United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Christopher Reed, Plaintiff,

v.

Bradley A. Friedman, P.A. and Star 

Lakes Association, Inc., Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 20-22973-Civ-Scola

Order Dismissing Complaint

Plaintiff Christopher Reed complains Defendants Star Lakes Association, 

Inc., and Bradley A. Friedman, P.A., a condominium association and its lawyer, 

violated federal and state statutes in their efforts to collect various debts for 

unpaid association maintenance and special-assessment fees. (Compl. ECF No. 

1.) The Defendants say Reed’s complaint should be dismissed because the 

property and debt at issue belong not to Reed himself, but to a business entity, 

Reed’s Enterprise. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8.) Accordingly, say the 

Defendants, Reed lacks standing to bring this suit and the debt is not subject 

to the consumer protections afforded by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

or the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act. (Id.) Reed counters that 

Reed’s Enterprise is simply his “second ‘legal name’” and therefore, the 

complained of wrongful conduct was, in effect, directed towards him, 

individually, as a “natural person.” (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 9, 2–3.) The Court 

agrees with the Defendants that Reed lacks standing and that the debt at issue 

here is not afforded consumer protection under the FDCPA and, therefore, 

grants their motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) in part, as to Reed’s federal claims. 

And, because jurisdiction is based on federal-question jurisdiction, the Court

dismisses the remaining state-law claims, without prejudice.

1. Background1

Reed, through his interest in Reed’s Enterprise, owns a condominium 

unit in Miami, located at 18975 NE 2nd Avenue. (Compl. ¶ 13; Claim of Lien, 

1 The Court generally accepts the Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true for the purposes of 

evaluating the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 

116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, the Court has also considered extrinsic 

documents, supplied by the Defendants, because (1) the Defendants have made a factual 

attack on the complaint regarding standing, Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 

Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2008), and (2) the supplied documents are central to 

Reed’s claim and none of the parties challenges their authenticity, see Speaker v. U.S. Dept. of

Health & Human Services Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (“In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic 

document if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.”).

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ECF No. 8-1, 15; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 3.) Star Lakes hired Bradley to collect debts

allegedly owed for unpaid maintenance and special-assessment fees for that 

unit. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Reed appears to have received various letters Bradley 

addressed to Reed’s Enterprise, attempting to collect on the debts. (Id. ¶ 15; 

Collection Letters, ECF No. 8-1.) In this series of letters, Bradley informed 

Reed’s Enterprise of Star Lake’s intent to lien and foreclose on the unit based 

on the amounts owed. (July 16, 2019, Intent to Lien Letter, ECF No. 8-1, 1–3; 

Apr. 17, 2020, Intent to Lien Letter, ECF No. 8-1, 4–13; June 29, 2020, Intent 

to Foreclose Letter, 8-1, 14–21.) The letters from Bradley and the recorded 

Claim of Lien all identify Reed’s Enterprise as the owner of the unit. (ECF No. 

8-1.) Reed, for his part, says he “does not owe, and never has owed, the specific 

amounts claimed by” the Defendants in the letters or in the claim of lien. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16.) 

Reed emailed Bradley on July 13, 2020, telling him that he had an 

attorney representing him regarding Star Lake’s claims. (Id. ¶ 17.) Just over 

twenty minutes later, Bradley emailed Reed “debt collection communication 

directly referencing other matters” Reed had addressed in his earlier email. (Id. 

¶ 18.)

2. Legal Standard

A. Standing

Because the question of Article III standing implicates subject matter 

jurisdiction, it must be addressed as a threshold matter prior to the merits of 

any underlying claims. Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., 

P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1250 (11th Cir. 2015). Indeed, standing generally must be 

present at the inception of the lawsuit. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 560 n.5 (1992). Article III of the U.S. Constitution grants federal 

courts judicial power to decide only actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. 

Const. Art. III § 2. The doctrine of standing is a “core component” of this 

fundamental limitation that “determin[es] the power of the court to entertain 

the suit.” Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 

1259, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Warth v. 

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of 

standing under Article III consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have 

suffered an actual or imminent injury, or a concrete “invasion of a legally 

protected interest”; (2) that injury must have been caused by the defendant’s 

complained-of actions; and (3) the plaintiff’s injury or threat of injury must 

likely be redressable by a favorable court decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–

61; see also Hollywood Mobile Estates, 641 F.3d at 1265 (same).

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“[A] dismissal for lack of standing has the same effect as a dismissal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).” Stalley, 524 

F.3d at 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 921 

F.2d 1190, 1203 n. 42 (11th Cir. 1991)). Motions to dismiss a complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction can consist of either a facial or factual attack 

on the complaint. Id. (citation omitted). A facial attack requires the court to 

“merely look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject 

matter jurisdiction,” whereas a factual attack, like here, “challenges the 

existence of subject matter jurisdiction using material extrinsic from the 

pleadings, such as affidavits or testimony.” Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1233–34. “A 

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits 

and is entered without prejudice.” Id. at 1232. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all the complaint’s allegations as 

true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. 

McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). A pleading must only contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

assessing the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations, the Court is bound 

to apply the pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, 

the complaint “must . . . contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna 

Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). “Dismissal is therefore permitted when on the basis of a dispositive issue 

of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of 

action.” Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotations omitted) (citing Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall 

Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A court must dismiss a plaintiff’s claims if 

he fails to nudge his “claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive 

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dismissal. See Id. at 555. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure 

from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not 

unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than 

conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

3. Analysis

In attempting to ward off dismissal because of a lack of standing, Reed’s 

primary argument is that he and Reed’s Enterprise, a Florida-registered 

fictitious name, are one and the same. He urges the Court to consider Reed’s 

Enterprise simply his “second ‘legal name’” and to view any wrongs perpetrated 

against Reed’s Enterprise by the Defendants to have been perpetrated against 

him directly. (Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 3.) The Court is not persuaded.

To begin with, Reed, in his response, has provided a link to the fictiousname detail page on sunbiz.org for Reed’s Enterprise. See, e.g., http://dos.

sunbiz.org/ scripts/ficidet.exe?action=DETREG&docnum=G20000020195

&rdocnum=G20000016495). Similarly, the Defendants have provided a copy of

Reed’s application for registration of a fictitious name. (Defs.’ Reply, Ex. 1, ECF 

No. 10-1.) These records both show that Reed’s Enterprise is owned by two 

people: Reed and Rosenna Denise Reed. And, thus, as a matter of pure logic 

and commonsense, it is impossible for Reed and Reed’s Enterprise to be 

coextensive. Further, the Fictitious Name Act is not, as Reed contends, simply 

a convenient method of adopting a second legal name in lieu of going through 

the much more onerous process, defined by Florida Statutes, of legally 

changing one’s name. See Fla. Stat. § 68.07 (requiring, among other things, the 

submission of fingerprints for a state and national criminal-history records 

check; verification of residence and domicile in the county where the name 

change is sought; submission of the petitioner’s father’s name, mother’s 

maiden name, spouse’s name, children’s names and their residences, current 

occupation and places of employment for the preceding five years, residences 

since birth, graduate-school history, bankruptcy history, arrest history; and 

participation in a formal hearing). Instead, as provided for in the Fictitious 

Name Act, the purpose of registering a fictitious name is to transact business

under that name. Fla. Stat. § 865.09(2)(c) (defining “fictitious name” as “any 

name under which a person transacts business in this state, other than the 

person’s legal name”); Fla. Stat. § 865.09(2)(a) (defining “Business” as “any 

enterprise or venture in which a person sells, buys, exchanges, barters, deals, 

or represents the dealing in any thing or article of value, or renders services for

compensation.”) Accordingly, contrary to Reed’s opposition, the Court will not 

consider Reed’s Enterprise to be the same as Reed himself nor will it consider 

Reed’s Enterprise to be a natural person simply because the fictitious named is 

owned by a natural person rather than a business entity.

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In light of this finding, the Court readily concludes Reed lacks standing 

to pursue the claims set forth in his complaint—he is neither the owner of the 

condominium unit nor the target of the Defendants’ letters nor claim of lien. 

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised (May 24, 

2016) (holding that, for a party to have standing to bring a lawsuit, he must 

have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision”). Even if the Defendants’ letters to Reed’s Enterprise or claim 

of lien violated the FDCPA, Reed has not shown that any resulting injury to 

Reed’s Enterprise from the statutory violations inured to him.

And, even if Reed were somehow able to pursue these claims on Reed’s 

Enterprise’s behalf—as he seems to suggest in offering to amend his plaintiff 

status to “Christopher Reed, aka Reed’s Enterprise”—the complaint 

nevertheless fails to state a claim. This is because the debt apparently owed by 

Reed’s Enterprise is not a “consumer debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA. 

The existence of a “debt” is threshold requirement for each of the FDCPA claims 

Reed raises. Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th 

Cir. 1998). And the FDCPA defines a “debt” as “any obligation or alleged 

obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the 

money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the 

transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether 

or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). In 

turn, the FDCPA specifically defines “consumer” as “any natural person

obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3)

(emphasis added here). Reed’s Enterprise, as a registered fictitious name 

owned by Reed and another person, is not a “natural person.” Therefore, the 

alleged debt, by definition, is not a consumer debt within the meaning of the 

FDCPA. Accordingly, since Reed’s Enterprise would not be able to state a claim 

for relief under the FDCPA, Reed would, in turn, have no basis for standing to 

sue on its behalf.

4. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants the Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss (ECF No. 8) in part, dismissing count one, brought under the FDCPA. 

Because the Court is dismissing Reed’s FDCPA claims on the basis of standing, 

the Court’s dismissal is without prejudice. Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1234 (noting a 

complaint dismissed for a lack of standing is not a judgment on the merits and 

therefore should be without prejudice). Regarding the remainder of Reed’s 

complaint, under the FCCPA (counts two and three), the Court declines to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses those state-law claims, also

without prejudice. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir.

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2004) (“encourage[ing] district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims 

when . . . the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial”).

The Clerk is directed to close this case. Any pending motion are denied 

as moot.

Done and ordered, at Miami, Florida, on December 11, 2020.

________________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

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