UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

CASE NO. 1:20-cv-20078-RNS 

MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, as 

personal representative of the Estates of 

Dolores Marti Mercade and Fernando Canto 

Bory, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y 

APARTAMENTOS, S.L., a Spanish limited 

liability company, 

 Defendant. 

____________________________________/ 

DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO LIFT STAY 

Defendant IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS, S.L.U. (“Iberostar”) submits 

this Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Lift Stay in the above-titled action (ECF No. 21) (the 

“Motion”). The proceedings were stayed by this Court on April 24, 2020 (the “Stay”), “pending 

the Iberostar’s request for authorization from the European Commission” (ECF No. 17) (the 

“Order”). In support of Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendant states as follows: 

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

1. The European Commission requires an EU-based company to obtain authorization before it 

can file a response to any lawsuit brought under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 

(Libertad) Act (the “Helms-Burton Act” or the “Act”). This requirement arises from Council 

Regulation 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of 

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Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 

1996 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC) (the “Council Regulation 2271/96”). 

2. On April 15, 2020, Iberostar filed an application for authorization to the European Commission 

to respond to the Complaint in this action (the “Application”). 

3. On May 19, 2020, the European Commission acknowledged receipt of Defendant’s 

Application. 

4. On June 15, 2020, Iberostar requested the European Commission to provide an update on the 

status of the Application. 

5. On June 22, 2020, the European Commission confirmed that it is “currently assessing 

[Defendant’s] application,” and that the Commission does “[its] utmost to ensure that a 

decision is taken in due course.” 

6. The Order staying the case was entered on April 24, 2020, and required Iberostar to submit a 

status report every 30 days regarding Iberostar’s request for authorization. Since the last status 

report filed by Iberostar, the European Commission, on July 24, 2020, requested additional 

information from Iberostar. 

7. This morning, on August 10, 2020, the European Commission informed Iberostar that “the 

duration of the administrative procedure pursuant to Article 5, second paragraph, [of Council 

Regulation 2271/96] varies according to the complexity of the case.” It also stated that “the 

procedure requires extensive consultation of both the Commission’s services and Member 

States’ authorities,” and reminded Iberostar that “until and unless [Iberostar] receives an 

explicit authorisation from the Commission, Article 5, first paragraph, prohibits [Iberostar] 

from actively appearing before U.S. courts pursuant to the relevant summons or any others 

based on Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, including the filing of a Rule 12 motion.” 

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8. When Defendant sought the Stay, Defendant was confident the European Commission would 

resolve the Application within ten weeks. This estimate was based upon the European 

Commission traditional practice in other matters and because the application sought it be 

considered on an expedited basis. See Declaration of Hermenegildo Altozano, ¶ 5 (ECF No. 

16-2). However, we believe this is the first time the European Commission has considered an 

authorization request under Council Regulation 2271/96 based on a claim under the HelmsBurton Act.1

 Because the process is confidential and may be without precedent it has taken 

longer than anticipated. The current pandemic has also slowed down the processing of 

Iberostar’s Application, making it difficult to make a prediction at this point. Defendant is 

doing everything in its power to assist the process, keeping the Commission informed of the 

need and status in this litigation, and emphasizing to the Commission the importance of its 

resolution of Defendant’s Application. 

9. The Order should be maintained and the Stay should not be lifted in order to provide Defendant 

a fair opportunity to obtain the authorization it needs to participate in these proceedings, and 

avoid the EUR 600,000 in fines for each breach that Defendant is exposed to if it does not 

obtain authorization to defend itself in this action. 

10. The Stay is warranted, moderate and consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent. As such, the 

Order should not be vacated. The Stay is warranted on international comity grounds because 

the Council Regulation 2271/96 requires Iberostar to obtain authorization before it files a 

motion to dismiss with this Court. Title III is in conflict with an EU statute that condemns the 

 

1

 Defendant cannot comment on Plaintiff’s speculative statement that “[i]t appears that a similarly situated defendant 

has filed a motion to dismiss a Title III Helms-Burton action in this district without any apparent authorization from 

the European Commission.” Motion at n.4 (ECF No. 21). Any proceeding before the European Commission is 

confidential and it is impossible for Defendant—or any third party—to confirm whether or not such defendant has 

sought authorization from the European Commission, or otherwise been granted or denied such a request. 

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title and imposes strict requirements on its European citizens due to its extra territorial scope 

and application. The proceeding to obtain authorization is progressing as demonstrated by the 

fact that the European Commission sought additional information from Iberostar as recently as 

ten days ago. The Stay is the only way for Defendant to answer this Court’s summons without 

facing fines and be in violation of European regulations. Importantly, Defendant is not seeking 

to avoid U.S. litigation by invoking a foreign blocking statute, but the opposite. Defendant is 

seeking authorization to engage in U.S. litigation despite the existence of a foreign blocking 

statute. The difference is dispositive of the Motion, which should be denied. 

11. The time that has elapsed under the Stay that is in place is not immoderate. Ninety days is not 

excessive in light of the pandemic and the issues raised by the Helms-Burton Act claim against 

Iberostar, a Spanish entity. The 30 day status reports provide a mechanism to ensure the matter 

does not linger indefinitely. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

12. The Supreme Court has recognized that “the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the 

power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with 

economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 

U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which 

must weigh competing interest and maintain an even balance.” Id. at 254-55. 

13. “A variety of circumstances may justify a stay pending resolution of a related case in another 

court.” Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Commc’ns, 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, 

however, there is no “related case in another court,” id., but a proceeding before a European 

agency, the European Commission, in which Defendant is seeking permission to participate in 

the litigation brought by Plaintiff before this Court. The Supreme Court has held that 

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abstention principles “permit a federal court to enter a stay order that postpones adjudication 

of the dispute.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719, 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1722 

(1996) (emphasis in the original) (internal citations omitted). It is well-settled that “a district 

court has the authority to stay proceedings on its own motion or on motion of the parties.” In 

re Braga, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254 (noting 

that federal courts have inherent authority to stay proceedings)) (other internal citations 

omitted). “Federal courts routinely exercise their power to stay a proceeding where a stay 

would promote judicial economy and efficiency.” Cypress Chase Condo. Ass’n “A” v. QBE 

Ins. Corp., No. 10-61987-CIV, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41104, 2011 WL 1544860, at *15 (S.D. 

Fla. Apr. 15, 2011). In the Eleventh Circuit, the critical question for a district court in deciding 

a stay request is whether the related proceeding is “likely to have a substantial or controlling 

effect on the claims and issues in the stayed case.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. 

Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191, 1198 (11th Cir.2009); accord In re Braga, 789 F. 

Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 

III. MEMORANDUM OF LAW 

14. This Court granted the Stay “[i]n the interest of international comity,” Order at ¶ 2, and 

properly limited the Stay’s scope, as required by the Eleventh Circuit, until the European 

Commission decides Iberostar’s Application. Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1264. The Stay is not 

“immoderate,” id., or indefinite. The Stay is warranted to provide Iberostar a fair opportunity 

to obtain an authorization from the European Commission to comply with this Court’s 

summons, and as such it should not be lifted. As a European entity, Iberostar has no alternative 

in order to comply with applicable European regulations but to seek authorization from the 

European Commission. 

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I. International Comity Warrants the Stay of this Proceeding Until the European 

Commission Decides Iberostar’s Application for Authorization to Comply with 

this Court’s Summons 

15. International comity is an abstention doctrine that reflects “[t]he extent to which the law of one 

nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by 

judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation.” Hilton v. 

Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895). It “serves as a guide to federal 

courts where the issues to be resolved are entangled in international relations.” UngaroBenages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations 

omitted). Comity “is a nation’s expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard 

both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own 

laws.” GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(internal citations omitted). 

16. The issues to be resolved here, namely, Plaintiff’s claims brought against a European entity 

under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, “are entangled in international relations.” Ungaro–

Benages, 379 F.3d at 1237. As explained in Defendant’s Motion to Stay, under Council 

Regulation 2271/96, Iberostar faces EUR 600,000 in sanctions for each breach of that 

regulation, including failure to obtain authorization from the European Commission before it 

files a motion to dismiss with this Court. (ECF No. 16 at ¶ 3.) See also Order at ¶ 2 (ECF No. 

17). 

17. The Stay acknowledges an “expression of understanding” of a United States’ district court to 

Defendant’s difficult position, based on its European nationality and domicile and two 

conflicting legal systems. GDG Acquisitions, 749 F.3d at 1030 (internal citations omitted). 

The Stay also “demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the 

rights of persons protected by its own laws,” Id. It is Defendant’s “international duty,” as a 

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European entity, to obtain permission to comply with this Court’s summons. Id. It is also a 

matter of “convenience” to allow Defendant to obtain such authorization before this litigation 

proceeds. Id. Both Defendant’s Motion for a Stay and the Order demonstrated “due regard . . . 

to the rights of persons protected under [the Act],” because Defendant sought, and the Order 

granted, time to obtain permission from the Commission to engage in Plaintiff’s litigation, not 

to avoid it. 

18. Further, the Stay is warranted because the related proceeding is “likely to have a substantial or 

controlling effect on the claims and issues in the stayed case.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of 

Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191, 1198 (11th Cir.2009); accord In re Braga, 

789 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2011). The proceeding before the European 

Commission arises from a blocking statute engendered by the enactment of Title III of the Act. 

The Commission’s proceeding will therefore have a substantial effect on Iberostar’s rights and 

obligations under both U.S. and European law. Id.

19. Plaintiff correctly states that, the doctrine of comity has “historically been extended to foreign 

proceedings in which a judgment has been rendered.” French Cuff v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115813, *6. See Motion at p. 3. This is not such a case because no 

judgment has been rendered in foreign proceedings here. 

20. Plaintiff asserts the Stay was improperly entered “where there is no judgment from a court in 

another country.” Motion at p. 4. To support her statement, Plaintiff cites to GDG 

Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1025 (11th Cir. 2014). In GDG 

Acquisitions, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a decision by a district court dismissing an action 

on prospective international comity grounds, based on interests “in resolving the dispute in a 

foreign forum.” GDG Acquisitions, 749 F.3d at 1030. Plaintiff’s reference is misplaced 

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because there is not such an interest here. Far from asking this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

action to have it “resolv[ed]” in Spain, Iberostar is seeking permission in Europe to engage in 

litigation in the U.S. Id. The outcome in GDG Acquisitions is inapposite here. 

21. Plaintiff further quotes a Second Circuit case, Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular Del 

Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997), and its holding that Courts will not yield to foreign 

proceedings, however, if deferring would “be contrary to the policies or prejudicial to the 

interests of the United States.” Id. See Motion at p. 3. Not only is Iberostar not requesting 

that this court yield to foreign proceedings, but Plaintiff failed to argue any policy or interest 

of the United States that is being prejudiced by the Stay, which was granted precisely to allow 

Iberostar to properly appear in this U.S. litigation. In Pravin, the assignee of a creditor sued 

the Republic of Peru and its instrumentality seeking the enforcement of Peruvian debt. Peru 

had started efforts to negotiate the settlement of its unpaid debt and sought the stay of the 

enforcement proceeding in the U.S. to avoid “a creditor stampede to find and attach Peruvian 

assets.” Pravin 109 F.3d at 853. The Second Circuit noted that “extending comity to Peru’s 

debt negotiations [was] only appropriate if it [was] consistent with United States government 

policy.” Pravin 109 F.3d at 855. The Court identified at least two aspects of United States 

policy implicated by that suit, including “the United States strong interest in ensuring” “the 

continuing enforceability of foreign debts owed to United States lenders,” id., and on that basis 

affirmed the district court’s denial of the stay. Here, Plaintiff failed to identify any specific 

United States policy or interest that is being prejudiced by the Order allowing Iberostar to seek 

authority from the European Commission to participate in these proceedings. 

22. Plaintiff also states, quoting Custom Polymers PET, LLC v. Gamma Meccanica SPA, 185 F. 

Supp. 3d 741, 751 (D.S.C. 2016), that “[a]bstention is rarely invoked and only under 

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exceptional circumstances may a federal court order a stay or dismissal of an action to avoid 

duplicative litigation in a foreign country.” Motion at p. 3. Polymers was decided under South 

Carolina law by a South Carolina district court. It is not binding on this court and inapposite 

in this case for several reasons. 

23. First, unlike in Polymers, the purpose of the Stay is not “to avoid duplicative litigation in a 

foreign country,” Polymers, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 751, but to allow time for Iberostar “to obtain 

authorization before filing a response” to this lawsuit, Order at ¶ 1. 

24. Second, the factors considered in Polymers when addressing whether to stay the case under 

principles of international comity followed “the Fourth Circuit[’s] Colorado River abstention 

doctrine,” Polymers, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 751, which was later discussed and applied by the 

Eleventh Circuit in Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th 

Cir. 1994). The Colorado River factors are, however, inapplicable to this case because they 

assume the existence of duplicative litigation in a foreign country, an element that is lacking 

here. Colorado River requires, first, considering “the relative order of the two suits.” 

Polymers, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 751. Obviously Iberostar cannot request permission to appear in 

a U.S. litigation before such litigation has started. The proceeding before the European 

Commission must necessarily come after the Helms-Burton litigation has been brought in the 

U.S. The second factor, i.e., “[w]hether [Florida] is a more convenient forum than [Spain]” is 

not pertinent either because Defendant is not seeking to move this litigation to Spain or to have 

the claims brought by Plaintiff litigated in Spain. Polymers, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 753. The third 

factor, the “source of law in the case,” Polymers, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 751, is also irrelevant 

because the issues to be decided in each proceeding are different and thus subject to different 

applicable laws. The European Commission must decide whether Iberostar should be allowed 

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to participate in the U.S. litigation under Council Regulation 2271/96. This Court will decide 

claims brought under the Helms-Burton Act. Put simply, the analysis under Polymers does 

not work in the case at hand. 

25. Finally, Plaintiff wrongly alleges that Defendant “attempts to supersede United States law with 

foreign law,” Motion at p. 6, by asking this Court to “defer[] to the ‘blocking law’ of another 

country,” id. at p. 5. Defendant, however, is doing the opposite, namely, seeking authorization 

to comply with this Court’s summons despite the blocking law. 

26. In Societe Nationale, the Supreme Court barred an approach that would “effectively subject 

every American court hearing a case involving a national of a contracting state to the internal 

laws of that state.” Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. 

of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987). Unlike in Societe Nationale, Council Regulation 2271/96 

does not apply to every European national before “an American court hearing a case,” but only 

in those few cases arising from the Helms-Burton Act. In any event, in Societe Nationale, the 

party resisting discovery invoked a French blocking statute to avoid to comply with a U.S. 

court discovery request. Here, Iberostar is invoking a European blocking statute, namely, the 

Council Regulation 2271/96, in order to seek the authority to comply with this Court’s 

summons. 

27. Plaintiff also cites to Snowden v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Kan. 1991), 

in which “a district court rejected a defendant’s attempt to use a Canadian blocking statute to 

thwart compliance with an order or subpoena from outside of Ontario.” Motion at pp. 6-7. 

Unlike in Snowden, Iberostar is not seeking to “thwart compliance with an order” from this 

Court, but to pursue an avenue that will allow it to defend itself. Id. And to that end, Defendant 

filed the Application with the European Commission. 

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28. Finally, Plaintiff argues that “a stay of an action brought under Helms-Burton in favor of a 

proceeding to obtain authorization under the EC Blocking Regulation does nothing for 

international comity as the European Union rejects the premise and effect of Title III of the 

Helms-Burton Act just as the United States rejects the premise and effect of the EC Blocking 

Regulation.” Motion at pp. 10-11. This is incorrect. First, Plaintiff adduces no evidence that 

the United States “rejects the premise and effect of the EC Blocking Regulation.” Motion at 

p. 11. Second, staying the U.S. proceeding to allow Defendant to obtain an authorization 

promotes international comity because allowing Iberostar to pursue such -authorization, 

despite the conflict over permissibility of extra-territoriality between the Helms-Burton Act 

and the Council Regulation 2271/96, enables Iberostar to appear before the European 

Commission and establish a record of compliance while the Court establishes and expresses 

understanding and due regard to foreign nations without any serious impairment to Plaintiff’s 

rights. 

II. The Stay Is Neither Immoderate nor Indefinite, but Fully Consistent With 

Eleventh Circuit’s Precedent. 

29. In exercising its discretion to stay a case pending resolution of “related proceedings in another 

forum, the district court must limit properly the scope of the stay.” Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1264. 

A stay must not be “immoderate.” CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp., 685 F.2d 

1284, 1288 (11th Cir.1982). “[A] stay is immoderate and hence unlawful unless so framed in 

its inception that its force will be spent within reasonable limits, so far at least as they are 

susceptible of prevision and description.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 257. In considering whether a 

stay is “immoderate,” the Eleventh Circuit examines “both the scope of the stay (including its 

potential duration) and the reasons cited by the district court for the stay.” Trujillo, 221 F.3d 

at 1264. 

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30. The “reasons cited by the district court for the stay,” id., are to provide an opportunity to 

Defendant to obtain an authorization before the European Commission. In the Order, this 

Court determined that, “in the interest of international comity . . . it [was] appropriate to stay 

this case pending the Iberostar’s request for authorization from the European Commission.” 

Order at ¶ 2. The reasons are consistent with abstention principles, including international 

comity, and with binding precedent. See ¶¶14-28 above. 

31. The scope of the Stay and its potential duration was consistent with the Stay’s goal. The Order 

took into account that the “request for authorization ha[d] already been filed and is currently 

pending before the European Commission.” Order at ¶ 2. On June 22, 2020, the European 

Commission confirmed that it was “assessing [Defendant’s] application,” and that the 

Commission does “[its] utmost to ensure that a decision is taken in due course.” See ¶ 5 above. 

The European Commission continues to work on Iberostar’s Application and has recently 

requested additional information. See ¶¶ 6-7 above.

32. Plaintiff alleges that the “Eleventh Circuit has found that a district court abused its discretion 

when it stayed ‘a case pending the resolution of related proceedings in another forum . . .’ 

Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1264.” Motion at p. 4. The facts in Trujillo, however, were very different 

from the facts in this case. 

33. In Trujillo, Banco Central del Ecuador brought suit in a Bahamian court against several 

members of the Trujillo family and several companies associated with the Trujillos. The 

Eleventh Circuit found the stay to be “indefinite in scope” because the “stay appear[ed] to 

expire only after a trial of the Bahamian case and the exhaustion of appeals in that case.” 

Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1264. Also because “the Bahamian case [was] not progressing quickly.” 

Id. In support of its holding the Eleventh Circuit cited to two cases, American Manuf. Mut. 

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Ins.Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc., 743 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.1984) and CTI–Container 

Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp., 685 F.2d 1284 (11th Cir.1982). 

34. In Stone, the Eleventh Circuit found the stay of federal court proceedings pending conclusion 

of state court proceedings indefinite where the state proceedings had been pending for 18 

months and no trial date had been set in state court. Stone, 743 F.2d at 1524. 

35. In CTI-Container, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a decision to stay a federal litigation pending 

determination by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal of its jurisdiction to hear claims, on 

the basis of an agreement between the United States and the Government of Iran. CTI–

Container, 685 F.2d at 1288. The Eleventh Court’s rationale to vacate the stay in CTIContainer was mostly because there was “no way to estimate the months or even years that 

may pass before [the pending claims in the parallel litigation] are decided by the Iran-United 

States Claims Tribunal.” CTI–Container, 685 F.2d at 1287. 

36. In the words of the Eleventh Circuit, in both CTI-Container and Stone the stay requests were 

denied because they “involved stays resulting in indefinite delays pending the outcome of 

proceedings that were unlikely to control or to narrow substantially the claims or unresolved 

issues in the stayed lawsuit.” Miccosukee, 559 F.3d at 1197. This is not the case here. 

37. This case has not been stayed pending parallel litigation before a foreign court. The distinction 

is of paramount importance in this case. The Stay is not of indefinite nature because it will 

expire as soon as the European Commission resolves Iberostar’s Application, which it has been 

actively considering for 90 days now. There is no need to wait for a “trial of [a] Bahamian 

case and the exhaustion of appeals,” like there was in Trujillo. Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1264. 

There is no pending state court parallel proceeding that has caused this litigation to be stayed 

for 18 months, like the case in Stone. Stone, 743 F.2d at 1524. Finally, there is no agreement 

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between two countries, like Iran and the United States, that has made a foreign tribunal 

question whether it has jurisdiction to determine the foreign dispute that caused the U.S. 

litigation to be stayed, like there was in CTE-Container. CTI–Container, 685 F.2d at 1288. 

This stay has nothing to do with waiting for a full, complex and long foreign proceeding to 

finalize: Iberostar requested authorization to file a Motion to Dismiss; the European 

Commission is actively considering the petition, and Defendant is swiftly providing the 

Commission with any information it needs so that it can resolve Iberostar’s Application as 

soon as possible. 

38. In Trujillo the fact that “the record indicate[d] that the Bahamian case [was] not progressing,” 

played a strong role in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to have the stay vacated. Trujillo, 221 

F.3d at 1264. Here, the European Commission has been in close contact with Defendant and 

it does “[its] utmost to ensure that a decision is taken in due course.” See ¶ 5 above. 

39. Furthermore, to vacate the stay in Trujillo, the Eleventh Circuit considered that “courts 

regularly permit parallel proceedings in an American court and a foreign court.” Trujillo, 221 

F.3d at 1265 (internal citations omitted). Here, the authorization proceeding before the 

European Commission and this U.S. litigation cannot proceed in parallel. Iberostar is seeking 

permission to comply with this Court’s summons, which Iberostar cannot do unless it is 

expressly authorized. Otherwise, “Iberostar faces EUR 600,000 in sanctions for each breach 

for failure to first obtain authorization.” Order at ¶ 2. 

 

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III. CONCLUSIONS 

40. The Stay is warranted, consistent with Eleventh Circuit’s precedent, and necessary for 

Iberostar to obtain authorization to comply with this Court’s summons. 

41. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests the Motion be denied. 

Filed this 10th day of August, 2020. 

Respectfully Submitted, 

Counsel for Iberostar 

HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 

701 Brickell Avenue 

Suite 3300 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone: (305) 374-8500 

Facsimile: (305) 789-7799 

Email: adolfo.jimenez@hklaw.com 

Email: katharine.menendez@hklaw.com

By: /s/Adolfo E. Jiménez 

Adolfo E. Jiménez 

Fla. Bar No. 869295 

Katharine Menéndez de la Cuesta 

Fla. Bar No. 125633 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 10, 2020, a true and correct copy of this RESPONSE 

TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO LIFT STAY was filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF 

system which will send notification of the filing to all counsel and parties of record. 

/s/Adolfo E. Jiménez 

Adolfo E. Jiménez 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 14-4 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2020 Page 16 of 16 Case 1:20-cv-20078-RNS Document 22 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/2020 Page 16 of 16