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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DARYL PETITT

(AC 38993)

Lavine, Elgo and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a jury trial, of three counts of the crime of sale of

narcotics, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant’s conviction arose from three drug transactions between the defendant and an

undercover police officer, T, who, after each transaction, handed the

drugs off to a supervising police officer, C. The drugs were later delivered

to the state laboratory, where a forensic science examiner, V, analyzed

the drugs and confirmed that they were cocaine. At trial, C identified,

solely on the basis of markings on the packaging and the number of

bags, exhibit 1 as the cocaine that the defendant had sold to T during

the first sale, exhibit 2 as the cocaine sold during the second sale, and

exhibit 3 as the cocaine sold during the third sale. Exhibit 1 was admitted

into evidence without objection by the defendant, but the trial court

sustained the defendant’s objections to exhibits 2 and 3, concluding that

there was an inadequate foundation for the evidence because C did not

have firsthand knowledge that would tie the cocaine to the defendant.

T later testified and identified all three exhibits as the cocaine he had

purchased from the defendant and subsequently handed off to C. The

court overruled the defendant’s renewed objections to exhibits 2 and

3 and admitted the exhibits into evidence, stating that the evidence had

been authenticated and that the weight given to such evidence was a

matter for the jury. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence

exhibits 2 and 3, the cocaine from the second and third sales, as that court

could have determined with reasonable probability that the contents of

those exhibits were in substantially the same condition as when the

offense was committed: the chain of custody of each batch of cocaine

was reasonably traced to permit the jury to find that what was turned

over by T to C, was subsequently tested in the state laboratory, and

appeared in court, was the cocaine purchased from the defendant, as

the testimony of T and C identifying the cocaine completed the chain

of custody from the defendant to the securing of the drugs, and the

testimony of V, coupled with an exhibit showing when the cocaine was

delivered to the laboratory, completed the chain of custody and provided

confirmation that the cocaine seized from the defendant was what V

received and tested; furthermore, this court declined to hold that evidence is inadmissible unless it is either unique or distinguishable on

its own or unless the first officer to encounter the evidence puts a

distinguishing mark on it, as it was not practical to require all cooperating

civilian buyers of narcotics to mark, change or alter the appearance of

evidence or its packaging before delivering it to the supervising police

officers or to require more of undercover police officers than from

other cooperating witnesses, and this court was bound by precedent

established by our Supreme Court upholding the validity of the chain

of custody as a proper means of authentication.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court committed

plain error by admitting into evidence exhibit 1, the cocaine from the

first sale between the defendant and T, which was based on his claim

that T, who was the only police officer who saw the drug transactions,

could not authenticate the drugs; exhibit 1 would have been properly

admitted into evidence even if the defendant had objected, as the testimony of V established that exhibit 1 was cocaine, and the testimony of

T, C, and V, along with an exhibit showing when the cocaine was

delivered to the laboratory, established the same chain of custody for

exhibit 1 as was established for exhibits 2 and 3, there was no obvious

error affecting the fairness and integrity of the trial where the sole

difference in the admissions of exhibit 1 and exhibits 2 and 3 was the

defendant’s failure to object, and the defendant did not show that any

manifest injustice would result from the failure to grant the relief he

sought.
Argued September 19—officially released December 5, 2017

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

three counts of the crime of sale of narcotics, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of StamfordNorwalk, geographical area number one, and tried to

the jury before Blawie, J.; verdict and judgment of

guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Daniel J. Foster, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr.,

state’s attorney, and Susan M. Campbell, assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

FLYNN, J. Real evidence that plays an actual and

direct part in the incidents giving rise to a criminal trial

may be properly authenticated because it was found or

seized at the crime scene. Where that real evidence is

a narcotic substance, the state’s proof of that narcotic

character is properly authenticated by presenting testimony tracing the evidence from the time it was found

or, in this case, purchased to the time it is offered in

the courtroom with sufficient completeness to render

it reasonably probable that what is offered is the original

and has neither been changed nor altered.

The defendant, Daryl Petitt, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three

counts of illegal sale of narcotics in violation of General

Statutes § 21a-277 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims

the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into

evidence crack cocaine from the second and third sales

the defendant made to an undercover police officer,

who could not authenticate the drugs because he made

no distinguishing mark on the contraband. The defendant also claims that the trial court committed plain

error by not striking from evidence the crack cocaine

from the first sale the defendant made to the officer

because the evidence was not first properly authenticated. He seeks reversal of all three counts and a new

trial on each of them. We conclude that because the

chain of custody was properly established for all three

pieces of evidence, the trial court neither abused its

discretion nor committed plain error in admitting them

into evidence for the jury’s consideration. We accordingly affirm the judgment.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could

have found, and procedural history are pertinent to this

appeal.1

In the fall of 2013, a confidential informant

informed Stamford Police Officer Michael Connelly that

a man who went by the name ‘‘DP’’ was selling crack

cocaine. The informant provided Connelly with DP’s

cell phone number, which one could call to make

arrangements with DP to buy drugs. Connelly identified

DP as the defendant and, as officer in charge, proceeded

to conduct an investigation using an undercover officer.

The investigation consisted of three drug buys using

money provided by Connelly, which were conducted

by Waterbury Police Detective Maximo Torres acting

as undercover officer. Torres wore a Kel monitoring

device, which recorded and transmitted audio and

global positioning system (GPS) information to other

officers stationed nearby. After each sale, Torres met

Connelly at a prearranged safe location and gave Connelly the drugs he purchased from the defendant.

The first sale took place on October 29, 2013. On that

date, Torres called the defendant and asked for $100

worth of cocaine. The defendant agreed to sell Torres
the cocaine and had Torres meet him at a bodega. There,

the defendant and a man the defendant introduced as

his cousin got into Torres’ car. During the ride, the Kel

device recorded the defendant stating that he had three

bags left to sell and that he sold ‘‘base.’’ Torres drove

the two to another location, where the cousin briefly

left. The cousin returned with drugs that he then handed

to the defendant. Torres drove the two back to the

bodega, where the defendant gave Torres six pieces of

cocaine in bags in exchange for $100. The defendant

and the cousin left. Torres met police at the safe area,

where he gave Connelly the six bags of cocaine that he

obtained from the defendant. Connelly weighed, fieldtested and secured the drugs in an evidence locker

pending further testing at the state laboratory.

The second sale occurred on November 5, 2013. Torres called the defendant, and they arranged to meet in

downtown Stamford. Torres was met by the defendant

and a woman he introduced as his girlfriend. Torres

drove them to another location. While the three were

in the car outside of the Stamford Police Department,

the defendant exchanged six bags of cocaine with Torres for $100. Torres eventually drove the two to a restaurant and dropped them off. Torres met police at the

safe area, where he gave Connelly the six bags of

cocaine that he obtained from the defendant. Connelly

weighed, field-tested and secured the drugs in a police

property locker pending future testing at the state laboratory.

The third sale also occurred on November 5, 2013.

Torres called the defendant asking for $50 worth of

cocaine. Torres picked up the defendant and his girlfriend at the restaurant and drove them to an apartment

complex. Upon arrival, the defendant exchanged three

bags of cocaine with Torres for $50. After dropping

them off, Torres met police at the safe area, where he

gave Connelly the three bags of cocaine the defendant

had given to him. Connelly weighed, field-tested and

secured the drugs in a police property locker pending

future testing at the state laboratory.

The drugs Torres purchased from the defendant,

which had been weighed, field-tested, and secured by

Connelly, later were delivered to the state laboratory

by Stamford Police Officer Terry Lauf on June 17, 2014.

Vivian Texidor, a forensic science examiner at the state

laboratory, was assigned to analyze the drugs to confirm

that they indeed were narcotics. She opened the packaging on June 23, 2014, but did not test the drugs until

June 30, 2014. After taking photos of the drugs and

weighing them, Texidor performed tests and determined that the drugs were cocaine in freebase form.2

After testing, Texidor sealed the drugs in bags, labeled

them and initialed them. At trial, Texidor identified the

drugs by the label and her initials.

The defendant was charged with three counts of ille-
gal sale of narcotics. Following a jury trial, he was

convicted on all counts, and was sentenced to a total

effective sentence of twelve years of imprisonment,

followed by five years of special parole. This appeal

followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court abused

its discretion when it admitted into evidence the

cocaine from the second and third sales. The defendant

argues that because Torres did not make any identifying

mark on the drugs before he handed them off to Connelly, no witness could authenticate the evidence as

being exactly what the defendant had sold to Torres.

The state contends that the drugs were positively identified by Torres and that, even absent this positive identification, the drugs were properly authenticated through

the chain of custody.

The following additional facts are pertinent to our

analysis. At trial, the state introduced its exhibit 1,

which Connelly identified as the six bags3 of crack

cocaine the defendant had sold to Torres during the

first sale on October 29, 2013. Connelly also identified

his name on the bag containing the bags of cocaine and

the heat seal the Stamford Police Department put on

the outer bag to prevent tampering. The state offered

exhibit 1 into evidence, and it was admitted without

objection.

Later, the state introduced its exhibit 2. Connelly

identified his name written on the outer packaging containing the drugs and the heat seal applied by the property personnel at the Stamford Police Department.

Connelly, however, had trouble identifying the evidence

through the outer packaging, so he asked for permission

to open the outer packaging, which the court allowed.

Connelly then was able to identify the exhibit as the

six bags of crack cocaine the defendant had sold Torres

during the first November 5, 2013 sale. When the state

subsequently offered exhibit 2 into evidence, the defendant objected. Defense counsel questioned Connelly as

to how he could identify the evidence. Connelly replied

that, between the markings on the packaging and the

number of bags of cocaine inside, he knew the evidence

was what he had received from Torres. The trial court

sustained the objection, concluding that there was an

inadequate foundation for the evidence because,

although Connelly testified that he had received the

cocaine from Torres, Connelly did not have firsthand

knowledge that would tie the cocaine to the defendant.4

Similarly, when the state introduced its exhibit 3,

Connelly again had trouble seeing through the outer

packaging. After opening it, Connelly identified his

name on the evidence. He then identified the three bags

of cocaine the defendant had sold to Torres during the

second sale on November 5, 2013. The state then offered
the exhibit into evidence, and the defendant again

objected. The trial court sustained the objection for the

same reasons as before.

Torres later testified and identified all three exhibits

as the crack cocaine he had purchased from the defendant and subsequently handed off to Connelly at the

prearranged locations.5 Based on Torres’ testimony, the

state again offered exhibits 2 and 3 into evidence. The

defendant objected to each. During voir dire, defense

counsel questioned Torres as to whether there was

anything on the evidence that positively identified it to

him, which Torres said there was not. The trial court

then asked Torres whether he put any identifying mark

on the bags himself. Torres stated he did not and that

it was not common practice for him to mark evidence

before handing it off. Defense counsel also asked Torres

whether the Waterbury Police Department used a different label for its evidence than the Stamford Police

Department, and Torres confirmed that it did use a

different label. The defendant claimed that because

cocaine is fungible, Torres could not positively identify

the drugs because he did not mark the drugs himself

and the labels on the exhibits presented at trial were

different from what he would have seen as a Waterbury

police officer. The trial court overruled the objections,

stating that the evidence had been authenticated and

that the weight given to such evidence was a matter

for the jury. Accordingly, the court admitted exhibits

2 and 3 into evidence.6

A

Section 9-1 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence

provides: ‘‘The requirement of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the offered evidence

is what its proponent claims it to be.’’ The proponent

need only advance prima facie proof that the proffered

evidence is what it is claimed to be before the evidence

may be admitted, with the ultimate determination of

authenticity resting with the fact finder. See, e.g., State

v. Bruno, 236 Conn. 514, 551, 673 A.2d 1117 (1996); Neil

v. Miller, 2 Root (Conn.) 117, 118 (1794). The opposing

party is free to offer evidence to discredit this prima

facie showing. Shulman v. Shulman, 150 Conn. 651,

659–60, 193 A.2d 525 (1963).

‘‘For purposes of authentication . . . an adequate

foundation to authenticate the exhibit would be testimony that the [real evidence] offered is the [evidence]

that was found [at the scene of the crime]. The offered

item may possess characteristics that are fairly unique

and readily identifiable. If so, the testimony of a percipient witness . . . will be sufficient to support a finding

that the [real evidence] is what it is claimed to be. On

the other hand, if the offered evidence is of such a

nature as not to be readily identifiable, the foundation

for authentication will be substantially more elaborate.
Typically, it will entail testimony that traces the chain

of custody of the item from the moment it was found

to its appearance in the courtroom, with sufficient completeness to render it reasonably probable that the original item has neither been exchanged nor altered.’’

(Footnotes omitted.) 2 C. McCormick, Evidence (7th

Ed. 2013) § 213, pp. 13–14.

‘‘[I]n a criminal prosecution, the state has the burden

of proving the case set forth in the information in all

its material parts beyond a reasonable doubt, so that

the court must find, in order to convict, that all the

elements of the crime charged have been established

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The trier must consider, however, the whole evidence, taken together, and

is not bound to dissect it into unconnected fragments

for a separate microscopic examination of each, regardless of its relation to the rest. . . .

‘‘As a general rule, it may be said that the prosecution

is not required or compelled to prove each and every

circumstance in the chain of custody beyond a reasonable doubt; the reasonable doubt must be to the whole

evidence and not to a particular fact in the case. . . .

An object connected with the commission of a crime,

however, must be shown to be in substantially the same

condition as when the crime was committed before it

can be properly admitted in evidence. . . .

‘‘There is no hard and fast rule that the prosecution

must exclude or disprove all possibility that the article

or substance has been tampered with; in each case the

trial court must satisfy itself in reasonable probability

that the substance had not been changed in important

respects. . . . The trial court must also decide under

the same test of reasonable probability whether the

identification and nature of contents is sufficient to

warrant its reception in evidence. . . . The court must

consider the nature of the article, the circumstances

surrounding its preservation and custody and the likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it in making its

determination; and there is no rule which requires the

state to produce as witnesses all persons who were in

a position to come into contact with the substance

sought to be introduced in evidence.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Johnson, 162 Conn. 215, 231–33, 292 A.2d

903 (1972).

In the present case, the jury found that the defendant

had sold cocaine to Torres. The defendant, though,

claims, without citation to any authority, that Torres

needed to positively identify the exhibits in order to

authenticate them. He contends that such identification

was impossible because cocaine is a fungible good that

has no unique or distinguishing characteristics on its

own, and Torres did not mark this specific cocaine

himself. The defendant’s contention, as fleshed out during counsel’s oral argument before this court, is that

it is incumbent on the person who first obtains the
contraband from a defendant to mark it in a particular

way at the time of purchase or seizure so that it has a

distinguishing characteristic in order for it to be properly authenticated and admitted into evidence for the

jury’s consideration. The state, however, rightly points

out that the items did not have to be conclusively identified through their unique or distinguishing characteristics because a chain of custody was established. The

state relies on State v. Hall, 165 Conn. 599, 345 A.2d

17 (1973), in support of its position.

In Hall, an undercover police officer procured drugs

from the defendant, which two other officers observed.

Id., 601–602. After the sale, the undercover officer

handed off the drugs to one of the observing officers,

who secured it, conducted a Marquis reagent test, which

proved positive for narcotics, and later delivered the

drugs to the toxicological laboratory for further testing.

Id., 602. At trial, the drugs were admitted into evidence

when one of the observing officers was able to authenticate the evidence because he saw the defendant sell the

drugs to the undercover officer, who was unavailable

to testify because he died prior to trial. Id., 602–605.

The defendant in the present case argues that Hall

is inapplicable because the other police officers here

did not see the transfer of drugs from the defendant to

Torres. We disagree, however, and conclude that the

operative piece of Hall that is relevant here is that

someone who saw the sale testified to the drugs’ authenticity. In Hall, it was one of the observing officers. Id.,

604. Here, it was Torres.7

More on point is State v. Johnson, 166 Conn. 439,

352 A.2d 294 (1974). In Johnson, an undercover officer

arranged to purchase heroin from a drug dealer, who

needed to obtain the drugs from the defendant, his

supplier. Id., 440–41. In a parking lot, the defendant

threw a plastic bag into the dealer’s car and left. Id.,

441. When the dealer went to sell the drugs to the

undercover officer, other officers converged on the

scene and arrested the dealer. Id. The defendant was

apprehended nearby. Id. The plastic bag was taken from

the dealer by police and then delivered to the state

laboratory for its contents to be tested, which confirmed that the bag contained heroin. Id. The defendant

claimed the trial court erred in admitting the plastic

bag and its contents because there was insufficient

proof of identification. Id., 442. The trial court admitted

the evidence after the dealer and police officers identified the bag. Id., 442–43. The dealer testified that the

defendant threw a bag into the dealer’s car and that

the exhibit looked like the same bag the defendant

tossed to him, with the only difference being the location of the elastic on the bag. Id., 442. The officer who

arrested the dealer testified that the exhibit was the

bag he seized from the dealer and then turned over to

another officer, who testified that the exhibit was the
bag he received and then delivered to the state laboratory. Id., 442–43. At no point does the opinion suggest

that anyone marked the bag. Our Supreme Court found

no error because ‘‘[t]he trial court must decide under the

test of reasonable probability whether the identification

and nature of contents are sufficient to warrant the

reception in evidence of an offered exhibit, and this

ruling of the trial judge may not be overturned except

for a clear abuse of discretion’’ which our Supreme

Court did not find. Id., 443.

In the present case, the defendant’s argument is no

different from the argument that our Supreme Court

rejected forty-three years ago. In Johnson, the dealer,

the arresting officer and the officer who secured the

drugs all testified. Id., 442–43. Here, Torres and Connelly provided the same complete chain from the defendant to the drugs’ securing. In both cases, there was

evidence that, once secured, the drugs were then delivered to the state laboratory, which confirmed the presence of the narcotics in the items seized. Id., 441. Our

Supreme Court in Johnson found no abuse of discretion

in permitting such identification of contraband by an

admitted drug dealer who purchased from a supplier;

id., 443; we see no abuse of discretion in the admission

of such identification by an undercover officer making

a supervised controlled purchase, where a chain of custody was traced.

The trial court admitted exhibits 1, 2 and 3 as case

law permitted it to do. See State v. Anonymous (83-

FG), 190 Conn. 715, 724–25, 463 A.2d 533 (1983). Texidor’s later testimony coupled with exhibit 15, which

documented when Lauf delivered the bags of cocaine to

the state laboratory, completed the chain and provided

confirmation that the cocaine seized from the defendant

was what Texidor received and tested. This chain was

traced before the jury commenced deliberation and the

seized cocaine evidentiary exhibits were given to them.

‘‘It is not unusual to admit an exhibit into evidence

before its relationship to the issues of a case has been

established. . . . This procedure may expedite the

trial, and it is ordinarily not prejudicial because the

exhibit may be stricken if the necessary evidentiary

foundation is not eventually laid.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id.

Thus, the trial court here, in reasonable probability,

could have determined that the contents of exhibits 2

and 3 were in substantially the same condition as when

the offense was committed, so as to render the exhibits

admissible in evidence, especially in light of all of the

other evidence tending to support the reasonable inference that what the defendant sold to Torres was indeed

cocaine. The chain of custody of each batch of contraband cocaine was reasonably traced to permit the jury

to find that what was turned over by Torres to Connelly

and appeared in court was the cocaine purchased from
the defendant. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting exhibits 2 and 3 into evidence.

B

The only alternative to the defendant’s claim that we

can glean from his arguments is that he is asking this

court to hold that evidence is inadmissible unless it is

either unique or distinguishable on its own or the first

officer to encounter the evidence puts a distinguishing

mark on it. Not all persons who participate in controlled

narcotic purchases are police officers; some are cooperating civilians. It is not practical to require all such

cooperating buyers to mark, change or alter the appearance of evidence or its packaging before delivering it

to the supervising police officers or to require more of

undercover police officers than from other cooperating

witnesses. Such intervention would raise questions

about its admissibility in an altered state. Furthermore,

such a holding would eliminate the chain of custody

as a valid option for authentication. Given the extent

of Supreme Court precedent upholding chain of custody

authentications, we decline to do so.8

‘‘[I]t is well established that this court, as an intermediate appellate tribunal, is not at liberty to discard, modify, reconsider,

reevaluate or overrule the precedent of our Supreme

Court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Joseph’s

High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission,

176 Conn. App. 570, 595, 170 A.3d 73 (2017). We, thus,

are bound by precedent established by our Supreme

Court, our highest court and court of last resort in

upholding the validity of the chain of custody as a

proper means of authentication.9

II

The defendant also claims that his conviction should

be reversed because the trial court committed plain

error in its admission, without objection by the defendant, of exhibit 1, the cocaine from the first sale

between the defendant and Torres. We disagree.

‘‘An appellate court addressing a claim of plain error

first must determine if the error is indeed plain in the

sense that it is patent [or] readily [discernible] on the

face of a factually adequate record, [and] also . . .

obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . This determination clearly requires a review of the plain error

claim presented in light of the record. . . . [T]he plain

error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious

that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public

confidence in the judicial proceedings. . . . A party

cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 812,

155 A.3d 209 (2017); see also Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘The

court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it
was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to

the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice

plain error not brought to the attention of the trial

court.’’). In this case, we conclude that there was no

error.

The testimonies of Torres, Connelly and Texidor, coupled with exhibit 15, established the same chain of

custody for exhibit 1 as was established for exhibits 2

and 3. Texidor also established that exhibit 1 was

cocaine. Accordingly, the exhibit would have been properly admitted into evidence even if the defendant had

objected. We fail to see an obvious error affecting the

fairness and integrity of the trial where the sole difference in the admissions of exhibit 1 and exhibits 2 and

3 was the defendant’s failure to object. In addition, the

defendant has not shown that any manifest injustice

would result from the failure to grant the relief he seeks.

Under these circumstances, there can be no plain error.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

It is worth noting at the outset that the state and the defendant agree

on the entire chronology of events, with the defendant only disputing the

genuineness of the three exhibits of cocaine presented.

2 Texidor identified the weight of each exhibit as 1.009 grams for exhibit

1, 0.952 grams for exhibit 2 and 0.512 grams for exhibit 3. Connelly had

earlier identified the weights of the cocaine from the first sale weighing 1

gram, the second sale 0.9 grams and the third sale 0.6 grams.

3 Although we refer to these items as bags, they are tiny knotted bits of

glassine about the size of a raisin covering the cocaine.

4 Although the Kel device provided audio and GPS information to the

officers surveilling the sales, there was no video of the exchanges, and

Torres was the only officer who saw the sales.

5 Torres testified that, after the first sale, he ‘‘was brought to another

prearranged location. At that location . . . I handed over . . . what I purchased from [the defendant] to the case officer.’’ When later asked what,

if anything, he had handed to Connelly after the second sale, Torres replied:

‘‘What was purchased from [the defendant].’’ When asked what he had

handed off to Connelly after the third sale, Torres replied: ‘‘[T]he contraband

that was purchased from [the defendant].’’

6 Although Texidor had not yet testified at the time the court admitted

exhibits 2 and 3 into evidence, she later testified and identified the exhibits

as being what she had tested. She further opined on their status as cocaine.

This testimony, coupled with exhibit 15, which was admitted into evidence

during Texidor’s testimony, provided the remaining links in the chain of

custody from the crime scene to the courtroom.

7 We previously have declined to apply Hall in circumstances where either

no witness saw the alleged transaction or the witness could not see what

precisely changed hands. In State v. Mierez, 24 Conn. App. 543, 551–54, 590

A.2d 469, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 910, 911, 593 A.2d 136 (1991), officers

could not describe what was passed from the defendant to the alleged buyer

other than as ‘‘small objects,’’ and they saw no money change hands. In

State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 160, 655 A.2d 263 (1995), no witness saw

the alleged drug transaction. Similarly, in State v. Davis, 38 Conn. App. 621,

625, 662 A.2d 812, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 919, 665 A.2d 907 (1995), no

witness saw drugs pass from the defendant to the alleged buyer. Here,

because Torres was the buyer and the observing officer, and he paid the

dealer the money, and took possession of the drugs those issues are not

present.

8 The defendant’s claim would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt

for this one link in the chain, when it is clear from our case law that not

every step in a chain of custody needs to be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt; State v. Johnson, supra, 162 Conn. 231–33; a point that the defendant

concedes on appeal.

9 We note that the trial court charged the jury, in part, on the chain of
custody, stating: ‘‘Where . . . the state relies in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of a crime, although each link in the

chain of evidence to support it need not be proven beyond a reasonable

doubt, the cumulative impact of that evidence must, in order to support

that inference, convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the element

has been proven.’’ This instruction was not objected to, and neither party

has addressed it in the arguments.