UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

 Case No.: 1:20-cv-23287(DPG)(AMO) 

LUIS MANUEL 

RODRIGUEZ, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, 

et al., 

 Defendants. 

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS 

 WPP PLC, YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC AND BCW LLC’S 

 MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

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Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Berenthal & Associates, P.C. and Rodriguez, 

Tramont & Nuñez P.A., hereby respond in opposition to Defendants WPP plc (“WPP”), Young & 

Rubicam LLC (“Y&R) and BCW LLC (“BCW”) (collectively, “WPP Defendants”) Motion to 

Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (the “Motion”) (DE 229) and state as follows: 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

Plaintiffs are the owners of a 90% interest in Ramón Rodriguez e Hijos Sociedad en 

Comandita (“RRHSC”). RRHSC was the owner of that property consisting of the former Partagas 

cigarette factory building and a modern mixed-use building adjacent and connected to said factory 

at the corner of Calle 23 y 16 (23rd Street and 16th) in Havana, Cuba (“RRHSC Property”). The 

Castro government confiscated ownership of RRHSC, which was then owned by Plaintiffs’ 

ancestor Ramon Rodriguez Gutierrez (“RRG”), and as a consequence also confiscated the RRHSC 

Property, all without compensation to RRG. See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶¶1-4, 

[ECF No. 208]. Plaintiffs are the owners of a “Claim” created by the Helms-Burton Act (“HBA”) 

to compensate victims of trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban government without 

compensation. 

In 2007 or 2008, Imperial entered into a joint venture with Cuba and its tobacco monopoly 

company, “Tabacuba.” Habanos is a joint venture company controlled by Cuba with financial 

interests owned 50% by Imperial and 50% by Cuba. See SAC ¶7. At all relevant times1, Imperial’s 

joint venture arrangements with Cuba and Tabacuba (the “Cuban Joint Ventures”) collectively 

“manufacture[d], market[ed], distribute[d] and s[old] cigars manufactured in Cuba.” See SAC ¶6. 

1

 Imperial reportedly sold its Cuban Joint Venture interests in October 2020. 

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Imperial’s joint venture partner, Tabacuba, is the Cuban tobacco monopoly company: “the only 

economic organization in the country that integrally directs tobacco activity in all phases of its 

production chain, from agriculture to marketing.”2 Both Tabacuba and “La Vega” (the Cuban state 

tobacco leaf monopoly company) have offices in the confiscated RRHSC Property. See SAC ¶2. 

Imperial benefits directly from Tabacuba (and La Vega’s) extensive use (trafficking) of the 

RRHSC Property for management of the day-to-day business of all Cuban tobacco. See id., ¶¶ 8, 

9, 10, 80, 81, 82 and 91. Imperial and Habanos have “trafficked” in the Property without 

compensation to Plaintiffs in violation of the HBA.3

Beginning as early as 2010 Imperial and Habanos also retained WPP through its subsidiary 

advertising agencies. Beginning in 2017, Imperial and Habanos’ commercial activity using or 

otherwise benefiting from the confiscated Property, i.e., “trafficking” see 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(ii), 

was furthered and facilitated, with Y&R and BCW’s assistance, by the use of sponsored official 

social media “portals” operated by Twitter, Instagram and YouTube. SAC ¶22. The portals were 

used to market products produced, shipped, or stored at or from the confiscated RRHSC Property. 

See SAC ¶ 12. Imperial and Habanos’ use of U.S.-based internet services run by U.S. companies 

(Twitter, Instagram and YouTube) is in violation of U.S. law.4

2

 See http://www.tabacuba.com.cu/en_us/info/nuestra-fortaleza-es-la-herencia

3

 The unauthorized use of the Property by Imperial and Habanos extended to Tabacuba’s 

management of the day-to-day business of all Cuban tobacco products from offices it maintained 

in the RRHSC Property at all times from 2008 until at least October 29, 2020. See SAC ¶ 11 This 

included use of a portion of the Property by Tabacuba, for its executive offices, and the use of the 

loading dock and space for warehousing and shipping Habanos’ products. See id., ¶ 79. 

4

 The Habanos-sponsored official social media “portals” established by Twitter, Instagram, 

and YouTube are not exempted by the HBA nor by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 

C.F.R. Part 515. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.578(a) (authorizing the exportation to Cuba of “services 

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The WPP Defendants at all times acted as agents of Imperial or Habanos for the purpose 

of advertising, marketing and promoting Cuban Cigar products and the Habanos Brand name. The 

WPP Defendants together with other WPP subsidiaries, operate as a single company, (the “WPP 

Group” “Young & Rubican Group” or similar). The entities under the WPP Group, including WPP, 

Y&R, BCW, are part of a complex network that share resources and operate as a single entity. See

SAC, ¶ 21. The WPP Group, acting through Y&R and BCW, continuously trafficked in the 

RRHSC Property by marketing and publicizing the Cuban tobacco products made, stored, shipped 

or managed from the RRHSC Property since at least 2010 through October 2020. See SAC, ¶¶ 82 

– 83. 

For the reasons set forth at length herein, the WPP Defendants are subject to this Court’s 

jurisdiction, and should be held accountable for their trafficking as provided for under the HBA. 

LEGAL ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW

WPP Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(2) and (6) (lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim). See Motion (D.E. 229). 

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court is bound to the four corners of the complaint 

(including any sources incorporated by reference. Tung v. Dycom Indus., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 3d 

incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as . . . social networking [and] 

sharing of photos” but only if “such services are widely available to the public at no cost to the 

user”) (emphasis added); id., §515.578(b)(1) (expressly excluding from authorized services the: 

“direct or indirect exportation . . . of services with knowledge or reason to know that such services 

are intended for . . . organizations administered or controlled by the Government of Cuba.”) 

(emphasis added); see also 31 C.F.R § 515.206 (excluding from “exempt transactions” the 

“provision of marketing and business consulting services” and “provision of services to market, 

produce or co-produce, create or assist in the creation of information or informational materials.”). 

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1244, 1254 (S.D. Fla. 2020) citing St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 

2002). Within the Eleventh Circuit, the Court is also permitted to consider an extrinsic document 

if it is central to plaintiff’s claim and its authenticity is not challenged.5 Tung, 454 F. Supp. 3d at 

1254 (citing Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010)). 

The Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) and should afford the Plaintiff every favorable inference Chames v. Calhoun 

Cnty. Comm'n, 21-11651, 2022 WL 1217652, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 26, 2022). To survive a motion 

to dismiss, the complaint need only contain enough factual matter, which accepted as true, states 

a claim to relief that is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

I. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE WPP DEFENDANTS 

A. The WPP Defendants Trafficking Through U.S. Internet Services in Violation of U.S. 

Law 

Plaintiffs allege that the WPP Defendants, acting through various subsidiaries of WPP, 

Y&R and BCW, operate as a group for the purpose of providing marketing, advertising, and 

other services. See SAC, ¶ 2. The WPP Defendants also “purchase Internet, email, and other 

networking and telecom services in the United States (“US Services”).” See SAC, ¶ 54. The 

WPP Defendants also used of their own U.S. Services as well as social media “portals” operated 

by Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube, and networking and other services provided through 

Microsoft, and other services sold by US companies to further the trafficking of the RRHSC 

Property by Habanos, the Cuban Joint Ventures and other Cuban Government entities. See id. 

5

 While Defendants filed affidavits in relation to prior motions to dismiss, they did not do 

so here, and are limited to the facial validity of the SAC. 

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Of particular significance to the instant Motion, beginning in 2017, Imperial and 

Habanos’ commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from the confiscated Property, i.e., 

“trafficking” see 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(ii), was furthered and facilitated by Imperial and 

Habanos’ use of official social media “portals” operated by Twitter, Instagram and YouTube. 

The portals were used to market products produced, shipped, or stored at or from the confiscated 

RRHSC Property. See SAC, ¶ 41. The trafficking by WPP, Y&R and BCW at issue here is in 

the form of marketing, merchandizing, branding, or advertising services for the benefit of the 

Cuban government and the entities it controls, including Habanos and the Cuban Joint Ventures.

See SAC, ¶ 55. 

The trafficking was conducted, at least in part, through US websites, internet domains 

and other US Services, in violation of both the Liberty Act. This conduct is not exempted by the 

CACRs, which apply to all “person[s] subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including 

corporations owned by U.S. companies, such as Y&R, BCW. . . and the subsidiaries those US 

companies own and control. The CACRs apply equally to WPP and its direct and indirect 

subsidiaries. The use of U.S.-based internet services run by U.S. companies (Twitter, Instagram 

and YouTube) for the purpose of marketing, promoting and otherwise facilitating and furthering 

Imperial and Habanos’ “trafficking” in the confiscated RRHSC Property is in violation of U.S. 

law.6 The WPP Defendants’ use of U.S. companies (or their subsidiaries, even if foreign6 The Habanos-sponsored official social media “portals” established by Twitter, Instagram, 

and YouTube are not exempted by the HBA nor by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 

C.F.R. Part 515. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.578(a) (authorizing the exportation to Cuba of “services 

incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as . . . social networking [and] 

sharing of photos” but only if “such services are widely available to the public at no cost to the 

user”) (emphasis added); id., §515.578(b)(1) (expressly excluding from authorized services the: 

“direct or indirect exportation . . . of services with knowledge or reason to know that such services 

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incorporated) as marketing and distribution agents to further Imperial and Habanos’s trafficking 

is also in violation of U.S. law. 7 

As demonstrated below the WPP Defendants deliberate use, in violation of U.S. law, of 

U.S. websites operated by U.S. companies to traffic in the confiscated Property, subjects them to 

personal jurisdiction in Florida. Through these intentional acts, the WPP Defendants have 

damaged Plaintiffs, five of whom reside in this district. The WPP Defendants suggest that, 

despite having illegally used U.S. internet services in violation of U.S. law in furtherance of 

intentionally tortious conduct to damage to forum residents, this Court does not have personal 

jurisdiction over them. WPP Defendants are wrong. This Court has personal jurisdiction over 

them. 

II. Defendants’ Trafficking is Intentional Tortious Conduct Aimed at this Forum 

A. The Nature of Plaintiffs’ HBA Claims 

As set out more fully in Plaintiffs’ Opp. to Joint Motion, the HBA Claim is a legislatively 

created claim designed to compensate victims of Cuba’s uncompensated confiscation of property 

when the confiscated property is used by Cuba’s joint venture partners and other who assist it in 

trafficking. The remedy available under the HBA is analogous to the remedy available to the true 

owner, or heirs or successors of the true owner, of stolen property who has a claim for conversion. 

are intended for . . . organizations administered or controlled by the Government of Cuba.”) 

(emphasis added); see also 31 C.F.R § 515.206 (excluding from “exempt transactions” the 

“provision of marketing and business consulting services” and “provision of services to market, 

produce or co-produce, create or assist in the creation of information or informational materials.”). 

7 

 See 31 C.F.R § 515.206 (excluding from “exempt transactions” the: “provision of 

marketing and business consulting services” and “provision of services to market, produce or coproduce, create or assist in the creation of information or informational materials.”). 

 

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And, significantly: “a thief does not acquire good title to stolen property and, therefore, ‘one who 

purchases or acquires property from a thief,’ even in good faith, does not have a right to the 

possession of the goods against ‘the rightful owner.’” At common law, a taking of property 

without compensation is the essence of theft. See Danopulos v. Am. Trading II, LLC, 69 N.E.3d 

157 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). The true owner has then a claim for conversion: “Conversion is a 

common-law tort relating to the wrongful exercise of dominion over property in exclusion of the 

owner's right, or the withholding of property from the owner's possession under a claim 

inconsistent with the owner's rights.” Id. at 159. And, significantly: “Under the common law, a 

thief does not acquire good title to stolen property and, therefore, ‘one who purchases or acquires 

property from a thief,’ even in good faith, does not have a right to the possession of the goods 

against ‘the rightful owner.’” Id. The common law also prevented the government from taking 

land without compensation. See Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 124–25, 81 A.2d 533 (1951). 

The harm that Congress sought to remedy, is not some theoretical or “procedural” harm. It 

is true that there is no claim for “conversion” of real property at common law. By its nature, of 

course, real property is not mobile. Cuba, however, is a foreign country whose totalitarian regime 

and uncompensated taking of property caused many U.S. Citizens to flee Cuba. The harm that the 

HBA seeks to remedy is a concrete harm analogous to harm recognized at common law. It has a 

direct analogue to common law remedies available to the owner of property taken either by theft 

or by government taking: “[O]ne who purchases or acquires property from a thief,’ even in good 

faith, does not have a right to the possession of the goods against ‘the rightful owner.’” The HBA 

also adds the requirement that the trafficking in the confiscated property is done “knowingly,” i.e., 

“with knowledge or having reason to know.” 

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B. The WPP Defendants are Responsible for Trafficking by Habanos 

As discussed more fully below, the relevant “jurisdictional contacts” at issue on this 

Motion is the WPP Defendants’ conduct in facilitating Imperial and Habanos’ use of U.S.-based 

internet services run by U.S. companies (Twitter, Instagram and YouTube) in violation of U.S. 

law. That conduct constitutes “trafficking” as defined in the HBA. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(ii). 

The WPP Defendants intentional conduct assisted and furthered Habanos’ trafficking. The 

WPP Defendants also profited from the trafficking. Under the HBA, therefore, the trafficking by 

Habanos is attributed to the WPP Defendants. In particular, under the HBA: “a person ‘traffics’ in 

confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally— 

 . . . 

(ii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause 

(i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) 

or (ii)) through another person 

See 22 USC § 6023 (13)(A)(ii) (sic). 

The conduct at issue constitutes “trafficking” as defined in § 6023 (13)(A)(i) or (ii). Therefore, 

under § 6023 (13)(A)(ii) [second], the WPP Defendants are responsible for the trafficking whether 

they “cause[ed], direct[ed], participated in Habanos, or even if all they did was to “profit[] from 

trafficking” by or through Habanos. 

 This leads to the second reason why the WPP Defendants are responsible for the 

“trafficking” and “jurisdictional contacts” at issue. Imperial did not file affidavits or declarations 

and did not otherwise challenge the allegations of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, it is making 

a purely “facial” challenge. As Imperial acknowledges, “Because Imperial is making a purely 

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facial challenge, the Court’s review is limited to the allegations in the Amended Complaint.” See 

Motion at 5 n.4. Plaintiffs allege that Imperial directed or profited the conduct at issue. See Amd. 

Comp., ¶¶ 30, 37, 55, 57, 62 and 66. Including specifically the use of U.S. internet services 

operated by U.S. companies. See id., ¶¶ 11-12, 37, 54 and 55. In addition, Plaintiffs served Imperial 

directly with notice that its conduct constituted “trafficking” under the HBA before filing this 

lawsuit; Imperial nevertheless continued its trafficking. See id., ¶¶ 67 – 68. Finally, Imperial again 

and directly profited from the trafficking (and, therefore, again “trafficked” under (13)(A)(ii) 

[second]) when it sold its interests in the Cuban Joint Ventures. See SAC, ¶¶ 98 – 99. 

WPP Defendants argue that (a) WPP cannot be subject to specific jurisdiction for acts 

attributed to Y&R and/or BCW, and (b) Y&R and/or BCW’s actions do not subject them to 

specific jurisdiction in this forum. As discussed more fully below, the relevant “jurisdictional 

contacts” at issue on this Motion is the use of U.S.-based internet services run by U.S. companies 

(Twitter, Instagram and YouTube) in violation of U.S. law. That conduct constitutes “trafficking” 

as defined in the HBA. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(ii). 

WPP’s argument fails for two reasons. First, under the HBA, all trafficking by Y&R and 

BCW are attributed to WPP. In particular, under the HBA: “a person ‘traffics’ in confiscated 

property if that person knowingly and intentionally – 

(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in 

clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as 

described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person 

See 22 U.S.C. §6023(13)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). Therefore, under § 6023(13)(A)(iii), WPP is 

responsible for the trafficking even if all that WPP did was to “profit from trafficking” by or 

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through the other WPP Defendants. 

Second, the WPP Defendants chose not to file affidavits or declarations for the instant 

motion to dismiss and did not otherwise challenge the allegations of the SAC, thus making their 

motion a purely “facial” challenge and the Court’s review is limited to the allegations in the 

Amended Complaint.” Insofar as the WPP Defendants impliy that certain allegations are 

conclusory, Plaintiffs have submitted additional facts to clarify such allegations. However as 

demonstrated herein, the SAC properly alleges both a claim of trafficking under the HBA and a 

claim of jurisdiction over the WPP Defendants. 

III. WPP, Y&R, AND BCW ENGAGED IN TRAFFICKING AS DEFINED BY THE HBA 

Pursuant to the HBA a person “traffics” in confiscated property if, inter alia, that person 

“knowingly and intentionally”: 

(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes 

of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control 

of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property, 

(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated 

property, property; or 

(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in 

clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as 

described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, 

 . . . . 22 U.S.C. § 6023 (emphasis added). 

It is undisputed that two entire floors of the RRHSC Property are used by Tabacuba (Núñez 

Decl.[ECF No. 89-6] ) and that Tabacuba is the Cuban monopoly that "integrally directs tobacco 

activity in all phases of its production chain, from agriculture to marketing."8. There is no dispute 

that at the very least, Tabacuba is trafficking in the RRHSC Property. As a consequence, every 

8

 http://www.tabacuba.com.cu/en_us/info/nuestra-fortaleza-es-la-herencia/ last visited 

June 9, 2021. 

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leaf of tobacco grown, cultivated, sold and or marketed in or from Cuba, including those leaves 

used by Habanos, is overseen and controlled by Tabacuba, which uses the RRHSC Property to 

conduct its operations. 

The SAC properly pleads that the WPP Defendants assisted Imperial, Habanos and 

Tabacuba in marketing, advertising or promoting the confiscated RRHSC Property. (SAC ¶12, 14, 

96). Contrary to the WPP Defendants’ the SAC properly alleges that the WPP Defendants 

illegally trafficked under §6023(13)(A)(ii) and (iii) by engaging in commercial activity that 

benefits from confiscated property and by causing, directing, participating in, or profiting from 

trafficking.9 

The crux of WPP Defendants’ argument is that the HBA creates a wide net of liability by 

holding each company that received money from traffickers in connection with trafficked property 

liable for trafficking. (Motion 14-18) The WPP Defendants go so far as to propose a brightline 

rule “With no connection to the confiscated property, there can be no trafficking.” (Motion at 17). 

While the WPP Defendants may object to the law, it is clear that Congress intended the HBA to 

hold such secondary actors liable for trafficking, and the Courts have consistently upheld this basis 

of liability. “[T]he allegations of participation and profit are sufficient to show trafficking. 

Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., 19-CV-21724, 2022 WL 831160, at *44 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 

21, 2022), motion to certify appeal denied sub nom. Havana Docks Corporation v. Bloom/Mcaliley 

Carnival Corporation ., 19-CV-21724, 2022 WL 1522007 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2022). 

9

 The SAC alleges that the WPP Defendants causes, directs, participates and/or profits 

from trafficking (SAC ¶45) and it also alleges that the WPP Defendants acted as agents of Imperial 

or Habanos for advertising, marketing and promoting Cuban Cigar products and the Habanos 

Brand name, such acts are defined as commercial activities (SAC ¶14, 42) 

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“‘[T]rafficking’ in confiscated property provides badly needed financial benefit, including 

hard currency, oil, and productive investment and expertise, to the current Cuban Government” 

22 U.S.C. § 6081(6) (emphasis added). “Trafficking undermines the foreign policy of the United 

States” (id.), a clear reference to the embargo against Cuba. Most important, the HBA exists to 

provide the “victims of these confiscations . . . with a judicial remedy . . . that would deny 

traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful seizures.” 22 U.S.C. 

6081(11). There can be no doubt, HBA was created to stop hard currency from entering Cuba, 

and to deprive traffickers of profits related to the trafficked goods, even the secondary, tertiary and 

more remote traffickers) who profit from the wrongful seizures. If a defendant profits from 

trafficking by another person or is otherwise engaged in trafficking through another person they 

have engaged in trafficking under 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(iii). See de Fernandez v. Crowley 

Holdings, Inc., 21-CV-20443, 2022 WL 860373, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2022). The SAC 

properly pleads that the WPP Defendants have profited from their commercial activities in 

promoting those cigar products which a product of Imperial, Habanos and Tabacuba’s trafficking 

in the RRHSC Property. See SAC ¶12, 14, 19, 45, 57, 58, 59, 61 and 96. 

Particularly on point is properties is Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 

2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 863 (2022). In Glen, plaintiff’s grandfather owned beachfront 

properties in Varadero Cuba that were confiscated by the Cuban government without 

compensating Glen’s grandfather (or successors). At the time Glen brought the action, the 

property was home to four resort hotels. Glen brought an action against American Airlines for 

operating a website “BookAAHotels.com”, that offered its users the option to reserve hotel rooms 

at these luxury hotels. American Airlines was not occupying the hotels, but rather advertising 

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these hotels and acting as a booking agent for use of these hotels. American Airlines argued that it 

was not responsible for confiscating the property or for the operation of the hotels. American 

Airlines also argued that as it only made $503.18 in profit, it should not be liable for damages in 

the amount of three times the value of the property. Although it concluded for other reasons that 

Glen could not assert an HBA claim, the Fifth Circuit agreed that Glen’s injury was traceable to 

American, even though the injury was separate from confiscation or use of the property. All that 

is required is a “causal link between a claimant's injury from the Cuban Government's 

expropriation of their property and a subsequent trafficker's unjust enrichment from its use of that 

confiscated property.” Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 

142 S. Ct. 863 (2022). 

IV. THE COURT HAS SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS 

Plaintiffs have plead that each Defendant committed a tortious act in this state, either 

directly or through an agent, and the cause of action asserted against each Defendant arises from 

that tortious conduct. F.S. § 48.193(1)(a). SAC ¶2. Further, where, as here, the claim asserted 

against the defendant arises under federal law, if any defendants’ personal contacts with a single 

state are not sufficient to subject them to personal jurisdiction in any state, Rule 4(k) allows the 

Court to consider a defendant’s contacts with the U.S. 

As discussed supra, the claim created by the HBA is in the nature of a tort akin to unjust 

enrichment. The HBA also adds a requirement that the statutory “trafficking” be done 

intentionally. As such, the claim is in the nature of an intentional tort and should be treated as such 

for purposes of analyzing personal jurisdiction. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 

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F.3d 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that “trademark claims allege ‘tortious acts’ for 

purposes of Florida’s long-arm statute.”). The HBA claim at issue arises under federal law and 

does not have a direct analogue under state or other federal statutes. Recent cases are clear, 

however, that a defendant’s physical presence in the forum is not necessary for an exercise of 

personal jurisdiction. See Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1353 – 54 (discussing the Florida long-arm statute). 

Further, if it is not otherwise subject to jurisdiction in any individual state, service against WPP is 

proper under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 4(k) because claim arises under federal law and the. “For a claim 

that arises under federal law, serving a summons . . . establishes personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general 

jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and 

laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. The court in Macrotrend Capital Group Inc. v. Edwards, 18-cv-61327, 

2019 WL 2106421 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2019) after discussing recent cases found, personal 

jurisdiction appropriate over a defendant who committed a tort while in Michigan because the 

injury was suffered by a corporate plaintiff in Florida. See id. at *5. 

A claim under the HBA is significantly different that other claims such as trademark 

infringment involving questions of jurisdiction and use of the internet. The HBA defines 

“trafficking” to include essentially all commercial use of confiscated property. See 22 U.S.C. § 

6023(13)(A)(i)-(iii). Here the specific conduct at issue is the WPP Defendants’ use of U.S. internet 

services and social media portals operated by U.S. corporations for the purpose of trafficking. This 

is not a case like the many that the Defendants cite involving websites that can generally be 

accessed from anywhere. The WPP Defendants expressly contracted with U.S. companies such as 

Twitter and Facebook for the use of their U.S. based internet services. More importantly, the WPP 

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Defendants’ trafficking through U.S. internet services operated by U.S. corporations is directly 

prohibited by law, including the Cuban Asset Control Regulations (“CACRs”). When the WPP 

Defendants illegally used internet services to further its trafficking of the Property in violation of 

the HBA, although they did so virtually, they deliberately entered the state (or the country) in order 

to further their unlawful trafficking. This conduct provides more than sufficient basis for 

subjecting the WPP Defendants to personal jurisdiction. 

Nor is there any due process or other Constitutional impediment that prevents assertion of 

personal jurisdiction over the WPP Defendants. The U.S. Supreme Courts’ recent decision in the 

recent case of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), 

discussed the Constitutional standards at length. Discussing “specific jurisdiction” the Court 

explained: 

The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name “purposeful 

availment.” The defendant, we have said, must take “some act by which [it] 

purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 

State.” The contacts must be the defendant's own choice and not “random, 

isolated, or fortuitous. They must show that the defendant deliberately “reached 

out beyond” its home—by, for example, “exploi[ting] a market” in the forum State 

or entering a contractual relationship centered there. Yet even then—because the 

defendant is not “at home”—the forum State may exercise jurisdiction in only 

certain cases. The plaintiff ’s claims, we have often stated, “must arise out of or 

relate to the defendant's contacts” with the forum. Or put just a bit differently, “there 

must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, 

principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is 

therefore subject to the State's regulation.’ ” 

141 S. Ct. at 1024-25 (emphasis added, citations omitted). In the instant case, the WPP Defendants’ 

conduct is particularly apt for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. By their “own choice” and not 

through any “random, isolated, or fortuitous,” the WPP Defendants deliberately exploited a 

market. 

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Addressing the need for fairness, the Court made clear that: 

When (but only when) a company “exercises the privilege of conducting activities 

within a state”—thus “enjoy[ing] the benefits and protection of [its] laws”—the 

State may hold the company to account for related misconduct. Later decisions have 

added that our doctrine similarly provides defendants with “fair warning”—

knowledge that “a particular activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign 

sovereign.” A defendant can thus “structure [its] primary conduct” to lessen or 

avoid exposure to a given State's courts. 

Id. at 1026 (citations omitted). Again, this applies with full force to the WPP Defendants and in 

particular WPP, which knew or should have known that use of U.S. persons to conduct its 

trafficking could “subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” The Court held that 

jurisdiction was proper in Montana because one plaintiff was injured there. Even though the 

allegedly defective car at issue was neither designed, manufactured nor sold by Ford in Montana. 

Like the WPP Defendants, Ford argued that: 

[T]he needed link must be causal in nature: Jurisdiction attaches “only if the 

defendant's forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff ’s claims.” . . . And that rule 

reduces, Ford thinks, to locating specific jurisdiction in the State where Ford sold 

the car in question, or else the States where Ford designed and manufactured the 

vehicle. On that view, the place of accident and injury is immaterial. . . . 

But Ford's causation-only approach finds no support in this Court's requirement of 

a “connection” between a plaintiff ’s suit and a defendant's activities. That rule 

indeed serves to narrow the class of claims over which a state court may exercise 

specific jurisdiction. But not quite so far as Ford wants. None of our precedents 

has suggested that only a strict causal relationship between the defendant's 

in-state activity and the litigation will do. As just noted, our most common 

formulation of the rule demands that the suit “arise out of or relate to the 

defendant's contacts with the forum.” The first half of that standard asks about 

causation; but the back half, after the “or,” contemplates that some relationships 

will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything 

goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase “relate to” incorporates real 

limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. But again, 

we have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring 

proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff ’s claim came about because 

of the defendant's in-state conduct. 

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 Id. at 1027 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 

Again, the discussion applies directly to the issue at hand. Plaintiffs argue that jurisdiction 

in this forum is appropriate because of the WPP Defendants deliberate conduct in providing their 

U.S. internet services in order to further Imperial and Habanos’ “trafficking” of Plaintiffs’ 

Property. There is no surprise, no unfairness, nor any Constitutional or other reason that the Court 

should apply to save WPP Defendants from their deliberate conduct. Nor is there any reason why 

jurisdiction in this District is inappropriate. As discussed in Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the 

Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss, Congress expressly found that the Cuban Government, had 

forcibly confiscated property from thousands of U.S. Nationals, and thousands more who fled 

Cuba as refugees and became U.S. Nationals. That includes six of the seven Plaintiffs. It is also no 

surprise that the Plaintiffs would be found in South Florida, as the Court can take judicial notice 

of the many hundreds of thousands of local residents who fled here directly from Cuba or whose 

ancestors did so. As the Ford Court held, the place of the plaintiff’s injury can indeed be the 

Constitutionally appropriate forum. In this regard as well, it is significant that Plaintiffs are directly 

damaged under the HBA when Imperial and Habanos trafficked in the Property through the WPP 

Defendants’ efforts. The place of injury is plainly an appropriate forum. 

V. INSOFAR AS WPP CLAIMS IT IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF ANY 

STATE, JURISDICTION IS PROPER UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) 

While WPP’s SEC filings state that it claims both London and New York as its 

headquarters, (SAC ¶13), it appears that WPP seeks to disclaim that it is subject to jurisdiction in 

any state within the United States. WPP makes clear that it does not acknowledge that is it subject 

to the general jurisdiction of any state in the United States. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) was designed 

for such a defendant. 

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Service of a summons on a defendant that is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts 

of general jurisdiction establishes personal jurisdiction over said defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(k)(2). Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiffs have set forth a claim of WPP’s minimum 

contact with the United States. Moreover, although it is the self-proclaimed “world leader in 

communications, experience, commerce and technology”10 with reported revenues in 2020 of over 

£3,524,800,000 from the United States, (Ex. 13 Page 17, N. 2), and leased over 1,800,0000 square 

feet, (Ex. 13 Page 19), and earns more of its income from the U.S. than any other country (SAC 

¶36), WPP would nevertheless have this Court believe that it lacks minimum contacts with the 

United States. Plaintiffs have certainly alleged sufficient contacts with the United States. SAC 

¶¶20, 22, 23, 36 and 69. 

“The Eleventh Circuit has recognized, ‘[i]f ... the defendant contends that he cannot be 

sued in the forum state and refuses to identify any other where suit is possible, then the federal 

court is entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2).’ Oueiss v. Saud, 1:20-CV-25022-KMM, 2022 WL 1311114, 

at *12 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2022). See Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1220 

(11th Cir. 2009) (“ A district court is not required to analyze the laws of all fifty states to ascertain 

whether any state court of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the defendant; rather, ‘[i]f ... 

the defendant contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses to identify any other 

where suit is possible, then the federal court is entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2).’” (internal citations 

omitted). As WPP (and Imperial, and Habanos) has failed to identify a jurisdiction where it is 

subject to general jurisdiction, jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) is appropriate. 

VI. THE CONSEQUENCE FOR TRAFFICKING DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST 

10 https://www.wpp.com/about/our-history 

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AMENDMENT 

The doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires that the court avoid passing on the 

questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavailable. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 

U.S. 681, 690 (1997) (“It has long been its considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical 

or contingent questions, . . . . or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity 

for its decision, or to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise 

facts to which it is to be applied . . . .or to decide any constitutional question except with reference 

to the particular facts to which it is to be applied . . . .”) (citing Alabama State Fed'n of Labor, 

Local Union No. 103, United Broth. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 

461 (1945)) (Internal Citations Omitted). 

The right to free speech is not absolute. “Any First Amendment interest which might be 

served by advertising during an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh 

the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial 

activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on 

economic activity.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 

376, 389 9543949973(1973). While the advertisements and other activities taken by the WPP 

Defendants are not fully before the court at this time, and thus under the doctrine of avoidance, it 

is premature to rule on any constitutionality issue at this early juncture, advertisements which 

promote the use and purchase of trafficked goods (and that promote goods or activities that are 

prohibited by the United Stated long standing embargo against Cuba) are promoting illegal 

activities. The HBA can and does hold traffickers economically liable for participating in the 

trafficking, even if Defendants do so only in the course of carrying out what might otherwise seem 

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like ordinary commercial speech.. 

VII. ANY CONFLATION BETWEEN ENTITIES WAS CAUSED BY DEFENDANTS 

The WPP Defendants also complain that “Plaintiffs attribute actions to some undefined 

combination of WPP, BCW, Y&R, related corporate entities and unrelated third parties.” (Motion 

at 19). In fact, the “combination” is a direct result of WPP’s actions. As set forth in the complaint, 

Y&R, together with other subsidiaries of WPP (“affiliates”), operate as a single company, under 

the name “VMLY&R”; BCW, together with other subsidiaries of WPP, operate as a single 

company, under the names “BCW”, “Young & Rubicam” and “Young & Rubicam Group”; WPP, 

Y&R, BCW (and the WPP Group) use the unincorporated trade name “Young & Rubicam Group,” 

or “Y&R Group,” (SAC ¶47- 54). That WPP has its subsidiaries operate under various names, and 

holds itself out as a single entity is, on its face, clearly deceptive to the public. For example, while 

BCW, LLC registered to use the assumed name “Young & Rubicam Group” (Ex. ___), the same 

“Young & Rubicam Group” name was also used by Y&R and (according to BCW) by BCW, S.L. 

(Lombardo Depo. 134:16-136:1, Lombardo Ex. 8). 

Contrary to Defendants’ contentions, there is no issue of “Group Pleading.” As 

acknowledged in the case cited by Defendants, group pleading is an issue when a complaint fails 

to give fair notice to each defendant of the claims against it. Quality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle, 

Inc. v. State Farm Indem. Co., 917 F.3d 1249, 1274 (11th Cir. 2019). In the instant action, as in 

the Quality Auto case, “there is no problem with respect to ‘some unnamed plaintiff’” and the 

allegations make clear that “each of the named Defendants is tortiously interfering in the manner 

alleged with the named Plaintiff[s].” Id. at 1275. Each of the WPP Defendant had fair notice that 

they are each being accused of trafficking under the HBA. Any confusion claimed by the 

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Defendants is a direct consequence of Defendants design to obfuscate and conflate corporate 

identities. 

VIII. IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES JURISDICTION IS LACKING THE 

COURT SHOULD TRANSFER THE ACTION TO NEW YORK 

While Plaintiffs maintain that this Court has jurisdiction over the WPP Defendants, and 

that the instant action should proceed in the Southern District of Florida, should the Court conclude 

that jurisdiction is lacking, the Court has the authority to transfer the action to an alternate venue 

with jurisdiction. See 28 USC §1631. “Whenever a civil action is filed . . . and that court finds 

that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such 

action or appeal to any other such court . . . . in which the action or appeal could have been brought 

at the time it was filed or noticed.” 28 U.S.C. §1631. 

A claimant under the HBA may only bring a claim for trafficking that occurred no more 

than two years prior to the commencement of the action. 22 U.S.C. §6084. Dismissal of the action 

would materially prejudice the Plaintiffs as they would be barred from asserting claims for 

trafficking that occurred more than two years prior to the date of commencing a new action.11 The 

interest of justice is, therefore, served by transferring the action to a circuit that has jurisdiction. 

Thus justice requires that, if the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Court transfer the action to such venue 

that does have jurisdiction. See Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (statute of 

limitations is a factor in determining the interest of justice). 

Y&R is subsidiary of WPP, with its headquarters and principal place of business at 3 

11 Since the action was first commenced, Imperial has divested itself of its interest in 

Habanos, and it is unknown if Y&R or BCW have continued to traffic in the last two years. 

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Columbus Circle, New York, a property owned by WPP, plc. SAC ¶, Ex. 13 at 5, Ex. 14. BCW 

is a subsidiary of WPP with its headquarters in New York, New York. Lombardo Dec. II at ¶4. 

WPP, a public limited company organized under the jurisdiction of Jersey has its principal office 

at 3 World Trade Center, New York, New York. SAC ¶36, n. 14, Ex. 13 at 1, 13, 17. Therefore, 

each of the WPP Defendants are headquartered the Southern District of New York. See Daimler 

AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 157 (2014) (“The majority does not dispute that a State can exercise 

general jurisdiction where a corporate defendant has its corporate headquarters, and hence its 

principal place of business within the State.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Defendants’ 

motion in its entirety. And alternatively, should the Court find that personal jurisdiction is lacking, 

that the Court transfer the instant action to the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of New York, and allow such court to determine the remaining portions of the Motion. 

REQUEST FOR HEARING

Due to the novel and complex issues that are present in this recently activated area of law, 

Plaintiffs request a hearing on this motion. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

RODRIGUEZ TRAMONT & NUÑEZ P.A.

By: /s/ Paulino A. Núñez Jr. 

Paulino A. Núñez Jr. 

Florida Bar No. 814806 

Primary email: pan@rtgn-law.com 

255 Alhambra Circle 

Suite 1150 

Coral Gables, FL 33134

BERENTHAL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

By:: /s/ David W. Berenthal 

David W. Berenthal 

Florida Bar No. 159220 

E-mail: dwb@berenthalaw.com 

45 East 72nd Street 

Suite 5C 

New York, NY 10021

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Telephone: (305) 350-2300 Telephone: (212) 302-9494 

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