UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT PIERCE DIVISION

CASE NO. 20-14220-CIV-CANNON/Maynard

ADRIAN MOJICA-MORALES,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHAD WOLF, acting Secretary of the U.S. Department

Of Homeland Security, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7] 

(the “Motion”), filed on September 25, 2020. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the Response 

in Opposition filed by Plaintiff Adrian Mojica-Morales (“Plaintiff”) [ECF No. 8], Defendants’ 

Reply [ECF No. 9], and the full record in this case. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7] is GRANTED.

Plaintiff seeks the following relief in his complaint: (1) a declaration that Defendants’

decision to terminate Plaintiff’s status under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program 

(DACA) was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), see 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (2) a court order vacating the Termination Notice issued to Plaintiff and 

restoring Plaintiff’s DACA status; and (3) an Order enjoining Defendants from making future 

attempts to terminate Plaintiff’s DACA status [ECF No. 1 ¶34 (prayer for relief paragraphs a-c)]. 

Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Sweet 

Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The burden for 

establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction rests with the party bringing the claim.”). Plaintiff 

bases his claims against Defendants under the APA [ECF No. 1 ¶31], but a claim under the APA, 

standing alone, does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court to review an agency determination. 

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See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977) (“[T]he APA does not afford an implied grant 

of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action.”). Plaintiff also 

cites the Declaratory Judgment Act [ECF No. 1 ¶12], see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, but a claim 

under that statute cannot serve as an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction either. 

See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). The Court therefore lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff’s claims also are barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. On June 23, 

2020, Morales filed an action in this district challenging the identical agency action he seeks to 

challenge here—i.e., the termination of his DACA status issued by United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Services and the subsequent initiation of removal proceedings by the Department of 

Homeland Security. See Adrian Mojica-Morales v. Chad Wolf, et al., Case No. 20-CV-14206-

ROSENBERG, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1). On June 30, 2020, 

Judge Rosenberg dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the same 

reason this Court dismisses here—there is no basis for exercising federal subject matter jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s claims under the APA or the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. (ECF No. 6).

“To claim the benefit of collateral estoppel the party relying on the doctrine must show 

that: (1) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was 

actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation 

must have been “a critical and necessary part” of the judgment in the first action; and (4) the party 

against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 

the issue in the prior proceeding.” Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000); see 

also Irvin v. United States, 335 F. App’x 821, 823 (11th Cir. 2009). 

All of the requisite elements of the collateral estoppel doctrine are satisfied. It is well 

settled that collateral estoppel applies to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and Judge 

Rosenberg’s prior ruling was exactly that—a final judgment concerning whether the court could 

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exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims based solely on the APA and/or the 

Declaratory Judgment Act. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992) (“A final 

determination of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of a case in a federal court, of course, precludes 

further adjudication of it.”); N. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun, Ga., 989 

F.2d 429, 432–33 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying collateral estoppel to issues of subject matter 

jurisdiction); Grand Metro. P.L.C. v. Butterworth, No. CIV.A. 88-40317WS, 1988 WL 1045191, 

at *2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 1988). The jurisdictional deficiencies present here are identical to the 

ones present in the previous case, and nothing in Plaintiff’s latest complaint cures those 

jurisdictional defects. Nor is there any material difference between the order Plaintiff sought to 

challenge in the prior case and the order he seeks to challenge now. Accordingly, the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel operates as an additional bar against Plaintiff’s claims. 

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7] is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF 

JURISDICTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

4. All deadlines are TERMINATED, and all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Pierce, this 11th day of February 2021.

________________________________

AILEEN M. CANNON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

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