UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-81237-CIV-SMITH

PATRICK MCFADDEN, 

 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, et al., 

Defendants. 

 / 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

This cause is before the Court on Defendant Mark Sohn’s (“Sohn”) Motion for Summary 

Judgment [DE 31], Plaintiff’s Response [DE 48], and Sohn’s Reply [DE 52]. Also, before the 

Court are Defendant City of Boynton Beach’s (“the City”) Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 

34], Plaintiff’s Response [DE 46], and the City’s Reply [DE 55]. This action arises from an 

incident in which a 911 caller reported a domestic dispute that resulted in the arrest of Plaintiff for 

fleeing and eluding the police and resisting an officer without violence. Plaintiff’s three-count 

Complaint alleges (1) a state law claim for battery against the City, (2) a state law claim for battery

against Sohn, and (3) an unreasonable use of force claim against Sohn. The City has moved for 

summary judgment on Count I, and Sohn has moved for summary judgment on Counts II and III. 

For reasons that follow, both motions are granted. 

I. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS1

On September 4, 2017, Plaintiff and two female passengers were sitting in 

Plaintiff’s vehicle at a shopping center parking lot in Boynton Beach, Florida. The City’s police 

officers, Officer Daryn Whitefield and Detective Danielle Whitefield were dispatched to that 

1

 The Court omits record citations to the facts that the parties have not disputed. 

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location in response to an unidentified female’s call to 911, placed at 4:08 p.m. The caller reported 

a domestic dispute in which a black male and a white female were “beating the crap out of each 

other” and arguing heatedly, in a white SUV at a shopping center in Boynton Beach. Later in the 

call, the caller indicated that the female was the one hitting the male. (Computer Aided Dispatch 

(“CAD”) Report [DE 46-33] at 4.) When Detective Whitefield arrived on the scene to investigate, 

she observed a male and female in a white SUV arguing heatedly. Upon seeing Officer 

Whitefield’s and Detective Whitefield’s patrol cars approaching, Plaintiff left the scene by driving 

around Detective Whitefield’s patrol car and onto Federal Highway before the officers could begin 

their investigation. 

After receiving approval from shift supervisor Henry Crowell (“Crowell”), Officer 

Whitefield and Detective Whitefield started to pursue Plaintiff’s vehicle with Officer Whitefield

leading. Crowell authorized pursuit on the basis that a potential abduction was underway. Officer 

Whitefield and Detective Whitefield turned on their patrol cars’ lights and sirens to signal to 

Plaintiff to stop. Plaintiff failed to stop so Officer Whitefield and Detective Whitefield closely 

followed the white SUV throughout Boynton Beach with their lights and sirens activated. During 

the pursuit, Detective Whitefield observed a female passenger discarding hypodermic needles on 

to the roadway. (Danielle Whitefield Dep. [DE 45-2] 10:14-18.) 

Plaintiff eventually exited onto the I-95 South highway, at which point the City’s Officer

Shepaum and Sergeant Daniel Dugger joined the pursuit. At 4:23 p.m., Mark Sohn (“Sohn”), a 

City K-9 officer, joined the pursuit by taking the lead.

2

 Using the vehicle’s public address (“PA”)

system, at 4:24 p.m., Sohn commanded Plaintiff to pull over stating, “[t]his is Boynton Beach 

Police Department. You need to pull your vehicle over to the side of the road immediately. I am 

2

 It is the City of Boynton Beach Police Department’s policy for a K-9 unit to take the lead in 

pursuits. 

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a K-9 unit with a dog. Do not get yourself hurt. I will use my dog to apprehend you. Pull your 

vehicle over to the side of the road.” (Sohn Dash Cam Video [DE 32-7] at 08:14-08:27.) However, 

Plaintiff failed to comply.

At this point, Plaintiff was driving at eighty miles per hour, exceeding the posted speed 

limit on I-95 South. (Incident Report [DE 32-5] at 1 ¶ 2.) Sohn observed a female passenger in 

the rear seat and another in the front passenger seat of Plaintiff’s vehicle and used the PA system 

to ask whether they were injured or needed help. (Sohn Dash Cam Video at 08:32-08:42.) The 

female in the rear seat had her hands raised above her head. (Id.; Sohn Decl. [DE 32-8] at ¶ 11.) 

At 4:25 p.m., Sohn again commanded Plaintiff to pull over his vehicle. (Sohn Dash Cam Video 

at 08:32-08:42.) Sohn told Plaintiff that he would be placed under arrest and that the police would 

continue to pursue him. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to drive and again refused to comply. One minute 

later, Sohn stated again that he was with the City’s police department and commanded, “You are 

under arrest, pull your vehicle over to the side of the road.” (Id. at 10:24.) Plaintiff continued 

driving and refused to comply. Between 4:27 and 4:33 p.m., Sohn instructed Plaintiff six times to 

pull over and stop his vehicle. Each time, Plaintiff refused to comply and continued driving. (Id. 

at 11:29-17:58.) 

At 4:38 p.m., Plaintiff exited I-95 at Commercial Boulevard in Broward County. At this 

point, several Broward Sheriff’s officers joined the pursuit. Sohn made another appeal to Plaintiff 

to pull over at 4:40 p.m., after advising him that the pursuit had been joined by the Broward 

Sheriff’s Office. (Id. at 25:50-25:56.) Plaintiff continued to drive, refusing to comply. 

Subsequently, Plaintiff was seen slamming on his brakes to avoid rear-ending a vehicle causing

his tire to appear to smoke. (Sohn Dash Cam Video at 27:31-27:35.) At 4:43 p.m., Sohn observed 

the female passenger in the rear of Plaintiff’s vehicle signaling for help and making attempts to 

leave the vehicle. (Id. at 27:49.) As Plaintiff continued to drive in non-compliance with Sohn’s 

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instructions, the female in the rear seat raised her hands above her head for the rest of the pursuit.

Throughout his pursuit, Sohn kept dispatch apprised of his observations and the fact that 

Plaintiff was not complying with Sohn’s repeated instructions for Plaintiff to pull over his vehicle 

and to stop. After Sohn advised dispatch of his observation of the female passenger in the rear of 

Plaintiff’s vehicle attempting to leave the vehicle while it was in motion, dispatch informed Sohn 

that Plaintiff was on the phone with a Broward Sheriff’s 911 operator. (Id. at 29:32-31:41.) 

Dispatch told Sohn that Plaintiff was refusing to stop because he had just been released from prison 

and did not want to get in trouble and go back to prison. Thereafter, Sohn using his vehicle’s PA

system, advised Plaintiff that the officers knew he was on the line with 911 and commanded him 

to pull over. (Id. at 31:50.)

Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he had told the Broward Sheriff’s 911 operator that 

he was in fear for his life. (Pl.’s Dep. [DE 35-6] at 81:9-23.) Plaintiff also stated that before he 

brought his vehicle to a stop, he advised the operator that he was surrendering but that he did not 

want to be harmed. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the 911 operator indicated that she would relay to 

the officers on the scene that Plaintiff was surrendering. (Id.) 

After more than thirty minutes of refusing to comply with multiple signals to stop and at 

least thirteen commands to pull over from Sohn over his vehicle’s PA, Plaintiff’s vehicle came to 

rest at the intersection of 1800 Sample Road in Broward County. The intersection was busy, and 

the traffic light was red. Plaintiff’s vehicle was in the middle lane with vehicles in the lane to his 

left and to his right. Based on their observation of the actions of the female passengersin Plaintiff’s 

vehicle, the initial 911 call by the unidentified female, Plaintiff’s failure to stop the vehicle in 

response to Officer Sohn’s multiple commands, Plaintiff telling the Broward Sheriff’s 911 operator 

that he did not want to go back to prison, and the number of civilian vehicles using the intersection, 

the officers approached Plaintiff’s vehicle as a felony stop.

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Sohn pulled up behind Plaintiff and exited his marked patrol car with his gun drawn and

K-9, Bako, harnessed. Sohn had no way of knowing if anyone in Plaintiff’s vehicle was armed. 

Several other patrol vehicles including City officers, law enforcement officers from the Broward 

Sheriff’s Office, and officers from the Florida Highway Patrol arrived on the scene in the moments 

following. (Sohn Dep. [DE 35-5] at 29:15-20.) As they arrived, some of the patrol cars’ lights 

were flashing and sirens were also on. Sohn and Detective Whitefield gave multiple verbal

commands to Plaintiff, instructing him to exit the vehicle. Again, Plaintiff failed to comply. Sohn 

and the officers from Boynton Beach, the Broward Sheriff’s Office, and the Florida Highway 

Patrol, who had arrived on the scene, considered Plaintiff a flight risk and a danger to the officers 

and pedestrians in the area. (Danielle Whitefield Dep. [DE 35-2] at 36:21-37:11; Dugger Dep., 

[DE 35-10] at 30:2-7.)

As Sohn approached Plaintiff’s vehicle from behind, he saw the female passenger in the 

rear seat with her two hands still raised and extended outside her passenger window. Initially,

Sohn could not see Plaintiff’s hands. (Sohn Dep. at 27:7.) As he moved closer, he saw Plaintiff’s

hands raised near his face and that Plaintiff was holding an unidentified object in in his right hand. 

(Id. at 27:12.) Because Plaintiff’s vehicle was still operational, and the female passengers were 

still in the vehicle, Sohn (whose body camera was facing Plaintiff’s left side) repeated several 

commands for Plaintiff to exit Plaintiff’s vehicle. Still, Plaintiff refused to exit the vehicle. At his 

deposition, Plaintiff testified that he did not recall whether he heard the commands to exit the 

vehicle after he stopped at the stoplight. (Pl.’s Dep. [DE 35-6] at 93:2-4.)

The vehicle which was in the left lane beside Plaintiff pulled forward to drive through the 

intersection leaving the lane beside Plaintiff free and clear. The vehicle which was now in the 

middle of the intersection slowed to allow a patrol car to come through the intersection to come to 

a stop facing Plaintiff’s vehicle. As this one patrol vehicle was in front of Plaintiff’s vehicle and 

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Sohn’s was behind Plaintiff’s vehicle, Plaintiff had space in both the left lane and the right lane on 

either side of him if he chose to flee again. Sohn then released K-9 Bako to apprehend Plaintiff. 

K-9 Bako jumped through the driver’s window and bit Plaintiff’s left hand. When an unidentified 

Broward Sheriff’s officer came up to Plaintiff’s vehicle, Plaintiff told the unidentified Broward 

Sheriff’s officer that he could not get the door open. Sohn instructed K-9 Bako to release Plaintiff. 

K-9 Bako bit Plaintiff’s hand for approximately twenty-five seconds. As the unidentified Broward 

Sheriff’s officer attempted to pull Plaintiff out of his vehicle, Plaintiff unlocked his door and fell 

sideways. Plaintiff was then handcuffed and placed under arrest for fleeing and eluding, a felony 

in violation of section 316.1935, Florida Statutes, and resisting arrest without violence, in violation 

of section 843.02, Florida Statutes. After Plaintiff was secured, other officers extracted the female 

passengers from the car and placed them under arrest. Sohn then rendered first aid to Plaintiff by 

applying gauze pads and wrapping Plaintiff’s wrist. Broward Fire Rescue was summoned and 

subsequently transported Plaintiff to Broward Health Hospital, where he was treated for his 

injuries. 

Plaintiff suffered a complex wound measuring approximately five centimeters on his left 

forearm where K-9 Bako bit him. (Wigoda Dep. [DE 45:15] at 11:9-10.) Plaintiff’s treating 

physician at Broward Health North, Dr. Paul Wigoda, noted in Plaintiff’s chart that there was no 

clear sign of tendon or nerve injury. (Id. at 18-19.) Plaintiff’s wound was repaired, and Plaintiff 

was discharged with an antibiotic. (Id. at 19-20.) Dr. Kenneth Garrod, a board certified 

Orthopedic and Hand Surgeon, performed a medical examination of Plaintiff’s injuries sustained 

during his arrest. (See DE 27.) Dr. Garrod found that Plaintiff’s injuries had fully healed and that 

Plaintiff has no permanent abnormalities from the incident, aside from a scar. (Garrod Dep. [DE 

35:12] at 11:3-5.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition on January 20, 2021, that he experienced pain 

in the vicinity of the scar from his wound. (Pl.’s Dep. [DE 45-4] at 52:11-53:15; 55:2-56:19.) 

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When asked, Plaintiff did not describe his pain with particularity. Plaintiff claimed no other 

damages arising from the dog bite. (Id.)

Officer Brian Goldfuss (“Goldfuss”), the City’s corporate representative, testified 

regarding the City’s policy on felony vehicular stops and high-risk vehicular stops. He admitted 

that traffic stops were one of the biggest dangers that officers can face on the job. (Id. at 39:15-

40:13.) He confirmed that, during a high-risk felony stop, the dangers posed were greater, not just 

to police officers, but also to occupants of the vehicle being stopped and members of the public in 

the vicinity of the stop. (Id.) He recognized that in exigent circumstances, the biggest priority was 

to remove from the stopped vehicle the person whom the officer is concerned is posing the risk. 

(Id. 41:20-42:1.) He acknowledged that one option under the City’s police department training 

policy was for an officer in a high-risk felony stop to utilize a canine to enter the passenger 

compartment of the vehicle to remove a person who is not complying with verbal commands. (Id.

at 38:12-22.) 

Sergeant Jon Kautz (“Kautz”), the City’s corporate representative on the City’s use of force 

policy, testified that it was not appropriate to release K-9s to apprehend a suspect who surrendered. 

(Kautz Dep. [DE 45-17] at 12: 11-15.) With the caveat that it would depend on the totality of the 

circumstances, Kautz admitted that a person who had not been complying with police commands 

following a vehicular pursuit was not considered a suspect who was surrendering. (Id. at 16:9-

17:2.)

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings . . . show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. 

Emps. Health Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 982, 991 (11th Cir. 2001). Once the moving party demonstrates 

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the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must “come forward with 

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The Court must 

view the record and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and decide whether “‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission 

to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Allen v. 

Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52)).

In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rely solely on 

the pleadings, but must show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 

that specific facts exist demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); see 

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). A mere “scintilla” of evidence supporting 

the opposing party’s position will not suffice; instead, there must be a sufficient showing that the 

jury could reasonably find for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Walker v. Darby,

911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff stipulates to the fact that his arrest was lawful and that, at all relevant times, Sohn 

was acting in the scope of his discretionary authority. The state law battery claims Plaintiff asserts 

against the City and Sohn in Counts I and II of the Complaint and the claim for violation of 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against Sohn in Count III, all turn on Plaintiff’s allegation of an 

unreasonable use of force when Sohn used K-9 Bako to apprehend Plaintiff during Plaintiff’s

arrest. The City and Sohn each argue entitlement to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law 

battery claims because Sohn’s use of K-9 Bako to apprehend Plaintiff was reasonable. Sohn also 

maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims based on qualified 

immunity. Because each of Plaintiff’s claims require a finding of unreasonable or excessive use 

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of force, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff can establish Counts I-III of the Complaint. 

Next, the Court will consider Sohn’s defense of qualified immunity. 

A. Use of Force

Under Florida law, an officer’s use of force in making a lawful arrest is generally accorded 

the presumption of good faith. City. of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); 

Jennings v. City of Winter Park, 250 So. 2d 900 (Fla 4th DCA 1971). To overcome the 

presumption of good faith, a plaintiff must establish that the officer used force that is clearly 

excessive. Sanders, 672 So. 2d at 47 (finding that excessive force transforms ordinarily protected 

use of force into a battery). In determining whether an officer’s use of force was excessive, courts 

apply the same analysis as that used when analyzing a claim under the Fourth Amendment. 

Cordoves v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 92 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Fla. 2015). “The Fourth 

Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the plain right to be 

free from the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

In evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, the court considers 

“whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation” Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (emphasis added). A court views things from the vantage point of the 

reasonable officer at the scene, while recognizing that officers must make in-the-moment judgment 

calls under ever-evolving circumstances and not with the hindsight of 20/20 vision. Id. at 386-87;

Garczynsi v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158 (11th Cir. 2009). “Not every push or shove, even if it may 

later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

The Eleventh Circuit has found the use of canines to effect lawful arrests to be reasonable

when apprehending a fleeing suspect. See Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F. 3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 

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2009) (reasonable use of canine to apprehend suspect who fled and eluded police by vehicle,

although he communicated to officers that he was in the act of surrendering); Anderson on behalf 

of MA v. Vazquez, 813 F. App’x 358, 361 (11th Cir. 2020) (use of canine to stop a minor was not 

constitutionally unreasonable where minor and others committed auto burglary, failed to comply 

with commands, potentially carried a weapon, fled through a populated area, and the officer 

commanded the dog to let go within 30 to 40 seconds and nothing adequately contradicted the 

officer’s testimony that he was unable to see that the suspect was a minor). On the other hand, 

using a canine on a suspect who has already surrendered has been found to be an unlawful use of 

force. See Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000) (use of canine

who bit Plaintiff for almost two minutes was unreasonable use of force when Plaintiff had 

immediately complied and had already surrendered by laying on the ground).

“Objective reasonableness” is the test for excessive force claims. Graham, 490 U.S. at 

386. The Court must consider: “(1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship 

between the need and amount of force used, and (3) the extent of the injury inflicted.” Hadley v 

Guttierez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008). The second factor regarding the relationship 

between the need and amount of force used is measured by “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, 

(2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) 

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. 

at 386. 

In determining whether Sohn’s conduct in this case was reasonable, the Court must analyze 

the totality of the circumstances as viewed by the officers in the heat of the moment. In this case, 

the totality of the circumstances requires consideration of not just when the canine was deployed 

but when the officers first attempted to stop Sohn. First, prior to arrest, Plaintiff was being pursued 

on suspicion of abduction of two females following the report of a domestic dispute. Second, just 

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as the officers arrives on the scene to investigate, Plaintiff fled and eluded the police officers for 

more than thirty minutes.

3

 Third, Plaintiff’s recklessness in evading capture posed great danger 

to both the officers pursuing him and other civilians; he drove at excessive speed, almost rearended another motorist, and kept driving even as the female passenger in the rear seat of his vehicle 

attempted to exit the vehicle. Fourth, Plaintiff resisted arrest by refusing to exit his vehicle and 

held an unidentified object in his hands, which reasonably led the officers to believe that he might 

be holding a weapon.4 Fifth, Plaintiff was a flight risk, as shown by the high-speed chase, his 

ongoing refusal to pull over, and his vehicle, although stopped at a busy intersection, remained 

operational with a path of escape if Plaintiff chose to flee. Finally, K-9 Bako was deployed for 

approximately twenty-five seconds as a means of getting Plaintiff to exit the vehicle and the injury 

from the bite resulted in no permanent disability to Plaintiff’s hand. 

Based on the foregoing, no reasonable officer in possession of the facts and circumstances 

in this matter would find that the force used to arrest Plaintiff was excessive. K-9 Bako 

apprehended Plaintiff for only twenty-five seconds under circumstances where Plaintiff failed to 

surrender after repeated instructions to do so by the officers. In Vazquez, the court found that the 

use of the canine to apprehend the minor suspect was an exercise of reasonable force where the 

minor had committed burglary, failed to comply with the officer’s commands, had fled into a 

populated area, potentially carried a weapon, and the officer commanded the dog to let go within 

3

 Plaintiff was eventually charged with violation of section 316.1935, Florida Statutes, and 

resisting arrest without violence, in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes. 

4

 While Plaintiff argues that there is a question of fact as to whether he was surrendering, at the 

time K-9 Bako was deployed 1) Plaintiff had refused to exit the vehicle after being instructed to 

do so eleven times and after eluding the police officers for more than thirty minutes, and 2) unlike 

his female passengers, his hands were still in the car, and though raised, his hands were not empty. 

Based on these circumstances, it was reasonable for Sohn to believe that Plaintiff was not 

surrendering. Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1293 (finding that it was objectively reasonable for the 

officer to question the sincerity of defendant’s attempt to surrender and use the canine to apprehend 

the defendant.) 

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thirty to forty seconds. 813 F. App’x at 361. Here, the amount of force used was no greater than 

the amount needed to get Plaintiff to exit Plaintiff’s vehicle. Like in Vazquez, Plaintiff was at a 

busy intersection, failed to comply with the officers’ commands, and was suspected of having a 

weapon. When balanced against the officers’ suspicion that the female passengers in the car were 

being abducted, Plaintiff’s fleeing and eluding the officers for more than thirty minutes across two

counties, the harm posed to the occupants of Plaintiff’s vehicle and the motoring public, and the 

non-permanent injury suffered by Plaintiff, the use of K-9 Bako to apprehend Plaintiff was a use 

of reasonable force. The use of K-9 Bako to apprehend Plaintiff does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law battery claims and §§ 1983 and 1988 claims fail 

and Sohn and the City are entitled to a grant of summary judgment on their claims. 

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields public officials from suit against them in their individual 

capacities, except in scenarios where their conduct contravenes “clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights . . . which a reasonable person would have known.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 

F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir.2003) (internal citations omitted). To claim qualified immunity, “a public 

official must prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the 

allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 272 (11th Cir. 2013). “Once 

the official has done so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy the following two-pronged 

inquiry: (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has shown make out a violation of a constitutional 

right; and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s 

alleged misconduct.” Id. 

Plaintiff stipulates to the fact that his arrest was lawful and that Sohn’s complained of 

conduct occurred while Sohn was acting in the scope of his discretionary authority. Thus, the 

burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that his constitutional right was violated and that it was 

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clearly established at the time of Sohn’s alleged misconduct. Plaintiff “must show that [officer]’s 

conduct was so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force that an official 

had to know he was violating the Constitution even without caselaw on point. This test entails 

determining whether application of the excessive force standard would inevitably lead every 

reasonable officer in a defendant’s position to conclude such force was unlawful.” Priester, 208 

F.3d at 922. 

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and for the reasons explained in

Section A above, the Court concludes that a reasonable officer would believe that the amount of

force utilized by Sohn was reasonable. Sohn deployed K-9 Bako for no more than 25 seconds to 

aid in removing Plaintiff from the vehicle to effect Plaintiff’s arrest. At the time, Plaintiff had not 

complied with multiple orders to exit the vehicle. Thus, the force was reasonable under the 

circumstances, does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and Sohn is entitled to qualified immunity. 

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that:

1. Defendant, Marc Sohn’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 31] is GRANTED. 

2. Defendant, City of Boynton Beach’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 34] is 

GRANTED. 

3. The Court will enter a separate judgment. 

4. All pending motions not otherwise ruled upon are DENIED as moot. 

5. This case is CLOSED.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 28th day of March 2022.

cc: Counsel of Record

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