1 NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0788n.06 F iled: October 23, 2006 No. 05-4441 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
JOHN S. PEACE and WIL LIAM WA LK ER , P lai nt iffs- App e lla nt s,
v. RANDA LL WE LLINGTON, Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE N OR THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Be for e : D AU G HTREY , C OLE, and G IBBO NS, Ci r c uit Judg e s. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge . Plaintiffs-appellants John S . Peace (Peac e) and Willi am Walker (Walker) appe al the district cour t’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt for d e f e n d an t
- a p p e l l e e R an d a l l W e l l i n g t o no np l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s o f

d i s p ar a t e i mp a c tun d e r

T i t l e V II of the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, as a mended by

the Civil R ights Ac t of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VI I ), and violation of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983). The district cour

t held that Peace and Walker br oug ht forth no evidenc e to support a pr im a fa c ie
case of disparate impact and a lso failed to set for th sufficient e vidence to establish a g enuine iss ue of mate ri a l f

a c t th at a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n o c c ur re d o r t hat We lli ng ton

wa s r e sp on sib le for suc h a violation. For

the followingrea sons, we af firm the district cour

t’s judgme nt.2 I
. Plaintiffs Peace and Walker a re A frica n-Amer ican a

nd employ ed by

the Mahoning County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment (MCSD). Def

endant Wellington is the duly elec ted Sheriff

of MahoningCounty , Ohio. Peace and Walker, a s employ ees of the MCSD, are me mbers of a barg ainingunit repre sented by the Fr ater

nal Orde r of Police/Ohio L abor Council, Inc. (F OP), and their employ

ment with MCS D is g overne d by a Collective B arg aining Ag ree ment (CBA ). Unde r Article 36 of

the most rece nt CBA, the pa rties agree d to eliminate the ra nk of cor poral within the MCSD . A rt ic le 36 of

the CB A, in r e le va

nt p art , s tate s: Corporals who opt not to take the Serg eants test or who fail the test, shall be r eturne d to t he ra nk of De puty wi th no los s of p ay and wi th c re dit

fo r D e pa rtme nta l se nio ri ty as a D eputy . Corporals who opt to not take the Serg eants test will be plac ed into the Deputies ra

nk in order of

their depa

rtmental seniority

afte r the promotions to the rank of Se rg e ant h ave be e n f

ill e d. Any

Cor po ral who pas ses t

his te st w itha

c omp os ite sc or e of se ve nty pe rc e nt ( 70 %) or

be tte r sha ll be pr omo te d to th e ra nk of Se rg e ant. Such promotion shall take place pri o r t o any deputy beingpromoted to the ra nk of Serg eant. Acc ording ly , any

corpor al who ac hieved a score of 70 per cent or

highe r would automatica lly be promoted to the ra

nk of ser g eant, while a

ny corpor al who did not obtain a scor e of 70 pe rce nt or highe r o r o pte d n ot t o ta

ke the e xam w ou ld b e de mot e d to the ra nk of de puty but w ith out a

los s of pay or depa rtmental seniority
. Wellington distributed study materia l for the pr omotion ex amination in the spring of 2001 to Peace , Walker, and a ll other members of the MCSD who planned to take the examination. W ellington did not par ticipate in the cr eation, administration, or scor ing of the promotion ex amination. After one re scheduling , the examination was administered on September 29, 2001. F orty -nine de puties and eig ht corpora ls, including Pea ce a nd Walker,3

ultimately

took the exam. Forty

deputies who took the e x am passed w ith a composite score of 70 perc ent or hig her. O f the e ight c orpora ls who took the test, four passe d and four failed. Pea ce and Walker w ere two of the four corpor als who fa iled the promotion examination. Despite fa iling the e x amination, Peace and Walker w ere not immediately demoted. On Fe bruar y 14, 2002, howeve r, MCSD Deputy J oseph Hood filed a

g rieva nce r equestingthat an arbitrator order

Wellington to demote the cor porals who f

ailed the e x am to the ra

nk of deputy
. The a rbitrator ultimately

found that the pa

rties had mutually

ag ree d to the elimination of the rank of cor poral fr om the org anizational structure of the MCSD, that four cor

porals had f

ailed the examination, and that there w ere no conditions prece dent to the demotion of those who f ailed. Acc ording ly , the ar

bitrator dire cted Sher iff Wellington to demote the c orpora ls who either f ailed or opted not to take the examination. On Dec ember

6, 2002, Peace , Walker, and the two other c orpora ls who failed the examination filed a complaint ag ainst the MCSD in t he MahoningCounty Common P leas Court
se e kin g a pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tio n b arr ingthe MCSD fr om i mpl e me nti ngthe arb itr a tor ’s jud g me nt, alongwith punitive damag es. On F ebrua ry 24, 2003, the Court of Common Pl eas a dopted the op ini on of the Ma g istrate Judg e Eu g e ne F e hr and dis mis se d p la int if

fs ’ c omp la int

fo r f a ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief could be g rante d. On De c e mbe r 3 0, 20 02 , th e same pla int if fs , in c lud ingPe a c e and

Wal ke r, fi le d a

n unf a ir labor pra ctice c harg e ag ainst the FO P with the Ohio St ate Employ ment Relation Boa

rd (O SERB ), a lle g ingthat th e F OP v iol ate d O hio Re vis e d Co de § 4 11 7. 11 (B )( 6) by fa ili ngtoSection 4117.11(B )(6) of the Ohio Revised Code pr ovides that it is an “unfa ir labor 1 prac tice for

an employ ee or g anization, its ag ents, or re prese ntatives, or public employ ees to, . . . [f] ail to fairly

repr esent a ll public employ ees in a barg aining unit.” Section 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code pr ovides “[i] t shall be an unlaw ful 2 discriminatory

prac tice . . . [f]or any

employ er, be cause of the ra ce, c olor, relig ion, sex , national orig in, disabilit y , ag e, or a ncestry of any person, to discha

rg e without just cause, to re fuse to hire , or otherw ise to discriminate ag ainst that person with re spect to hire, te nure, te rms, conditions, or privileg es of e mploy

ment, or any

matter dire ctly

or indirec tly

related to employ

ment.” O H IO 4 repr esent their inter ests duringneg otiations and failing to proce ss their g rieva nce. Followingan 1 investigation, on April 9, 2003, the OSERB dismissed the char g e with pre judice for lack of probable cause to believe that a n unfair la

bor pra ctice ha d been c ommitt ed by the FO P and as untimely filed. On May 16, 2003, Wellington posted a letter titled “Demotion of Corpora ls” that provided notice that the four c orpora ls who failed the e x amination, including Pea ce a nd Walker, would be demoted to the r ank of de puty , eff ective Ma y 18, 2003, with pay

in acc ordanc e with the CBA a g ree ment. On September 17, 2003 seven of

the deputies who pa ssed the promotion examination were pr omoted to the rank of serg eant pur suant to Article 36 of the CBA, e ffe ctive September 21, 2003. On Fe bruar

y 26, 2004, both Peace and Walker f iled char g es of discr imination aga inst the MCSD wi th t

he Oh io C ivi l Rights Commis sio n ( OC RC) . O n July 22 , 2 00 4, the OC RC deter mined that no evidenc e had be en discove red dur ing the course of its investigation that would substantiate either

that Peace and Walker w ere demoted or de nied promotion to serg eant on the basis of ra ce. T he OCRC concluded that there w as no proba ble ca use to believe that the MCSD enga g ed in any

unlawful discr iminatory

prac tice under

Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02. 2RE V . C ODE ANN . § 4112.02(A).

Peace and Walker limit their appea l to their Title VI Idisparate impact claim and § 1983 3 claim. I ssues raise d in the district court, y et not raised on a ppeal, a re c onsidered a

bandoned a

nd not review able on a

ppeal. Turner v. City of Taylor , 4 12 F .3 d 6 29 , 6 39 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Dixon v. As hc ro ft , 392 F.3d 212, 217 ( 6th Cir. 2004). 5 On Janu ary 19 , 2 00 5, Pe a c e and

Wal ke r f ile d a c omp la int

in t he No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Oh io
a g a ins t We lli ng ton

in h is o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity a s sh e ri ff

. Pe a c e and

Wal ke r b ro ug ht t

hr e e se pa rate claims: (1) a

disparate treatment claim, citing unla wful discrimination based on r ace in violation of Title VI I ; (2) a dispa

rate impact claim, also ba sed on Title VI I ; and (3) a § 1983 claim citing failure to promote and their de motion from the rank of corpor al to the ra

nk of deputy

in violation of the Equa l Protection Clause of the F ourtee nth Amendment of the United States Consti tution. 3 The district cour

t held that Peace and Walker f ailed to establish a pr im a fa c iecase of disparate impact under

Title VI I . The district cour t also found that Peac e and Walker failed to set forth suff icient evidenc e to establish a g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to whether a constitutional viol ation actua lly occur red or whether Wellington was re sponsible for any such
v i o l a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , th e c o urtg r an t e d W e l l i n g t o ns u m m ar

y j u d g m e n to nb o thth e T i t l e V II
and § 1 98 3 c la ims . O n O c tob e r 5 , 2 00 5, the dis tr ic t c ourt dis mis se d w ithpr e

jud ic e pla int if

fs ’ complaint in its entirety
. Peace and Walker f

iled a timely

notice of a

ppeal to this court on Oc tober 24, 2005. I I
. Th is c ourt

re vie ws the g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo
. DiCarlo v. Potter , 358 F.3d 40 8, 41 4 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 4) . Summa

ry jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr iate if

“ the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s,6

answe rs to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). I f, on the other hand, “a rea sonable jury

could re turn a verdic t for the nonmovingparty ,” summary judgme nt for the movingparty is inappropriate
. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 4 7 7 U. S
. 2 4 2 , 2 4 8 (1 9 8 6 ). Inre v i ew i n g th e d i s tri ctco urt 's decision, this court dra

ws all justifiable infer ence s in favor of the non-movingparty
. Ma tsu sh ita Elec. I ndus. Co., Lt d. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Ti tle VI Imake s it

“ an unla wf ul e mpl oy

me nt p ra c tic e fo r a

n e mpl oy e r . . . to d isc ri min a te ag ainst any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileg es of employ ment, beca

use of suc h individual’s rac e, color , relig ion, sex , or national orig in[ .]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a )(1)
. There are two principal mea ns of provingemploy er discr imination under Title VI I : disparate tr eatment a nd disparate impact. Huguley v . Gen. M otors Corp. , 52 F.3d 1364, 1370 (6th Cir. 1995). As pr e vio us ly no te d, we de a l on ly

wi th a dis pa rate imp a c t c la im i n this appeal. Disparate impact ca

uses of a ction penalize employ ment prac tices that ar e “f air in for m but discriminatory

in operation.” Phillips v. Cohen , 400 F.3d 388, 397 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (interna l qu otatio n ma

rk s and c itatio n o mitte d) . A c c or din g ly , th e dis pa ra te imp a c t ana ly sis is i nte nd e d to
e ns ur e that e mpl oye rs do no t us e se e min g ly ne utr a l de c isi on -m akin g me c ha nis ms t hat in a c tua lity tend to eliminate a g reater portion of othe rwise qua lified members of a prote cted group than they do members of

other g roups. Id. Unlike disparate treatment, disparate impac t does not require a sh ow ingof

dis c ri min ator

y mot ive , a s th e c la im “ is b a se d o n s tatis tic a l e vid e nc e of sy ste matic7

discrimination (i.e., a patter n or pra ctice which re sults in di scrimination).” Huguley , 52 F.3d at 1370. The Supreme Court has established a three -par t burden-shiftingtest to determine whe ther an unlawf ul disparate impac t exi sts. Albermarle Pape r Co. v. Moody , 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Kovace vich v . Kent State Univ. , 2 24 F .3 d 8 06 , 8 30 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) . F ir st, the pla int if f m us t establish a pr im a fa c iec a se of dis c ri min a tio n, i.e ., “ that an a dv e rs e imp a c t ha s a c tua lly
occur red.” Is ab e l v . Ci ty

of M e mp his , 404 F.3d 404, 411 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I f the plaintiff establishes a pr im a fa c iec a se , th e e mpl oy e r m us t th e n s ho w that th e pr oto c ol i n q ue sti on ha s a “manife st relationship to the employ ment,” re fer

red to a s the “business justification.” Id. ; Griggs v. Duk e Power Co. , 4 01 U. S. 4 24 , 4 31 (1 97 1) . I f t he e mpl oy e r d e mon str a te s su c h a bu sin e ss jus tif ic a tio n, the pla int if

f m us t th e n s ho w that ot

he r p ote nti a l te sts or

se le c tio n p ro toc ols wo uld
serve the employ er’ s interest without cre ating the undesira ble discriminatory

eff ect. Albe rm ar le , 42 2 U .S. a t 42 5; Isabel , 404 F.3d at 411. Acc ording ly , Peace and Walker must first establish a pr im a fa c iecase of discriminatory impact. To do so, Peac e and Walker must: (1) identify

a spec ific employ

ment prac tice to be challeng ed; and ( 2) demonstrate an “ adver se ef fec t” by offe ringstatistical evidence “of a kind or deg ree sufficie nt to show that the prac tice in question has ca used the a dverse eff

ect in question.” Kovace vich , 2 2 4 F. 3 d

at8 3 0 (qu o t i n g Scales v . J.C. Bradford and Co. , 9 25 F .2 d 9 01 , 9 08 (6 th Cir . 1 99 1) ); se e als o J

oh ns on v . U

.S . D e pt. of H e alt h a nd Hu ma n S e rv s. , 30 F.3d 45, 48 ( 6th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has not specifie d the ty pe or ty pes of statistical evide nce upon which8

courts should rely
. Isabel , 404 F.3d at 412. A plaintiff who pre sents a statistical ana ly sis of a challeng ed pra ctice unde r Title VI Ineed not r ule out all other potential va riables nor

prove discrimination with scientific ce rtainty , Alexande r v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am ., 177 F.3d 394, 406 ( 6th Cir. 1999), but a plaintiff must prove discr imination by a pre pondera

nce of the e vidence
. Bazemorev. Friday , 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986) ( finding that the per suasive forc e of a plaintiffs’ statistical re g ression ana ly sis “will depend in a g iven ca se on the fa ctual context of eac h case in light of a ll the evidence prese nted by both the plaintiff and the defe ndant.”)
. Peace and Walker of

fer virtually no statistical substantiation for their disparate impact claim. Plaintiffs’ brief

includes only

two substantive sentenc es re g ardingdisparate impact, and both are conclusory . Br ief of Plaintiff- Appellants at 10. Pea ce a nd Walker empha siz e that “75% of those demoted to de puty wer e Af rica n-Amer ican.” Id. With out mo re , h ow e ve r, it i s imp os sib le to d e te rm ine wh e the r t he pr omo tio n e xami natio n in fa c t r e su lte d in

a dis pa ra te impact. Peac e and Walker offe r no evide nce r eg ardingthe other c orpora ls who took the promotion ex amination; we ca n only speculate that one of

the two other c orpora ls who failed the examination was Afric an-A merica n, based on the statement in the brief . Fur ther, Pea ce a

nd Walker put forth no data re g ardingthe deputies who took the pr omotion ex amination or of the total pool of test-taker s, so as to permit assessment of the overa ll impact of the examination. Be cause the mere asser

tion that 75 perce nt of corpor als who fa iled the examination were Afric anAmeric an does not mee t plaintiffs’ burde n, we a ffirm the district c ourt’s holding that Peace andUnder the Supreme Court’s thre e-pa rt burden- shifting test discussed a bove, if Pea ce a

nd 4 Walker had e stablished a prima facie case of disparate impact, Wellington would then be require d to show that the protocol in question has a “ manifest re lationship to t he employ ment,” ref err ed to as the “ business justification.” Griggs v. DukePower Co. , 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Is ab e l v . Ci ty

of M e mp his , 404 F.3d 404, 411 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Be cause we f ind that Peace and Walker have not established a prima facie c a se , w e do no t a dd re ss t he po ssi ble bu sin e ss justification. 9 Walker fa iled to establish a prima facie c a se of dis pa rate imp a c t. 4 I I I
. In Co un t I I Iof

the ir c omp la int , Pe a c e and

Wal ke r a lle g e a

§ 1 98 3 e qu a l pr ote c tio n c la im and cite violation of the ir rig hts under the F ourtee nth Amendment of the United States Constit ution. To state a viable § 1983 c laim, a plaintiff must alleg e that: (1) he or she wa s deprive d of a r ight, pr ivilege , or immunity secur ed by

the Constitut ion or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was ca used by a per son actingunder the color of state law. Flagg Bros., Inc. v . Brooks , 4 36 U. S. 1 49 , 1 55 -5 7 ( 19 78 ); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter , 4 20 F .3 d 5 71 , 5 75 (6 th Cir. 2005). A succ essful equa l protection cla im ag ainst a public employer f or employ

ment discrimination require s that the plaintiff show that the e mploy er ma de an a dverse employ ment decision “w ith a discriminatory intent or purpose.” Charles v. Baesler , 910 F.2d 1349, 1356- 57 (6th Cir. 1990). Peac e and Walker rely solely on their asse rtion that 75 perc ent of those de moted
wer e Af rica n-Amer ican a

nd have not pr oduced a

ny evidenc e of discr iminatory intent or purpose. Thus, their § 1983 cla im fails. I V.10

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt for defe ndant Wellington.