EXHIBIT A

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

CASE NO.: 20-cv-23287-DPG 

LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, 

MARIA TERESA RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a 

MARIA TERESA LANDA, 

ALFREDO RAMON FORNS, 

RAMON ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, 

RAUL LORENZO RODRIGUEZ, 

CHRISTINA CONROY, and 

FRANCISCO RAMON RODRIGUEZ, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, 

CORPORACIÓN HABANOS, S.A., 

WPP PLC, YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC, 

and BCW LLC, a/k/a BURSON COHN & 

WOLFE LLC, 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS BY 

DEFENDANTS WPP PLC, YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC, AND BCW LLC

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1 

BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................3 

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................5 

I. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

OVER WPP, Y&R, AND BCW ......................................................................................... 5 

A. Plaintiffs Correctly Do Not Assert That WPP Defendants Are Subject To 

General Jurisdiction In Florida ................................................................................6 

B. Plaintiffs Fail To Establish Specific Jurisdiction Over WPP, Y&R, Or BCW 

Under Florida’s Long-Arm Statute ..........................................................................7 

1. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute Does Not Authorize Specific Jurisdiction 

Because None Of The Allegedly Tortious Activities Took Place In 

Florida ..........................................................................................................7 

2. The Allegedly Tortious Activities Of Y&R And BCW Cannot Be 

Imputed To WPP Under Agency Theory To Establish Jurisdiction ..........10 

C. Exercising Jurisdiction Would Violate Defendants’ Due Process Rights .............11 

1. The Alleged Confiscation Of The RRHSC Property Does Not “Arise 

Out Of Or Relate To” WPP Defendants’ Activity .....................................12 

2. There Is No “Purposeful Availment” Because WPP Did Not Have 

Minimum Contacts With The United States ..............................................13 

3. The Exercise Of Specific Personal Jurisdiction Does Not Comport 

With “Traditional Notions Of Fair Play And Substantial Justice” ............14 

II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE THAT WPP, Y&R, AND BCW UNLAWFULLY 

“TRAFFICKED” IN CONFISCATED PROPERTY ....................................................... 15 

III. PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE ..................................................................................................................... 19 

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................20 

REQUEST FOR HEARING ..........................................................................................................21 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

CASES 

Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 

751 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2014) .....................................................................................................9 

Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regul., Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty., 

221 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2000) ...............................................................................................14 

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 

480 U.S. 102 (1987) ...........................................................................................................14, 15 

Associated Transp. Line, Inc. v. Productos Fitosanitarios Proficol El Carmen, 

S.A., 

197 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................6 

Blue Water Int’l, Inc. v. Hattrick’s Irish Sports Pub, LLC, 

No. 8:17-cv-1584-T-23AEP, 2017 WL 4182405 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2017) ...........................9 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 

137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) .............................................................................................................12 

Bryant v. Dupree, 

252 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2001) ...............................................................................................19 

BTG Patent Holdings, LLC v. Bag2Go, GmbH, 

193 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2016) ....................................................................................14 

Calder v. Jones, 

465 U.S. 783 (1984) .................................................................................................................13 

Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 

267 U.S. 333 (1925) .................................................................................................................10 

Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 

789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................6 

Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood Equity Partners L.P., 

960 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) .....................................................................................7, 8 

Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine), Ltd. v. Charman, 

635 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ...........................................................................................7 

Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 

216 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2000) ...............................................................................................10 

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Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

571 U.S. 117 (2014) ...............................................................................................................6, 7 

Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 

No. 19-22619-Civ-Scola, 2020 WL 2733729 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020)...............................7, 8 

Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 

593 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2010) ...............................................................................................14

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 

485 U.S. 568 (1988) ...........................................................................................................18, 19 

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 

141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) .......................................................................................................12, 13 

Glen v. Trip Advisor LLC, 

No. 19-1809-LPS, 2021 WL 1200577 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2021) ..............................................19 

Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

No. 19-23988-Civ-Scola, 2020 WL 2323032 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2020).................................19 

Gonzalez v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

835 F. App’x 1011 (11th Cir. 2021) ........................................................................................19 

Hard Candy, LLC v. Hard Candy Fitness, LLC, 

106 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (S.D. Fla. 2015) ..............................................................................10, 11 

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310 (1945) .................................................................................................................11 

Kountze v. Kountze, 

996 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 2008) ................................................................................................8 

Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 

261 F. App’x 274 (11th Cir. 2008) ..........................................................................................19 

Licciardello v. Lovelady, 

544 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................................13 

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 

736 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2013) ....................................................................................... passim

Madara v. Hall, 

916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1990) .............................................................................................5, 6 

Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 

288 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002) .........................................................................................10, 14 

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Melgarejo v. Pycsa Pan., S.A., 

537 F. App’x 852 (11th Cir. 2013) ......................................................................................7, 20 

Mother Doe I v. Al Maktoum, 

632 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ....................................................................................11 

Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 

851 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2017) ...............................................................................................18 

Pathman v. Grey Flannel Auctions, Inc., 

741 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2010) ......................................................................................7 

Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 

558 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................................14, 15 

Prunty v. Arnold & Itkin LLP, 

753 F. App’x 731 (11th Cir. 2018) ....................................................................................7, 8, 9 

Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 

450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................................5, 6 

Taylor v. Moskow, 

717 F. App’x 836 (11th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................8 

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 

425 U.S. 748 (1976) .................................................................................................................18 

Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 

314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................19 

Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp., 

901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018) ...............................................................................................11 

Walden v. Fiore, 

571 U.S. 277 (2014) .................................................................................................................12 

Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 

No. 8:12-cv-755-T-26TBM, 2012 WL 5830590 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2012), .........................10 

STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 

22 U.S.C. § 6023(13) (2018) .......................................................................................15, 16, 17, 18 

22 U.S.C. §§ 6081 et seq. (2018) ..............................................................................................1, 17 

22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (2018) ............................................................................................................15 

Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2020)....................................................................................................... passim

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k) ................................................................................................................1, 6, 11 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and (6) .......................................................................................................1 

OTHER AUTHORITIES 

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 

W. Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affs. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 

104th Cong. 152 (1995) (statement of Ignacio E. Sanchez) ....................................................18 

Jason Rotstein, The Legacy of the Libertad Act: Defeating Title III Claims and 

Protecting International Comity, Harv. Int’l Law Journal Online, 

https://harvardilj.org/2019/11/the-legacy-of-the-libertad-act-defeating-title-iiiclaims-and-protecting-international-comity/ (last accessed Apr. 28, 2021) ............................18 

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-17-201, Cuba: U.S. Policy Changes 

Increased Engagement with Private Sector 9, 50 (2016) .........................................................16 

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Defendants WPP plc (“WPP”), Young & Rubicam LLC (“Y&R”), and BCW LLC 

(“BCW”) (collectively, “WPP Defendants”) respectfully submit this memorandum of law in 

support of their motion to dismiss with prejudice the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (6). 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

Plaintiffs sue under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081 et seq. (2018), to 

recover the value of the “RRHSC Property,” a cigarette factory allegedly confiscated by the Cuban 

government in 1961. ECF No. 82 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 1–3. Plaintiffs do not claim that any WPP 

Defendant has—or has ever had—any ownership interest in or control over the RRHSC Property, 

or has ever used the RRHSC Property. Rather, the amended complaint contends that WPP 

Defendants were hired to “market and publicize” products made by Defendants Imperial Brands 

plc (“Imperial”) and/or Corporación Habanos S.A. (“Habanos”) at the RRHSC Property. Id. ¶ 11. 

In particular, the amended complaint alleges that WPP Defendants have managed the YouTube, 

Twitter, and Instagram “portals” for Imperial and/or Habanos since 2017. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiffs seek 

to hold all three WPP Defendants liable for three times the value of the RRHSC Property based on 

this alleged marketing and social media activity. This claim must be dismissed with prejudice. 

This motion addresses two fatal defects in the amended complaint:1

 

First, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over WPP Defendants is improper, under either 

Florida’s long-arm statute or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k). All WPP Defendants are 

incorporated and headquartered outside of Florida. Plaintiffs do not allege that the purportedly 

unlawful marketing activities for Imperial and/or Habanos were undertaken by WPP Defendants’ 

1

 In the joint motion to dismiss filed concurrently, WPP Defendants, Imperial, and Habanos 

identify multiple additional grounds for dismissal, including that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing 

and that Plaintiffs fail to state a Title III claim. ECF No. 91. 

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Florida-based employees—indeed, declarations from the Chief Financial Officers (“CFOs”) of 

BCW and VMLY&R (the business name under which Y&R currently operates) confirm they were 

not. See Decl. of Gerald Lombardo (“BCW Decl.”) ¶¶ 14–15; Decl. of Jim Bellinghausen 

(“VMLY&R Decl.”) ¶¶ 6, 16–17. Despite being on notice of this fatal defect since at least the 

filing of WPP Defendants’ motion on February 26, 2021, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint contains 

no new allegations connecting WPP Defendants or their marketing activities to Florida.2

Plaintiffs suggest that Y&R or BCW must have subsidiaries that performed the work at 

issue. See Am. Compl. ¶ 32. Yet this is guesswork; Plaintiffs apparently chose to conduct no fact 

investigation regarding which corporate entities actually performed marketing services for 

Habanos. In the two attached declarations, BCW and VMLY&R’s CFOs identify two Spanish 

entities—VMLY&R Madrid S.L. and BCW S.L. (Spain)—as indirect subsidiaries of WPP that 

performed marketing activities for Habanos. BCW Decl. ¶ 21; VMLY&R Decl. ¶ 24. Neither 

Spanish subsidiary has been owned by either BCW or Y&R during the trafficking period alleged 

in the amended complaint. BCW Decl. ¶ 25; VMLY&R Decl. ¶ 28. Moreover, Plaintiffs still fail 

to allege that any of the marketing activity targeted Florida consumers, which is not surprising 

given that Habanos products cannot be sold legally in the U.S. Thus, as was the case with the 

original complaint, the only connection between this case and the forum is that six of the seven 

plaintiffs reside here, which is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. 

2

 Because Plaintiffs still do not tie any WPP Defendants’ employees or activities in Florida, or 

anywhere else in the United States, to any of the relevant marketing activity for Habanos and/or 

Imperial, the Court may dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim as to WPP, Y&R, and BCW without relying on 

either of the two declarations attached to this motion. Similarly, this Court may dismiss the 

amended complaint without considering the declarations and exhibits submitted in support of codefendant Habanos’s motion to dismiss. 

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Second, the vaguely-described marketing services allegedly undertaken by WPP 

Defendants do not constitute “trafficking” under any reasonable understanding of the term. Title 

III was not intended to reach marketing activities by entities that have no ownership or other 

interest in confiscated property and that have made no use of confiscated property. Applying Title 

III to alleged marketing activities would be contrary to the statutory text and Congress’s intent. 

Extending Title III to marketing would implicate constitutional concerns, as it would amount to 

the regulation of speech protected by the First Amendment. WPP Defendants’ alleged marketing 

activity is not proscribed by Title III, and this Court should avoid any overly broad interpretation 

of the statute that would impose severe monetary penalties on protected speech. 

These defects are the same as those identified in WPP Defendants’ original motion to 

dismiss. See ECF No. 74. Plaintiffs failed to rectify—or even address—any of these issues in the 

amended complaint. This continued failure to allege essential facts indicates that Plaintiffs cannot 

state a claim. Moreover, even if WPP’s two Spanish subsidiaries were named as defendants in 

future litigation, the Court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over two foreign subsidiaries 

entirely owned by a foreign parent company with no substantial activity in the forum state or the 

U.S. Allowing Plaintiffs any further amendment to their claims would be futile. 

For the foregoing reasons, WPP Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant this 

motion to dismiss with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

On August 6, 2020, members of the Rodriguez family (“Plaintiffs”) commenced this suit 

in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. ECF No. 1. On February 26, 2021, 

WPP Defendants and Imperial filed both separate and joint motions to dismiss, arguing that 

Plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed for a multitude of reasons, including lack of personal 

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jurisdiction and lack of standing. ECF Nos. 72–74. Rather than oppose the motions, Plaintiffs 

filed an amended complaint. ECF Nos. 82, 84. 

The amended complaint alleges that Plaintiffs own a claim to real property—the RRHSC 

Property—confiscated by Cuba’s Castro government in 1961. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4, 46. According 

to Plaintiffs, Imperial purchased in 2007 an indirect interest in Habanos together with “ownership 

interests” in other non-party entities (collectively referred to, with Habanos, as the “Cuban Joint 

Ventures”). Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 30, 50. Beginning in January 2008, Habanos and the other Cuban Joint 

Ventures allegedly used the RRHSC Property to produce and distribute hand-rolled cigars. Id. 

¶¶ 8–9, 51–52.3

 Plaintiffs allege that Imperial and/or Habanos retained WPP as an “agent,” along 

with WPP’s U.S.-based subsidiaries Y&R and BCW, to “market and publicize” Habanos products 

“since at least 2010.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. Neither the original complaint nor the amended complaint 

describes the scope or form of the alleged marketing activities, except to allege that “no later than 

2017,” Y&R and BCW set up “portals” on social media websites, Twitter, YouTube, and 

Instagram. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiffs continue to offer no factual details concerning the alleged “portals,” 

their accessibility, or their use in advertising Habanos products. 

Possibly in response to the fact that neither Y&R nor BCW has performed any work for 

Imperial or Habanos, VMLY&R Decl. ¶¶ 16–17, BCW Decl. ¶¶ 14–15, the amended complaint 

adds one vague reference to the existence of possible subsidiaries of Y&R and BCW. Am. Compl.

¶ 32 & n.23. Plaintiffs make no further allegation either identifying the new subsidiaries or 

specifying any work they performed. Plaintiffs allege only that “[b]eginning in 2016,” marketing 

3 Plaintiffs assert, “[u]pon information and belief,” that Habanos and non-party Tabacuba have 

used the RRHSC Property since 2010 and “likely for many years before that.” Am. Compl. ¶ 51. 

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responsibility “switched” from non-party Ogilvy,4

 another WPP subsidiary, to Y&R. Id. ¶ 56. 

“[B]eginning in 2019,” marketing “was again switched to still another WPP subsidiary, BCW,” 

which used the same e-mail address that Y&R had allegedly used: press.habanos@yr.com. Id. 

Plaintiffs then allege that Y&R and BCW “each continues to have and to acquire [its] own 

subsidiaries.” Id. ¶ 32. By engaging in these undefined advertising activities—apparently either 

directly or through unnamed subsidiaries—Plaintiffs claim that all three WPP Defendants 

“cause[d], direct[ed] [or] participate[d] in, or profit[ed] from, trafficking” in Habanos products 

“manufactured at, stored in, or distributed from the confiscated RRHSC Property” in violation of 

the Helms-Burton Act. Id. ¶¶ 31, 34–35, 37. 

Like the original complaint, the amended complaint does not identify any connection 

between WPP Defendants and Florida. Though Y&R and BCW have “offices in Miami-Dade,” 

id. ¶¶ 26–27, Plaintiffs do not assert that Y&R or BCW did anything in Florida relevant to this 

suit. Nor do Plaintiffs suggest any advertising was targeted toward—or even seen by—Florida 

residents. Plaintiffs claim they suffered harm in Florida only because most of them reside there. 

Id. ¶ 14.

ARGUMENT 

I. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

OVER WPP, Y&R, AND BCW

A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction must be granted unless the plaintiff 

“establish[es] a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Madara 

v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). A district court accepts facts alleged in the 

4

 Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Ogilvy are irrelevant. Plaintiffs’ own allegations are that Ogilvy 

stopped any Cuba-related marketing work in 2015, Am. Compl. ¶ 56, and thus these actions are 

beyond the statute of limitations for the Helms-Burton Act. Moreover, Ogilvy is a distinct 

corporation that Plaintiffs have now twice declined to name as a defendant in this suit. The Court 

should disregard whatever noise Plaintiffs attempt to make concerning Ogilvy. 

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plaintiff’s complaint as true only if they do not conflict with the defendant’s affidavits and are not 

“vague and conclusory allegations.” Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006). 

When presented with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a 

claim, a district court should address the personal jurisdiction question before addressing whether 

plaintiffs state a claim. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514.

Florida’s long-arm statute provides for two types of personal jurisdiction: (1) specific 

jurisdiction, in which the suit “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to a defendant’s contacts with Florida,” 

and (2) general jurisdiction, in which the defendant “engages in ‘substantial and not isolated 

activity’ in Florida” that is unrelated to the present matter. Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 

789 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)-(2) (2020)). When a foreign 

defendant is without sufficient contacts in any state, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) “permits 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over [these] defendants for claims arising under federal law 

when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole.” Associated Transp. Line, 

Inc. v. Productos Fitosanitarios Proficol El Carmen, S.A., 197 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiffs correctly do not claim that general jurisdiction is proper as to WPP Defendants. 

Plaintiffs incorrectly argue, however, that the Court can exercise specific jurisdiction over all 

defendants under section 48.193(1)(a) of Florida’s long-arm statute, Am. Compl. ¶ 42, or in the 

alternative, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k), id. ¶ 43. The exercise of specific 

jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute or under Rule 4(k) would be improper, and the 

amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as to all WPP Defendants. 

A. Plaintiffs Correctly Do Not Assert That WPP Defendants Are Subject To 

General Jurisdiction In Florida 

General jurisdiction is appropriate only if a corporation’s place of incorporation or 

principal place of business is located in the forum or, in “exceptional” cases, where its operations 

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are “so substantial” that personal jurisdiction is proper. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 

137, 139 n.19 (2014); see also Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, No. 19-22619-Civ-Scola, 2020 WL 

2733729, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020) (“It is clear that a very high threshold must be met in 

order for general jurisdiction to be exercised over a nonresident defendant in Florida.”) (quoting 

Pathman v. Grey Flannel Auctions, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2010)). 

WPP Defendants are not subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because—as the amended 

complaint acknowledges—no WPP Defendant has its place of incorporation or principal place of 

business in the state. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27 (alleging Y&R and BCW are incorporated in 

Delaware with their principal places of business in New York); id. ¶ 25 (alleging WPP “is a limited 

liability company incorporated in the Bailiwick of Jersey”). Nor do Plaintiffs offer any exceptional 

circumstances that could subject WPP, Y&R, or BCW to general jurisdiction in Florida. Thus, 

Plaintiffs rightly do not seek to assert general jurisdiction over any WPP Defendant. 

B. Plaintiffs Fail To Establish Specific Jurisdiction Over WPP, Y&R, Or BCW 

Under Florida’s Long-Arm Statute

1. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute Does Not Authorize Specific Jurisdiction 

Because None Of The Allegedly Tortious Activities Took Place In Florida

Plaintiffs allege that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over WPP Defendants is proper 

under section 48.193(1)(a) of Florida’s long-arm statute. Am. Compl. ¶ 42. Jurisdiction is not 

appropriate under section 48.193(1)(a)(2) unless the cause of action “aris[es] from” the defendant’s 

“[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a). Under Florida law, a 

cause of action “aris[es] from” conduct in the state when there is “a direct affiliation, nexus, or 

substantial connection” between the cause of action and the defendant’s activity. Melgarejo v. 

Pycsa Pan., S.A., 537 F. App’x 852, 860 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Citicorp Ins. Brokers (Marine), Ltd. v. Charman, 635 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)). 

And, to satisfy section 48.193(1)(a)(2), the Florida long-arm statute “expressly requires that the 

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tort be committed in Florida.” Prunty v. Arnold & Itkin LLP, 753 F. App’x 731, 735 (11th Cir. 

2018) (quoting Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood Equity Partners L.P., 960 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2007)). 

Last year in Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, another court in this district declined specific 

jurisdiction over defendants sued under the Helms-Burton Act. 2020 WL 2733729, at *3. The 

plaintiffs in that case argued that the defendants, Expedia, Inc. and Booking.com, unlawfully 

rented hotel rooms at a property confiscated by the Cuban government. See id. Plaintiffs claimed 

that personal jurisdiction was appropriate—and that the tort occurred in Florida—because the 

plaintiffs resided in Florida and websites promoting the rentals were accessible in Florida. See id. 

The court disagreed, finding that the alleged trafficking occurred at the confiscated property in 

Cuba, not through a website. See id. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the tort was 

committed in Florida because the plaintiffs resided there. See id. It accordingly dismissed the 

defendants from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. at *5. 

Plaintiffs’ argument is identical to the claim rejected in Del Valle: Plaintiffs allege that 

tortious acts occurred in Florida because several plaintiffs reside in Florida. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 

31, 34–35. Yet “the existence of an injury within Florida . . . is insufficient to support jurisdiction 

over an out-of-state tortfeasor.” Taylor v. Moskow, 717 F. App’x 836, 841 (11th Cir. 2017) 

(quoting Kountze v. Kountze, 996 So. 2d 246, 252 (Fla. App. 2008)). As in Del Valle, the amended 

complaint’s core allegation is that the Cuban government allegedly confiscated Plaintiffs’ property 

in Cuba. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. No tort occurred in Florida. See Del Valle, 2020 WL 2733729, at *3. 

Plaintiffs attempt to connect their claim to Florida because Y&R and BCW have “offices 

in Miami-Dade” and allegedly set up “‘official’ portals” for Habanos on social media platforms. 

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27, 55. Yet Plaintiffs’ amended complaint still does not allege that Y&R, 

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BCW, or any of Y&R or BCW’s unnamed subsidiaries performed any work for Imperial or 

Habanos in Miami. Nor could they: None of these entities has done any work for either Habanos 

or Imperial in the U.S., let alone in Florida or with Florida-based employees. See VMLY&R Decl. 

¶¶ 16–18; BCW Decl. ¶¶ 14–16.5

 Further, Plaintiffs allege neither a connection between WPP and 

Florida nor any direct activities relevant to this suit that were undertaken by WPP. Y&R and 

BCW’s limited business operations in Florida are unrelated to any alleged work with Habanos or 

Imperial and thus, are insufficient to establish jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute.

Moreover, the minimal allegations regarding WPP Defendants’ marketing activities do not 

show that a “tort [was] committed in Florida,” as required to establish jurisdiction under section 

48.193(1)(a)(2). Prunty, 753 F. App’x at 735. Plaintiffs fail to allege that WPP Defendants’ online 

advertising activities specifically targeted Florida or Floridians, or even that Floridians accessed 

or saw the allegedly unlawful marketing. Plaintiffs claim only that Y&R and BCW assisted in 

setting up “portals” for Imperial to market Habanos products on Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram. 

See Am. Compl. ¶ 12. But the listed social media platforms can be accessed around the world. 

Florida courts recognize that a tort does not occur in the state just because the defendant’s online 

activity is accessible in Florida. See Blue Water Int’l, Inc. v. Hattrick’s Irish Sports Pub, LLC, 

No. 8:17-cv-1584-T-23AEP, 2017 WL 4182405, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2017); cf. Advanced 

Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(arguing that running a website “should not open a defendant up to personal jurisdiction in every 

spot on the planet where that . . . website is accessible”). 

5

 Rather, two Spanish indirect subsidiaries of WPP—VMLY&R Madrid S.L. and BCW S.L. 

(Spain)—previously had contracts to perform marketing for Habanos; neither of those two 

corporations has been in Y&R or BCW’s ownership chains since 2003, well before the period 

relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. VMLY&R Decl. ¶¶ 27–28; BCW Decl. ¶¶ 24–25. 

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Finally, Plaintiffs continue to allege that BCW used the same e-mail address as Y&R when 

it began marketing Habanos products in 2019. Am. Compl. ¶ 56. As WPP Defendants argued 

previously, it is unclear how this fact—even if true—is relevant to jurisdiction. Plaintiffs never 

allege that this e-mail address was used by anyone in Florida or sent e-mails that were received by 

anyone in Florida. Further, no U.S.-based employees of Y&R or BCW or their subsidiaries had 

access to send or receive e-mail from this e-mail account. See VMLY&R Decl. ¶ 21. Thus, 

Plaintiffs do not and cannot allege that any relevant activity relates to Florida. They accordingly 

fail to demonstrate the cause of action “aris[es] from” WPP Defendants’ alleged tortious activity 

as required by section 48.193(1)(a)(2) of the Florida long-arm statute. 

2. The Allegedly Tortious Activities Of Y&R And BCW Cannot Be Imputed 

To WPP Under Agency Theory To Establish Jurisdiction 

Plaintiffs’ only factual allegation related to WPP is described as “us[ing] or allow[ing] its 

U.S. subsidiaries to contract for the use of social media ‘portals.’” Am. Compl. ¶ 38. Yet “a 

foreign parent corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state merely because a 

subsidiary is doing business there.” Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 

1272 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293–94 (11th 

Cir. 2000) (“[A]s long as a parent and a subsidiary are separate and distinct corporate entities, the 

presence of one in a forum state may not be attributed to the other.” (citing Cannon Mfg. Co. v. 

Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 337 (1925))). Rather, the jurisdictional contacts of a 

subsidiary will be imputed to a parent entity only where the parent exercises “day-to-day control 

of the internal affairs or basic operations of the subsidiary.” Hard Candy, LLC v. Hard Candy 

Fitness, LLC, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1241 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (quoting Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. 

Ziplocal, LP, No. 8:12-cv-755-T-26TBM, 2012 WL 5830590, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2012)). 

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Plaintiffs allege that WPP has two U.S.-based subsidiaries, Y&R and BCW, which have 

“offices in Miami-Dade.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27, 31, 34–35. Plaintiffs provide no details about 

WPP Defendants’ corporate relationships or any allegations suggesting WPP exercises day-to-day 

control over Y&R and BCW. Thus, Y&R and BCW’s activities cannot be imputed to WPP. See 

Hard Candy, LLC, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 1241. Because WPP’s alleged ownership of the subsidiaries 

is Plaintiffs’ sole basis for personal jurisdiction over WPP, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 38, this provides 

an independent basis for the dismissal of WPP. 

C. Exercising Jurisdiction Would Violate Defendants’ Due Process Rights 

Application of section 48.193(1)(a)(2) of the Florida long-arm statute and Rule 4(k) must 

satisfy due process.6

 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2); Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 

1312 (11th Cir. 2018). To prove that the exercise of specific jurisdiction affords the defendants 

their due process rights, the plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test, which examines: “(1) whether 

the plaintiff’s claims ‘arise out of or relate to’ . . . the defendant’s contacts with the forum; 

(2) whether the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully availed’ himself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum state . . . ; and (3) whether the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Louis Vuitton 

Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy these elements. The application 

6

 Rule 4(k) applies only when “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of 

general jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). It could not apply to Y&R or BCW, which are 

incorporated and have their principal places of business (and accordingly are subject to 

jurisdiction) in other states. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27 (noting places of incorporation and 

principal places of business); see also Mother Doe I v. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143 

(S.D. Fla. 2007) (declining to exercise jurisdiction under Rule 4(k) when the defendants may have 

been subject to jurisdiction in the courts of another state). To the extent it applies to WPP, that 

exercise of jurisdiction is unconstitutional because Plaintiffs fail to allege any minimum contacts 

between WPP and the United States, as discussed further below. 

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of personal jurisdiction to WPP Defendants is accordingly unconstitutional and all three 

defendants must be dismissed. 

1. The Alleged Confiscation Of The RRHSC Property Does Not “Arise Out 

Of Or Relate To” WPP Defendants’ Activity 

Due process requires that the allegedly tortious activity must ‘“arise out of or relate to’ at 

least one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1355; see also Walden 

v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). Although “a strict causal relationship” between a defendant’s 

contacts and the underlying controversy is not “always require[d],” “the phrase ‘relate to’ 

incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum.” Ford 

Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021). Thus, there must be 

“an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an 

occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” 

Id. at 1025 (brackets omitted) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 

1780 (2017)). Regardless of whether the plaintiffs are nonresidents or residents of the forum State, 

specific jurisdiction will be improper where “the forum State, and the defendant’s activities there, 

lack[] any connection to the plaintiffs’ claims.” Id. at 1031 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 

S. Ct. at 1781). 

As described in Section I.B, Plaintiffs make no allegations connecting any of WPP 

Defendants’ work to Florida. No Florida employees of any of the three companies named are 

alleged to have worked on the marketing or social media portals at issue.7

 Nor do Plaintiffs 

7

 VMLY&R Madrid S.L. and BCW S.L. (Spain) do not have U.S. offices and did not perform 

marketing work for Habanos in the United States. VMLY&R Decl. ¶¶ 25–26; BCW Decl. ¶¶ 22–

23. 

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contend the marketing or social media portals were targeted to Florida.8

 Plaintiffs’ claims 

accordingly do not arise out of or relate to any of WPP Defendants’ contacts with Florida, and 

exercise of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional. 

2. There Is No “Purposeful Availment” Because WPP Did Not Have 

Minimum Contacts With The United States 

Plaintiffs fail to meet the other requirements of due process as to WPP. To assess 

purposeful availment, the traditional “minimum contacts” test applies.9

 Under the “minimum 

contacts” test, the defendant’s contacts must: (1) be “related to the plaintiff’s cause of action; 

(2) involve some act by which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of doing 

business within the forum; and (3) [be] such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being 

haled into court in the forum.” Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1357. 

Plaintiffs do not plead that WPP has minimum contacts with the U.S. The amended 

complaint still fails to explain what WPP does in the U.S. or who performs this work on behalf of 

WPP in the U.S. Read liberally, Plaintiffs are perhaps alleging that WPP relied on Y&R and BCW 

to “conduct marketing and social media campaigns,” see Am. Compl. ¶ 43, which the declarations 

prove is false, VMLY&R Decl. ¶ 16; BCW Decl. ¶ 14. Regardless, Plaintiffs provide no basis to 

8 Ford’s clarification of the “arise out of or relate to” standard is not intended to address Internet 

contacts, as the Court states: “None of this is to say that any person using any means to sell any 

good in a State is subject to jurisdiction there.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028 n.4. 

Applying Ford here is clear: There was no sale at all in the U.S., let alone in Florida. And Ford

had in-state marketing by defendants, which Plaintiffs have not even alleged as to WPP 

Defendants. Ford does not, then, alter the “arise out of or relate to” analysis concerning WPP 

Defendants’ alleged online marketing campaigns. 

9

 There are two tests that courts use to assess purposeful availment: the traditional “minimum 

contacts” test and the effects test. Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1356. The effects test evaluates “the 

commission of an intentional tort.” Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984)). Because the complaint does not allege that 

WPP intentionally aimed its conduct at the plaintiffs with the goal of causing injury, the effects 

test does not apply. 

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impute Y&R and BCW’s activities to WPP, as discussed above. Even the most favorable reading 

of Plaintiffs’ complaint does not indicate that any activities were directed toward Florida, let alone 

that WPP took any such actions. Further, even if Plaintiffs alleged that the online advertising 

targeted Florida, which they have not, such an allegation would not necessarily by itself be 

sufficient to show purposeful availment. See BTG Patent Holdings, LLC v. Bag2Go, GmbH, 193 

F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (refusing to find purposeful availment where the only 

activities in Florida were “Internet press releases, third party news stories, and social media 

activities”). Thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction here would violate WPP’s due process 

rights.10

3. The Exercise Of Specific Personal Jurisdiction Does Not Comport With 

“Traditional Notions Of Fair Play And Substantial Justice” 

When evaluating “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”11 relevant factors 

include: “[1] the burden on the defendant, [2] the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, 

[3] the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, [4] the interstate judicial 

system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and [5] the shared 

interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Meier ex rel. 

Meier, 288 F.3d at 1276. This Circuit has emphasized the burden is particularly “unique” for a 

foreign defendant that is being forced to litigate “in a foreign legal system.” Oldfield v. Pueblo 

10 In its individual motion to dismiss, co-defendant Imperial argues that no legislative jurisdiction 

exists over Imperial’s foreign business, ECF No. 88, at 17–19, an argument equally relevant to 

WPP’s foreign business. Because “[t]he inquiry into whether sufficient legislative jurisdiction 

exists is similar to that explored in determining sufficient minimum contacts for the purposes of 

assessing . . . personal jurisdiction consistent with due process,” Am. Charities for Reasonable 

Fundraising Regul., Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty., 221 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000), the reasoning in 

Section II of Imperial’s individual motion applies and there is no legislative jurisdiction as to WPP. 

11 Only when the plaintiff has satisfied the first two elements of the due process test does the court 

consider “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1355 (citing 

Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010)). 

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De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1221 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 

Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)). Here, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over WPP, a 

foreign entity, would impose an unfair and inappropriate burden on WPP. Aside from its 

ownership of Y&R and BCW, see Am. Compl. ¶ 31, Plaintiffs have not alleged that WPP has any 

contacts with Florida. There is accordingly a significant burden in forcing WPP to litigate here. 

See Oldfield, 558 F.3d at 1221. 

II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE THAT WPP, Y&R, AND BCW UNLAWFULLY 

“TRAFFICKED” IN CONFISCATED PROPERTY

Plaintiffs fall equally short in alleging that WPP Defendants “traffic[ked]” in any property 

confiscated by the Cuban government. “[T]rafficking,” as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13) (2018), 

is an essential element of a Title III claim, 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a) (2018). Because the alleged 

marketing activity does not constitute trafficking, Plaintiffs’ claim must be dismissed.12

Trafficking consists of “knowingly and intentionally” committing certain acts with respect 

to confiscated property without proper authorization. 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13). In particular, Section 

6023(13)(A) provides that an entity “traffics” when it: 

(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes 

of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control 

of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property, 

(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated 

property, or 

(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in 

clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as 

described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person. 

12 The joint motion to dismiss filed by all co-defendants demonstrates that WPP Defendants’ and 

Imperial’s purported liability flows entirely from the alleged conduct of Habanos—a “Cuban joint 

venture corporation,” Am. Compl. ¶ 24—and/or non-party Tabacuba—“the Cuban tobacco 

monopoly company,” id. ¶ 8—which cannot constitute trafficking for which Defendants could be 

liable. 

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Id. § 6023(13)(A). 

Even Plaintiffs distinguish between WPP, Y&R, and BCW and the other Defendants, 

which they call the “Direct Traffickers.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 54. According to Plaintiffs, the Direct 

Traffickers held an ownership interest in, controlled, and used the RRHSC Property in purported 

violation of Sections 6023(13)(A)(i) and (ii). Id. WPP Defendants, however, are not alleged to 

have leased, managed, controlled, or otherwise have had an interest in the RRHSC Property, 22 

U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(i), or to have engaged in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting 

from the RRHSC Property, id. § 6023(13)(A)(ii). Plaintiffs instead allege that each WPP 

Defendant “causes, directs [or] participates in, or profits from, trafficking” by Imperial, Habanos, 

Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–31, 34–35, 57 & nn.20–21, 26. 

Plaintiffs offer little more explanation for how WPP Defendants engaged in trafficking 

prohibited by the Helms-Burton Act. Their theory must be—given the lack of allegations that 

WPP, Y&R, or BCW caused, directed, or participated in trafficking—that WPP Defendants 

“profit[ed] from” being hired by Imperial and/or Habanos to market Cuban cigars, see Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 37, 55–57 (alleging Imperial and/or Habanos and/or Tabacuba decided to “retain” WPP, Y&R, 

and BCW), a theory disproven by declarations demonstrating that no WPP Defendant performed 

the work in question, BCW Decl. ¶ 18; VMLY&R Decl. ¶ 20. Under Plaintiffs’ theory, any 

company receiving money from alleged “Direct Traffickers” in connection with those entities’ 

business would be liable for trafficking under the Helms-Burton Act.13

13 In an attempt to distort the statute’s definition of “trafficking,” Plaintiffs rely on a completely 

distinct, and irrelevant, regulatory regime known as the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 

(“CACR”). Am. Compl. ¶ 33. The CACR, initially promulgated by the Office of Foreign Assets 

Control (“OFAC”) over 30 years before Helms-Burton was enacted, determines which activities 

U.S. companies may engage in with Cuban persons or entities. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., 

GAO-17-201, Cuba: U.S. Policy Changes Increased Engagement with Private Sector 9, 50 (2016). 

Notably, the CACR does not even use the term “trafficking,” a concept for which Congress first 

created liability several decades after the CACR went into effect. Plaintiffs have incorrectly 

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Title III cannot be read so broadly. Plaintiffs’ definition of trafficking would impose 

liability on a virtually limitless variety of actors. For example, Plaintiffs’ theory would encompass, 

among others, journalists who—knowing that an article about a purportedly confiscated property 

will generate “clicks” and profits for their online magazine or newspaper—write stories about 

Habanos cigars; or organizers of cigar conventions in Europe and Asia at which Habanos pays a 

fee to display its products; or the owners of countless tobacco shops and cigar bars from South 

America to Australia that may keep a few boxes of Habanos products on their shelves. Each of 

these reporters, internet media companies, or business owners would have—under Plaintiffs’ 

theory—profited from Habanos’ alleged use of the confiscated property to manufacture and 

distribute cigars. This is not what Congress intended nor what the statute says. 

When it enacted Helms-Burton, Congress focused on foreign investment and direct dealing 

in confiscated property. Congress therefore defined trafficking to include the sale, purchase, or 

holding of an interest in confiscated property. The statutory findings in Title III reflect Congress’s 

concern that “[t]he Cuban Government is offering foreign investors the opportunity to purchase an 

equity interest in, manage, or enter into joint ventures using property” confiscated from U.S. 

nationals and “this ‘trafficking’ . . . undermines the foreign policy of the United States.” 22 U.S.C. 

§ 6081(5)–(6) (emphasis added). The findings equate trafficking with investment and related 

ownership interests in the confiscated property. 

Section 6023(13)(A)(iii) was intended to ensure that corporations could not evade liability 

for their investments in confiscated property through the use of joint ventures or other corporate 

structuring—not to dramatically expand the scope of trafficking to companies that have no interest 

conflated Title III of the Helms-Burton Act with OFAC regulations for imports and exports of 

goods and services. The CACR has nothing to do with this case. 

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in or control over and that make no use of confiscated property. See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(iii) 

(noting the provision was limited to “trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)”). Indeed, during 

Senate hearings before the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, one of the drafters of the legislation14

testified that Section 6023(13)(A)(iii) “makes it clear . . . to the courts that Congress’ intent is that 

intermediate shell subsidiaries not be created to avoid liability. . . . Therefore, it takes up the chain 

of a parent company . . . which is not doing it directly but through some subsidiaries.” Cuban 

Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere and 

Peace Corps Affs. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 104th Cong. 152 (1995) (statement of Ignacio 

E. Sanchez). Plaintiffs’ reading of Section 6023(13)(A)(iii) would go beyond such theories of 

vicarious liability to draw in entities with no investment in or connection to the confiscated 

property. This cannot be correct. 

Beyond impermissibly distorting the statutory language and intent of Congress, holding 

advertising companies liable for marketing activities would implicate constitutional concerns. 

Advertising is entitled to First Amendment protections. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 

Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760–70 (1976) (rejecting a First Amendment exception for 

commercial speech); Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2017) 

(“Commercial speech . . . is undeniably entitled to substantial protection under the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” (quotation marks omitted)). Under 

the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance,” “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute 

would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 

14 See Jason Rotstein, The Legacy of the Libertad Act: Defeating Title III Claims and Protecting 

International Comity, Harv. Int’l Law Journal Online, https://harvardilj.org/2019/11/the-legacyof-the-libertad-act-defeating-title-iii-claims-and-protecting-international-comity/ (last accessed 

Apr. 28, 2021). 

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problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. 

DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 

This Court should not interpret the Helms-Burton Act to impose regulations on speech, particularly 

when there is no indication that Congress intended the statute to cover such activity. The Court 

should accordingly conclude that WPP Defendants have not “trafficked” in the RRHSC Property. 

III. PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE

A district court has the discretion to dismiss a complaint with prejudice where there 

(1) there has been “repeated failure to cure deficiencies” by prior amendments; (2) “where 

allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party;” or (3) “where 

amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). When an 

amended complaint merely repeats previously alleged claims, the district court may regard any 

amendment as futile. See, e.g., Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 261 F. App’x 274, 276 

(11th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s dismissal with prejudice where the second amended 

complaint repeated claims already made in prior complaints). District courts need give a plaintiff 

only one opportunity to amend a complaint to state a claim. Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. 

Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002). Multiple Helms-Burton claims, litigated both in the 

Eleventh Circuit and elsewhere, have been dismissed with prejudice after the district court 

determined that further amendment of the complaint was futile. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. 

Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-23988-Civ-Scola, 2020 WL 2323032, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2020), 

aff’d, 835 F. App’x 1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2021); Glen v. Trip Advisor LLC, No. 19-1809-LPS, 

2021 WL 1200577, at *9 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2021). 

Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint in an attempt to allege personal 

jurisdiction and state a claim for relief. Indeed, they did so with the benefit of first previewing the 

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motions to dismiss and declarations filed by WPP Defendants and Imperial. ECF Nos. 71–72, 74. 

Yet Plaintiffs failed to meaningfully respond to the previously-identified factual deficiencies, as 

set forth above. Plaintiffs only vaguely addressed personal jurisdiction by implying that Y&R and 

BCW may own subsidiaries who may have done the work—but failed to name the subsidiaries, 

identify the work performed, or provide any details about the relationship to Y&R or BCW. 

Plaintiffs added no allegations to connect the defendants or the claim to Florida; to describe the 

allegedly unlawful marketing work; or to suggest that WPP is responsible for the acts of Y&R or 

BCW. Plaintiffs’ failure to add any allegations on these critical points is both fatal to their claim 

and indicates they have no relevant allegations that would state a claim. 

Even if the Court were inclined to permit Plaintiffs another amendment to add as new 

defendants the two Spanish entities that worked with Habanos, such an amendment would be futile 

because the Court has no jurisdiction over VMLY&R Madrid S.L. or BCW S.L. (Spain). Both 

entities are incorporated and headquartered abroad; the employees who performed work for 

Habanos were located abroad; and neither entity has an office in the U.S. BCW Decl. ¶¶ 22–23; 

VMLY&R Decl. ¶¶ 25–26. As such, there is no connection to Florida and no basis for this Court’s 

jurisdiction. See Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1355 (holding that due process permits jurisdiction when 

claims “arise out of or relate to” contacts with the forum); Melgarejo, 537 F. App’x at 860 

(determining that Florida long-arm statute section 48.193(1)(a)(2) requires “a ‘direct affiliation,’ 

‘nexus,’ or ‘substantial connection”’ between the cause of action and the defendant’s activity). 

Because amendment is futile, the Court should dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the amended complaint against WPP 

Defendants with prejudice.

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REQUEST FOR HEARING

 This case raises novel and complex issues of law, and WPP Defendants accordingly request 

a hearing. The joint brief submitted concurrently by WPP Defendants, Imperial, and Habanos also 

includes a request for hearing, and WPP Defendants are amenable to holding a combined hearing 

on both the joint motion to dismiss and this separate motion to dismiss. 

Date: April 28, 2021 s/Naim S. Surgeon 

NAIM S. SURGEON

Florida Bar No. 101682 

E-Mail: naim.surgeon@akerman.com 

PEDRO FREYRE

Florida Bar No. 192140 

E-Mail: pedro.freyre@akerman.com 

AKERMAN LLP 

Three Brickell City Centre 

98 Southeast Seventh Street, Suite 1100 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Tel: (305) 982-5507 

Fax: (305) 374-5095 

CHRISTOPHER DAVIES (pro hac vice) 

E-Mail: christopher.davies@wilmerhale.com 

JESSICA LUTKENHAUS (pro hac vice) 

E-Mail: jessica.lutkenhaus@wilmerhale.com 

ASHLEY MCLAUGHLIN LEEN (pro hac vice) 

E-Mail: ashley.leen@wilmerhale.com 

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE 

AND DORR LLP 

1875 Pennsylvania Ave NW 

Washington, DC 20006 

Tel: (202) 663-6000 

Fax: (202) 663-6363 

Attorneys for Defendants WPP PLC, YOUNG & 

RUBICAM LLC, and BCW LLC 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 28 of 38 Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 93 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/28/2021 Page 27 of 27
DECLARATION OF GERALD LOMBARDO 

IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 29 of 38 Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 93-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/28/2021 Page 1 of 5
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Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 31 of 38
Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 93-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/28/2021 Page 4 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 32 of 38
Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 93-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/28/2021 Page 5 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 33 of 38
DECLARATION OF JIM BELLINGHAUSEN 

IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 34 of 38 Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 93-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/28/2021 Page 1 of 5
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Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 36 of 38
Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 93-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/28/2021 Page 4 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 37 of 38
Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 93-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/28/2021 Page 5 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 97-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2021 Page 38 of 38