Filed 7/6/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MALEKEH KHOSRAVAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CHEVRON CORPORATION

et al.,

Defendants and 

Respondents.

 B307482

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV20678)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, David S. Cunningham III, Judge. Reversed.

Weitz & Luxenberg, Benno Ashrafi, Josiah Parker, Tyler 

Stock, and The Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

King & Spalding, Peter A. Strotz, Anne M. Voigts and 

Brian Priestley for Defendants and Respondents.

_________________
2

Malekeh Khosravan appeals from a postjudgment order

denying her motion to strike or tax costs with respect to the 

expert witness fees incurred by defendants Chevron Corporation, 

Chevron U.S.A. Inc., and Texaco Inc. (Chevron defendants)

following the trial court’s granting of the Chevron defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment. Malekeh and her husband 

Gholam Khosravan1 brought claims for negligence, premises 

liability, loss of consortium, and related claims, alleging 

Khosravan contracted mesothelioma caused by exposure to 

asbestos while he was an Iranian citizen working for the National 

Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) at the Abadan refinery the 

Khosravans alleged was controlled by the predecessors to the 

Chevron defendants, Exxon Mobil Corporation, and ExxonMobil 

Oil Corporation (Exxon defendants). The trial court concluded 

the Chevron and Exxon defendants did not owe a duty of care to 

Khosravan, and we affirmed. (Khosravan v. Exxon Mobil 

Corporation et al. (Apr. 20, 2021, B304346) [nonpub. opn.] 

(Khosravan I).)

The trial court awarded the Chevron defendants their 

expert witness fees as costs based on the Khosravans’ failure to 

accept the Chevron defendants’ statutory settlement offers made

to Khosravan and Malekeh under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 998.2 On appeal, Malekeh contends the trial court erred

in denying the Khosravans’ motion to strike or tax costs because 

1 During the pendency of this action, Gholam Khosravan 

died, and Malekeh Khosravan was substituted as his successor in 

interest. To avoid confusion, we refer to Gholam Khosravan as 

Khosravan and Malekeh by her first name.

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code 

of Civil Procedure.
3

the settlement offers required the Khosravans to indemnify the 

Chevron defendants against possible future claims of nonparties, 

making the offers impossible to value; the Khosravans obtained a 

more favorable judgment than the offers in light of the indemnity 

provisions; and the offers were “token” settlement offers made in 

bad faith.

The Chevron defendants respond that the Khosravans’ 

claims were meritless, and thus the requirement in the section 

998 offers that the Khosravans indemnify the Chevron 

defendants against claims filed by their heirs or other third 

parties was valueless. But even if a party’s claims lack merit (a 

questionable proposition as to the Khosravans’ claims evaluated 

as of the time of the offers), under Civil Code section 2778, 

subdivision (3), the Khosravans would still be liable for the costs 

of the Chevron defendants’ defense against the claims. Thus, the 

value of the section 998 offers would be difficult, if not impossible,

to quantify, requiring the Khosravans (and the court) to assess 

the likelihood of the Khosravans’ heirs or others filing suit 

against the Chevron defendants, and if they did, the necessity 

and cost of defense against the claims, meritless or otherwise. 

We recognize the desire by defendants to reach a settlement that 

protects them from all liability for the conduct alleged in the 

complaint, whether as to the plaintiffs or their heirs in a 

wrongful death action. But if defendants seek that protection

through indemnification, they may well need to give up the 

benefit of section 998. We reverse.
4

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Lawsuit

Khosravan and Malekeh filed this action on June 13, 2019 

against the Chevron and Exxon defendants. The complaint 

alleged the Chevron and Exxon defendants owed Khosravan a 

duty of care based on their predecessors’ control over the Abadan 

refinery in which Khosravan worked and a 1954 contractual 

agreement (the Agreement) between the Iranian government and 

a consortium of international oil companies (collectively, the 

consortium members), including defendants’ predecessors. The 

complaint alleged the predecessors to the Chevron defendants, as 

consortium members, contributed “capital, management and 

skills in the operation and management of the oil properties of 

[NIOC], specifically the . . . oil refinery in Abadan, Iran.” 

Further, the predecessor companies had “full and effective control 

of the [Abadan] refinery . . . in order to operate that refinery in 

conformity with good oil industry practice and sound engineering 

principles applicable to that industry.” The complaint alleged 

Khosravan was exposed to products containing asbestos while he 

worked at the Abadan refinery and other Iranian facilities from 

approximately the 1950s to the late 1970s and that Khosravan

contracted mesothelioma caused by this exposure. (Khosravan I, 

supra, B304346.)

B. The Chevron Defendants’ Settlement Offers

On October 9, 2019 the Chevron defendants served the 

Khosravans with offers to compromise under section 998. The 

Chevron defendants offered “to mutually waive costs in exchange 

for: [¶] [D]ismissing with prejudice all of [the Khosravans’]
5

causes of action against Chevron, and [¶] [R]elease of all future 

claims based on the allegations in the complaint, including, but 

not limited to, claims for wrongful death, and indemnity in the 

event such claims are filed by non-parties to this case.” The 

offers provided that if the Khosravans did not accept the offers 

within 30 days, they “shall be deemed withdrawn.”

The Khosravans did not respond to the offers.

C. The Chevron Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

On September 20, 2019 the Chevron defendants moved for 

summary judgment, which the trial court granted on December 6, 

2019. We affirmed, concluding the Khosravans had not raised a 

triable issue of fact as to whether the Chevron defendants’ 

predecessors exercised control over the Iranian oil facilities where 

Khosravan worked. We explained the Agreement did not show 

that the Chevron defendants’ predecessors controlled the Abadan 

refinery because “the Agreement tasked [the Iranian Oil Refining 

Company] and NIOC, not the consortium members, with refinery 

operations.” Further, the Agreement did not create a duty of care 

owed to Khosravan by the Chevron defendants’ predecessors. We 

also concluded the Khosravans’ evidence did not “show[] that 

employees of the consortium members who were seconded to the 

Abadan refinery as management employees were paid by the 

consortium members or their work was directed or controlled by 

the consortium members.” (Khosravan I, supra, B304346.)

D. The Trial Court’s Award of Costs to the Chevron Defendants

On February 13, 2020 the Chevron defendants filed a 

memorandum of costs requesting approximately $33,900 in total 

costs, including $19,673 in expert witness fees. 
6

The Khosravans moved to strike or tax costs on multiple 

grounds, including that the Chevron defendants’ expert witness 

fees were not recoverable under sections 1032 and 1033.5.3 The 

Khosravans asserted the Chevron defendants’ statutory

settlement offers were not capable of valuation because the offers

required the Khosravans to indemnify the Chevron defendants 

against future claims by nonparties. The Khosravans also 

argued the Chevron defendants’ section 998 offers were “zerovalue, token offers, that they could never have expected [the 

Khosravans] to accept in good faith . . . .” The Khosravans 

attached the trial court’s July 12, 2017 order in Kordestani, et al.

v. 3M Company, et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2017, No. 

JCCP4674) denying the defendants’ summary judgment motion

in a personal injury asbestos case brought by an Abadan refinery 

worker, in which the court found the consortium members owed a 

duty of care to workers in facilities covered by the Agreement. 

The Khosravans argued the favorable decision in the Kordestani 

case showed the unreasonableness of the Chevron defendants’ 

offers.

3 Section 1032, subdivision (b), provides, “Except as 

otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is 

entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or 

proceeding.” Under section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), a “prevailing 

party” is defined to include “a defendant where neither plaintiff 

nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against 

those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that 

defendant.” (See Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019) 

33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1103.) Section 1033.5, subdivision (8), 

provides that “[f]ees of expert witnesses ordered by the court” 

may be recoverable as costs under section 1032.
7

In their opposition, the Chevron defendants argued their

statutory settlement offers were valid and the judgment in favor 

of the Chevron defendants was prima facie evidence of the 

reasonableness of the offers. The Chevron defendants attached 

the December 4, 2015 order in Malek et al. v. Blackmer Pump 

Company, et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2015, No. BC580695) 

and the November 20, 2018 order in Sabetian v. Air & Liquid 

Systems Corporation et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2018, No. 

BC699945), in which the trial courts granted summary judgment 

for the Chevron defendants, finding the Chevron defendants did 

not owe a duty of care to protect refinery workers from asbestos 

hazards at the Abadan refinery. The Chevron defendants argued

these superior court decisions demonstrated the reasonableness 

of their offers to settle for a mutual waiver of costs.

On July 9, 2020 the trial court granted the Khosravans’ 

motion in part, striking approximately $14,000 in expert witness 

fees, but the court denied the motion as to $5,360 in expert 

witness fees. On July 29 the court entered judgment, awarding

the Chevron defendants $15,564 in total costs against the 

Khosravans.

Malekeh timely appealed.4

4 On appeal Malekeh only challenges the trial court’s ruling 

as to the award of expert witness fees.
8

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding the Chevron Defendants 

Their Expert Witness Fees

1. Applicable law and standard of review

“‘“[C]osts” of a civil action consists of the expenses of 

litigation . . . . The right to recover any of such costs is 

determined entirely by statute.’” (Olson v. Automobile Club of 

Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1148; accord, 

Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 738.) Under 

section 998, subdivision (c)(1), “If an offer made by a defendant is 

not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable 

judgment or award, the plaintiff . . . shall pay the defendant’s 

costs from the time of the offer. In addition, . . . the court . . . , in 

its discretion, may require the plaintiff to pay a reasonable sum 

to cover postoffer costs of the services of expert witnesses, who 

are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and 

reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial . . . , 

or during trial . . . , of the case by the defendant.”

On a motion to strike or tax costs, “[t]he burden is on the 

offering party to demonstrate that the offer is valid under section 

998.” (Ignacio v. Caracciolo (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 81, 86 (Ignacio); 

accord, Timed Out LLC v. 13359 Corp. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 933, 

942.) “The offer must be strictly construed in favor of the party 

sought to be bound by it.” (Ignacio, at p. 86; accord, Timed Out, 

at p. 942.) “‘We independently review whether a section 998 

settlement offer was valid. In our review, we interpret any 

ambiguity in the offer against its proponent.’” (Prince v. 

Invensure Ins. Brokers, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 614, 622; 

accord, Menges v. Department of Transportation (2020) 
9

59 Cal.App.5th 13, 20 (Menges) [the validity of an offer to 

compromise under section 998 “is subject to de novo review”].)

“‘An offer to compromise under section 998 must be 

sufficiently specific to allow the recipient to evaluate the worth of 

the offer and make a reasoned decision whether to accept the 

offer.’” (Menges, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 26; accord, Fassberg 

Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 720, 764.) “The inclusion of nonmonetary 

terms and conditions does not render a 998 offer invalid; but 

those terms or conditions must be sufficiently certain and capable 

of valuation to allow the court to determine whether the 

judgment is more favorable than the offer.” (Menges, at p. 26; 

accord, Ignacio, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 87; Valentino v. Elliott 

Sav-On Gas, Inc. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 (Valentino) 

[“[A]n ‘offer’ includes all its terms and conditions and must be 

evaluated in the light of all those terms and conditions.”].) 

“To further the purposes of promoting reasonable 

settlement under section 998, we must consider the validity of 

section 998 offers as of the date the offers are served.” (Burch v. 

Children’s Hospital of Orange County Thrift Stores, Inc. (2003) 

109 Cal.App.4th 537, 547-548; accord, Valentino, supra, 

201 Cal.App.3d at p. 698 [the value of terms and conditions of a 

section 998 offer must be evaluated “as of the time” the offer was 

made “without the benefit of hindsight”].) Where a defendant’s 

settlement offer contains terms that make it “exceedingly difficult 

or impossible to determine the value of the offer to the 

plaintiff[,] . . . a court should not undertake extraordinary efforts 

to attempt to determine whether the judgment is more favorable 

to the plaintiff. Instead, the court should conclude that the offer 

is not sufficiently specific or certain to determine its value and 
10

deny cost shifting under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.” 

(Fassberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Los 

Angeles, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 766; see Valentino, at p. 700

[courts should not “engage[] in pure guesswork”].)

“‘“Where . . . the offeror obtains a judgment more favorable 

than its offer, the judgment constitutes prima facie evidence 

showing the offer was reasonable and the offeror is eligible for 

costs as specified in section 998.”’” (Adams v. Ford Motor 

Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1484; accord, Menges, supra, 

59 Cal.App.5th at p. 27.) Once the offeror shows the section 998 

offer is valid, the burden shifts to the offeree to show the offer 

was not made in good faith. (Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical 

Center (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 918, 926; Adams, at p. 1484.)

2. The Chevron defendants have not carried their 

burden to show they obtained a judgment more 

favorable than their settlement offers

Malekeh argues the Chevron defendants’ settlement offers 

are invalid under section 998 because they are not capable of 

valuation given their requirement that the Khosravans 

indemnify the Chevron defendants against all future claims 

asserted by nonparties based on the allegations in the complaint. 

Further, to the extent the settlement offers can be valued, 

Malekeh asserts the judgment obtained by the Chevron 

defendants is not more favorable than the offers because the

indemnity provisions should be given a significant negative 

valuation. The Chevron defendants argue the releases in their 

offers are reasonably valuable because “regardless of who 

brought what claims related to the subject matter of this 
11

litigation, those claims were equally meritless.” Malekeh has the 

better argument.

A valid section 998 offer may include terms requiring the 

release of all claims (by parties or nonparties) arising from the 

injury at issue in the lawsuit. (Ignacio, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 88 [“Boilerplate language identifying individuals and entities 

beyond the named parties in the case as releasors and releasees 

does not invalidate the offer, if the claims released relate only to 

the subject matter of the current litigation.”]; see Auburn Woods I 

Homeowners Assn. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 717, 725 [“An offer that 

requires the offeree to release all claims between the parties in 

the current action is effective under section 998.”].) Thus, the 

inclusion of terms in the Chevron defendants’ settlement offers 

requiring the Khosravans to release all claims based on the 

allegations of the complaint does not by itself invalidate the 

section 998 offers. But the offers’ inclusion of a requirement that 

the Khosravans indemnify the Chevron defendants against 

claims by nonparties renders the offers difficult to value and 

potentially costly to the Khosravans.

Valentino, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d 692, relied on by 

Malekeh, is instructive. There, the plaintiff, who slipped and fell 

at a gas station, brought a personal injury action against the 

station’s owner. (Id. at pp. 694-695.) The owner made a

statutory settlement offer for entry of a $15,000 judgment in 

exchange for the plaintiff releasing the owner, its attorneys, and 

its insurance carrier “from any and all claims and causes of 

action arising out of [plaintiff’s] claims including insurance bad 

faith and violation of Insurance Code [s]ection 790.03.” (Id. at 

p. 695.) After a jury awarded the plaintiff only $9,750, the owner 

sought its costs under section 998, which the trial court granted. 
12

(Id. at pp. 695-696.) We reversed, concluding the required 

release rendered the offer less favorable than the jury’s award 

and difficult to quantify. (Id. at p. 698, 702.) We explained that 

the value of the term requiring the plaintiff to release unfiled

claims against the owner, its insurance carrier, and its attorney 

may have exceeded the difference between the statutory offer’s 

monetary value and the judgment obtained. (Id. at p. 698.) We

also observed that “[t]o pinpoint the value of the various potential 

unfiled claims [plaintiff] might have had at the time of the 

statutory offer or in the future against three different parties, 

only one of whom was even a party to the instant action, would 

require the court to engage in wild speculation bordering on 

psychic prediction.” (Id. at p. 699.) Given this uncertainty, we 

reasoned, “Neither this court nor the trial court can be expected 

to properly allocate defendant’s offer between the personal injury 

causes of action involved in the instant litigation and the several 

other causes of action [plaintiff] is being asked to surrender.” (Id. 

at p. 700; see McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 

695, 706 [“[A] section 998 offer requiring the release of claims and 

parties not involved in the litigation is invalid as a means of 

shifting litigation expenses because ‘it would be hard enough for 

a trial court to place a value on a condition requiring the plaintiff 

to dismiss a single specific lawsuit she had already filed against 

the defendant in another court. But when the condition 

mandates surrender of an array of potential lawsuits against not 

only the defendant but two other parties the task becomes 

impossible.’”].)

Here, there is a potentially high price tag on the 

requirement the Khosravans indemnify the Chevron defendants

for claims not yet filed by third parties. The Chevron defendants 
13

would not have included the indemnification provisions if they

had no value. Further, contrary to the Chevron defendants’ 

contention, even if nonparties were to bring only meritless 

claims, the Khosravans would still be liable for the costs of the 

Chevron defendants’ defense against these claims. (Civ. Code,

§ 2778, subds. 3 & 4.) “[Civil Code] section 2778, unchanged 

since 1872, sets forth general rules for the interpretation of

indemnity contracts, ‘unless a contrary intention appears.’ If not 

forbidden by other, more specific, statutes, the obligations set 

forth in [Civil Code] section 2778 thus are deemed included in 

every indemnity agreement unless the parties indicate 

otherwise.” (Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 

44 Cal.4th 541, 553.) “[T]he statute first provides that a promise 

of indemnity against claims, demands, or liability ‘embraces 

the costs of defense against such claims, demands, or liability’

insofar as such costs are incurred reasonably and in good faith. 

[Citation.] Second, the section specifies that the indemnitor ‘is 

bound, on request of the [indemnitee], to defend actions or 

proceedings brought against the [indemnitee] in respect to the 

matters embraced by the indemnity,’ though the indemnitee may 

choose to conduct the defense. [Citation.] Third, the statute 

declares that if the indemnitor declines the indemnitee’s tender 

of defense, ‘a recovery against the [indemnitee] suffered by him in 

good faith, is conclusive in his favor against the [indemnitor].’”

(Ibid.)

Accordingly, the indemnification provisions in the Chevron 

defendants’ settlement offers, as in Valentino, supra, 

201 Cal.App.3d at pages 699 to 700, would have required the 

Khosravans to evaluate a series of contingencies to determine the 

cost of indemnification for possible future claims of unidentified
14

parties.5 What was the likelihood of the Khosravans’ children or 

heirs filing wrongful death claims against the Chevron 

defendants had the Khosravans settled? And would the Chevron 

defendants have demanded the Khosravans defend against those 

claims? If not, what defense costs would the Khosravans have 

5 Section 377.60 provides as to wrongful death claims, “A 

cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful 

act or neglect of another may be asserted by any of the following 

persons or by the decedent’s personal representative on their 

behalf: [¶] (a) The decedent’s surviving spouse, domestic 

partner, children, and issue of deceased children, or, if there is no 

surviving issue of the decedent, the persons, including the 

surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to 

the property of the decedent by intestate succession.” Under 

California law, the decedent’s release of claims for his or her 

injuries does not bar a future wrongful death claim by the 

decedent’s heirs. (Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 

272, 283-284 [“Nor can a decedent release a claim on behalf of his 

or her heirs in settlement with the defendant.”]; Earley v. Pacific 

Elec. Ry. Co. (1917) 176 Cal. 79, 82 [decedent’s release of claims 

from his injury did not constitute a bar to wife’s wrongful death 

action for loss of consortium].) As the Supreme Court explained 

in Earley as to a wrongful death claim by the decedent’s widow, 

“Our statute creates a new right of action with a different 

measure of damage from that which accrued to the injured person 

as a result of the defendant's wrongdoing. The right of action is 

to the heirs or representatives of the deceased and the elements 

of damage (without here attempting to specify them all) include 

in the case of the widow an admeasurement of the financial loss 

occasioned to her by the death of her husband through the 

deprivation of his society, comfort, and protection.” (Earley, at 

pp. 81-82.) The parties do not identify how many potential claims 

by nonparties based on the allegations in the complaint might 

exist.
15

been required to reimburse? The Chevron defendants provide no

valuation for the likely expense of defending against potential

claims, meritless or not. For the same reasons, the trial court 

(and this court on appeal) would have “to engage in wild 

speculation bordering on psychic prediction” to determine the 

valuation of the costs of defending against potential future 

claims. (Valentino, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 699.)

Even if it were somehow possible to value the settlement 

offer with inclusion of the indemnification provisions, the 

Khosravans’ potential liability for indemnification (even if a 

future case could be resolved at the summary judgment stage) 

would far exceed the costs the Khosravans would owe absent the 

settlement, whether measured by the Chevron defendants’ 

request for $33,900 in costs or the court’s award of $15,500. 

Thus, the Chevron defendants have failed to show the judgment 

is more favorable than their statutory settlement offers.

Toste v. CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 

362 is on point. There, the Court of Appeal concluded a statutory 

settlement offer conditioned on approval of a good faith 

settlement motion and containing a requirement the plaintiff 

indemnify and hold the defendants harmless against all third 

parties’ claims was invalid both because it was conditional and 

the indemnification provision defied accurate valuation. (Id. at 

p. 373 & fn. 6.) As to the latter issue, the court observed, “The 

requirement that appellant indemnify and hold respondents 

harmless against third party claims ‘render[s] it difficult to 

accurately value the monetary term of the offer . . . .’” (Ibid.) The 

Chevron defendants attempt to distinguish the offer in Toste as 

involving the release of all third party claims, “not just those 

based on the same subject matter.” But there is no suggestion in 
16

Toste that the settlement offer required indemnification of claims 

beyond the subject matter of the lawsuit (arising from a 

construction truck hitting and killing the plaintiff’s father during 

a road paving project). (Id. at p. 364.) We agree with the 

observation of the Toste court that a term in a settlement offer 

requiring a plaintiff to indemnify a defendant against third party

claims defies accurate valuation under the framework of 

Valentino. (Id. at p. 373, fn. 6.)

The Chevron defendants’ reliance on Ignacio, supra, 

2 Cal.App.5th 81, is misplaced. In Ignacio, the Court of Appeal 

concluded a statutory offer containing an “incredibly broad” 

release provision, “encompass[ing] numerous claims the releasers 

may have against the releasees beyond those at issue in the 

lawsuit,” was not valid under section 998. (Ignacio, at p. 88.) We 

agree the release provision here is not as broad as that in 

Ignacio. But Ignacio did not involve or address the validity of a 

provision in a section 998 offer requiring the indemnification of 

future claims by unidentified nonparties.6

6 Because we conclude the Chevron defendants’ settlement 

offers were not valid section 998 offers, we do not reach 

Malekeh’s contentions the offers were unreasonable bad faith 

offers or the offers unconstitutionally required the Khosravans to 

coerce their children and heirs to refrain from filing claims 

related to Khosravan’s injury. However, we question the 

Chevron defendants’ assertion “everyone involved knew” the 

Chevron defendants would prevail on summary judgment. At the 

time the Chevron defendants made their settlement offers, one 

trial court had found the consortium members owed a duty of 

care to protect refinery workers from asbestos hazards based on 

the Agreement, and two trial courts had concluded otherwise. 

But this court had not yet issued its decision in Sabetian v. Exxon 
17

DISPOSITION

The order denying the Khosravans’ motion to strike or tax 

costs is reversed. We remand for the trial court to recalculate the 

award of costs to the Chevron defendants consistent with this 

opinion. Malekeh is to recover her costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

McCORMICK, J.*

Mobil Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1075, in which we 

concluded the Chevron defendants did not owe a duty of care to 

protect refinery workers from asbestos hazards at the Abadan 

refinery. Although the Chevron defendants prevailed in Sabetian 

and Khosravan I, the plaintiffs’ positions were far from frivolous,

and the outcome was not as obvious as the Chevron defendants 

now maintain.

* Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.