NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES T. CLAGETT, III, AKA 

Charles Thomas Clagett, III,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

J. WOODRING, Terminal Island FCI; et 

al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-55051

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-06251-JFW-MAN

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 8, 2016

Pasadena, California

Before: BERZON, CHRISTEN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Charles T. Clagett III appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

several prison employees, who he claims violated his constitutional rights and were 

therefore liable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

DEC 28 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Reviewing de novo, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 436 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 

2006), we affirm in part and reverse in part.

1. We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Joseph 

Woodring, a former warden, and Robert Young, a former associate warden, on 

Clagett’s First Amendment claim for retaliation. In the prison context, Clagett 

must establish the following elements regarding this claim: “(1) [a]n assertion that 

a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise 

of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 

2005). The district court found that Clagett raised a genuine dispute regarding the 

first four elements but that he failed to show the lack of a legitimate penological 

goal for his reassignment. We disagree.

Defendants claim that Clagett was reassigned from the education department 

to food service due to the suspicions of prison staff that he was improperly 

performing legal work in the prison law library. While this would be a legitimate 

penological interest if found to be true, see Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th 

Cir. 1995), Clagett’s evidence raises a genuine dispute as to whether Defendants’ 
3 

true motivation for the transfer was retaliation for filing grievances and an earlier 

iteration of this lawsuit. Clagett’s transfer occurred shortly after his administrative 

complaint was denied and shortly after he filed his complaint in this action. 

Clagett also declares that Woodring threatened him for filing grievances on the 

morning of the day he was transferred; that the head of the education department 

told him his performance was excellent and that the transfer decision had been 

made by higher-level staff; and that medical staff told him that they were pressured 

to clear him for the new position in food service.

Defendants countered with several declarations that hint at misconduct by 

Clagett, but these declarations are too vague to support a grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants. For example, Young said that he learned of 

Clagett’s misconduct through Woodring—who in turn had learned of it from 

education department staff—but Woodring had no recollection of Clagett’s 

transfer. No declarant from the education department claims to have ever told 

Woodring about Clagett’s misconduct. No staff member claims to know who 

actually initiated Clagett’s transfer. Lastly, no staff member suggests why, after a 

stint in food service, Clagett was transferred back to the education department even 

though he had supposedly engaged in misconduct in his previous stint there. 
4 

Defendants’ evidence does not dispel a genuine dispute about whether there was a

legitimate penological goal for Clagett’s reassignment.

2. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Dr. Evelyn 

Castro on Clagett’s Eighth Amendment claim. To prove an Eighth Amendment 

violation for inadequate health care, Clagett must show that Dr. Castro was 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 104 (1976), when she cleared him for food service work. While Clagett 

was previously ineligible for food service due to his hepatitis diagnoses, that 

ineligibility was no longer the case due to a policy change. Further, other inmates 

with serious physical limitations worked in food service, including those with 

walkers and in wheelchairs. Clagett alleges that he suffered distress from the 

specific assignment he received, which forced him to stand and bend. Dr. Castro, 

however, had no authority over specific assignments within food service. Her

action was limited to medically clearing Clagett for assignment to food service and

therefore did not constitute deliberate indifference.1

 

 1 We note that Clagett’s replacement brief did not challenge the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment on all claims against Pratap Misra, as well as several

of Clagett’s other claims: a First Amendment claim against Castro; an Eighth 

Amendment claim against Woodring and Young; and Fifth Amendment claims 
5 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

 

related to the inadequate provision of bedding materials. We therefore need not 

address them here.