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i

23–351 2007

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–14]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

MILITARY SERVICES’ REQUIREMENT ON

RECONSTITUTION OF EQUIPMENT

HEARING HELD

APRIL 6, 2005

(II)

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado, Chairman

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JIM RYUN, Kansas

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan

CATHY MCMORRIS, Washington

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire

CANDICE MILLER, Michigan

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

LANE EVANS, Illinois

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

TIM RYAN, Ohio

MARK UDALL, Colorado

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina

LYNN BOPE, Professional Staff Member

RYAN VAART, Professional Staff Member

PAUL LEWIS, Counsel

MARY ELLEN FRASER, Counsel

LINDSAY YOUNG, Staff Assistant

SARAH GELINAS, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2005

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, April 6, 2005, Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization

Act—Military Services’ Requirement on Reconstitution of Equipment ........... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, April 6, 2005 ....................................................................................... 27

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2005

FISCAL YEAR 2006 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—MILITARY SERVICES’ REQUIREMENT ON RECONSTITUTION OF EQUIPMENT

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hefley, Hon. Joel, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, Readiness Subcommittee .............................................................................................................. 1

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member,

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 2

WITNESSES

Christianson, Lt. Gen. Claude V., Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4, U.S. Army ........ 3

Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, Director, Congressional Budget Office ............................. 7

Hugel, Rear Adm. Mark A., Deputy Director, Fleet Readiness Division, U.S.

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 6

Huly, Lt. Gen. Jan C., Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps ................................................................................... 4

Wetekam, Lt. Gen. Donald J., Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and

Logistics, U.S. Air Force ...................................................................................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Christianson, Lt. Gen. Claude V. .................................................................... 41

Hefley, Hon. Joel .............................................................................................. 31

Holtz-Eakin, Douglas ....................................................................................... 88

Hugel, Rear Adm. Mark A. .............................................................................. 53

Huly, Lt. Gen. Jan C. ....................................................................................... 74

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 36

Wetekam, Lt. Gen. Donald J. .......................................................................... 65

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

CBO Estimates of Potential Needs Compared with Funding chart ............. 127

CBO and Service Estimates of Costs Related to Equipment Stress and

Loss chart ...................................................................................................... 129

Maintenance and Replacement Activities in CBO’s Bottom-Up Method

chart ............................................................................................................... 128

Page

IV

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Ms. Davis (Susan) ............................................................................................. 137

Mr. Hayes .......................................................................................................... 136

Mr. Hefley ......................................................................................................... 133

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 137

Mr. Reyes .......................................................................................................... 135

Dr. Schwarz ....................................................................................................... 136

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 136

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2006 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—MILITARY SERVICES’ REQUIREMENT ON

RECONSTITUTION OF EQUIPMENT

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, READINESS, SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 6, 2005.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m. in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joel Hefley (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOEL HEFLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. HEFLEY. The committee will come to order, and please be

seated, gentlemen.

I apologize, first of all, for being a little tardy here. I was in the

Terrorism Subcommittee hearing dealing with a subject that was

very important to me. So I just am running a little late, and I hate

to do that.

I want to welcome you to this afternoon’s subcommittee hearing

on resetting or reconstitution of military equipment returning from

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom

(OEF).

This is the subcommittee’s second hearing on this topic; the first

was held in October of 2003. Much of the testimony at that time

indicated that there was not enough information yet to determine

the cost of reset. Today, we do know more. Through emergency

supplemental funding, the military services have received approximately $9 billion for reset cost. The fiscal year 2005 emergency

supplemental has a request for approximately $9.8 billion for reset

requirements. Although these figures are large, there are more bills

to come. We will most likely see those bills in a fiscal year 2006

emergency supplemental.

A structured reset program requires time, facilities, spare parts,

trained workers, contractors, forward deployed maintenance workers and full funding that includes both operation and maintenance

of procurement dollars. It is not clear to me if the reset programs

are fully funded. I have asked the director of the Congressional

Budget Office to be present today in order to decipher the different

methods that can be used to calculate reset costs. Reset is a priority and a must-pay bill. Congress must understand how each of the

services has determined the size of the bill and managing implementation.

2

I also intend to explore today to what extent factors other than

money limit reset. Do we have the spare parts? Are there adequate

facilities both at home and in the theater? And the most challenging factor, time; how much time will it take?

Not surprisingly the Army and Marine Corps have the most significant challenges. The current operational tempo (OPTEMPO),

combined with the aging fleet and significant combat losses challenge the Army and the Marine Corps ability to sustain operational

availability. I expect to learn today what actions the Army and the

Marine Corps are taking to meet this challenge.

I would like to gain a better understanding of the difference between reset and recap, two important programs in the Army. I

would also like to better understand the Marines cross-leveling of

equipment as a means to make up equipment shortfalls.

I would like to now turn to Mr. Ortiz, the Ranking Member, to

see if he has any opening remarks.

Mr. Ortiz.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hefley can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming

our distinguished witnesses, and I look forward to hearing the testimony on this important readiness issue.

Before I begin, I would like to first express my thanks and appreciation to our military personnel for all the sacrifices they make in

providing for our defense.

I would like also to recognize the support of the many dedicated

government service civilians and private individuals who work

hard to help maintain the readiness of our armed forces. We cannot

fight and win without them, and I thank them for their dedicated

service to our national defense.

Mr. Chairman, our armed forces have been engaged in combat

operations for over three years now, and the stress of this continuous combat is clearly evident on our military’s equipment. Increased usage rates, environmental conditions and heavier armor

are wearing out our ground and air equipment as much as five

times faster than peacetime. This problem is only made more difficult by the Department of Defense’s (DOD) requirement to reconfigure equipment to meet its goals of transformation.

While I have been pleased to see the effort that the service has

put into meeting these challenges, I am very concerned by the

growing backlog of expenses that have not been requested by the

Department’s fiscal year 2006 budget for the supplemental budget

request. By Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) estimates, this

growing mountain of worn-out equipment could cost as much as

$18 billion to repair or replace. This is an enormous shortfall, and

surely it will have an effect on our ability to respond to continuances in the future.

I hope the officers on our panel today, who have the very difficult

job of managing this emerging problem, will be able to explain to

you how they plan to overcome this funding shortfall.

3

One final point I would like to make before I close this about the

defense: Our defense industrial base, the depots that repair all of

this damaged and worn-out equipment are carrying a tremendous

workload. At this point, I see little surge capacity remaining in our

depots to meet emerging requirements.

The current conflicts have demonstrated that we must have the

ability to surge our industrial base and sustain that rate over the

long term. I hope our witnesses will take this opportunity to comment on the defense industrial base and how they plan to ensure

our depots are strong and fully equipped to meet the needs of our

troops in the field.

I, again, welcome our witnesses, and I thank you for your courage. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Ortiz.

Let me introduce the witnesses and ask any of them if you have

an opening statement and if you would like to summarize that.

Without objection, all witnesses’ written statements will be made

a part of the record.

First is Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, Deputy Chief of

Staff, G–4, United States Army. Second is Lieutenant General Jan

Huly, Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations of

the Marine Corps. Third is Lieutenant General Donald Wetekam,

Deputy Chief of Staff Installation of Logistics, United States Air

Force. Fourth is Rear Admiral Mark Hugel, Deputy Director of

Fleet Readiness Division of the United States Navy. And finally,

Mr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of the Congressional Budget Office.

Lieutenant Christianson, are you the kick-off guy here?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CLAUDE V. CHRISTIANSON, DEPUTY

CHIEF OF STAFF, G–4, U.S. ARMY

General CHRISTIANSON. Yes, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ortiz, distinguished

members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to appear

before you today to talk about the work we are doing to reconstitute our Army’s equipment.

Fundamental to our Army’s ability to meet future threats is the

absolute requirement that we rapidly return our equipment to an

effective level of readiness upon return from operational employment.

Over the past 3 years, the Army has deployed over 40 percent

of its equipment to Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. Currently, we have about 15 percent of our equipment in the forward

area. The increased operating tempo of our deployed equipment,

combined with the harsh environment and an aging fleet plus significant combat losses challenges us to sustain readiness at the tip

of the spear.

As an example, Army helicopters experience usage rates roughly

twice their peacetime rates. Tanks and other track vehicles are

being used at roughly five times their peacetime rates, and our

truck fleet is operating at three to five times what we would consider normal peacetime rates. This readiness challenge can only be

4

met with a structured, formal, fully-funded program to reset the

equipment when it returns from the operational area, complimented by a long-term program to ensure we can sustain the

readiness of our systems over their entire lives.

We feel we have developed a comprehensive approach to providing our forces with ready and capable equipment. Even in the

midst of this conflict, our approach ensures that, first of all, the

forward commanders have the combat power they need, while minimizing the load on the strategic transportation system. Second,

that returning units will be rapidly returned to an operationally

ready condition, prepared for whatever mission comes their way.

Third, as we are able to draw down our forward forces, that we can

reset that equipment that we have kept in the operational area.

Fourth, that our Army prepositioned stocks (APS), our APS equipment, is brought back to readiness condition for its mission as soon

as it is able to be redeployed. And last, that we have in place a

long-term program to sustain the operational readiness of our all

critical systems over their lives.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the soldiers, their families and our

professional civilians, we greatly appreciate the support of the Congress, and especially this committee, in addressing our needs. Your

support has given us a solid foundation upon which we are building

a stronger, more relevant and ready force. We appreciate your support, and I look forward to answering your questions this afternoon. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Christianson can be found in

the Appendix on page 41.]

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you.

General Huly.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAN C. HULY, DEPUTY COMMANDANT

FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General HULY. Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, distinguished members of the committee, it is my privilege to report to

you any actions taken to date to reset the Marine Corps as well as

our future reconstitution efforts. These actions are critical to ensuring we are prepared to meet today’s operational challenges while

maintaining good stewardship of our Nation’s treasure. I recognize

that this is only possible with your continued support while we remain at war.

There are a myriad of programs ongoing to reconstitute the Marine Corps. Our forces preparing for combat and forward deployment are using their equipment three to six times higher than normal. This increases the cost of operations and maintenance beyond

what was originally budgeted. Additionally, our gear is being damaged by enemy action and worn down in the harsh desert environment. These effects increase maintenance and create a toll that frequently renders economical repair not feasible after being used in

Iraq and Afghanistan. Repairing, replacing and redistributing this

equipment among units rotating in and out of theaters of operation

are some of our highest priorities.

Our prepositioning programs have once again proven their strategic utility by helping to close rapidly and sustain reinforcements

in combat. We are recovering from using these extensively for OpVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:43 Nov 29, 2007 Jkt 023351 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-14\096030.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
5

eration Iraqi Freedom, but we face some challenges, two of our

three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) have been reconstituted and will complete a scheduled maintenance cycle in the

next one to two years. Equipment and supplies from the third

squadron have been downloaded and used for current requirements

in Iraq. We are planning to reconstitute this squadron and our

Norway prepositioned equipment as soon as possible, and have

identified the replacement of our ground equipment as an area

where our fiscal year 2005 supplemental request will be applied.

While our analysis of requirement costs continue, we are confident that our supplemental request, when combined with those

additional items presented at the behest of the Congress, is what

we need to continue to fight the global war on terror (GWOT) while

continuing to modernize the force, where practical.

Added to supplemental funding requests, the Marine Corps is internally funding essential warfighting equipment through an urgent-needs process that allows us to fulfill requests and provide to

marines and sailors rapidly the equipment they need to conduct

combat mission in operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. This

process of satisfying urgent requests is directly tied to lessons

learned on the modern battlefield; enables us to bypass the normal

development procurement process and aggressively pursue improved armor, counter-improvised explosive device (IED) equipment, medical packages, rifle and night-vision optics, and other important items that can be quickly placed in the hands of troops conducting operations.

In September 2004, in order to meet the current enduring challenges of the changing nature of the war, the Commandant improved numerous structural changes to our operational forces;

bringing these improvements to fruition will require the continued

support of this committee in supplemental and additional items as

we begin the extensive phases of recruiting, equipping, building

and training these additional marine units.

In closing, I would like to again thank the members of the committee for their continued support of the Marine Corps and for the

opportunity to discuss our current readiness and its inextricable

link to our resource requirements. Marines’ accomplishments are a

direct reflection of your continued support and commitment to

maintaining our Nation’s expeditionary warfighting capability. I

look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Huly can be found in the Appendix on page 74.]

Mr. HEFLEY. General Wetekam.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DONALD J. WETEKAM, DEPUTY

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS, U.S.

AIR FORCE

General WETEKAM. Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz and

distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear today.

It is my privilege to report on our reconstitution efforts, our successes in this area and our challenges for the future.

The Air Force is organized, trained and equipped to meet expeditionary commitments through our Air Expeditionary Force (AEF)

6

concept. We have sized our logistics support system to meet those

AEF requirements, along with maintaining a surge capability. Our

experiences to date in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi

Freedom have largely confirmed the fact that our logistics system

is capable of meeting those requirements. We have experienced

many successes throughout OEF and OIF. We have flown over

270,000 sorties, opened 36 bases and supported as many as 31,000

airmen within the Central Command area of responsibility. Our

airmen have been busy and successful.

Of course these successes are not the result of internal Air Force

efforts alone. Congressional help was and remains key to providing

the funding necessary for protecting our forces, replenishing and

replacing equipment lost in combat, and reconstituting critical capabilities.

No success comes without challenges, especially in a combat environment involving multiple locations worldwide. The cost of resetting the force continues to increase with each passing year of

the global war on terrorism. As we face these challenges, we thank

you for your continued support. I offer my written comments for

the record and look forward to our discussion on this important

topic.

[The prepared statement of General Wetekam can be found in

the Appendix on page 65.]

Mr. HEFLEY. Admiral Hugel.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. MARK A. HUGEL, DEPUTY

DIRECTOR, FLEET READINESS DIVISION, U.S. NAVY

Admiral HUGEL. Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the invitation

to come and spend time discussing the reconstitution of our military equipment returning from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Through your support, the Navy has been able to repair and replace equipment utilized to support United States operations in

theater and maintain the level of readiness forecasted by our budget programming models.

Before I address fleet reconstitution, I would like to share a

snapshot of what our Navy is doing today. We currently have 93

ships and 38,000 sailors forward deployed worldwide in support of

the global war on terror, including the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike

Group and the Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group.

The Navy Ashore component has proven critical to continuing ongoing and combined operations with extensive medical, construction and other combat support and combat service support to the

Marine Corps and Army ground elements. In addition, we have recently participated in operation non-focused items (NFI) assistance,

which provided sustained relief to South Asian tsunami victims,

demonstrating our surge capability and the value of seabasing in

both responsiveness and access.

Testimony today addresses three areas of fleet readiness. The

first is maritime readiness, which covers the maintenance approach

that we are applying to the increased wear on our ships and submarines involved in the global war on terror.

7

Our ship maintenance budget during this period reflects the

proper balance of readiness which directly contributes to the combined power of our forward presence forces and our ability to surge

assets as required by the fleet response plan. Due to the increased

operational tempo associated with the global war on terror, we

have been experiencing some increase in the war-related maintenance, and we have been successfully able to address those challenges through using supplemental funding. Similarly, in the aviation area, we have sufficient supplemental funds each fiscal year

to fund equipment reconstitution for our aircraft supporting OIF

and OEF. Our aviation and maritime depot maintenance programs

have been able to fund and execute necessary maintenance and repair actions to provide a surge-ready force while maintaining the

appropriate workload balance between public- and private-sector

industrial base. Additionally, we are finding and implementing innovative process improvements to assure that our maintenance is

being delivered effectively and efficiently.

Finally, my testimony addressing our success in reconstituting

our naval ground forces, in particular our naval construction force,

allowing continued level of sustained support for the Marine Corps

and Army ground forces in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan. Again,

the financial support of the budget supplemental process allows the

Navy to maintain our current readiness levels while still accomplishing the emerging wartime missions as they occur.

In closing, I would like to thank you for your continued support

of our Navy. Your efforts have been critical in allowing the Navy

to sustain an unprecedented level of current readiness and to be

prepared to surge when called upon.

I would like to thank the committee for offering me this opportunity, and I stand ready to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Hugel can be found in the

Appendix on page 53.]

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Holtz-Eakin.

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, DIRECTOR,

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

Mr. HOLTZ-EAKIN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Ortiz, and members of the committee, the Congressional Budget Office is pleased

to have the chance to be here today to discuss the cost of additional

equipment stress. As the committee is well aware, the United

States has maintained a substantial force presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the result has been that many hundreds of thousands of pieces of equipment are in need of repair or replacement.

The heart of the CBO’s work in this area is summarized in the

chart which you have in front of you and which is on the poster,

which shows our estimates of the cost of equipment stress in this

area. As the written statement details, we take two approaches to

estimating these costs. Given the absence of complete and comprehensive data, we take a top-down approach which broadly attempts to assess the additional costs by looking at faster depreciation due to higher operational tempo. And the second approach is

a bottoms-up approach, which for each piece of equipment would

directly measure costs associated with sustainment, restoration, recapitalization or replacement. But uncertainty is associated with

8

both approaches, but the results indicate that, for 2005, there is a

range of $7 to $8 billion in additional costs associated with the

higher operational tempo and that, over the window from 2003 to

2005, this higher cost ranges from somewhere in the vicinity of $18

to $21 billion. If one goes back over that period, as the statement

provides the details for, we can see a range of $3 to $5 billion in

funds dedicated to this task, and as a result, there is an accrued

unpaid liability there of somewhere in the vicinity of $13 to $18 billion for excess costs in excess of funding.

The distribution of these costs across services is unequal. Because of the larger presence of the Army, about 60 percent of these

costs are associated with Army equipment; 20 percent in our estimates are associated with Air Force aircraft; and the remaining 20

percent are split between the Navy and the Marine Corps, with the

latter predominating.

The CBO’s estimates are quite similar to those produced by the

services themselves. Their estimate is about $13 billion, and the

percentage distribution in cross services is similar as well.

Looking forward, to the extent that the United States maintains

the same presence in these areas in fiscal year 2006 and assuming

that the operational tempo is diminished somewhat next year, one

could estimate that these costs will occur in the range of $6 to $7

billion for FY 2006.

Now I would close our remarks in emphasizing the uncertainty

associated with these estimates. In either approach, the top-down

or the bottom-up approach, our particular estimates could be either

too high or too low. In the top-down approach, it could be the case

that adding an additional intensive year of usage does not, in fact,

mean that the lifetime has been reduced in proportion to that intensity. Maybe their peacetime rates are much lower than one

would expect the equipment to be used at, or in the other direction,

we could understate the cost by not directly factoring in the harsh

conditions in which the equipment are operated.

More generally, under both approaches, an enormous amount of

data is required to do it exactly right. In the absence of that data,

we adopted an approach of trying to bracket the approach with two

different analytic constructs and by using analogies where we did

not have direct evidence on these costs.

We thank you for the chance to be here today and look forward

to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holtz-Eakin can be found in the

Appendix on page 88.]

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.

We keep getting testimony that a lot of the equipment is going

to be left over there, simply is not going to come back, and you testified to that here. Is that because of the level of use of the equipment or the harsh environment, or both? Is this equipment that,

if it was here in the United States, would be repaired and put back

into service? The Navy always operates in a harsh environment of

salt water, and now we are operating on the ground in sand. Is

that what is causing this? Or is it, you feel, that just bringing it

back and then having to repair it and bring it up to standards

would simply not be economic?

9

General CHRISTIANSON. There are really two reasons, Mr. Chairman, why we have decided to leave equipment in the area of responsibility (AOR).

First is that some of that equipment is special equipment, for example, all of the vehicles that had armor plating added to them we

left over there so that we could maximize the level of force protection. In addition, there is some special communications gear. There

is gear over there that we have put in the theater that allows us

to detect explosives. There is gear in the theater that allows us to

jam frequencies and do other kinds of things that we do not have

a lot of, so we do not want to keep rotating it back and forth. So,

primarily, we are leaving equipment there that gives the soldiers

and the forward members of the military the kind of capabilities

they need to execute the warfight.

The second reason that we would leave equipment over there is

to take some of the load off the strategic distribution system. Instead of sending things back and forth, the more we can leave in

theater, the easier it is for us to work on the strategic system; plus,

it is more rapid for the people to transition from one unit to the

next if a lot of the equipment stays there. So those are the two fundamental reasons.

The second part of your question is, do we intend to fix that? Absolutely, we do. We concur with the CBO findings that there is a

workload out there that we have not yet identified because we do

not know when it is going to come back. But when it does come

back, we will put it through the same process that we are doing

for the equipment that is coming back with the units today.

General HULY. Sir, in the Marine Corps, we have those same

concerns with the equipment, and the same rationale added to

those. We believe we are saving in transportation costs by not

bringing some of the equipment back, even though we possibly

could, but to just leave it in place over there and then just redistribute what we need within the Continental United States

(CONUS).

Some of the equipment over there is one of a kind, so it just

makes sense to leave it there and get the maximum use out of it,

and we replace it only as necessary. And some of the equipment is

just not worth the effort to bring it back; it is in such a shape of

disrepair that it just makes sense to leave it there.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. At what point do you know that some of this equipment that you just cannot bring back has to be replaced and buy

new equipment? And the period of time that it takes to replace this

equipment?

General CHRISTIANSON. Congressman, actually, we are finding

out some of that right now. As units have come back with their

equipment, there is a percentage of their equipment that cannot be

repaired. It is just too costly to be repaired, and we have to replace

it. In the cases where we have production lines going, you should

see that come to you as a procurement requirement.

In those cases where we do not have any production capacity,

where we are not making the item anymore. For example, the

Bradley, you will see that come to you in recap requirements to

10

turn that chassis, that hull of a tank or a Bradley back into a new

piece of equipment at the latest standards.

And we have some planning factors we use on how many are

what we call wash out, in other words, how many are worn out so

badly that they cannot be repaired and they need to be replaced.

And I have some of those numbers here.

In the case of aviation, we are anticipating about three percent

of our helicopters will never be replaced, they are just too beat up.

Tracks, about two percent. But the biggest number is wheeled vehicles, and we estimate about 12 percent of our wheeled vehicles,

when they come back, cannot be repaired and have to be replaced.

So those are the planning factors we are using.

In terms of the timing of when they come back, that is a tough

question because we rely on the forward commander to determine

whether or not they need those capabilities forward. So in the case

of up-armored humvees, I do not anticipate up-armored humvees

coming back for a long, long time until our forestructure is drawn

down to the point where we do not need as many as we do today.

So that vehicle is going to be the last coming back. So it is a reset

requirement that sits out there, as the CBO indicated. We just do

not know when we are going to actually fix them, so it is very difficult for us to anticipate programming those dollars.

Admiral HUGEL. Sir, we have recently undertaken an initiative

to establish repair and replacement facilities in theater. And as you

probably know because you have been there, the operating forces

get the equipment in their hands, they get comfortable with it, and

by golly, they are going to use it. And it is just the case of having

the one in your hand. It is a process for us to get them to evaluate

that equipment, to turn it in, to get a new piece of gear, and then

we evacuate that piece of equipment to a location, generally either

in the rear with our foreservice support group in theater, or we

evacuate it back to Kuwait, so we can get a good analysis of it. And

I do not have to tell you because you have been there, but you have

seen some of the equipment. It is just not equipment that you

would want to bring back and operate with in the United States.

Perhaps the turn signals might not work on it. Perhaps the speedometer does not work. It is just nothing that will ever prove worthwhile for us to repair and replace back here again, but it meets the

purposes for over there, and it just makes good sense to keep it in

theater for as long as we possibly can.

General WETEKAM. Sir, if I might for the Air Force.

Our situation is a little different. We do rotate most of our equipment. In terms of our aircraft, we do rotate those, and so they receive depot-level maintenance, et cetera, back here at their normal

depots.

A lot of that is true also for our ground support equipment. The

major exception are vehicles and some of our specialized mobility

handling equipment. Even prior to 9/11, we had five War Reserve

Material (WRM) sites established in theater with contract support,

and so while we have had to plus up those contracts for support

of additional equipment that we have put in theater, we do have

in-theater support for a lot of that stuff.

Admiral HUGEL. Congressman, as you know, the Seabees we

have on the ground have similar ground support equipment as our

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Marine Corps brethren. We have folks there to do maintenance on

that equipment on the ground. And as long as that equipment is

economically feasible to maintain, then we are going to keep it

maintained and bring it home with us when the time comes. When

it is just not economically feasible to do the repairs anymore, then

we will abandon it in place, but we do not see very much of that.

Mr. ORTIZ. I just have one more question, Mr. Chairman.

You know, given the current state of the equipment and the condition of the equipment, what would happen, God forbid, if there

is an unforeseen crisis somewhere in the area? You know, we have

Lebanon, Syria. We have Iran. We have Iraq. Some of the equipment is not worthy. Can we respond to another unforeseen crisis

with what we have?

General HULY. Sir, for the Marine Corps, we have approximately

25 percent of our aviation assets of our total assets in the inventory, and about 30 percent of our ground equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan right now.

We have sufficient storage. We have two maritime prepositioned

squadrons worth of equipment that we have not touched and we

have fenced, so to speak. And they are forward deploy, one in the

Mediterranean and one in the Pacific region, so that if we needed

to respond to a crisis, we would have a maritime prepositioned

squadron worth of equipment.

Added to that, we still have equipment with our organizations in

the Continental United States that we are swapping around, crossleveling to get back to the units as they rotate. So I believe that

we have sufficient assets, more than sufficient assets, to be able to

respond to a crisis.

Is it necessarily the equipment that we are going to want—that

we are going to actually need in the next crisis? I will tell you, for

instance, right now, we do not have a lot of up-armored vehicles,

humvees, for instance, in the Continental United States because as

fast as the industrial base can produce them, we are shipping them

directly into the theater. If something were to break out that we

needed armored humvees again in a different location, we would

have to look at either another source of supply for those or actually

sharing what we have elsewhere. But overall, I think we are in

good shape to respond to any crisis that develops, that we certainly

are anticipating might be a potential.

General CHRISTIANSON. As you know, we have prepositioned sets;

we have a set in Korea that is pretty much land-bound in Korea

if something were to happen there. We also had put, about two

years ago, a Flotilla, a one-by-one brigade, aboard ship that has got

some strategic flexibility and can move. So we do have some

prepositioned assets.

And the 4th Infantry Division and the 101st are just finishing

their reset coming back. If something were to happen and it was

important enough, we would probably hold units in the current operation to use those organizations to respond if we had to.

So we have got about 15 percent of our combat equipment forward positioned in Iraq. The rest of it remains here. About a third

of that is going to reset. The rest of it is ready to go. So there

would be some difficult decisions, but we have the capability to respond.

12

Mr. ORTIZ. My time is up, thank you so much.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr.Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to say I am honored that these gentlemen are

here today. I regret that we could not have included the Guard and

the Reserve because I think an important component that we are

missing today is that the overwhelming preponderance of Guard

and Reserve equipment that has gone to Iraq stayed in Iraq, and

so we are looking at a portion of the problem, but the biggest portion, if you are looking for the problem, is what the Guard and Reserve left behind, and I think that is a fair assessment.

I would like to ask a few questions in particular of the Air Force.

I am troubled by the Administration’s acknowledged plan to terminate the C–130J program, particularly in light of every trip that

I have taken to Iraq, it is pretty apparent that we are flying the

wings off of the C–130’s that are in the region. A lot of those are

E models, I am told, and a lot of those the Air Force has already

scheduled to retire at the end of this conflict. So I would like your

thoughts on that, what is being taken to address that.

I would like to hear what your different Guard and Reserve components are telling you. I know the Marine Corps Reserve has been

extremely active in Iraq, I know the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have been extremely active over there. I am sure you

have called up the seabee reserve to serve over there, and so my

hunch is that a lot of the equipment that was dedicated to them—

and I know for a fact that, when the 90th Engineers came back to

Mississippi after their tour in Iraq, they left every stick of equipment they had behind. So we have now been through a hurricane

season that, thank goodness, did not hit Mississippi, but was only

60 miles away. The folks we were counting on their stateside mode

to help reopen the roads and get electricity to the people and fix

bridges; they did not have a stick of equipment last August and

September when the hurricanes hit many parts of the states adjacent to us.

And last, I would like to turn this back to the Marines and the

Army.

I am happy that this committee is doing, I think, a lot of work

toward resolving the armored humvee problem; we still have a lot

to do. Just last week, a couple of Mississippians were horribly injured, one losing two legs; but all present acknowledged that had

it not been for the fully-armored humvee, that those two soldiers

probably would have lost their lives.

It is something I should have seen myself, but thank goodness

someone else was smart enough to point it out to me. Almost all

of our vehicles in theater have flat bottoms. When a mine detonates underneath that flat bottom vehicle, it is much like a flatbottom boat hitting a wave; the reaction is very severe. You are

catching the full pressure of that detonation. It throws the vehicle

up. In the case here, the humvee was thrown over 10 yards I am

told.

I am told that in some parts of the world, and particularly the

South Africans, in responding to the landmines that they were encountering during their wars, they went back and redesigned many

of their urban fighting vehicles to have a V-bottom. Much like a VVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:43 Nov 29, 2007 Jkt 023351 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-14\096030.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
13

bottom boat, it slices and diffuses that force. In fact, I am told the

Russians were probably very good at this and that most of the vehicles they used in Bosnia had a V-bottom. And when their vehicles

would hit a landmine, it blew the tires off, but the people inside

the vehicle walked away from it.

What is being done as we reconstitute to be a little bit smarter?

And I have got to admit, I am one of the ones that fought very hard

for the up-armored humvees, but maybe it is time to look beyond

that to some sort of an urban fighting vehicle that incorporates a

V-bottom so that we find ourselves with fewer young people that

are in Walter Reed because of their legs blown off as a result of

that flat bottom.

So I know it is three questions, the C–130J, sir, the talk about

your Guard and Reserve equivalents and their equipment shortages, and what are we doing as far as looking at the next generation of fighting vehicles and responding to the landmine problem

that we are encountering in Iraq?

General WETEKAM. Sir, if I may, I will start with the C–130J

briefly.

The Department of Defense has indicated that we are going to

review the production decision on the 130J within the Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR). The 130J is really part of a larger issue,

and that is the theater lift issue, and what do we need and what

is our current capability and what is our current fleet telling us?

The production termination decision was made almost coincidentally with the discovery that our C–130E and early age model fleet

was not as robust as we thought it was. Essentially the problem

with the center wing box that was discovered almost at the same

time. And so what we are really doing is looking at the entire theater lift issue, the C–130 fleet as a whole. The 130J obviously has

to be a part of that solution as we determine really what part of

the 130E model and H model fleet are going to be available to us,

what it takes to reconstitute that fleet. And so that will be—that

is being looked at currently.

General HULY. Just for the record, so we do not get lost in the

shuffle; the Marine Corps is also into the C–130Js. Our C–130J requirement and solution is different than the United States Air

Force’s. We received some 33, I believe, of the C–130Js out of a

fleet of about 51 we were anticipating. Recent funding decisions got

us cut off for the procurement of those last 18, but we think that

that funding is being put back in so we can ultimately get our requirement of the C–130Js. But to us, the C–130J version that we

are getting is a great aircraft, and we look forward to its service

for many years in the future.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, to that point, I had the good fortune to

meet one of your flight crews in Kuwait just last week, and they

had been up most of the night refueling other planes. And he was

extremely proud of the performance of the plane. What he did request—and I am going to pass this on to you—is the program to

replace the fuel pods can be moved along, apparently they took the

pods off some older models and stuck them on the newer planes.

He felt like it was in the works. If there is anything this committee

can do to move that along, I am asking for your thoughts on that.

14

General HULY. Sir, I am going to take that question for the

record, and I will get back to you on that, to exactly what the status of that is. I know it is in the works, but I want to give you the

exact scoop.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 136.]

General CHRISTIANSON. Sir, let me address first of all the equipment that we left behind, particularly for the Guard and the Reserve forces.

The Army has developed a force generation model of which will

put our Reserve components of one in five or one in six years, and

what the intent is that for one year out of that five or six year cycle

they would be ready for deployment. The challenge we have right

now, particularly with the Guard, is with their homeland security

and their state missions, the suite of equipment they must have in

their unit to do that mission you just mentioned for the Mississippi

Guard, we have not yet identified this. We will identify that, and

we will fill those units with that equipment. So even coming out

of a deployment like the one we came out of now, we are obligated

to provide the equipment to those organizations to execute those

state missions. And then as they come into that one year window,

then we give them all the equipment they need to execute their

full-mission suite. That process was not in place when the first rotations came back, as you know. So most of the Guard and Reserve

units, engineer in particular, transportation units in the Reserve

had to leave almost all of their main equipment in country, and it

is still there being used every day. So we have that challenge to

address that.

Our intent is to handle the Guard, the Reserve and the active

forces exactly the same. The rotational model is one in three years

for active, one in five for the Army Reserve, and one in six for the

National Guard. That is the intent. Now we did not get there right

away with these forces, so we still have some work to do, but at

the strategic level, we are going to maneuver the equipment to give

the units the capability to be able to handle their mission sets.

General HULY. As far as the Reserve equipment for the Marine

Corps goes, we are doing our best to cross-level once our Reserve

levels get back; 95 percent of all of our Reserve units have seen

combat in either Afghanistan or Iraq. And as they return, we are

providing them with what equipment we have got and replacing

the equipment that has been damaged or destroyed, looking for industrial base opportunities where that is needed. And we are also

trying to, as you pointed out, be a little bit smart in what we are

replacing in anticipation of our future requirements. We are looking for those opportunities and vehicles to get better armor on

them, underneath armor. We have taken some of our humvees, as

you know, and armored them up better on the bottom so that they

can withstand a certain quantity of a landmine or an explosive

charge placed underneath them. That does not get all of the support that we want under there, and we are looking forward to the

next generation of vehicles, but have not decided on which one to

procure yet.

Admiral HUGEL. Congressman, our active components are an integrated fighting force; we prepare the units and first units; we

15

marry those two up. Right now the equipment is in use. About half

of the equipment is Reserve equipment; the other half is active

equipment, but all of the equipment is being treated and maintained the same way, and it is as a result of this close integration

of the reservists into our construction battalion (CB) battalion.

General CHRISTIANSON. And Congressman, if I could address the

question of armor protection for our forces forward given the environment they are in, particularly in regard to the humvee and its

flat bottom, really I think the vehicle of choice over there is the

stryker, which does not have the same type of bottom and is much

more protective for the forces, over 800 armored security vehicles—

which is a special vehicle designed much like the South African vehicle you mentioned.

And third, we have purchased some of the sport utility vehicle

(SUV) 31s from South Africa, and those who are the most exposed

for this kind of damage are using those vehicles over there. So we

have taken those vehicles right now, and we look to the future and

what kind of land vehicle are we going to have. In the Army’s case,

the tactical truck system, how it looks is going to be driven much

by what we learn here, and the last point that I would leave is still

the vehicle that we are not going to go away from is the heavy armored vehicle, so we do not see any intent in the future that the

Army is going to get rid of any tanks or Bradleys. But they all need

to provide the level of force and protection that I think both you

and I would like to have.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to pursue this a little bit about the Guard and Reserve

forces, if I might. About a year and a half ago, when the 39th Brigade left Arkansas, I went out one of the days when they were

loading up the equipment on rail cars, it was like the biggest use

of rail and moving of equipment since World War II through Arkansas, and it was just rail car after rail car. And so they moved

all that stuff with them. And now they have come back, and most

of them are now back in Arkansas or Oklahoma.

So General Christianson, can you explain to me kind of the trail

now that is going to happen in terms of if I am General Morrow

in Arkansas and I am trying to figure out how to replace this

equipment that is either worn out or some left behind, so who does

the adjutant general go to? Does that come directly through you

or—walk me through that, if you would, please.

General CHRISTIANSON. It is going to be a centrally controlled

program. The Army Materiel Command effective 1 October this

year will be completely in charge of this program. We will work directly with the Army National Guard, G–4, my equivalent on the

Army Guard side, directly with the State maintenance officer and

the units in the organization.

What the unit commander should expect is for the equipment

they have brought back with them, it should go through the same

reset program that all of the active forces have gone through, no

difference. The timing may be different. Where it is done is going

to be controlled by Army material command. So a lot of it is going

to be done locally, but some of it will require repairs that will have

16

to go to the depot or will have to go to some kind of a higher level

organization.

So our intent is to leverage the combat supplies management

system (CSMS), the mates, all of the technical capability the Guard

has, but to leverage all that in the context of a unified national

program with a single standard. So no one is going to get something back at a lower standard that comes out of this program.

That is our intent.

Dr. SNYDER. So requests from the Guard or the Army Reserve

not come through you, or do they? They eventually get to you?

General CHRISTIANSON. Yes, sir. They will come to me from the

National Guard, the bureau itself here in Washington, and then we

will bring that all together. And then Army Material Command is

kind of the coordinator of the national program who will ensure

that all of this work is distributed right and that the standards

have been—they obtain the same level of productivity and standards coming out.

Dr. SNYDER. I have not talked to the folks back home about this

issue yet, but as you know, the concept of the enhanced brigades

came up so we could take certain units and make sure they got the

equipment they needed, and I think that probably has worked reasonably well, but these are the folks that did get some help with

getting equipment several years ago, but they have now gone overseas. And I think there is some fear that perhaps now they will be

behind getting that replaced. Is that a reasonable fear to have?

General CHRISTIANSON. The enhanced brigades are also going to

be modularized as they go through this reset process. They will

come out of this reset process looking different than they did when

they went into this operation. They are going to look just like the

Army modular brigade construct, it will be no different. If it is a

heavy brigade. It will look the same as all other heavy brigades,

so when it comes out of this process, as its equipment is reset, it

will be issued the right kind of equipment to meet those requirements. I can take for the record the timeline to know when 39th

is actually going through its modularity window because that will

give you and the Adjutant General (AG) a picture, a window of

when they should come out of this looking like the new organization.

Dr. SNYDER. That is all right. You do not need to take that for

the record. I was using them as an example. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Wetekam, you referred earlier to the Quadrennial Defense Review. I want to ask you about the mobility capabilities

study; very very much concerned about the issue of C–130’s, we

grounded a bunch of them at Pope. They had to move one of the

45th National Guard planes to back field. Does the Mobility Capability Study take into account the recapitalization and reconstitution issues that you mentioned in your testimony on page four?

General WETEKAM. Sir, it takes into account those issues to a degree, but it is not at the heart of the Mobility Capability Study

(MCS).

17

What we expect out of the MCS—and of course, it is not produced yet—it is essentially a range, if you will, of forces that will

be required, depending on the contingencies. I certainly share your

concerns relative to the existing C–130J fleet.

In addition to Mobility Capability Study, Air Mobility Command

and the program office, the C–130 program office, are working hard

right now to assess what the data, the new data is really telling

us with regards to the condition of the C–130’s, the older 130’s that

have the center wing box problems you referred to, sir.

Mr. HAYES. Well, the data is telling us it is a bad problem. I

think what you are going to find, when you look more closely, with

the grounded birds and wing boxes, it is worse than we think, and

we very badly need to get into spending money on the new Js.

And when you answered the question for Congressman Taylor,

you mentioned a wing box. Did you say it is better or worse than

we first thought, or did I misunderstand that?

General WETEKAM. It is worse than we first thought. We had initially established a limit at 45,000 equivalent baseline hours, at

which we restricted—put flight restrictions on those aircraft, but

continued to operate them. What we found out in recent months is

that 45,000 equivalent baseline hours is the point at which we actually need to ground the aircraft, and we have moved that restriction limit back to 38,000. So it is worse than we thought it was

until a few months ago when we got essentially new data as we

have worked more with the center wing boxes. It is not getting better; it is going in the wrong direction.

Mr. HAYES. You are confirming what we had feared.

The MCS study was due at the end of March; now it comes out

at the end of April. I am pretty sure we use that as another way

of letting folks up here know what the situation is. At Pope, we

have got 31 aircraft grounded, seven or eight limited flying status,

20 percent of the fleet, 84 of which are on active duty on restricted

weight capabilities. We have just got to keep hammering the fact

that recapitalization, that is keeping our young men off the ground

in Iraq and Afghanistan and increasing safety.

Talk at length about the continued, not just procurement as it

is now outlined—and hopefully, we have corrected the initial oversight in the budget for continuing production. Speak to that, and

then speak to the issue of what really we need, and that is more

C–130Js than was initially projected. And anyone else that would

like to speak in the range of whoever uses them, I would love to

have your comments for the record. We need those aircraft badly.

General WETEKAM. Yes, sir. Essentially, the production for the

Marine Corps 130’s is kind of bridging, if you will, the production

gap until the department can fully assess the impact, as referred

to earlier.

Mr. HAYES. There is a study underway, and I am sure you are

probably aware of it, but I know there is a request, and that is,

the amount of money that is being spent, we are way past the point

of diminishing returns. We are spending money on aircraft that

may fly for a limited amount of time; some that will never fly

again. We need to transfer those tax dollars into new aircraft with

availability and capabilities that are full time, not limited on

18

weight. So again, any comments on that? And I yield back my time

after that answer.

General WETEKAM. Sir, I just say that I share your concerns with

aging aircraft, 130’s are a big part of that, but we have other fleets

as well, as you are certainly aware, that are in the same boat. Our

KC–135 fleet, which averages about 43 years of age——

Mr. HEFLEY. Do not lose focus. If we can get them on the C–

130’s, then obviously have answered on the 15s and the KC–135s

and so on. You are right. Let’s give the people some airplanes, you

know?

General WETEKAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. HEFLEY. Dr. Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. General Wetekam, we are not picking on you, sir,

but let’s talk about A–10s. My understanding is that there are

about 200 A–10s Guard, Reserve and Active left in the inventory;

is that about correct?

General WETEKAM. Sir, I believe it is slightly higher than that.

I can tell you in just a moment what the total number is.

We have a total, total inventory including trainers of 357 active

and on-guard Reserve.

Dr. SCHWARZ. That is a lot better than I thought. The plan is to

upgrade, refit, refurbish. What part of that fleet to keep them active and in the inventory, my understanding, until maybe the year

2018, 2020?

General WETEKAM. Sir, I will have to take that for the record

and provide you an accurate assessment. We do have upgrade

plans for the A–10, but I do need to be sure what portion of the

fleet and what the projected service life is.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 136.]

Dr. SCHWARZ. I feel about the A–10 the way my friend Mr. Hayes

feels about the C–130J. I have a vested interest in it. There is an

A–10 base in my district, but that A–10 squadron has flown in

every operation this country has been involved in for the past 15

or 18 years, including the first Gulf War, Kosovo, the southern nofly zone, Iraqi Freedom, and they are a superb outfit.

Then I speak with my friends who are both retired and active officers in the Army and the Marine Corps. When you talk about

plans the Air Force might have to take the A–10 out of the inventory and replace it with another close air support aircraft, they are

unhappy campers.

So my interest is, and the assurance, that I want, if you can possibly give me, is that keeping the A–10’s in the inventory active

and in support of our Marine Corps and Army troops on the ground

is—that is the plan, that is ongoing.

General WETEKAM. Yes, sir. We have long-term plans for the A–

10. We will, as I said for the record, provide you with the detailed

force structure laid out for the outyears. But we certainly share the

Army and the Marine Corps’ enthusiasm for the A–10 as well. It

has been a great performer for us.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 136.]

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you very kindly, General. I would yield

back my time right now. I have another question later.

19

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, gentlemen and thank you for being here.

The first question I have, on the occasions that I have had to

visit in theater, we have been told various things about how fast

the equipment is wearing out. Is it accurate that the equipment is

wearing out five times faster than we anticipated because of the

harsh environment?

General CHRISTIANSON. I am not sure that it is accurate that it

is wearing out five times faster. I think it is accurate we are using

it five times more than we would in peacetime operation, training

operations. How much wear is being done kind of depends a little

bit on the equipment.

As I mentioned earlier, with wheeled vehicles that we have

added a lot of extra armor to, so it is carrying extra weight. I believe they are wearing out much faster.

What we are finding out on the aircraft—when we have come

back for those aircraft that we have completely reset—that there

is not as much wear as we thought. Part of that is because I believe our soldiers learned from Desert Storm and took actions as

part of these operations to avoid some of the damages we saw on

those helicopters during Desert Storm.

The same thing has been applied to some of our ground systems.

We have better filtration systems. The maintenance checks and

services the soldiers are doing forward, I think, have helped to help

alleviate some of the wear. Not the usage.

The usage is five times higher than normal. But the wear depends on other things. As I mentioned, we are not seeing that in

the stuff we are resetting right now, with the exception of wheeled

vehicles, which I think are wearing out at a higher rate than our

other equipment.

Mr. REYES. In that same vein, what are the lessons that we have

learned? Is somebody in a position to not only evaluate but to make

recommendations and maybe implement changes to either our logistics system or the design of the vehicles that are wearing much

faster? What is being done in that area?

General CHRISTIANSON. Exactly what you said is what is happening. We are taking the lessons learned and applying them. The lessons learned after Desert Storm were applied primarily to aviation

and paid huge dividends in this operation.

The aircraft that came back out of this last operation, as I mentioned, the wear and tear was much less than we thought. In addition, other lessons that are learned are being applied during the

RESET. So if we are able to put improved capabilities on those helicopters, better screening systems for dust, better capabilities for

cleaning. We are doing that as part of the RESET program.

Better training for the soldiers, what extra steps should you take

in this kind of environment when you are operating? Those are also

lessons that are being applied every day at the point of the sphere.

So we are doing exactly that.

I think where we see the results is in the equipment forward. So

even though the equipment is being used at a much higher rate

than normal, we are seeing readiness rates that are 94, 95 percent

almost across the fleet. With aviation, almost all of our aviation

fleets are well above the Army standard in the deployed area deVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:43 Nov 29, 2007 Jkt 023351 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-14\096030.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
20

spite their high usage. So I think they are applying many of the

lessons.

Mr. REYES. What about some of the information that we get that

parts are taking a long time, vehicles are deadlined for parts and

are down an inordinate amount of time.

What do you know about that? What are you doing about that

and where are we today about that?

General CHRISTIANSON. In the two and a half years that we have

been in operation over there, there have been significant changes

to the way the supply distribution system works. As you know,

there is—there are a lot of items that are moving by ground and

it is a long ways, so we have used a lot of repair time, a lot of time

just waiting for supplies to be delivered. But today I can report

that for those items that are ordered and delivered by air, the turnaround time is 18 days on average over there.

The biggest problem we are having is the distribution locally, because when it gets up into Iraq and then gets out to the forward

operating basis, those distribution runs are all made in coordination with all of the maneuver forces. They take into consideration

the security environment, as you can well imagine.

But we are getting good turn-around times in supply. Eighteen

days is very, very good. Now this is compared to almost twice as

long a year and a half ago. So we are doing very, very well.

The other indication that the repair part situation is good is on

aviation. We have very few helicopters that are down waiting for

repair parts. We have about 10 percent of our helicopters that are

in a phased maintenance. After so many hours, they bring them in

for a phase maintenance. I think this is also indicative of a good

supply system and lessons learned and applied in this operating

environment. We are watching it every day. We watch the supply

turn-around times every single day.

Mr. REYES. Are these—excuse me, go ahead, General.

General HULY. Sir, in the Marine Corps, perhaps in the early

stages of the campaign, there might have been some supply problems or some delays. But I have heard of no reports of any recently

and readiness rates don’t bear out that they have got a problem.

Our readiness, like the Army’s, is way into the 90 percent for our

ground vehicles. So I think they have got the supplies. They have

got the maintenance capabilities to keep things running. Our aviation rates over there as well remain high. This is because we do

have the forward in store supplies and the maintenance effort over

there.

Conversely, however, though, our maintenance on the CONUSbased aircraft is declining. It is declining at the expense, because

we are putting the effort into keeping things forward deployed.

That is where the emphasis is right now.

Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one quick follow-up by way

of documentation? I was going to ask, are there reports that can

give us a comparison of how things were early on in this conflict

versus where they are today? Could we get copies so we could take

a look at them?

General CHRISTIANSON. Congressman, I will take that for the

record, and I will give you some background. We track that all the

time.

21

I wanted to add one thing that I forgot that is very important.

In the last couple of years, one of the things, one of initiatives that

we have taken that has paid huge dividends is we now have satellite connectivity to the very forward edge of the battlefield for logisticians.

So before where we take several days for a request for a repair

part to get back here to the United States, today it is happening

in less than half a day. That makes a huge difference in the ability

to support the forces. Because now the people who are back here

supporting are able to respond rapidly. The last point I would

make is we also have a supply capability in Kuwait.

About 35 to 40 percent of the repair parts that are needed in

Iraq are coming from that warehouse in Kuwait. So that shortens

the supply pipeline significantly and helped us in turn-around

time, but we will get you the information and you can see what

happened.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 135.]

Mr. REYES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to go back

to the C–130 question, and particularly the wing boxes. Can you,

in particular, General, talk about how many aircraft are currently

affected by wing box cracks? Given the rate that we have seen over

the last year with the problem, can you forecast what we may run

into this year? I ask all this to go to the point of the company or

companies that produces the wing boxes, do they have the capacity? Are they producing fast enough to be able to replace what

needs to be done so that we don’t run into a crisis in regards to

replacing those parts.

General WETEKAM. Yes, sir. First off, the first part of your question is we have—and these numbers change, because as we operate

aircraft they obviously move into that over 38,000-hour category

and then the over 45,000 or 45,000-hour base line category.

But my most current data is that we have 35 aircraft that are

over 45,000 hours and so essentially are restricted from all operations at this point. In addition to that, there is another 56 aircraft, and this includes also C–130Hs, it is not just the E models,

but some of the earlier H models. Fifty six aircraft that are in that

restricted area where they can operate, but they have significant

limitations on maneuvering and on carriage, weight carriage.

I will take for the record what our projection is for the next year.

There are a number of aircraft obviously that will be moving into

those categories, and I will take that for the record.

Relative to the production capacity, we think that it is about 36

per year, according to the manufacturer, 36 center wing boxes that

could be produced. And so—but it is not just a case of producing

the wing boxes, it is also a case of having the depot capacity then

to replace the wing box. We couldn’t do 36 simultaneously, and we

are still assessing that.

So the wing box production capacity itself would seem to be adequate. But we haven’t fully assessed what the depot capacity could

be and how fast we could put those aircraft, particularly those 36

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that are already in the—or the 35, rather, that are in the grounded

category through the depot.

Mr. MILLER. Does the work actually have to be done at a depot.

Can it be done privately?

General WETEKAM. Yes, sir. I say depot, but that could be either

public sector depot. We do in C–130 work in both Ogden, Utah and

Warner Robbins, Georgia. There are a number of private sector depots that do contract C–130 work and have in the past as well. I

would suspect that it would be a combination of the two.

Mr. MILLER. I would hope, so because we have a facility in

Crestview that does a lot of work. When I look at the numbers, I

see that the private sector does—not that I am against depots at

all, but it seems that they are turning out equipment faster within

budget, and I want to make sure that we don’t just force everything

back into the depots to get the work done.

General WETEKAM. No, sir. In a situation like this, where we

have an operational restriction, we would seek to repair it, you

know, address it as quickly as we could, using whatever capacity

is available.

Mr. MILLER. Very good. Thank you, sir.

Admiral, can we go to the water for just a minute.

Admiral HUGEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MILLER. You may have addressed it before I got here. But

talking about the Kennedy and the plans to retire the carrier does,

this cause a capability issue as we reconstitute our forces? What

happens when the Kitty Hawk comes home to be retrofitted, you

know, during that period of time?

Admiral HUGEL. In the near term, Kennedy was already planned

to be in a maintenance period, and so we had enough other carrier

strike group capability in place to continue to supply our six plus

two carrier strike group rate, and that is in accordance with the

fleet strike plan.

We are looking now over the longer term to determine whether

we will be able to continue supplying six plus two carrier strike

group readiness or something less than that with Kennedy out of

the mix.

A piece of that work is understanding the—not only the capability that we need to have deployed but the presence that we need

to have. Those two things, coupled together, to make sure that we

are meeting the combatant command (COCOM) requirements forward.

We are additionally looking at Kitty Hawk and the Kitty Hawk

replacement. The plans are not finalized yet on replacing Kitty

Hawk. So further study required there before we announce where

we are going.

Mr. MILLER. You—I have heard the discussion, in regards, if I

might, for just a second, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is out. In

a 30-second nutshell, I have heard the term ‘‘mothball’’ used in regards to the Kennedy. What does that mean?

Admiral HUGEL. We have fundamentally two different kinds of

things we do with a ship after we inactivate it, Congressman. One

is to mothball the ship, basically to lay the ship up in a condition

so that if we decide somewhere down the road we need to reactivate the ship, the systems have been dried out, the ship has been

23

dehumidified so that rust and the deterioration of the hull life components doesn’t get away from us. The other alternative is to scrap

the ship, to cut it up, and that is a pretty final action.

So mothballing or demobilizing the ship allows us to put the ship

away, but to recover the ship if somewhere down the road we decide we need the ship back in the inventory.

Mr. MILLER. I understand when you—the reasoning, I guess, behind from a financial standpoint. But can you quasi-mothball something and turn it into a training carrier?

Admiral HUGEL. Quasi-mothballing means taking pieces of the

ship completely out of action, sealing the compartments and locking it up. If we were to use a ship for a training asset you need

to have access to the entire ship. If there is a flood in the ship, you

need to get to wherever the problem might be, and so it is impractical to partially mothball a ship and continue to operate it, sir.

Mr. MILLER. Okay. I have got some other questions in that regard, but I will pass them too you.

Admiral HUGEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to you all for being here,

and for your service, and particularly to General Huly. We miss

you, and miss your service in San Diego.

I wanted to turn just a second to what could be, I guess, the most

personal of all readiness questions, having met with a group of Marines just a few days ago in San Diego, who were being treated at

Balboa Hospital.

One of their big concerns was that their weapons jammed, and

that even despite their cleaning the weapons constantly, that they

still are having a lot of problems, it is hard to get a replacement,

and they also mentioned that they would like to have a side arm

available to them so that when their weapons jammed that they

have a backup.

Could you tell me how you would respond to them when they

make those requests, and what we are doing about that?

General HULY. Ma’am, this is the first that I have heard of any

weapons jamming in combat or in any training leading it to it. If

it is so, it hasn’t been a problem that has been brought to our attention. I am sure if they are saying it happened to them, then we

will check it out. So I am going to have to take your question for

the record. I will find out which units specifically and to see what

the problems were.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 137.]

Ms. DAVIS. Okay, I can help you with that. Thank you.

General HULY. Thank you.

Ms. DAVIS. And also I just wanted to ask then about the tracking

of war-related expenses and equipment, do we do that separately

or are all those war-related expenses tracked in one way and other

military tracking expenditures are tracked another way. Do we

separate those out or are they together?

General HULY. I can speak for the Marine Corps in that we are

capturing all of our war-related expenses and our costs separately

at this time from our normal operating costs. We had a very good

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foundation of what our normal operating costs were preOIF and

preOEF.

We were pretty much able to capture what our costs were, not

only for our own information and managing internally, but to be

able to present it to the Congress and to the Department of Defense to be able to justify what it is that we are asking for. So, yes,

ma’am, we do break them out separately.

Ms. DAVIS. Is that true for all the services?

General CHRISTIANSON. Yes, ma’am. We have to track our expenses separately. I know that if an auditor came in to look they

probably wouldn’t think we are doing it as well as we should. But

we are trying to keep them separate for many, many good reasons.

We have to do that.

General WETEKAM. The true is for the Air Force as well, ma’am.

Admiral HUGEL. Yes, ma’am. Within the capability of our ability

to distinguish an underway day for the war versus just being an

underway for other reasons, we do try to distinguish those costs.

Certainly we program in budget and predict with models that are

tied to baseline requirements and then wartime requirements

above that.

Ms. DAVIS. Because, I am glad to hear that then because there

was some question of whether or not DOD allowed that, but that

is the way that you do that.

It is my understanding that in 2004 the supplemental requested

2.8 billion addressed to equipment and wear and then 2005 supplemental was about 12 billion for that purpose. Now that we are in

2006, if we have a pretty good idea about what those amounts are,

if you are separating them out, then why don’t we include those

from your point of view in the 2006 budget request, which will be

separate from the supplemental?

General CHRISTIANSON. In accordance with the Office of the Secretary Defenses (OSD’s) policy, the incremental costs of the war we

put into the supplemental, the emergency supplemental request.

The problem with trying to anticipate it, and we do the best we can

when we build a supplemental requirement, is we are not exactly

sure what is going to come back next year.

If the security situation changes up or down, the units that were

returned or the units we will send over will not be the ones that

we currently are planning. So we could get a lot more equipment

back. So, for example, if a security situation improves dramatically

over the next six to eight months by the end of this calendar year,

we could see a lot more of the equipment we have left behind returning here.

If that happens, there will be a larger amount of RESET required next fiscal year than we are currently planning, because

currently we know we are only planning for the units to come back

that we think are going to come back.

So we are kind of in a little bit of a time crunch. I know, Mr.

Chairman, you had asked earlier, what is the resource that really

drives all of this? Time is the resource that we really don’t have

any control over. So we—if the budget goes in and it has to be in

by this time, and we have—we don’t know what force structures

will remain in theater until after that time, we have no choice but

to ask for it in a supplement.

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Ms. DAVIS. Where do we factor in equipment for the Iraqi Army?

General CHRISTIANSON. Most of the equipment that I know—

some of the equipment we have given the Iraqi Army. Some of our

prepositioned trucks, for example, that are very old models that we

don’t want in the Army anymore. About 1,215 we gave to the Iraqi

Army. We were compensated, recompensated from Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq) (CPA) for that.

Most of the other stuff that I know is being purchased commercially and is not equipment that the Army, at least in the Army’s

case, the Army is not giving them. It is outside the Army.

Ms. DAVIS. Great. Thank you.

Admiral Hugel, I was going to ask you just about the sea swapping and what we anticipate down the road. We know there are a

lot of plusses of that, certainly, but the downside in terms of readiness—and if we don’t have any more time, Mr. Chairman, I will

stop. But that was a question that perhaps others haven’t asked

about.

General HULY. Yes, ma’am, we have done sea swap pilots on the

west, for a couple of West Coast ships now. We are embarking on

sea swap pilots for ships based on the East Coast. We continue to

learn from each of those sea swap exercises the upside and the

downside, and there appear to be quite a few upside things.

So I think when the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) testified

earlier on what the future force structure requirements in terms of

number of ships might be, he mentioned sea swap as an issue and

an effort that we are going to continue to explore. Depending on

our success at employing sea swap, depending on how much of the

fleet we can do sea swap with, we will eventually dictate the size

of the force that we need because of the extra forward deployed

operational availability we get from those platforms when we are

able to swap crews back and forth.

So far, we have learned many good lessons from sea swap. The

East Coast ships will add to that collection.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Evans. Mr. Evans has some questions for the

record. We will do that. Do any of—any of the rest of you have any

questions for the record as well? We will do that.

Are there any final questions or comments?

If not, the committee stands adjourned.

Thank you, gentlemen, very, very, much.

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 6, 2005

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEFLEY

Mr. HEFLEY. General Huly, of the various variables impacting the ability of your

service to accomplish its reset requirements, which is the most difficult to manage

or attain?

General HULY. The most difficult variable impacting the Marine Corps’ ability to

accomplish resetting is maintaining an adequate inventory of equipment. This is because the Marine Corps must maintain sufficient assets in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) to fight the war while continuing to train for future deployments and

maintain sufficient prepositioned assets to be ready to engage in future operations.

The Marine Corps has had to take equipment from home stations, training schoolhouses, our Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons and Global Preposition Program

(Norway) in order to supply deploying units. All of the equipment deployed in the

AOR is undergoing use at a rate five to eight times greater than average peacetime

utilization in a challenging environment. This has accelerated aging of those assets

and our need to procure replacements equipment at a far faster rate just to stay

even.

We have employed cross-leveling of equipment across the Marine Corps to mitigate the effects of heavy equipment use/loss in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Cross-leveling alone will not be sufficient to meet GWOT operational needs and

maintain essential readiness over time.

Mr. HEFLEY. Of the various variables impacting the ability of your service to accomplish its reset requirements, which is the most difficult to manage or attain?

Admiral HUGEL. The most challenging variables are the safety of our personnel

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and transit time to rotate equipment to and from CONUS.

Mr. HEFLEY. Of the various variables impacting the ability of your service to accomplish its reset requirements, which is the most difficult to manage or attain?

General WETEKAM. The Air Force faces a number of significant reconstitution

challenges. The most difficult challenge facing the Air Force is recapitalizing and

reconstituting our aging aircraft fleet. In the mid-1960’s, our average fleet age was

around 81⁄2 years, by Desert Storm it had climbed to 17 years, and today’s fleet average age is over 23 years.

Managing and sustaining these aging airframes strains our resources and personnel as well as our supply systems. In addition, harsh operating environments and

increased ops tempo lead to extensive wear and tear on aircraft systems. The sustained high demand for the capabilities provided by fleets comprised of primarily

older aircraft continues to delay our ability to reconstitute while accelerating the

need for re-capitalization. Also, critical to operating aging fleets is the cost to maintain and sustain them. Although there are no current constraints regarding our

depot capacity, it is crucial that we maintain adequate levels of funding for Depot

Purchased Equipment Maintenance (DPEM) and Contractor Logistics Support

(CLS). We have seen a steady increase in the DPEM requirement with a comparable

increase in DPEM funding which has grown from ∼$1.6B in FY00 to ∼$3.3B in

FY04, and CLS funding which has grown from ∼$1.8B to ∼$2.5B in the same period.

One program we developed to help address aging aircraft issues is the Fleet Viability Board (FVB). We chartered a recurring FVB to provide an unbiased assessment of fleet health. Along with the Fleet Viability Board assessments, we must

continue to divest our oldest legacy aircraft to free resources for reinvestment in

newer aircraft. This allows us to take advantage of new technology and increasing

capabilities.

Thank you for your continued support of the Air Force.

Mr. HEFLEY. Of the services that have stay-behind or remain-behind equipment

in Iraq or Afghanistan, how much of that equipment is likely to ever return for repair?

General HULY. The Marine Corps recently conducted an assessment of the Demand on Equipment in theater. This assessment took into consideration actual and

projected combat losses and heightened stress placed on equipment due to the

OPTEMPO and environmental impact. Equipment that cannot be repaired in theater is transported from Iraq back to CONUS for evaluation and induction into the

depot maintenance cycle. For equipment that is experiencing heightened usage, the

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objective is to rotate it systematically to replace tired equipment with fresh equipment before it becomes unserviceable/irreparable.

To date, the USMC has had two ships sets of gear return to CONUS for replacement/refurbishment with three additional ships scheduled for return over the next

several months. We continue to monitor equipment, the replenishment cycle, and

will leverage opportune lift for air return of retrograde assets as well as surface return for ground equipment assets.

We recognize the need to automate this decision process and are developing a tool

that integrates equipment usage rates, combat losses, and cost factors from our operating forces, program managers, and our Marine Corps Logistics Command. This

Total Life Cycle Management Tool will provide a mechanism from which future

sound, prudent, mission-focused Marine Corps management decisions can be made

regarding equipment maintenance and/or new acquisitions.

Mr. HEFLEY. Of the services that have stay-behind or remain-behind equipment

in Iraq or Afghanistan, how much of that equipment is likely to ever return for repair?

Admiral HUGEL. Unless the equipment is deemed beyond economical repair or suffers from extensive battle damage, we anticipate all of the equipment to return for

servicing. Aviation Support Equipment in part due to quantity and size, is rotated

via Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships as the Marine Air Wing (MAW) rotates into theatre. Aircraft are rotated back in keeping with their peace time established depot maintenance schedule. Seabee equipment is also rotated primarily

through MPF ships.

Mr. HEFLEY. Of the services that have stay-behind or remain-behind equipment

in Iraq or Afghanistan, how much of that equipment is likely to ever return for repair?

General WETEKAM. Most equipment used by the Air Force is sustained under a

maintenance concept that doesn’t require it to return to the United States for repair. Air Force equipment is used, inspected, serviced and maintained at the location of use until the equipment is neither no longer necessary or has completed it’s

life cycle. If the equipment is no longer necessary and is still serviceable, it is reallocated to other valid users within the Air Force. If the equipment has reached the

end of it’s lifecycle, it is demilitarized (if necessary) and disposed of via established

disposal processes. For that very small population of equipment items requiring return to the United States for repair, e.g., materiel handling equipment, selected

communications-electronics equipment, etc., the Air Force returns that equipment

to the government depot system or private sector contractors for repair and/or overhaul.

Mr. HEFLEY. To what extent do you have the ability to perform depot maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait?

General HULY. Currently limited depot maintenance is being conducted in theater. The lack of infrastructure inhibits our ability to create this capability. However,

the ability of CONUS based depots to respond to GWOT requirements remains high.

The Marine Corps and the Army are partnering to leverage heavy maintenance

support for ground vehicles in Iraq. The first facility to implement this partnership

is the Army’s HMMWV Service Center. The Service Center will provide preventive,

corrective, and heavy maintenance support in several locations throughout the area.

In addition to the HMMWV, 13 systems that are common to both the Marine Corps

and Army have been identified as candidates for joint repair capability. Currently

the Marine Corps units in theater have the resident maintenance capability and expertise to sustain its units up to depot level maintenance. We will continue to expand this partnership and leverage common repair facilities where at all possible.

Marine aviation has a limited depot-like repair capability in the Iraq Theater. We

have facilities in theater with depot artisans; this provides capabilities tailored to

the requirements of the deployed rotary wing units (fixed wing depot capability is

almost exclusively resident in CONUS). Complete full depot-level maintenance is

not done in Iraq; as such work requires infrastructure and tools not available there.

For example, we have artisans in theater that can conduct aircraft battle damage

assessments and some associated repairs, as well as structural analysis and deep

cleaning. Standard depot work such as complete rebuilding of components, however,

cannot usually be done at these limited facilities. A Memorandum Of Agreement

with the US Army has allowed us to leverage their depot-like capabilities in Afghanistan when required to support Marine aircraft detachments operating there.

Mr. HEFLEY. To what extent do you have the ability to perform depot maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait?

Admiral HUGEL. For Aviation Support Equipment, we maintain the ability to do

emergent field depot maintenance and battle damage repair using flyaway depot artisans in theatre both ashore and afloat. Battle damage or emergent repairs that

135

require extensive depot rework must be returned to CONUS. Normal peacetime

scheduled depot level maintenance is performed only in CONUS. For Navy Seabee

equipment, we do not perform depot level maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait.

Mr. HEFLEY. To what extent do you have the ability to perform depot maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait?

General WETEKAM. The Air Force neither has nor requires physical depot capabilities in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait. Depot maintenance is the heavy repair work

that requires specialized equipment, facilities and skills not found within our deployed maintenance forces. As a result, the Air Force returns equipment requiring

repair and/or overhaul to organic and contract depot repair facilities throughout the

globe. On a selective basis, theater maintenance is complemented by deployable expeditionary depot maintenance support via Combat Logistics Support Squadron

(CLSS) teams, Contract Field Teams (CFTs) and/or Depot Field Teams (DFTs).

Mr. HEFLEY. To what extent do you have the ability to perform depot maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait?

General CHRISTIANSON. We do not perform depot level maintenance on the equipment in theater. Rather, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and its subordinate commands have established Forward Repair Activities (FRA) which provide a

repair and return capability and a flexible response to urgent requirements, such

as the application of Add-on Armor kits. Employees from our depots and commercial

contractors perform the work at the FRAs. The FRAs are specialized and vary in

size based upon the Warfighers’ requirements. Supporting aviation, ground vehicles

and electronic equipment, these FRAs are located in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and at

three sites in Iraq.

Mr. HEFLEY. What is the difference between the Army’s RESET program and the

Recapitalization program?

General CHRISTIANSON. The Army’s Recapitalization program is depot repair,

based on an extensive maintenance scope of work, that rebuilds our equipment to

a near, zero time/zero mile condition. Through this effort, we extend the service life

of our aging fleets. The result of the Recapitalization program is sustained system

readiness through improved reliability and availability.

The Army’s Reset program is a series of actions to restore returning units to a

desired level of combat capability. Returning equipment is repaired to address the

damage inflicted by heavy usage in a desert environment. Some of this repair work

is below depot level maintenance, accomplished in the unit motor pools or other

maintenance facilities. Some equipment requires work that can only be accomplished with the skills and equipment available in depot facilities. The high operational tempo in theater places some equipment under great stress. In effect, a year

operating within theater equates to five or six years of operation in peacetime for

some equipment. To mitigate this accelerated aging of the fleets, we are applying

the Recapitalization scope of work to the returning equipment in the worst condition. Reset also includes the procurement of new equipment to replace battle losses

and equipment that is not economically repairable.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

Mr. REYES. Are there reports that can give us a comparison of readiness rates at

the beginning of the conflict versus now?

General CHRISTIANSON. During the initial phase of the conflict, the Army experienced readiness rates below the DA Goal for some critical combat weapon systems.

During this time, readiness was challenging because of the supply pipeline and theater distribution system in an immature theater. The theater is currently matured

and many of the initial shortcomings have been resolved. For the past year, the

Army has shown a positive trend in maintaining its critical combat systems (M1,

M2/3, M109A6, MLRS, PATRIOT, AH–64, UH–60, OH–58D & CH–47D) resulting

in exceeding the Department of the Army (DA) Goal (90 percent for ground and 75

percent for air) in the past six months for all systems except the AH–64 and CH–

47 in the OIF/OEF theater of operation. Although the AH–64 and CH–47D trends

are slightly below the Army goal, the materiel readiness did not hamper any operational missions. The Army has established Forward Repair Activities, Field Service

Representatives and Contract Maintenance to assist in maintaining the combat

weapon systems in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in which track vehicles are

being used at five times and aviation two to three times their peacetime OPTEMPO.

The theater has the highest priority for CL IX repair parts and any systemic materiel or maintenance issues are discussed at the senior leaders’ weekly HQDA VTC

with the theater. We have made significant progress in filling supply requests by

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fielding satellite connectivity to the very forward edge of the battlefield for logisticians. Before this improvement, it took several days, on average, for a repair part

request to be sent to CONUS. Today, it takes less than a half day. This has made

a significant difference in the ability to support deployed forces. Additionally, the

Army and DLA have established substantial supply facilities in Kuwait. Thirty-five

to forty percent of repair parts requests required in Iraq are shipped from Kuwait.

The emphasis on theater readiness, however, has hampered efforts to maintain

readiness in non-deployed units. As RESET of returning units is conducted and

depot level programs, to include RECAP, are conducted, the Army expects readiness

in non-deployed units to also improve.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. Status and thoughts on the program to replace fuel pods on the C–

130.

General HULY. The USMC is actively focused on rapidly upgrading the refueling

pods to address the issues noted by Mr. Taylor. The refueling pods issues constituted a Part I deficiency identified during Operational Test and Evaluation. Currently (as of June 2005) five aircraft have the upgraded refueling pod system. Four

of these aircraft are located at MCAS Miramar, and the other is the test aircraft

at Pax River (VX–20). There is a detailed plan to perform this upgrade on all remaining aircraft; we expect to upgrade approximately two aircraft per month, which

should complete the upgrades by June 2006.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HAYES

Mr. HAYES. You are confirming what we had feared. The MCS study was due at

the end of March; now it comes out at the end of April. I am pretty sure we use

that as another way of letting folks up here know what the situation is. At Pope,

we have got 31 aircraft grounded, seven or eight limited flying status, 20 percent

of the fleet, 84 of which are on active duty on restricted weight capabilities. We have

just got to keep hammering the fact that recapitalization, that is keeping our young

men off the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and increasing safety.

Talk at length about the continued, not just procurement as it is now outlinedand hopefully, we have corrected the initial oversight in the budget for continuing

production. Speak to that, and then speak to the issue of what really we need, and

that is more C–130Js than was initially projected. And anyone else that would like

to speak in the range of whoever uses them, I would love to have your comments

for the record. We need those aircraft badly.

General WETEKAM. As you know, the C–130 has proven to be one of the most effective air lifters in the Air Force since the first A model entered the inventory in

the late 1950’s to the current E, H and J models. It has been involved in every

major conflict from Vietnam to Iraqi Freedom. The stated requirement for C–130

combat delivery intra-theater airlift is a minimum of 421 E/H equivalents, a mix

of C–130 E, H and J model aircraft. In order to meet that requirement, the Air

Force is currently modernizing the intra-theater fleet through the C–130 Avionics

Modernization Program (AMP) and will continue to recapitalize the oldest most

problematic C–130s with the C–130Js. Moreover, the Air Force, through the MCS

and QDR, as well as the Joint Intra-theater Airlift Study, will refine the intra-theater airlift requirement and force mix for the total force.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SCHWARZ

Dr. SCHWARZ. The plan is to upgrade, refit, refurbish. What part of that fleet will

keep them active and in the inventory, my understanding, until maybe the year

2018, 2020?

General WETEKAM. The plan is to upgrade the entire A–10 inventory of 356 aircraft (203 active duty, 102 Air National Guard, 51 Air Force Reserve Component)

with the A–10 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and Precision Engagement

(PE).

The A–10 SLEP extends the service life to 16,000 operational flight hours, supporting operations through the aircraft retirement in the 2023 timeframe. The SLEP

program is designed to increase the A–10 service life through inspections and consolidated structural improvements such as repairs to cracks, removal of corrosion

from fuel tanks and replacement of wing leading edges. Estimated cost for the SLEP

program is about $2.1M per aircraft for FY05-FY11.

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Precision Engagement greatly enhances A–10 operations on the digital battlefield

by improving aircraft avionics, integrating a tactical datalink: and a targeting pod,

and adding J-series weapons capability (global positioning satellite guided weapons).

This $322M program provides significantly greater combat capability for the A–10

and completes in FY09. Precision Engagement upgraded aircraft are designated A–

10C.

The A–10 program also has $156M in FY06 through FY08 for system development

and demonstration of an engine kit designed to improve engine performance. A decision to procure the engine kits ($1.8B) will be made during the FY08 POM cycle.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. Can you, in particular, General, talk about how many aircraft are

currently affected by wing box cracks? Given the rate that we have seen over the

last year with the problem, can you forecast what we may run into this year? I ask

all this to go to the point of the company or companies that produces the wing

boxes, do they have the capacity? Are they producing fast enough to be able to replace what needs to be done so that we don’t run into a crisis in regards to replacing

those parts.

General WETEKAM. As of 20 April 2005, there are 57 aircraft restricted and 31

aircraft grounded. Another four aircraft that experienced grounding center wing box

cracks have been retired.

Our forecast estimates 6 additional aircraft will reach the 45K Equivalent Baseline Hours (EBH) threshold and be grounded, and 12 additional aircraft will reach

the 38K EBH threshold and be restricted, in the next 12 months.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to you all for being here, and

for your service, and particularly to General Huly. We miss you, and miss your service in San Diego. I wanted to turn just a second to what could be, I guess, the most

personal of all readiness questions, having met with a group of Marines just a few

days ago in San Diego, who were being treated at Balboa Hospital.

One of their big concerns was that their weapons jammed, and that even despite

their cleaning the weapons constantly, that they still are having a lot of problems,

it is hard to get a replacement, and they also mentioned that they would like to

have a side arm available to them so that when their weapons jammed that they

have a backup.

Could you tell me how you would respond to them when they make those requests, and what we are doing about that?

General HULY. We have queried numerous Marines currently deployed in theater

and are not aware of any jamming issues with the Modular Weapon System (M16A4

or M4). No reports of weapons jamming have been received and no documentation

of not being able to get replacements is available. The Army recently conducted a

lubrication study with Marine Corps participation for small arms due to numerous

claims that its existing lubricant was causing malfunctions due to the environment

it was being employed in (sandy, dusty). This lubrication study found that the lubricant that is currently in use is, in fact, better than lubricants commercially available for weapons.

The Marine Corps has had an issue with M9 service pistols jamming and an investigation into the cause of the jamming revealed the problem to be a magazine

issue. The root cause of the M9 jamming was found to be a surface finish on some

contracted magazines that had been issued and these magazines are being removed

from the inventory and M9 magazines are being replaced by an improved magazine

with a better surface finish and improved feeding reliability.

In reference to having a backup weapon available, Marines are not routinely

issued secondary or ‘‘backup’’ weapons. Some key billets, which employ crew served

weapons, are issued a secondary weapon because the primary weapon is not intended for use by or protection of an individual.

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