UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 1:20-cv-23278-GAYLES/GOODMAN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

APPROXIMATELY $9,105,221.62 IN FUNDS (PLUS

INTEREST) CURRENTLY HELD BY THE UNITED 

STATES MARSHALS SERVICE REPRESENTING 95%

OF THE NET PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE 

REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 500 WEST 

JEFFERSON STREET, LOUISVILLE, KY 40202

KNOWN AS PNC PLAZA

Defendant.

________________________________________________/

CLAIMANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT TO ECF NO. 207

AND REQUEST FOR BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 1 of 13
Claimants Mordechai Korf, Uriel Laber, Optima CBD Investments, LLC (“Optima CBD”), 

and CBD 500, LLC (“CBD 500”) (collectively, “Claimants”), pursuant to this Court’s Paperless 

Order Granting the Government’s Motion to Suspend Deadlines Surrounding Claimants’ Motion 

to Dismiss, (ECF No. 207), (the “Order”) hereby respectfully request that this Court issue a 

briefing schedule on Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint with Prejudice 

(ECF No. 196) (the “Motion to Dismiss”). 

In its Order, the Court invited the parties to seek reconsideration if “there is no ruling within 

sixty days of the Government’s Motion to Stay being fully briefed.” As of today, the Government’s

motion to stay this case (ECF No. 201) has been fully briefed for sixty days, the Claimants’ Motion 

to Dismiss has been pending for more than six months, and this case has been pending for more 

than three years. As Claimants already have shown, the Government’s motion to stay is meritless 

and there is no valid basis for a stay. The plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1) requires a 

finding that “civil discovery” will adversely affect a related criminal investigation in order for the 

Government to obtain a stay in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Here, indisputably, the Claimants 

have not sought and do not seek civil discovery, and the Court can and should decide the pending 

Motion to Dismiss without any. The Government’s desire to avoid defending its deficient pleading 

is not a valid basis for a stay.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

More than three years ago, the Government commenced this action by filing a civil 

forfeiture complaint that named as the in rem defendant the rights and interests of Optima CBD 

and CBD 500 in PNC Corporate Plaza Holdings, LLC. See Case No. 20-cv-23279, ECF No. 1 ¶ 

10. Claimants moved to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that the complaint failed to allege a cognizable 

in rem defendant and also failed to plead a substantial connection between the purported in rem

defendant and any alleged underlying criminal activity. See Case No. 20-cv-23279, ECF No. 78 at 

16-18 (the “First Motion to Dismiss). After denying the Government’s prior motion to stay these 

proceedings, ECF No. 46 (the “First Motion to Stay”), this Court ultimately recommended 

dismissal without prejudice (ECF No. 164) (the “R&R”) and Judge Gayles affirmed and adopted 

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 2 of 13
the R&R on January 3, 2023, while permitting the Government an opportunity to amend. See ECF 

No. 185 & 186. On January 5, 2023, the Government filed its first amended complaint. ECF No. 

187 (the “FAC”). 

On February 10, 2023, Claimants moved to dismiss the Government’s FAC with prejudice,

(ECF No. 196) (the “Motion to Dismiss”), and, on March 8, 2023, Judge Gayles referred the 

Motion to Dismiss to this Court for “a report and recommendation.” ECF No. 198. Yet instead of 

responding to the Motion to Dismiss, on May 18, 2023, thirteen days after Claimants answered the 

Governments Second Set of Special Interrogatories, the Government (again) moved to stay these 

proceedings, (ECF No. 201) (the “Second Motion to Stay”), claiming that 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1)

requires an indefinite stay. But the District Court has already rejected the exact same argument in 

denying the First Motion to Stay, the parties have already fully and finally litigated the First Motion 

to Dismiss, and Claimants – over three years into this case – have still not sought any discovery. 

See ECF No. 46; ECF No. 55 at 2-3 (response in opposition to First Motion to Stay noting that 

“the United States fails to explain how the resolution of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim as a matter of law will adversely affect a criminal investigation” and that “[a] Rule 

12(b)(6) motion addresses not the bases for the factual allegations, but only whether the facts 

alleged state a claim as a matter of law.”); ECF No. 75 (Omnibus Order) (“The Court denies the 

government’s motion to stay the Kentucky action, case no. 20-cv-23279.”); see also ECF No. 77 

at 10:17, 16:5-9 (transcript of hearing on motion to stay, with counsel noting that Claimants are 

“not invoking civil discovery” and that “[t]he rule requires that the government show that civil 

discovery will adversely affect the criminal proceeding, but if [Claimants] are not invoking civil 

discovery, the [Government] can’t meet that test and [Claimants] are not invoking civil 

discovery.”). The Government’s latest attempt to avoid defending its flawed pleadings – by again

claiming that responding to a motion to dismiss will cause irreparable harm to a criminal 

investigation – is even more unavailing today than its first attempt, which was properly denied in 

2021. The First Motion to Dismiss has already been extensively litigated and ruled on by the Court

without any “cat out of the bag” discovery intruding into an alleged criminal investigation. Given 

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 3 of 13
the procedural background, the briefing and resolution of the Motion to Dismiss will not cause 

irreparable harm but will instead proceed on well-trodden ground. 

Yet despite all this history, on May 18, 2023, the Government moved this Court to suspend 

the Government’s obligation to respond to the Motion to Dismiss pending resolution of the Second 

Motion to Stay. See ECF No. 202. Because the Second Motion to Stay is “pending before Judge 

Gayles,” Claimants responded that they did not oppose a “limited, temporary suspension of the 

Government’s deadline to respond to Claimants’ Second Motion to Dismiss” and Claimants 

“agree[d] to briefly defer the Government’s obligation to respond to the Motion to Dismiss.” ECF 

No. 206. That same day, this Court granted the Government’s unopposed motion to suspend 

deadlines, but invited the parties to “file a motion to reconsider” in the event that “there is no ruling 

within sixty days of the Government’s Motion to Stay being fully briefed[.]” ECF No. 207. As of 

yesterday, the Second Motion to Stay has been fully briefed for 60 days. 

ARGUMENT

Throughout the three-year lifespan of this civil forfeiture case, the Government has sought 

to indefinitely stay this proceeding at every step. Having received a second chance to plead its 

forfeiture claim, the Government — rather than defend its insufficient FAC —continues its efforts

to delay this proceeding without end. See generally ECF No. 201; ECF No. 202. As it 

unsuccessfully argued before, the Government contends, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1), that it 

need not respond to the Motion to Dismiss and that its obligation to respond should be suspended

indefinitely because responding to Claimants’ legal arguments will adversely affect a related 

criminal investigation.

The fundamental and ultimately fatal problem with the Government’s argument is that 18 

U.S.C. § 981(g)(1) requires the Government prove that “civil discovery will adversely affect the 

ability of the Government to conduct a related criminal investigation or the prosecution of a related 

criminal case.” (emphasis added). Quite simply, the statute does not apply,1and the Government’s 

1

In the Response in Opposition to the Government’s Second Motion to Stay, Claimants show that

18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1) does not apply. See ECF No. 208.

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 4 of 13
effort to avoid responding to the Second Motion to Dismiss should be denied because Claimants 

are not seeking civil discovery of any kind. Contrary to the Government’s position, a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, including a motion based on the statute of limitations, does not 

constitute, or require, “civil discovery.” Rather, with some limited exceptions, in considering a 

motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, and the 

Government need only defend the legal (not factual) soundness of the claims it asserts in FAC. 

The Government’s Second Motion to Stay is therefore based upon a red herring because the 

Claimants have not propounded any discovery, and instead only seek to dismiss the FAC for failure 

to state a claim as a matter of law. 

At bottom, the plain language of the statute requires “civil discovery” that will adversely 

affect an investigation for the Government to obtain a stay. Here, indisputably, the Claimants have 

not sought and do not seek any civil discovery, and the Court can and should decide the pending 

Motion to Dismiss without any. The Government commenced this action nearly three years ago 

and Claimants have been wrongfully separated from their property for far too long. The 

Government should be required to defend its claims as a matter of law, just as they had to do so 

with their original complaint. 

1. The Claimants Do Not Seek “Discovery” So § 981(g) is Irrelevant

Under Section 981(g)(1), a court must stay “the civil forfeiture proceeding if the court 

determines that civil discovery will adversely affect the ability of the Government to conduct a 

related criminal investigation or the prosecution of a related criminal case.” (emphasis added). Yet, 

at this point in this matter, there is no prospect of civil discovery, since Claimants have not 

requested any. For that reason alone, the Government’s motion should be denied. The statute 

requires that civil discovery exist, and the government is entitled to a stay under 18 U.S.C. § 

981(g)(1) only if that discovery “will adversely affect the ability of the Government to conduct a 

related criminal investigation or the prosecution of a related criminal case.” (emphasis added); see 

also United States v. $3,592.00 United States Currency, 15-CV-6511-FPG, 2016 WL 5402703, at 

*1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (“Importantly, the government’s burden is not simply to show that 

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 5 of 13
civil discovery could adversely affect the criminal case, but to show that civil discovery will

adversely affect the criminal case.”) (emphasis in original). Absent any civil discovery whatsoever, 

let alone any showing of an adverse impact an ongoing criminal investigation, there is no basis in 

the statute or otherwise for the stay the Government seeks. See United States v. All Funds 

($357,311.68) Contained in N. Tr. Bank of Florida Account No. 7240001868, CIV.A.3:04-CV1476-G, 2004 WL 1834589, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2004) (denying motion to stay under 981(g) 

where “Government fail[ed] to point to any specific discovery request or abuse that has taken 

place”); United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $423,059.02, 12-3054-CV-S-ODS, 2012 

WL 1950218, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 30, 2012) (denying motion to stay and finding “Claimants 

warrant they will not seek any discovery from the United States in this forfeiture action. This 

would seem to address the government’s concerns.”). The Government does not, and cannot, show 

that responding to Claimants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion is the equivalent of civil discovery, because a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion must necessarily accept the factual allegations as true and respond to them 

on that basis.

In fact, Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal of the FAC, with prejudice, based 

on the Government’s own publicly filed allegations contained therein, and does not rely on any 

civil discovery. Because “the Government’s arguments do nothing more than speculate about how 

civil discovery will adversely affect its criminal investigation,” a stay is improper. All Funds 

($357,311.68), 2004 WL 1834589, at *2; see $3,592.00 U.S. Currency, 2016 WL 5402703, at *1

(“Importantly, the government’s burden is not simply to show that civil discovery could adversely 

affect the criminal case, but to prove that civil discovery will adversely affect the criminal case.”)

(emphasis in original); see also United States v. Leasehold Interests In 118 Ave. D, Apartment 2A, 

754 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[T]he Government should be required to make some 

specific showing of potential harm if the requested discovery is disclosed without being compelled 

to compromise the prosecution of the ongoing related criminal proceeding. Mere conclusory 

allegations of potential abuse or simply the opportunity by the claimant to improperly exploit civil 

discovery, however, will not avail on a motion for a stay.”). Here, the Government cannot meet its 

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 6 of 13
burden to show that civil discovery will adversely impact a criminal investigation because there is 

no civil discovery that will have such an impact.2

Nevertheless, the Government argues in the Second Motion to Stay that, because the 

Claimants have asked the Court to take judicial notice of certain publicly available records from 

the U.S. Department of State, the Motion to Dismiss therefore somehow seeks “to delve into 

factual matters at the motion to dismiss stage, the litigation of which threatens to adversely impact 

the ongoing criminal investigation.” ECF No. 201 at 9. The Government is wrong.

The exhibits upon which Claimants rely in their Motion to Dismiss – State Department 

emails produced pursuant to FOIA requests – are subject to judicial notice. See Hetherington v. 

Madden, 2022 WL 18356994, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2022) (court may take judicial notice of 

documents available publicly on official state websites, especially where there is no dispute as to 

“the substance or accuracy”); Awodiuya v. Ross University School of Medecine, 2019 WL 

13244298, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2019) (taking judicial notice of documents obtained through a 

FOIA request). Despite these records’ public availability, the Government (incredibly) insinuates 

in its Reply in Support of its Second Motion to Stay (ECF No. 211) that the State Department 

FOIA emails cannot be verified and might be inauthentic. See id. at 4 n.1 (“the government will 

urge the Court not to take judicial notice of Claimants’ exhibits. Claimants’ earlier submissions 

were unreliable, but at least they purported to come from Ukrainian courts.”). In fact, all of 

Claimants’ exhibits are readily accessible on the State Department’s own FOIA website. See 

https://foia.state.gov/Search/Search.aspxs

• Exhibit 1 (ECF No. 196-1) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=%22C06833620%22&begi

nDate=&endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=

2 Even if the Government adequately showed that discovery in this matter will adversely affect a 

related criminal investigation, which it has not, the case should not be stayed if “a well-crafted 

protective order limiting discovery could ‘protect the interest’ of the government while preserving 

the ability of the claimants to pursue the civil case.” United States v. Sum of $70,990,605, 4 F. 

Supp. 3d 209, 214 (D.D.C. 2014).

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 7 of 13
• Exhibit 2 (ECF No. 196-2) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=%22C06833617%22&begi

nDate=&endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=

• Exhibit 3 (ECF No. 196-3) is available at: 

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=C06833603&beginDate=&

endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=

• Exhibit 4 (ECF No. 196-4) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=C06833602&beginDate=&

endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=

• Exhibit 5 (ECF No. 196-5) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=C06833292&beginDate=&

endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=

• Exhibit 6 (ECF No. 196-6) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=C06832514&beginDate=&

endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=

• Exhibit 7 (ECF No. 196-7) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=C06833502&beginDate=&

endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=

• Exhibit 8 (ECF No. 196-8) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=%22Lutsenko%20and%20

Kolomoisky%22&beginDate=&endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEnd

Date=&caseNumber=

• Exhibit 9 (ECF No. 196-9) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=%22totally%20stinks%22

&beginDate=&endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNum

ber=

• Exhibit 10 (ECF No. 196-10) is available at:

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 8 of 13
o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=%22demands%20resignati

on%20of%20PG%20Lutsenko%22&beginDate=&endDate=&publishedBeginDat

e=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=

• Exhibit 11 (ECF No. 196-11) is available at:

o https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?searchText=%22Danyliuk%20Meeting

%20Request%22&beginDate=&endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEnd

Date=&caseNumber=

The Government’s insinuation that Claimants’ exhibits are inauthentic and cannot be verified 

because the “source” is far from one “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” ECF No. 

211 at 4, is particularly misplaced, and frankly odd, given the source of the exhibits is the 

Government’s own FOIA website.

Contrary to the Government’s assertion that Claimants “have gone beyond the pleadings 

and asked the Court to weigh factual contentions and evidence,” ECF No. 201 at 9, judicially 

noticeable facts fall squarely within the corners of the pleadings and are properly considered on a 

motion to dismiss. See American Marine Tech, Inc. v. World Group Yachting, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 

3d 1075, 1081 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“A court properly takes judicial notice of relevant public records 

in deciding a motion to dismiss, and consideration of such documents does not convert a motion 

to dismiss into one for summary judgment”); Leroy v. Medtronic, Inc., 2015 WL 4600880, at *5 

(N.D. Fla. Jul. 29, 2015) (courts in this circuit may take judicial notice of public records “whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” without “transforming a motion to dismiss...into a 

motion for summary judgment”).

Claimants submitted the State Department emails to show that the Government was aware 

of PrivatBank’s nationalization and the alleged crimes committed against PrivatBank that underly 

the claims in the FAC in 2016 and 2017, which would render the Government’s forfeiture action 

time-barred. The Claimants therefore asked the Court to take judicial notice of those emails 

produced by the State Department on a publicly available FOIA website. See ECF No. 196 at 15-

16. The Government is free, in opposing the Motion to Dismiss, to argue that the State Department 

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 9 of 13
documents are not subject to judicial notice (they are), and/or that they do not show on their face 

that the Government knew or should have known about the alleged offenses upon which its claims 

are based at the time the documents were created (they do). Neither of those arguments, however, 

require civil discovery, thus Section 981(g) does not apply and the Government is not entitled to a 

stay.

Regardless, Claimants’ argument concerning the five-year limitations period is only one of 

numerous reasons the FAC should be dismissed. See Motion to Dismiss at 9-20. Even if the Court 

finds that consideration of that argument – and the State Department documents upon which it 

relies – would be improper at this stage, the Court should still dismiss the FAC based on the 

remainder of Claimants’ arguments, none of which require consideration of the State Department 

documents or anything other than the publicly-filed allegations in the Government’s own FAC. 

See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss at 9-14 (FAC should be dismissed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)’s 

one-year limitations period); 14-15 (FAC should be dismissed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(d)’s 

two-year limitations period); 16-19 (FAC should be dismissed for failing to adequately allege 

substantial connection between in rem defendant and alleged underlying offense). The 

Government does not argue, because it cannot argue, that responding to these arguments will 

involve civil discovery, or even require the Court to consider facts outside of the four corners of 

the FAC. Accordingly, the Government’s motion should be denied because the Government has 

failed to show that (non-existent) civil discovery will adversely impact an ongoing criminal 

investigation as required under Section 981(g).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Government’s invocation of 18 U.S.C. § 981(g) to 

suspend all briefing on Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss is improper. 

2. The Government Fails to Meet the Requirements for Reconsideration

As discussed in the procedural background, the District Court denied the Government’s

previous attempt to stay the case and briefing on the First Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 46; 

ECF No. 55 at 2-3; ECF No. 75; ECF No. 77 at 10:17, 16:5-9. After the District Court’s denial, 

the Government then attempted to renew its motion to stay through an ore tenus motion presented 

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 10 of 13
to the District Court on May 25, 2022, and the District Court again declined to stay briefing on the 

First Motion to Dismiss and referred the Motion to this Court for a ruling. Compare ECF No. 134 

at 5:16-17 (during a May 25, 2022 Status Conference, Government arguing that “a stay under 

981(g) would be appropriate here”) with ECF No. 132 (May 25, 2022 Order referring Motion to 

Dismiss to Judge Goodman “for a ruling”). Nevertheless, yet again, the Government attempts to 

seek a stay under § 981(g). 

This latest attempt, although couched in terms of a new motion, is in reality nothing more 

than a thinly veiled motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s previous order denying the 

First Motion to Stay. Yet the Government entirely fails to satisfy the requisite legal standard for 

reconsideration. See United States v. Dean, No. 20- 11603, 2020 WL 7655426, at *2 (11th Cir. 

Dec. 23, 2020) (“A party’s disagreement with the court’s decision, absent a showing of manifest 

error, is not sufficient to demonstrate entitlement to relief.”). The Government may disagree with 

the Court’s prior denial of a stay, but “[a] motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for the 

moving party . . . to instruct the court on how the court ‘could have done it better’ the first time.” 

N.A.S. v. MORADA-Haute Furniture Boutique, LLC, 1:20-CV-24676, 2022 WL 17583629, at *1 

(S.D. Fla. July 26, 2022) (Gayles, J.) (quoting Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb's History, Inc. v. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 916 F. Supp. 1557, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995)). And yet, that is 

precisely what the Government is doing. 

In its Second Motion to Stay, the Government complains that its First Motion to Stay was 

“previously denied . . . without explanation” or “without written explanation following a hearing.” 

ECF No. 201 at 2, 4. Indeed, the Government points out that the “first motion to dismiss 

highlighted” the necessity of staying this case “in order to avoid adverse effects on the ongoing 

criminal investigation.” Id. at 2. In other words, the Government contends that the First Motion to 

Stay was wrongly decided because the briefing on the First Motion to Dismiss should have been 

stayed and the District Court, to the Government’s dismay, issued its decision “without 

explanation.” In sum, the Government seeks reconsideration without bothering to try to satisfy the 

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 11 of 13
legal requirements for reconsideration because those legal requirements cannot be met. The 

Government’s thinly disguised attempt at reconsideration is meritless and improper. 

The District Court’s denial of the Government’s serial stay requests was correct at the time 

and remains correct now. The Government’s desire to avoid scrutiny of the flawed claims in the 

FAC is no reason to reconsider the District Court’s previous rulings. 

Indeed, given the extensive litigation of the First Motion to Dismiss, it defies credulity for 

the Government to argue that the instant Motion to Dismiss somehow poses any new and distinct 

dangers to its criminal investigation (which argument is irrelevant in any event as Section 981(g) 

does not provide for a stay absent civil discovery). The First Motion to Dismiss was extensively 

briefed and argued, and this Court recommended dismissal in the 84-page R&R, which was 

affirmed and adopted in its entirety. The Government cannot explain how responding to the legal 

arguments raised in the instant Motion to Dismiss requires civil discovery or would otherwise 

require disclosure of facts that would adversely impact an ongoing criminal investigation –

especially given that the parties and the Court have already been down this road. In short, the 

Government fails to meet its burden for reconsideration of the District Court’s decisions. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Claimants respectfully request that the Court deny the Motion 

to Suspend Deadlines Surrounding Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 202) and set a briefing 

schedule on Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 12 of 13
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robert T. Dunlap

Velvel (Devin) Freedman 

Robert T. Dunlap (FL Bar No. 119509)

Colleen Smeryage

Friedman Normand Friedland, LLP

1 SE 3rd Avenue, Suite 1250

Miami, FL 33131

Tel: (786) 924-2900

vel@fnf.law

rdunlap@fnf.law 

csmeryage@fnf.law 

Howard M. Srebnick (FL Bar No. 919063)

Zaharah Markoe (FL Bar No. 504734)

Black Srebnick

201 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 1300

Miami, FL 33131

Tel: (305) 371-6421

Hsrebnick@royblack.com

Zmarkoe@royblack.com

Marc E. Kasowitz 

Mark P. Ressler

Joshua N. Paul

Pro Hac Vice Anticipated

Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP

1633 Broadway

New York, New York 10019

Tel: (212) 506-1700 

Mkasowitz@kasowitz.com

MRressler@kasowitz.com

Jpaul@kasowitz.com 

Attorneys for Claimants

Case 1:20-cv-23278-DPG Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2023 Page 13 of 13