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33–593 2007

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–126]

COMBAT VEHICLE ACTIVE PROTECTION

SYSTEMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD

SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

(II)

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania, Chairman

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada

KEN CALVERT, California

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JIM RYUN, Kansas

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

LANE EVANS, Illinois

ADAM SMITH, Washington

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

STEVE ISRAEL, New York

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

TIM RYAN, Ohio

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member

ANDREW HUNTER, Professional Staff Member

BENJAMIN KOHR, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2006

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, September 21, 2006, Combat Vehicle Active Protection Systems ..... 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, September 21, 2006 ............................................................................... 27

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

COMBAT VEHICLE ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Ranking Member,

Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ..................................................... 3

Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative from Pennsylvania, Chairman, Tactical

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Buhrkuhl, Dr. Robert L., Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) ........... 7

Feldman, Lloyd, Assistant Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office

of the Secretary of Defense .................................................................................. 10

Sorenson, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) for Acquisition and Systems Management . 9

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Buhrkuhl, Dr. Robert L. ................................................................................... 31

Feldman, Lloyd ................................................................................................. 48

Sorenson, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey ............................................................................. 39

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Bradley ....................................................................................................... 00

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 00

Mr. Weldon ........................................................................................................ 00

(1)

COMBAT VEHICLE ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 21, 2006.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, TACTICAL AIR

AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. WELDON. The subcommittee will come to order. Today continuing our high priority placed on providing force protection for

our men and women in combat, the subcommittee is holding its

sixth hearing on force protection issues. We will receive testimony

from Department of Defense (DOD) witnesses on combat vehicle active protection systems (APS), systems designed to protect ground

combat vehicles from threats like rocket propelled grenades (RPGs)

and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). This capability has been described to me as a mini missile defense systems. Only instead of

a system with 20-to–30 minute timelines, a system with 2-second

to 3-second timelines and once armed is without the man-in-theloop.

Also, because of the proximity of engagements to the defending

vehicle, there are associated potential collateral damage considerations. So achieving this capability is not without significant conceptual, technical, and tactical challenges.

In April 2005, Central Command (CENTCOM) validated a Joint

Urgent Operational Needs Statement request from our forces in

Iraq for a capability that included a requirement for a fully automated, active protection system against rocket propelled grenades

and anti-tank missiles. Initially, the tasking for the Central Command request was assigned by the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell

(JRAC) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the Office

of Force Transformation (OFT) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

After conducting a market survey of active protective systems

that offered the promise of providing near-term capability, the Office of Force Transformation and other agencies to include the

Army, determined that a system called TROPHY developed by an

Israeli company offered the most promise of providing the required

capability. After preliminary testing, the Office of Force Transformation estimated that the TROPHY system could be fielded onto

one demonstrator vehicle in the first half of 2007.

2

However, the Army and OSD’s Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell recommended against continuing testing of TROPHY because of technical and collateral damage issues, and that the Central Command

urgent requirement could not be met until at the earliest, the 2011

fielding of the active protection system being developed for the

Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program.

So we have a situation where Central Command has validated

an urgent requirement for an active protection system. The Office

of Force Transformation indicates that a system could be fielded in

the first half of next year, 2007. Yet the Office of the Secretary of

Defense has decided to not field a capability until 2011 at the earliest. We would like to understand what factors went into this decision.

Further complicated a public understanding of the facts in the effort to develop and field a system that could protect our personnel

was a recent evening news segment. This segment implied to the

mothers and fathers of America that U.S. officials are not doing everything they can to give their sons and daughters the best possible equipment for the war on terrorism. I don’t know about our

witnesses, but I know that it doesn’t apply to me, and I am confident they believe it doesn’t apply to them.

The news segment in question further implied and quoted an

unnamed official as saying that an active protection system is

‘‘ready today.’’ that can be put on U.S. combat vehicles in Iraq.

Well, if that is the case, I want to know where that system is. The

segment also interviewed a distraught mother who had lost her son

and implied that if only the Army had not blocked the TROPHY

active protection system, her son would be alive today.

It further went on to infer that if the Army had not blocked this

system, 132 lives that were lost might not have been lost. When

in actuality, the reported facts are that even if this system had

been deployed in Iraq on all the vehicles for which it was designed,

122 of the 132 would still have been killed. Now, a loss of one service member is unacceptable and one too many. But implying that

132 would have been saved is just factually incorrect and outrageous.

This segment goes on to say that the Israeli military, based on

its recent experience in Lebanon, is ‘‘rushing to deploy TROPHY.’’

yet the best available information we have been able to get indicates that the Israelis had originally planned to do an operational

assessment of the TROPHY system in 2007, but are now in discussions to attempt to accelerate this plan. We are all entitled to our

own views, but I don’t call this type of reporting responsible journalism. This is journalism that plays on people’s deep emotions,

strings unrelated facts together which leads to false conclusions

and with an unknown intent.

Now we invited their news media, including their anchor, to

come to this hearing because if they have a story to tell, let them

tell it where we can ask questions as opposed to 30 or 60 second

sound bites, and of course, the media which proclaims to want to

have all the open information and all the facts would not send their

person, even the producer, to come before this committee, which I

find highly offensive.

3

If you are going to make a claim to the American people, then

have the intestinal fortitude to defend your position in front of the

Members of Congress who are responsible for implementing these

systems. And if you don’t, in my opinion, you have no integrity as

a media source.

Now I will tell you what I really think when you get here in person. In addition, the Army has not always been clear in responding

to the public and Congress and has provided contradictory information on its active protection systems program. So I am not going

to be a rubber stamp for any service. In an information paper dated

June 13 responding to a query from our committee, the Army stated in one place that the TROPHY system could be deployed as

early as the end of 2006 on Israeli vehicles, but further on in the

response, indicated it was on a similar developmental timeline as

the only other U.S. active protection system in development scheduled for fielding in 2011.

Similarly, explanations regarding the selection of the contractor

for the Future Combat Systems active protection program are unclear as to what the contractor was selected to do. This has led to

media accusations that the Army cooked their books in the selection of the contractor. We intend to ask the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to determine the facts in the source selection.

Contrary to information provided in witness statements, we are not

aware of any funded program for an active protection system for

current systems like the M 1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles or

Stryker vehicles in the Army or Marine Corps budgets.

We look forward to hearing the specifics of these purported programs. Some of the major issues we need to address are number

one, does the current threat to our combat vehicles require an active protection system for these vehicles? Number two, does an effective acceptable active protection exist to equip those vehicles?

And when can it be fielded?

Number three, is the investment required to equip those vehicles

with an active protection system warranted relative to all of our

other requirements? I have additional questions about tests that

the Army may or may not have attended about what the process

was to determine which eventual course of action we take, and if

we do have a short-term capability, why in the world aren’t we implementing it while we pursue a longer term capability?

Those are questions that this committee wants to get to the bottom of. Again, given the urgent action request from Central Command for our forces in Iraq, the subcommittee hopes to understand

why the Office of the Secretary of Defense has declined to pursue

an interim active system capability. With the earliest possible projected fueling of an active system being 2011.

Before we introduce the witnesses for their opening remarks, I

would like to recognize my good friend from Hawaii, the ranking

member, Mr. Abercrombie.

STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, RANKING MEMBER, TACTICAL AIR AND

LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, ordinarily, you are aware that I seldom make a formal statement at

4

this point and submit it for the record, but in this instance with

your permission, I would like to speak more formally.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I am correct in making the claim that

there may be other committees that have as good a record as this

committee does of focussing on testing and proving systems, not

just in the military sense, but in any process that the Congress approves of legislatively with regard to any issue that might come before us of a legitimate legislative nature, but there cannot be any

committee in this Congress that pursues more assiduously the

question of testing, the question of viability with regard to any activity that is legislatively mandated by us or any of those committees to advance the interests of the American people.

More particularly in this instance, where the Armed Services

Committee is concerned, no committee or subcommittee pursues

the issue of adequate testing in order to make certain that where

the life and death of American servicemen and women is at stake,

that any equipment that is provided to them has the best possible

foundation. I think I can state that without reservation.

To my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, certainly as far as me being

your ranking member is concerned, we were not contacted. The

staff associated both with my office personally and the staff assigned by the committee certainly were never given the opportunity

to inform me that such a proposal was underway by the media.

Now, I don’t know, Mr. Chairman, you said I see this camera over

here, I don’t know where it is from, but I don’t see anybody named

Brian Williams or Lisa Myers or any producers or anybody like

that around here. I know Mr. Williams gets paid a good deal of

money to pontificate daily on the air and presumably has some

shred of integrity that would require him to have some kind of investigation as to what he is putting forward for public consumption, or has some basis, in fact.

Now the subject of this hearing is a critical one. How does our

military select and develop weapon systems that help protect the

lives of our troops in combat? Is that a fair assessment? I think so.

Such a process should get the troops what they need, be open to

new ideas and be willing to try unorthodox approaches. This committee has been a leader in that respect.

However, the process through which we give our troops equipment also has to be thorough. I need only cite our work on the

Presidential helicopter as the most recent example. It would be

tragic if an effort to protect our troops ended up instead actually

putting them in greater risk, what this committee wants from the

DOD and the military is a system that is both open to new ideas

and timely, but also rigorous in vetting technologies before they go

into battle.

That is a difficult balance to strike, but finding that balance is

essential. The issues in question in today’s hearing are very complicated, both from a technical and a military operational standpoint. active protection systems ‘‘for vehicles are a daunting technical challenge.’’ I have an idea that that—that the witnesses today

are going to verify what I am saying. The systems have to be completely automated due to the short reaction time available to shoot

down an incoming missile or rocket-propelled grenade. I want to

keep trying to read through this without getting upset about this.

5

Every committee in this Congress is important. Every subject

matter of every committee is important, but this is the only committee that deals with life and death issues in virtually everything

we do and every vote we take, the consequences can result in somebody losing their life or their limbs. It is not an abstraction, it is

not an academic discussion, it is not a matter of political punditry

so you could score points on somebody. This committee takes very,

very seriously issues of life and death. I am going to repeat, the

systems have to be completely automated due to the short reaction

time available to shoot down an incoming missile or rocket-propelled grenade.

It isn’t done with sound bites on television. They have to be safe

enough to use in real combat environments, not just in a testing

range. This committee does not make votes using the men and

women in our Armed Services as lead goats or as fodder for tests

in order to satisfy television. For example, a protective system that

indeed protects the vehicle but kills all the American troops standing beside it may not exactly be the ideal choice. At a minimum,

the complexity of the issues involved at today’s hearing suggest serious testing and military judgment must be applied to this problem before the military moves forward.

The NBC story broadcast a few weeks ago that led to today’s

hearing raised many issues about how the Army decided to proceed

with the development of an active protection system and what kind

of threats our troops face in Iraq or may face in the future elsewhere. The NBC story alleged the following—this is—I realize, Mr.

Chairman, you elucidated your view, but I would like to do mine.

That the Army chose to pursue its own active protecting systems

from Raytheon rather than buying an Israeli system called TROPHY. That the Army overruled others in the Pentagon who wanted

to test the Israeli system in Iraq on select U.S. vehicles, that the

Army rejected the Israeli system due to its ties to Raytheon, a U.S.

defense company, that the Army rejected the Israeli system because it could threaten funding for the Future Combat System,

which includes the Raytheon Active Protection System project.

Parenthetically Mr. Chairman, the Army probably feels that the

biggest threat to the Future Combat System is you and I and the

members of this committee, because if anybody has taken the Future Combat System through its paces, it is this subcommittee.

Since the report came out, a number of additional facts have

emerged. In my judgment the Israeli TROPHY protection system

is not ready to deploy today. It is, at best, an advanced prototype

and does not counter roadside bombs, which is the main threat to

U.S. vehicles in Iraq. And the main thing—I see Mr. Simmons

there at the end of the row, the main thing that we went to Iraq

to investigate on a bipartisan basis having nothing to do with

Raytheon or Democrats or Republicans or the Future Combat System. The TROPHY system essentially uses small shotgun shelltype projectiles to shoot down incoming threats. I am not sure that

Lisa Myers has the first clue as to what that is all about, let alone

Brian Williams. He is too busy being made up.

However, these shells can cause considerable injury to nearby

dismounted troops and/or civilians. So the utility of the system in

the war in Iraq that features lots of both friendly infantry near

6

U.S. vehicles and civilians is questionable. This is urban warfare.

The Army contends that the project its working on for active protection will produce a more effective system that is more relevant

to addressing the threats to U.S. vehicles in Iraq, and that I believe

is what the goal and purpose of the Army investigation and testing—the weapons testing program is all about.

Finally, the Army contends that the process it went through and

analyzed various active protection systems was open and followed

all appropriate regulations and guidelines. That is what this subcommittee investigates regularly. So the goal of today’s hearing is

to lay all the facts on the table so this committee can decide what

further steps are needed.

I will tell you this, that Ms. Myers and Mr. Williams should be

ashamed of themselves. Now, that may be very hard for self-important media types in this country who never reflect on themselves

except by way of self-congratulation, they should be ashamed of

themselves, they should be ashamed they are not here today because they had played fast and loose with the emotions of people

whose sons and daughters, whose wives and husbands have been

put at risk, or worse, in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is about time that

they show a little responsibility to go along with the glory. Thank

you.

Mr. WELDON. As usual, it is great to have you as my ranking

member, Mr. Abercrombie, because you display the kind of sentiment that I think best reflects what this Congress is all about. We

just want the truth. That is all. We want to know what the truth

is. We want to know what the facts are. And we are willing to take

them on, either side. I will show them no favoritism in this hearing. I will be as aggressive with the Army as those who propose

other alternatives. We want the best for our troops, and we will

pay for it.

This committee has put dollar after dollar on the table above the

amount requested by the White House and the Pentagon to buy

equipment that is needed immediately, and we want to put the

best capability in the field immediately. But to have a sensationalist news account come out that plays on the emotions of people that

have been traumatized by the loss of their loved ones is just, to me,

unacceptable. And I wish that NBC would have come in here today.

I wish they would have taken the same approach to an open hearing of the Congress the same way they purport to want the facts

in their news accounts.

They claim to confess to want to know what the real story is.

Well, here we are, NBC. Where are you? Are you here? Are you

hiding behind some wall or are you on the cool camera looking from

the outside? Well, maybe it seems like Neil and I are being a little

too aggressive, but we are sick of this. We went through this with

The New York Times when they put on the front page of The New

York Times a depiction of our soldiers showing the enemy where

the most vulnerable spot is to kill one of our soldiers based on the

equipment we provide for them. And in spite of our military generals saying, please don’t use that, The New York Times ran the

story on the front page. Well, you know the media has to be held

accountable.

7

The media likes to hold us accountable and none of us back away

from that. When is it time to hold the nameless faceless bureaucrats, the producers, the behind-the-scenes people who hold the

bombs, when is it time to hold them accountable? I think it starts

today. We have with us three expert witnesses that have been directly involved with active protection systems. Representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense is the director of the Joint Rapid

Acquisition Cell, Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl. Is that correct?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. Buhrkuhl, sir.

Mr. WELDON. Buhrkuhl. Thank you. Representing the Army is

Major General Jeff Sorenson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the

Army For Acquisition and Systems Management. And Assistant Director for the Office of Force Transformation, Mr. Lloyd Feldman.

We thank you all for being here. NBC News, I will repeat, declined

our invitation to be represented here today. I guess democracy just

doesn’t work both ways with the media.

Without objection, all of our witnesses’ prepared testimony will

be included in the hearing record. And Doctor, we would thank you

for your service and ask you to start off, make whatever comments

you would like to make, and then we will go to questions following

the statements by all three of you.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT L. BUHRKUHL, DIRECTOR, JOINT

RAPID ACQUISITION CELL, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

Dr. BUHRKUHL. Thank you, sir. Chairman Weldon, Congressman

Abercrombie, other distinguished members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to appear today before the subcommittee to discuss the concerns expressed over delaying the integration of the Israeli active protection system named TROPHY onto

the Full Spectrum Effects Platform called FSEP. As a director of

the Department’s Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, also called the

JRAC, I am responsible for facilitating the Department’s response

to the immediate warfighting needs that are submitted by the combatant commanders.

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell provides a single pointed of contact in the Department for facilitating solutions to address these

urgent needs. We focus on near-term material solutions typically

involving existing off-the-shelf capabilities that can satisfy to some

degree the urgent needs of the combatant commanders. On April

19, 2005, the United States Central Command submitted a Joint

Urgent Operational Needs Statement for a capability that included

a suite of scalable nonlethal and lethal capabilities mounted onto

a Stryker infantry carrier vehicle. The suite of weapons would conceptually provide the warfighter with a full spectrum of components to conduct force protection missions, route reconnaissance,

crowd control, raids and point defense all in an effort to save lives

and reduce collateral damage. The Central Command’s concept included a component for a fully automated active protection system

to counter rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles. This

component subsystem was the TROPHY active protection system

and was to be used on the Stryker vehicles in lieu of the slat

armor. Slat armor forms a metal cage around the vehicle and detoVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:40 Sep 19, 2007 Jkt 033593 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-126\264250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
8

nates rocket-propelled grenades before they can penetrate the vehicle itself. On April 28, 2005, after evaluating the Central Command’s request, the joint staff supported the need but stated that

the proposed FSEP solution with all of its subsystems was

unachievable in the near term, which is a requirement for taking

action to resolve an immediate warfighter need. Subsequently, the

Office of Force Transformation working with Army officials and the

Naval Surface Warfare Center planned a more thorough and accelerated schedule for integrating the subsystems onto the FSEP vehicle and presented their proposal to the JRAC on September 19,

2005.

Based on the JRAC’s recommendation in January 2006, the Dep- uty Secretary of Defense approved the use of $31.3 million for the

Army to proceed with Spiral 1 Development of FSEP. In May of

this year, however, the Army——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, Dr. Buhrkuhl. Would you just explain for the record what you mean by that kind of development?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. Sir, we in the JRAC do not focus on development.

What we try to do is take off-the-shelf technologies that are available. The nearest we would get to development would be the integration of those components on a single platform.

In May of this year, however, the Army program manager identified potential delays in delivering Spiral 1 capabilities, specifically,

the active protection subsystem TROPHY displayed technical development and performance risks, which ultimately led to the decision to delay the integration of this capability onto FSEP Spiral 1

Strykers. During my deliberations, I consulted with numerous

stakeholders that included the joint staff, the commander Army

Test and Evaluation Command, the Office of the Director for Operational Tests and Evaluation, the Director of Capabilities developments, U.S. Army capability’s integration center and representatives from the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the Office of

Force Transformation, all of whom expressed their opinions regarding the availability and the readiness of the TROPHY active protection subsystem.

The majority of the stakeholders believes that the TROPHY, because of technological inventory and qualification testing requirements, would not meet the overall FSEP schedule and that it was

desired by the combatant commander. I then presented the pertinent facts to CENTCOM and asked that they request that the request be revalidated. In doing so, I specifically raised the issues

about the potential cost and schedule impacts of the active protection subsystem on the overall FSEP program. On May 16, 2006,

Central Command responded that they are proceeding with Spiral

1 with the already available lethal and nonlethal capabilities and

using slat armor for vehicle and crew protection instead of the

TROPHY subsystem was the preferred option.

Slat armor is used today, has proven itself in combat conditions

and according to the Army is very effective against rocket-propelled

grenades. Based on these consultations, I validated the Army program’s manager’s decision to integrate the active protection subsystem capability in a later spiral of the FSEP program.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the acquisition community is committed to the safety of our warfighters and in ensuring that they have

9

the best protection and weapons systems available. Thank you for

the opportunity to testify today and I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Buhrkuhl can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JEFFREY SORENSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY) FOR ACQUISITION AND SYSTEMS

MANAGEMENT

General SORENSON. Congressman Weldon—Chairman Weldon,

excuse me, and Congressman Abercrombie, distinguished members

of the House Armed Services Subcommittee, I would like to express

my appreciation for this opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the Army’s continued effort to improve the force protection capabilities of our soldiers, specifically combat vehicle active

protection systems, otherwise known as APS. Although I have already submitted testimony for the record, I would like to make

some brief opening remarks. I want to be absolutely sure that you

understand the Army is committed to making sure our soldiers

have the best force protection capability and active protection systems available. However, the systems we provide our soldiers must

meet the current threat and they must be proven, tested and validated. We will not give our soldiers a false sense of security by

fielding systems that are not rigorously tested in an operational environment. Every soldier is important, and every loss of life is tragic. The Army has taken significant steps to counter the rocket-propelled grenade, otherwise known as RPG, threats for many years

and will continue to modernize our force protection capabilities for

future threats. The RPG threat to our combat systems is considerably less than what has recently been reported in the press. I have

provided some, if you will, unclassified data which I will go through

in questions later on to address that specific issue, but in fact, the

main threat to our forces is Improvised Explosive Devices (IED),

specifically to those in our wheeled vehicle fleet. To date, the Army

has fielded 950 sets of Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles, 1,097 sets of

M113 Slat Armor Kits and two brigades sets of Stryker Slat Armor

Kits.

In addition, the first sets of Stryker Reactive Armor Tiles will be

available for fielding this October and the first set of the Abrams

Reactive Armor Tiles will be available for fielding to theater in

June. The reactive armor and slat armor protection systems currently deployed contribute greatly to the effectiveness of our current forces, specifically our combat systems, the Stryker, the

Abrams and the Bradley to defeat RPG threats without use of an

active protection system. Currently the Army through the Future

Combat System program is diligently proceeding on a path to obtain the best single short range APS for current force systems

while they are developing a parallel path to ensure that the common full-spectrum capability hit avoidance subsystem for the future combat system man ground vehicles.

The full spectrum solution is to counter both short and long

range threats and to provide a 360 degree hemispherical bubble of

protection. Contrary to news media reports, the Lead System Integrator (LSI), that is Boeing and SAIC and the government conVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:40 Sep 19, 2007 Jkt 033593 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-126\264250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
10

ducted the source selection for the subcontract award for the APS

system. Raytheon did not participate in the source selection. The

LSI, with complete government participation and concurrence, selected Raytheon.

The Army further maintains that no contract improprieties occurred during the source selection process. The reference to the

Raytheon participation in the trade study process was reported incorrectly and was aired by the media. The terms of the APS subcontract award to Raytheon, they were to conduct a technical trade

study as stipulated in their contract. Their participation in the

trade study was proper and consistent within the context of the

subcontract award requirements. And that the purpose of the engineering trade study was to determine the best short range APS integrate system architecture that would meet the integration requirements for both current force active protection requirements

consistent with an established growth path to the Future Combat

System manned ground vehicles. There are a number of U.S. and

foreign-based active protection systems under development. However, none of these APS systems can be integrated today into our

combat systems.

The Army considers TROPHY an engineering prototype and does

not consider the system operationally validated for fielding to the

current force. Challenges exist in developing, integrating and fielding APS systems, such as minimizing collateral damage to the soldiers and the noncombatants while ensuring the right for self-defense.

In conclusion, the Army is absolutely committed to providing our

soldiers with the best force protection capability available. However, the Army will not procure and field any system that is not

proven, not tested adequately, and not validated to be operationally

ready and safe. The Army finds the recent news reports to our approach to procuring an APS capability biased, unfair and truly disheartening. Thank you, and I will look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Sorenson can be found in the

Appendix on page 39.]

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Feldman, thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF LLOYD FELDMAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FORCE TRANSFORMATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. FELDMAN. Chairman Weldon, Congressman Abercrombie,

members of the subcommittee, I am honored to address the subcommittee, and I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss the Office of Force Transformation’s innovative work on Project Sheriff

which became FSEP and its demonstration to the TROPHY active

protection system. I have included, as part of my written testimony, four addendums that include the chronology of the relevant

events related to the initiative to process analysis and rationale

that led to the selection of the TROPHY system and how the TROPHY system was integrated into a Stryker vehicle provided by the

U.S. Army for the Sheriff FSEP Program and relevant testing information and results.

The United States military finds itself today engaged in a long

war against multiple types of terrorist cells and other malignant

11

nonstate actors whose organizations are amorphous and ever

changing. Confronting this threat requires shedding long-held assumptions regarding our preferred methods of warfare and how our

forces go about finding, tracking and targeting an elusive enemy

who hides among civilian populations and exhibits no moral inhibitions to sacrificing innocents to achieve their aims.

Confronting this enemy requires waging a war against individuals. Successfully fighting the type of war requires a willingness to

embrace new types of capabilities, vastly different tactics and new

ways of developing capabilities relevant for this fight. That is, in

part, what the Office of Force Transformation was established to

do for the Department of Defense. The Office serves as an internal

catalyst for change. It champions those types of concept technology

pairings that are potential game changers in terms of how their future use will fundamentally alter battlefields of tomorrow.

OFT operates at the intersection of nonarticulated needs and

nonconsensual change. In plain speak, we do things that perhaps

a Title 10 agency might not be ready to do or want to do, and they

are, in fact, are chartered to do to be against the flow. As a result,

the Office has a wide field of maneuver, a sanctuary where new

ideas and innovations can be experimented with outside the restricted confines of established requirements in the world of acquisition. We generate new knowledge and create unique experimental

articles for use in the combatant commands, the warfighters, to enable an alternative path for the Department to address future

needs. Requirements in the context of the Office of Force Transformation are, in some ways, a term of art, and we choose to address needs and opportunities which have not been established

working in advance of requirements.

One method that OFT uses to speed the creation of new knowledge across the force is through the idea of concept technology pairing. The objective is to operate in advance of requirements. These

initiatives should not be considered programs. They are far removed from the normal acquisition process and in some cases, the

rigor the intent is the early exploration through experimentation,

operational experimentation with surrogate technologies or early

applications around the loosely-defined concept tied to recognized

gaps and current capabilities.

In this case, complex urban operations in difficult to discriminate

scenarios where people not wearing uniforms embedded oftentimes

in human defilade need to be discriminated while providing survival to the forces so that we don’t kill the Italian journalist and

we don’t have to die while attempting not to do it.

To date, the Office of Force Transformation has launched concept

technology pairings in the areas of operationally responsive space,

Project Sheriff, Redirected Energy, Stiletto/Wolfpac and Sense and

Respond Logistics.

Concept-technology pairing is to provide the first rung in the ladder that gets us to the future that we want to achieve and develop

operational dexterity, conceptual learning with the forces. These

pairings are not expected to be 100 percent effective, and we should

not be surprised if some of them fail. The product here is learning

in conjunction with the real capabilities developed for the forces,

addressing warfighter needs. New knowledge can best be advanced

12

through a process of trial and error, exploring the limits in ways

acquisition programs are sometimes not able to do, but where the

pairings approach differs from the departmental efforts like Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) is one of intent.

ACTDs are expected to enter into production at the completion

of their 3-year phase and as such, a premium is placed on finding

and selecting the ACTDs only from those candidates that offer a

near-term promise of being produced and procured. The result is a

collection of relatively well appreciated and understood technologies and not those more on the cutting edge of innovation. The

output from our concept technology pairing initiatives however, is

new knowledge that, in turn, leads quickly into another more refined version of the concept, successive iterations of the concept, in

essence, bring that concept forward and allow warfighters to use

and shape new term opportunities for concepts like Sheriff FSEP

that were previously relegated to an ill-defined future.

By getting these capabilities into the hands of warfighters early

and allowing them to experiment and exploring with successive

iterations of the capabilities allows for the rapid coevolution of tactics concepts and leads to a level of operational dexterity that promotes innovation among the forces. It is the information age way

of getting to an understanding of how you would use things before

they are, in fact, laid in concrete, like riding a bicycle. It is not

about the bike. It is about what you are going to learn to do, and

eventually the Tour de France winning bike will come to Lance

Armstrong, the newspaper boy bike to somebody else, and we will

be able to work that out.

Project Sheriff and the follow on Wolfpack Platoon Project are

the Office of Force Transformation initiatives that pair leading

edge operational concepts for complex irregular warfare with stateof-the-art enabling technology. The Project Sheriff initiative was

started in 2004 and addressed urgent warfighter needs to integrate

the sensors, lethal and nonlethal weapons and force protection.

It is designed to rapidly and iteratively experiment with pioneering tactics and technology through a close interaction between innovative warriors and a supporting community of industry, government laboratories and universities. These rapidly executed experiments are designed to create and test an integrated prototype no

more than 18 months that fits into an overarching operational construct to create a low-cost experimental venue where warfighters

and supporting science and technology community and a cell closely cooperate and complement and inform the more deliberate acquisition process by identifying warfighter needs and experimenting

with potential technological solutions, tactics, procedures, policies,

employment of nonlethal and autonomous systems.

The ultimate goal is to be a catalyst for meeting the emerging

needs of ground battle in irregular warfare, counterinsurgency and

security and stabilization operations. The project also specifically

addressed U.S. Central Command’s urgent needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. These needs were formally expressed in a time-critical

Joint Operational Needs Statement developed by Multi-National

Corps Iraq, and endorsed by Central Command in 2005 for capabilities to be provided by the Sheriff Project. Project Sheriff and the

13

new follow-on Wolfpack Platoon Project being proposed and defined

in cooperation with the Marines are designed to specifically address

the compressed strategic and operational and tactical levels of war

and intelligence; the problem of identifying combatants intermixed

with noncombatants; the need for in-depth situational awareness;

the blurred distinction between combat and police actions; the requirement for multiple levels of graduated response and precise

target discrimination; the opportunity for increased command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, C4ISR, to create tactical options against a distributed threat and to move it to the lowest level possible; the digital,

organizational and intelligence divide found between tactical units

at the edge of battle and the technology enabled higher headquarters which have a different set of tools, and drive it down lowest; and the increased threat of improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank guided munitions, snipers, and

small arms ambushes.

To meet this new highly dynamic and evolving threat to American forces, Project Sheriff’s goals were experiment with innovative

concepts of operation, tactics, technologies and procedures that

would both inform and be informed by potential technology

enablers; integrate commercial off the shelf from mature technologies into complementary combined arms solutions mounted on

a light armored vehicle under compressed timelines; combine nonlethal directed energy, high power millimeter wave, high power

white light, laser glare aversion for optical denial, long range

acoustic device—with sensor enabled active protection, lethal response, and electronic warfare; develop the synergistic, combined

arms employment of lethal kinetic energy and nonlethal directed

energy weapons in compartmented urban terrain; and combine active protection, lethal gunfire and electronic warfare to meet the

threat of RPGs, snipers, and IEDs; serve as an active denial technology proof-of-concept in anticipation of fielding longer-range,

more capable directed energy technologies; and to test rapidly and

rigorously but not exhaustively in an operationally realistic environment prior to deployment to get an initial level of assessment

for safety, utility and advantage; and to complete required bio-effects research, legal, and policy reviews prior to deployment; and

increase the learning and inform the acquisition programs and

minimal expense, informing requirements with empirical data on

what can be done, abated tests for military forces which is required

in the information age.

The active protection system is one component of the FSEP sheriff vehicle that we put together at that point in time. It is an important one but it is one component of a suite that was designed

to provide congruent ability to do advanced sensing with new sensors, to use countermeasures, to spoil shots visual acuity and dexterity to engage our forces and provide survival and then to do

weapons systems with a congruent field of view, the idea of getting

to a rear stack instead of a trigger for our forces that would minimize the engagement timeline and get to self-targeting so that adversaries who engaged our forces would not get a fast successful

shot, and at the time they were doing that, we would, in fact, be

14

able to progress through our own timeline of engagement with

these particular tools.

As I say, active protection system is one component to this combined arms approach that aims to fundamentally enhance capabilities for ground battle in complex urban environments. In addition

to IEDs, RPGs and an increasingly sophisticated and prevalent

threat in irregular warfare, and an active protection system enables light armored vehicles to survive a first shot from a hidden

enemy while the TROPHY active protection system was selected as

the most promising near-term capability for experimental assessment based on government laboratory evaluation. Initial U.S. defense laboratory testing of TROPHY began this year. The ongoing

Wolfpack Platoon Project will continue a testing program that

builds on these initial successful tests and that validates extensive

Israeli testing in U.S. industry evaluations. The aim of this testing

program is to evaluate near-term active protection technology to

rapidly meet immediate warfighting needs; determine how APS fits

into a combined arms approach to the RPG, IEG, sniper and small

arms ambush threat; and conduct experiments led by warfighters

to advance operating concepts and refine needs that will inform the

development of any active protective system.

My testimony does not address the issue of the deliberations that

led to the removal of the active protection system from FSEP, as

the Office of Force Transformation is not a member of the Joint

Rapid Acquisition Cell. Representatives from the Office of Force

Transformation were invited to numerous meetings with Dr.

Buhrkuhl and the JRAC, and we presented our views in the course

of these discussions.

I thank the committee for its interest in Office of Force Transformation’s Sheriff and follow-on efforts and the continued support

for the department-wide transformation. I look forward to providing more detail to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldman can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

Mr. WELDON. Thank you for your statements, and thank you for

your service to the country. And there will be no five-minute rule.

So I will give the members all a chance to ask as much questions

as they want, and we will eventually ask for unanimous consent to

allow our good friend and colleague to join us in asking questions

today. Dr. Buhrkuhl, I would want to focus on, first of all, a couple

of questions to you. In your prepared statement, you indicate that

Central Command’s requirement was for a fully automated active

protection system against rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank

missiles. Our reading of the requirement also dated April 19, 2005,

that you reference indicates that the requirement was for ‘‘an improved active protection capability against rocket-propelled grenades.’’ would you please clarify what Central Command’s request

was for?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. Yes, sir. Central command’s request was, as you

stated, for an improved active protection capability against RPGs.

What was briefed to us was the Full Spectrum Effects Weapon System (F–SEWS). This program called FSEP now was in Sheriff in

F–SEWs and FSEP. The name kept changing. And the F–SEWS,

15

inherent in that was the TROPHY’s subsystem where we were

briefed on the joint urgent operational need.

Mr. WELDON. When the decision was made to proceed with the

Full Spectrum Effects Platform without the TROPHY system, what

was the estimate of the Office of Force Transformation’s fielding

need based on continued required testing?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. I am not sure on the Office of Force Transformation. I don’t recall their date. I can tell you, we had estimates

from 6 to 14 fields to field it from the testing community, whether

it was the Army Test and Evaluation Command or the OFT operational testing.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Feldman, would you like to respond to that?

Mr. FELDMAN. My recollection at this time——

Mr. WELDON. Could you pull the mike closer?

Mr. FELDMAN. My recollection at this time was that we felt that

we could have the testing completed and fielding by September

2007.

Mr. WELDON. September of 2007.

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELDON. The Office of Force Transformation had indicated

a readiness for fielding of the TROPHY system in 2007, the estimated fielding date for the this system associated with FCS is

2011. A decision was made to not proceed with the TROPHY system. What was the decision based on?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. The decision for us for FSEP—and remember we

are looking—we were looking at a full package program was what

the user required, was to meet a national training center date of

the end of February to be able to deploy for an operational assessment the end of July.

So the time frame didn’t fit, waiting on the TROPHY to fit into

that timeline. We also consulted and looked at the slat armor as

an alternative, and since it seems to be very effective against

RPGs, we felt like that provided the effectiveness against that danger for warfighters.

Therefore, we, as we normally do or sometimes do in the JRAC

provide the warfighter with a 95 percent solution now in the near

term, now, we didn’t disapprove, obviously, a Spiral update later,

but for now, to meet the immediate needs, we felt like we had to

move forward.

Mr. WELDON. Well, that is one I am sure my colleagues are going

to want to explore further. It is hard for me to understand. I understand that you are saying that you had alternative proposals and

technologies that, in fact, you felt would meet the threat, but I still

want to further explore in the committee the reasons why we didn’t

aggressively pursue a short-term varient if, in fact, that was, in the

opinion of the Army, possible.

In your statement, you indicate you made a statement in May of

this year to validate the Army program manager’s decision, integrate the active protection capability and subsequent development.

Is there an ongoing testing to field this capability? If so, what is

your estimated date of fielding of the capability?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. Sir, there is an ongoing effort between the Naval

Warfare Center, the Army Program Manager (PM). The first priority though is to get the three Strykers prepared and ready to go

16

to theater in July. They are focused on that. I am not sure what

they are doing as far as continual testing of the TROPHY.

Mr. WELDON. What is your experience with the status of

CENTCOM? Urgent action needs statements, how many have come

through your office and how many have been deferred?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. I can’t remember an exact amount. We deferred

for probably two or three, and we have addressed about $250 million worth of needs over the last two years.

Mr. WELDON. The point that we want to reinforce is this committee has been wanting to take the lead in providing whatever additional funding has been necessary. We did that back when the

President was running for re-election and Secretary Wolfowitz

didn’t want us to talk about a supplemental.

This committee stood up as Democrats and Republicans and de- manded that we put an additional $25 billion on the table because

the Army’s request for its budget for that year was actually a requested decrease while we had $6 billion of unfunded requirements

not being met.

So there should not be a question of dollars. We want—what is

the ultimate fact that this committee stands behind is, we do not

want to have an additional soldier, marine, sailor, corps man killed

if there is a way for us to avoid that, and cost should never be an

issue. So there should never be an issue of the expense necessary

to put an acceptable technology into the field. Now, granted, as

Neil pointed out very precisely, we want the testing, we want to

make sure there is not collateral damage. We want to make sure

that we are testing it before we go into—but as soon as possible,

we want deployment so that we can protect the soldiers.

Let me ask you a couple of specific questions just for the record;

maybe, General, you would be the best to answer this, or I don’t

know who.

Last year, the Army planned a test competing RPG defense systems in a shoot-off rodeo, and this competition was cancelled, I understand, by the Army, supposedly in part due to cost. Now, my

understanding is that contractors usually pay the costs of such

tests. There was speculation that the Army cancelled the tests because the Raytheon system was not yet ready. So for the record,

would you comment on that, please?

General SORENSON. Yes, Chairman. I would say from my understanding, certainly cost was not the overriding factor. I think the

issue was in order to make an assessment of what we would be

doing for active protection systems for not only the future force, but

also the current force, that it was best to be done in a source selection process as opposed to somebody who might have a capability

show up, and we not take a look at others that in many cases could

be in development and available.

So the decision was made at that point, rather than just kind of

doing the rodeo where maybe a few people show up, but really canvass industry, canvass foreign industry to find out potentially in a

time frame what actually could we find——

Mr. WELDON. How long would that take?

General SORENSON. I am sorry?

Mr. WELDON. How long would that take to do that canvassing?

General SORENSON. The selection?

17

Mr. WELDON. For the systems.

General SORENSON. Again, as we walk through this, we basically

put out a Request for Proposal (RFP) back out in 2005 with respect

to having an APS developer. The contract was awarded to

Raytheon here in March. A trace study was done subsequent to

that and looked at 20 different systems. The systems were analyzed in terms of their capabilities based upon data that had already been evaluated by our Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), as well as other commands within, if

you will, the Tank Automotive Command, TARDEC, et cetera. And

that particular study was basically done within a matter of about

three or four days in terms of trying to assess what additional systems could potentially be put in to current force and future force

activity.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for just a moment?

Mr. WELDON. Certainly.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Just so we get clear, because a lot of the technical expressions that you have made in the course to the testimony here I think members of the committee understand pretty

clear, but maybe not everybody in the public has a grip on it. Let

me just see if I understand what you said so far—and I have this

clear, particularly in the light of the document that we have had

a chance to look at here.

Now isn’t it a fact, isn’t it a clear fact of the matter that very

few deaths—rather, let me restate that—most deaths come from

small-arms fire or roadside bombs, and that the RPG and missile

fire account for the very few? And as a result, there is other protective equipment which you have cited in terms of armor, various

types of armor that help protect against RPGs and missiles already, and effectively so; isn’t that the case?

General SORENSON. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So when you are making the representation

to the Chairman here, part of the time frames and everything else

is based on what you conceive of as being the essential nature of

the kind of protection that you either are providing now or have

to provide.

General SORENSON. Correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. This gives you your 95 versus 100 percent

and so on; in other words, the RPG and missile fire. If you read

the text of the NBC report and imagine it being said, you would

think that the RPG and missile fire is the essential feature of the

deaths and maiming that takes place, and that is not the case, is

it?

General SORENSON. No, it is not. And again, the data that we

have provided here is basically for official use (FOU), it has been

sanitized, it is basically National Ground Intelligence Center

(NGIC) data. It essentially says that 85 percent of attacks with respect to our combat vehicles are from IEDs. And you can see there

we have identified, in terms of percentage, what the killed in action

are from the IEDs.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So for purposes of public information, the context within which you are making the decisions has to be what is

18

the existing danger to the people we are trying to protect and the

vehicles we are trying to equip; isn’t that correct?

General SORENSON. Yes, sir. And if you look——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General SORENSON. If you look at chart two, you can see that the

total RPG attacks in our combat systems is a very small percentage. And even with that small percentage, most of the attacks have

resulted in no damage to those vehicles because of what we put on

those vehicles, whether it is Slat armor, reactive tiles, or whatever;

and you can see right there there is zero killed in action, none.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman.

What I am going to do, because we are scheduled to have votes

at 11:30, I am going to go to the other Members. And I turn now

to Mr. Abercrombie for further questions. Or we will come back;

you and I will get more.

Let’s go to—Mr. Gibbons is next. You are recognized.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here today to help us better

understand these very perplexing issues.

You know, oftentimes in government we tend to let the perfect

get in the way of the good. And many times we have a tendency

to resist fielding technology until we have created the Library of

Congress information on that technology to avoid any risk. And oftentimes we here get a little frustrated with the process, think it

is a little too bureaucratic. Sometimes we would like to see things

happen more quickly than we do.

You know, we need to be risk takers. And I know that is not a

popular idea when we are in a war, but when I look back over the

course of history of things that have been developed during the trying times of war, some systems have proven to be much better that

were instantly created and thrown out there. And I will just give

you the P–51 Mustang during World War II, created in a very

short time frame, became a remarkable aircraft interceptor for the

United States Army Air Corps at the time.

When I look at IED and jamming devices, many times we have

a tendency to want to believe that we can do this technology, but

in order to cover every spectrum of jamming technology, we have

got to have a system as big as this room before we can get something out there to protect the soldiers in some form or some fashion. And I would presume it is in the same tendency that we are

looking at this system here.

Let me ask just a basic question for those of you that are knowledgeable about the Trophy system or the Raytheon APS system.

When you compare the two, how long has the Trophy system been

under development, under the same kind of process as compared

to the Raytheon system? And which one can go into production

today?

General SORENSON. Sir, if I may address that particular piece of

it. I think our understanding, in our working with the Israeli Defense Forces, (IDF) basically the Trophy system has been certainly

under development, I would say, probably for about the last decade.

With respect to the Raytheon system, it has not been under development that long, but in terms of our analysis, in terms of system

19

engineering, we have done some looking at the particular system

here and found out that if you put the Trophy system on our combat systems, it is about 1–1/2 times heavier, it takes up 1–1/2 times

more volume, 10 times the power, and 3 times the integration problems. So it is not just a simple solution.

And as you alluded to earlier, while the particular system itself

might be something of avoiding a kill, there is a whole envelope of

an onion here. We try to avoid the encounter to begin with by improving our situational awareness. We began to avoid, if you will,

the detection of our systems through signature management and

tactics, we began to avoid the acquisition or our targets, another

envelope here of the onion, and then to avoid the hits, and to avoid

the penetration and to avoid the kill.

And we have put improvements with respect to situation awareness, we have put improvements with respect to our current suite

of Slat armor and reactive armor tiles. We put countermeasure systems in terms of other ballistics protection. And that all is being

used right now, as well as our tactics changes, to increase the force

protection capabilities. It is just not a simple, you have got this,

you have got the Klingon cloak, everything is going to be fine; it

is a very complicated capability in terms of force protection.

Mr. GIBBONS. What do we sacrifice if we had put the Trophy system, say, for example, on a few vehicles today, sent them over

there? What are we sacrificing if we did that?

General SORENSON. Sir, it is not that we are sacrificing. Just

from a systems engineering standpoint, if you put it on Stryker

today, which essentially is what it was put on, first of all, the radars are exposed. Those radars can be taken out very easily in a

complex attack by someone shooting a rifle at it and beginning to

destroy the radar; therefore the system becomes ineffective.

If you talk about what this particular system was looked at, it

is going to be in a crowd; it is going to be the tactics, techniques

and procedures (TTP) that you want to make sure it is not basically killing everybody in its—anywhere around there. Can we put

a Trophy system on there that would be effective in doing that?

The answer to that is no. Even the Israelis at this point in time

are struggling to put it onto their Merkava tank; not a Stryker, not

a Humvee, but their tank system.

And so the final integration of this capability is something that

has to be looked at. How does it affect power, how does it affect

weight, how does it affect volume? It is not just something you

hang on and it makes work.

Mr. GIBBONS. So you are saying today we could not adapt the

Trophy system to——

General SORENSON. Absolutely not. In fact, the test report that

we got in from our tester said at best, even with Trophy system,

at best, today if we had the system to get it integrated and get tested and then ultimately get fielded, we are looking at 2008, at best.

And even today, we don’t have the produceable item yet that we

could basically do that with.

Mr. GIBBONS. So the contract with the Raytheon system would

be to address all of these issues, to reduce the amount of power

consumption, to reduce the profile of the radar on the vehicle, to

eliminate the idea that the radar is going to be susceptible to a

20

multiple complex attack, to distinguish that system—to have a system that distinguishes between true and false attacks that are

going to be on that system.

General SORENSON. Yes, indeed. And, in fact, we will have the

capability from the Raytheon system at this point in time in terms

of what we would basically hang on a vehicle in about 2008. After

that, it is the integration into a Stryker—which, oh, by the way,

we thank the committee for having given us money to begin to do

that not only this year in fiscal year 2006, but we have additional

funds in fiscal year 2007 that we are beginning to do the integration work on how we would basically begin to do that into a

Stryker platform, which, quite frankly, would be more vulnerable

than our Abrams and Bradley platforms.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, without having to reinvent the wheel, General, would it be possible to modify the Trophy system to accommodate your concerns and to make those changes in that system that

would more clearly reflect your concerns about power, about exposure, about distinguishing targeting and capability there, and have

that system on line faster than completely doing a Raytheon system from the ground up?

General SORENSON. Sir, at this point in time, in terms of we have

done that analysis, we have done that through our trace studies

and so forth, we have looked at the possibility of doing that, and

at the very best we potentially could save maybe six or seven

months, but that is a potential. And quite frankly, with the other

issues that I talked to with respect to the Trophy system, not the

least of which from the standpoint of providing 360-degree coverage, we have issues. From the standpoint of an autoloader that

is not yet developed, we have issues. From the standpoint of the

fact that it would basically be vulnerable to our one shot, now that

particular side is completely vulnerable to another attack. In other

words, I’m the enemy, I shoot, I basically deploy that system. Now

it has got nothing; I shoot, I kill.

So there are some issues right now with the Trophy system that

would take additional development and integration before we could

even be capable of putting it on our platforms. It is still long-term.

Mr. GIBBONS. General, I want to thank you for your explanations

here today. And I can understand the difficulty. I know that it occurs in every system we produce for our men and women in the

military. And I know there are evolutions of improvements that

start—whether it is body armor, armor for a vehicle, jamming capability for IEDs, and now active protective systems for RPGs or

other missiles coming in our tanks. And I know the difficulties

there. I know the challenges that are ahead of you. I know the

commitment that our men and women out there in your position

are looking at today to make us all safer, and I thank you for that.

Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with your words and

that of Mr. Abercrombie in your opening remarks about the responsibility of this committee, the responsibility of our government to

protect our troops. We grow, we evolve just as the attacks as on

our troops do, and I hope that we are able to find those solutions

quickly so that not another life is risked or lost unnecessarily. But

I can think that these people out here know how difficult it is to

21

send somebody to war, and how much they want to protect those

individuals as well as anybody else. So thank you.

Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas Mr. Conaway is recognized.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one question.

The idea of fratricide, in other words, our dismounted troops

alongside most of these vehicles, right now at this stage the risks

for an RPG or an antitank missile exploding against the side of a

vehicle and the collateral damage for that, is that more or less than

if we blow up that RPG round or that antitank missile away from

that unit? What does that look like from a test standpoint?

General SORENSON. With respect to the reactive—first of all, the

Slat armor is essentially something that is going to just prevent

the capability from basically penetrating. With the reactive armor

tiles, there is a blast effect from the collateral damage, but it is localized. And we have done extensive testing on exactly what that

particular dimension of vulnerability would be with respect to

those reactive armor tiles.

With respect to the Trophy system, or in this case as well with

the Raytheon Quick Kill system, these two issues with respect to

collateral damage are yet to be investigated or fully understood.

But clearly it is going to be a little farther out as opposed to right

against the vehicle, so consequently you are going to put a lot more

people in harm’s way just because of when those explosions are

going to take place.

But again, with the reactive armor tile, it is more or less a blast

issue. When you begin to use a Trophy system or another type of

APS system, you now begin to introduce fragmentation, which becomes a lot more deadly and a lot more lethal.

Mr. CONAWAY. Any one of the three. Part of this hearing was

triggered by the NBC report, maybe the Fox report, whatever, and

you may have covered this in your opening statements, but just in

a free kind of a response, what should we be saying to our constituents back home in response to their concerns raised by obviously

an emotional appeal that went out over that two-night broadcast?

What should our response be?

General SORENSON. Sir, I would say from the Army perspective,

the response is we have provided—again, thanks to this committee

for the funding that we have received—Slat armor, which essentially is Slat tiles on our Stryker systems, two brigade sets’ worth;

950 sets of the Bradley reactive armor; 1,000-plus sets of the reactor armor tiles for the M–113 personnel carriers. Those have found

to be the most effective capabilities.

The proof in the pudding is in this data chart. If you go to chart

two and look at the attacks that have taken place from RPGs and

our combat systems, the current capabilities that we have fielded

have resulted in only minimal damage to our platforms. You can

see that in red with respect to the percentage there, it is a low percentage. In addition, you can see in terms of the killed in action

is basically zero.

So the systems that we currently field have in fact protected our

soldiers today. We are continuing to look at new threats, evolving

threats, and I would contend, based upon our discussions with the

22

Israelis and so forth, that right now what we have postured in

terms of our developments for both short and long range is the

most effective capability that we can give our soldiers into the future. I could go into that in more detail, but not in this particular

setting.

Mr. FELDMAN. I would also like to say, in addition to what the

Army has contributed at this point in time and is going forward

with, that the elements of force transformation that will continue

to work in the environment under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology and Logistics, exploring some concept technology solutions, fully intend to press ahead with an experimental

article to allow us to explore the capabilities of this close-in generation’s active protection system in a sweep of lethal and nonlethal

countermeasures to allow us to do the exploration of tactics and

concept development.

In addition to that, there has been some discussion that, in fact,

we were going to explore the possibility of doing a comparative test

evaluation of something like what we have been talking about here,

the Trophy active protection system. It is not on the table at this

point, but it is being explored.

It is very important for us to understand, as to the Department’s

future in force transformation, that looking at those things which

are hitting us right now and which we have had some success

against is not all we need to do. We need to take a look at the recent engagement in Lebanon in which areas were flooded with

antitank munitions, hundreds of them, in fact. And these things do

provide enhanced lethality. Additional variants of RPGs in our future provide enhanced lethality, and things that engage these are

highly nuanced.

As we noticed before with antishift munitions coming at vessels,

when you interdict the kinematic package of a Mach 2 2-ton missile

coming at you, in fact, you have to deal with the residuals and the

fragmentations are significant. But there is a great benefit to interdicting weapon systems that come at you in a way that interferes

with their design function of the warhead, whether it be shape

charge or whether it be high explosive. In those cases we need to

understand with witness boards and tactics the nuance of how we

like to deploy our forces and how we would like to be able to utilize

some of the benefits that come with systems that are highly directional in their response, as the Trophy system was, and that enable

you to virtually put a capability down the bearing through which

an RPG or a weapon has come in a retrodirective manner.

So an additional part of the answer should be, we are looking in

small numbers in prototypical programs at the potential to address

this and develop the concepts and the tactics to go with it. And

that informs the debate and informs the requirements for what we

would do in the future.

General SORENSON. If I could just have one more alibi. I would

say the other piece of it, which I found to be extremely disturbing

and disheartening, was the second part which talked about the

Army’s attempt to block the potential selection based upon intent

to cook the books. And I can tell you without any equivocation—

and any member of the committee can inspect those books if they

would like—that particular source selection was above board; there

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were no improprieties conducted by any member of the LSI nor the

government team, and they were the ones that made the decision,

not Raytheon.

Dr. BUHRKUHL. Sir, I would just like to add that the Department

is committed to the safety of our warfighters, and we try to provide

them with the best equipment possible.

And for the record I want to make sure, Mr. Chairman, that you

understand on the two joiners and operational needs that were

turned back, neither was the result of a lack of funds. The Department has been very good in that regard.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized.

Mr. Taylor is recognized.

After consultation with the Minority, I now ask unanimous consent that Mr. Simmons, a member of the House Armed Services

Committee, be allowed to participate in today’s Tactical Air and

Land Subcommittee hearing and be authorized to ask the witness

questions. Any objections?

Mr. Simmons will be recognized now for his time.

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the Chairman, and I thank the Ranking

Member, and I commend them for the hearing, but more importantly, over the years that I have seen the Chairman and the

Ranking Member operate, I commend them for their bipartisanship

and their fairness and their insight into these issues, and I think

this hearing is a very good example of that.

Years ago, in another life and in another place, I had some up

close and personal associations with RPGs, RPGs 2 and 7 in Vietnam, and in particular during the Tet Offensive. And what I

learned about them was that if they were fired correctly, if the

rocket-propelled grenade was fired correctly, the shape charge was

properly aligned with the metallic surface, whatever it may be, it

could be very devastating. But if you were able to disrupt its trajectory, if it hit at an angle—and we, in fact, had one hit during the

Tet Offensive off an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) at an angle,

hit a soldier in the back in his flack jacket, knocked him out and

hospitalized him for three days, but it didn’t even explode. So the

unique properties of the RPG are such that it has to be aimed

properly, it has to be in proper alignment to be fully successful.

And so when I went with the Ranking Member up to Mosul to

the Stryker Brigade and talked to the troops, I asked them about

the Slat armor and the stand-off gauges. And one soldier told me,

we got hit six times and continued to function. He said, I am not

going to operate in any other vehicle than this Stryker vehicle.

They are absolutely enthusiastic and positive about how that fix

was working. And that was the clear impression I got.

We have photographs that we brought back from the Stryker Brigade, and I think in the text of our report, our bipartisan report,

which was signed off on by every member, both sides of the aisle,

that was one of the success stories that we encountered.

And I think your data shows that these approaches are almost—

they are not 100 percent successful, but they are pretty close to it

for this type of weapon.

Point two. If you are firing a projectile to intercept a projectile,

you don’t want anybody in the way of it. One of my closest nearVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:40 Sep 19, 2007 Jkt 033593 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-126\264250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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death experiences in Vietnam was from friendly fire. And there is

no such thing as friendly fire, let me tell you. It will kill you just

as much. It will kill you just as much. So the idea of friendly fire,

the idea that you are shooting a projectile to hit a projectile, creates lethality for the battlefield, for friendly soldiers and civilians.

We just have to understand that that is the nature of the beast.

And so we don’t want to create another hazard in an already hazardous situation. I think that is certainly the case.

Now, the one concern that I do have—and I think it is an important concern, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that we might at some

point perhaps pursue it in a closed session—is if you design an

RPG that has multiple explosions—I am talking hypothetically—

where the first explosion basically destroys the cage or destroys the

tile or destroys the Slats, and then there is a second explosion of

the shape charge behind the first, then that may tend to defeat everything that we have deployed.

So I guess the way I look at it is I don’t see an immediate threat

based by the RPG that we find in the field. I think we have met

that threat. I think this committee and this Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, has met that threat almost 98 percent, maybe almost

99 percent of the time. But when we look to the future, we may

need an alternative system that deals with the multiple explosive

device which somebody might be cooking up at some time in the

future because they know—based on the data that you have presented, they know that the current system is pretty much ineffective against the three types of vehicles that we have deployed that

are designed to deal with this.

So I would ask you if you are looking ahead and planning ahead,

and if you are future planning, does it meet that future threat.

General SORENSON. And, Congressman, that is a great question.

I think the answer to that is, yes, we are looking at that type of

capability in terms of a threat right now, in terms of even modifying and making changes to our current suite that we have already

deployed. But we are clearly looking at that threat long term, as

well as potential issues with respect to antitank kinetic threats,

which we think are more longer-term, as well as more deadly in

the future.

Mr. SIMMONS. And very briefly, a second comment. RPGs are

successful against helicopters. A helicopter, when it is airborne,

could be mounted with a Trophy-style system with 360-degree—not

a lot of ground troops around a helicopter in the air, and it might

have some applicability for a Trophy or a similar system. Have you

given any consideration to this system as a possible air defense

system for helicopters?

General SORENSON. Sir, we have not. We have actually deployed

our current suite of aircraft survivability equipment, otherwise

known as the Common Missile Warning System, and we have

found that to be effective against the threats, as required.

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you very much.

Again, Mr. Chairman, and to the Ranking Member, thank you

for your aggressive oversight of this issue.

Mr. WELDON. I thank the gentleman for his participation.

25

One final point I would like to make before we have votes—and

we do have three votes back to back, so this will probably be it,

unless my friend has additional questions.

There has been some confusion with regard to the source selection process FCS/APS system. Was the decision to go with a Quick

Kill APS the result of a source selection process or the subsequent

trace study analysis?

General SORENSON. Sir, the answer to that is a little bit of both,

and let me just try to frame the issue here.

Clearly when the contract was written for the RFP, that there

was to bid back on, it was to be the APS developer as part of the

overall hit avoidance requirement. As we were—as that contract

was put out, the requirement was that they would develop an architecture, a system engineering plan, and they could propose their

particular candidate. While the candidate was not specifically evaluated in terms of a major factor, it was a subfactor analysis within

the source selection. Obviously, if they got a great engineering

plan, but the particular system they are going to actually put on

there would be something that we couldn’t really accept at some

time in the future, or it was too costly, schedule issues and so

forth, then that probably would have downplayed, if you will, hypothetically that type of proposal.

Once the particular developer was identified, in this case it was

Raytheon, they then conducted a trace study, they, GD, with the

LSI, and basically did the analysis of particular systems that could

be put into place not only for the current force, but also for the future combat system. It was at that point in time that the vertical

launch system that was proposed by Raytheon was validated as the

particular APS to proceed further with. But all the others—we net

down those, as I had mentioned before, 20 systems down to 7.

Those were evaluated in the trace study based upon burdens to the

particular system, i.e., system integration problems, based upon

cost, based on performance, and that pretty much identified about

80 percent of the criteria. And those selections were then evaluated, and what came out was the Raytheon Quick Kill system.

Mr. WELDON. Any other comments by our witnesses?

Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No.

Mr. WELDON. I want to thank all of you for your appearance

today and for your service to the country. We want you to continue

to be aggressive.

Mr. Feldman, we want you to continue to play your role and be

aggressive. We need to have systems of checks and balances within

the Pentagon itself. That is healthy. And we are prepared to provide the financial support and the resources to fund those systems

as you deem that they are appropriate and safe and will, in effect,

protect our troops from injury or death.

Thank you very much. This hearing now stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WELDON

Mr. WELDON. Do we need an interim capability to protect our military until the

objective system comes on line in 2011? Or based on what we know about current

threat systems and current armor solutions, is it an acceptable level of risk to wait

until 2011 to give our military some sort of APS capability?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. The vast majority of threats currently being encountered are Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attacks are

much less frequent. For combat vehicles, such as the Abrams, Bradleys and

Strykers, reactive armor tiles should be adequate to defeat almost all of the RPGs

currently being encountered or expected. Therefore, the risk to combat vehicles of

not having an Active Protection System (APS) available until 2011 is considered to

be low.

Mr. WELDON. Is Slat armor effective against all known proliferating RPG threats?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. Slat armor is only effective against some Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) threats. These specific RPGs have design features which make Slat

armor effective. To protect against the remaining types of RPGs, the Army has developed and is procuring reactive armor tiles for the Abrams, Bradley and Stryker

combat vehicles. These reactive armor tiles are effective against almost all of the

RPGs encountered or expected.

Mr. WELDON. How is the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell working to respond to

CENTCOM’s April 19, 2005 urgent operational need statement calling for an ‘‘improved active protection capability against RPGs’’?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell responded to the United States

Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) by funding

Spiral 1 Development of the Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP), which includes

a suite of capabilities that include lethal and non-lethal responses against a variety

of threats. The plan for Spiral 1 Development included an Active Protection System

against Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) threats, as well as, an Active Denial Technology against threat personnel. The Army program manager recommended that the

Active Protection System and Active Denial Technology be delayed until those technologies were adequately developed for operational use in a later development spiral. We coordinated with CENTCOM and obtained their concurrence prior to proceeding with the revised FSEP capability. The Army program manager will be responsible for any later incorporation of active protection capability against RPGs.

Mr. WELDON. A February 9, 2006 notification to Congress indicated that $31.3

million was being transferred from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to the Army for the development of Spiral 1 Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP). The documentation

provided to Congress indicated that the system would include ‘‘a rocket-propelled

grenade Active Protection System.’’ We now understand that APS will not be part

of FSEP spiral 1. How is this funding being used now that the decision has been

made to delay APS?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. To provide our service members with the most updated capabilities, the Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP) project is following a spiral acquisition strategy. Spiral 0 provided one vehicle for the development of tactics and employment considerations. Since the removal of Active Protection System (APS), the

FSEP project adjustments include: 1) procuring three Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles for integration, 2) incorporating a training strategy to allow the unit to meet

its go-to-war mission rehearsal exercise with the Spiral 0 vehicle and two Infantry

Combat Vehicles, 3) adjusting the in-theater support requirements from six months

to 12 months in order to provide the operational commander this capability throughout the rotation, and 4) adding an enhanced Counter—Improvised Explosive Device

capability. The adjustments provide the best blend of capabilities for training, testing, and deployment.

Mr. WELDON. You mentioned in your written statement that you ‘‘. . . validated

the Army program manager’s decision to integrate the Active Protection capability

in a subsequent development.’’ Please discuss this subsequent development effort

and if it is funded?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. The Department is pursuing development of Active Protection

System capability in a number of ways that have been outlined in other responses.

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As that capability matures, we expect that the Army will examine the most suitable

alternatives for integrating capability onto the Full Spectrum Effects Platform

(FSEP). However, the Army has yet to identify the funding needed to perform that

integration and testing onto FSEP.

Mr. WELDON. What services besides the Army need active protection? If so, what

has been their position on Active protection so far, and what plans have they made,

if any?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. The Navy/Marine Corps are evaluating Army assessments of Active Protection Systems, and will continue to monitor advances in this capability

and evaluate its utility for future use by Naval Forces on its vehicles. The Air Force

has not yet identified this as a requirement for Air Force vehicles.

Mr. WELDON. Active protection for land forces should not be limited to heavy armored vehicles, but should include trucks and HUMVEES. Are there systems that

are scalable to these other, lighter platforms?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. First generation active protection system (examples include the

Russian Arena and Drozd and the American Close-In Active Protection System

(CIAPS) and Full Spectrum Active Protection Close-In Shield (FCLAS), respectively)

were designed for armor-on-armor combat where the active protection systems were

designed simply to protect the armored vehicle by reducing the penetration capability of the incoming round. While they reduced penetration to an inch or less, they

were characterized by a large lethal fratricide zone. They were also heavy, though

still lighter than the armor they could replace.

Some advanced systems (examples include Trophy, Integrated Army Active Protective System (IAAPS), Small Low-Cost Interceptor Device (SLID)) have attempted

to address the fratricide issue by increasing the standoff, focusing the lethal mechanism to a smaller volume, or using a hit-to-kill mechanism. While these are a definite improvement over first generation systems, they are more complicated and expensive. They are still relatively heavy (500 lb or more) and still produce collateral

effects that represent unacceptable risks when used in scenarios involving dismounted friendly combatants and/or non-combatant personnel in proximity to the

vehicles.

Some efforts have been made to address the collateral effects in these systems.

For example, the Israeli Iron Fist system uses a non-fragmenting grenade designed

to reduce (but not eliminate) the potential for collateral damage. While several of

these systems claim to be applicable to light vehicles, they are clearly optimized for

armored combat.

Since 2003, Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and the Army

have been working on systems that could be used on lighter vehicles. The objectives

were:

1) No collateral damage aside from that caused by the threat itself,

2) Residual penetration which could be handled by the light armor

applique ́s used for tactical vehicles in service today,

3) Light weight, and

4) Low cost.

These systems and components are under test today and promise capability

against Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and even heavy Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs). They do not have a growth path to be able to counter standoff kinetic

weapons such as gun fired tank rounds, and as such are not replacements for the

Quick Kill system under development for Future Combat Systems (FCS).

Mr. WELDON. You state in your written statement that ‘‘Retaining Trophy as a

component of Spiral 1 (FSEP) would add, at a minimum, an additional six to fourteen months to the schedule, thereby delaying other useful FSEP capabilities.’’ Was

this timeline based upon recommendations from the Army’s Test and Evaluation

Command as well as the Office of Force Transformation? If so, did both organizations agree on this timeline?

Dr. BUHRKUHL. As I stated in my testimony, we collaborated with the Office of

Force Transformation (OFT) throughout our deliberations on responding to the Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Urgent Operational Need. OFT, however, is not

a test activity and so we consulted with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to determine the most likely timeframe for testing. We were aware of the OFT concern regarding the schedule; however, after studied consideration of the development and

performance risks involved, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) agreed with the

recommendations of the independent test organizations and the program office.

Mr. WELDON. Do we need an interim capability to protect our military until the

objective system comes on line in 2011? Or based on what we know about current

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threat systems and current armor solutions, is it an acceptable level of risk to wait

until 2011 to give our military some sort of APS capability?

General SORENSON. No, the Army’s current assessment is that we do not need an

interim capability. The vast majority of threats currently being encountered are improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attacks are

much less frequent. For combat vehicles, such as the Abrams, Bradleys and

Strykers, reactive armor tiles should be adequate to defeat almost all of the RPGs

currently being encountered or expected. Therefore, the risk to combat vehicles of

not having an Active Protection System (APS) available until as early as 2011 is

considered to be low. Note that APS is not effective against IEDs.

The RPG threat to our combat systems is considerably less than what has been

reported in the media. Since 2003, and as of 7 November 2006, 148 Soldiers have

been killed in action (KIA) or died of wounds received in actions involving an RPG.

Of the 148 killed in action, 63 were RPG only; the remaining KIAs were the result

of complex attacks involving an RPG and some other kind of weapon. Additionally,

of the 148 killed in action since 2003, only ten Soldiers killed in action involved current combat vehicle systems that the Army could potentially accept the integration

of an active protection capability (Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, etc.).

Mr. WELDON. Is SLAT armor effective against all known proliferating RPG

threats?

General SORENSON. SLAT armor is not effective against all known proliferating

RPG threats. To protect against the remaining types of RPGs, the Army has developed and is procuring reactive armor tiles for the Abrams, Bradley and Stryker combat vehicles. These reactive armor tiles are effective against almost all of the RPGs

encountered or expected.

Additionally, to counter future threats (proliferating RPG threats being one), the

Army is embarked on a holistic approach towards survivability, including leveraging

the network for improved situational awareness, reducing signature management,

improving ballistic protection, modifying operational tactics, and pursuing hit avoidance. In the context of military ground combat vehicles, hit avoidance comprises

technologies that enable defeat of the threat prior to its impact with the vehicle.

The hit avoidance requirement for our future force is a 360-degree hemispherical

‘‘bubble’’ of protection to our combat platforms.

Currently, the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is developing a full-spectrum solution to counter short- and long-range threats, which include a wide range

of ballistic projectiles: RPGs, antitank guided missiles, tank-KE/HEAT, top attack

munitions. This full spectrum system will be fielded to the entire force.

Mr. WELDON. In reference to the Request for Proposal (RFP) and the source selection process please explain the weighting of the evaluation criteria that led to the

selection of Raytheon. Specifically, did the evaluation criteria lean more towards an

APS solution for FCS, the current force, or were they weighted the same?

General SORENSON. The source selection criteria were weighted to determine the

best Active Protection developer for FCS. A portion of the contract statement of

work addressed ‘‘spinning out’’ short-range technology to Current Force (CF) but no

specific CF requirements were used as evaluation criteria. The trade study similarly

evaluated the best technology for FCS. The FCS objective is to develop a full spectrum capable solution to counter short and long-range threats. The FCS short-range

system will be ‘‘spun-out’’ to the CF—the desired end state is to enhance commonality between current and future force systems and to enable future upgrades to both.

The Lead Systems Integrator’s Request for Proposal (RFP) Statement of Work

(SOW) included:

Base Effort: Develop a robust, detailed APS architecture to integrate into Manned

Ground Vehicle (MGV) platforms and apply architecture to Army’s current force.

Option A: Supply APS B kit for current force (First Priority and Focus)

Option B: Definitize the FCS materiel solution, including short and long range capability

The RFP award factors in descending order of importance were: Technical, Cost,

Management/Schedule, and Past Performance. The Technical factor was more important than the combination of Cost and Management/Schedule. The six Technical

subfactors in descending order of importance were: Systems Engineering and Architecture; Expertise in APS Technologies; Simulation, Modeling and Test; Fratricide

and Collateral Damage; Specialty Engineering; and Integration Capability.

Mr. WELDON. An unclassified Army information paper on APS dated 13 June

2006 states: ‘‘The Army is currently not funding the development and procurement

of an APS for Stryker.’’ Other than the FCS APS development effort, does the Army

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have any other funded APS efforts that could benefit the current force earlier than

2011?

General SORENSON. No, the Army does not have any other funded APS efforts

that could benefit the current force earlier than 2011. The Army APS development

provides APS solution for both the current (PEO Ground Combat Systems—Stryker,

Bradley, Abrams) and the future (Future Combat Systems—FCS MGV) platforms—

in close coordination with the Science & Technology community.

The Army is developing a short range RPG countermeasure capability for the Current Force (Stryker, Abrams and Bradley) and a full-spectrum solution to counter

short- and long-range threats, which includes a wide range of ballistic projectiles:

RPGs, antitank guided missiles, tank-KE/HEAT, top attack/precision guided missiles, and large caliber cannon. Developmental funding does exist and the POM fiscal year 2008-13 is still being worked.

Mr. WELDON. Does the current force have to wait for the FCS program to spin

out an APS solution? Why can’t the current force develop and field an interim APS

solution on its own? Does this mean that current force systems can only get future

technology upgrades from the FCS program?

General SORENSON. The Army solution to an Active Protection System currently

includes the current force. The Army conducted significant analysis to determine

current and future requirements. The current force will not get an APS capability

earlier by splitting the APS development approach in two. The current approach ensures commonality and future upgrades to both current force and FCS MGV combat

vehicles. The Army approach to active protection includes a tightly integrated team

that includes PM Future Combat Systems, PEO Ground Combat Systems (Stryker,

Bradley and Abrams), the Science and Technology Community and the Best of Industry. The plan is to provide short-range capability to the current force first (ShortRange RPG defeat) and then full spectrum capability to current (Stryker, Bradley,

Abrams) and FCS (Manned Ground Vehicles) second. No system will be procured

or fielded unless the Army is confident that the system is safe for Soldiers’ use and

is effective and survivable under operational conditions. Active protection is not just

an FCS program—it is an Army program and approach to full spectrum Soldier survivability. The Army will ensure that both current and FCS equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) receive future technology upgrades.

Mr. WELDON. In thinking about potential scenarios, it would seem that a closerange attack with an RPG would be very difficult to defend against, given the extraordinarily fast reaction times required. Is that correct? Can an APS be effective

in close-range situations at all?

General SORENSON. Generally, the closer the weapon is fired and the faster the

incoming round, the harder it is for most APS solutions to identify, track, intercept

and neutralize the inbound threat. It requires engagement closer to the vehicle,

which means you need to use a more lethal countermeasure to adequately defeat

the RPG threat. The short-range APS will be effective against the Army’s requirement for close-in attacks. A major part of the solution in the defeat of close-range

attacks may be tactics and doctrine. Technical testing and User experimentation

with APS will be conducted to establish the best way to defeat close-range RPG attacks.

We are currently investigating different technologies to neutralize close-range

RPGs. The APS systems can be effective in close-range situations, but like any system will have design limitations for ranges that it can not protect against. For this

reason, the Army’s Current Force and FCS APS program is developing a suite of

technologies to counter threats with multiple means—a full spectrum hit avoidance

suite.

Mr. WELDON. Do we need an interim capability to protect our military until the

objective system comes on line in 2011? Or based on what we know about current

threat systems and current armor solutions, is it an acceptable level of risk to wait

until 2011 to give our military some sort of APS capability?

Mr. FELDMAN. It has been stated that current threat levels do not merit a need

for Active Protection Systems (APS) deployment before 2011, but the recent experience of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Lebanon calls this assumption into question. A majority of the casualties sustained by the IDF in the recent conflict were

directly related to Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) provided to the Hezbollah

by Syria and Iran. Many of the IDF heavy and light armored vehicles were attacked

by more advanced threats in greater numbers than had been expected. It is important that we explore near term protection solutions, which unlike armor, are not reliant on amelioration of lethality upon vehicle impact. An interim capability will

provide protection against emerging threats, and also provide a platform for the development of Tactics Techniques and Procedures concerning the usage of Active Protection Systems. It is our understanding that the 2011 timeframe is when the Quick

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Kill system will be ready for test. Significant acquisition quantities would not be

expected until 2 to 3 years after that. All this time could be used for learning how

we employ and specify these systems.

Mr. WELDON. Is SLAT armor effective against all known proliferating RPG

threats?

Mr. FELDMAN. This question needs to be answered in a classified forum as it requires a discussion of capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities.

Mr. WELDON. Various news reports have quoted Office of Force Transformation

(OFT) sources implying that the Trophy system is ready for deployment now. What

is the official OFT position on the current availability of Trophy as it pertains to

the FSEP program?

Mr. FELDMAN. The OFT has never stated that the Trophy was ready for deployment. In order to be ready for deployment the system must first be subjected to additional qualification and performance testing. The Trophy system has continued development with the IDF since the demonstrations at NSWC Dahlgren in March including initial development of an autoloader and the beginning of certification testing. The Army recommended that the Tropy not be included on the FSEP program

and the JRAC, after consulting with CENTCOM who in turn consulted with the

user in the field, made the decision to delay the use of the Trophy on this spiral

of the FSEP program. Trophy is being carried forward as part of the OFT Wolf Pack

Platoon project with proposals for further performance testing and certification for

US usage should this stage prove out. The OFT position is that with a limited procurement of 3 test systems and 40 countermeasures, and an appropriate test program, the Trophy could be approved for US usage.

Mr. WELDON. I understand that the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) has

worked very closely with the Israeli government in regards to integrating Trophy

on a Stryker vehicle. Please tell us what your current understanding is of when the

Israeli Defense Force (IDF) plans to field Trophy to their forces?

Mr. FELDMAN. OFT worked closely with Rafael, General Dynamics Land Systems

(GDLS) and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to integrate the Trophy on the first

Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP) vehicle. Independent of that effort, Rafael

and GDLS developed an initial integration concept for the Trophy system that

would allow a Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) to fulfill all of its missions

with the Trophy system installed. According to the Embassy of Israel Research and

Development Attache ́ the initial low rate production of Trophy will begin by March

2007 with full production by August of 2007. Multiple IDF platforms are being considered for Trophy integration, with the first being Merkava Main Battle Tanks.

The first Merkava MK4 equipped with Trophy is expected to leave the production

line in January 2008.

Mr. WELDON. There have been statements that there are major collateral damage

issues associated with Trophy. Based on your understanding of the data that the

Israeli government has shared with you, do you have similar concerns?

Mr. FELDMAN. Of the systems examined for the Full Spectrum Effects Platform

(FSEP), Trophy had the lowest potential for fratricide and collateral damage of all

of the intercepting systems. This is due to the fact that the Trophy uses a small

amount of explosive to fire a limited number of small projectiles towards the incoming round in an extremely focused group. Most of the other alternative systems

launch projectiles with large radially exploding warheads. In all cases the Trophy

projectiles will have no energy within 250 meters and in most cases, against Rocket

Propelled Grenades (RPGs) fired from ground level, the projectiles will be in the

ground within 65 meters. First order safety studies done by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) indicated that troops with body armor

would be safe at even closer distances. Additional testing needs to be conducted to

understand and characterize the collateral damage to noncombatants at close range

(within 65 meters). As part of the proposed Trophy test program, countermeasure

characterization and analyses of safety hazards to dismounted troops and civilians

would be conducted. In addition, the proposed program will include the initial development of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures by the warfighters to determine how

and under what conditions the system should be employed.

Mr. WELDON. What can you tell us about the various testing that the Israeli’s

have done on Trophy?

Mr. FELDMAN. The Israeli’s have conducted a significant amount of testing on the

Trophy system. Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), with Rafael and General

Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), has developed a classified summary brief of this

testing. The testing includes over 450 test firings in a variety of conditions as well

as safety and environmental testing. The table below summarizes the testing that

was conducted in conjunction with the Full Spectrum Effects Program (FSEP)/

Project Sheriff efforts.

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The Trophy integrated on the FSEP Stryker

Test Result

Fit and Function Trophy installed and fit as designed. System functioned as expected.

Electromagnetic Vulnerability (Tailored Environment)No susceptibilities on Trophy.

Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordance (HERO)Trophy caused no effects to any ammunition types

expected aboard FSEP.

Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel (HERP)Below personnel exposure limits.

Electromagnetic compatibility No interaction of Trophy with other systems on

board vehicle.

The Trophy integrated on the IDF Stryker

Test Result

Fit and Function Trophy installed and fit as designed. System functioned as expected.

Flash Signature The flash signature seen through the periscopes of

the vehicle would not cause ocular damage to personnel inside the vehicle. Flash outside of the vehicle would not cause ocular damage.

Acoustic Signature Adequate hearing protection is provided by the required standard hearing protection worn inside the

vehicle.

Blast Overpressure Minimal blast overpressure inside of the vehicle.

Trophy is designed to be operated with open hatches.

Debris Protection Witness panels proved that blast shields protected

crew hatch areas from debris. Trophy is designed

to be operated with open hatches.

Live Fire tests conducted at Naval

Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren

Division (NSWCDD)

38 tests were conducted with inert Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) being fired at (or in close

proximity to) the vehicle Multiple tests were conducted firing 2 RPGs nearly simultaneously—one

to each side of the vehicle.

The test were conducted against RPG–7 missiles

with inert warheads. These RPGs had the same velocity and flight profiles as live RPGs and were certified by NSWCDD Explosive Ordnance Device

(EOD) techs as being representative. RPGs were

fired remotely from 100 meters away using test

stands.

12 of the 38 tests were conducted as the vehicle

was moving at approximately 25mph.

35 of the 381 tests were rated as a success. System

identified, tracked and engaged threat 2 RPGs.

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The Trophy integrated on the IDF Stryker—Continued

Test Result

Notes:

(1) Tests using a ‘‘live’’ Trophy engagement round accounted for 6 tests with 4 countermeasures firing.

All other Trophy tests were deemed either a success or a failure by using tracking cameras in place

of the ‘‘live’’ Trophy countermeasure and analyzing

the system data with the video coverage with modeling and simulation to predict the outcome.

(2) System successfully distinguished between RPGs

aimed to strike the vehicle and RPG’s that would

miss the vehicle.

In addition to the tests noted above a structural test was conducted at Aberdeen

Proving Ground to determine that the loading imposed by a Trophy warhead would

not overstress a Stryker vehicle. A 1/2 kg charge of C–4 was detonated in place of

the Trophy warhead and no structural damage was noted.

Mr. WELDON. It has been said that the Trophy testing that was conducted at the

Dahlgren Naval Test Center in March 2006 required additional power sources and

control panels in the Stryker’s crew space. Is this correct, please explain?

Mr. FELDMAN. Two integrations of the Trophy system were performed to support

the Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP) program:

1. The first was the integration of the Trophy onto the FSEP Stryker vehicle conducted in December 2005. In this integration, the Trophy launchers were mounted

to the side of the FSEP vehicle. Structural analysis and testing of the launcher

mounting points verified that the Stryker hull would not be adversely affected by

the Trophy system. The Trophy search radar systems were mounted on each side

and at the front and rear of the vehicle in special mounting brackets.

TROPHY ON THE FSEP STRYKER

The internal components of the Trophy system were integrated as part of the

FSEP system and were mounted in racks and positions suitable for employment in

the FSEP vehicle. The Trophy system was powered by the FSEP system generator.

No additional electrical power requirements were needed. This first integration incorporated the Trophy as part of the FSEP system and was reflective of how it

would be included in a combat vehicle.

2. The second FSEP Trophy integration was on the Israeli Defense Force Stryker.

This integration was conducted to support the tests and demonstration planned at

the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) in March 2006.

The exterior installation of this system was identical to that on the initial FSEP

vehicle installation. The interior components of the Trophy system were rack mounted inside the vehicle to facilitate the necessary testing and analysis. Again, in this

installation the Trophy system ran exclusively on vehicle power. No additional

power systems were needed. This installation was not intended to represent a combat capable configuration. The installation was developed as a demonstration capability to facilitate the testing, demonstration and extraction of data from the system.

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FSEP TROPHY ON THE IDF STRYKER

In addition, to the Trophy integration done to support Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP), General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and Rafael have completed

a concept study and analysis of a Trophy installation that would meet all Stryker

Infantry Carrier Vehicle requirements. This integration concept utilizes the Trophy

system components that have been developed for integration on Israeli Defense

Forces (IDF) vehicles.

Mr. WELDON. Is the OFT currently conducting any other efforts in regards to Trophy? If so please explain.

Mr. FELDMAN. Rafael is currently planning to lend OFT an initial production variant of the Trophy system. This variant is identical to the system being provided to

the IDF for integration on the Merkava MK4 main battle tank. The updated system

includes an autoloader, ruggedized radars and electronics, and an updated countermeasure design. This system will be integrated on the Wolf Pack platoon Cougar

vehicle. As part of this effort OFT, the IDF, Rafael and GDLS will establish the plan

to ensure that appropriate testing and safety analyses are conducted to demonstrate

the capabilities and limitations of the Trophy system.

The current plan is for the testing efforts to be completed in time for Trophy systems to be used as part of the Wolf Pack Platoon experimentation in January of

2008. This proposed effort would be sufficient to demonstrate Trophy applicability

on both wheeled and tracked vehicles.

Mr. WELDON. Can you identify a proven, lightweight and low cost RPG defeat system that provides protection for vehicles, including light tactical vehicles, without

fratricide that is made in the USA?

Mr. FELDMAN. Although there are several United States systems that have been

demonstrated to various degrees, none meets all of the above requirements. All US

systems that have been examined by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) require significant further development and testing.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRADLEY

Mr. BRADLEY. Can you identify a proven, lightweight and low cost RPG defeat system that provides protection for vehicles, including light tactical vehicles, without

fratricide that is made in the USA?

General SORENSON. To date, no low cost, lightweight US APS sub-system has

been fully developed, integrated, and tested on a current ground combat or tactical

system. Current systems that might be available require significantly more testing

and refinement to prove their capabilities against all threats of interest. In the past,

Army Science and Technology program has studied at a number of approaches to

APS in programs such as Integrated Army Active Protection (IAAPS), Close-in Active Protection System (CIAPS), Full Spectrum Active Protection System (FSAP)

and Full Spectrum Active Protection Close-in Layered Shield (FCLAS). Both CIAPS

and FCLAS investigated the possibility of integrating active protection on light tactical vehicles (HMMWVs, trucks, etc). There are significant challenges to overcome

with regards to putting APS on a tactical vehicle such as: integration (space, weight,

power and cooling—(SWAP–C)), lack of armor to defeat (catch) threat debris and capability to provide 360 degree protection. To date, no APS has been able to overcome

all of these challenges for tactical vehicles.

Mr. BRADLEY. Can you identify a proven, lightweight and low cost RPG defeat system that provides protection for vehicles, including light tactical vehicles, without

fratricide that is made in the USA?

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Dr. BUHRKUHL. There is currently no ‘‘proven’’ lightweight Active Protection System (APS) for either combat or light tactical vehicles. All the systems under development require much more refinement and testing. While these candidate systems

under development may have the potential to meet the proven, lightweight and low

cost criteria, more development, testing, and certification is needed to prove that potential. Specifically, these candidates include: The Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Iron Curtain APS, recently demonstrated on a High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV); U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center’s (TARDEC) Tactical RPG Airbag Protection System (TRAPS) demonstrated on a HMMWV in 2005; and the Aviation and

Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center’s (AMRDEC) Close-In Active Protection System (CIAPS II) planned for demonstration on a HMMWV in

FY07.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES

Mr. JONES. In the spirit of fielding a system as soon as possible, and if the above

information is accurate, would your office support funding and further development

of a system like FCLAS?

General SORENSON. FCLAS is one of the active protection (AP) solutions the Army

S&T community assessed for vehicle platform protection against close-in fired Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and man portable Anti-tank Guided Missiles

(ATGMs) that is in the early stages of development. FCLAS has undergone range

testing of a proof-of-principle prototype design with some success in defeating current threat RPGs during testing. The system experienced radar multipath (i.e., a

propagation phenomenon that results in false targets and signal interference) as a

result of ground clutter and will have to go through a significant redesign to correct

this condition before it would be considered adequate for a ground vehicle.

The current FCLAS configuration presents an integration burden and adds significantly to the system weight. FCLAS autonomously conducts surveillance with

the nose cone sense and tracking radar for target acquisition, tracks the threat,

launches, fuses, and detonates the countermeasure to defeat the incoming threat.

The user is provided control over which tubes can protect the vehicle via a system

controller. This capability prevents an FCLAS round from operating in areas where

dismounts are known to be. The system is envisioned to be effective against hand

held HEAT (i.e. RPGs and man-portable ATGMs) but some vehicle armor will be

necessary to protect the occupants from residual debris after threat intercept.

The FCLAS short-comings are: 1) the complexity of mounting and space required

to integrate a large number of launchers; 2) side-firing warhead creates large hazard area; 3) supply chain requirement for such a large quantity of interceptors; 4)

loss of sector coverage once a countermeasure is fired (no coverage for near simultaneously fired threat in the same azimuth); and 5) no growth potential for long range

intercept of large anti-armor threats.

The FCLAS is not ready to hand over to the US Army Test and Evaluation Command for testing to assess its capabilities, limitations and level of safety. Any APS

system being considered for fielding would have to be tested to verify the developer’s

claims, check compatibility, and ensure Soldier and noncombatant safety when the

system is being used in environments and conditions like those it will be exposed

to in combat. This testing would include a test to define the potential hazard to dismounted troops and noncombatants who may be in the vicinity of the vehicle.

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