09831-00001/12371807.3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

DECURTIS LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CARNIVAL CORPORATION,

Defendant.

CARNIVAL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

DECURTIS CORPORATION and 

DECURTIS LLC,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-22945-RNS

Oral Argument Requested

DECURTIS’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS 

MOTION TO AMEND PROTECTIVE ORDER

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09831-00001/12371807.3

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Opposition seeks to minimize the risk that Carnival could use DeCurtis’s highly 

confidential – attorney’s eyes only (“AEO”) technical information to amend Carnival’s patents in 

an inter partes review (“IPR”) proceeding. Carnival claims there are IPR procedures and 

USPTO rules that “mitigate” this risk, but it does not cite any that offer explicit protection. If 

there were such procedures or rules, courts would not need to enter prosecution bars like the one 

requested here. Yet they do, and in fact it is the favored approach in modern patent practice. As 

Senior Federal Circuit Judge William C. Bryson explained in British Telecommunications PLC v. 

IAC/InterActiveCorp, 330 F.R.D. 387, 396 (D. Del. 2019), a bar that allows a patentee’s 

litigation counsel to participate in IPR proceedings so long as they do not advise on the drafting 

of any claim amendments strikes a reasonable balance between the patentee and the alleged 

infringer’s competing interests. Carnival fails to explain why the clear guidance articulated by 

Judge Bryson in British Telecommunications should not be followed here.

Carnival also argues there is some uncertainty about what type of AEO material might be 

produced in this litigation that Carnival could use to amend its claims to DeCurtis’s detriment. 

Carnival’s argument is disingenuous; it knows exactly what type of material DeCurtis is 

concerned will be misused. The parties are direct competitors, worked together for years, and 

are asserting claims and counter-claims for unfair competition, patent infringement, and trade 

secret misappropriation, all centered on guest engagement technology involving wearable 

devices. Carnival is seeking in discovery the source code and technical documents that 

undergird all of the major features of DeCurtis’ guest engagement systems. Any competent 

patent attorney with access to such material could use it to revise Carnival’s patents to read 

directly onto DeCurtis’s technology while avoiding prior art. 

While Carnival claimed during the months of negotiations between the parties that it was 

opposed to the bar that DeCurtis was proposing because it would not be “bilateral” and it would 

be burdensome for Carnival to have to use separate counsel to amend a claim in an IPR 

proceeding, those arguments are barely an afterthought in the Opposition. Carnival submits no 

declaration or other evidence establishing that it is particularly important that it use its litigation 

counsel in an IPR proceeding. Carnival weakly complains that it would be put “in a difficult 

situation” if it had to “coordinat[e] litigation strategy and consistent arguments between multiple 

sets of counsel” (at 10), but that is a “situation” that AmLaw 100 firms must deal with on a 

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regular basis when representing multinational corporations asserting claims for patent 

infringement and trade secret misappropriation against a competitor. The marginal 

inconvenience Carnival would be put through pales in comparison to the prejudice DeCurtis 

would suffer if Carnival were able to misuse DeCurtis’s AEO information to amend its patents to 

read directly onto DeCurtis’s technology. Not only would that pave the way for Carnival to seek 

significant damages from this litigation, but it could potentially destroy DeCurtis’s entire 

business which is predicated on developing and implementing guest engagement systems like 

those at issue here for cruise lines and related industries. A prosecution bar preventing 

Carnival’s litigation counsel with access to AEO information from advising on the drafting of 

any claim amendments is reasonable and should be entered. 

ARGUMENT

I. IPR PROCEDURES AND USPTO PATENT RULES WILL NOT PREVENT 

CARNIVAL FROM AMENDING CLAIMS USING DECURTIS’S 

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Carnival argues (at 6-7) that DeCurtis’s concern about the misuse of its AEO material is 

“misplaced” because there are IPR procedures and USPTO rules that “mitigate” this risk.1

 

Carnival is unable to cite to any procedures or rules that would actually have the effect of 

preventing Carnival’s counsel from using what it learns about DeCurtis’s technology to amend 

DeCurtis’s claims in an IPR proceeding—because no such rules exist.

The single USPTO rule that Carnival cites (six times) states expressly that Carnival can 

amend its claims in an IPR proceeding, and can even do so more than once upon a proper 

showing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a), (c). The various procedural and technical obstacles to 

amending a claim that Carnival cites—e.g., the patentee must confer with the board, must 

“clearly show” the basis for the changes, cannot enlarge the scope of the claim, and must satisfy 

the general requirements of patent eligibility—do not limit Carnival’s ability to use AEO 

information to draft claims. Carnival misleadingly says (at 7) that it would be unable to 

 1

 Carnival has sandbagged DeCurtis by raising this argument for the first time in the 

Opposition. As can be seen from the correspondence that DeCurtis submitted previously, 

Carnival’s purported concern during the meet and confer process was that the prosecution bar 

was not “bilateral” enough. (See, e.g., Schmidt Decl. Ex. 2 at 2-3.) In its opposition, Carnival 

moves the goal posts, focusing almost entirely on arguments that DeCurtis is not likely to be 

prejudiced in a reexamination proceeding and making only a token attempt to show Carnival will 

be unfairly prejudiced by the proposed prosecution bar. See infra Section III. Carnival’s 

gamesmanship serves as an addition ground for the rejection of its arguments. 

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“unilaterally” amend and that “DeCurtis would have the opportunity to respond” to any 

amendment, but that is beside the point. In the context of a proposed amendment in the IPR, 

DeCurtis may have the ability to respond to whether the amendment is proper under the USPTO 

rules (e.g., whether it avoids the prior art, does not enlarge the claim, and satisfies the other 

requirements of patent eligibility), but those rules do not allow DeCurtis to question whether 

Carnival has misused DeCurtis’s confidential information in drafting a narrowing amendment. 

Carnival does cite any instance in which the USPTO entertained a request to police the 

patentee’s suspected use of a respondent’s AEO information produced in separate litigation, or 

otherwise refused to allow an amendment because the patentee was shown to have exploited 

such AEO information. Nor is DeCurtis aware of any such precedent.2 

While Carnival makes much of the fact that it is only possible to “narrow” a claim in an 

IPR proceeding, that does not mean Carnival could not misuse DeCurtis’s AEO material. As 

Judge Bryson explained in British Telecommunications PLC, “even though claims may only be 

narrowed in post-grant proceedings, the risk associated with the improper use of confidential 

information is that the patent prosecutors can arrange to strategically narrow claims to avoid 

prior art while still capturing the defendants’ products.” 330 F.R.D. at 396 (internal quotations 

omitted). Under normal circumstances, amending a claim involves a degree of uncertainty 

because the patentee does not know whether, in narrowing a claim, it may undermine its 

infringement position by making the patent too narrow to apply to its competitors’ products. But 

if the patentee’s counsel knows the specific details of the competitor’s technology, because it has 

had access to its source code and technical documents, as Carnival’s litigation counsel will in 

this case, then narrowing the claim in a way that maps onto the competitor’s systems, while 

avoiding the prior art, is relatively easy to do. 

 2

 Carnival also argues that it is unnecessary to apply a prosecution bar to amending claims in an

IPR proceeding because the protective order already precludes parties from using designated 

material for any purpose other than this litigation. As the Federal Circuit explained in Deutsche 

Bank, such provisions are inadequate, and the whole purpose of adding a prosecution bar to a 

protective order is to address their inadequacy. See In re Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas, 605 

F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Typically, protective orders include provisions specifying 

that designated confidential information may be used only for purposes of the current 

litigation. . . . Courts have recognized, however, that there may be circumstances in which even 

the most rigorous efforts of the recipient of such information to preserve confidentiality in 

compliance with the provisions of such a protective order may not prevent inadvertent 

compromise.”). 

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Carnival does not deny, or even really address, the fact that a narrowing amendment in an 

IPR proceeding may be used to map a claim into a competitor’s system in an IPR proceeding, 

and thus its argument that IPR procedures and USPTO rules protect DeCurtis is unpersuasive 

and should be rejected. 

II. CASE LAW SUPPORTS IMPOSING A PROSECUTION BAR RESTRICTING 

LITIGATION COUNSEL FROM AMENDING CLAIMS IN IPR PROCEEDINGS 

As discussed in DeCurtis’s motion (at 10-12), while courts applying Deutsche Bank were 

at one time skeptical that about the need to bar litigation counsel from amending or altering 

claims in an IPR proceeding, that is the modern practice as discussed in British 

Telecommunications PLC. Carnival’s efforts to distinguish Judge Bryon’s “excellent opinion” in 

British Telecommunications PLC, and the cases collected therein, fall short. See CustomPlay, 

LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 WL 2251110, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2019).

Carnival claims that “recent USPTO precedent and motion to amend practice have, in 

effect, addressed” the concerns raised in British Telecommunications PLC and other cases “by 

making clear that proposed claim amendments are intertwined with substantive responses 

regarding prior art invalidity.”3

 (Opp. at 8.) Carnival cites no actual authority suggesting this is 

true, and the argument does not follow logically. Whether or not a patentee’s amendment must 

address prior art invalidity, the patentee can still “strategically narrow claims to avoid prior art 

while still capturing the defendants’ products” which represents “a potentially significant risk of 

prejudice from the plaintiff's attorneys’ exposure to the defendants’ confidential materials.” 

British Telecommunications PLC, 330 F.R.D. at 396. That a patentee may not be able to 

“proactively” (Opp. at 8) offer the narrowing amendment, but rather must make the amendment 

to address a ground of invalidity, is not a meaningful, or even relevant, limitation on the 

patentee’s opportunity to misuse AEO information. The whole purpose of an IPR proceeding is 

to challenge the validity of the patent. Under Carnival’s logic, the challenger would have to 

waive its arguments regarding invalidity—i.e., not initiate an IPR proceeding at all—in order to 

protect itself against the possibility that Carnival will respond to the invalidity challenge by 

 3

 Carnival also purports to distinguish British Telecommunications PLC on the grounds that 

Judge Bryson had already rejected the same argument in a prior but related case. (Opp. at 8 n.4.) 

That is irrelevant unless the court was relying on the higher standards applicable to a motion for 

reconsideration, which it was not. 

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amending its claims to read directly onto the challenger’s technology. It would be far more 

reasonable and equitable to simply require Carnival to use different counsel to amend its claims. 

Carnival’s reliance in its Opposition on the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board’s 

(“PTAB”) decision in Lectrosonics Inc. v. Zaxcom Inc., Case Nos. IPR2018-01129, -1130, Paper 

No. 15 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2019) is misplaced. Lectrosonic does not purport to address the 

misuse of AEO information in amending claims in an IPR proceeding and does not say that there 

is “precedent” or “practice” that diminishes the need for a prosecution bar in such situations. In 

fact, Lectrosonics confirms that the limitations on amendments are not as restrictive as Carnival 

would have the Court believe. See id. at 5, 7 (confirming that the PTAB rules “do[] not require

. . . every word added to or removed from a claim in a motion to amend be solely for the purpose 

of overcoming an instituted ground” of unpatentability, and acknowledging that patentees are

allowed to make a “proposed substitute claim adding a novel and nonobvious feature or 

combination to avoid the prior art”) (emphasis added).

Carnival also refers the Court back to an unpublished slip opinion it issued eight years 

ago, long before British Telecommunications PLC was decided, claiming that this Court once 

“observed” that “a prosecution bar in the reexamination context [is] largely unnecessary.” (Opp. 

at 7 (quoting Omega Patents, LLC v. Skypatrol, LLC, No. 11-cv-24201, Slip Op. at 13 (S.D. Fla. 

June 15, 2012) (Torres, J.)). That was actually a quote from Ameranth, Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 

2012 WL 528248, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2012), a case that was expressly distinguished in 

British Telecommunications PLC, as being part of the older line of cases that “predate[]” the 

more modern decisions precluding counsel with access to AEO from amending claims in a 

reexamination proceeding. See 330 F.R.D. at 398. Moreover, neither the Ameranth court nor 

this Court in Omega Patents, LLC considered the possibility that a patentee could strategically 

narrow a claim in an IPR proceeding to read directly onto a competitor’s technology while 

avoiding prior art.4

 The Court is not bound by its decisions in Omega Patents, LLC and should 

not follow it here. 

Carnival attempts, and fails, to distinguish other cases on various grounds. Carnival says 

that the court in Front Row Techs., LLC v. NBA Media Ventures, LLC did “not restrict the 

 4

 Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC is similarly distinguishable. 2015 WL 

7257915, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2015) (refusing to bar participating in post-granting proceeding 

but failing to consider how a narrowing amendment in an IPR proceeding could in fact be 

“competitively used to draft claims that read on Defendants' products”).

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patentee’s litigation counsel’s ability [sic] to participate in reexamination proceedings.” (Opp. at 

7; see also id. at 11.) Actually, the parties in Front Row mutually agreed to limit the prosecution 

bar so that it did not apply to post-granting proceedings at all, making it unnecessary for the 

Front Row court to resolve the issue. 125 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1295 & n.15 (D.N.M. 2015). Thus, 

Front Row does not support Carnival’s position. Carnival says Grobler v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 

3359274 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2013) is distinguishable because the proposed protective order was 

based on the Northern District’s Model Protective Order, but the language in this proposed order 

is based on the Northern District’s Model Protective Order. That is the order Carnival chose 

originally to start negotiations with DeCurtis when DeCurtis first filed this lawsuit in the Middle 

District of Florida.5 (Mot. at 3; Schmidt Decl., Ex. 3). 

Finally, Carnival notes that in Voice Domain Technologies, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 2014 WL 

5106413, at *9 (D. Mass. Oct. 8, 2014) and Telebuyer, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2014 WL 

5804334, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2014), the courts left open the “possibility” of allowing 

participation in reexamination proceeding upon further application to the court. Of course, 

Carnival will always have the option to seek leave to amend this protective order in the future if 

it can show a good cause, but that is irrelevant to the instant motion. Once DeCurtis has satisfied 

its burden to show there a risk of misuse of its AEO, the burden is on Carnival to show why any 

particular attorney seeking to participate in amending or revising claims should be exempt. In re 

Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas, 605 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In its Opposition, 

Carnival has not met this standard and it cannot vaguely reserve the right to request an 

exemption as a substitute for meeting the standards articulated by the Federal Circuit.

The case law does not support Carnival’s position. A prosecution bar should be entered 

barring litigation counsel from advising on claim amendments in an IPR proceeding. 

III. DECURTIS HAS SHOWN WHY THERE IS A PARTICULARIZED RISK OF 

HARM IN THIS LITIGATION

Carnival argues (at 9-10) that DeCurtis has not sufficiently stated how and what DeCurtis 

AEO material may be misused by Carnival. This argument is difficult to square with the fact 

 5

 Carnival cites another old, unpublished slip opinion to distinguish Grobler. See Bonutti 

Skeletal Innovations LLC v. Linvatec Corporation, No. 12-cv-01379, Slip Op. at 9 (M.D. Fla. 

Nov. 15, 2013). Carnival fails to mention that the primary ground for denying the proposed bar 

at issue in Bonutti was that there was a request to bar litigation counsel from participating at all 

in the reexamination process once an amendment was proposed. This prosecution bar does not 

impose any similarly sweeping limitation. 

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that Carnival drafted the provisions of the protection order that determine the subject matter 

triggering protection under the protection bar—“Highly Confidential or Highly Confidential –

Source Code material comprising technical information”—and with the fact that Carnival never 

asserted during the months of negotiations between the parties over the protective order that it 

was unclear what particular kinds of information DeCurtis was concerned might be misused. 

(Mot. at 3-5.) If Carnival had such concerns, it could have opposed the entire prosecution bar on 

the grounds that the risk of any misuse by Carnival was speculative, just as the nonmoving party 

did in the case it relies on. See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. Suns Legacy Partners, LLC, 

2012 WL 6049746, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2012) (denying request for prosecution bar entirely

because party failed to show there was any risk of misuse from the disclosure of sensitive 

information). 

In any event, DeCurtis has made an adequate showing of potential harm. As DeCurtis 

explained in its motion, the background of the parties’ dispute is that David DeCurtis helped to 

build Carnival’s guest engagement system and contributed to the invention of the patents 

Carnival is asserting in this litigation before going on to work with other companies and 

competing directly with Carnival in the field of guest engagement systems utilizing wearable 

devices. Carnival is now suing DeCurtis for patent infringement and trade secret 

misappropriation, and is seeking in discovery detailed AEO information about DeCurtis’s new 

systems. (See Mot. at 9; Schmidt Decl. Exs. 10 at 9-10 and 11 (discovery requests for source 

code and technical documents concerning design, architecture, and operation of DeCurtis’s guest 

engagement systems); Opp. at 9 n.5 (acknowledging Carnival is trying to obtain through 

discovery DeCurtis’s “trade secret information”). The gist of Carnival’s claims is that 

DeCurtis’s systems are not really new and that he is simply using Carnival’s patented technology 

and/or trade secrets unlawfully. (Carnival’s First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 3, 60-61, 85-96). 

Once Carnival’s counsel has access to the AEO source code and technical documents that 

are used for DeCurtis’s systems, Carnival’s allegations that DeCurtis is not doing anything new 

or distinct from what Carnival already patented will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Carnival can 

rewrite its patent claims to match the disclosed details about DeCurtis’s systems. This level of 

specificity about the type of data that may be misused is almost identical to what Carnival 

concedes (at 9) was adequate in other cases. See, e.g., CustomPlay, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

2019 WL 2251110, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2019) (source code and trade secrets); Carlson Pet 

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Products, Inc. v. North States Industries, Inc., 2019 WL 2991220, at *9 (D. Minn. July 9, 2019) 

(“information regarding technical specifications, design, and development”); Kelora Systems, 

LLC v. Target Corporation, 2011 WL 6000759, at *7 (“highly confidential, technical 

information such as source code”). 

Other cases relied on by Carnival are inapposite. In Paice, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., a 

court denied a request to bar particular individuals from participating in an IPR proceeding but 

only after finding that the bar already prohibited the individuals from amending claims in an 

IPR proceeding. 2014 WL 4955384, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2014) (“I am satisfied that the 

prohibition in the current prosecution bar that Plaintiffs’ representatives ‘not participate in or be 

responsible for . . . drafting or revising patent claims’ constitutes sufficient protection to mitigate 

the risk that Plaintiff's litigation counsel could influence the Ford–IPR in the way Defendants 

claim.”). Paice thus supports the bar that DeCurtis asks for here, which allows Orrick to 

participate in IPR proceedings so long as it is not advising on the amendment of any claims. In 

PPS Data, LLC v. Athenahealth, Inc., another older unpublished slip opinion that Carnival cites, 

the parties agreed to extend the bar to post-grant hearings. No. 11-cv-00746, Slip Op. at 16 

(M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012). The only dispute was over a proposed exception that would allow 

litigation counsel “to discuss publicly available material” with the party’s separate IPR counsel. 

Carnival has not requested any exception like this, which makes PPS Data irrelevant.

DeCurtis has adequately shown that there is a risk of the prejudice from the type of 

material that it will produce in discovery to Carnival, and a prosecution bar should be entered to 

protect against that risk. 

IV. CARNIVAL FAILS TO SHOW THAT IT WOULD BE BURDENED BY HAVING 

TO USE OTHER COUNSEL TO AMEND CLAIMS IN AN IPR PROCEEDING

As Carnival’s own cases acknowledge, a court “must balance the risk of inadvertent 

disclosure or competitive use of confidential information against the potential harm to the 

opposing party in denying its choice of counsel.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable 

Commc'ns, LLC, No. 2015 WL 7257915, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2015). In considering the 

potential harm to the party opposing the bar, courts consider “the extent and duration of 

counsel’s past history in representing the client before the PTO, the degree of the client’s 

reliance and dependence on that past history, and the potential difficulty the client might face if 

forced to rely on other counsel for the pending litigation or engage other counsel to represent it 

before the PTO.” Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1381. Carnival fails to make any concrete 

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showing regarding any of these factors, in contrast to the authority Carnival cites. See

Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Amerlux, LLC, 167 F. Supp. 3d 270, 274 (D. Mass. 2016) (party 

submitted declarations showing “counsel have represented [party] in many district court and 

patent proceedings” and “are now engaged in an IPR concerning two of the patents at issue in 

this suit” which led court to find party should not be barred from using its preferred counsel). 

Carnival fails to convincingly explain why it cannot use any of the other 35 patent 

attorneys at Orrick to amend a claim, or why it could not use the patent prosecutors, McDermott 

Will & Emery, who obtained most of the patents at issue. (Mot. at 11.) Nor does Carnival show 

why it is particularly important that its litigation counsel in this Action participate in the 

amendment process. The declaration submitted by lead counsel T. Vann Pearce is a barebones 

vehicle for attaching irrelevant USPTO materials. See Pearce Decl. Exs. A-D. It contains no 

explanation of the length of time he, or anyone at Orrick, has represented Carnival, much less an 

explanation of why it would be so harmful for a multinational corporation like Carnival to use 

another attorney to perform the limited role of preparing any amendments to be submitted in an 

IPR proceeding. Carnival does not even cite to Mr. Pearce’s declaration in making its prejudice 

argument. (Opp. at 10-11.) 

With nothing concrete to suggest that it will be prejudiced if the bar is entered as 

DeCurtis proposed, Carnival resorts to vaguely saying that it will be put “in the difficult position 

of coordinating litigation strategy and consistent arguments between multiple sets of counsel.” 

(Opp. at 10.) Carnival offers no concrete support to suggest this would actually be 

burdensome—most complex litigation involves similar complications (including this litigation 

where Carnival is represented by two firms and numerous lawyers)—but even if this represents 

some burden, it is not significant compared to the magnitude of the harm DeCurtis could suffer if 

AEO information produced in this litigation is used to modify Carnival patents to read directly 

onto DeCurtis’s systems. As DeCurtis explained in its Motion (10-11), barring Carnival from 

using litigation counsel to amend its claims in an IPR proceeding affords DeCurtis the “modest 

protection” it needs while not imposing a particularly “heavy” burden on Carnival. British 

Telecommunications PLC, 330 F.R.D. at 389. Carnival fails to rebut this point and show there is 

anything particular onerous about imposing such a bar under the facts presented here.

Carnival also suggests (at 11) that the prosecution bar is too vague because it applies to 

“indirectly” assisting in amending a claim. The Court rejected a nearly identical argument in the 

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unpublished slip opinion that Carnival cites, Omega Patents, No. 11-cv-24201, Slip Op. at 11, 

and it should do so again. The meaning of the word is obvious, as DeCurtis explained in its 

Motion (at 12 n.5). 

Lastly, although the main reason that Carnival refused to agree to the proposed bar was 

that it was not “bilateral” (Schmidt Decl., Ex. 9 at 5), Carnival now all but concedes that it 

actually is, shifting its argument to claiming that the “application” of the bar would be unfair

because Carnival has patents and DeCurtis does not. (Opp. at 11.) Carnival cites no authority 

suggesting that a prosecution bar must apply equally to parties with patents and those without, 

and indeed the notion is directly at odds with the purpose of prosecution bars, which is to prevent 

patentees from misusing AEO information to amend or assert patent claims. 

Conclusion 

In light of the foregoing, DeCurtis’s request for a prosecution bar should be granted and 

the protective order amended as proposed. 

Dated: October 16, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

DECURTIS LLC

By: /s/ Jason P. Stearns

One of its attorneys

David C. Gustman (Pro Hac Vice)

Jeffery M. Cross (Pro Hac Vice)

Jill C. Anderson (Pro Hac Vice)

Jennifer L. Fitzgerald (Pro Hac Vice)

Freeborn & Peters LLP

311 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 3000

Chicago, IL 60606

Tel. (312) 360-6000

Email: dgustman@freeborn.com

 jcross@freeborn.com

 janderson@freeborn.com

 jfitzgerald@freeborn.com

Scott L. Watson (Pro Hac Vice)

Justin C. Griffin (Pro Hac Vice) 

Patrick T. Schmidt (Pro Hac Vice)

Zachary A. Schenkkan (Pro Hac Vice)

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

865 S. Figueroa St., 10th Floor

Jason Stearns

Florida Bar No. 059550

Freeborn & Peters LLP

201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 3550

Tampa, FL 33602

Tel. (813) 488-2920 

Email: jstearns@freeborn.com

 ckitchell@freeborn.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff DeCurtis LLC and 

DeCurtis Corporation

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Los Angeles, CA 90017

Tel. (213) 443-3000

Email: swatson@quinnemanuel.com

 justingriffin@quinnemanuel.com

 patrickschmidt@quinnemanuel.com

 zackschenkkan@quinnemanuel.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on October 16, 2020, the foregoing was filed and served by 

using the CM/ECF system which will send notice of electronic filing to all counsel of record. 

/s/ Jason P. Stearns

Jason P. Stearns

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