IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 6, 2019 Session

APRIL H. v. SCOTT H.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Rutherford County

No. 17CV-281 Howard W. Wilson, Chancellor

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No. M2018-00759-COA-R3-CV

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This is a divorce case. Wife filed for divorce in February 2017 after twelve years of 

marriage. Following a three-day trial, the trial court ordered Husband to pay $1000 in

transitional alimony to Wife for six months and $500 per month for the following six 

months. The trial court also entered a permanent parenting plan for the parties’ two 

minor children naming Husband primary residential parent. Husband received 233 days 

of parenting time, and Wife received 132 days. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we 

affirm.

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is 

Affirmed and Remanded.

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Mitchell E. Shannon, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, April H.1

Heather G. Parker, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Scott H.

OPINION

I. Background

April H. (“Appellant” or “Wife”) and Scott H. (“Appellee” or “Husband”) were 

married on August 20, 2005. Two minor children, J.H. (age 11) and L.H (age 6), were 

born to the marriage. Wife has two children from previous relationships, K.S. (age 20) 

 

1 Due to the sensitive nature of the facts we use the parties’ last initial and the children’s 

initials to protect their anonymity.

05/13/2019
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and D.S. (age 16). During the marriage, Wife worked small jobs (i.e., fast food), but she 

was primarily a stay-at-home mom. Husband works for TVA; his gross monthly income 

was approximately $9,332.12 at the time of trial. In 2011, Wife earned an online 

bachelor’s degree in marketing. At the time of the hearing, Wife was 37 years old, and 

Husband was 41 years old. 

Wife filed a complaint for divorce on February 23, 2017 alleging irreconcilable 

differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Prior to filing her complaint, Wife filed a 

petition for an order of protection alleging that Husband abused J.H. and D.S. The trial 

court entered an ex parte order of protection, which was subsequently consolidated with 

the divorce case. On March 8, 2017, Husband filed an answer to Wife’s petition for 

order of protection denying any abuse. Husband also filed a proposed parenting plan, 

wherein he asked the court to grant equal parenting time to the parties. On March 10, 

2017, Husband filed an answer and counter-complaint for divorce alleging irreconcilable 

differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The pendente lite matters were heard by a 

special master, who dismissed the order of protection and granted a temporary parenting 

schedule giving each parent equal parenting time according to Husband’s proposed 

parenting plan. The parties settled the division of marital property in mediation but were 

unable to agree on a parenting plan and alimony.

According to Wife, one of the major problems in the marriage was the way 

Husband treated her son D.S. D.S. exhibited severe behavioral issues throughout the 

parties’ marriage and was removed from multiple schools for fighting. At times, D.S.’s 

behavior was so volatile that he was confined to his bedroom for his own safety and the 

safety of others in the home. D.S.’s behavior and the parties’ attempts to manage his 

behavior strained the marital relationship. At one point, D.S. went to live with his 

grandmother in Michigan; however, this arrangement did not last. Wife then sent D.S. to 

live at Good Sheppard Children’s Home. 

The parties separated in April 2017, and Husband moved into an apartment near 

J.H. and L.H.’s school. In June 2017, following the parties’ separation, D.S. returned to 

live with Wife in the marital home. On August 11, 2017, Husband filed an emergency 

motion for a restraining order to keep D.S. away from the two younger children. 

According to Wife, L.H. made an allegation that D.S. had done “something down there.” 

There was a DCS investigation, and the matter was eventually heard by a special master, 

who held that there was no proof that D.S. had harmed the children. The emergency 

motion was dismissed, but the special master’s ruling, which was later confirmed by the 

trial court’s order of September 27, 2017, provided that D.S. was not to be left 

unsupervised with the minor children.

On November 1, 2, and December 21, 2017, the trial court heard all pending 

matters. On January 29, 2018, the trial court issued its memorandum and order. As is 

relevant to this appeal, the trial court named Husband primary residential parent for L.H.
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and J.H. Under the permanent parenting plan, Husband received 233 days of parenting 

time, and Wife received 132 days. The trial court ordered Husband to pay transitional 

alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month for six months and $500 per month for the 

following six months. Wife filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. 

She appeals.

II. Issues

Wife presents the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in its award of alimony to Appellant.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in significantly reducing 

Appellant’s parenting time.

In the posture of Appellee, Husband requests attorneys’ fees on appeal. 

III. Standard of Review

This case was tried by the court sitting without a jury. As such, we review the trial 

court’s findings of fact de novo on the record with the presumption that those findings are 

correct, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). 

We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of 

correctness. Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105-106 (Tenn. 2011); Hyneman 

v. Hyneman, 152 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 

IV. Analysis

A. Alimony

Wife argues that the trial court erred in awarding her transitional alimony of

$1,000 for six months and $500 for the following six months. She contends that the trial 

court should have awarded rehabilitative alimony of $1,000 per month for four years. 

Concerning its award of alimony, the trial court’s order states in relevant part:

[Wife] has both the ability and the education necessary to earn a steady 

living. Further, she has minimal debt, and no debt associated with her 

home. Considering her bona fide expenses of $1,477 per month, as well as 

the assets granted to her in the parties’ division of property and the income 

and expenses of the Husband, the court finds that [Wife] should be entitled 

to transitional alimony for the purpose of assisting with her expenses as she 

obtains regular employment. Beginning on February 1, 2018, support shall 

be paid to [Wife] by [Husband] in the amount of $1,000 per month for a 
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period of six months, then reduced to $500.00 per month for an additional 

six months.

Tennessee recognizes four types of alimony: rehabilitative alimony, transitional 

alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(1). 

Each type of alimony addresses a specific need. Alimony in futuro and alimony in solido

are the two forms of “long term or more open-ended support.” Burlew v. Burlew, 40 

S.W.3d 465, 471 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Waddey v. Waddey, 6 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tenn. 

1999)). By contrast, rehabilitative alimony is short-term support that enables a 

disadvantaged spouse to acquire additional education or training so that the spouse can 

achieve a standard of living comparable to the standard of living that existed during the 

marriage or the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other 

spouse. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(e)(1). See also Robertson v. Robertson, 76 

S.W.3d 337, 340-41 (Tenn. 2002); Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 456 n. 4 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2007). The purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to assist the disadvantaged spouse 

in becoming self-reliant following a divorce. Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 

108 (Tenn. 2011); Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 340-41; Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 

738-39 (Tenn. 1991).

Where economic rehabilitation is unnecessary, transitional alimony may be 

awarded. In contrast to rehabilitative alimony, which is designed to increase an 

economically disadvantaged spouse’s capacity for self-sufficiency, transitional alimony 

is designed to aid a spouse who already possesses the capacity for self-sufficiency but 

needs financial assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of establishing and 

maintaining a household without the benefit of the other spouse’s income. Gonsewski, 

350 S.W.3d at 109 (emphasis added). Transitional alimony assists the disadvantaged 

spouse with the transition to the status of a single person. Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 

S.W.3d 108, 115 (Tenn. 2012) (citations omitted); Miller v. McFarland, No. M2013-

00381-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 2194382, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2014). 

“[T]rial courts in Tennessee have broad discretion to determine whether spousal 

support is needed and, if so, to determine the nature, amount, and duration of the award.” 

Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d at 114 (citations omitted). As a result, “[a]ppellate courts are 

generally disinclined to second-guess a trial judge’s spousal support decision unless it is 

not supported by the evidence. . . .” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 234 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1998). Instead, “[t]he role of an appellate court in reviewing an award of spousal 

support is to determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard and 

reached a decision that is not clearly unreasonable.” Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 

S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn. 2006). In other words, appellate courts decline to second-guess 

a trial court’s spousal support decision absent an abuse of discretion. Robertson, 76 

S.W.3d at 343. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice by 

applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a 

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an 
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injustice. Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011); 

Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tenn. 2010). The abuse of discretion 

standard does not permit an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial 

court, but “reflects an awareness that the decision being reviewed involved a choice 

among several acceptable alternatives, and thus envisions a less rigorous review of the 

lower court’s decision and a decreased likelihood that the decision will be reversed on 

appeal.” Henderson, 318 S.W.3d at 335 (quoting Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 

S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010)). Consequently, when reviewing a discretionary decision 

by the trial court, such as an alimony determination, the appellate court should presume 

that the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the decision. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 105-06; Loewen v. Loewen, No. M2014-02501-

COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 6438753, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2015). 

The Legislature has outlined several factors for courts to consider in determining 

whether to award spousal support and, if so, the nature, amount, length, and manner of 

payment thereof, to wit:

(1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial 

resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or 

retirement plans and all other sources;

(2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and 

opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the 

necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such 

party's earnings capacity to a reasonable level;

(3) The duration of the marriage;

(4) The age and mental condition of each party;

(5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, 

physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;

(6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek 

employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a 

minor child of the marriage;

(7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and 

intangible;

(8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in § 

36-4-121;

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible 

contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, 

and tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, 

training or increased earning power of the other party;

(11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its 

discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and
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(12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are 

necessary to consider the equities between the parties.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i). Although each of these factors must be considered 

when relevant to the parties’ circumstances, “the two that are considered the most 

important are the disadvantaged spouse’s need and the obligor spouse’s ability to pay.” 

Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 110 (quoting Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 457). 

In reaching its decision to award transitional alimony to Wife, the trial court 

considered all of the factors outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(i). 

As set out in its order, supra, the trial court discussed the parties’ property settlement 

agreement, under which Wife received more assets than Husband. Specifically, Wife 

received: (1) the unencumbered marital home, with an approximate value of $160,000; 

(2) $60,000 from Husband’s 401(k); (3) half of Husband’s TVA pension worth 

approximately $48,000; (4) three savings accounts totaling over $8,800; and (5) two cars. 

The trial court found that Wife has no mental or physical condition that prohibit 

her from working full time. Wife obtained a bachelor’s degree in marketing during the 

marriage, and the trial court considered Wife’s education in determining that she “has the 

ability to transition into a job that will provide her with a stream of income necessary to 

meet her monthly financial needs, which amount to $1,477.00 per month.” Wife was 

advised by the special master in April 2017 that she should begin looking for 

employment. In awarding transitional alimony, the trial court reiterated that Wife will

need to seek employment. Nonetheless, Wife maintains that she has no ability to earn 

sufficient income to cover her monthly expenses of $1,477 per month.2 Wife has a 

bachelor’s degree. She testified that after earning her degree, she obtained employment 

in the marketing field. Wife is able bodied and under the age of 40. Based on the 

division of marital property, she has minimal debt and no mortgage obligations. 

Although she will need to procure employment, the record shows that she is capable of 

doing so. As such, the trial court’s award of transitional alimony is appropriate. 

As discussed above, transitional alimony is designed to aid a spouse who already 

possesses the capacity for self-sufficiency but needs financial assistance to adjust to the 

economic consequences of establishing and maintaining a household without the benefit 

of the other spouse’s income. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 109. This is the scenario 

presented here. $1,000 in transitional alimony for six months tapering to $500 per month 

for six additional months will give Wife the time to find employment and the motivation 

to do so. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the type, 

amount or duration of alimony.

B. Parenting Time

 

2

The parties do not appeal the trial court’s finding that Wife’s monthly expenses total $1,477.
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Wife also appeals the trial court’s allocation of parenting time for the parties’ 

minor children. Decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually driven and 

require careful consideration of numerous factors. Holloway v. Bradley, 190 Tenn. 565, 

230 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1950); Brumit v. Brumit, 948 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1997). Therefore, determining the details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the 

broad discretion of the trial judge.” Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) 

(internal citations omitted). As the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated,

[i]t is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a visitation order in the 

hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court. Appellate 

courts correct errors. When no error in the trial court’s ruling is evident 

from the record, the trial court’s ruling must stand. This maxim has special 

significance in cases reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. The 

abuse of discretion standard recognizes that the trial court is in a better 

position than the appellate court to make certain judgments. The abuse of 

discretion standard does not require a trial court to render an ideal order, 

even in matters involving visitation, to withstand reversal. Reversal should 

not result simply because the appellate court found a “better” resolution. 

An abuse of discretion can be found only when the trial court’s ruling falls 

outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an 

application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the 

record.

Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also

Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2013).

“[C]ustody and visitation arrangements are among the most important decisions 

confronting a trial court in a divorce case. The needs of the children are paramount; 

while the desires of the parents are secondary.” Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), the 

child’s best interest is the cardinal concern in setting a parenting plan. 

In a suit for annulment, divorce, separate maintenance, or in any other 

proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a 

minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis of the best

interest of the child. In taking into account the child’s best interest, the 

court shall order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy 

the maximum participation possible in the life of the child consistent with 

the factors set out in this subsection (a), the location of the residences of the 

parents, the child’s need for stability and all other relevant factors. The 

court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following, where 

applicable:
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(1) The strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each 

parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority of 

parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child;

(2) Each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future performance of 

parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of 

the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing 

parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents, 

consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the willingness 

of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and 

continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the 

child’s parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and 

caregiver to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and 

rights, and the court shall further consider any history of either parent or 

any caregiver denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court 

order;

***

(7) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;

(8) The moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it 

relates to their ability to parent the child. . . ;

***

(11) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other 

parent or to any other person. The court shall, where appropriate, refer any 

issues of abuse to juvenile court for further proceedings;

(12) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or 

frequents the home of a parent and such person’s interactions with the 

child;

***

(15) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (a) (emphasis added). 

On appeal, Wife contends that the parenting schedule set by the trial court denies 

her “the maximum participation possible in the life of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-6-106 (a). The trial court awarded Husband 233 days of parenting time and Wife 132 

days. Wife argues that the trial court should have equally divided the parenting time, 

which was the arrangement under the temporary parenting plan. As set out in its order, 

the trial court weighed the relevant statutory factors in determining the parenting 

schedule. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a), supra. The trial court determined that several 

of the factors did not weigh in favor of one party or the other. For example, the trial 

court found that “both parents love their children very much, and neither parent disputes 

this.” Although Wife made allegations that Husband physically abused the two boys, the 

trial court determined that there was “no credible corroborating evidence to support such 
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abuse.” The record supports this finding. Dr. Osborne, the children’s counselor, testified 

that neither J.H. nor L.H. relayed any statements regarding abuse by Father. 

Furthermore, a cursory DCS investigation found Wife’s allegations of abuse against 

Husband to be unfounded.

Regarding each parent’s “past and potential for future performance of parenting 

responsibilities, including willingness and ability to facilitate and encourage a 

relationship between the children and the other parent,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 

(a)(2), the trial court found that this factor weighed in favor of Husband, to wit: 

The Special Master’s ruling of September 8, 2017 (confirmed by the Court 

on September 27, 2017) provides that [Wife’s] oldest child D.S., shall not 

be left alone unsupervised with the other children. The testimony shows 

that D.S. and J.H. continue to share a bedroom despite the order of this 

court. Although [Wife] claims that she did not understand the ruling and 

that the two boys merely sleep in the same bedroom and do not interact, the 

court finds that this explanation is not satisfactory. [Wife’s] ongoing 

violation of the previous court order indicates that she may have trouble 

abiding by orders in the future. Further, the children’s counselor, Dr. 

Osborne, testified that although there is evidence of parental alienation on 

the part of both parents, it is more clearly evident on the part of the [Wife].

With regard to meeting the emotional needs of the children, the trial court found that:

[a]lthough both parents nurture the children’s emotional needs, [Wife] 

refuses to participate in counseling with the children despite being invited 

and encouraged to do so. The court finds that her decision to forego the 

counseling sessions is inexplicable and hampers the full range of benefits 

that counseling can provide. Further, as disclosed to the counselor by the 

children, [Wife] places her children ‘in the middle’ between her and 

[Husband] by her actions amounting to parental alienation. Her inability to 

act as a co-parent is detrimental to the children’s emotional well-being. 

Dr. Osborne testified that Husband brought the children to therapy and although she was 

concerned about parental alienation, the children were doing well. According to Dr. 

Osborne, Wife only brought the children to see her on one occasion. Afterward, J.H.

reported to Dr. Osborne that Wife told J.H. not to tell Husband that he had been to 

counseling. Dr. Osborne elaborated that both children described situations where they 

heard each parent talk negatively about the other parent. However, the children seemed 

more focused on the fact that Wife was interrogating them about their activities at 

Husband’s house. Dr. Osborne’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding that 

Husband is more adept at meeting the emotional needs of the children.
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The trial court also determined that Husband’s “moral, physical, mental and 

emotional fitness” as it relates to his ability to parent the children is superior to that of 

Wife. She contends that the trial court is punishing her by reducing her time with the 

children for her “human frailties [and] past mis-steps.” Her argument is indicative of the 

problems outlined by the trial court throughout its ruling. Wife ardently complains that 

she is being punished, but she never argues that spending more time with her is in the 

children’s best interest. In fact, in her arguments to this Court, Wife spends very little 

time discussing the children or their needs. 

The trial court found that the factor involving the character and behavior of 

persons who reside in or frequent the home of a parent and interact with the children must 

also favor Husband, and the record supports this finding. Of particular concern is Wife’s 

ongoing relationship with her father, George Soles. Testimony reveals that Wife told 

Husband that Mr. Soles assaulted and sexually molested her and her siblings. 

Additionally, Wife’s daughter, K.S., testified that Wife told her to “watch out” for Mr. 

Soles because he did inappropriate things with Wife and her siblings. Wife’s deposition 

testimony revealed that during the pendency of the divorce, Wife left the children alone 

with Mr. Soles to “test him to see if he would do anything.” Based on this evidence, the 

trial court correctly determined that Wife’s decision was “incredibly inappropriate” and 

could have exposed the children to danger. Unfortunately, leaving the children alone 

with Mr. Soles was not Wife’s only poor decision with regard to who she allowed to 

interact with the parties’ children. 

In addition to the issues with Mr. Soles, Wife reconnected with Jason Reed, K.S.’s 

biological father, in 2014. According to Husband, Wife admitted to him that K.S.’s birth 

was a product of rape. At the time K.S. was conceived, Wife was sixteen years old and 

Mr. Reed was twenty-seven years old. Assuming arguendo that Wife’s relationship with 

Mr. Reed was consensual, it was still illegal.3 Since 2017, Wife has seen Mr. Reed 

repeatedly including having him to dinner at the marital residence. K.S. testified that 

Wife has considered getting back together with Mr. Reed, and Wife did not deny her 

intentions of becoming more serious in her relationship with Mr. Reed once the divorce 

was finalized. Wife contends that “if the court believes the persons should not be around 

the children, the remedy would be to exclude them from contact rather than reducing 

Wife’s time.” Wife’s suggestion might be persuasive; however, in view of the evidence 

that Wife ignored the prior order prohibiting unsupervised contact between D.S. and the 

two younger children, it is not likely that Wife will comply with other no contact 

mandates. From the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not 

err in fashioning the parenting schedule. 

C. Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

 

3

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506. There is no indication in the record that Mr. Reed was ever 

charged with a crime.
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Both parties ask this Court to award their respective attorneys’ fees and costs on 

appeal. Litigants must typically pay their own attorneys’ fees absent a statute or 

agreement providing otherwise. See State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 

S.W.3d 186, 194 (Tenn. 2000). However, an award of appellate attorney fees is a matter 

that is within this Court’s sound discretion. Archer v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d 412, 419 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). In considering a request for attorney fees on appeal, we consider 

the ability of the party seeking the fee award to pay such fees, his or her success on 

appeal, whether the appeal was taken in good faith, and any other equitable factors 

relevant in a given case. Moran v. Wilensky, 339 S.W.3d 651, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2010)(citing Archer v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d 412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). 

Considering all of the relevant factors, we exercise our discretion to deny the parties’ 

requests for attorneys’ fees. 

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order. The case is remanded 

to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with 

this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed against Appellant, April H., for all of 

which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE