Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-442 | September 30, 2019 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Thomas J. Gaunt

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Paternity of A.H., 

Minor Child, 

D.H.,

Appellant,

v. 

K.M., 

Appellee.

September 30, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JP-442 

Appeal from the Johnson Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Michael T. Bohn, 

Judge

The Honorable Andrew S. 

Roesener, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No.

41C01-1703-JP-44 

Brown, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-442 | September 30, 2019 Page 2 of 19

[1] D.H. (“Father”) appeals from the order of the trial court regarding the custody 

of A.H. Father raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the 

court erred in granting joint physical custody and in granting K.M. (“Mother”) 

legal custody. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Mother began dating in November 2015. In January 2016, Mother 

learned she was pregnant. In February 2016, Father and Mother moved in 

together at the house of Father’s grandmother. Mother gave birth to A.H. on 

August 31, 2016. In December 2016, Mother told Father they were no longer a 

couple, but they continued to cohabitate. 

[3] On March 14, 2017, Mother took A.H. to Dr. Christina Fox for a wellness visit. 

The report of Dr. Fox’s progress notes states: “Current concerns at this visit 

include concern that bruises on [A.H.] came from [Father who] said it was from 

her toy but [Mother does not] believe it . . . .” Petitioner’s Exhibit C (some 

capitalization omitted). The report also states: “Circular bruise on left cheek 

with some pooling toward the mouth. ‘pinch’ style bruise on left arm just above 

elbow, fainter bruising on right back by hip.” Id. Later that month, Mother 

moved to Michigan with A.H. On March 23, 2017, Father filed a petition to 

establish paternity of A.H. 

[4] An Assessment of Alleged Child Abuse or Neglect by the Indiana Department 

of Child Services (“DCS”) dated June 2017 indicated that Michigan Child 
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Protective Services made an unannounced visit to Mother’s home on March 27, 

2017, as a courtesy for DCS and observed the home to be appropriate and did 

not note any new bruising. The assessment also contained the following 

concluding statement: 

Physical abuse, specifically bruises/cuts/welts and child neglect, 

specifically environmental life/health endangering are 

substantiated against [Father] and [Mother] as to [A.H.]. 

[Father] maintains that he was there with [A.H.] when she got 

the bruise on her cheek, however his explanation for the bruise is 

not consistent with the bruising. [A.H.] spent most of the time 

prior to the other bruises with [Mother], giving her the most 

opportunity to cause the injuries. With both parents stating that 

they felt that there were concerns for the other prior to the 

assessment, they have both exposed the child to unsafe 

conditions in the home.

Petitioner’s Exhibit D. 

[5] On June 22, 2017, the court held a hearing at which it indicated that the orders 

it would issue that day were going to be temporary in nature except for the issue 

of paternity. After hearing from Father and Mother, the court stated: “I’m 

going to leave primary physical and sole legal custody with [Mother] for now. 

This is going to be very difficult moving forward. Just because I’m doing this 

today doesn’t mean I’m not going to give [Father] physical custody ultimately.” 

Transcript Volume II at 16. The court stated: “I don’t know that this is perfect, 

but the fairest way I can think to do it is like every third week [Father] gets a 

week of time with [A.H.].” Id. The court ordered the parties to participate in 
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mediation and that Mother “provisionally has primary physical and sole legal.” 

Id. at 20.

[6] On July 11, 2017, the court entered an order establishing Father as the legal and 

biological father of A.H. and ordering that Mother have primary physical 

custody and sole legal custody. The court also ordered that Father have 

parenting time as follows: “One week long visit on the third (3rd) week of each 

month. Father’s first visit shall commence July 2, 2017 at 12:00 p.m. and 

concluding July 9, 2017 at 12:00 p.m.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 71. 

[7] On October 12, 2017, the court held a status conference. In support of her 

motion for change of venue, Mother stated that she lived in Michigan, went to 

her mother’s home where she grew up, and had a life established with school 

and playdates for A.H. The court denied her request for change of venue. 

[8] On November 2, 2017, Mother petitioned for a personal protection order 

against Father in a Michigan trial court, and the court denied the petition on 

November 30, 2017. 

[9] On April 9, 2018, Guardian ad Litem Andrew Woods (“GAL Woods”) filed a 

report which stated the following under the heading summary and 

recommendation:

This is a difficult case. I have concerns about the issue of 

bruising on [A.H.]. Both Dr. Fox and Dr. Thompson observed 

bruising on [A.H.]. Dr. Thompson’s report clearly identifies the 

bruising as non-accidental. Further, Dr. Thompson opines that 

[A.H.] is at high risk for continued injury without intervention of 
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some sort. The DCS investigation consisted of interviews with 

both parents, review of the medical records and the involvement 

of the Greenwood Police Department. Neglect/abuse was 

substantiated against both parents. A CHINS case was not filed.

Both parents point to the other as the culprit. Father believes 

that Mother inflicted the injuries in part to give her an excuse to 

leave Indiana and move to Michigan. Mother describes a pattern 

of inappropriate and rough parenting by Father to support her 

contention that he caused the injuries. The authorities involved 

apparently didn’t have enough evidence to move forward. What 

is left are a number of questions without answers. Each parent 

provided conflicting stories buttressed by witness accounts. Each 

parent did their best to convince me that the other was at fault. 

In the end, I can’t render an opinion one way or the other based 

upon the information provided.

I’m troubled by Mother’s sudden departure. She left Indiana 

abruptly relating that it was to get away from [Father] and the 

bruising he caused to [A.H.]. However, by all accounts Mother 

left [A.H.] alone with Father for periods of time prior to her 

move to Michigan. If Father caused the injuries to [A.H.], 

leaving him alone with her was a lapse in judgment on Mother’s 

part. I have no doubt the parties’ relationship was troubled. 

They strike me as quite different people. However, Mother made 

a choice to leave the state and then did not allow Father access to 

[A.H.] for a long period of time. Mother’s attempt to file a 

protective order in Michigan belies [sic] her efforts to keep Father 

from having a relationship with [A.H.]. Mother mentioned that 

the move was in part to escape [Father], but she seems to have 

little appreciation for how that distance would impact Father’s 

ability to parent [A.H.].

Mother has lived in Michigan for over a year. She has done little 

to stabilize a life for [A.H.] by obtaining full-time employment 

and a permanent home outside of maternal grandmother’s 

residence. While not critical of co-habitation with extended 

family members, I’m worried for [A.H.] that Mother has failed to 
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demonstrate an ability to support and maintain a home that 

provides permanency for [A.H.].

Father is not without his flaws. I tend to agree with Jessica[]

Powers[’s] description of Father as having an “intense 

personality.” He persisted to text Mother on a daily basis asking 

about [A.H.’s] welfare after Mother asked him to stop. Mother’s 

friends at Pets Smart [sic] both noted Father’s demeanor in an 

unfavorable manner which, in part, supports Mother’s 

complaints that Father was controlling and authoritative in their 

relationship. Many of Father’s text messages to Mother were 

critical of the manner in which she addressed or failed to address 

[A.H.’s] medical issues. I have concerns that if awarded primary 

custody of [A.H.] he will discount input by Mother.

Father demonstrates more stability than does Mother. He has a 

full-time job he appears to enjoy. He has a goal to someday 

manage the department where he works. He has his own home

and maintains this household. Father is organized and presents a 

plan for [A.H.] if she were to live with him on a more permanent 

basis.

[A.H.] is clearly loved by both parents. Presently [A.H.] travels 

approximately 8 hours twice a month so she can spend time with 

Father. This is troublesome. It’s a long drive for such a young 

child, with no clear solution other than awarding one parent 

custody with the other parent having diminished time with their 

daughter. The Court can maintain the current arrangement, but . 

. . a more definitive decision will need to be rendered once [A.H.] 

starts school.

Ideally, if distance weren’t such a factor, I’d recommend a shared 

parenting model with the parties utilizing a co-parenting app to 

assist in resolution of disputes. However, that is not the reality of 

the current situation. This is such a close call, I’m reluctant to 

recommend either parent as a distinct candidate for primary 

physical custody. They both have their strengths and 

weaknesses. Based upon the information available if I were 
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forced to choose, I think Father can provide a more stable and 

structured home for [A.H.] at this point. This recommendation 

is tempered. If Father demonstrates behavior that proves 

alienating of Mother’s relationship with [A.H.], then the issue of 

physical custody should be reviewed. While I empathize with 

Mother’s departure and understand her reasoning for the same, it

was rash and without forethought.

GAL Exhibit 1.

[10] On January 4, 2019, the court held a hearing. Father appeared with counsel, 

and Mother appeared pro se. The court stated: “So we are set for basically final 

hearing on that provisional order.” Transcript Volume II at 43. Mother 

objected to the admission of the GAL’s report on hearsay grounds and because 

she disagreed with the outcome. The court admitted the report over Mother’s 

objection. 

[11] Father testified that he worked at Costco Wholesale as a tire installer and parttime supervisor, graduated from Greenwood Community High School, lived in 

Greenwood, and exercised parenting time since the matter was commenced. 

He testified that the distance between his residence and Mother’s residence was 

about 470 miles and it took about eight and one-half hours “[f]rom door to 

door.” Id. at 47.

[12] He testified that Mother said something on March 10, 2017, about being 

extremely angry. He stated that A.H. fell over two days later and hit her face 

on an activity cube toy resulting in a small bruise on her cheek, that Mother 

took A.H. to a doctor on March 14th for a wellness visit, and that he discovered 
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CPS paperwork, the doctor’s report, and domestic violence paperwork in the 

diaper bag later that day. He stated that, when he left for work that morning, 

A.H. had one bruise on her cheek from when she fell and that she had five 

bruises by the time he found the paperwork. He also detailed his difficulties in 

using Skype to communicate with A.H. when she was with Mother. He 

testified that A.H. had twenty-six yeast infections since parenting time began, 

that he thought there was a continuing problem with diapering and cleanliness 

of A.H., and that he brought the yeast infections to a doctor’s attention ten to 

fifteen times. When asked if there was ever an occasion where he saw A.H. 

injured or harmed by Mother as a result of her carelessness or negligence, he

answered: “That I witnessed? No.” Id. at 75. Father testified that there was 

plenty of risk of harm and stated: “Leaving [A.H.] unbuckled in car seats while, 

you know, sitting in a place, or leaving her unbuckled in a swing, leaving her 

unbuckled in her bouncing chair, an infant bouncing chair, which is one that 

they’re laying in, so they bounce up and down in.” Id. at 76. He denied ever 

shaking A.H. or muffling her crying. He stated that Mother informed him on 

March 21st that she was moving to Michigan with A.H. the following day and 

that he filed a petition for custody two days later. He testified that he rents his 

home in Greenwood and intends to become a homeowner. He indicated he 

had concerns about Mother including forgetting to provide A.H. medications or 

change her diaper and “just kind of benign neglect.” Id. at 57.

[13] Father’s sister testified that she watched A.H. five days a week when Mother 

and Father were living together and that she would be available to help care for 
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A.H. if Father was awarded custody. She testified that she observed a few 

occasions when Mother was unsafe with A.H. such as when A.H. was not 

buckled into her swing. She stated that Mother told her that she forgot to 

buckle A.H. into her car seat and when they arrived home A.H. “flipped out of 

the car seat” and landed on the concrete porch. Id. at 92. She testified that she 

never heard Mother say that she was afraid of Father’s care. She also stated 

that she did not think Mother changed A.H.’s diaper as frequently as she should 

have. On cross-examination, she indicated that she remembered offering her 

house to Mother “for refuge if anything happened at [Mother’s] home.” Id. at 

98. On redirect examination, she stated that she made the offer when Mother 

and Father “weren’t getting along.” Id. at 99. 

[14] Jonathan Goens testified that he worked with Mother at PetSmart for some 

time and became friends with Father. He stated that there had been times 

where Mother seemed distracted and that Father usually cared for A.H. 

Marcus Guido testified that he was in a romantic relationship with Mother for 

approximately a year and that Mother blindsided him on the temple on one 

occasion. He also stated that Mother “made the comment that raising a child is 

no different than raising a dog, trying to make the comparison with raising a 

child to that of an animal needing food and needing water, needing to go 

outside to go to the bathroom, the basic needs of a dog or a cat.” Id. at 112. On 

cross-examination, he denied that his cheating on Mother ended their 

relationship and when asked, “You don’t remember kneeling then and begging 

me to punch you,” he answered: “No, I really don’t.” Id. at 114. 
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[15] Jennifer Dresslar, Father’s friend, testified that Father was a great dad and that 

she went with him to pick up A.H. on occasions and observed that A.H. had 

dirt underneath her nails, smelled bad, wore dirty clothes, and had a yeast 

infection almost every time they picked her up. She stated that Mother was 

always pleasant but seemed to ignore Father when he wanted to bring things to 

her attention. 

[16] Mother testified that she just started a business, A.H. was in school, she and 

A.H. have their own apartment, A.H. has a play group on Thursdays, she is 

with A.H. every night, and A.H. has a very reliable daycare center, a dentist, 

and a primary physician. She stated that Father sent a text message which 

stated: “I think you’d be a great mom. Believe me, out of the two of us, I’m the 

one who shouldn’t be a parent.” Id. at 127. She stated: “I do believe that me 

having full custody is in her best interests, and I pray the Court has that interest 

as well.” Id. at 128. On cross-examination, she acknowledged that there was 

one occasion when A.H. fell onto pavement because she forgot to buckle her 

into her car seat. 

[17] On February 1, 2019, the court entered an order awarding Mother and Father 

joint physical custody and appointing Mother as the sole legal custodian. The 

order states:

FINDINGS OF FACT

* * * * *
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14. Since the provisional order was established, Father has 

regularly exercised his court ordered parenting time.

15. Mother currently resides in Lincoln, Michigan. Lincoln is 

approximately 470 miles from Father’s home in Indiana and it 

takes around 8 hours to travel from Father’s home to Mother’s 

home.

16. The parties have used a half-way point to meet for the 

exchange of [A.H.]. 

* * * * *

19. [A.H.] is set to start pre-school in April of 2020. 

20. Father was ordered to pay thirty dollars ($30.00) per week 

pursuant to the Court’s July 11, 2017 Order Establishing 

Paternity and Provisional Orders Concerning Custody, Parenting 

Time and Child support.

21. Father is currently employed at Costco as an installer and 

part time supervisor. Father’s weekly income is $590 per week.

22. Mother is currently self-employed. She has recently started 

her own pet grooming service. Mother’s weekly income through 

her new business is approximately $233.00 per week.

23. The Court finds that Mother is capable of full-time 

employment and imputes $290.00 per week in income for

purposes of a child support calculation.

24. Mother currently pays $100 per week for work-related child 

care expenses. Father currently pays $45 per week for workrelated child care expenses.

25. Father filed three separate contempt petitions against Mother 

alleging that she 1) failed to follow the procedures in I.C. 31-17-

2.2-1(b)(4) and (5) with respect to a relocation; 2) failed to allow 

Father an opportunity for additional parenting time pursuant to 
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the provisions of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines; and 3) 

failed to allow reasonable visitation via Skype.

26. The “Third Motion to Amend Contempt” also sought relief 

from Mother’s habitual non-compliance with pick-up/drop-off 

times.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

* * * * *

6. The Court gives great weight to the report and 

recommendations of the GAL. Specifically, the GAL’s 

recommendation for a shared parenting model if distance were 

not a factor.

7. Additionally, the GAL correctly noted that since [A.H.] is not 

currently in school, the Court can maximize the parenting time 

of each parent before needing to make a more permanent 

decision on physical custody.

8. The current parenting schedule has Mother exercising two 

weeks of parenting time followed by one week of parenting time 

for Father.

9. It is apparent that both Father and Mother love [A.H.] and 

seek to have primary physical custody of her.

10. The Court finds that it is in [A.H.’s] best interest to for [sic] 

the parents to share physical custody of the child. The parenting 

schedule shall be modified to allow each parent two consecutive 

weeks of parenting time.

11. The Court takes into consideration the GAL’s concerns with 

the distance between the parties in making this parenting time 

determination. The Court finds that a weekly car trip of 

approximately eight hours would not be in the child’s best 

interest. 
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12. However, the Court understands that given the age of 

[A.H.], and that she has bonded with both parents, it is important 

that she maintain regular weekly contact with each parent while 

in the custody of the other.

13. The parties have attempted to utilize parenting time via 

Skype with limited success. The major problem after reviewing 

the exhibits introduced into evidence, from the Court’s 

perspective, is lack of a definite day and time for the Skype 

sessions to take place.

14. The Court orders the parties participate in Skype parenting 

time on each and every Tuesday and Thursday at 7:30 p.m. for a 

period of fifteen (15) minutes. 

* * * * *

16. It is apparent from the communications entered into 

evidence through the various exhibits that the parents are not 

willing and able to communicate in advancing the child’s welfare 

as contemplated in I.C. 31-14-13-2.3(c).

17. Additionally, the parents live approximately eight hours 

apart making everyday communications regarding issues . . . 

related to school, religion, and medical decisions more difficult.

18. Leading up to the final hearing, Mother has exercised 

primary legal custody of [A.H.]. 

19. Father has taken initiative in having [A.H.] seen by her 

pediatrician in Indiana and has sought medical treatment for the 

reoccurring yeast infections suffered by [A.H.].

20. Mother has sought medical treatment for [A.H.] in Michigan 

and has taken the steps to have her enrolled in pre-school.

21. The Court does not find the parents to be suitable individuals 

to share joint legal custody of [A.H.] given the difficulty in 

communication between the parties and the distance between 

their respective residences.
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22. The Court awards Mother sole legal custody of [A.H.].

* * * * *

24. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court does not 

find that Mother has willfully violated the prior orders of this 

Court as alleged by Father.

25. The Parties are admonished that they should make great 

efforts to arrive on time for all future parenting time exchanges.

26. The Court finds that the GAL recommendation of a coparenting application would greatly assist the Court and parties 

in [] future contempt issues regarding parenting time.

JUDGMENT

1. Mother and Father are awarded joint physical custody of the 

minor child. Each parent shall enjoy two continuous weeks of 

parenting time with the pick-up/drop-offs to occur on Saturdays 

at the half-way point previously decided on by the parties.

2. Father’s first full two weeks of parenting time shall occur on 

his first visit after the issuance of this order.

3. The parties are ordered to allow Skype parenting time to occur 

each and every Tuesday and Thursday at 7:30 p.m. for a period 

of at least fifteen (15) minutes unless otherwise modified by 

agreement.

4. Mother shall be the sole legal custodian of [A.H.].

5. Father is ordered to continue to pay $30 per week in child 

support. Based on the figures presented, the Court does not find 

a 20% deviation to allow for a child support modification. (For 

purposes of calculating the child support obligation, the Court 

reduced the weekly work-related child care expense paid by each 

parent by one-half since the child is in the other parent’s care for 

one-half of the year.)
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6. Weekly support payments (and the annual child support 

administrative fees as required by the Indiana Code) shall be paid 

by Father . . . .

7. The parties shall split the uninsured medical expenses with 

Father paying sixty-seven percent (67%) and Mother paying 

thirty-three percent (33%) of all uninsured medical, dental, 

orthodontic, ophthalmologist, and pharmalogical expenses.

8. Father shall claim the minor child as a dependent for state and 

federal tax purposes commencing in 2019 (for taxes paid during 

calendar year 2018) and each even numbered year thereafter. 

Mother shall claim the child in all odd numbered years.

* * * * *

9. The parties are ordered to use OurFamilyWizard.com, or an 

alternate parenting app agreed upon by the parties, for all 

communications regarding the scheduling and implementation of 

parenting time.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume III at 94-103.

Discussion

[18] Before addressing Father’s arguments, we note that Mother did not file an 

appellee’s brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake 

the burden of developing arguments, and we apply a less stringent standard of 

review, that is, we may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error. 

Zoller v. Zoller, 858 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). This rule was 

established so that we might be relieved of the burden of controverting the 

arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with 

the appellee. Wright v. Wright, 782 N.E.2d 363, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
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[19] The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting joint physical custody and 

in granting Mother legal custody. Father asserts that he provided extensive

testimony about his love and care for A.H. and his employment. He also points 

to the testimony of his witnesses and the GAL report. He asserts that Mother’s 

income of $232 on her child support worksheet is not well-founded. He 

contends that he is cooperative, generated the initiative in Skyping, and 

attempts to reschedule Mother’s missed Skype appointments. 

[20] A trial court’s findings control as to the issues they cover, and a general 

judgment will control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Yanoff 

v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). When a trial court has made 

findings of fact, we apply the following two-tier standard of review: whether the 

evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support 

the conclusions thereon. Id. Findings will be set aside if they are clearly 

erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no 

facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. A judgment is clearly 

erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. To 

determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, our review of the 

evidence must leave us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 

Id. A general judgment entered with findings will be affirmed if it can be 

sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.

[21] A trial court’s custody determination is afforded considerable deference as it is 

the trial court that sees the parties, observes their conduct and demeanor, and 

hears their testimony. Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 945-946 (Ind. 
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Ct. App. 2006). Thus, on review, we will not reweigh the evidence, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id.

at 946. We will reverse the trial court’s custody determination only if it is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id.

[22] The standard for an initial custody determination is set forth in Ind. Code § 31-

14-13-2, which provides:

The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best 

interests of the child. In determining the child’s best interests,

there is not a presumption favoring either parent. The court shall 

consider all relevant factors, including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child’s parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given

to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) 

years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child’s parents;

(B) the child’s siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect 

the child’s best interest.

(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and 

community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals 

involved.
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(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by 

either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto 

custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall 

consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this 

chapter.

[23] The record reveals that GAL Woods indicated that he would recommend a 

shared parenting model if distance were not a factor. While his report stated

that if he “were forced to choose” he thought Father could provide a more 

stable and structured home, it also stated that “[t]his recommendation is 

tempered,” that this case is such a close call he was reluctant to recommend 

either parent as a distinct candidate for primary physical custody, both parents 

have their strengths and weaknesses, he had concerns if Father were awarded 

primary custody that he would discount input by Mother, and that it was a 

difficult case. GAL Exhibit 1. The Assessment of Alleged Child Abuse or 

Neglect dated June 2017 indicated that Michigan Child Protective Services 

observed that A.H. did not have any new bruising during an unannounced visit. 

The court was able to hear the witnesses including Mother’s testimony that she 

had started a business, A.H. was in school, she and A.H. had their own 

apartment, and A.H. had a very reliable daycare center, a dentist, and a 

primary physician. Based upon the evidence as set forth above and in the 

record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings and conclusions are not 
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clearly erroneous and that the court did not err in granting joint physical 

custody to Mother and Father and in granting Mother legal custody.1

[24] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[25] Affirmed.

Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur. 

1 To the extent Father asserts that Mother’s income of $232 on her child support worksheet is not wellfounded, we note that the trial court used a weekly gross income amount of $290 for Mother in calculating 

his support obligation.