sectors and NORAD headquarters. For example, from January 

through November 2004, the Northeast Air Defense Sector reported 2,069 

cases where aircraft were monitored for violations of restricted airspace 

 15 Operation Noble Eagle is a DOD-led military mission that began on September 11, 2001, 

to defend the United States against terrorism or foreign aggression. 

NORAD’s Mission Has 

Expanded to Defend Domestic 

U.S. Airspace 
Page 14 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

and other activities.16 However, NORAD headquarters had information on 

only 266, or 13 percent of the cases. NORAD headquarters acted to correct 

the problem and is implementing a new reporting system and conducting 

training. NORAD’s air defense sectors are primarily responsible for 

tracking and cataloging restricted airspace violations. NORAD 

headquarters officials told us that their airspace data had not been shared 

outside DOD. However, in July 2005, DOD informed us that it is planning 

to share information contained in its new system with the FAA upon 

completion of an interagency memorandum of understanding. 

The agencies have recognized that individual actions alone are not 

sufficient to respond to violations of restricted airspace, and consequently 

they have also coordinated their efforts to try and enhance the response to 

each violation. The agencies have established the National Capital Region 

Coordination Center to enhance the effectiveness of air security and air 

defense operations in the national capital region. The center’s primary 

mission is to facilitate rapid coordination and information sharing among 

participating agencies in preventing, deterring, and interdicting air threats 

to the region. To facilitate center operations, the participating agencies 

approved a concept of operations plan in May 2005 that identifies agency 

roles and missions in securing and defending national capital region 

airspace and specifies certain interagency operating protocols. 

The individual and coordinated agencies’ actions represent noteworthy 

efforts to counter the threat to U.S. aviation and the homeland. However, it 

is important to recognize that it may not be possible to prevent all 

restricted airspace violations or to deter all attacks. Airspace security 

measures could be challenged. In addition, in some cases, some pilots do 

not consult FAA notices on the location of restricted airspace as required 

by FAA, and consequently sometimes inadvertently enter restricted 

airspace without authorization. Although FAA has established stricter 

sanctions against pilots and stepped up its outreach efforts, violations 

continued at the time of our review. Consequently, the interagency 

management of the response to airspace violations could benefit from 

 16 NORAD may monitor for other activities if, for example, it receives intelligence 

information that indicates an aircraft may present a potential threat. Because NORAD data 

includes information on other airspace activity as well as violations into restricted 

airspace, NORAD data did not correspond to FAA data for the same time period. 

Coordinated Agency 

Initiatives Taken to Secure 

U.S. Aviation 

Interagency 

Management of the 

Response to Airspace 

Violations Could 

Benefit from Closing 

Gaps in Policies and 

Procedures 
Page 15 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

filling gaps in policies and procedures. We also identified gaps in TSA’s 

risk assessment of the aviation sector. 

TSA has made improvements in airspace security; however, TSA does not 

have complete knowledge of the level of risk existing in the commercial 

aviation sector. While agency officials told us that they conducted 

vulnerability assessments, a component of risk assessments, at many of 

the commercial airports, they had not assessed all of them. TSA officials 

explained that they had not yet established milestones for specific actions 

needed to complete the risk assessments. As a result, TSA lacks assurance 

that some airport managers have taken reasonable steps to enhance 

security. 

General aviation airports and aircraft are also a concern because TSA has 

generally not assessed the level of security existing at these airports. 

About 19,000 general aviation airports operate in the United States, and 

TSA’s overall vulnerability assessments at these airports have been 

limited. Most general aviation airports are not required to provide the 

same level of screening for pre-boarding passengers as at commercial 

airports. TSA has reviewed some general aviation airports for 

vulnerabilities and developed risk assessment tools to enable managers to 

conduct self-assessments. Nonetheless, the assessments are voluntary, and 

the completion of these assessments has been limited.17 Thus, TSA plans to 

outreach to airport managers to promote use of the tool. In a November 

2004 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

direct the Assistant Secretary of TSA to develop an implementation plan 

with milestones and time frames to execute a risk management approach 

for general aviation, and the agency concurred with our recommendation. 

While improvements have been made in the overall management response 

to airspace violations, the interagency response to airspace violations 

suggests that there are opportunities for further improvement, because 

these agencies have not formally developed an interagency program to 

institutionalize the defense of restricted airspace. Specifically, the 

agencies do not have: 

 17 GAO, General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but Continued 

Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term Success, GAO-05-144

(Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004). 

Gaps in TSA Risk 

Assessments 

Gaps in the Interagency 

Management of Violations 
Page 16 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

• an organization in charge, 

• interagency policies and procedures, 

• protocols for information sharing, and 

• common definitions of restricted airspace violations. 

Each agency simultaneously acts and commands and controls its own 

resources in responding to a violation of restricted airspace. At the same 

time, TSA, FAA, and DOD officials told us that, at the National Capital 

Region Coordination Center, determining who leads the interagency 

response is difficult, may change depending on the nature of the airspace 

violation, and may shift during the course of a violation, as the agencies 

monitor the intruder’s flight and consider the appropriate response. TSA is 

the executive agency for the center, but TSA officials said that they only 

resolve or “deconflict” agency issues and do not see themselves as being in 

charge of the interagency process for responding to violations of restricted 

airspace. At the same time, DOD pointed out that the response at the 

center has little or no effect on NORAD’s response, because NORAD and 

FAA control National Capital Region airspace. Without central leadership, 

the potential exists for a somewhat slower response to a violation as the 

agencies decide who is in charge while the violating aircraft continues to 

operate in restricted airspace. 

While the interagency coordination achieved at the time our report was 

noteworthy, TSA, FAA, DOD, and other agencies had not implemented 

certain key policies and procedures that are critical to multi-organizational 

success, particularly when they are acting simultaneously in a time-critical 

operation. For example, the agencies had not agreed on policies and 

procedures to specify who has access to Domestic Events Networkinitiated conferences, and under what circumstances. Additionally, 

according to FAA, during a violation FAA personnel may not have access 

to DOD’s classified teleconference systems if the interagency response 

goes beyond a certain national security classification, because FAA 

officials may lack appropriate security clearances. In other cases, 

according to DOD officials, when a secure conference is taking place, FAA 

officials cannot connect themselves into the conference, the originating 

party must call them and FAA must subsequently answer the call, in order 

to participate. If unable to participate, FAA officials told us that they may 

be unable to effectively manage other aircraft in the area in a timely 

manner, potentially resulting in aircraft collisions or exposing aircraft 

transiting the area to danger if the decision is made to shoot down the 

violator. 

Leadership Over the National 

Capital Region Coordination 

Center Is Uncertain 

Interagency Coordination Is 

Occurring, but Policies and 

Procedures Are Not Well 

Established 
Page 17 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

In April 2005, the agencies completed their interagency concept of 

operations plan for the National Capital Region Coordination Center, but 

the concept of operations plan does not address when and how 

responsibility for response is passed from agency to agency during a 

violation. Also, the agencies have not begun to develop a plan covering any 

other U.S. airspace. Such plans outline the general concept of program 

operations with specific actions and responsibilities to be assigned to 

participating agencies in a separate, more detailed plan. Without a concept 

of operations plan, the effective passing of responsibility from one agency 

to another to respond to a restricted airspace violation cannot be ensured, 

potentially leading to confusion and a slower response. 

Information sharing protocols and procedures have not been established 

by the agencies or within some parts of FAA. After the agencies complete 

the response to an airspace violation, FAA and NORAD officials record the 

violation in separate databases. These databases consist of records of 

violations that, taken together, could reveal trends indicating testing or 

training for an attack. However, neither FAA nor NORAD routinely shares 

even parts of its data with the other. Furthermore, the FAA database was 

not routinely shared with the agency’s own Strategic Operations Security 

Manager, despite the manager’s repeated attempts to obtain access. In May 

2005, FAA finally agreed to share parts of the database with its own 

Strategic Operations Security Manager. Although the FAA database was 

set up for a different purpose, the manager had previously indicated that 

he could use information to enhance security; however, he told us that the 

FAA department that maintains the database had previously refused to 

provide the information, citing the need to protect pilot information. 

We also obtained access to key elements of the database18 and found 

information that could suggest approaches to reducing violations of 

restricted airspace. For example, we could identify aircraft that repeatedly 

violated restricted airspace and the airports from which the flights 

originated. Specifically, we found 2 general aviation aircraft that had 

accounted for 6 violations each, and 29 airports, 17 of which are in 

Maryland and Virginia, that had accounted for about 30 percent of all 

airspace violations nationwide. This is the type of information that was not 

shared with the FAA Strategic Operations Security Manager, but which 

such an office might find useful in light of intelligence agency threat 

 18 FAA excluded pilot information from the key elements we obtained. 

Concept of Operations Plan for 

the National Capital Region Is 

Completed, but Remaining 

Airspace Is Not Covered 

Information Sharing Protocols 

and Procedures Have Not Been 

Established 
Page 18 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

assessments about the potential for terrorist use of general aviation 

aircraft. 

Additionally, FAA enforcement actions taken on airspace violations are 

not routinely shared with other agencies. Since agencies do not have this 

information, they have little knowledge as to the disposition and 

effectiveness of their collective efforts, and they may be hampered in their 

ability to target limited resources effectively. For example, NORAD air 

defense-sector personnel did not have aggregated or general information 

about FAA’s administrative enforcement actions against pilots who had 

violated restricted airspace in their sectors.19

Finally, the potential for confusion exists about what constitutes a 

restricted airspace violation because no common definition has been 

accepted. FAA and NORAD, the primary agencies collecting airspace 

violations data, define it differently. NORAD uses the term “incursion” and 

defines different types of incursions depending on various factors, 

including airspeed and direction. FAA uses the term “pilot deviation” and 

defines it as the actions of a pilot that result in the violation of a Federal 

Aviation Regulation or a NORAD Air Defense Identification Zone, a 

category of restricted airspace. However, the terms are not synonymous, 

and a violation can trigger a response in one agency but not another, even 

though multiple agencies share the responsibility for restricted airspace 

security and an appropriate, timely response is critical. Moreover, without 

a common definition that can be used as a basis for collecting nationwide 

data, the agencies may not be aware of the scope and magnitude of 

violations, making it potentially more difficult to target resources 

efficiently and enhance security. 

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the fragmented missions of agencies 

involved in securing and defending U.S. airspace converged into a broader 

interagency mission to protect the airspace. Since September 11, 2001, 

several involved agencies took actions that represent noteworthy efforts 

to counter the threat to U.S. aviation and the homeland. TSA has 

attempted to identify vulnerabilities of aircraft and airports and 

consequently implemented and continues to implement security 

enhancements. Although TSA is finishing the development of a risk-

 19 Such information would not have to include privacy information that could be used to 

identify individual pilots. 

Common Definitions Have Not 

Been Accepted 

Conclusions 
Page 19 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

assessment tool to assess general aviation threats, TSA has not established 

milestones with specific actions needed to complete a similar risk 

assessment for the commercial aviation sector. Until the assessment is 

completed, TSA may lack complete knowledge as to the level of risk in 

commercial aviation, and it cannot be assured that commercial aircraft 

owners and operators at some airports are effectively targeting resources 

to mitigate the risk of terrorists’ using commercial aircraft to attack 

population centers and critical infrastructure. Because the interagency 

process to manage the response to restricted airspace violations is a timecritical operation, the implications of not having well-developed policies, 

procedures, information sharing protocols, and common definitions are 

serious. In addition, if information and databases are not appropriately 

shared, opportunities to better target limited resources and proactively 

identify emerging threats could be missed. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 

Assistant Secretary of TSA to establish milestones with specific actions 

needed to complete risk assessments applicable to the commercial 

aviation sector. 

We further recommend that the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland 

Security, and Transportation work together to 

• determine the extent to which one agency should be in charge of leading 

the interagency process of responding to violations of restricted airspace 

as they occur; 

• determine the degree to which interagency policies, procedures, and other 

guidance on the Domestic Events Network are needed to evaluate its 

effectiveness and identify potential improvements; 

• develop a concept of operations plan or other relevant document to guide 

the interagency process of responding to violations in all U.S. airspace; 

• establish information sharing requirements and protocols; and 

• establish common definitions. 

In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and 

Transportation work together to determine the extent to which key 

elements of FAA’s pilot deviations database could be shared with NORAD. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the 

Administrator of FAA to take the following actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 20 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

• Obtain necessary security clearances for appropriate FAA personnel to 

ensure that they are not excluded from airspace violations conferences 

that require such clearances; and 

• Ensure that FAA shares sufficient data from its airspace violation database 

(also known as its pilot deviations database) with FAA’s office of the 

Strategic Operations Security Manager to meet the needs of that office. 

We received unclassified written comments from DHS, classified written 

comments from DOD, and unclassified oral comments from the 

Department of Transportation on the classified draft report that we will 

issue to you in September 2005. We have included the DHS comments in 

their entirety in appendix II and the unclassified portion of DOD’s 

comments in appendix III. Each agency also provided technical comments, 

and we incorporated them in our draft report and this statement where 

appropriate. 

DHS and DOD disagreed with our draft report recommendation that the 

secretaries of the three departments work together to appoint an 

organization responsible for determining the extent to which one agency 

should be in charge of countering violations of restricted airspace as they 

occur. DHS maintains that each agency should maintain full authority to 

execute its own portion of the mission that contributes to the interagency 

effort. DHS and DOD both pointed out that the Interagency Airspace 

Protection Working Group in the Homeland Security Council addresses 

interagency coordination issues, and DHS indicated that the working 

group may be a vehicle for addressing the gaps we identified. We note that, 

to date, the issues we highlighted in our testimony remain unresolved. 

Nevertheless, we revised our recommendation to suggest that the 

secretaries of the three departments work together to determine the 

extent to which one agency should be in charge of leading the interagency 

process of responding to violations of restricted airspace. Ultimately, we 

believe that if the agencies can collectively resolve the issues and gaps we 

identified in our report, which they acknowledged, then an organization in 

charge may not be needed. 

As discussed above, DHS agreed or partially agreed with the rest of our 

recommendations, while DOD disagreed with most of the 

recommendations and agreed with some. Department of Transportation 

officials agreed with the recommendations in our draft report. 

DHS generally concurred with our recommendation to establish 

milestones with specific actions needed to complete risk assessments 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 21 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

applicable to the commercial aviation sector. In its response, DHS said 

that it continues to conduct assessments as part of its risk-based 

management approach. While these are good first steps, we still believe it 

is also important to establish milestones with specific actions needed to 

ensure that the assessments are completed within a reasonable time 

period and are effectively managed. While DHS disagreed with having a 

lead agency, its comments stated that more could be done to coordinate 

efforts during violations, but that the focus should be on open 

communications to ensure flexibility in responding to the violation. DHS 

told us that the Interagency Airspace Protection Working Group meets 

regularly and addresses relevant national airspace issues, but we noted 

that there is still an absence of an air security strategy, plan, or concept of 

operations, and the issues we found that could enhance air security such 

as information sharing and common definitions still need to be addressed. 

DHS concurred with our recommendations to determine the degree to 

which interagency policies and procedures on the Domestic Events 

Network are needed; develop a concept of operations for management of 

the interagency response to violations in all U.S. airspace; and establish 

information sharing requirements and protocols. With regard to our 

recommendation to establish common definitions, DHS concurred in part, 

citing that each agency’s mission and command and control processes 

require that it develop its own definitions for airspace violations. However, 

DHS agreed to share its definitions with other agencies. We agree that 

sharing definitions is important; however, it is unclear to us whether 

simply sharing and not harmonizing definitions would sufficiently reduce 

confusion during the interagency operation responding to violations of 

restricted airspace. This is especially a concern in a time-critical function 

where clear decisions are imperative. 

DOD concurred or partially concurred with some of our recommendations 

and nonconcurred with others. DOD also noted that we omitted from our 

draft report certain DOD procedures officials supplied to us that integrate 

DOD’s response to violations of restricted airspace with those of other 

agencies. We acknowledge that DOD has internal procedures that discuss 

the way DOD interacts with other agencies, and we considered those 

procedures as part of our analysis. DOD’s procedures notwithstanding, we 

identified a number of potential gaps in the interagency process of 

responding to violations of restricted airspace that remain unaddressed. 

We recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, and 

Transportation work together to accomplish five initiatives. First, DOD 

nonconcurred with our recommendation that the three secretaries work 

together to identify an organization that would be responsible for 
Page 22 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

addressing interagency coordination issues. As did DHS, DOD pointed out 

that the Interagency Airspace Protection Working Group already 

addresses interagency coordination for homeland air defense. 

Nonetheless, problems remain. For example, as we point out in our report, 

information sharing protocols and procedures have not been established, a 

concept of operations plan for airspace outside the national capital region 

has not been developed, and common definitions have not been adopted. 

DOD also pointed out that TSA hosts agencies at the National Capital 

Region Coordination Center. While true, TSA officials told us that they 

view their role as one of deconflicting rather than of leading interagency 

efforts. As stated earlier, we believe that if the agencies can effectively 

resolve the issues and gaps we identified in the interagency process of 

responding to violations of restricted airspace without having an 

organization in charge, then an organization in charge may not be needed. 

Second, DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation that the three 

secretaries work together to determine the extent to which one agency 

should be in charge of leading the interagency process of responding to 

violations of restricted airspace as they occur. DOD stated that our report 

is misleading because it implies that having someone in charge would 

prevent some airspace violations. DOD also stated that DHS has managed 

air security by hardening commercial aircraft cockpit doors, placing 

armed Federal Air Marshals on some flights, and taking other actions. 

DOD also pointed out that FAA manages airspace for flight safety and 

DOD defends domestic airspace. DOD stated that all of these missions 

occur at all times and there is never a “lead change.” As discussed above, 

we revised and clarified our recommendation to suggest that the 

secretaries of the three departments determine the extent to which one 

agency should be in charge of leading the interagency process of 

responding to restricted airspace violations. Our recommendation is 

intended to enhance the response to violations of restricted airspace and 

is not premised on the notion that its adoption would prevent the 

violations from occurring. Moreover, while steps taken by DHS, FAA, and 

DOD to secure aviation, ensure flight safety, and defend homeland 

airspace are important contributions, they generally do not contribute to 

knowing who is in charge of the response as a violation is occurring. Also, 

we agree with DOD that there is never a “lead change,” because the 

interagency process lacks central leadership. Finally, we did not 

recommend that a specific agency or individual be in charge. We 

recommended that the departments study the question of whether it would 

be advantageous to have someone in the lead. If the departments 

determined that such a change would be beneficial, they would 

presumably also determine what, if any, changes in law would be needed. 
Page 23 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

We acknowledge, however, that if the agencies can effectively resolve the 

issues and gaps we identified in the interagency process of responding to 

restricted airspace violations, then an organization in charge may not be 

needed. 

Third, we recommended that the three secretaries determine whether 

interagency policies, procedures, or other guidance is necessary to 

evaluate Domestic Events Network performance and identify 

improvements. DOD nonconcurred and stated that the Domestic Events 

Network is not designed for decision making. We note that the network is 

a telephone conferencing system that permits communication between the 

agencies responding to violations of restricted airspace for the purpose of 

deciding on the coordinated response. We are not aware that the agencies 

have evaluated network performance to determine whether enhancements 

are possible, and our recommendation was intended to promote such an 

evaluation. We continue to believe that government initiatives benefit from 

appropriate evaluation of performance, and consequently we stand by our 

recommendation. 

Fourth, we recommended that the secretaries work together to develop a 

concept of operations plan for management of violations in all U.S. 

airspace. DOD nonconcurred on the basis that the agencies do not manage 

violations but respond to them. Nonetheless, DOD agreed that an overall 

air strategy and identification of roles and missions for each agency should 

be considered. We agree that an overall strategy for securing U.S. air space 

would be beneficial, and we believe that if such a strategy is developed, a 

concept of operations plan or other relevant document would follow. As a 

result of DOD’s comment, we have revised our recommendation to one of 

developing a concept of operations plan or other relevant document to 

guide the interagency response to violations of restricted airspace. 

Finally, DOD concurred with our recommendations that the secretaries 

work together to establish information sharing protocols and procedures 

and establish common definitions. 

We had also recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and 

Transportation work together to determine the extent to which key 

elements of the FAA’s pilot deviation database could be shared with 

NORAD, and DOD nonconcurred. In its comments, DOD stated that it does 

not require access to private citizen data contained in the FAA database. 

We agree that DOD does not require such information. However, we 

recommended that DOD meet with the Department of Transportation to 
Page 24 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

determine whether any elements would be useful, and if so, to pursue a 

means to obtain them. Consequently, we stand by our recommendation. 

Department of Transportation officials told us that they agreed with our 

recommendations and indicated that a national air security policy should 

be established to outline major goals and responsibilities for each of the 

agencies with responsibilities for the protection of U.S. airspace. 

Department officials also stated that without a national policy, the 

agencies would continue to work without unified, common goals. 

Transportation officials suggested that a policy coordinating committee be 

established for air security to address interagency issues. They also agreed 

that information sharing is critical to enhance air security and told us that 

they had begun sharing pilot deviations data with the FAA Strategic 

Operations Security Manager as we had recommended. We agree with the 

Department’s overall comments and believe that this is the type of 

dialogue that should take place between the Departments of Homeland 

Security, Defense, and Transportation. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to discuss these issues. At this time, I would be happy to 

address any questions. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 25 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

In conducting our review of the response to violations of restricted 

airspace, we visited key offices within DOD, DHS, and FAA that have 

responsibility for oversight and management of U.S. airspace. We 

conducted our review in the Washington, D.C., area, at DOD, including the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Defense 

Intelligence Agency, and Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Office; 

DHS, including the Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

United States Secret Service, and the Transportation Security 

Administration, including the National Capital Region Coordination 

Center; FAA Headquarters, Domestic Events Network, Air Traffic Control 

System Command Center, and the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar 

Approach Control facility. We also met with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National 

Counterterrorism Center, the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration, and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. We did 

not review ground-based air defense batteries that are also part of the 

homeland air defense system. 

We conducted fieldwork at U.S. Northern Command and NORAD, 

Colorado Springs, Colorado, as well as NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense 

Sector, Rome, New York; Western Air Defense Sector, Tacoma, 

Washington; and the Continental U.S. NORAD Region and Southeast Air 

Defense Sector near Panama City, Florida. In addition, we visited the Air 

Force’s Air Combat Command, Langley, Virginia, and 84th Radar 

Evaluation Squadron, Ogden, Utah; Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement’s Air and Marine Operations Center, Riverside, California; 

and FAA’s Air Traffic Control Center, Fort Worth, Texas. 

To determine the extent to which violations of restricted airspace have 

occurred since September 11, 2001, we met with NORAD and FAA officials 

to obtain relevant data from their incursion and pilot deviation databases, 

respectively, and discussed their methods for determining what 

constitutes an incursion/pilot deviation. After determining that NORAD’s 

database was not adequate to accurately identify the number of violations 

of restricted airspace, we obtained relevant portions of FAA’s pilot 

deviation database and performed the analysis necessary to develop the 

data provided in the report. We reviewed the reliability of the FAA 

database to determine the numbers of incursions. We (1) performed 

electronic testing of the data elements needed for our analysis and looked 

for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, (2) reviewed related 

documentation, and (3) interviewed officials knowledgeable about the 

data. We noted several limitations in the data, including missing values for 

key data elements and the fact that events might be both over- and underAppendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 26 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

reported due to varying definitions of pilot deviations. We were able to 

partially correct for these problems and consequently determined that the 

data were sufficiently reliable to illustrate analyses for tracking violations 

of restricted airspace. However, because we could not fully correct for 

data errors, the data presented should be considered estimates rather than 

precise numbers. 

To identify the actions taken individually or in coordinated fashion to 

secure U.S. airspace and aviation and to mitigate the threat since 

September 11, 2001, we interviewed officials at the National Capital 

Region Coordination Center; the headquarters of NORAD and its 

Continental U.S. NORAD Region and the three continental U.S. based air 

defense sectors, TSA, FAA, and Air Combat Command; and the Air and 

Marine Operations Center. We discussed and reviewed changes in 

operational responsibilities and plans of these organizations both pre- and 

post- September 11, 2001. To better understand these actions, we toured 

and observed the workings of the National Capital Region Coordination 

Center, the air defense sectors, the Domestic Events Network, and the Air 

and Marine Operations Center. While at some of these centers, we 

observed the agencies’ responses to actual violations of restricted 

airspace, the interaction of the agencies involved in responding, and the 

steps taken by the various agencies involved to address the violation. We 

discussed with agency officials the procedures for responding to 

incursions into restricted airspace and reviewed pertinent documentation 

relating to those procedures where they existed. 

In examining interagency policies and procedures that govern the 

management of airspace violations, we first reviewed existing GAO work 

that found that the success of interagency efforts depends on melding 

multi-organizational efforts through central leadership, an overarching 

strategy, effective partnerships, and common definitions. We then 

compared the extent to which agencies with responsibility for preventing 

or responding to violations of restricted airspace have established an 

organization in charge, interagency policies and procedures, protocols for 

the sharing of database records documenting violations of restricted 

airspace, and common definitions of restricted airspace. 

We conducted our review from June 2004 through April 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 27 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 28 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 29 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 30 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 32 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

Davi M. D’Agostino (202) 512-5431 

Brian J. Lepore, Lorelei St. James, James F. Reid, James R. Nelson, Carissa 

D. Bryant, Ronald La Due Lake, Rebecca Shea, Michael C. Zola, Cheryl 

Weissman, and R.K. Wild made key contributions to this statement. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 33 GAO-05-928T Homeland Security 

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, But 

Continued Partnership with Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term 

Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004. 

Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve Northern 

Command’s Mission, but Challenges Remain. GAO-04-622C. Washington, 

D.C.: September 8, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to be 

Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2003. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. forces for 

Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Related GAO Products 

(350731) 
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Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

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