62084 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 204 / Friday, October 22, 2004 / Notices 

such information does not detract from 

the fact that Respondent provides 

needed medical services to such an area. 

However, as will be discussed below, 

while this provides some support for 

maintaining registration, under the facts 

of this case, it also has a negative 

implication for continued registration. 

The Government also took exception 

to Judge Randall’s finding regarding the 

veracity of the random drug tests 

administered Respondent, especially as 

they relate to the detection of 

methamphetamine. The Government 

argued in part, that ‘‘[f]rom the factual 

findings, it would be possible that 

Respondent could have taken 

methamphetamine many times in the 

month, and yet evaded detection.’’ The 

Government further argues that the 24 to 

36 hour metabolism rate for 

methamphetamine, in effect, creates an 

adequate window for a person to avoid 

detection when administered a drug 

test. 

The Deputy Administrator is reluctant 

to apply the Government’s arguments to 

these facts. While it is acknowledged it 

is ‘‘possible’’ Respondent could have 

taken methamphetamine and avoided 

detection, to accept the premise that he 

continued abusing would require 

assumptions about his conduct that are 

not supported by the record. 

The primary aim of a ‘‘random’’ drug 

test is to create a level of 

unpredictability as to when the test will 

be administered. The unpredictable 

nature of such a test theoretically 

creates a disincentive for the continued 

use of drugs on the part of the 

individual being monitored. Against 

this backdrop, it is important to point 

out there is no evidence in the record 

raising any question as to the efficacy of 

the PHP drug testing program. Without 

such evidence, and in light of evidence 

of Respondent’s negative drug tests, the 

Deputy Administrator concludes that 

the random nature of the PHPadministered tests served as an effective 

deterrent to Respondent’s further drug 

use. 

The Government also argued it would 

be unreasonable to reach the conclusion 

testified to by the PHP medical director 

that ‘‘a single use of illegal drugs or 

even three illegal uses in a one-year 

period’’ does not constitute evidence of 

chemical abuse. This argument is not 

particularly compelling. 

The Deputy Administrator agrees with 

Respondent that the term ‘‘abuse,’’ as 

being used by the witness, was referring 

to the diagnosis of chemical abuse 

under the DSM–4, which requires 

certain criteria which, in the witness’s 

opinion, were not present in 

Respondent’s case. While the Deputy 

Administrator agrees with the 

Government that a single or multiple 

uses of illegal drugs can be deemed 

‘‘abuse’’ in non-diagnostic terminology, 

Judge Randall’s findings on this point 

were primarily credibility findings as to 

the expert’s assessment of Respondent’s 

lack of chemical dependency. 

The Deputy Administrator considers 

Respondent’s illicit purchase and use of 

methamphetamine particularly serious 

acts of misconduct. As the record 

demonstrates, Respondent was not 

chemically dependent. This infers that 

it was neither addiction nor dependency 

that motivated his ‘‘street’’ purchases of 

methamphetamine. Instead, he 

exercised unhindered judgment to 

illegally obtain and use what he as a 

physician, well knew to be an 

insidiously dangerous controlled 

substance and did so, according to his 

post-arrest interview, to enhance his sex 

life. This motivation to violate the law 

and risk his reputation and livelihood 

evidences a particularly cavalier and 

irresponsible attitude toward his 

responsibilities as a DEA registrant.

There is no evidence in the record 

that Respondent used illicit drugs while 

actually engaged in the practice of 

medicine. However, as a cardiologist, it 

is inferred that it was possible that he 

might be subject to being called on 

unexpectedly to treat patients 

experiencing serious heart problems on 

an emergent basis. If this had occurred 

while Respondent was under the 

influence of methamphetamine, his 

patients would either have been placed 

at risk by Respondent’s impairment or, 

if he declined to treat them because of 

his drug use, they would not have been 

able to be seen immediately by another 

cardiology specialist, as Respondent 

was the only one in the rural area. These 

potential risks should have been 

apparent to Respondent when he 

elected to use methamphetamine and 

raise significant questions as to his 

judgment and ability to use sound 

professional discretion in treating 

patients with controlled substances. 

Of particular concern to the Deputy 

Administrator is the finding that 

Respondent admitted previously 

purchasing methamhetamine and 

illicitly distributing it to another 

individual. This criminal conduct is 

made even more egregious because the 

recipient was a fellow physician. The 

evidence also shows that a portion of 

the methamphetamine Respondent was 

purchasing when arrested was destined 

for distribution to that medical 

colleague. Thus, in an area already 

undeserved by medical professionals, 

Respondent not only placed himself at 

risk, but, by distributing 

methamphetamine to another physician, 

added to the threat posed to his rural 

community by potentially impaired 

physicians. 

Since his arrest, Respondent’s 

professional practice has continued 

without blemish and he has avoided 

illicit drugs. These are commendable 

and indicate potential for future 

registration. On the other hand, 

Respondent’s calculated abandonment 

of his responsibilities and willingness to 

risk serious criminal and professional 

sanctions do not auger well for 

continued registration being in the 

public interest. As observed by the 

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal, ‘‘[a]n 

agency rationally may conclude that 

past performance is the best projector of 

future performance.’’ ALRA 

Laboratories, Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 

451 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Based on the foregoing, at this time, 

the Deputy Administrator does not have 

sufficient confidence that Respondent 

can successfully fulfill the 

responsibilities of a registrant. 

Accordingly, the Deputy 

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, pursuant to the 

authority vested in her by 21 U.S.C. 823 

and 28 CFR 0.100(b), and 0.104, hereby 

orders that DEA Certificate of 

Registration BC4775233, previously 

issued to Imran I. Chaudry, M.D., be and 

it hereby is revoked. His pending 

application for renewal of that 

registration and his request to modify 

said registration to reflect a new 

requested address, are hereby denied. 

This order is effective November 22, 

2004.

Dated: October 5, 2004. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 04–23709 Filed 10–21–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Juan Pillot-Costas, M.D. Revocation of 

Registration 

On February 20, 2004, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), issued an Order 

to Show Cause to Juan Pillot-Costas, 

M.D. (Respondent) of Ponce, Puerto 

Rico, notifying him of an opportunity to 

show cause as to why DEA should not 

revoke his DEA Certificate of 

Registration BP3441475, as a 

practitioner, under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5) 

and deny any pending applications for 

renewal or modification of that 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 204 / Friday, October 22, 2004 / Notices 62085

1While the Order to Show Cause includes ‘‘M.D.’’

as part of Dr. Cronk’s professional title, DEA 

investigative reports and other supporting 

documentation refer to his professional title as 

‘‘D.O.’’ Given these references to the ‘‘D.O.’’

professional designation, the Deputy Administrator 

will refer to Dr. Cronk in a similar fashion.

registration. As a basis for revocation, 

the Order to Show Cause alleged that 

Respondent had been mandatorily 

excluded from participating in Federal 

health programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

1320–7(a). 

By letter dated March 18, 2004, 

Respondent, through legal counsel, 

requested a hearing. On April 20, 2004, 

Administrative Law Judge Gail A. 

Randall (Judge Randall) issued an Order 

for Prehearing Statements, requiring the 

Government and Respondent to file 

prehearing statements by May 12 and 

June 2, 2004, respectively. The 

Government filed a timely prehearing 

statement, however, Respondent failed 

to file his prehearing statement by the 

deadline. 

On June 29, 2004, Judge Randall 

issued a sua sponte Notice and Order to 

Respondent allowing him a limited 

extension of time, until July 21, 2004, to 

file his prehearing statement. The 

Notice and Order cautioned Respondent 

that if he failed to meet this deadline, 

Judge Randall would deem his 

inactivity to be a waiver of his hearing 

entitlement and that she would issue an 

order terminating the case. Respondent 

did not file a prehearing statement and 

on August 10, 2004, Judge Randall 

issued her Order terminating the 

proceedings. On August 26, 2004, the 

Office of Chief Counsel forwarded the 

record to the Deputy Administrator for 

entry of a final order based on the 

investigative file. 

Therefore, the Deputy Administrator 

finds that Respondent, having requested 

a hearing but having failed to participate 

in the matter after being apprised of the 

consequences, is deemed to have 

waived his hearing right. See Bill Lloyd 

Drug, 64 FR 1823–01 (1999); Vincent A. 

Piccone, M.D., 62 FR 62074 (1997). After 

considering material from the 

investigative file, the Deputy 

Administrator now enters her final 

order without a hearing pursuant to 21 

CFR 1301.43(d) and (e) and 1301.46. 

The Deputy Administrator finds that 

Respondent currently possesses DEA 

Certificate of Registration BP3441475. 

The Deputy Administrator further finds 

that as a result of Respondent’s 

fraudulent activities, pursuant to his 

guilty plea, he was convicted in the 

United States District Court, District of 

Puerto Rico of one count of conspiring 

to solicit and receive kickbacks in 

relation to Medicare referrals for durable 

medical equipment, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. 371, in addition to one count of 

providing false declarations before the 

grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

1623. 

As a result of Respondent’s conviction 

of the Medicare related count, on March 

31, 2003, he was notified by the 

Department of Health and Human 

Services of his five-year mandatory 

exclusion from participation in the 

Medicare program pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

1320a–7(a). Exclusion from Medicare is 

an independent ground for revoking a 

DEA registration. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5); 

see Johnnie Melvin Turner, M.D., 67 FR 

71203 (2002). The underlying 

conviction forming the basis for a 

registrant’s exclusion from participating 

in federal health care programs need not 

involve controlled substances for 

revocation under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5). 

See KK Pharmacy, 64 FR 49507 (1999); 

Stanley Dubin, D.D.S., 61 FR 60727 

(1996). 

Accordingly, the Deputy 

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, pursuant to the 

authority vested in her by 21 U.S.C. 823 

and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, 

hereby orders that DEA Certificate of 

Registration BP3441475, issued to Juan 

Pillot-Costas, M.D., be, and it hereby is, 

revoked. The Deputy Administrator 

further orders that any pending 

applications for renewal of such 

registration be, and they hereby are, 

denied. This order is effective 

November 22, 2004.

Dated: October 5, 2004. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 04–23712 Filed 10–21–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration 

John A. Cronk, D.O.; Revocation of 

Registration 

On January 5, 2004, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), issued an Order 

to Show Cause to John A. Cronk, M.D. 

(Dr. Cronk),1 proposing to revoke his 

DEA Certificate of Registration, 

BC2204131, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(2) and (a)(4) and 823(f). 

Specifically, the Order to Show Cause 

alleged in relevant part, the following:

1. On May 21, 2003, in the Criminal 

District of Dallas County Texas, 

pursuant to a plea agreement, Dr. Cronk 

entered a plea of guilty to unlawfully 

possessing methamphetamine, a third 

degree felony under Texas state law. Dr. 

Cronk was placed on unsupervised 

probation for a period of five years, 

ordered to enroll in an inpatient drug 

treatment at a treatment center in 

Atlanta, Georgia and to pay a $1500 

fine. The court directed that further 

proceedings be deferred in the case 

without entering an adjudication of 

guilt. The conviction was premised on 

Dr. Cronk’s arrest for possession of 

methamphetamine which took place at 

the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on 

November 28, 2002. 

2. During April 2003, DEA diversion 

investigators received information from 

former and current employees of Dr. 

Cronk’s medical office that he failed to 

maintain accountability of controlled 

substances or maintained a controlled 

substance log book for an extensive 

period. The employees further divulged 

that they suspected Dr. Cronk of abusing 

drugs during office hours and had also 

found on his office desk a vial 

containing a substance later tested and 

identified by a field test as 

methamphetamine. This test was 

conducted by a long-term patient of Dr. 

Cronk, who was also a former law 

enforcement officer. When confronted 

by that patient, Dr. Cronk admitted 

methamphetamine use. 

3. On May 7, 2003, at the request of 

DEA investigators, officers of the 

Northeast Area Interdiction Task Force 

(NADITF) recovered three bags of trash 

from Dr. Cronk’s residence in Heath, 

Texas. Among the items recovered were 

a syringe with a brown liquid substance 

later determined to be 

methamphetamine, an attached needle, 

and discarded pieces of mail bearing Dr. 

Cronk’s name and address. 

4. A state search warrant obtained to 

search Dr. Cronk’s residence was then 

executed by NADITF officers and DEA 

investigators on May 9, 2003. Recovered 

in that search were several vials 

containing residual amounts of 

methamphetamine; forty-five tabs of 

methadone; two vials of testosterone; 

ninety-five tabs of alprazolam; thirty-six 

tabs of Ambien; eight tabs of 

Vicoprofen; six bottles of Lortab elixir; 

five bottles of Histex; six tabs of ecstasy; 

several marijuana cigarette butts; 

$9,911.00 in cash; and, over 200 blood 

collection vials which had been 

converted to methemphetamine pipes, 

along with other drug paraphernalia. 

5. On May 15, 2003, DEA 

investigators arrived at Dr. Cronk’s 

office in Quinlan, Texas (which was 

also Dr. Cronk’s DEA registered 

location) to conduct an audit of 

controlled substances. Dr. Cronk was 

not present during, but his office 

manager nevertheless signed a DEA