1

Filed 8/22/24 In re A.G. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re A.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

MENDOCINO COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A169551

 (Mendocino County

 Super. Ct. No. 22JV00017-01)

A.G. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his 

parental rights over his now six-year-old daughter A.G. (minor) pursuant to 

Welfare and Institution Code1 section 366.26. Father contends the court 

erred in declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception to adoption. 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
2

BACKGROUND

Proceedings Before Section 366.26 Hearing

These proceedings were initiated pursuant to a section 300 petition

alleging failure to protect and abuse of a sibling.

In its detention report, the Mendocino County Department of Social 

Services (Department) noted it had received a referral alleging then threeyear-old minor, who was living with mother,2 was present “in the home where 

dangerous items were found within reach.” Specifically, the social worker 

observed drug paraphernalia, including syringes, which were “ ‘loaded and 

ready to go with heroin’ ” on the bed, dresser, and in a tote bag on the floor; a 

“blackened spoon with an unknown substance” and what appeared to be 

marijuana; and a “rubber tourniquet laying on the floor,” all of which “was at 

child level, and in easy reach of both children.”3

In the Department’s interview with father, he stated he had lived with 

mother prior to minor’s birth for three years. He maintained he had never

observed mother to be under the influence, although “he had heard rumors 

she was using.” From birth, minor mostly lived with mother, while father 

lived about two minutes away. Except for a three-month period when minor

lived with paternal grandmother and father, father never lived with or had 

custody of minor. Despite testing positive for methamphetamine and 

marijuana, father denied any drug use stating, he had not used 

methamphetamine since he was 18. 

2 Mother is not a party to this appeal, and we relate only those facts 

relevant to the issues on appeal.

3 Minor’s half sibling, five-year-old H.S., also resided in the home. He 

is not a party to this appeal. 

 
3

The court ordered minor, along with her half sibling, placed in 

maternal aunt’s home and set the matter for a jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found the amended counts of

the petition true,4 adjudged minor a dependent of the court, found by clear 

and convincing evidence removal was necessary, ordered reunification 

services and supervised visitation for father, and set the matter for a review 

hearing. 

Over the next year and a half, the Department recommended 

continuing services. During that time, father had been doing well and minor 

had started overnight visits. However, after three overnights visits, visits 

were suspended because father relapsed. At the 18-month review hearing, 

the Department recommended services be terminated. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated services to father

and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.

Section 366.26 Hearing

In its section 366.26 report, the Department recommended termination 

of parental rights and making adoption the permanent plan. 

The report noted that during the prior 18 months, father visited minor

“three times per week by Zoom and once a week in-person.” Visitation had 

progressed to “overnight visits” during the last review period. However,

there were “concerns” as minor had recently regressed in bed wetting and 

having nightmares after overnight visitation began. Visits were then “pulled 

back to [be] supervised again” due to father’s relapse. After services were 

4 The factual bases for the amended counts related to father’s past and 

current drug use; his “extensive Child Welfare history including one or more 

of his older children who he does not have in his custody”; and father’s failure 

to protect minor despite knowledge of mother’s continuing drug use. 
4

terminated, father missed seven in-person visits but continued to make Zoom 

visits. When minor did “not show interest in Zoom visits, [father] agree[d] to 

end them early instead of stretching them out,” and as a result, Zoom visits

had “become increasingly shorter.” Since the beginning of the proceedings, 

minor had been placed with maternal aunt with whom she “had an existing 

relationship” and with whose home she was familiar. Maternal aunt and her 

husband had provided a “comfortable, safe, and nutur[ing]” home for minor

and “demonstrated their commitment to [minor’s] well-being and now 

permanency.” Minor had “thrived” in her placement and appeared “to feel 

comfortable, safe, and nurtured.” 

The Department also filed an Adoption Assessment Report. The 

adoption specialist confirmed father had attended “at least 134 visits” with 

minor since detention, including 114 Zoom visits, 16 in-person visits, 3 

overnight visits, and 1 phone visit. At the beginning, father was “diligent 

and creative in his effort to engage” minor during Zoom visits. However, 

after six months, minor “became less engaged and responsive.” It was 

unknown if the decreased engagement was due to “changes in her 

relationship” with father, minor’s “successful acclimation” to maternal aunt’s 

home, “ ‘Zoom fatigue,’ ” or something else. Regardless, toward the end of the 

reunification period, minor would begin the call by stating, “ ‘I don’t want to 

talk today.’ ” During in-person visits, father “generally behaved 

appropriately,” and minor “was reported to be happy to see her father at the 

visits and often ran to greet him with a hug.” After her first overnight visit, 

minor began “wetting and soiling herself several times per day, after months 

of having no toileting accidents.” Shortly thereafter, the overnight visits 

were suspended.
5

The specialist opined a “continuing relationship between [minor] and 

her birth parents would be beneficial for [minor] particularly if the birth 

parents addressed the issues that led [minor] to come into care.” Father had 

been “mostly consistent in his visitation,” and minor and father’s interactions 

“appear to be mostly positive and enjoyable for [minor].” 

Finally, the specialist stated terminating parental rights would not be 

detrimental to minor’s well-being. Despite any positive relationship minor

has with parents, “the permanency, safety, and security that [minor] would 

gain through adoption outweigh the potential detriment from terminating 

parental rights.” Minor had been in her current placement almost two years. 

She appeared “to have substantial emotional ties to the potential adoptive 

parents” and “removal from [them] would be detrimental to [her] well-being.” 

At the section 366.26 hearing, father did not testify—although he was 

present—and his counsel read a letter from father instead. The letter 

expressed father’s “deep concern about the termination of [his] parental 

rights.” Additionally, father expressed his feelings over the separation from 

minor, his “ ‘earnest efforts ’ ” in complying with his case despite “ ‘a lack of 

support’ ” from the Department, and his willingness to go to “ ‘rehab [if]

necessary,’ ” because minor’s “ “best interests are served by going with her 

father.’ ” He described the “ ‘false allegations’ ” from mother and detailed the 

services he completed, despite the “ ‘challenges and delays that have been 

orchestrated by CPS,’ ” and asked the court to “ ‘consider these efforts, and 

grant [him] another chance and opportunity to prove [his] devotion and how 

[he has] changed.’ ” He closed by asking the court to “ ‘[p]lease allow [minor] 

to be in . . . [his] care’ ” and for him “ ‘to reengage’ ” with services.

Minor’s counsel objected to the letter on relevance grounds stating, 

“This is a two-six, and that is not even an option for Your Honor to grant 
6

additional services.” Counsel for the Department joined the objection stating, 

“the only thing relevant at today’s hearing is whether there is clear 

convincing evidence of adoptability, and whether or not any of the exceptions 

to termination of parental rights have been proven by a preponderance of 

evidence by the parents. And so that does not apply today. [¶] So I would say 

in reply to that letter that those statements would not provide the Court 

grounds with which to provide services to the father, or to do anything other 

than address the issues at the two-six hearing of the clear and convincing 

evidence of adoptability.” 

The court overruled the objections and accepted father’s statement, 

although observing, “it is largely irrelevant to the issues before the Court 

today. Services have been terminated.” Father’s counsel made no objection. 

Minor’s counsel then moved on to the issue of termination stating, 

minor was “doing really well” and “thriving” in her current placement, where 

she had been “since the inception of this case” with her half sibling. Counsel 

asserted minor “is adoptable, so . . . that prong has been met. And at this 

time, I don’t believe any exceptions apply. [¶] The parental bond exception 

does not apply in this case. There’s been no such evidence demonstrated or 

provided by father’s counsel, and I would ask Your Honor to grant the two-six 

today.” Counsel for father and the Department submitted without comment.

The court commenced its ruling by disagreeing with father’s assertion

in his letter that the Department had not been helpful. In any event, the 

court stated, “the clock has run out. Services have been terminated,” and the 

focus is now on minor and “what is best for her.” Minor had been in her 

placement “for two years now,” and the court wanted “security for her.” The 

court found by clear and convincing evidence minor is likely to be adopted, 

identified adoption as the permanent plan, and terminated father’s and 
7

mother’s parental rights. The court noted termination of parental rights 

would not be detrimental, and “[d]espite having positive relationships at 

some points with both parents, permanency, safety and surety that she would 

gain via adoption outweighs any potential detriment from terminating 

parental rights.” 

DISCUSSION

Beneficial Relationship Exception

“At the section 366.26 hearing, the question before the court is 

decidedly not whether the parent may resume custody of the child.” (In re 

Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) Instead, the purpose of the 

hearing is to select and implement a permanent plan. (Ibid.) “[T]he court

must first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the child is 

likely to be adopted. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If so, and if the court finds 

that there has been a previous determination that reunification services be 

terminated, then the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for 

adoption. [Citation.] But if a parent shows that termination would be 

detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the 

court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another 

permanent plan. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi), (4)(A).)” (Caden, at 

pp. 630–631.) One of those reasons is the beneficial relationship exception. 

(Id. at p. 631.)

The Department first contends father forfeited the issue of applicability 

of the beneficial relationship exception by failing to raise it below. We agree. 

“If a parent fails to raise one of the exceptions at the [section 366.26] 

hearing, not only does this deprive the juvenile court of the ability to evaluate 

the critical facts and make the necessary findings, but it also deprives this 

court of a sufficient factual record from which to conclude whether the trial 
8

court’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] 

Allowing the [parent] to raise the exception for the first time on appeal would 

be inconsistent with this court’s role of reviewing orders terminating parental 

rights for the sufficiency of the evidence.” (In re Erik P. (2002)

104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403.) Thus, a failure to raise an exception forfeits the 

issue on appeal. (Ibid. [forfeiture of sibling relationship exception]; In re 

Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252 [forfeiture of beneficial 

relationship exception]; see also In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 

292 (Daisy D.) [no sua sponte duty to consider exception to adoption, and 

parent’s failure to raise it in juvenile court precludes her from doing so on 

appeal from termination of rights].)

Father asserts he was impliedly “imploring the juvenile court to apply 

the parental-benefit exception on behalf of his daughter and order a 

permanent plan of legal guardianship” through his letter to the court.

We disagree. Nothing in the letter alerted the court that father was 

raising the exception, nor did father produce any evidence to support it. 

Instead, his letter focused primarily on reinstating reunification services. It 

is clear from the record, the court and counsel for the Department and minor

all interpreted the letter as a request to reinstate services. Neither father 

nor his counsel made any suggestion the letter was more expansive than 

that. Nor did they say anything in response to the Department’s objection to 

the letter, in which county counsel asserted the section 366.26 hearing was a 

time to decide if minor was adoptable and whether any exceptions applied, 

and that none applied in this case. They similarly did not object when 

minor’s counsel later stated, “The parental bond exception does not apply in 

this case. There’s been no such evidence demonstrated or provided by 

father’s counsel, and I would ask Your Honor to grant the two-six today.” 
9

Having failed to raise any statutory exception to termination of 

parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing, father has forfeited the issue. 

(Daisy D., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 292.)

Even assuming father had preserved the issue for review, the court did 

not err in terminating parental rights.

The beneficial relationship exception applies where “[t]he parents have 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would 

benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The 

parent must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, three things: “(1) regular 

visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would 

benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636.) We 

review the first two elements for substantial evidence, and the third for abuse 

of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639–640.)

Here, assuming without deciding that father met the first element of

the exception, regular contact, we address only the second and third 

elements, beneficial relationship and detriment.

The second element requires the court to determine “whether the child 

would benefit from continuing the relationship with her parent. . . . ‘[T]he 

relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as “[t]he age of the 

child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ 

or, ‘negative’ effect of the interaction between parent and child, and the 

child’s particular needs.” [Citation.]’ (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) 

‘[C]ourts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk 

about their parents.’ (Ibid.) Caden C. instructs us that ‘it is not necessary—

even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise “quantitative measurement of 

the specific amount of ‘comfort, nourishment or physical care’ [the parent] 
10

provided during [his or] her weekly visits.” [Citation.]’ (Ibid.) Expert 

opinions or bonding studies provided by psychologists who have observed 

and/or reviewed the parent-child relationship are often ‘an important source 

of information about the psychological importance of the relationship for the 

child.’ (Id. at pp. 632–633, fn. omitted.) Ultimately, the court’s role is to 

decide whether the child has a ‘ “significant, positive, emotional relationship 

with [the parent].” ’ (Id. at p. 633.)” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 

75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316–317 (Katherine J.).)

The third element asks the court “to ascertain whether severing 

parental ties—and thus ‘terminating [the] parental’ relationship—would be 

detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) ‘What 

courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected by 

losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the 

child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.’ (Ibid.) 

Because any harm caused by loss of this relationship may be significantly 

mitigated by the child’s adoption into a stable, loving home, the court must 

then perform a delicate balancing act. The ‘subtle, case-specific inquiry [that] 

the statute asks the courts to perform [is]: does the benefit of placement in a 

new, adoptive home outweigh “the harm [the child] would experience from 

the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]” ’ 

(Ibid.) ‘When the relationship with the parent is so important to the child 

that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, 

termination would be “detrimental to the child due to” the child’s beneficial 

relationship with a parent.’ (Id. at pp. 633–634.)” (Katherine J., supra, 

75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317, fn. & italics omitted.) 

As to the second element, father points out his “meaningful visits with 

minor,” in which the two “played, conversed, and exchanged hugs and kisses”; 
11

that minor often ran to greet him; and the Department’s observation that a 

continuing relationship would be beneficial for minor. 

Although it is clear, as the court noted, there were “positive 

relationships at some points with both parents,” father has failed to show 

there was a “significant, positive, emotional relationship.” Indeed, the 

evidence shows the contrary. Minor was placed in her adoptive home at three 

years old, and father had never had custody of minor and never lived with 

minor except for a brief three-month period. While the adoption specialist 

opined there was a “strong emotional bond between” mother and minor, she

made no similar pronouncement as to father and minor. By the end of the 

review period, minor had become “less engaged and responsive.” It was 

unknown if the decreased engagement was due to “changes in her 

relationship” with father, minor’s “successful acclimation” to maternal aunt’s 

home, “ ‘Zoom fatigue,’ ” or something else. Regardless, toward the end of the 

reunification period, minor would begin calls by stating, “ ‘I don’t want to talk 

today.’ ” Finally, although minor appeared to enjoy in-person visits, she did 

not suffer any negative reactions in transitions at the end of visits, and she 

had started to regress—bedwetting and soiling herself several times a day—

after overnight visits commenced. (See In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 

1061, 1073–1074 [while the mother stressed evidence that in many visits the 

minors were happy to see her, she ignored “other evidence the juvenile court 

was entitled to credit . . . , including occasions on which the [minors] did not 

engage with her favorably, as well as evidence that her interactions with 

them sometimes had a negative impact on them”].)

In sum, although the Department’s reports showed father’s visits with 

minor appeared “to be mostly positive and enjoyable” for minor, the evidence 
12

falls short of establishing the second element of the beneficial relationship

exception. 

As to the third element, father contends “despite the evidence of 

consistent visitation, along with evidence of [minor’s] meaningful relationship 

with [f]ather, the juvenile court terminated [his] parental rights.” He notes 

that by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, minor was five years old, 

“knew her father” and the “ongoing contact with [f]ather was important to 

her and certainly had a nurturing effect on her well-being.”

Here, the record shows there simply was not a sufficiently significant

relationship, the loss of which would outweigh the benefits of adoption, in 

light of minor’s age, time away from parental care, and the detriment that 

would arise from a disruption of her current care. Indeed, the adoption 

specialist stated termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to 

minor, rather it was her “removal from the potential adoptive parents [that] 

would be detrimental to [her] well-being.” Having considered all the evidence 

before it and having engaged in a careful weighing of the benefits of adoption 

against any detriment of termination, we conclude the juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion in terminating father’s parental rights. 

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
13

BANKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

LANGHORNE WILSON, J. 

SIGGINS, J.*

In re A.G. (A169551)

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First District 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.