2023 IL App (4th) 210258-U 

NOS. 4-21-0258, 4-21-0259, 4-21-0265, 4-21-0266 cons.

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMES ADAM TILLMAN, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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 Appeal from the

 Circuit Court of

 McLean County

 Nos. 18CF1084 

 19CF455 

 19CF1010 

 20CF632 

 Honorable 

 Paul G. Lawrence, 

 Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court committed plain error by imposing Class X sentencing on 

defendant’s possession of a stolen motor vehicle conviction because he was 17 at 

the time he committed his first Class 2 or greater felony. 

¶ 2 In December 2019, defendant, Adam James Tillman, pleaded guilty to possession 

of a stolen motor vehicle (PSMV), a Class 2 felony, and was sentenced to drug court probation. 

In December 2020, after his probation was revoked, the trial court resentenced defendant to six 

years in prison, applying mandatory Class X sentencing due to defendant’s prior convictions for 

burglary in 1995 and residential burglary in 2000. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed 

defendant’s sentence. People v. Tillman, Nos. 4-21-0258, 4-21-0259, 4-21-0265, 4-21-0266 

cons. (2022) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). 

FILED

February 21, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 3 Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was denied. However, the 

Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order (People v. Tillman, No. 128615 (Ill. Nov. 30, 

2022)), directing this court to vacate our prior judgment and reconsider our decision in light of 

People v. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, on the issue of whether defendant was eligible for Class X 

sentencing. 

¶ 4 Having reconsidered defendant’s arguments that (1) trial counsel “was ineffective 

for failing to point out that one of [defendant’s] predicate offenses [(the 1995 burglary)] occurred 

when he was 17 years old” and (2) the six-year sentence pursuant to Class X sentencing was 

second prong plain error in light of Stewart, we vacate defendant’s six-year sentence and remand 

the cause for a new sentencing hearing.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 In December 2019, defendant pleaded guilty in three separate cases to escape, a 

Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2018)), theft, a Class 4 felony (id. § 16-1(a)(1)(A)), 

and PSMV, a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2018)). In exchange for his guilty 

pleas, defendant received a sentence in each case of drug court probation and 180 days in jail. At 

the time of defendant’s guilty plea, the trial court admonished him that, if his probation was 

revoked, he was subject to mandatory Class X sentencing under section 5-4.5-95 of the Unified 

Code of Corrections (Corrections Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95 (West 2018)) on the PSMV 

conviction due to his prior convictions (1) in 2000 for residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 

(West 2000)) and (2) in 1995 for burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 1994)). The 1995 burglary 

was committed when defendant was 17 years old.

¶ 7 In July 2020, the State charged defendant in a new case with driving while his 

license was revoked or suspended (625 ILCS 5/6-303(d) (West 2020)). Based on that same 
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conduct, the State also filed a petition to revoke defendant’s drug court probation in all three of 

the aforementioned cases. In November 2020, a jury found defendant guilty of driving while his 

license was suspended, and that same day, the trial court found the petition to revoke proven. 

¶ 8 In December 2020, the trial court sentenced defendant to two years in prison for 

driving while his license was suspended and resentenced defendant to consecutive terms of one 

year in prison for the theft conviction, two years for the escape conviction, and six years (the 

mandatory minimum sentence for a Class X felony) for the PSMV conviction. In so ordering, the 

court stated, “So essentially [defendant], I’m giving you the minimum sentence that I’m allowed 

to give you today after taking everything into account.”

¶ 9 Defendant appealed, arguing that (1) trial counsel “was ineffective for failing to 

point out that one of [defendant’s] predicate offenses [(the 1995 burglary)] occurred when he 

was 17 years old,” which, defendant argued, precluded him from being resentenced as a 

mandatory Class X offender for the PSMV offense, or alternatively (2) the sentence was second 

prong plain error. This court affirmed defendant’s sentence. People v. Tillman, Nos. 4-21-0258, 

4-21-0259, 4-21-0265, 4-21-0266 cons. (2022) (unpublished summary order under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). Subsequently, defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal with the 

Illinois Supreme Court.

¶ 10 On November 30, 2022, the supreme court denied defendant’s petition for leave 

to appeal but issued a supervisory order (People v. Tillman, No. 128615 (Ill. Nov. 30, 2022)),

directing this court to vacate our prior judgment and reconsider our decision in light of Stewart

on the issue of whether defendant was eligible for Class X sentencing. 

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Having reconsidered defendant’s arguments that (1) trial counsel “was ineffective 
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for failing to point out that one of [defendant’s] predicate offenses [(the 1995 burglary)] occurred 

when he was 17 years old” and (2) the six-year sentence pursuant to Class X sentencing was 

second prong plain error in light of Stewart, we vacate defendant’s PSMV sentence and remand 

the cause for a new sentencing hearing. 

¶ 13 A. Plain Error

¶ 14 The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error 

under the following two scenarios:

“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that 

the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, 

regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred 

and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and 

challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the 

evidence.” People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189, 940 N.E.2d 1045, 1058 (2010). 

¶ 15 The usual first step in a plain-error analysis is to determine whether any error 

occurred at all. Id. If error did occur, then we determine whether either of the plain-error prongs 

are satisfied. Id. at 189-90.

¶ 16 B. Class X Sentencing and Stewart

¶ 17 1. Class X Sentencing

¶ 18 At the time of defendant’s sentencing and resentencing, section 5-4.5-95(b) of the 

Corrections Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2020)) provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 

“When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 

felony, except for an offense listed in subsection (c) of this Section, after having 

twice been convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the 
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same elements as an offense now (the date the Class 1 or Class 2 felony was 

committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony, except for an 

offense listed in subsection (c) of this Section, and those charges are separately 

brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be 

sentenced as a Class X offender.”

That provision did not apply unless the following criteria were also met:

“(1) the first felony was committed after February 1, 1978 (the effective

date of Public Act 80-1099); 

(2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and

(3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second.” Id.

¶ 19 2. Stewart

¶ 20 Recently, in Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 14, the supreme court interpreted a 

previous version of section 5-4.5-95(b) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2016)) that contained the 

same relevant language as the version at issue in this case. The supreme court specifically 

addressed “whether the legislature intended a prior felony conviction to be a qualifying offense 

for Class X sentencing if the same offense would have resulted in a juvenile adjudication had it 

been committed on the date of the present offense.” Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 16. Based on a 

later amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b) (Pub. Act 101-652 (eff. July 1, 2021) (adding a fourth 

requirement that the first qualifying offense was committed when the person was 21 years of age 

or older), the supreme court answered that question in the negative. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, 

¶ 22. 

¶ 21 On the facts of that case, the supreme court held the defendant’s 2013 conviction 

for an offense committed when he was 17 years old was not a qualifying offense for Class X 
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sentencing under the applicable version of section 5-4.5-95(b). Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 22. 

¶ 22 C. This Case

¶ 23 Here, in light of the holding in Stewart, we conclude that defendant’s sentence 

was reversible second prong plain error. Defendant was sentenced to six years as a Class X 

offender for his PSMV conviction pursuant to section 5-4.5-95 of the Corrections Code (730 

ILCS 5.5-4.5-95 (West 2020)) because defendant had two prior Class 1 or Class 2 convictions—

namely, a 2000 Class 1 residential burglary and a 1995 Class 2 burglary. We note that defendant 

also has a conviction for a Class 2 burglary in 1996. However, because the 1995 and 1996 

offenses were committed when defendant was 17 years old, neither of those offenses was a 

qualifying offense for Class X sentencing under the applicable version of section 5-4.5-95(b). 

Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 22. Accordingly, defendant had only one qualifying Class 1 or 2 

felony offense and was ineligible for mandatory Class X sentencing. See 730 ILCS 5.5-4.5-95 

(West 2020).

¶ 24 Because (1) sentencing defendant pursuant to section 5-4.5-95(b) was error and 

(2) “[t]he imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects substantial rights” (internal quotation 

marks omitted), (Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 12), defendant’s sentence amounts to plain error 

under the second prong of the plain-error analysis; therefore, we vacate defendant’s six-year 

sentence for PSMV and remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing regarding defendant’s 

PSMV conviction. 

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we vacate defendant’s six-year sentence for PSMV and 

remand the cause to the McLean County trial court for a new sentencing hearing on that offense. 

¶ 27 Reversed and remanded with directions.