January 22, 2002

Ms. Mary Lampert

Massachusetts Citizens for Safe Energy

Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee

148 Washington Street

Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332

Dear Ms. Lampert:

I am responding on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to your

letter of September 24, 2001, in which you expressed concerns regarding the security of

nuclear power plants in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. To address

those concerns, you recommend that the NRC institute 17 measures. 

The NRC is currently considering the issues that you raise, along with many other

security-related issues, as part of our ongoing reevaluation of the agencyís safeguards and

security programs. This reevaluation will be a top-to-bottom analysis of all aspects of the

agencyís safeguards and security programs. As such, the reevaluation will consider pertinent

information from other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, and military agencies. The NRC

continues to actively monitor the security situation at all sensitive U.S. nuclear facilities, and has

issued advisories to licensees to ensure that they are taking appropriate security measures.

Several of your recommendations deal with issues that are under consideration as part

of the ongoing reevaluation of the agencyís safeguards and security programs. However, I can

provide current information with respect to some of your suggestions. 

You recommend that armed guards be required at nuclear power plants. Armed guards

are currently protecting all nuclear power plants, and the NRC has taken steps both to augment

those security forces in the wake of September 11 and to increase their authority. This past

June, the NRC renewed its request for Congress to provide legislation which would allow

nuclear facility guard forces to use weapons comparable to those available to the Department

of Energyís private security forces and to use deadly force if necessary to protect civilian

nuclear facilities. We have also requested the strengthening of existing Federal criminal laws in

order to provide greater deterrence for acts of theft and sabotage aimed at these facilities. We

have strongly urged prompt Congressional action on our legislative proposals.

With regard to your suggestion to require the presence of National Guard troops at

sensitive nuclear facilities, the Commission believes that the individual Governors, working in

consultation with their security advisors and Federal law enforcement authorities, can best

determine where to deploy National Guard assets to protect critical infrastructure. I have

written to the Governors of the affected States to ensure that they are aware of the nature and

the limitations of the defensive capabilities at nuclear sites. My aim was to ensure coordination

with the sites and to assist the Governors in allocating resources responsibly. 
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You also urge NRC to support the establishment of ìno fly zonesî over commercial

nuclear power plants. In response to the events of September 11, the NRC has been in regular

communication with other federal agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

and the Department of Defense (DOD). Among the important subjects that have been

discussed is the protection of air space over sensitive sites. Shortly after the September 11

attacks, representatives of the FAA and DOD determined that a Notice To Airman (NOTAM),

issued by the FAA, was the appropriate vehicle to protect the air space above sensitive sites. 

This NOTAM strongly urges pilots ìto not circle or loiter over the following sites: 

Nuclear/Electrical power plants, power distribution stations, dams, reservoirs, refineries, or

military installations, unless otherwise authorized by air traffic control or as required to land or

depart at towered/non-towered airports.î This notice is still in effect. Should additional

restrictions be deemed appropriate as a result of changing or more specific threats, our

continuous communication with the other Federal agencies will allow prompt coordination.

In light of the difficulty in protecting the numerous specific potential targets of an aircraft

attack, the NRC agrees with the strategy of enhancing security at airports and within airplanes

in flight, and not necessarily of seeking to defend all potential targets of such terrorism. The

Commission also believes, however, that additional attention should be devoted to assessing

the potential vulnerability of sensitive sites, including commercial nuclear facilities. At this time,

the NRC staff is evaluating the effects of a deliberate aircraft impact and the resulting fire and

explosion on the structural integrity of the reactor containment building and other reactor

support facilities. The NRC will consider the results of this study during the top-to-bottom

reevaluation of security and safeguards programs being conducted.

You make several recommendations about Operational Safeguards Response

Evaluation (OSRE) security tests. The overall goal of the OSRE is to improve the efficacy of

facility security by identification and correction of weaknesses. It is Agency policy for NRC

licensees to address identified weaknesses immediately through the implementation of

corrective actions. NRC believes that the program has served an important function by

contributing to the identification of areas for improvement in the licenseesí security programs. 

The tests are difficult because they are designed to exploit potential vulnerabilities revealed in

table top drills. They do not necessarily reflect the likelihood of success by a less informed

attacking force. In keeping with the NRCís effort to improve the effectiveness of the exercise

program, the NRC intends to pilot new ways to test the adequacy of physical protection at

nuclear power plants. One way is to combine self-assessment with agency oversight. The

NRC will consider the OSRE program during the reevaluation of security and safeguards

programs.

You also suggest that the NRC require plant operators to implement the measures

associated with the highest alert status following any serious incident, such as the recent

terrorist attacks. You also recommend that power plant operators be required to shut down or

to curtail operations in the event of a terrorist situation. Immediately after the terrorist attacks

on September 11, 2001, the NRC issued an advisory to the licensees of all nuclear power

plants and other sensitive nuclear facilities. The advisory informed the licensees that they

should move to the highest level of security, which all promptly did. We have issued a variety of

subsequent advisories in order to assure an adequate security response in the event of a

terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility and have conducted audits of the security

posture at all nuclear power plants in the Nation. The NRC retains the authority to issue orders
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requiring specific actions by some or all of its licensees if necessary, but such action was not

needed. Further evaluation of security issues is of course being undertaken in the context of

our top-to-bottom review.

You further propose that the NRC require stockpiles of potassium iodide (KI) for public

use and take other steps to facilitate its distribution. A year ago the NRC revised a portion of its

emergency response regulations to require that KI be considered as a protective measure for

the general public in the event of a severe nuclear power plant accident. In doing so, the

Commission found that KI is a reasonable, prudent, and inexpensive supplement to evacuation

and sheltering for specific local conditions. In recognition of the Statesí responsibility for

implementing emergency response activities, the Commission left the final decision to the

States on whether the use of KI was warranted as a supplemental measure. However, subject

to available resources, the Commission agreed to fund the initial purchases of KI for any State

making a decision to stockpile KI. The NRC has worked with a host of Federal agencies, such

as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Food and Drug Administration

(FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to put the new program in place. We

recently informed the States of our program to fulfill requests for KI.

I appreciate the opportunity to respond to your concerns. Please do not hesitate to

contact me if you have any further questions.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Richard A. Meserve

cc: See attached list.
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cc: Derek Haskew

MASSPRIG

29 Temple Place 

Boston, MA 02111

Philip Fitzpatrick

Clean Water Action, Massachusetts

36 Bromfield Street, #204

Boston, MA 02108

Dr. David Rush

Greater Boston Physicians 

 Social Responsibility

68 Foster Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

Matthew Wilson

Toxics Action Center

29 Temple Place

Boston, MA 02111

Sandra Gavutis

C-10 Research and Education Foundation

44 Merrimac Street

Newburyport, MA 01950

Deb Katz

Citizens Awareness Network

Box 83

Shelburne Falls, MA 01370

David Agnew, Diane Turco

Cape Downwinders

173 Morton Road

S. Chatham, MA 02659-1334

Daniel Burnstein

Center for Atomic Radiation Studies

Gardner Road

Brookline, MA 02146

Dr. Richard Clapp

Boston University, School of Public Health

Boston, MA 02215