i

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5.1

5 November 2002

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication (JP) 0-

2,Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF); JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations; and JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare.

Electronic Warfare
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BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-5.1

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 5 NOVEMBER 2002

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This revision clarifies electronic warfare’s (EW) roles and place within the information

operations (IO) construct. Specifically it corrects the previous version by properly showing the

functions of EW in both offensive counterinformation (OCI) and defensive counterinformation

(DCI) (pages 2-3). This revision also attempts to remove outdated or inappropriate examples of

what EW brings to the fight and how EW is best employed. Finally the training section in chapter

six, pages 35-36, has been expanded to give a ready reference to the many Service-specific and joint 

schools as well as information tools available to the EW practitioner.

Supersedes: AFDD 2-5.1, 19 November 1999

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Maj Stan Jones)

Certified by: HQ AFDC/DR (Col Gary Cox)

Pages: 58

Distribution: F

Approved by: DAVID F. MacGHEE, JR., Major General, USAF

Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center
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FOREWORD

Air and space power and technology have always been tightly bound together

throughout the history of air and space operations. This linkage is very evident in the combat 

machines, devices, and tactics needed to survive in the air and space environment. The use of

radio and radar early in World War II as the means to find targets on the surface and in the air

illustrates the first technological exploitation of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum in aerial

warfare. The advent of countermeasures to these systems produced what we now consider

electronic warfare (EW). Today's weapon systems and support systems rely on radio, radar,

infrared (IR), electro-optical, ultraviolet, and laser technologies to function in peace and war. 

Unhampered use of the EM medium is vital to assure the success of any modern military

operation. Coalition forces in Operation DESERT STORM operated "at will" over Iraq and

Kuwait after gaining control of the EM spectrum early in the war. Air Force Doctrine Document 

(AFDD) 2-5.1, Electronic Warfare, provides a basis for understanding, planning, and executing

this portion of air and space warfare.

DAVID F. MacGHEE, JR.

Major General, USAF

Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... v

CHAPTER ONE—Background .................................................................................................. 1

CHAPTER TWO—EW Operational Concepts......................................................................... 5

GENERAL.................................................................................................................................. 5

EW TENETS .............................................................................................................................. 6

Control .................................................................................................................................... 6

Exploit..................................................................................................................................... 6

Enhance................................................................................................................................... 6

ELECTRONIC WARFARE COMPONENTS........................................................................... 7

Electronic Attack (EA)............................................................................................................ 7

Electronic Protection (EP) ...................................................................................................... 9

Electronic Support (ES).......................................................................................................... 9

EW EFFECTS........................................................................................................................... 10

Detection............................................................................................................................... 11

Denial.................................................................................................................................... 11

Deception .............................................................................................................................. 11

Disruption ............................................................................................................................. 13

Destruction............................................................................................................................ 13

ADDITIONAL FACTORS....................................................................................................... 14

Directed Energy (DE) in EW................................................................................................ 14

Enemy Capabilities............................................................................................................... 15

Operational Requirements .................................................................................................... 15

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).......................................................... 15

Environmental Conditions.................................................................................................... 15

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 16

CHAPTER THREE—Electronic Warfare Organization ....................................................... 17

General...................................................................................................................................... 17

Joint and Multinational Operations........................................................................................... 17

JAOC/CAOC Planning and Execution Process........................................................................ 18

EW Support to the Joint Force Air and space Component Commander (JFACC)................... 20

EW Support to the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)......................................... 21

COMAFFOR Headquarters Organization: The “A” Staff........................................................ 22

Intelligence (A-2).................................................................................................................. 22

Operations/Plans (A-3/A-5).................................................................................................. 22

Communications and Information (A-6)............................................................................... 23

CHAPTER FOUR—Planning And Employment.................................................................... 25

PLANNING .............................................................................................................................. 25

General.................................................................................................................................. 25

Planning Requirements......................................................................................................... 27

Planning Priorities................................................................................................................. 27
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Force Mix Considerations..................................................................................................... 27

Intelligence Support .............................................................................................................. 28

Logistics Support .................................................................................................................. 28

Employment.............................................................................................................................. 29

General.................................................................................................................................. 29

Combatant Commanders....................................................................................................... 29

EW Applications Across the Spectrum of Combat............................................................... 30

Military Operations Other Than War.................................................................................... 30

Combat Operations ............................................................................................................... 30

CHAPTER FIVE—Equip and Sustain..................................................................................... 33

General...................................................................................................................................... 33

System Engineering .................................................................................................................. 33

Effective Electronic Protection (EP)......................................................................................... 33

Communications Plans ............................................................................................................. 34

Reprogramming and Electronic Database Support................................................................... 34

Intelligence Support.................................................................................................................. 34

CHAPTER SIX—Education and Training .............................................................................. 35

Education .................................................................................................................................. 35

Basic...................................................................................................................................... 35

Advanced .............................................................................................................................. 35

Senior.................................................................................................................................... 36

Training..................................................................................................................................... 36

Suggested Readings..................................................................................................................... 37

Glossary ....................................................................................................................................... 39

Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................................................ 39

Definitions............................................................................................................................. 41
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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This AFDD establishes operational doctrine for United States Air Force EW operations. 

It articulates fundamental Air Force principles for the application of combat force and provides

commanders operational-level guidance on the employment and integration of Air Force

resources to achieve desired objectives.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all Air Force military and civilian personnel (includes AFRC and

ANG units and members) involved in planning or conducting electronic warfare operations. The 

doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to

consider not only the contents of this AFDD, but also the various issues relating to the particular 

situation in which they find themselves—national military objectives, forces available, enemy

capabilities, rules of engagement (ROE)—when accomplishing their assigned missions.

SCOPE

This doctrine provides guidance for planning and conducting electronic warfare

operations in support of national and joint force commander (JFC) campaign objectives.

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FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS

Foundational doctrine statements (FDS) are the basic principles and beliefs upon which

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these statements.

μ Unfettered access to selected portions of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum is critical

for weapon system effectiveness and protection of critical air assets. 

μ EW is any military action involving the use of the EM spectrum to include directed

energy (DE) to control the EM spectrum or to attack an enemy. 

μ EW is a force multiplier. EW operates on multiple levels of a conflict, from selfprotection to operational attack plans. When EW actions are properly integrated with

other military operations, a synergistic effect is achieved, losses minimized, and

effectiveness enhanced.

μ Control of the EM spectrum is an essential and critical objective in the success of

today’s military operations and is applicable at all levels of conflict. 

μ The decision to employ EW should be based not only on overall joint campaign or

operation objectives, but also on the risks of possible adversary responses and other

potential effects on the campaign or operation.

μ Properly constructed force packages that includes EW enhances the probability of

survival of all forces. It is unlikely that combat air and space operations will be able to

completely avoid enemy defenses since they usually defend the desired targets.

μ Senior officers must be well versed in the basic tenets of air and space EW employment 

and integration. 

μ EW impacts personnel in many areas to include: flight operations, air weapons,

communications, intelligence, maintenance, security, and other operations and support

functions.

μ Operators must train against an integrated air defense system (IADS) that includes all

types of threats: surface-to-air, air-to-air, and electronic warfare systems. “Train with

EW. Fight with EW.”

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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND

Modern military forces rely heavily on a variety of complex, high technology, electronic

offensive and defensive capabilities. EW is a specialized tool that enhances many air and space

functions at multiple levels of conflict. Proper employment of EW enhances the ability of US

operational commanders to achieve operational superiority over the adversary. Control of the

electromagnetic (EM) spectrum has a major impact on the success of military operations. 

Modern weapons and support systems employ radio, radar, infrared (IR), optical, ultraviolet,

electro-optical, and laser technologies. Commanders must prepare to operate weapons systems in 

an intensive and nonpermissive electromagnetic environment. This may be aggravated by both

intentional and unintentional emissions from friendly, neutral, and enemy forces. Mission

accomplishment requires awareness, dynamic planning, and flexibility at all levels of war.

Unfettered access to selected portions of the EM spectrum is critical for weapon system

effectiveness and protection of critical air assets.

 Modern military systems, such as the E-8C joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS),

 rely on access to the electromagnetic spectrum to accomplish their missions. 

EW is any military action involving the use of the EM spectrum to include directed

energy (DE) to control the EM spectrum or to attack an enemy. This is not limited to radio

or radar frequencies but includes IR, visible, ultraviolet, and other less used portions of the EM

spectrum. EW assists air and space forces in gaining access to the battlespace and operating free 

No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from the enemy until it 

is ripe for execution.

 Niccolo Machiavelli

 The Prince, 1521
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from interference from adversary threat systems. During Operation DESERT STORM, force

packaging, which included self-protection, standoff, and escort jamming, and antiradiation

attacks, significantly contributed to the Air Force's extremely low loss rate and astounding

success rate against Iraqi forces. 

Within the information operations (IO) construct, EW is an element of information 

warfare; more specifically, it is an element of offensive and defensive counterinformation

(see figure 1.1). The three major components of EW are electronic attack (EA), electronic

protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). All three contribute to air and space

operations, including the integrated IO effort. Control of the EM spectrum is gained by protecting 

friendly systems and attacking adversary systems. EA limits adversary use of the electronic

spectrum; EP protects the use of the electronic spectrum for friendly forces; and ES enables the

commander’s accurate estimate of the situation in the operational area. All three must be

carefully integrated to be effective. Therefore, commanders should ensure maximum integration

among EW, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and other IO functions.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

INFORMATION- IN- WARFARE INFORMATION WARFARE

COUNTERINFORMATION

OFFENSIVE

COUNTERINFORMATION

DEFENSIVE

COUNTERINFORMATION

Electronic

Warfare PSYOP

Deception Physical 

Attack

Information

Attack

Information 

Assurance OPSEC

CounterintelligenceCounterPSYOP

Electronic

Protection

Counterdeception

gain exploit attack defend

 Weather

 Collection Dissemination

 Precision

 Navigation

 Public

 Affairs

ELECTRONIC

WARFARE

I S R

Figure 1.1. Information Operations Construct
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During the Gulf War, EF-111 RAVENS

were used successfully against Iraqi radars

and communications facilities.

Control of the EM spectrum can have a major impact on the success of military

operations across the levels of conflict. Proper employment of EW enhances the ability of US

operational commanders to achieve objectives. EW is a force multiplier. EW operates on

multiple levels of a conflict, from self-protection to operational attack plans. When EW

actions are properly integrated with other military operations, a synergistic effect is

achieved, losses minimized, and effectiveness enhanced.

Air Force electronic warfare

strategy embodies the art and science of

employing military assets to improve

operations through control of the EM

spectrum. EW exploits weaknesses in an

adversary’s ability to operate and applies

force against the adversary's offensive,

defensive, and supporting capabilities across

the EM spectrum. An effective EW strategy

requires an integrated mix of passive,

disruptive, and destructive systems to protect 

friendly weapon systems, components, and

communications-electronics systems from

the enemy’s threat systems. 

Electronic warfare is intimately tied to advances in technology. The advent of radar

and its proven effectiveness early in World War II started the “move–countermove” 

developments of radar, sensors, jammers, and countermeasures. Shortly after the development of 

radar, chaff was developed as a countermeasure. Concurrently, airborne jammers were

developed to minimize the effectiveness of radar. The cold war witnessed the development of

radar with effective electronic protection. Further EA developments were designed to defeat

these protective measures. Conflicts in Vietnam and the Middle East provided deadly reminders 

of the necessity for effective EW against advanced threats and of the intense effort required to

counter these threats. Current technology has given rise to new enemy capabilities, which

includes the use of microwave and millimeter wave technologies, lasers, electro-optics, digital

signal processing, and programmable and adaptable modes of operation. It also includes the use

of IR, visible, and ultraviolet frequencies and that part of the electromagnetic spectrum where DE 

weapons might function. Anticipating future technological developments is vital for EW and the 

survivability of friendly forces.
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Control of the electromagnetic spectrum is an essential and critical objective in the

success of today’s military operations and is applicable at all levels of conflict. EW

considerations must be coordinated into IO and fully integrated into operations in order to be

effective. Friendly forces must prepare to operate in a nonpermissive EM environment and

understand EW's potential to increase force effectiveness. Additionally, the scope of these

operations is global and extends from the Earth’s surface into space.

EW in Vietnam

The EB-66 was used against terminal

threat radars, surface-to-air missiles

(SAMs), and antiaircraft artillery

(AAA) until the development of selfdefense pods on fighter aircraft. Then

they were used as stand-off jamming

platforms. 

Countermeasures helped keep American aircraft losses to a manageable rate. One

Air Force officer estimated that ECM [electronic countermeasures] reduced losses by 

25 percent, while a Navy officer put the figure at 80 percent. Nevertheless, air

operations were expensive both in losses and effort. Communist gunners proved a

worthy and resourceful foe, although limited by second-rate Soviet equipment. Yet,

despite the able Communist air defense tactics and their adaptation to the changing

tactical situation, the American airmen gradually increased their edge. The big

improvement for the offensive side came with the use of ECM and antiradiation and 

standoff weapons. These increased accuracy and decreased losses. In the full-scale 

operations of Linebacker II, the American airmen showed that massive application

of modern aircraft with modern equipment could succeed against defenses limited in 

numbers and quality.

Kenneth P. Werrell

Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: 

A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense
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CHAPTER TWO

EW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

GENERAL

Military forces depend on the electromagnetic spectrum for many applications including,

but not limited to, communications, detection, identification, and targeting. The effective

application of electronic warfare in support of mission objectives is critical to the ability to find, 

fix, track, target, engage, and assess the adversary, while denying that adversary the same ability.

Planners, operators, acquisition specialists, and others involved with Air Force EW must

understand the technological advances and proliferation of threat systems in order to enable

friendly use of the EM spectrum and protect the forces of the United States.

EW uses the tenets of control,

exploit, and enhance to be effective. 

The three tenets are employed by the

three components of EW: electronic 

attack (EA), electronic protection

(EP), and electronic warfare support

(ES). Proper application of these

components produces the effects of

detection, denial, disruption,

deception, and destruction in varying

degrees to enhance overall mission

objectives.

Many countries around the world operate advanced

surface-to-air missile systems, such as this SA-6.

EW TENETS

μ Control. To control is to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, directly or indirectly, 

so that friendly forces may attack the adversary and protect themselves from exploitation 

or attack.

μ Exploit. To exploit is to use the electromagnetic spectrum to the advantage of friendly

forces.

μ Enhance. To enhance is to use EW as a force multiplier.

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible,

through you inaudible; and hence hold the enemy's fate in our hands. 

Sun Tzu, 

The Art of War, c. 500 B.C.
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EW TENETS

Control

To control is to dominate the EM spectrum, directly or indirectly, so that friendly

forces may exploit or attack the adversary and protect themselves from exploitation or

attack. Electronic warfare has offensive and defensive aspects that work in a “movecountermove” fashion. Often, these aspects are used simultaneously and synergistically to

support the mission. In the same way that air superiority allows friendly forces the freedom from 

attack, freedom to maneuver, and freedom to attack, the proper coordinated use of EW allows

friendly forces to use the EM spectrum. As examples, the offensive denial of a command and

control (C2) network by jamming disrupts the adversary’s ability to marshal forces that would

otherwise engage a friendly strike force. The proper use of EP allows friendly radar and

communications to continue operating in the presence of enemy jamming.

Exploit

To exploit is to use the electromagnetic spectrum to the advantage of friendly forces. 

Friendly forces can use detection, denial, disruption, deception, and destruction in varying

degrees to impede the adversary’s decision loop. For instance, one may use electromagnetic

deception to convey misleading information to an enemy or use an enemy’s electromagnetic 

emissions to locate and identify the enemy. During the World War II, the United States tracked

Japanese Navy ships by their radio transmissions. This usually provided the location, and since

each radio operator had a unique touch, allowed Navy Intelligence to identify particular ships.

Enhance

To enhance is to use EW as a force multiplier. Careful integration of EW into air and

space operations will detect, deny, disrupt, deceive, or destroy enemy forces in varying degrees to 

enhance overall mission effectiveness. Through proper control and exploitation of the EM

spectrum, EW functions as a force multiplier and improves the likelihood of mission success. 

During the first night of Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, airborne jammers and antiradiation

missiles negated adversary SAM systems, allowing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

aircraft unimpeded access to prime C2 targets in Bosnia.
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ELECTRONIC WARFARE COMPONENTS

The three major components of EW are electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), 

and electronic warfare support (ES). Figure 2.1 illustrates this concept, and the relationship

between them.

Figure 2.1 EW Components

Electronic Attack (EA)

EA is the component of EW involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or 

antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of

degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. EA also prevents or

reduces an enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum. It can be accomplished through

EA Examples

μ Standoff Jamming

μ High-speed Antiradiation Missile (HARM)

μ Chaff

μ Flare

μ Self-defense Jamming

μ Directed Energy

ELECTRONIC

PROTECTION

Protect from friendly and enemy

EW employment

ELECTRONIC

WARFARE

SUPPORT

Intercept, identify, and

locate

ELECTRONIC

ATTACK

Direct attack (offensive

and defensive), chaff, and

flares, directed energy

EW COMPONENTS
8

The best defense is a good offense.

 Unknown.

Self-defense jamming, chaff, and flares are 

a part of EA.

F-16CJ's use a high-speed 

antiradiation missile (HARM) 

targeting system and missiles to 

suppress or disable enemy 

radars. 

detection, denial, disruption, deception, and destruction. EA includes direct attack with highspeed antiradiation missiles (HARMs); active applications such as decoys, noise jamming,

deceptive jamming, and expendable miniature jamming decoys; and employs EM or DE weapons 

(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams, etc.). Electronic emission control (EMCON)

and low observable technologies are passive applications of EA. 

Electromagnetic jamming and the 

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) are also

applications of EA:

μ EM Jamming. Electromagnetic jamming is

the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or

reflection of electromagnetic energy for the

purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s 

effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum,

with the intent of degrading or neutralizing

the enemy’s combat capability. Early Air Force 

EW efforts were primarily directed toward

electronically jamming hostile radars to hide the

number and location of friendly aircraft and to

degrade the accuracy of radar-controlled weapons. Currently, jamming enemy sensor

systems can limit enemy access to information on friendly force movements and composition 

and can cause confusion. Jamming can degrade the enemy's decision making and 

implementation process when applied against C2 systems. An adversary heavily dependent

on centralized control and execution for force employment presents an opportunity for EA.

μ Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). SEAD

is that activity which neutralizes, destroys, or

temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air

defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. The 

goal of SEAD operations is to provide a favorable

situation in which friendly tactical forces can perform

their missions effectively without interference from

enemy air defenses. In Air Force doctrine, SEAD is not

part of EW, but it is a broad term that may include the

use of EW. In Air Force doctrine, SEAD is part of the

counterair mission and directly contributes to obtaining

air superiority. This may involve using electromagnetic

radiation to neutralize, degrade, disrupt, delay, or

destroy elements of an enemy's integrated air defense system (IADS). During hostilities,

enemy air defensive systems will probably challenge friendly air operations. Weapon

systems tasked to perform SEAD may be employed to locate and degrade, disrupt, neutralize, 

or destroy airborne and ground-based emitters. Normal SEAD targets include radars for early 

warning/ground-controlled intercept (EW/GCI), acquisition (ACQ), surface-to-air missiles

(SAMs), and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Many Air Force functions can be enhanced with

the employment of SEAD operations.
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The RC-135 provides surveillance and 

reconnaissance information

Electronic Protection (EP)

EP includes the actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from

any EW employment that may degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

Examples of EP include frequency agility, changing pulse repetition frequency (PRF), etc. 

Integration of EP and other security measures can prevent enemy detection, denial, disruption,

deception, or destruction. EP is part of defensive counterinformation (DCI) and needs to be

properly integrated into the IO plan. Friendly force reliance on advanced technology demands

comprehensive EP safeguards and considerations. Proper frequency management is a key

element in preventing adverse effects (i.e., jamming friendly forces) by friendly forces. Much of 

the success of EP occurs during the design and acquisition of equipment. 

Electronic Support (ES)

Photo: rc-135~1.jpg

ES responds to taskings to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of

intentional and unintentional radiated

electromagnetic energy for the purpose of threat

recognition. Commanders, aircrews, and operators

use ES to provide near-real-time information to

supplement information from other intelligence

sources. Additionally, ES information can be

correlated with other ISR information to provide a

more accurate picture of the battlespace. This

information can be developed into an electronic order

of battle (EOB) for situational awareness and may be

used to develop new countermeasures. The

relationship between ES and signals intelligence (SIGINT), which includes electronic

EP EXAMPLES

μ Frequency agility in a radio

μ Change pulse repetition frequency (PRF) on a radar set

μ Electronic and material shielding for systems

μ Processes to counter meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion (MIJI)

ES Examples

μ Radar Warning Receivers

μ Communication Intelligence

μ Electronics Intelligence
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The EA-6B is a joint EW

platform that can detect threats,

provide standoff jamming, and

can carry HARMs.

intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT), is closely related because

they share the common functions of search, interception, identification, location, and exploitation 

of electromagnetic radiation. The distinction lies in the type and use of information and who has 

tasking authority. ES resources are tasked by or under direct control of operational commanders. 

The operational commander may have authority to task national SIGINT assets to provide ES or

may have direct operational control over tactical resources capable of providing ES. In either

case, ES is distinguished by the fact that the operational commander determines aspects of

resource configuration required to provide ES that meets immediate operational requirements. 

SIGINT is tasked by national authorities. The passive nature of ES allows it to be effectively

employed during peacetime. 

EW EFFECTS

EW is waged throughout the electromagnetic spectrum to secure and maintain

effective control and use through the integration of detection, denial, deception, disruption, 

and destruction. The operational application of EW is 

not limited to manned airborne application; it is also

applied from land and space by manned and unmanned 

vehicles. While control of the EM spectrum through

the proper application of EW is advantageous, when

improperly used without coordination it may heighten

the risk to friendly forces. An ill-timed jamming

package may highlight an otherwise unseen force or

deny the use of a frequency by friendly forces. An

incorrect or wrongly interpreted radar warning receiver 

(RWR) indication may cause an inappropriate action

to be taken. The proper employment of EW involves

various applications of detection, denial, deception,

disruption, and destruction.

EW Effects

μ Detection—Assesses the electromagnetic environment to include radar/radio

frequency, electro-optics/laser, and infared spectrums using active and passive means.

μ Denial—Controls the information an adversary receives and prevents the adversary

from gaining accurate information about friendly forces.

μ Deception—Utilizes the electromagnetic spectrum to confuse or mislead an adversary.

μ Disruption—Degrades or interferes with the enemy’s control of it’s forces in order to

limit attacks on friendly forces.

μ Destruction—Eliminates some or all of an adversary’s electronic defenses.
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Detection

Detection is assessing the electromagnetic environment to include radar/radio

frequency, electro-optics/laser, and the IR spectrums using active and passive means. It is

the first step in EW because effective mapping of the electromagnetic environment is essential to 

develop an accurate electronic order of battle (EOB). The EOB is critical for EW decision

making and for using the electromagnetic spectrum to meet mission objectives. The various

means of detection include on-board receivers, space-based systems, unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAV), human intelligence (HUMINT), and other ISR systems. Detection supports EA, EP, and 

ES, and enables the avoidance of known hostile systems. When avoidance is not possible, it may 

become necessary to deny, deceive, disrupt, or destroy the enemy’s electronic systems.

Denial

Denial is controlling the information an enemy or adversary receives, preventing the 

acquisition of accurate information about friendly forces. For example, denial can be done

by traditional noise jamming techniques designed to block communications channels or

radarscope presentations. Denial may also be accomplished through more advanced electronic

deception techniques or destructive measures. The EC-130H COMPASS CALL provides an

excellent denial example as the Air Force’s premier communications jamming weapon. A

discriminate electronic attack asset, it has the ability to deny enemy communication while

allowing friendly communications to remain unhindered.

Deception

Deception is confusing or misleading an adversary. One objective of EW is to exploit 

the decision-making loop of the opposition through use of the electromagnetic spectrum, making 

it difficult to distinguish between reality and the perception of reality. If an adversary relies on

electromagnetic sensors to gather intelligence, deceptive information can be channeled into these 

systems to mislead and confuse. Deception efforts must stimulate as many adversary information 

sources as possible to achieve the desired objective. Multisensor deception can increase the

adversary's confidence about the "plausibility" of the deception story. Deception efforts are

coordinated with the military deception officer and considered during development of an overall

deception plan, IO plan, and the overall campaign plan. Operational security is critical to an

effective deception plan.

Electromagnetic deception as it applies to EW is the deliberate radiation,

reradiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of EM

energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy

EM-dependent weapons, thereby degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. 

Deception jammers/transmitters can place false targets on the enemy radar’s scope, or cause the

enemy radar to assess incorrect target speed, range, or azimuth. Such jammers/transmitters

operate by receiving the pulse of energy from the radar, amplifying it, delaying or multiplying it, 

and reradiating the altered signal back to the enemy’s transmitting radar.
12

Manipulative EM deception involves an action to eliminate revealing or to convey

misleading EM telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces. An example of this is

to mislead the enemy by transmitting a simulated unique system signature from a nonlethal

platform, thereby allowing the enemy sensors to receive and catalog those systems as actual

threats in the area. Low observable technology is a passive form of manipulative electromagnetic 

deception. By passively manipulating or denying the threat radar from receiving proper return

pulses, it alters the perceived size or presence of an aerospace vehicle. EM deception can use

communication or noncommunication signals to convey indicators that mislead the enemy. It

can also cause the enemy to splinter their intelligence and EW efforts to the point that they will

lose their effectiveness. Manipulative electromagnetic deception can be used to cause the enemy

to misdirect ES and EA assets and, therefore, cause fewer problems with friendly

communications. In this application it is an EP technique.

Simulative electromagnetic deception is action to simulate friendly, notional, or

actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces. Examples of simulative electromagnetic detection 

are: the use of chaff to simulate false targets so that the enemy has the impression of a larger

strike package or the use of a jammer to transmit a deceptive technique that misleads an

adversary’s target tracking radar so that it cannot find the true location of its target.

Types of Electromagnetic Deception

μ Manipulative Electromagnetic Deception

μ Simulative Electromagnetic Deception

μ Imitative Electromagnetic Deception

ECM and the Normandy Landing

'Window' was also employed during the D-day landings. On D-day minus 2,

the coast of Northern France presented a solid radar front—an active threat to

invasion operations. Between Ostend and Cherbourg, there was a major German 

radar station every 10 miles. Actual count from Brest to Calais showed 6 Chimneys

and 6 Hoardings for long-range early warning, 38 Freyas for medium range EW and

night fighter control, 42 Giant Wurzburgs for night fighter control and coast gun

control for use against low flying aircraft, 17 Coastwatchers, and Small Wurzburgs,

one per flak battery.

The first task on D-day was to confuse what remained of the German early

warning radar (EWR) system which still posed a formidable threat to operations of

Allied troop carrier and tug [aircraft towing gliders] aircraft.
13

Self-defense jamming pods, such 

as the ALQ-184, use various 

deception techniques.

Imitative EM deception introduces EM energy into

enemy systems that imitate enemy emissions. Any enemy

receiver can be the target of imitative electromagnetic

deception. This might be used to screen friendly operations. 

An example is the use of a repeater jamming technique that

imitates enemy radar pulses. These pulses, when received by

the tracking radar, input incorrect target information into the

enemy’s system.

Other examples of deception include IR deception

involving manipulation of infrared signatures; radar deception

consisting of reradiation of signals through the use of reflectors, 

transponders, or repeaters; and optical deception by manipulation of the optical region of the EM 

spectrum through the use of aerosols, mists, etc. These techniques may be employed individually

or in combination. In general, EW deception planning determines how to use EM means to

mislead the adversary and create an advantage for friendly forces.

Disruption

Disruption is degrading or interfering with the enemy’s use of the EM spectrum to

limit the enemy’s combat capabilities. Disruption is achieved by using electronic jamming,

electronic deception, electronic intrusion, and destruction. These will enhance attacks against

hostile forces and act as a force multiplier.

Destruction

When used in the EW context, destruction is the elimination of some or all of an

adversary’s electronic defenses. It is the most permanent countermeasure. Target tracking

radars and C2 are high value targets because their destruction seriously hampers the enemy’s

effectiveness. Destruction requires determining the exact location of the target. This location

may be found through the effective application of ES measures. Onboard receivers and direction 

finding equipment may pinpoint the location of the target. Enemy EM systems can be destroyed 

by a variety of weapons and techniques, ranging from bombardment with conventional munitions 

to intense radiation and high energy particle beam overloading. Destruction of enemy EM 

On the night preceding D-day, the confusion was accomplished by Mandrel (antiFreya) jammers carried in eight Sterling aircraft along the south coast, and in four B-17s 

spaced to give cover as far as the island of Guernsey. Flying at 18,000 feet for 5 hours,

these squadrons screened the approach of airborne forces to the French coast.

Meanwhile, British Bomber Command aircraft carried jammers and dropped

Window [chaff] and dummy parachutists inland from the Dover-Calais area. Reacting to 

these countermeasures, German fighter strength spent most of the night circling over the

Calais area. As a result, there were no fighter attacks on the 884 transports and 105 

gliders of the 9th Troop Carrier Command, which landed or dropped some 15,000 troops.

Electronic Combat Principles

AFP 51-45

15 September 1987
14

1973 Arab-Israeli War

 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War

lasted less than a month, yet

it contained all the elements

of a much longer war.

 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War lasted less than a month, 

yet it contained all the elements of a much longer war. 

It was an intense, bitterly contested conflict with each

side well equipped with the weapons for modern

warfare. The Egyptian and Syrian air defenses at

that time were developed from Soviet design. The

design stressed overlapping networks of SAM and

AAA coverage. This formidable air defense network

consisted of the SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, the ZSU-23-4, 

and other AAA systems. While there were proven

ECM from the Vietnam War for the SA-2 and SA-3 

and infrared (IR) countermeasures, such as flares for

the SA-7, the SA-6 proved to be a surprise. The SA6's radars operated in a portion of the EM spectrum

never used before by the Soviets. The Israelis tried to 

compensate for their lack of ECM against the SA-6 by 

flying lower, trying to get under its radar coverage. 

This tactic placed them into the heart of the ZSU-23-4 

threat envelope and contributed to the loss of

numerous aircraft. This forced the Israelis to adjust

their electronic equipment, modify their tactics, and

seek additional ECM equipment, such as ECM pods

and chaff dispensers from the US.

 However, before the tactics were changed and the

new equipment arrived, the Israelis suffered heavy

aircraft losses, which taught them a valuable lesson. 

They learned ECM [EA] is an essential and vital part

of the SEAD campaign.

Electronic Combat Principles

AFP 51-45

15 September 1987

equipment may be the most effective means of denying the enemy the use of the EM spectrum. 

The length of suppression will depend on the enemy’s capability to repair and replace combat

assets. An example of EW application of destruction would be the use of a high-speed 

antiradiation missile (HARM) against an enemy radar. 

ADDITIONAL 

FACTORS

Directed Energy (DE) in EW

DE is an umbrella

term covering technologies

that relate to the production

of a beam of concentrated

electromagnetic energy or

atomic or subatomic particles.

Directed-energy warfare (DEW)

is military action involving the

use of DE weapons, devices,

and countermeasures to either

cause direct damage or destruction of enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel, or to

determine, exploit, reduce, or

prevent hostile use of the EM

spectrum through damage,

destruction, and disruption. It

also includes actions taken to

protect friendly equipment,

facilities, and personnel and to

retain friendly use of the EM

spectrum (JP 1-02). Applications of DE include: laser, radio

frequency, and particle beam. 

DE can be applied to conduct

EA, ES, or EP. For example, a

laser designed to blind or

disrupt optical sensors is EA. A 

warning receiver designed to

detect and analyze a laser signal

is ES. A visor or goggle

designed to filter out the

harmful wavelength of laser

light is EP.
15

UAVs like PREDATOR may be 

used for EA and/or ES in the 

future.

Enemy Capabilities

Commanders must know their own EW capabilities and those of potential enemies. 

Mission planning hinges on accurate information. Each year, new technology weapons systems

are fielded in increasing numbers. Potential adversaries recognize US dependence on

electronically oriented communications and weapons systems. Seeking to take advantage of this 

fact, some potential adversaries are organized to attack our critical weapons systems control

functions and associated communications nodes. Many countries have been purchasing modern

and capable weapons systems from a variety of sources. In addition, terrorists may acquire

highly sophisticated and dangerous weapons. To counter these possibilities, commanders and

their staff must become well versed in the employment of weapons systems and the EW

capabilities of all possible adversaries.

Operational Requirements

The level of EW involvement will always depend on the specific requirements of the 

mission. Electronic warfare is task oriented. Operational objectives, the tactical situation, the

effectiveness and availability of combat systems, and the prevailing domestic and international

political climate determine the appropriate application of military resources. EW planning is not 

just the automatic addition of a specific jamming pod or escort package for a mission. Each task 

may require a specific EW response in order to achieve a desired objective. Commanders and 

their staffs must consider the threat and assets available to support EW objectives. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

The key to successful military operations is a thorough knowledge of enemy

capabilities derived from near-real-time information, focused for the operational

commander, as well as long term operational, scientific, and technical intelligence

information gathered over a period of time. Knowledge of the enemy's projected military

capabilities is required to avoid surprise. Accurate intelligence is needed to gauge the intent of

an adversary, and this intelligence must be transmitted to the users in a timely manner. 

Numerous surveillance and reconnaissance systems are used to collect the data needed to build

the various electronic databases required to effectively employ EW. Advanced processing and

exploitation systems, with man-in-the-loop management and oversight, transform the data into

usable intelligence, while survivable communications grids bring the intelligence to the

operational user. As in all military operations, defining and managing intelligence requirements

are critical to EW

Environmental Conditions

The natural environment also affects the use of the EM 

spectrum. These effects occur over the entire spectrum. 

Clouds, sun glint, ground reflections, moisture, and dust can

degrade performance of systems operating in the IR and

optical frequencies. Atmospheric conditions can distort radar

signals causing track errors, extending the detection ranges or

creating “holes” in radar coverage. Rain and frozen

precipitation also affects microwave transmissions by

attenuating and scattering the signal. Even disturbances on the sun and in the upper atmosphere
16

can create radio frequency interference (RFI) in radars and satellite links, impact high-frequency 

radio and satellite communications, and degrade ground positioning system (GPS) accuracy. 

Planners using forecasts of terrestrial and space environmental conditions can exploit or mitigate 

these effects to their advantage over an adversary.

CONCLUSION

Electronic warfare through effective use of detection, denial, deception, disruption, and

destruction provides timely intelligence, enhances combat power by disrupting the enemy’s use

of the electromagnetic spectrum at critical times, and ensures continued friendly use of the

electromagnetic spectrum. The synergistic effects of various EW techniques can significantly

disrupt an IADS, sensors, communication links, weapon systems, and C2. Jamming, chaff, and

decoys degrade the enemy’s ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess. Radar-guided 

weapon systems that survive destruction attempts lose some effectiveness in an EW

environment. In short, the probability of success is greatly increased when EW is properly

employed. Electronic warfare is a key element in the successful employment of air and space

forces.
17

CHAPTER THREE

ELECTRONIC WARFARE ORGANIZATION

GENERAL

EW assets are organized on the air and space tenet of centralized control and

decentralized execution. Air Force EW resources are normally employed as part of an air and

space expeditionary task force (AETF) and exercised at the lowest level providing

responsiveness to the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). Appropriate EW expertise 

must be available at all levels of command where EW coordination, planning, and tasking occur.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Joint and multinational plans must be developed for integrating EW activities. Close 

coordination between coalition partners, Services, air traffic control facilities, civil defense

activities, and war-related commerce departments is essential for EW application to be effective

and not interfere with friendly forces. This is required to ensure maximum support, prevent

mutual interference, define mutually supporting roles, avoid duplication of effort, and provide

security. The importance of integration and coordination cannot be overemphasized, particularly

since technological advances are increasing the complexity and interdependence of combat 

operations. The required deconfliction and coordination of airborne and space-based EW support 

should be accomplished at the joint air operations center (JAOC), or at the combined air

operations center (CAOC), which works in coordination with the joint task force (JTF). 

Considerations must include the impact of EW on C2, other information operations, and

interrelated requirements for use of the EM spectrum. Specific guidance on organization and

procedures is covered in JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare.

The number of specialized EW assets is usually limited; therefore, operational control of

these forces should not be delegated lower than the joint force air component commander

(JFACC). The JAOC is notionally organized as illustrated in figure 3.1. Wing and unit level

staffs and individual aircrews develop the detailed tactical planning for specific EW missions.

Individual operators must keep current in systems employment and the threat.

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you 

with their ingenuity.

General George S. Patton
18

JAOC/CAOC PLANNING AND EXECUTION PROCESS

Fundamental to the JAOC is an integrated team controlled by the JAOC director. Within 

the JAOC, the EW staff officer or the EW branch of the Combat Plans Division (CPD)

(depending on JAOC manning and organization) normally has primary responsibility for air and 

space EW planning and integration into the air and space assessment, planning, and execution 

process (see figure 3.2) that produces the air tasking order (ATO) for the JTF and monitors its

execution. Individual wing commanders will provide an EW point of contact who may be the

wing electronic warfare officer (EWO), wing defensive systems officer (DSO), or wing

electronic combat officer (ECO) as the EW representative to the JAOC for the respective wing's

weapon platform(s). The wing EW representatives plan for available EW equipment

employment and oversee radar warning receiver and other EW systems reprogramming.

Component Liaisons

Area Air Defense

Information Warfare

Space

Logistics/Sustainment

Airspace Management

Weather

Legal

Rescue Coordination

System Administration

Air-to-Air Refueling

Communication Operations

(Others as needed)

Strategy

Division

Strategy

Plans

Team

Operational

Assessment

Team

Combat

Plans

Division

GAT

Team

MAAP

Team

ATO

Production

Team

C2

Planning

Team

Combat

Operations

Division

Offensive

Operations

Team

Defensive

Operations

Team

ISR

Division

Analysis

Correlation

And Fusion

Team

Targeting/

BDA Team

ISR

Management

Team

(ISR 

Management 

and RFI 

Management)

PED

Team

SCI

Management

Team

Air

Mobility

Division

Airlift

Control

Team

Air

Refueling

Control

Team

Air

Mobility

Control

Team

Aeromedical

Evacuation

Control

Team

Air

Mobility

Element

Note: This diagram illustrates a large notional AOC with all five major divisions and several support and specialty teams. 

The mission will determine the actual mix of divisions and teams in the JAOC; not all divisions and teams may be needed. 

Refer to AFI 13-1AOC, volume III, for a more complete discussion of all teams, processes, and supporting systems.

Figure 3.1. Notional JAOC with Representative Core, Specialty, and Support Teams
19

Figure 3.2. The Air and Space Assessment, Planning, and Execution Process

The JAOC EW staff officer or other personnel supporting the EW (CPD) branch typically

integrates with the IO cell that coordinates all IO actions within the JAOC. The EW

representative of the IO cell could be the same as the EW representative of the CPD, but more

likely would be a separate EW staff representative trained to facilitate the coordination of EW

with other disciplines of IO. Essentially, the JAOC EW staff officer or the CPD EW branch

oversees Air Force Service component asset issues while the IO EW representative coordinates

broader IO across the Services as a representative of the designated A-3/J-3. The IO cell is

charged with coordinating the offensive and defensive aspects of IO to include special programs

and integrating IO efforts with the joint air operations plan (JAOP). Those individuals should

represent all aspects of air and space EW planning and execution and work closely with the

intelligence personnel. The interface between the JAOC EW representative and the IO cell

ensures that all aspects of EW are fully integrated into strategy development, operational-level 

assessment, detailed planning, ATO production, and execution functions.

ASSESSMENT

& ANALYSIS

EXECUTION ATO / SPINS

PRODUCTION

STRATEGY

DEVELOPMENT

DETAILED

PLANNING

ASSESS

EXECUTE

PLAN

 AIR OPERATIONS

CENTER PROCESS

JFC GUIDANCE

& OBJECTIVES

JFACC GUIDANCE

& OBJECTIVES

COMPONENT COMMANDER

GUIDANCE AND

OBJECTIVES

COMPONENT PLANNING

AND EXECUTION

PROCESS
20

The JAOC is at the heart of coordinating air and space planning, execution, and assessment,

 to include electronic warfare.

EW SUPPORT TO THE JOINT FORCE AIR AND SPACE COMPONENT 

COMMANDER (JFACC)

The joint force commander (JFC) will normally designate a JFACC to exploit the

capabilities of joint air and space operations through a cohesive JAOP and a responsive and

integrated control system. The JFC must clearly define EW objectives and ensure that assets

supporting these objectives are properly employed and integrated throughout military operations. 

The JAOC formulates plans and coordinates air and space EW activities based on the JFACC's

guidance, which is based on JFC objectives. It receives, assembles, analyzes, processes, and

disseminates all source intelligence required for air and space EW planning. Airborne and spacebased EW support assets are normally tasked through the ATO. EW planners will support the

JFACC as follows:

μ Develop a joint EW strategy. 

μ Task, plan, coordinate, and allocate the joint EW capabilities/forces made available to the

JFACC by direction of the JFC and provide EW support to the Air Force functions.

μ Perform combat assessment of joint EW operations at the operational and tactical levels.

μ Provide integrated ES for the JFC.

μ μ Identify JFACC requirements.
21

μ μ Integrate and synchronize use of air and space assets.

μ μ Task theater ES assets to satisfy JFC requirements.

If working with allies in a coalition, the EW team will support the Combined Force

Air Component Commander (CFACC).

EW SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER, AIR FORCE FORCES 

(COMAFFOR)

The COMAFFOR provides unity of command, one of the most widely recognized

principles of war. The COMAFFOR normally exercises operational control (OPCON) over all 

assigned and attached US Air Force forces. EW planners will assist the COMAFFOR in

fulfilling the following administrative control (ADCON) responsibilities:

μ Make recommendations to the JFC (or the JFACC, if the COMAFFOR is not the JFACC) on 

the proper employment of the EW forces of the Air Force component.

μ Accomplish assigned EW tasks.

μ Nominate specific EW units of the Air Force for assignment to theater forces.

μ Maintain reach back to Air Force forces (AFFOR) rear and to the supporting Air Force EW

units.

μ Support operations and exercise EW plans as requested.

μ Inform the combatant commander (and any intermediate JFCs) of EW program and budget

decisions that may affect joint operation planning.

μ Provide lateral EW interface with Army, Navy, Marines, special operations forces (SOF), and 

coalition partners.

When the COMAFFOR is delegated OPCON of the Air Force component forces, and

there is no JFACC, EW planners will assist the COMAFFOR in fulfilling the following OPCON 

responsibilities:

μ Prepare an EW estimate of the situation to support the JFC’s estimate.

μ Develop and recommend EW courses of action to the JFC.

μ Develop an EW strategy and an operations plan that state how the COMAFFOR plans to

exploit EW capabilities to support the JFC’s objectives.
22

μ Make EW apportionment recommendations to the JFC.

μ Task, plan, coordinate, and allocate the daily airborne and space-based EW effort. 

μ Function as the integrator for EW for counterair operations, strategic attack, the overall air

interdiction effort, space support, and theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance.

μ Function as the EW interface, as directed by the JFC, for operations such as close air support, 

air interdiction within the land and naval component area of operations (AOs), and maritime

support.

μ Coordinate EW support for combat search and rescue.

μ Provide electronic database and communications network support.

μ Conduct joint EW training of components of other Services as directed, in joint operations

for which the COMAFFOR has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the

Air Force component's facilities and capabilities are suitable.

COMAFFOR HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION: THE “A” STAFF

The COMAFFOR headquarters is usually comprised of normal staff directorates (see

figure 3.3), A-1 through A-6, as well as a special staff. In deliberate planning or crisis action

planning, the numbered air force (NAF) who is normally designated as the COMAFFOR will

integrate EW experts into the organization. More details are available in AFDD 2, Organization 

and Employment of Aerospace Power. The core of the EW function is located in the A-3 as part 

of the JAOC and its IO cell. The entire IO operation must be integrated with A-2/3/5/6. The EW 

personnel will provide these functions:

Intelligence (A-2)

μ Provide to the intelligence staff the A-2 related EW objectives, intent, and plans.

μ Coordinate EW intelligence support from JFC fusion centers, major command (MAJCOM)

intelligence staffs, theater intelligence agencies, national intelligence agencies, and coalition

intelligence sources.

Operations/Plans (A-3/A-5)

μ Organize the operational EW aspects of the headquarters staff.

μ Coordinate operational EW issues with the JFC and component staffs. Typical issues would

include:

μ μ Rules of engagement for EW air and space forces.
23

μ μ Assist in unit bed down requirements for air and space EW forces.

μ μ EW development requirements for ATO and airspace control order (ACO).

μ μ Requirements for additional EW forces/capabilities.

μ μ Requirements for force protection. 

μ Identify essential elements of information (EEI) to A-2.

μ Apprise the ISR team chief of EW capabilities and limitations of all components and the

potential effects on operations.

μ Assist ISR team chief with EW intelligence support requirements of subordinate units.

μ Develop and coordinate the EW plan and integrate it into the IO plan that accomplishes the

JFC’s objectives.

μ Identify Service-specific EW training requirements and coordinate joint training with other

components.

μ Advise COMAFFOR on concepts of EW employment, force planning, and management of

EW resources for which he has OPCON/tactical control (TACON) or has established 

supported/supporting relationships.

μ Provide information on the number and location of all EW air and space assets.

Communications and Information (A-6)

μ Coordinate for the A-3 to ensure that frequency allocations and assignments meet technical

parameters under host-nation agreements.

μ Deconflict frequencies and coordinate the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) with J-6.

μ Provide communications-electronics operating instructions for assigned air and space forces.

μ Plan, coordinate, and monitor EW related communications security (COMSEC) procedures

and assets.

25

CHAPTER FOUR

PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT

PLANNING

General

EW planning requires a broad understanding of enemy and friendly capabilities, tactics,

and objectives (see figure 4.1). Employment of EW assets must be closely integrated into, and

supportive of, the commander's overall planning effort. This planning requires a multidisciplined 

approach with expertise from operations (ground, airborne, space), intelligence, logistics,

weather, and information.

To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind by

sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating 

confusion in their minds.

 Mae Tse Tung

INTERCEPT, IDENTIFY, LOCATE THREATS AND POTENTIAL TARGETS

COORDINATE AND EVALUATE POTENTIAL EW ACTIONS

DETERMINE DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE COURSES OF ACTION

COMMANDER'S DECISION

TO

NEUTRALIZE

 

DISRUPT AND/OR DESTROY JAM AND/OR DECEIVE

 LISTEN AND/OR EXPLOIT 

Figure 4.1. Steps to Determine Course of Action (COA) for EW Employment
26

DESERT STORM: First Night

MH-53J PAVE LOW 

Early in the morning of 17 January 1991, three US Air Force MH-53J PAVE

LOW helicopters led nine US Army AH-64 Apache helicopters across the Saudi

Arabia-Iraq border to attack two Iraqi early warning radar sites. Taking down these

two sites opened the door for attacks across Iraq by F-117s, other coalition aircraft

and Tomahawk missiles.

After the F-117s and cruise missiles came conventional aircraft. From 0355L to 

0420L (H+55 to H+1:20) large numbers of USAF, USN, USMC, RSAF, and RAF

aircraft smashed Iraqi air defenses and fields from H-3, an airfield located in western

Iraq, to Ahmed Al Jaber, an airfield in occupied Kuwait. Two packages of aircraft,

one a USN package from the Red Sea carriers and the other a USAF package from the 

south pointed directly at Baghdad. These "gorilla" packages were intended to seem

threatening enough to force the Iraqis to hurl their air resources in defense. Air Force 

ground-launched BQM-34 and Navy tactical air-launched decoys (TALD) mimicked

the radar return of conventional aircraft to further arouse Iraqi radar operators,

many already confused by the absence of central control from Kari. They responded

by turning on their equipment. Finally, radar-jamming aircraft radiated blanketing

electronic emissions that drove the Iraqi radar operators to go to full power in an

attempt to break through the interference. Then, the two incoming coalition flights

revealed their true nature and pounced in a shrewd and devastating ruse.

Instead of bomb-carrying fighter-bombers, they were radar-killing electronic

warriors carrying AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMS) designed to

home in on SAM and AAA radar. USAF F-4G Wild Weasels alone expended dozens

of HARMS in twenty minutes, while USN/USMC F/A-18s fired one hundred for the

night. HARMS filled the air over Baghdad, the site of over one-half of Iraq's SAM

and AAA batteries. Foolishly, the Iraqis did not turn off their radars, even when the

HARMS fireballed in their midst; as one USAF flight leader averred, ‘the emitters

came on and stayed on for the entire flight of the missiles.’ This deadly surprise not

only destroyed many Iraqi radars, it also terrified their operators. For the rest of the

war, they showed great reluctance to use radar and often chose to launch their SAMs

with optical or even no guidance. The initial HARM attack and the F-117 bombings of 

the Kari system left Iraq's integrated air defense system shattered, opening up the

country so completely that, within days, coalition air-to-air tankers regularly operated 

in Iraqi airspace. Other non-stealthy aircraft pummeled Iraqi airfields.

Richard G. Davis

 Decisive Force: Strategic Bombing in the Gulf War
27

Planning Requirements

As a conflict progresses, adjustments will be necessary based on current intelligence.

Proper EW planning can minimize friendly losses and optimize operational effectiveness.

Preconflict plans should cover all long-range possibilities. Accordingly, preparation is not under

pressure caused by enemy initiatives. An assessment of enemy and friendly capabilities is

fundamental for preconflict planning. These plans should integrate the C2 strategy, air defense

targeting, and plans to support primary mission resources. EW support to primary mission

aircraft will depend on where friendly aircraft are at critical times. This support should consider

detection, deception, denial, disruptive, and destructive systems capabilities. The C2 and air

defense prioritized target list must be integrated into the overall prioritized target list. How and

when these targets are attacked depends on the apportionment and allocation process, as

determined by the JFC’s objective. The EW plan should be optimized against enemy system

vulnerabilities. Factors influencing EW planning include available assets; desired effects

(exploitation, deception, disruption, or destruction); placement limitations (altitude, range, time,

or loads); frequency deconfliction; anticipated EW missions from other Services; and

authentication requirements.

Planning Priorities

As with any operation, the JFC's objective, enemy situation, and available assets will

impact on the priority for employment of EW assets. EW is task, scenario, and time dependent.

The commander's EW plans must be flexible to keep pace with the dynamic combat

environment.

Force Mix Considerations

A balance is necessary between dedicated and self-protection EW systems as well as

between the different EW effects. The commander's objectives, the enemy's capabilities, and the 

equipment available determine the actual force mix. Considerations include the threat, tactics,

attrition rates, regeneration factors, friendly and enemy sortie rates, technological risks, and

warning times. The effectiveness of offensive electronic assets can be measured by the

degradation of the adversary C2. Defensively, effectiveness can be measured by retention of

friendly forces C2 and survivability. The effectiveness of destructive assets can be measured by

analyzing the effect on the enemy. The desired impact will be specified in the overall objectives 

provided by the JFC.

EW jammers vary in effective range, power, and modulation. EM radiations can be

aimed and focused, but do not stop at definitive geographic boundaries or discrete altitudes. 

Theater EM spectrum (frequency) interface deconfliction procedures are necessary to minimize

mutual interference and degradation of friendly efforts. Frequency management is enhanced if:
28

μ Jammer system design includes directional antennas.

μ Capabilities exist to lockout frequencies.

μ Friendly forces state realistic restricted frequency requirements.

μ A command and control process exists which is responsive to real-time frequency changes.

Intelligence Support

Accurate and timely intelligence is the foundation for effective EW planning and

employment. Intelligence supports EW through several functions. First, constant analysis by

various scientific and technical centers guards against hostile technical surprise. Second,

indications and warning (I&W) centers provide tactical and strategic warning to friendly forces. 

Third, intelligence continually monitors threat systems to support reprogramming of all systems. 

Fourth, intelligence supports mission planning.

Specifically, intelligence supports EW by providing a technical threat description and a

tailored threat environment description. Electronic warfare planning requires parametric and

employment data, modeling and simulation tools, and mission planning tools to prioritize targets 

and defense tasks. All-source intelligence assets are required to support both offensive and

defensive EW planning. To be of value, these assets must provide timely intelligence and be

responsive to the commander's needs. Intelligence support includes establishing and maintaining 

comprehensive support databases as well as looking at scientific and technical intelligence and

general military intelligence capabilities. Intelligence information must be filtered, integrated,

and evaluated so the EW planners and decision makers are not overloaded with excessive or

meaningless data.

Logistics Support

Readiness and sustainability of electronic assets are directly related to the quality of

logistics planning. EW logistics programs should be developed in balance with modernization

efforts and the operating capability each category of resources provides. Emphasis must be on

total effectiveness to maximize EW capabilities.
29

EMPLOYMENT

General

The employment of EW capabilities to affect an adversary can yield a tremendous

advantage to US military forces. EW objectives must be clearly established, support overall

national and military objectives, and include identifiable indicators of success.

Combatant Commanders

Combatant commanders must carefully consider the potential of EW. Combatant

commanders should: 

μ Integrate EW capabilities into deliberate and crisis action planning in accordance with

appropriate policy and doctrine.

μ Ensure maximum coordination among EW and other information operations intelligence and 

communications support activities to maximize effect and to reduce electronic fratricide.

μ Incorporate EW tactics, techniques, and procedures into exercises and training events using 

the joint training process.

μ Identify EW capability requirements and submit appropriate mission needs statements.

μ Develop EW intelligence requirements in support of all pertinent OPLANs.

μ Identify EW education and training requirements.

Integration with friends and allies is vital for 

successful use of EW. This HARM-equipped 

German Air Force PANAVIA TORNADO was part 

of NATO forces used in Operation ALLIED 

FORCE.
30

EW Applications Across the Spectrum of Combat

EW may be conducted in a variety of situations and circumstances across the range of

military operations. The decision to employ EW should be based not only on overall joint

campaign or operation objectives, but also on the risks of possible adversary responses and

other potential effects on the campaign or operation. Based on an understanding of the tenets 

of EW discussed in chapter two, the employment of EW must include the consideration of

several factors. Several EW applications may escalate use of the EM spectrum. For example,

low orders of EW activity such as collection or exploitation have different consequences than

lethal SEAD options. The Air Force may conduct operations across the different levels of war,

and these operations may be affected by the EM spectrum. Included is a wide range of missions

ranging from peacetime operations to war. The application of EW in military operations other

than war (MOOTW) will probably be different. It is a theater commander’s responsibility to

determine the level of EW application to operations under his control.

Military Operations Other Than War

These missions may be operations into friendly nations; however, some nation-states are

unstable and may include elements that are actively hostile toward the United States. In other

situations, political or international considerations may require air operations to be conducted

within known threat areas. Terrorist and criminal groups may possess man portable air defense

systems (MANPADs) and other IR/electro-optical systems. The employment of flares and IR

jammers may become an operational requirement to counter these threats during peaceful

missions to these friendly nations. Several EW applications may be available for MOOTW. EW 

assets may be available for tasking for a variety of missions. Nearly all-nonlethal options are

available, but it is the commander’s responsibility to define these options in the ROE operation

order (OPORD) or other governing directive. Although electronic attack options, such as

communications and radar jamming are generally considered hostile, they may be necessary to

protect the tasked forces.

Combat Operations

A properly constructed force package that includes EW enhances the probability of 

survival of all forces. It is unlikely that combat air and space operations will be able to

completely avoid enemy defenses since they usually defend the desired targets. The density

and potential lethality of the adversary air defense system may challenge mission effectiveness

and the survivability of Air Force assets. At the tactical level, mission planning tries to strike the 

appropriate balance between mission accomplishment and force survival. Thorough planning at

the operational level gives tactical commanders the proper tools to allow them to strike that

balance.
31

BEKAA VALLEY (1982)

Russian built SA-9 like those used by Syria

 On 9 June the IAF [Israeli Air

Force] took on the Syrian air defenses

in the Bekaa Valley with a complex yet 

carefully planned, coordinated, and

executed attack. The Israelis used airand ground-launched drones as

decoys to activate Syrian radar. This

allowed the Israeli EC-135s to obtain 

the location and frequency of the

Syrian radars and in turn to rapidly

relay this information to strike elements. The Israelis thereby coupled

real-time intelligence with rapid

response to give their pilots precise

locations of the SAMs and accurate 

tuning information for their jamming 

equipment. In the electronics war, the IAF used ECM pods, chaff rockets, possibly chaff 

from drones, and standoff jammers in CH-53, Boeing 707, and Arava transports. The

Israeli airmen employed diversionary tactics, precise timing, sharply executed low-level 

tactics, and weapons such as ARMs, standoff weapons, iron bombs, and cluster

munitions. In addition, the Israelis used a new surface-to-surface ARM, the WOLF

missile. Ground forces fired artillery, launched ground assaults along the front, and just 

before the air attack took out a control center with a commando raid. The Syrians did

not help their own cause, as they failed to dig in, poorly sited their radar, and ignited

smoke screens that guided rather than confused the IAF. On the first day, the IAF

destroyed 17 missile batteries and severely damaged two others. The Syrians pushed

more SAM units into the Bekaa Valley, but to no avail. On the second day of the action, 

the IAF destroyed 11 more missile batteries. On 24 July the Israelis knocked out three

batteries of SA-8s. A few days later, they destroyed some SA-9s. Reportedly, the IAF

destroyed four SA-9 batteries in September.

Kenneth P. Werrell

Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM 

33

CHAPTER FIVE

EQUIP AND SUSTAIN

GENERAL

Air Force MAJCOMS are responsible to train and equip forces for employment by warfighting joint force commanders (JFCs). In the process of equipping forces for EW, MAJCOMs 

must plan for, acquire, and field the parts, supplies, munitions, support equipment, support

personnel, and communications infrastructure to sustain the EW capabilities of forces deployed

or in garrison.

SYSTEM ENGINEERING

The ALQ-131 is an integrated system that has 

 been updated to counter new and evolving

 threats. 

System design should be driven by user requirements, current and projected threats, and

concept of operations. To achieve this versatility, system design must be generic, robust, and

easily expanded or modified to meet the threat. EW systems should be an integral part of the

weapon system design. EW systems should be designed to accommodate any changes necessary

to counter new and evolving threats. These design features ensure EW equipment is not only

reactive but also anticipatory of threats designed to counter US responses. EW systems must be

able to operate in a dense environment of both friendly and hostile systems. A means of

maintaining security for possible war reserve modes must be incorporated in the system design to 

avoid compromise of our system capability. EW systems are subject to unintended interactions or 

mutual interference. This may come from other systems on the same platform, other aircraft, and 

other systems operating throughout the theater. Compatibility, interoperability, and frequency

deconfliction of EW systems must be integrated across the electronic battlespace.

EFFECTIVE ELECTRONIC PROTECTION (EP)

EW systems evolve continuously as engineers develop improved capabilities and

countermeasures to hostile capabilities. All weapons systems (not just EW systems) must have

effective EP to operate in a hostile EW environment. Friendly forces expanded use and reliance

on new technologies in the fields of communication and navigation have spotlighted the critical

need to develop robust EP programs. Systems in development must include EP considerations at 

the beginning of the design cycle and be able to accept EP updates (hardware and software) to 
34

keep pace with the evolving EW threat. Continuous intelligence support is required to look for

evolutionary and revolutionary developments in adversary threat systems so that the appropriate

EP can be designed and deployed.

COMMUNICATIONS PLANS

Communications plans are directly related to electronic warfare plans.

Communications plans provide for redundancy, workarounds, and regeneration of required

friendly communications systems. Communications staff participation is required when EW

frequency deconfliction and defensive information operations plans are worked. 

Communications support is critical for effective intelligence support and reprogramming actions

for EW systems.

REPROGRAMMING AND ELECTRONIC DATABASE SUPPORT

EW operations demand large amounts of data on US and friendly systems and operations 

in addition to intelligence support on hostile forces. Programming and reprogramming EW

systems and targeting work are based on parametric databases, EOB, and communications

network databases. An accurate and available intelligence base and the tools necessary to use 

the intelligence information are the foundation for effective EW planning and employment. 

These databases are developed from US and friendly data exchanges and all-source intelligence

collection and reporting. An EW system's flexibility depends on its capability to adapt to

changing threats. EW systems depend on rapid reprogramming, which is enabled by rapid

communication of intelligence data to operators and reprogramming centers, where updated 

mission software is created and transmitted to the field. This portion of the electronic warfare

integrated reprogramming (EWIR) process depends on MAJCOM, system program office (SPO), 

Air Logistics Center (ALC), and reprogramming center support. The COMAFFOR should

ensure the reprogramming process is accomplished for Air Force forces. In addition, if the

COMAFFOR is also designated by the JFC as the JFACC, then that commander should ensure

that reprogramming is done for all air and space forces assigned to the joint force.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

An accurate and available intelligence base is the foundation for effective EW

planning and employment. Intelligence supports EW by using various scientific and technical

centers to guard against hostile technical surprise. I&W centers provide tactical and strategic

warning for friendly forces. Also, intelligence monitors threat systems to support reprogramming 

and assist in mission planning.
35

CHAPTER SIX

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Effective employment of EW depends on commanders, aircrews, and planners

understanding EW system capabilities. To achieve this they must be well versed in the

integration of EW at all levels of operations. Specialized education and realistic training in IO

execution and EW employment achieve this objective. Specialized schools or classes are a

valuable tool that can provide commanders, operations staffs, and operators with in-depth IO and 

EW skills. Education provides in-depth knowledge of theories of EW, which allow commanders 

and aircrews to creatively adapt to the dynamics of warfare. Training provides specific skills to

be employed in time critical situations. Both are essential to success in war.

EDUCATION

Basic

High levels of proficiency are required for everyone involved with electronic 

warfare employment. All aircrews must receive basic EW education through unit-initiated 

programs. Aircrews should also attend major weapons system (MWS) specific training courses

in order to gain the required in-depth knowledge of employing EW from their MWS. Examples

include Fighter Electronic Combat Officers Course FECOC, (which is appropriate for A-10, F16, F-15C/E and F-117 aircrews) and each of the airframe specific courses offered by Air

Education and Training Command (AETC), both pipeline and upgrade training. Other specialties 

must be familiar with EW principles and employment in order to design and acquire useful

systems, provide intelligence support, reprogram mission data, and perform other critical support 

and planning tasks. Additionally, practitioners of EW should try to attend the many joint/NATO 

EW courses that are available. Our sister Services and coalition partners have valuable

experience that the USAF can learn from.

Advanced

Air operations staffs require specialized and comprehensive education training to acquire 

essential, unique skills. These individuals are key elements for the effective integration of

EW at all levels of the air campaign. They must have an in-depth knowledge of national

assets, and an understanding of targeting, so they can provide the commander with an EW

package tailored to the operational objectives. Attendance of a JAOC initial qualification training 

In the profession of war the rules of the art are never violated without drawing

punishment from the enemy who is delighted to find us at fault. An officer can spare

himself many mistakes by improving himself.

 Frederick the Great
36

course is recommended. Additionally, attendance of the USAF Electronic Warfare Coordinator

course is highly recommended.

In this time of electronic media it would be remiss to forget the many excellent training

and resource sites available on the worldwide web. Each of the major EW centers has such a

website. These websites require SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) access,

but they provide a wealth of technical and tactical information.

Senior

Senior officers must be well versed in the basic tenets of air and space EW

employment and integration. Not only are they tasked as commanders for air operations during 

times of conflict, they are also involved with critical decisions on equipping, sustaining, and

employing our forces to meet national objectives.

TRAINING

Training must have attainable objectives that are specific, relevant, and necessary 

for combat. Employment of EW during training should be accomplished in a realistic combat

environment and should include operations with actual combat equipment. Employment

restraints and limited resources are serious impediments to effective EW training. A review of

deficiencies noted from past operations and exercises provides a valuable training resource. 

Emphasis should be placed on evaluating EW tactics, procedures, and safety constraints to

optimize EW employment.

Electronic warfare training must be emphasized on a continuing basis (daily, weekly,

quarterly, etc.) and must include all personnel who may encounter direct or indirect, friendly or

hostile, EW situations. EW impacts personnel in many areas to include: flight operations,

air weapons, communications, intelligence, maintenance, security, and other operations

and support functions. Each training exercise must include EW objectives and EW assets. 

Strategic, and to a degree, operational level staff training can be achieved through gaming and

simulation. Effective tactical training can only be achieved through live coordination and

employment of actual EW assets.

Unit training should include enemy threat system characteristics, capabilities, and

limitations. Unit training should also include, to the maximum extent possible, joint and

coalition assets as well as organic USAF systems. Operators must train against an IADS that 

includes all types of threats: surface-to-air, air-to-air, and electronic warfare systems. 

Proficiency must be maintained in the operation of EW equipment as well as the employment of 

EW tactics both USAF and joint/coalition. Training should be realistic, based on accurate threat 

capabilities, and must provide accurate and rapid feedback to the trainees. The motto of EW

training remains: “Train with EW, Fight with EW.”

At the Heart of Warfare lies doctrine . . .
37

Suggested Readings

CJCSI 3210.01, Joint Information Warfare Policy

CJCSM 3212.01, Performing Electronic Attack in the United States and Canada for Tests, 

Training, and Exercises

DOD Directive S-3600.1, Information Operations

JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations

JP 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare

JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare

JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception

Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force

De Arcangelis, Mario. Electronic Warfare: From the Battle of Tsushima to the Falklands and

Lebanon Conflicts (Poole, Dorset: Blandford Press). 1985.

Munro, Neil. The Quick and the Dead: Electronic Combat and Modern Warfare (New York: St 

Martin's Press). 1991.

Price, Alfred. The History of US Electronic Warfare, Volume I (The Association of Old

Crowes). 1984.

Price, Alfred. The History of US Electronic Warfare, Volume II (The Association of Old

Crowes). 1989.

Werrell, Kenneth P. Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press) 

1988.

39

Glossary

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA antiaircraft artillery

ACO airspace control order

ACQ acquisition

ADCON administrative control

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AETF air and space expeditionary task force

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AFFOR Air Force forces

AFIWC Air Force Information Warfare Center

ALC Air Logistics Center

ANG Air National Guard 

AO area of operations

ATO air tasking order

C2 command and control

CAOC Combined Air Operations Center

CFACC Combined Force Air Component Commander

CJCSI Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces

COMINT communications intelligence 

COMSEC communications security

CPD Combat Plans Division

DCI defensive counterinformation

DE directed energy

DEW directed-energy warfare

DOD Department of Defense

DSO defensive systems officer

EA electronic attack

ECM electronic countermeasures

ECO electronic combat officer

EEI essential elements of information

ELINT electronics intelligence

EM electromagnetic

EMCON emission control

EOB electronic order of battle

EP electronic protection 

ES electronic warfare support 

EW electronic warfare

EW/GCI early warning/ground-controlled intercept 
40

EWIR electronic warfare integrated reprogramming

EWO electronic warfare officer

FDS foundational doctrine statement

GCI ground-controlled intercept

GPS ground positioning system

HARM high-speed antiradiation missile

HUMINT human intelligence

IADS integrated air defense system

I&W indications and warning

IIW information-in-warfare

IO information operations

IR infrared

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JAOC joint air operations center

JAOP joint air operations plan

JFACC joint force air and space component commander

JFC joint force commander

JP joint publication

JRFL joint restricted frequency list 

JSTARS joint surveillance, target attack radar system

JTF joint task force

MAJCOM major command

MANPAD man portable air defense system

MIJI meaconing, interference, jamming and intrusion

MOOTW military operations other than war

NAF numbered air force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OCI offensive counterinformation

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

OPSEC operations security

PRF pulse repetition frequency

RFI radio frequency interference

ROE rules of engagement
41

RWR radar warning receiver

SAM surface-to-air missile

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SIGINT signals intelligence

SOF special operations forces

SPO system program office

TACON tactical control

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

USAFR United States Air Force Reserve

Definitions

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other

organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces,

control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit

training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the 

operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

air tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and 

command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces to targets and specific 

missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling

agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called ATO. (JP 1-02)

antiradiation missile. A missile which homes passively on a radiation source. Also called

ARM. (JP 1-02)

chaff. Radar confusion reflectors consisting of thin, narrow metallic strips of various lengths and 

frequency responses, used to reflect echoes for confusion purposes. (JP 1-02) [NOTE: Most of

today’s chaff consists of aluminum-coated glass fiber.] 

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated

commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command

and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,

communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,

coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also

called C2. (JP 1-02)

command and control system. The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and

personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of

assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 1-02)
42

communications deception. Use of devices, operations, and techniques with the intent of

confusing or misleading the user of a communications link or a navigation system. (JP 1-02)

communications intelligence. Technical information and intelligence derived from foreign

communications by other than the intended recipients. Also called COMINT. (JP 1-02)

communications security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny

unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study

of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of 

such possession and study. Also called COMSEC. Communications security includes:

cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and physical security of communications 

security materials and information.

a. cryptosecurity—The component of communications security that results from the

provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. 

b. transmission security—The component of communications security that results from all 

measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means

other than cryptanalysis. 

c. emission security—The component of communications security that results from all

measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived

from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from crypto-equipment and

telecommunications systems.

d. physical security—The component of communications security that results from all

physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents

from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's

assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations 

frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly

when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in

succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included

primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept or CONOPS. (JP 

1-02)

control. 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of 

the activities of subordinate or other organizations. 2. In mapping, charting,and photogrammetry, 

a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the Earth or on a map or a photograph,

whose positions or elevations, or both, have been or will be determined. 3. Physical or

psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as

directed. 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, information, or

material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community agreement and are

specifically defined in appropriate regulations. See also administrative control, operational

control, tactical control. (JP 1-02)
43

counterinformation. Counterinformation seeks to establish a desired degree of control in

information functions that permits friendly forces to operate at a given time or place without 

prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Also called CI. (AFDD 2-5)

countermeasures. That form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or

techniques, has as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy activity. 

See also electronic warfare. (JP 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or

falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s

interests. (JP 1-02)

defensive counterinformation. Activities which are conducted to protect and defend friendly

information and information systems. Also called DCI.

directed energy. An umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of a beam 

of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles. Also called DE. (JP 1-

02)

directed-energy warfare. Military action involving the use of directed-energy weapons,

devices, and countermeasures to either cause direct damage or destruction of enemy equipment,

facilities, and personnel, or to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the

electromagnetic spectrum through damage, destruction, and disruption. It also includes actions

taken to protect friendly equipment, facilities, and personnel and retain friendly use of the

electromagnetic spectrum. Also called DEW. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic deception. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, suppression,

absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to 

convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons,

thereby degrading or neutralizing the enemy's combat capability. Among the types of

electromagnetic deception are:

a. manipulative electromagnetic deception—Actions to eliminate revealing, or convey

misleading, electromagnetic telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces;

b. simulative electromagnetic deception—Actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual 

capabilities to mislead hostile forces;

c. imitative electromagnetic deception—The introduction of electromagnetic energy into

enemy systems that imitates enemy emissions. See also electronic warfare. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic environmental effects. The impact of the electromagnetic environment upon

the operational capability of military forces, equipment, systems, and platforms. It encompasses

all electromagnetic disciplines, including electromagnetic compatibility and electromagnetic

interference; electromagnetic vulnerability; electromagnetic pulse; electronic protection, hazards

of electromagnetic radiation to personnel, ordnance, and volatile materials; and natural

phenomena effects of lightning and precipitation-static. Also called E3. (JP 1-02)
44

electromagnetic interference. Any electromagnetic disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or

otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics and electrical equipment. It 

can be induced intentionally, as in some forms of electronic warfare, or unintentionally, as a

result of spurious emissions and responses, intermodulation products, and the like. Also called

EMI. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic intrusion. The intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy into

transmission paths in any manner, with the objective of deceiving operators or of causing

confusion. See also electronic warfare. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic jamming. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic 

energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic 

spectrum, and with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy's combat capability. (JP 1-

02)

electromagnetic pulse. The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most

commonly caused by a nuclear explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to 

produce damaging current and voltage surges. Also called EMP. See also electromagnetic 

radiation. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic radiation. Radiation made up of oscillating electric and magnetic fields and

propagated with the speed of light. Includes gamma radiation, X-rays, ultraviolet, visible, and

infrared radiation, and radar and radio waves. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic spectrum. The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to

infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. See also electronic warfare. (JP 1-

02)

electromagnetic vulnerability. The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite

degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected 

to a certain level of electromagnetic environmental effects. Also called EMV. (JP 1-02)

electronic attack. See electronic warfare. (JP 1-02)

electronic intelligence. Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or

radioactive sources. Also called ELINT. (JP 1-02)

electronics security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized 

persons information of value that might be derived from their interception and study of

noncommunications electromagnetic radiations, e.g., radar. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed

energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The
45

three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection,

and electronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of

electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel,

facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy

combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an

enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic 

deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy

as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).

b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving passive and active

means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or

enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat

capability. Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked

by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and 

locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for 

the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future

operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions

involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance,

targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to

produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and

produce measurement and signature intelligence. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare integrated reprogramming. A systematic decision-making tool for

operational commanders. It gives all Air Force units a timely and accurate means to respond to

expected and unexpected electronic emissions, changes in air defense tactics, and unique mission 

requirements. Theses EWIR responsibilities include procedures for changes in tactics,

employment guidance, electronic warfare equipment (software/hardware), aircrew training and

training devices (i.e. threat simulators, threat emitters) and other support systems. Also called

EWIR.

electro-optics. The technology associated with those components, devices and systems which

are designed to interact between the electromagnetic (optical) and the electric (electronic) state.

(JP 1-02)

emission control. The selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other

emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security: 

a. detection by enemy sensors; b. mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or c. enemy

interference with the ability to execute a military deception plan. Also called EMCON. (JP 1-

02)

essential elements of information. The critical items of information regarding the enemy and

the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available

information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. Also called EEI. (JP 

1-02)
46

information. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human 

assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 1-02)

information attack. Any activity taken to manipulate or destroy an adversary's information

systems without necessarily changing visibly the physical entity within which it resides. (AFDD 

1-2)

information-in-warfare. A set of information operations functions that provides commanders 

battlespace situational awareness across the spectrum of conflict and range of air and space

operations. Information-in-warfare functions involve the Air Force’s extensive capabilities to

provide awareness throughout the range of military operations based on integrated intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its information collection/dissemination activities; 

and its global navigation and positioning, weather, and communications capabilities. Also called

IIW. (AFDD 2-5)

information operations. Use of offensive and defensive information means to degrade, destroy, 

and exploit an adversary’s information-based process while protecting one’s own. Also called

IO. (JP 1-02). The Air Force believes that in practice a more useful working definition is: 

[Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend or attack information and information systems and

include both information-in-warfare and information warfare.] {Italicized definition in brackets 

applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity}.

information superiority. That degree of dominance in the information domain which permits

the conduct of operations without effective opposition. Also called IS. (JP 1-02) The Air Force 

prefers to cast ‘superiority’ as a state of relative advantage, not a capability, and views IS as: 

[That degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to 

collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition.] {Italicized

definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

information system. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that

collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. See also 

information, information warfare. (JP 1-02)

information warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to

achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW.

(JP 1-02) [Information operations conducted to defend one’s own information and information

systems, or to attack and affect an adversary’s information and information systems.] {Italicized 

definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Integrated capabilities to collect, process,

exploit and disseminate accurate and timely information that provides the battlespace awareness

necessary to successfully plan and conduct operations. Also called ISR. (This is an Air Force

term as applied to the scope for this AFDD).
47

interference. See electromagnetic interference (JP 1-02) [Interference is any electrical

disturbance that causes undesirable responses in electronic equipment.] {Italicized definition in 

brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

intrusion. Movement of a unit or force within another nation’s specified operational area

outside of territorial seas and territorial airspace for surveillance or intelligence gathering in time 

of peace or tension. See electromagnetic intrusion. (JP 1-02) [Intrusion is intentionally

inserting electromagnetic energy into transmission paths in any manner. The object is to deceive 

equipment operators or cause confusion. The enemy conducts intrusion operations against us by 

inserting false information into our receiver paths. This false information may consist of voice

instructions, ghost targets, coordinates for fire missions, or even rebroadcasting or prerecorded

data transmissions.] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is

offered for clarity.}

jamming. See electromagnetic jamming. (JP 1-02) [Jamming is deliberately radiating,

reradiating, or reflecting electromagnetic energy to impair the use of electronic devices,

equipment, or systems. The enemy conducts jamming operations against us to prevent us from

effectively employing our radios, radars, NAVAIDs, satellites, and eletro-optics.] {Italicized

definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

joint air operations plan. A plan for a connected series of joint air operations to achieve the

joint force commander's objectives within a given time and theater of operations. (JP 1-02).

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or

attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander.

(JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander [joint force air and space component commander].

The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force

responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper

employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and

coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The 

joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions

and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. See also joint force

commander. (JP 1-02) [AFDDs 2-2 and 2-5 introduced the acronym JFASCC which is strictly 

an Air Force term to signify the Air Force commitment to developing a commander with both air 

and space knowledge. Subsequently (Jul 02), CSAF chose to revert back to JFACC (joint usage). 

For Air Force usage JFACC means Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander. See also 

AFDC Doctrine Watch #18] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and

is offered for clarity.}

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)
48

joint suppression of enemy air defenses. A broad term that includes all suppression of enemy

air defense activities provided by one component of the joint force in support of another. Also

called J-SEAD. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, 

a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

meaconing. A system of receiving radio beacon signals and rebroadcasting them on the same

frequency to confuse navigation. The meaconing stations cause inaccurate bearings to be

obtained by aircraft or ground stations. (JP 1-02) [Successful enemy meaconing causes: 1.

Aircraft to be lured into hot landing zones or enemy airspace 2. Bombers to expend ordnance on 

false targets. 3. Ground stations to receive inaccurate bearings or position locations.]

{Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers 

as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to

take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly

mission. The five categories of military deception are as follows:

a. strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in

support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that 

support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies, and operations.

b. operational military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in

support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to

the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and

conducted in a theater to support campaigns and major operations.

c. tactical military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support 

of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's

objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support

battles and engagements.

d. Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services

that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to

protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems.

e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)—Military deception

planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of 

the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions.

Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or

provide cover for, military operations and activities. See also deception. (JP 1-02)

offensive counterinformation. Offensive IO/IW activities which are conducted to control the

information environment by denying, degrading, disrupting, destroying, and deceiving the

adversary’s information and information systems. Also called OCI. (AFDD 2-5)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon

at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant

command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are
49

transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander

will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by

the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of

command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to

accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. 

Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations.

Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service

and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority

to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational

control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include 

authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, 

or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing

friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions

that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile

intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical

information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate 

or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

radar. A radio detection device that provides information on range, azimuth and/or elevation of 

objects. (JP 1-02)

radar countermeasures. See electronic warfare; chaff. (JP 1-02)

radar coverage. The limits within which objects can be detected by one or more radar stations. 

(JP 1-02)

radar deception. See electromagnetic deception. (JP 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in

combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation 

signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications,

electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (JP 1-02)

suppression. Temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of a

weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives. (JP 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses. That activity which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily

degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Also called

SEAD. (JP 1-02)
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tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military

capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control 

of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or

tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be

delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When

forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining

commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be

specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for

controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within

the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

window. Window is a historic British term for chaff that is occasionally referenced in various

documents. See chaff.