### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 22, 200 3

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA RC US THOM PS ON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty

No. S41,514 P hylli s H. Miller, Judge

No. E2001-02521-CC A-R3- CD August 22, 2003

T h e a p p el l an t , M ar cu s T h o m p s o n , wa s co n v i ct ed i n t h e S u l l i v an C o u n t y C ri m i n al C o u rt

of one c ount of conspira cy

to sell or deliver c ocaine , one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a nd one count of selling a nd delivering cocaine. The tria l court imposed a total ef fec tive sentenc e of forty y ear s incar cer ation in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection and f ines totaling $1 50 ,0 00 . O n a

pp e a l, the app e lla nt r a is es sev eral iss ue s f or ou r r e vie w, inc lud ing sp e e dy tr ia l, sufficie ncy

of the e vidence , double jeopar dy , evidentiary ruling s, and sente ncing . Upon re view of the re cord a nd the parties’ brief s, we a ffirm the judg ments of the trial court but r educe the amount of the a ppellant’s fine s to a total amount of $50,000.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt ar e Affi rm ed as M odi fie d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Steve McEwe n, Mountain City , Tenne s s e e( o na p p e a l) ; W il li am A . Kenne dy , Blountville, Tenne ssee (on appe al); and James Bow man, J ohnson City , Tenne ssee ( at trial), f or the a ppellant, Marc us Thompson.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; An g e le M. Gr e g ory , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; H. Gre eley

Wells, J r., District Attorney Gene ral; a n d Robert Montg omery , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound On September

8, 1998, the Sullivan Count y Gra nd J uryreturne d a multi-count prese ntment against the appe llant char g ing him in count one w ith conspiring be tween Ma rch 30,T h e n ame s of t h e appe l l an t ’ s c o- con s pi r at or s a r e mar k ed ou t on t h e pr es en t m ent i n cl u ded i n t h e r ec or d. 1

H o w e v e r, the ju ry in stru c tio n s re v e a l t h a t t h e a p p e llan t w a s c h a rg e d w ith c o n sp iring w ith J e n ic e T h o m p so n a n d D a ryl R . W ill ia m s, a .k.a . D a ryl R . L a the n

.
-2- 1998, to April 30, 1998, to sell or deliver more than 300 g ra m s o f co ca i n e; count two with the 1 possession of 300 g rams or more of coc aine on or about A p ri l 3 0
, 1 9 9 8, with the intent to sell or deliver; c ount three w ith selling or de livering .5 g rams or mo re o f a substance c ontaining c ocaine on or about April 30, 1998; count fo u r wi t h possessing dr ug para pherna lia on or about April 30, 1998; and count five with possessing ove r one-ha lf ounceof marijuana on or about April 30, 1998. On Dec ember

15, 1998, the appellant was indi cted in fede ral c ourt for c onspiracy to distribute and possess coca ine “beg inning approximately the month of September, 1996, and continuing to on or about May 1
, 1 9 98.” On January 1, 1999, the appe llant was re lease d into feder al custody and the

or ig ina l tria l date of

F e br ua ry 24 , 1 99 9, wa s r e se t.

After pleading g uiltyto the fede ral c harg e, the a ppellant was r eturne d

to sta te custody on April 10, 2000. On Jul y 21, 2000, the appellant filed a motion for speedy trial and the dismissal of his char g es on double jeopa rdy g rounds bec ause of

the fe dera l char g es. Afte r a he aring o n the motion on J uly

28, 2000, the trial court determined that the appellant was not e ntitled to a dismissal of his c harg es on double jeopar dy g rounds and further determined that the app el l an t h ad demonstrated “ no actua l prejudice ” bec ause of the delay

.

Tria l c omm e nc e d on Ma y 21
, 20 01

. Th e Sta te c a lle d L arry Rob bin s a s i ts fi rs t witness. Robbins testi fied that in April 1998, he w orked f or the Johnson C ity

Police Bur eau and was assig ned to work a s an ag ent for the 1 J udicial District D rug Task F orce (1 DTF ). Robbins st st explained that “[t] he F irst District is made up of our (4) four c ounties, Washington, Carter , Unicoi and Johnson, and each department is encour ag ed to s end an e mploy ee f rom their depa

rtment to the Drug Task Force to work as one entity to work the drug s in that four c ounty are a.” Robbins re lated that often the c ases c rossed the c ounty lines into another jurisdiction and ther eupon the 1 DTF st would contac t the drug task forc e from the ot her jurisdiction and the two forc es would work toge ther.

The 1 DTFarr ang ed a c ontrolled buy of one ounce of cra ck coc aine f rom Sanford st Whetsel, also known as Turk Whetsel, on April 29, 1998. Upon h is arre st and in exchang e for a p o s s i b l e “ re co m m en d at i o n fr o mt h e D

. A.
, ” W h et s el agr ee d t o arra n ge fo r h i s s u p p l i er , M el i s a Lon g, to bring him more cra ck coc aine. At that time, L ong resided in Kingsport, outside the jurisdiction of the 1 DTF . Acc ording ly , Whetsel arra ng ed for L ong to bring two ounces of cra ck coc aine to a st McDona ld’s Restaura nt in Gray
, a locale i n Washington C ounty , which was within the jurisdiction of the 1 DTF . The a g ree d purcha se price was $1,600 or $1,800 an ounce. Robbins furthe r noted

st that “[s] omeone who’ s buy ing a n ounce at a time is someone that’s g oing to be rese lling it.”

L ater on April 29, 1998, L ong broug ht the cra ck coc aine to the pr ear rang ed location

a nd sh e wa s arr e ste d. Rob bin s ta lke d wi th L on g abo ut c oo pe ratin g wi th the 1 DT Fto “ he lp h e rs e lf st out and hopef

ully g et a rec ommendation towards the D.A. about her involvement.” L ong reve aled that her supplier , the appe llant, was located in Sulli van County , within the ju ri s d i cti on of the 2 nd-3-

J udicial District Drug Task F orce (2 DTF ). Robbins contacted B rian B ishop, the Direc tor of the nd 2 DTFand asked for cooper ation in a pprehe nding L ong ’s supplier. Direc tor Bishop ag ree d to help. nd

L ater

that evening , L ong , acting p e r her a g ree ment with the 1 DTF , made a telephone st call to a c erta in number to arr ang e a dr ug transac tion with the appellant. Robbins saw the numbe r that L ong dialed, but he wa s unable to over hear the conve rsation. There afte r, age nts with the 1 DTF st drove L ong to Sull ivan County . Prior to the arr anged buy , L ong ’s per son and possessions wer e
s ea rc h ed an d n o co n tra b an d wa s fo u n d

. T h e re s t o f t h e arra n ged b u y wa s co n d u c t e d t h ro u gh members of

the 2 DTF

. nd

Rob bin s r e la te d th a t L on g wa s c ha rg e d w ith a

c ri me in the Was hin g ton Cou nty Criminal Court and t h at t hose cha rg es we re still pending at the time of trial. Robbins opined that L on g ho pe d h e r c a se wo uldbe dis mis se d in re turn f or he r c oo pe ratio n w ith the a uth oriti e s.

Me lis a L on g te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s a rr e ste d b y

Rob bin s o n A pril 29, 1 99 8, a t a McDona ld’s Restaura nt in Gray . Robbins asked L ong to tell him wh er e she obtained the cr ack

coca ine. L ong re v ea l ed t h at the appe llant was her supplier. Afte r ag ree ing to he lp the 1 DTF st appre hend the a

ppellant, L ong called the appellant f rom a pa y p h o n e o u t side the McDona ld’s Restaura nt. L ong told the appellant that “I neede d more of w hat I

had bef ore,” indicating that she neede d two more ounc es of c rac k coca ine. L ong asserted that the price of the c rac k cocaine was ove r $1,000 an ounce , but that she alre ady knew the price before she called. The appellant direc ted L ong to go to the house of his cousin, J enice Thompson, to obtain the drug s. Specifica lly , L ong testified that “[the app e lla nt] t oldme to g o. I me a n, he tol d me to g o th e re . I be e n th e re be fo re . A ndhe tol d me to g o.”

L on g fu rthe r s ta te d th a t w ith in thirty da y s pri or to Ap ri l 29 , 1 99 8, sh e ha d b e e n to Th omp so n’ s r e sid e nc e to o bta in c oc a ine a t the app e lla nt’ s dir e c tio n. Th e app e lla nt o bje c te d to thi s testimony , but the objection was overr uled. L ong asserted t hat on t he pre vious occa sion, she went to Thompson’s apartment in the Amber Court Apa rtments on Morelan d Dr i v e. Thompson’s boy friend, D ary l Wi lliams, also known as Dary l L athen, wa s als o at the apa rtment. L ong did not g ive Thompson or Will iams any money ; however , she obtained c ocaine from one of them. L ong could not specific ally

rec all whether

Thompson or Wil liams ga ve her the cocaine. L ong did not have to ask for the coca ine bec ause “ [t ]hey knew what I

was c oming f

or.”

I n the ea rly morning hours of April 30, 1998, Director Bishop wit h the 2 DTFdrove nd L o n g to T h o mp s o n ’ s ap ar tm e n t. Wh il e D ir e c to r B is h o p w a it e d in th e v e h ic le
, L o n g w e n t i n side T h o m p s o n ’ s ap art m e n t

. O n c e a g a i n , b o t h T h o m p s o n a n d W i l l i a m s w e r e i n t h e ap ar t m e n t

. “ T h e y” g ave L ong the cr ack coca ine. L ong explained that she di d not reme mber which person ga ve her the

c ra c k c oc a ine
, bu t did re c a ll tha t it wa s e ith e r T ho mps on or

Willi a ms. L on g a lso state d th a t sh e did not have t o tell Thompson or Wi lliams why she wa s there. L ong apolog ized for being late and place d the cr ack coca ine i n her purse. She did not g ive Thom pson or W illiams any money at that ti me

. L o n g th e n le f

t th e ap ar tm e n t a n d g o t in to th e c ar w ith D ir e c to r B is h o p to whom she relinquished possession of the c rac k cocaine.Lo ng was being p ai d by t he ap p el l ant fo r t he o unce she s up p o sedly s o l d W het sel and fo r t he t wo ounc es s he 2

p u rc h a se d fo r th e D T F

.
-4-

L a te r i n th e a ft e rn oo n o f A pril 30 , 1 99 8, L on g c a lle d th e app e lla nt andarr a ng e d to meet him in the parking lot of a Revco drug store on Stone D rive in orde r to pay him for the cr ack

coca ine. L ong was to pay the appe llant $3,600 which she obtaine d from DTF ag ents.

Soo n af t er the telephone c all, the appe llant arrive d at the Revc o parking lot. L ong sat in the front pa sseng er se at of the a ppellant’s vehic le. L ong t o l d the appe llant that she had the money and the appellant instructed L ong to put the money in the g love compartment of his vehicle. L on g re mov e d th e mon e y fr om he r pur se a ndpla c e d $ 3, 30 0 in the app e lla nt’ s g lov e c omp art me nt. L on g e xpla ine d th a t sh e ke pt $ 30 0 o f the mon e y be c a us e I gu es s i twa s m y

–fo r m ak i n g l i k e go i n g d o wn t h er e a n dm ak i n g a run or whatever , I g uess t hat’s what I was supposed to g et paid out of it.

. . . . I think we, may

be it was supposed to have been may be a hundred a n
ou nc e or so me thi ng lik e that, s o it c ome up to b e th ree ou nces, so three hundred dollar s ($300.00). 2 After L ong place d the money in the g love compartment, she and the a ppellant talked f

or a short time. Shortlythere afte r, they

wer e appr oache d by

the authorities and w ere arr ested.

L ong testified that she had known the appellant for approximately ten y ear s and they h ad at t en d ed h i gh s ch o o l t o get h er

. L o n g ad m i t t ed t h at s h e ha d b ee n t h e ap p el l an t ’s gi rl fr i en d i n h i gh school, but after

L ong became p re gn an t , the appe llant ended the r elationship. Approxim ately ten y e ars a ft e r the e nd of the ir re la tio ns hip
, L on g e nc ou nte re d the app e lla nt in a c lub a ndre ne we d th e ir acqua intance. Soon ther eaf ter, L ong contac ted the appellant a bout purcha sing c rac k cocaine for he r sister who wa s an addic t. She expl ained that “ I ’m not rea dy to go out in the stre et and buy no drug s.” L ong asserted that she did not use drug s at the time of the of fense s.

L ong testified that she had never been char g ed with a crime in Sull ivan County but

s t i l l h a d c h ar g e s i n W a s h i n g t o n C o u n t y w h i c h h a d b e e n p e n d i n g f o r ap p r o xi m a t e l y

t h r e e y e ar s. Ne v er t h el es s , L o n g h o p ed t o h av e t h e ch ar ges d i s m i s s ed

. L o n g ad m i t t ed t h at s h e n ev ert o o k d ru gs direc tly from the a

ppellant’s hands, “ but he would tell me wher e to g et it.”

Re g ard ing the ou nc e of c ra c k c oc a ine sh e so ld t o Wh e tse l, L on g re la te d th a t in iti a lly she did not have to pa y

for those dr

ug s. I nstead, the dr

ugs we re “f

ro n t ed ” to L ong beca

use she

a lr e a dy ha d a bu y e r f or the c ra c k c oc a ine

. Af

te r re c e ivi ng the mon e y fr om the bu y e r, L on g wa s to return w ith the money

and pay for the c ocaine . L ong explained that even thoug h she had obta ined

cra ck c o c a in e f

r o m T h o mp s o n a n d Wi ll iams o n p r e v io u s o c c a s io n s , “ th e y ’ r e n o t g o in g to front anything to me if he [t he appe llant] didn’t tell them to.”-5- L o n g s t at ed t h at i n t h e t h i rt y d ay s p ri o r t o Ap ri l 2 9
, 1 9 9 8
, s h e h ad o b t ai n ed d ru gs throug h the appe llant on three occa sions. She opined that “the f irst one, I probably was at the bridg e. The sec ond two may

be had be en at the house [ o f T hompson] . That wa s three y ear s ag o. I don’t

rea lly reme mber that fa

r bac k.” L ong related t hat t he bridge was at “John B. Dennis and More land Drive.” She stated that Thompson’s apartment w as also on Moreland D rive. F urthermor e, L ong testified that prior to obtaining drug s from underneath the bridg e, she spoke wit h the appe llant. The appellant instructe d L ong to go to that pa rticular loc ation to obtain the cra ck coc aine.

Brian B ishop, the direc tor of the 2 DTF , testified that at appr ox imately midnight on nd April 29, 1998, he wa s contac ted by the 1 DTFand wa s advised “that a pick up of cocaine had be en st

arr a ng e d. ” Sub se qu e ntl y , a g e nts wi th th e 1 DT Fbr ou g ht L on g to S ull ivan Co un ty to m e e t w ith st Direc tor Bishop. Dire ctor Bishop sear ched L ong ’s per son and belong ings prior their depa rture f or Thompson’s apartment. L ong had no contr aband or money on her pe rson or in her

purse. Dir ector B ish op the n d ro ve L on g to T ho mps on ’s apa rt me nt o n Mo re la nd Drive a t app ro xima te ly 1:0 0 a .m.
on April 30, 1998. Direc tor Bishop waited in the vehicle while L ong went into the apa rtment. L ong returne d to the vehicle w ith what appea red to be two ounce s o f cr ac kcocaine. Dire ctor B ishop testified that such a n amount of cr ack c ocaine was fa r too larg e for

persona l use.

Direc tor Bishop nex t had contact wit h L ong on the afternoon of April 30, 1998. L ong had ar rang ed to m eet the appellant in the R evco parking lot to pay for the drug s. L ong was wire d with a body

transmitter and the ag ents monitored the t ransa ction with a rece iver. L ong was g iven $3,600 prior to meeting with the appellant to pay for the cra ck coc aine. When the a g ents hea rd a pr earr ang ed sig nal, they

moved in and took the appe llant into custody . During a sea rch of the vehicle
, the ag ents discover ed the money in the g love compartment of the appe llant’s vehicle.

Ba sed upon these e vents, the authorities obtaine d a search warr ant for T hompson’s apartment. Direc tor Bishop a nd office rs wit h the 1 DTF
, the Kingsport P olice De partment, a nd the st Sul liv a n Cou nty Pol ic e De pa rt me nt w e re inv olv e d in the e xec uti on of the se arc h w arr a nt o n A pr il 30, 1998, at 9:00 p.m.

Direc tor Bishop stated that Thompson had a two-be droom apa rtm en t

. One of

the bedrooms appe are d to be a child’s room. On t he top shelf of the closet in the child’s room, off icer s discovere d a car dboard box containing a plastic shopping bag . I nside the shopping bag wer e seve ral lar ge bag s of white powde r, two smaller ba g s of white powde r, and two ba g s of a g ree n leaf y substance be lieved to be marijuana. Direc tor Bishop opined that the whit e powde r wa s coca ine and he estimated that the bag s contained ha lf a kilog ram, or 500 g rams, of c ocaine . On the top shelf of the sec ond bedroom, the of fice rs d i s co v er ed a small bag containing sever al plastic sandwic h bag “corners” of white powde r substance
, also believed to be cocaine, w hich was pa ckag ed for resa le. The off icer s also discovere d a set of digital scale s which Dire ctor B ishop ex plained could be used in the weig hing of

controlled substances. Additionally
, office rs discovere d more plastic sa ndwich bag s of the ty

pe used to pa ckag e coc aine f or re sale.-6- Di re c tor B ish op st ate d th a t no mon e y wa s f ou ndin T ho mps on ’s apa rt me nt. Moreove r, there wer e no expensive-looking items in the apartment. Direc tor Bishop c oncluded that the marijuana

discovere d was p ac k aged as if for r esale and had a street va lue of $225 or $250. Direc tor Bishop a lso explained that cra ck cocaine was t ypically smoked, but the office rs found no device in the apartment for the smoking of cra ck cocaine. Furthermore , Direc tor Bishop stated that powder cocaine could either

be snorted or i n

j ecte d, but no implements for either ty pe of use wer e discovere d in Thompson’s apartment. Direc tor Bishop admitt ed that althoug h various items wer e chec ked for fing erprints, “ there wer e no prints de veloped that wer e identified [as the a ppellant’s].” Howeve r, there wer e also no finge rp ri n t s which we re “ identified” a s belong ing to Thompson or Wil liams even thoug h they both resided in the a

partment.
Ag e nt D e nis e B uc kn e r w ith the Te nn e sse e B ureau of I nv e sti g a tio n ( TB I ) c ri me laboratory

in Knox ville testified that she ana ly zed a portion of the substanc es obtained by the police during these e vents. Both the State a nd the appellant stipulated that Ag ent B uckner was a n expert in drug che m i s t ry . Ag ent B uckner testified that she a naly zed two bag s of a substanc e and determined that it was 53.11 g rams of c ocaine base, w hich is also known as c rac k cocaine.

Ne xt, th e Sta te a ndth e app e lla nt s tip ulate d th a t A g e nt D a vidHo llo way , a fo re ns ic chemist with the TB I

crime la boratory , was a n expert i n forensic che mistry . Ag ent Holloway testified that he a naly zed a total of 467.8 g rams, or 1.03 p o u n d s , o f p o wder coca ine which wa s obtained fr om T hompson’s apartment. Ag ent Holloway also asserted that the g ree n leaf y substance weig hed 32.46 g rams and te sted positive for marijuana.

Robbins was rec alled to the stand and he testified th at L ong dialed the sa me telephone number to obtain the drug s as she had dialed to a rra ng e pay ment for the dr

ug s. Soon after the second telephone c all, the appe llant arrive d at the Revc o parking lot.

Ba sed upon the fore g oing, the trial court g rante d a judgme nt of acquittal on count f ive of the p r e s e n tm e n t, d e te r mi n in g th a t n o p r o o f w a s a d d u c e d th a t th e ap p e ll a n t w a s in v o lve d in the possession of marijuana

as alleg ed in that count. The jury fo u n d the appe llant not guilty of the po sse ssi on of dr

ug pa ra ph e rn a lia , but re turne d g uil ty ve rd ic ts on the c on sp ir a c y , pos se ssi on , a ndsa le counts.

S u b s eq u en tt o a se n t en ci n g h ea ri n g, t h e t ri al co u rt s en t en ce d t h e a p p el l an tas a R an ge I I multipl e offender to twenty y ear s incar cer ation for each offense

. The trial c ourt furthe r dete rmined that the appellant committed the offe nses while on parole for a previous offe nse and or dere d that the

s e n t e n c e s f

o r t h e i n s t a n t c o n v i c t i o n s b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y t o t h e e ar l i e r s e n t e n c e

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, the trial court fo u n d t h at t he appe llant was a pr ofessional c riminal and had a n extensive recor d of

c ri min a l a c tiv ity , andthu s it or de red t hat the s e nte nc e fo r c ou nt thr e e be se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly to count on e. T h e s en tence for c ount two was to be served conc urre ntly with count one for

a total eff ective se ntence of forty

y ear s incarc eration.W e ha v e c h o se n to a d d re ss the a p p e llan t’s issu e s in a d iff e re n t o rd e r tha n tha t i n w h ic h the y w e re ra ise d in 3

the a p p e llan t’s b rie f.

-7-

On appe al, the appe llant raises the f ollowing issues for our revie w: (1) whe ther the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the appellant’s c onvictions; (2) whether the appellant was de nied his c onstitut ional rig ht to a speedy trial; (3) whe ther the a

ppellant was subjec ted to double jeopar dy beca use his state and f

eder al convictions we re ba sed upon t he same underly ing c riminal activity ; (4) whether the appe llant was subjecte d to double jeopar dy based upon his convictions for conspira cy to sell coca ine and the sa le of c ocaine and possession wit h the i ntent to sell coca ine; (5) whe ther the trial court e rre d in admitting L ong ’s testimony reg arding the pre vious sales of coc ain eat T h o mp s on’s apartment ; (6 ) wh et h er the appellant’ s due proc ess rig hts were violated by the State withholding exculpatory

evidenc e; and ( 7) whe ther the se ntence s imposed were excessive. 3

II. Ana lys is A. Speedy

Trial We note that “[t] he rig ht to a speedy trial arise s under the Six th Amendment to the Constit ution of the United States made a pplicable to the State by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and Article 1, [section] 9 of the Constit ution of Tennesse e.” State v. B ishop
, 493 S.W .2d 81, 83 (Tenn. 1973). I n analy zing the spee dy trial issue, four f

actor s are important: “the leng th of the dela y , the

rea son for the de lay , the def endant’ s assertion o f t h e right, and the prejudice suffe red by the defe ndant from the delay .” State v. Utley
, 956 S.W .2d 489, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Ba rker v. W i n go , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. C t. 2182, 2192 (1972)).

“The rig ht to a speedy

trial attac hes at the time of arr est or indictment, whiche ver comes fir st, and continues until the date of the t rial.” St ate v. Vic kers
, 98 5 S. W.2 d 1 , 5 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1997). A delay of one y ear or l ong er will t rig g er a n inquiry into a speedy

trial violation. See State v. Simm ons, 54 S.W .3d 755, 759 (Tenn. 2001). I n the i nstant case , the appe llant was ar rested

on Ap ri l 30 , 1 99 8, a ndtr ia l be g a n o n M a y 21 , 200 1, a

de la y of we ll o ve r o ne y e ar. Th us , w e mus t examine the rema ining f

actor s to determine whe ther ther e has be en a spe edy trial violation.

Th e se c on d f

a c tor , th e re a so n f

or de la y , g e ne ra lly

fa lls int o o ne of

fo ur c a te g or ie s: “(1) intentional delay

to g ain a tactica l advantag e over the def ense or delay desig ned to har ass the defe ndant; (2) bur eauc ratic indiff ere nce or neg lige nce; (3) delay nece ssary to the fa ir and e ffe ctive prosec ution of the case; and (4) delay cause d, or acquiesce d in, by the def ense.” State v. Wood
, 924 S.W. 2d34 2, 34 6- 47 (T e nn . 1 99 6) (f oo tno te s o mit te d) . In t hi s c a se , th e app e lla nt w a s ta ke n in to fede ral custody on J anuary 30, 1999, and he rema ined in f eder al custody

for a pproxi mately

one y ear

. T h e a p pellant testified that during this time, he and defe nse counsel “we re, I g uess neg otiat i n g a defe nse and trying to, I don’t know, weigh my options and see which avenue we could take and see wh ic h w ou ld h a ve be e n b e tte r fo r me a s his c lie nt. ” A l arg e po rt ion of the de la y in the Sta te ’s c a se
was a ttributed to waiting f or the c onclusion of the ap p ellant’s fe dera l prosecution bef ore
c omm e nc ing his state pr os e c uti on . O n A pril 1 4, 20 00 , th e app e lla nt p le d g uil ty in f e de ra l c ou rt

to “[c]onspi rac y

to distribute and possess with the intent to dist ribute coc aine hy drochloride and

coca ine base ‘cr ack.’ ”-8- Howeve r, the a

ppellant and the State a g ree that the re cord doe s not revea l the rea son fo r the de la y be tw e e n the he ari ng on the app e lla nt’ s mot ion fo r a sp e e dy tr ia l, wh ic h o c c ur re d o n July 28, 2000, and the date of trial, May 21, 2001. We determine that “[t] he State’s inability to offer any
rea son for the [fu rt h er ] d elay in bring ing the defe ndant to trial is evidence of [neg lige nce or ] b u r e a u cra ti c in d if

f e r e n c e

. ” St a te v

. Wi ll ie Jo h n s o n , N o

. W2 0 0 1

- 0 2 9 2 9

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 3 WL 141045, at *11 (Te nn. Crim. App. at J ackson, J an. 14, 2003), perm. to appea l denied, (Te nn. 2003). Af te r e xami na tio n o f the re c or d, we c on c lud e that th is f a c tor weig hs a g a ins t th e Sta te , b ut i t is entitled to litt le weig ht.

I n addre ssing the third fac tor in our ana ly sis, we note ag ain that the appe llant moved for a speedy trial in J uly

2000, three y ear s afte r the c ommenceme nt of proce eding s. L ess than one y ear afte r asserting this rig ht, the appellant was broug ht to trial. This f actor weig hs in favor of

the appellant. See Vicker s , 98 5 S. W.2 d a t 6. Ho we ve r, the app e lla nt’s len gth y de la y in a sse rt ing his rig ht to a speedy

trial makes this fac tor less persua sive. See S tate v. Charles B. J ackson, Jr., No. 89- 16-I I I , 1989 WL

155948, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 29, 1989). W e also note tha t

on the da y

of tr ia l th e app e lla nt a sk e d f or a thi rt y da y c on tin ua nc e to “ re -g o o ve r” the c a se wi th counsel, indica ting a

lack of interest in bring ing his c ase to trial in a timely fashion.

Fina l l y , we m u s td et er m i n e w h et h ert h e a p p el l an twa s p re j u diced by

the delay

. Wood, 924 S.W .2d at 348. This is the “final a nd mo s t i m p o rt an t fac tor in the [speedy trial] analy sis.” Simm ons, 54 S.W .3d at 760. O u r s upreme court ha s expl ained that “ when e valuating this factor court s mu s t b e a w ar e th a t th e s p e e d y tria l r ig h t is d e s ig n e d : ( 1 ) to p r e v e n t u n d u e a n d oppressive incar cer ati o n p ri or to trial; (2) to minimiz e anxiety and conc ern a ccompa ny ing public a ccusation; and (3) to limi t the possibili ties that long de lay will impair the defe nse.” I d.

Ba sed upon the record before us, we c annot conc lude that the appe llant suffer ed any pr e jud ice by th e del ay

in p ro se c uti on . T he app e lla nt d oe s n ot c la im that th e de la y in b ri ng ing his

case to trial impaired his ability to prese nt a defense, “the most important issue conce rning prejudice to the defe ndant.” State v. Vanc e, 888 S.W .2d 776, 778 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . The a ppellant was inca rce rate d prior to trial, but the inca rce ration wa s due to a pa ro l e v i o l at i o n , not the instant char g es. The appellant does not arg ue that he w as subjecte d to “undue a nd oppressive inc arc eration pr ior to t ri a l.” I ns te a d, the app e lla nt c on te nd s th a t [i ]t is obvious from a

ppellant’s testimony during the motion hearing that he experience d anxiety and conce rn reg arding the State char g es as would re late to possible sentenc ing. A ppellant testified that f e d era l

a uth or iti e s a dv ise d h im that if he wa s sente nc e d u po n th e Sta te

c ha rg e s, his fe de ra l se nte nc e woul d r un c on c ur

re nt t o th e state

se nte nc e . F a c ing the possib ili ty of c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing wh ile

re ma ini ng in fe de ra l c us tod y up on the ina c tio n o f the Sta te wo uld undoubtedly

cause conce rn and an x iety . Of c ourse, in the e nd appellant’ s state s entenc e was run concurre nt to the federa l sentence
, bu t app e lla nt h a d n o w a y of kn ow ing thi s w ou ld b e the e ndre su lt.-9- As the appe llant acknowle dg es, the sente nce in the instant case wa s order ed to be

serve d concur

rently with his feder al case

. At the hearing on the appellant’ s speedy trial motion, the tr ia l c ou rt no te d th a t I don’t find that the [appellant] has demonstrated a ny actua l pre ju d ic e. . . . I mean ther e’s no e vidence th at he would have bee n g iven

concur rent time by

the fe dera l court sy stem , by the fe dera l prison sy ste m if that’ s o nly

a re c omm e nd a tio n b y

the jud g e , a nd it’ s u p to the pr iso n sy ste m. . . . [I ]t se e me d to be a n a c kn ow le dg me nt o n b oth parties pa rt when it wa s, when the case was rese t so many times, and of c ou rs e the re wa s n o s ta te me nt that he ’s los ing a ny op po rtun ity to

as k fo r a n y t h i n g. See Simmons, 5 4 S

. W .3d at 761 (observing that “a lost possibili ty of obtaining concur

rent sentenc ing is not suffic ient prejudice to establish a spee dy trial violation”). We ag ree with the trial court a nd conclude that appellant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

B. L ong ’s Testimony The a ppellant complains t hat the trial c ourt err ed by allowing L ong ’s testimony reg arding prior coc aine de als with the appe llant. The appe llant contends that these de als constituted other ba d acts and he wa s thereby entitled to the protec tions of Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 404(b). The appellant admits tha t the trial court held a he aring in compliance w ith Rul e 404(b) , but arg ues that the trial court rea ched the wrong result.

I nit ia lly , w e no te th at the app e lla nt c on c e de s th a t he faile d to raise thi s is su e in h is motion for new tria l, thus waiving the issue on appea l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). Ne verthe less, the appellant c ontends that this court may addre ss this i ssue as plain e rror

. Tenne ssee Rul e of Criminal Procedur e 52(b) explains that this c ourt may addre ss “[a]n error whic h has af fec ted the substantial rig hts of an acc used .

. . at any time, even though not raised in the m otion for a new tria l . . . where

nece ssary to do substantial justice .” See a lso Tenn. R. Evid. 103(d); State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 640 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. Reg ardle ss, the appellant has failed to convince this court that t h e t r i a l c o u r tc o m m i t t e d e rr o r i n a d m i t t i n g L o n g ’ s t e s t i m o n y.

Ev id e n c e t h a t a d e f

e n d a n t h a s c o m m i t t e d c r i m e s , w r o n g s , o r a c t s o t h e r t h a n th os e crimes f or which he is be ing tried is not admissi ble to prove his cha rac ter a nd there by

show ac tion in conformity with the charac ter tra it. See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Ha ll, 958 S.W .2d 679, 707 (Tenn. 1997) . Neve rtheless, such e vidence is admissibl e under Rule 4 0 4(b) if it is rele vant to a

ma te ri a l is su e in the c a se on tr ia l a ndif its pr ob a tiv e va lue is n ot o ut wei ghed b y the da ng e r o f i ts prejudicia l effe ct. Hall, 958 S.W.2d at 707.

I n order to permit the admission of the ev i d ence , the cour t must find byclea

r and convincing evidenc e that the appellant committed the prior crime. See State v. McCary , 922 S.W .2d 511, 514 (Tenn. 1996) . Gene rally , “[o] nly in an exceptional ca se will another c rime, wrong
, or bad act be rele vant to an issue other than the ac cused’ s charac ter. Such e x ceptional c ases include identity , intent, motive, opportunity , or re buttal of mistake or a ccide nt.” S t ate v. Luellen
, 867-10-

S.W .2d 736, 740 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. I n making its decision reg arding the admis sibili ty of the testimony , the trial court must first determine if the off ere d testimonyis releva nt to prove something ot her th an the a

pp e lla nt’ s c ha

ra c te r. I f the e vid e nc e is r e le va nt, the n, up on re qu e st, the c ou rt wi ll proce ed to a Rule 404(b) hearing.

We note that the pre sentment cha rg ing the appellant with conspira cy to sell or deliver

c oc a ine a lle g e d th a t th e c on sp ir a c y oc c ur re d be tw e e n Ma

rc h 3 0, 19 98 , a ndAp ri l 30 , 1 99 8. Th us , L ong ’s testimony

reg arding any

coca ine dea ls with the ap pellant during this ti me period do not constitute “other” acts of the appellant. Instead, such pr oof is nece ssary to establish that a

conspirac y
occur red during the time frame alleg ed in the pre sentment. As such, the trial court was not requir ed to perform a Rule 404(b) a naly sis as to the admission of this t estimony regard i n g the conspira cy
c ou nt.

Howeve r, L ong ’s testimony reg arding prior coc aine de als with the ap p ell ant does constitute other acts evidenc e as to the a ppellant’s possession cha rg e in count two and the sale a nd delivery char g e in count thre e. As we state d earlier, the trial c ourt held a jury -out hea ring on the Rule 404(b) issue. At the c onclusion of the hea ring , the trial court found that t h e State had established by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that these other a cts occ u rred. The c ourt furthe r determined that the proff

ere d testimonyrela ted to the appe llant’s intent; i.e. his knowing possession of t h e co ca i n e located in Thompson’s a partment. F inally , the trial court determined that the probati v e v alue of L ong ’s testimony was not outweig hed by any dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. Furthermore , afte r L ong ’s t estimony
, the t rial court ga ve the jury a limiting instruction restric ting the jury ’s consider ation of L ong ’s testim o n y as t o the appe llant’s intent in counts two and three
, specific ally

instructing the jur y t o not consider the te stimony“as to whe ther or not ther e’s a ny propensity by the defendant to commit the crime.” See S tate v. L ittle, 854 S.W .2d 643, 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

We ag ree with the trial court that the e vidence of the pre vious coca ine transa ctions betwee n L ong and the a

ppellant were probative t o the issue of the a ppellant’s intent to sell or deliver the coc aine a nd to possess the coca ine with the intent to sell or deliv er

. S ee i d

. ; State v. Be rnar d J erome J ones , No. M2000-00018-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 W L 1 5 6 2 8 6 4 , at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App. at N a sh v il le
, O c t. 2 0
, 2 0 0 0 ) ; S tate v

. Jo h n n y Wa y n e T il le r y , N o

. 0 1 C0 1

- 9 5 0 6

- CC

- 0 0 1 8 2
, 1 9 9 8 WL 148326
, a t * 1 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. a t N a s h v il le
, M ar

. 3 0
, 1 9 9 8 )

. A le a d in g tr e a ti s e o n T e n nessee evidenc e has e x plained:

I nte nt i s o rd ina

ri ly inf e rr e d fr om ev ide nc e of

the de fe nd a nt’ s o ve ra ll plan to c ommit such crimes or from proof of defe ndant’s motive. A

re la te d in fe re nc e is the inf e re nc e that a

pe rson int e nd e d a

c e rt a in result if he or

she had pr eviously

acte d in the same way and ac hieved the same r esult. This infere nce i s s t ro n g er if the previous ac ts and results closely

rese mble those alleg ed in the instant ca se. Neil P. Cohen et al., Tenne ssee L aw o f E v idence , § 4.04[10] , at 4-86 (L EXI S publis hing, 4th e d. 2000) (f ootnotes omitt ed). A dditionally , we obse rve that L ong ’s testimony reg arding the pre vious transac tions with t he appellant establishes the appellant’ s opportunity to c ommit the af oreme ntioned-11-

crimes. See State v. Paul J

. Ward, No. E2001-00175-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 65999, at *4 (Te nn. Cri m

. Ap p

. at Knox ville, J an. 18, 2002), pe rm. to appea l denied, (Te nn. 2002); see a lso Cohen, Te nn e sse e L a w of Ev ide nc e , § 4. 04 [14], a t 4- 95

. We c on c lud e that the tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its discretion i n admitting L ong ’s testimony reg arding prior coc aine tra nsactions involving the appellant.

C. Ex culpatory Evidence Th e app e lla nt a

rg ue s th a t “ the Sta te e nte re d in to an e xpr e s s o r i mp l i e d a g re e me nt w ith . . . L ong reg arding any criminal prosecution ag ainst her in exchang e for her testimonyag ainst the appellant.” As proof of the ag ree ment, the appe llant contends that “[i] t is incredible that the pe nding felony d ru g char g e [ag ainst L ong ] would remain pending and in limbo for three (3) y ear s without some ag ree ment betwee n the State and L ong reg arding her f avora ble test i mony

ag ainst the appellant.” The a

ppellant admits that this is sue is raised f or the first time on appea l, but claims that this court should not deem the issue wa ived and instea d we should addr ess this issue as plain err or.

Upon our re view of the rec ord, we conclude that the appe llant has waived this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. See Tenn. R

. Ap p

. P

. 3 (e ). Moreover, we observe that the

reco rd d o es not establish the exist ence of an a g ree ment betwee n the State and L ong . See State v. Brian S. Roberson, No

. 0 1 C 0 1 -9708-CC-00334, 1999 WL 77845, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Fe b. 19, 1999). Acc ording ly
, we will not revie w the appe llant’s claim as plain e rror . See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Tenn. R. Evid. 103(d).
D. Double Jeopardy The a ppellant has ra ised two issues reg arding double jeopar dy . Both the f eder al and state constitutions contain double jeopar dy clause s which protec t an ac cused f rom: (1) a

second pr os e c uti on fo llo wi ng a n a c qu itt a l; (2 ) a se c on d pro se c uti on fo llo wi ng c on vic tio n; and(3 ) mult ipl e punishments for the same offe nse. See U .S. C o n s t

. Amend. V; Te nn. Const. Art. I , § 10; State v. Denton
, 938 S.W .2d 373, 378 (Tenn. 1996) . Both of the appellant’ s claims relate to the third

c a te g ory , mu lti ple pu nis hme nts

.
1. Fe dera l

The a ppellant ar g ues that he “wa s twice put in jeopar dy for the sa me criminal conduct

ari sin g fr om h is c on vic tio ns in b oththe Un ite d St a te s D ist ri c t Co urt a ndthe Sul liv a n Co un ty Criminal Court.” I t is unclea r from the appellant’s arg ument whether his double jeopardy

conce rns involve his state convictions for c onspiracy , possession, or s al e an d delivery , or a c ombination of these c onvictions. Nevertheless, this issue is without merit.

Both fe dera l and Tenne ssee c ourts have f ound that th e d u al s o vere ignty doctrine permits convictions in state and f eder al court s ar i s i n g from the sa me criminal conduct without vio la tin g do ub le jeopard y . Se e g e ne ra lly B artku s v . I lli no is
, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. C t. 676 (1959); L avon v. State, 586 S.W.2d 112, 113-14 (Tenn. 1979). T he dual sovereig nty doctrine is based upon the ra tionale that “the s t at e an d fede ral g overnme nts are distinct sover eig nties, and thus the punishmen t o f a single a ct by eac h is not double jeopardy .” L avon, 586 S.W.2d at 113-14. The-12-

app e lla nt c on c e de s th a t T e nn e sse e c ou rt s c ur re ntl y ho no r the du a l so ve re ig nty do c tr ine
, bu t a sk s th is court to now a

bandon this doctrine.

This court re cently

fac ed a similar dilemma in State v. Carpe nter, 69 S.W.3d 568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) , cert. denied, 535 U.S. 995, 122 S. Ct. 1557 (2002). After rec og nizi ng that the du a l so ve re ig nty

do c tr ine ha s bee n cr iti c ize d, thi s cou rt ob se rv e d th a t ou r c a se s h a ve ne ve rthe le ss consisten t l y u p h eld the dual sove reig nty doctrine. I d. at 577-78. We noted that “ ‘established prec edent, f

reque ntly rea ffirme d by

this c o u rt , and long ac cepte d by the leg islature, should not be departed from lig htly .’” I d. at 5 7 8 (q uoting L avon, 586 S.W.2d at 114). Acc ording ly , this court declined to r ever se Carpe nter’s c onvictions on double jeopar dy g rounds. I d. L ikewise, we conclude that the appe llant is entitl ed to no re lief on this issue.

2. Sta te The a ppellant also complains that his “c onvictions for conspira cy to se ll c ocaine and the sale a nd possession w ith the intent to sell cocaine violate d the double jeopa rdy provisions of the Fifth Ame ndment to the United States Constit ution a nd Article I , § 10 of the Te nnessee Constit ution,

as we ll as the due proc ess g uara ntees of Article I
, § 8 of t he Tennessee Constit ution.” The a ppellant

rec og nizes that thi s court has held that “convic tions for both the sale of c ocaine and the c onspiracy to s e ll c oc a ine do no t vio la te do ub le je op ard y .” Sta te v. Th ornto n, 10 S.W. 3d22 9, 24 0 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1999). Reg ardle ss, the appellant a sks this court to rever se the a p p ellant’s convic tions. The appellant f

ails to specify

which convic tions he believes should be r ever sed.

I n T e n n e s s e e , w h e th e r tw o o f f e n s e s ar e th e “ s a me ” f

o r d o u b le je o p ar d ypurposes depends upon a

close and car eful analy sis of the offe nses involved, the statutory definitions of the crimes, the le g islative intent and the particular fa cts and c ircumst an ces. See State v. Bla ck
, 524 S.W. 2d91 3, 91 9 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) . T his a na ly sis is g uid e d in part by th e app licatio n o f the te st

announce d in Blockbur g er v. U nited States
, 28 4 U .S. 29 9, 30 4, 52 S. Ct. 18 0, 18 2 ( 19 32 ), na me ly “‘[w]here the same act or transac tion c onstitut es a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offe nses or only one is whethe r ea ch provision require s proof of an additional fac t which the other does not.’” Bla ck
, 524 S.W .2d at 919 (quoting Bloc kburg er, 284 U .S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182). How ever , the B lockburg er a naly sis is not decisive of the iss ue . “ Cou rt s sh ou ld a lso c on si de r w he the r the sa me e vid e nc e is u se d to pr ov e bo th offe nses.” Thornton, 10 S.W .3d at 239. Our supr eme c ourt explained the same e vidence tes t by statin g , “ ‘O ne te st o f i de nti ty of of fe nses is whe th e r the sa me e vid e nc e is r e qu ir e d to pr ov e the m. I f the same evidenc e is not require d, then the fa ct that both char g es re late to, and g row out of, one transac tion, does not ma

ke a single offe nse wher e two are define d by the statutes.’” Ducha c v. State, 505 S.W .2d 237, 239 (Tenn. 1973) (quoting 21 Am. J ur. 2d Criminal L aw § 82) ; see a lso Denton, 938 S.W .2d at 380.

Acc ording ly , we must utiliz e a four-pa rt test in order to de termine if double je opardy

a tta c he s: (1 ) a

B loc kb ur g e r a na ly sis of

the statut ory

of fe ns e s; (2) a n analy sis, guided by the principles of

Ducha c , o f t he evide nce-13- us e d to pr ov e the of

fe ns e s; (3 ) a c on sid e ratio n of wh e the r the re we re mul tip le vic tim s o r d isc re te acts; and (4) a comparison of the purposes of the re spective statutes. Denton
, 938 S.W .2d at 381.

As we no ted e arl ie r, thi s c ou rt app lie d s uc h a n a na ly sis in T ho rn ton , u lti ma te ly determining that “[b]ecause differ ent eleme nts are r equire d under e ach statute, the s ame e vidence was not used to prove both offense s, and the statutes ha ve diffe rent leg islat i v e p u rp o s es, the

c on vic tio ns fo r b oththe sa le o f cocai ne a ndthe c on sp ir a c y to s e ll c oc a ine do no t vi olate do ub le je op ard y .” 10 S.W. 3da t 24 0. L ike wi se , w e c on c lud e that the of fe ns e s a s c ha

rg e d in the ins ta nt c a se require differ ent eleme nts. Fo r ex ample, as this court has observe d, “[a]n agr eeme nt is not an essential ele ment of the off ense of selling or delivering drug s. Simi larly
, the actua l sa le or delivery of drug s is not an element of the conspirac y offe nse.” I d. at 239. Furthermore , an ag ree ment is not

an esse ntial element of the possession of drug s with the intent to sell or deliver, nor is possession an element of

the offe nse of c onspiracy

. Turning to the same evidenc e test, we c onclude that the a ppellant’s thre e convic tions

wer e base d upon differ ent evidenc e. The appellant’ s conspirac y convicti o n wa s based upon the ag ree ment betwee n himself, Thompson, and W illiams to sell or deliver the coc aine. The appellant’ s possession conviction was ba s ed upon his possession with the intent to sell or deliver the c ocaine that was discove red in Thompso n ’s apartment. Finally , the appe llant’s conviction for se lling or delivering coca ine stemmed fr om the transac tion with L ong involving two ounce s of coc aine.

Moreover, “thestatutes inv o l v ed d o n o th av e s i m i l arl egi s l at i v e p u rp o s es

. ” T h o rn t o n, 10 S.W. 3da t 239. Th a t is to sa y , the c on sp ir a c y statut e wa s des ig ne d to de te r a g re e me nts that w ou ld violate Tenne ssee law s. I d. Acc ording ly
, t h e s t at ute prohibits gr oup criminality . I d. at 240. Notably , the drug statutes p ro h i b i t the sale or delivery of controlled substanc es, or possession of

c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o s e l l o r d e l i v e r , w i t h o u tc o n s i d e r a t i o n o f g r o u p c r i m i n a l i t y. I d. Mo re ov e r, the app e lla nt wa s cha rg e d with po sse ssi ng the c oc a ine in Th omp so n’ s a pa rt me nt w ith the intent to sell and was c harg ed with selling two ounces of cocaine to L ong

. I n sum, the appellant was not cha

rg ed with selling and possessing with the i n t en t to sell the same controlled substanc e. Acc ording ly , the appe llant’s three convictions do not violate double jeopa rdy

.

I n a re lated is sue, t he appellant contends that due process prohibit s his convictions for all three offe nses beca use “in this case proof of

the conspira cy

was ‘e ssentially

incidental’ to the underly ing f

elonies of possession and [sale] of coc aine.” The appellant cited State v. Anthony , 817 S.W. 2d 29 9 (T e nn . 199 1) , in supp ort of this pr op os iti on

. Re g re tta bly , the Sta te didno t a dd re ss this issue in its brief.

This court has explained that “ [i ]n Anthony
, our supreme court wa s conce rned a bout the fa c t that pr ov ing on e fe lon y , th e arm e d r ob be ry , in he re ntl y a ndne c e ssa

ri ly pr ov e d th e e le me nts of the sec ond felony , kidnaping .” Thornton, 10 S.W.3d at 240. H oweve r, we further stated that “the-14-

proof of the eleme nts of sale of coc ai n e d o es not inherently or nec essarily

prove the elements of

c on sp ir a c y .” I d. Spe c if

ic a lly , th is c ou rt

ha s st a te d th a t [t ]her e will alway s be a ne x us betwee n the conspira cy and the substantive offe nse whe n the l atter of fense is completed. A conspirac y , howeve r, would rar ely be “esse ntially incidental” to the

u n d er l y ing of

fense , as that term is used in Anthony . . . . Moreove r, the statute prohibiting c onspiracie s is designe d to combat a dang er posed to the publ ic that is differ ent from the dang er soug ht to be preve nted by

the drug statutes. The plan and desig n of two or more individuals to sell cocaine c reates an offe nse that is worthy of its own pu nis hme nt. I d. at 240-41.

I n th e ins ta nt c a se , th e fa c ts u nd e rl y ing the app e lla nt’ s c on vic tio ns a re no t “ inh e re ntl y interwove n” so as to make eac h offe nse “esse ntially incidental” to the other off enses. The appellant

was c apable of possessing the coc aine with the intent to s ell or deliver without eng ag ing in a conspirac y

with Thompson and Wil liams. Additionally , the appe llant was ca pable of s el l i n g and delivering two ounces of

coca ine to L ong without entering into a conspirac y or possessing betwee n twenty -six g rams and 300 g rams of c ocaine . Moreove r, base d upon an y agr ee ment betwee n Thompson and Will iams, the appe llant could have e ntere d into a conspirac y without possessing the

coca ine with the intent to s el l o r deliver. See Thompson, 10 S.W.3d at 240. According ly , we
c on c lud e that th e app e lla nt’ s th re e c on vic tio ns do no t vi olate du e pr oc e ss.

E. Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e Th e app e lla nt n e xt co ntends th a t th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in h is convictions. I n assessing a cha lleng e to the suff iciency of evide nce, this court is guided by sever al well-e stablished principles. On a ppeal, a jury conviction re moves the pre sumption of the appellant’s innocenc e and repla ces it with one of g uilt, so that the a ppellant ca

rries the burden of

demonstrating to this court why

the evidenc e will not support the jury ’s finding s. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . The a ppellant must establish that no “rea sonable trier of fa ct” c ould have found the e ssential elements of the offe nse bey ond a rea sonable doubt. See J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e ).

Acc o rd i n gl y , on appea l, the State is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona

ble infer ence s which may be dra wn there from. S ee State v. Williams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983) . I n other wor ds, questions c oncerning the cr edibilityof witnesses a nd the weig ht and value to be g iven the evide n ce, a s well as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e,
are resolved by

the trier of

fac t, and not the appellate courts. See State v. Prue tt,788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

.

Th e app e lla nt w a s c on v i c t e d o nc o u n t o n eo f c o n s p i ri n g w i th T ho mps on a ndWilli a ms betwee n Marc h 30, 1998, and April 30, 1998, to sell or deliver at least twenty -six g rams but less than-15-

three hundred g rams of c ocaine

. Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 39-12-103( a) ( 1997) provides that the offe nse of c o n s p irac y is committ ed if two (2) or more pe ople, ea ch having the culpable mental state require d for the of fense which is the object of the conspirac y and eac h acting for the purpose of promoting or fa cilitating c ommissi on of an of fen s e, agree that one (1) or more of them will eng ag e in conduc t which constitutes such off ense. Additiona l l y , “[ t ] he commission of an ove rt ac t in furthera nce of the conspira cy

is an essential element of

the offe nse.” State v. Thornton, 10 S.W .3d 229, 234 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

.

F urthe rm or e , th e app e lla nt was c on vic te d o n c ou nt t wo of po sse ssi on of

a t le a st twenty -six g rams but less than 300 g rams of c ocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. F inally , the

ap p e l l a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d o n c o u n t t h r e e o f t h e s a l e a n d d e l i v e r y o f

. 5 g r a m s o r m o r e o f c o c a i n e

. It is a crime to knowing ly

sell or deliver a controlled substance or to knowingly possess a contr olled substance w ith the intent to sell or deliver. See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17- 417(a) (2),( 3), and ( 4). “[A] person . . . acts knowing ly with respec t to the condu ct o r t o ci rcumstances surrounding the conduct whe n the per son is awar e of the nature o f t h e co n duct or that the c ircumstance s exi st.” Tenn. Code Ann. §39- 11-302(b) (1997).

Tenne ssee law provides that possession of a drug can be either a ctual or c onstructive. See State v. Transou
, 92 8 S. W.2 d 9 49 , 9 55 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). As thi s c ou rt e xpla ine d in State v. Cooper

, 73 6 S. W.2 d 1 25 , 1 29 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 87 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) : B e fo re a pe rs on c a n be fo un d to c on str uc tiv e ly po sse ss a dr ug , it mus t

app e ar tha t th e pe rs on ha s “ the po we r a nd int e nti on a t a g ive n ti me to exercise dominion and contr ol over . . . [the drug s] either direc tly or throug h others.” In other wor ds, “c o n structive possession is the ability to r educe an objec t to actual possession.” The mere prese nce of a pe rson in an ar ea w here drug s are discovere d is not, alone,

su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

a fi nd ing that

the pe rs on po sse sse d th e dr ug s. L ikewise, mer e assoc iation with a person who does in fac t control the dr ug s o r pr op e rt y

wh e re the dr

ug s a re dis c ov e re d is ins uf

fi c ie nt t o support a finding that the per son possessed the drug s.

L ong testified that she c ontacted the appellant on three separ ate occa sions between Marc h 30, 1998, and April 30, 1998, in order to obtain coc aine. On two of these oc ca s ions, the appellant direc ted L ong to g o to T hompson’s apartment to obtain the cocaine. The first time L ong went to Thompson’s apa

rtment, she obtained c ocaine from either Thompson or Wil liams. L ong stated that she did no t h av e to ask Thompson or W illiams for coca ine bec ause “ [t ]hey knew what I was c oming f

or.”

L ate in the e vening of April 29, 1998, L ong telephoned the appellant to obtain two ounces of coca ine. Robbins witnesse d L ong dial a specific telephone number in or der to re ach the

app e lla nt. Rob bin s a lso te sti fi e d th a t th e re are tw e nty -e ig ht g rams in a n o un c e . T he app e lla nt a g a in-16-

direc ted L ong to g o to T hompson’s apartment. After e nlisti ng the aid of the 2 DTF , Robbins took nd L on g to S ull iva n Co un ty wh e re the y

me t w ith Di re c tor

B ish op . D ir e c tor

B ish op dr ov e L on g to Thompson’s apartment. When L ong enter ed th ea p a r tment, either Thompson or Williams gave L ong the coc aine. B oth Thompson and W illiams wer e in the apartment at that time. Ag ain, L ong did not have to a sk for cocaine prior to Thom pson or Will iams g iving he r the c ocaine . Neither Thompson nor Will iams asked L ong for pay ment at that time.

L a te r o n Ap ri l 30
, 19 98
, L on g a g a in dia le d the te le ph on e nu mbe r s he ha d p re vio us ly used to contac t the appellant. She a rra ng ed for

the appe llan t t o meet her in the Revco pa

rking lot to obtain pay ment for the c ocaine . Shortlythere afte r, t he appellant arrived at the pa rking lot. L ong enter ed the appellant’ s car and, at the appellant’s direc tion, place d $3,300 in the g love compartment of his ve hic le . T he a uth or iti e s a rr e ste d L on g a ndthe app e lla nt.

Sub se qu e ntl y , th e a uth oriti e s e xec ute d a se arc h w arr a nt o n T ho mps on ’s apa rt me nt. There in, the office rs discover ed at lea st 467.8 g rams of cocaine and cr ack c ocaine . The c ontraba nd was located in both of the bedroom closets in the apa rtment. Fifty

small bag s of the coc aine we re packa g ed for

resa le.

We conclude that the evidenc e adduc ed at tria l was suffic ient to establish the

appella nt’ s g uil t of

e a c h o f the of

fe ns e s. On Ap ri l 29 , 1 99 8, the app e lla nt d ir e c te d L on g to Thompson’s apartment to obtain two ounces of cocaine and the next day met with L ong and ac cepte d the pre arr ang ed pay ment of $3,300, constituting a sale and delivery of m ore than .5 g rams of c ocaine

.

Ad dit ion a lly , th e app e lla nt’ s a c tio ns in dir e c tin g L on g to Th omp so n’ s a pa rt me nt t o ob ta in c oc a ine a ndL on g ’s a c qu isi tio n o f the c oc a ine fr om Th omp so n or Wi lli a ms at th e apa rt me nt, clea rly establish that the appe llant constructively possessed the cocainein the apartment by exercising “dominion or control” ove r the c ocaine throug h Thompson or Wil liams. Furthermore, “[i] t may be inferr ed fr o m t h e amount of a controlled substanc e or substanc es possessed by an offe n d e r , a lo n g w ith o th e r r e le v a n t f a c ts s u rr o u n d in g th e arr e s t, th a t th e c o n tr o ll e d s u b s tance or substances w ere possessed with the purpose of selli ng or ot herw ise dispensing.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419 ( 1997). Although the appellant was convicted of possessing betwee n twenty -six and 30 0 g ra ms o f c oc a ine , th e pr oo f at tria l r e ve a le d th a t th e re we re ov er 40 0 grams of c oc a ine in Th omp so n’ s a

pa rtme nt. Rob bin s o pin e d th a t a ny on e bu y ing a t lea st one ou nc e of c oc a ine a t a tim e was purc hasing for r es ale. Furthermore, pa rt of the c ocaine found in Thompson’s apa rtment was i n d i vidually

packa g ed for

resa le. Moreove r, Dire ctor B ishop asserted that there w as no para pherna lia in Thompson’s apartment indicating tha t the cocaine was f or per sonal use. Acc ording ly
, we conclude that there is sufficient evide nce in the r ecor d supporting the appellant’ s conviction for poss es s i o n o f co ca ine with the intent to sell or deliver. See State v. J oseph L eroy Sulli van, No. 02C01-9803- CC-00071, 1999 W L 134981, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Ma r. 15, 1999); Tillery , No. 01C01-9506-CC-00182, 1998 WL 148326, at *1.

F ina lly , r e g ard ing the app e lla nt’ s c on sp ir a c y c on vic tio n, we c on c lud e that th ere is ample evide nce that the appellant “ orche strated” the sale a nd delivery of the cocaine to L ong . See-17-

Th or nto n, 10 S.W. 3da t 23 4. L on g we nt t o T ho mps on ’s apa rt me nt at th e appell ant’s dir e c tio n to obtain the coc aine a nd the cocaine was rea dy for he r whe n she ar rived. Our

supreme c ourt has noted that “[w]hi le the esse nce of the offe nse of conspirac y is a n ag ree ment to acc omplish a criminal or unlawful act, the a g ree ment need not be formal or expressed, and it may

be prove n by

circ umstantial evidenc e.” State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 915 (Tenn. 1998) ( citations omitt ed). I n the instant case
, the jury c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly inf e rr e d th e ex iste nc e of

a n a g re e me nt b e tw e e n th e app e lla nt, Thompson, and Will iams to se ll a nd deliver the cocaine. See, e.g ., State v. Yasmond F ender son , No. 03C01-9711-CR-00496, 1999 WL 2840, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App

. at Kn o x v ille, J an. 6, 1999) (finding that althoug h the State prese nted no direc t pr oof of an ag ree ment betwee n conspirator s, a jury may rea sonably

infer the exis tence of such a n ag ree ment from the c onspirators’ a cts).

F. Sentenc ing Appellate r eview of the l eng th, rang e or manner of service of a sentenc e is de novo. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (1997). I n conducting its de novo revie w, this court consider s the following fac tors: (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the se ntencing heari n g; (2) the prese ntence report; (3) the princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (4) the nature and cha

rac teristics of the c riminal conduct involved; (5) evidenc e and inf ormation offe red by the parties on enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors; (6) any statement by

the def endant in his own behalf ; and (7) the potential for r ehabilitation or t reatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-102 and - 103 (1997), -210 (2002 Supp.); se e also State v. Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991). The bur den is on the appellant to demonstra te the impropriety of his sentenc es. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

. I n the ins ta nt c a se , be c a us e the re c or d d oe s n ot a ff ir ma tiv e ly

re fl e c t th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

a de qu a te ly

c on sid e re d s e nte nc ing princ ipl e s a ndbe c a us e the tr ia l c ou rt did not specify which enhance ment fac tors wer e applica ble to eac h offe nse, this court will examine the trial court’ s determinations without a presumption of corr ectne ss. I d. at (d); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

1. L eng th of Sentence s

Th e appell ant co mpl a ins that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in imp os ing se nte nc e s o f t we nty y ear s for e ach of

the appe llant’s convictions, the maxi mum sentence possible for a Ra ng e I I offe nder convicted of

a Class B felony

. Specifica lly
, the appellant contends that the trial court g ave imprope r weig ht to certa in enhanc ement fa ctors and f ailed to consider

an appr opriate mitig ating fac tor.

The a ppellant was c onvicted of thre e Class B felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 417(c) (1) a nd (i)(5)

. To beg in a sentencing determination, a court should beg in at the pre sumptive min imu m, the n “ e nh a nc e the se nte nc e wi thi n the rang e a s a pp ro pria te fo r the e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, and then r educe the sentenc e as a ppropriate for the mitigating fac tors.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e) . The pre sumptive sentence for a Class B fe lony i s t h e m i n i mum sentence within the appropriate ra ng e. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). The appellant wa s sentence d as a standa rd Rang e I I offe nder, and on appea l, does not challeng e this desig nation. Acc ording ly , the pre sumptive sentenc e for

the appe llant’s Class B fe lony convictions was twe lve y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( a)( 1)-( 3) (1997)

.As of J u l y 4, 2002, t h e s t at u t or y e n h an ce men t f ac t or s h av e bee n r en u mber ed. Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 35- 4 114 ( Su pp. 2002)

. H owe v er , i n t h e i n s t an t c as e, w e wi l l u s e t h e n u mber i n g of t h e 1997 v er s i on of

T en n es se e Code Ann ot at ed s ec t i on 40- 35- 114.

-18-

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th e e xiste nc e of

the fo llo wi ng e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s: (1) the a ppellant has a

previous history

of criminal convictions or criminal beha vior in addition to those necessa ry to establish the appropriate ra ng e; (2 ) the app e lla nt w a s a

le a de r i n the c omm iss ion of a n o ff e ns e inv olv ing tw o o r m or e c ri min a l a c tor s; ( 8 ) t h e ap p e l l a n t h a s a p r e v i o u s h i s t o r y o f u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o c omp ly

w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a s e n t e n c e i n v o l v i n g r e l e a s e i n t h e c o m m u n i t y; and (1 3) the fe lon ie s w e re c omm itt e d w hil e the app ella nt w a s o n p aro le from a prior felony

conviction. Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (1 ), (2 ), (8 ), a nd (1 3) (1 99 7)

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt g a ve “ g re a t w e ig ht” 4 to enhanc ement fa ctors ( 1 ), (2), a nd (13), a nd g ave “ modera te weig ht” to enhanc ement fa ctor (8)

.

The a ppellant does not conte nd that the trial court erre d i n finding the exist ence of enhanc ement fa ctors (8) or (13)

. Upon re view of the rec ord, we conclude that those enha nceme nt fac tors do exis t and wer e cor rec tly applied to all three of the appellant’s convictions. Howeve r, the appellant c ontends that the trial court erre d in giving g reat weig h t t o enhanc ement fa ctor (1) and further err ed in finding the pre sence of enha nceme nt fac tor (2).

Re g ard ing e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor (1 ), the app e lla nt ar g ue s tha t the app e lla nt ha d o nly four prior misdemeanor

convictions in addition to the felony convictions used to establish his status

a s a Ra ng e I I of

fe nd e r. Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (1 ). Th e app e lla nt a sse rt s th a t “ wh ile thi s fac tor may

have be en applicable , it was entitled to litt le weig ht since these w ere misdemeanor and

no t f e lon y of fe ns e [s], a nd su c h a nu mbe r of mis de me a no r c on vic tio ns sh ou ld no t be c on str ue d a s a leng thy criminal history .”

I nitially , we note that “ the we ight to be affor ded an e x isting fa ctor is left to the trial court’s discr etion so long a s the court c o m p l i es wi th the purposes a nd principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act and its finding s are adequately supported by

the re cord.” State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 475-476 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1996). Moreove r, th e proof a dduced at the sentenc ing he aring

re ve a le d th a t no t on ly

didthe app e lla nt h a ve fo ur prio r crimin a l c on vic tio ns in a dd iti on to tho se convictions used to establish the appe llant’s status as a Rang e I I offe nder, the appellant had previously

admitted to being a “pr ofessional drug deale r.”
Specifica lly
, Bill Edwar ds, who had be en the a ppellant’s probation officer on a prior

occa sion, testified that when Edwa rds compiled a pr esente nce r eport for the appe llant in 1995, the

ap p e ll a n t to ld E d w ar d s “ th a t th e o n ly r e a s o n h e e v e r w o rk e d w a s a s a c o v e r to

– f o r h is d ru g s [a le s ]; that he esse ntially

was a profe ssional drug deale r.” Edw ards f urther te stified that the appe llant-19- was ve ry open about it that for a four y ear period that he had starte d out in the drug business working as what he ca lled a runne r, which

was someone who deliver ed drug s t o t he buy er a nd broug ht the money fr o m t h e buy er ba ck to the dea ler, a nd that he, in fa ct, had thr o u g h s e lf p r o mo ti o n

. . . g r o w n in to w h e r e h e w a s , in fac t, the de a le r and ha d a t le a st tw o ru nn e rs a t a ny g ive n tim e wo rking fo r h im. Additionally
, the prese ntence report f or the instant of

fense s ref lects that the appellant admitted that h e b ega n d ri n k i n g ex ce s s i v el y wh en h e wa s i n h i gh s ch o o l an d t h at h e “ b ega n u s i n g m ar i j u an a a tage 15 and that he use d m ar i

j u ana ‘hea vily ’ for

‘seve ral y ear s’ at the r ate of ‘2 or 3 joints a day .’ He

re po rt e d th a t he be g a n u sin g c oc a ine in 1 99 3 ‘ if so meon e is s ha

ri ng it. ’” We c on c lud e that th is evidenc e of criminal behavior j ustifies the application of enhance ment fac tor (1) to all three of the appellant’ s convictions and is entitled to g reat weig ht.

Reg arding enh an c e ment fac tor (2) the appellant “ first assert[ s] t hat this factor was not applicable to the conspiracy conviction s ince it i s an esse ntial element of that offense beca use two (2) or more criminal actor s are nece ssary for c ommissi on of that off ense.” See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40 -3 5- 11 4( 2) . T he app e lla nt a lso arg ue s th a t th e pro of do e s n ot s up po rt the fi nd ing that he wa s a leade r in the commission of the possession and sale offe nses.

I nitially , we note that the appellant is cor rec t in asserting that a court may not enhanc e a sente nce if

the enha nceme nt fac tor is an essential e lement of the o ffe nse. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114. How ever , being a lea der in th e co m m ission of an offe nse involving two or more criminal ac tors is not an element of the offe nse of c onspiracy . Conspiracy involves an ag ree ment be tw e e n tw o o r m or e pe rs on s to e ng a g e in a c ri min a l a c t; c on sp ir a c y

do e s n ot r e qu ir e that th e Sta te prove le ader ship in the criminal act. Nota bly , this court has pre vi o usly upheld the application of enhanc ement fa ctor (2) to conspirac y convictions. See State v. Santiag o, 914 S.W .2d 116, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ; State v. L ittle, 854 S.W .2d 643, 652 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

.

Moreove r, we note that the proof adduce d at trial amply

established the a

ppellant’s

ro le a s a le a de r i n e a c h of the se of

fe ns e s. As the tr ia l c ou rt

ob se rv e d, “ He did n’ t a llo w a ny bo dy e lse to ge t the money

. . . . [T] he other two people, they wer en’t paid the money when the c ocaine was picked up. They mere ly handed it ove r.

. . . He’ s the one that made the ar rang ements. He ’s the one that g ot the money .”

“Our case s have established that enhanceme nt for being a lea der in the c ommissi on of an of fense does not requir e that the [appellant] be the sole leade r but only that he be ‘a ’ lea der.” State v. H ic k s , 8 6 8 S. W. 2 d 7 2 9
, 7 3 1 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 9 3 )

. We c o n c lu d e th a t th e tria l c ourt pr op e rl y app lie d th is e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor to e a c h o f the app e lla nt’ s c on vic ti on s and did no t e rr in assig ning this fa ctor g reat weig ht. See State v. Holston, 94 S.W .3d 507, 512 (T en n

. C ri m . App. 2002); State v. Bla ckmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 337 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

The a ppellant next contends that the trial c o u r t s hould have c onsidered a s a mitigating fac tor that the appellant assisted fede ral authorities in prosecution of other criminal def

endants. The-20-

appellant a

rg ues t hat t he trial court should have mitigated the sentenc e base d upon mitigating fac tor (9) or (13). Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35-113( 9) (1997) states that a sente nce ma y be mitig a te d if “ [t ]h e d e f

e n d a n t a s s is te d th e a u th o r it ie s in u n c o v e r in g o f f e n s e s c o mm it te d b y

other persons or in detecting or apprehending other persons who had committed the offe nses.” Mitig ating fac tor (13) state s that a trial court may mitigate a

sentenc e base d upon “[a]nyother fa ctor c onsistent with the purposes of this cha pter.” I d. at (13).

At the sentenc ing hearing, the following colloquy occur red be tween de fense counsel and Dire ctor B ishop:

Def ens e Counsel: You were active or wer e involved in the prosec ution in Feder al Court as we ll as t h i s prosec ution. I s that

c or re c t?

Direc tor Bishop: Ye s, sir.

Def ense Counsel: All rig ht, and in the cour se of, of the fe dera l prosec ution, [ the appe llant] ag ree d to prov i d e assist ance to y ou and to the fede ral go v ernme nt in reg ard to prose cution of other pe ople, didn’t he.

Direc tor Bishop: Ye s, sir, to the fede ral g overnme nt. Yes, sir.

De fe ns e Cou ns e l: A nd in fa c t a s a re su lt o f that, v ari ou s o the r p e op le

we re ind ic te d d ow n in F e de ra l Co urt a ndwo un d u p p le a din g g uil ty i n F e d e r a l C o u r t , d i d n ’ tt h e y?

Direc tor Bishop: Idon’t believe his information [l ed] to that but he didpr ov ide inf

or ma tio n a

bo ut tho se ind ivi du a ls.

. . . . De f e n s e Co u n s e l: O k a y , a n d a s a r e s u lt o f
, a n d y o u may not know this, but as a result of his c ooperation, he obtained what was c alled a Downwa rd De parture in Fede ral Court, g ot less of a sente nce?

Di re c tor B ish op : I kn ow that to be true , y e s.

The trial c ourt ref

used to apply

mitigating fac tor (9) be cause the appe l l ant assis ted the fe de ra l auth or iti e s in pr os e c uti ng ind ivi du a ls, bu t th e app e lla nt d id n ot a ssi st sta te a uth oriti e s in the pr os e c uti on of

state c a se s. We c a n f

ind no thi ng in the la ng ua g e of mit ig a tin g fa c tor

(9 ) tha t so lim its the app lic a tio n o f thi s mit ig a tin g fa c tor

. Ho we ve r, we c on c lud e that be c a us e the app e lla nt d id

no t he lp a uth or iti e s u nti l a ft e r h is a rr e sts , th is e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor is e nti tle d to lit tle we ig ht i n it s application to a ll o f

th e ap p e ll a n t’ s c o n v ic ti o n s

. Cf

. St a te v

. Wi ll iam D o u g la s Z u k o w s k i, N o. M2001-02184-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 213785, at *19 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jan. 31,-21-

2003) perm. to appea l denied, (Tenn. 2003). Acc ording ly
, we conclude that the t rial court did not

err in sentencing the appe llant to the max imum sentence w ithin the rang e for eac h offe nse.

2. Consecutive Sentenc ing The a ppellant complains that the trial c ourt err ed by ordering that the sentenc e on count three be ser ved conse cutively to his sentenc e for count one. I nitially , we note that “[w] hether sentenc es ar e to be se rved concurr ently or consecutively is a matter a ddresse d to the sound discretion of the trial c ourt.” State v. Ada ms, 973 S.W .2d 224, 230-31 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1997).

Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35-115( b) (1997) contains the discr etionary criter i a for imposing conse cutive sente ncing . See also State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W .2d 933, 936 (Tenn. 1995)

. The trial court imposed consec utive sentenc ing be cause the appe llant is a profe ssional criminal who ha s knowing ly devoted his l ife to criminal acts as a ma jor source of livelihood and he is an offe nder w hose re cord of criminal ac tivityis ex tensive.
The professional criminal classification derive d from Gray v. State, 538 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976) . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115, Sente ncing Commi ssion Com ments. Gray de fi ne d a pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l a s “ on e wh o h a s k no wi ng ly de vo te d h ims elf to c ri min a l a c ts a s a major sourc e of livelihood or who has substantial income or resour ces not shown to be de rived fr om
a sourc e other

than criminal activity .” I d. The appellant’s presentenc e re port ref lects the a ppellant’s last reported j ob was at Fuddr ucker ’s R estaurant in King sport, which employ ment ended in 1994. Th e re po rt state s tha t “a c c or din g to pr e vio us TD OC re c or ds , th e de fe nd a nt h a s w or ke d at We nd y ’s
, Fuddr ucker ’s, Holiday

I nn, Shoney ’s, McDona ld’s, and Pizz a Hut in King sport, TN. He stated that the on ly re a so n he ‘e ve r wo rk e d wa s a cov e r job fo r co c a ine sa le s. ’ T he de fe nd a nt w a s n ot a va ila ble for update of this information.” F urthermor e, Edwa rds t estified at the sentenc ing he aring that during the c omp ilatio n o f the app e lla nt’ s 19 95 pr e se nte nc e re po rt , the app e lla nt re la te d that ov e r the c ou rs e of four y ear s, he we nt from being a “r unner” for dr

ug s into a “dea ler” with “runne rs” wor king for the appellant. The discove ry of a la rg e amount of c ocaine at Thompson’s apa rtment, some of whic h

wa s p a c ka g e d f

or re sa le , in dic a te s tha t the app e lla nt wa s a de a le r at th e tim e of

the ins ta nt o ff

e ns e s. T h u s , w e d e t e r m i n e t h a tt h e tr i a l c o u r td i d n o te rr i n f i n d i n g t h a tt h e S t a t e h a d p r o v e n b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the appellant was a profe ssional criminal. See State v. Adrian S. L ennox, N o

. M 2000-02869-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1077964, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 14, 2001).

Additionally , the pre sentenc e report refle cts that the twenty -nine-y ear -old appe llant has two prior convictions for the sale of cocaine, a conviction for ag g ravated assault, two convic tions for marijuana possession, a c onviction for driving while his license wa s suspended, and a convic tion for possession of al co h o l b y a per son under the a g e of twe nty -one. Mor eover , the appe llant

a dmi tte dly

ha s a n e xten siv e pa st i n th e dr ug tr a de . T he re fo re , w e c on c lud e that the tr ia l c ou rt did not err in f

in d in g th a t th e ap p e ll a n t h a s a n e xte n s iv e r e c o r d o f c r im in a l a c ti v it y

. T h e tria l c ourt permissibly

imposed consec utive sentenc ing.

3. Fines-22- Finally , the appe llant contends that the trial c ou rt ’s impositi on of fines totaling $150,000 is ex cessive. B oth the state and f ederal const itutions prohibit the imposit ion of “excessive” fi n es

. S ee U.S. Const . Amend. VI I I ; Tenn. Const. Art. I , § 16; State v. Tay lor, 70 S.W .3d 717, 720 (Tenn. 2002) . A defe ndant convicted of the sale of .5 g rams or more of coc aine

m ay b e fined not more tha n $100,000. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 417(c) (1). Additionally , a defe n d ant convicte d of the possession of more than twenty -six g rams but less than 300 g rams of

coca ine with the intent to se ll or deliver or a defe ndant convicte d of the c onspiracy to sell or deliver the same a mount of coca ine may be fine d not more than $200,000. I d. at (i)(5). Howe ver, our supreme c ourt has indicate d that a fine may be conside red e x cessive e ven thoug h it does not exceed the statutory

maxi mum. Tay lor, 70 S.W .3d at 721.

I n th e ins ta nt c a se , th e jury impos e d a

fi ne of $3 0, 00 0 f

or the app e lla nt’ s sa le conviction and f

ines of $60,000 ea ch for the possession and conspira cy convictio n s fo r a total amount of $150,000, well wit hin the m axim um fine permissible by statute. The tria l court ratified these fine s in sentencing the appe llant. Our supre me court has noted that “[ t ] h e trial c ourt’s imposit ion of a fine , within the limit s set by the jury
, is to be base d upon the fa ctors provide d by the 1989 Sentencing Act, which inc lude ‘the de fendan t ’s ability to pay that fine, a nd other fa ctors of jud g me nt inv olv e d in se tti ng the tot a l se nte nc e .’ ” I d. a t 72 3 ( qu oti ng Sta te v. Ma rs ha ll
, 870 S.W .2d 532, 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). Thus, althoug h the defendant’s ability to pay a fine is a fac tor, it is not nec essarily

a contr olling one. Re g ardle ss, we re cog nize that an oppressive f ine ca n disrupt future reha

bilitation and preve nt a

defe ndant from be coming a produc tive member of society . See Ma rs ha ll
, 870 S.W .2d at 542.

Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts tha t th e app e lla nt i s in dig e nt andwi ll b e inc arc e rate d f or fo rt y y e ars

. Th e re fo re , “ a larg e pu nit ive fi ne do e s no t app e ar ne c e ssa ry to a c hie ve the app ro pria te ov e ra ll sentenc e.” T ay lor, 70 S.W .3d at 723. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the f ines imposed are excessive. We reduc e the a mount of the appe l lant’s fines to $10,000 for the sale c onviction and $20,000 eac h for his re maining two c onvictions.

III. Conclusi on Ba sed upon the foreg oing, we af firm the judg ments of the trial c ourt, but remand f or
a re duction of the a

ppellant’s fine s as direc ted in this opini on.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE