alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1

SHOE CARNIVAL, INC.CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

|I, Mark L. Lemond, certify that:
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|Date: | June 14, 2007 | By:/s/ Mark L. Lemond   | 
|----- | ------------- | ----------------------- | 
|      |               | Mark L. Lemond          | 
|      |               | President and           | 
|      |               | Chief Executive Officer | 

---
#### Jean R. Brown, Respondent, v. Joseph Brown, Appellant.

Order fixing alimony *pendente lite*and counsel fees in an action for separation modified by changing the words and figures “the sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred ($3,500) Dollars” in the second ordering paragraph thereof to “the sum of Two Thousand ($2,000) Dollars”, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Lewis, P. J., Johnston, Adel, Sneed and Wenzel, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.39



AMENDMENT TO
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT



THIS
AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is made and entered into as of the  16th day
of January, 2018, by and between Live Ventures Incorporated (formerly known as LiveDeal, Inc.), a Nevada corporation
(the “Company”), and Jon Isaac (“Executive”).



WHEREAS,
the Company and Executive have entered into an employment agreement, effective as of January 1, 2013 (the “Employment
Agreement”); and



WHEREAS,
the Company and Executive desire to amend the Employment Agreement in the manner reflected herein.



In
consideration of the mutual promises, covenants and agreements herein contained, intending to be legally bound, the parties agree
as follows:



1.       Section
2 of the Employment Agreement hereby is amended so that the Term is deemed to continue until December 31, 2020, or upon the date
of termination of employment pursuant to Section 6 of the Employment Agreement; provided, however, that the Term may be extended
as mutually agreed to by the parties.



2.       Section
4 of the Employment Agreement hereby is amended by deleting such section in its entirety and by substituting in lieu thereof the
following:



Business
Expenses. During the Term, the Company will reimburse Executive for all reasonable business expenses incurred by him in connection
with his employment and the performance of his duties as provided hereunder, upon submission by the Executive of receipts and other
documentation in conformance with the Company’s normal procedures for executives of Executive’s position and status,
including a reasonable housing expense not to exceed $7,000 per month.



3.       This
amendment is deemed to be effective as of January 1, 2016.



4.       Except
as specifically amended hereby, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.



5.       This
Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which will be deemed an original, but all of which together will constitute
one and the same instrument.



[Signature Page Follows]











1






IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have
executed this Amendment as of the date first written above.





|LIVE VENTURES INCORPORATED, a Nevada corporation |                                | EXECUTIVE
|------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------ | ---------
|                                                 |                                |          
|                                                 |                                |          
|                                                 |                                |          
|By:                                              | /s/ Virland A. Johnson         |          
|                                                 | Name: Virland A. Johnson       |          
|                                                 | Title: Chief Financial Officer |          



















2
### §2272. Acceptance of volunteer services

Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, the Architect of the Capitol, upon the recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer, may accept and use voluntary and uncompensated services for the Capitol Visitor Center as the Architect of the Capitol determines necessary. No person shall be permitted to donate personal services under this section unless such person has first agreed, in writing, to waive any and all claims against the United States arising out of or connection with such services, other than a claim under the provisions of chapter 81 of title 5. No person donating personal services under this section shall be considered an employee of the United States for any purpose other than for purposes of chapter 81 of such title. In no case shall the acceptance of personal services under this subsection 1 result in the reduction of pay or displacement of any employee of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol.

(Pub. L. 110–437, title V, §503, Oct. 20, 2008, 122 Stat. 4997.)

1 So in original. Probably should be "section".
458 P.2d 860

#### Lorena Brown TURNER, Petitioner, v. Craig Lee DAHL, Respondent.

No. 8905.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. 17, 1969.

Ordered that petition for writ of certiorari be and the same is hereby denied.

Further ordered that the record in Court of Appeals Cause No. 317, 80 N.M. 564, 458 P.2d 816, be and the same is hereby returned to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
#### Julia Giofrida, Respondent, v. Isaac N. Easterbrook, Appellant.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concurred.
Editorial Note on Part 134
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 134 appear by CBP Dec. 16-26, 81 FR 93018, Dec. 20, 2016.

§ 134.55 Compensation of Customs officers and employees. ( a ) *Time for which compensation is charged.* The time for which compensation is charged shall include all periods devoted to supervision and all periods during which Customs officers or employees are away from their regular posts of duty by reason of such assignment and for which compensation to such officers and employees is provided for by law.
( b ) *Applicability* — ( 1 ) *Official hours.* The compensation of Customs Officers or employees assigned to supervise the exportation, destruction, or marking of articles so as to exempt them from the application of marking duties shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of §§ 24.16 or 24.17(a)(3), respectively, of this chapter when such supervision is performed during a regularly-scheduled tour of duty.
( 2 ) *Overtime.* When such supervision is performed by a Customs Officer or employee in an overtime status, the compensation with respect to the overtime shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of § 24.16 or § 24.17, respectively, of this chapter.
( c ) *Expenses included.* In formulating charges for expenses pertaining to supervision of exportation, destruction, or marking, there shall be included all expenses of transportation, per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence, and all other expenses incurred by reason of such supervision from the time the Customs officer leaves his official station until he returns thereto.
( d ) *Services rendered for more than one importer.* If the importations of more than one importer are concurrently supervised, the service rendered for each importer shall be regarded as a separate assignment, but the total amount of the compensation, and any expenses properly applicable to more than one importer, shall be equitably apportioned among the importers concerned.
[T.D. 72-262, 37 FR 20318, Sept. 29, 1972, as amended by T.D. 94-74, 59 FR 46757, Sept. 12, 1994]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

KEY WEST DIVISION

CASE NO. 4:20-cv-10076-JLK

KEY WEST BAR PILOTS

ASSOCIATION and PIER B

DEVELOPMENT CORP., a

Florida Corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. JOYCE GRIFFIN, in her official capacity as

SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS FOR MONROE

COUNTY, FLORIDA; the CITY OF KEY WEST,

a municipal corporation of the State of Florida; and

KEY WEST COMMITTEE FOR SAFER CLEANER

SHIPS, INC., a Florida non-profit corporation,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

ORDER MODIFYING SCHEDULED BENCH TRIAL TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HEARING

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon sua sponte review of the record.

The record reflects that this matter is set for a bench trial on August 12, 2020 (via Zoom) on

Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment. However, the Court has carefully reviewed the parties’

pretrial stipulations and motions for summary judgment, and it appears the parties agree there are no

factual issues for the Court to resolve. Instead, the Court appears to be faced with legal questions only,

including (among other things) the issue of whether the Key West ballot initiatives violate the United

States Constitution. For that reason, it appears to the Court at this time that instead of a bench trial, a

better procedure would be to assess the parties’ recently filed Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 37

and D.E. #40).

Case 4:20-cv-10076-JLK Document 54 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/2020 Page 1 of 2
2

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the bench trial set for

August 12, 2020 be, and the same is hereby , MODIFIED to focus on the Summary Judgment motion

previously filed by the parties (D.E. # 37 and 40).. The summary judgment hearing will be held on the

same date (and at the same time) as the bench trial was to occur, starting Wednesday, August 12,

2020 at 9:30 a.m. via Zoom, with the same zoom information. The Court is primarily concerned with

the issue of jurisdiction (i.e., whether this case is ripe for review, and whether Plaintiffs have standing

to mount these legal challenges). Therefore, the parties should focus their arguments on jurisdiction.

It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the parties may excuse their fact witnesses

that are not relevant to jurisdiction. If any party objects to this change in procedure, the Court will

entertain any such objections at the outset of the hearing. 

DONE and ORDERED in chambers at the James Lawrence King Federal Justice 

Building and United States Courthouse, Miami, Florida, this 10 day of August, 2020. th

 

 JAMES LAWRENCE KING

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to: 

All Counsel of Record 

Case 4:20-cv-10076-JLK Document 54 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/10/2020 Page 2 of 2
### §605. Sale or lease of property, supplies, or services

(a) Any sale or lease of property, supplies, or services to the Congressional Budget Office shall be deemed to be a sale or lease to the Congress subject to section 4103 of this title.

(b) Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to fiscal years beginning after September 30, 1996.

(Pub. L. 104–197, title I, §104, Sept. 16, 1996, 110 Stat. 2404.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 4103 of this title, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original a reference to section 903 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. 98–63, title I, July 30, 1983, 97 Stat. 336, which is classified to section 4103 of this title and in part as a note set out under section 4103 of this title.

#### Codification

Section was enacted as part of the appropriation act cited as the credit to this section, and not as part of title II of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 which comprises this chapter.

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:

Pub. L. 104–53, title I, Nov. 19, 1995, 109 Stat. 527.

Pub. L. 103–283, title I, July 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 1433.

Pub. L. 103–69, title I, Aug. 11, 1993, 107 Stat. 701.

Pub. L. 102–392, title I, Oct. 6, 1992, 106 Stat. 1713.

Pub. L. 102–90, title I, Aug. 14, 1991, 105 Stat. 458.

Pub. L. 101–520, title I, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 2266.

Pub. L. 101–163, title I, Nov. 21, 1989, 103 Stat. 1054.

Pub. L. 100–458, title I, Oct. 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 2169.

Pub. L. 100–202, §101(i) [title I], Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1329–290, 1329–300.

Pub. L. 99–500, §101(j) [H.R. 5203, title I], Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783–287, and Pub. L. 99–591, §101(j), Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341–287.

Pub. L. 99–151, title I, Nov. 13, 1985, 99 Stat. 800.

Pub. L. 98–367, title I, July 17, 1984, 98 Stat. 482.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Public Affairs

Region II

101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900

Atlanta, GA 30323

No.: II-96-77 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contacts: Ken Clark 404-331-5503 (Friday, September 13, 1996)

Roger Hannah 404-331-7878

NRC SCHEDULES SPECIAL INSPECTION EXIT MEETING AT ST. LUCIE PLANT

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has scheduled a

public exit meeting at Florida Power & Light's St. Lucie nuclear

power plant to discuss the results of an NRC maintenance rule

inspection at the plant. That meeting will be Friday, September

20 at 1:00 p.m. in Room 123 of the plant's Training Building.

The maintenance rule inspection will begin Monday, September

16 and will conclude with the exit meeting on Friday, September

20. The inspection will be led by NRC Region II Inspector Bill

Holland and will include four other regional inspectors with

additional staff support from NRC headquarters in Rockville,

Maryland.

The maintenance rule, which all plants were required to

implement by July 10, 1996, requires plants to monitor the

performance or condition of plant structures, systems or

components against established goals to provide assurance they

are capable of performing their intended function, or to perform

preventive maintenance to keep them capable of performing their

function.

The maintenance rule includes not only safety-related

structures, systems or components but nonsafety-related parts of

the plant that may be needed in an accident or emergency

situation, or whose failure may affect safety equipment, or whose

failure may cause the plant to automatically shut down or to

activate a safety-related system.

The inspection team is looking at whether FPL has

established the appropriate goals and risks related to

maintenance, and whether the plant staff has the appropriate

balance between reliability and availability of equipment and

systems.

The first maintenance rule inspection was performed in July

at the Palo Verde plant in Arizona, and the NRC will conduct a

similar inspection at every commercial nuclear power plant in the

country. The maintenance rule inspection at St. Lucie is the

first in the southeast (NRC Region II).
####
NUMBER 13-22-00499-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

 

IN RE DAMIEN GABRIEL GARZA

 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Silva

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria1

On October 20, 2022, relator Damien Gabriel Garza filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by denying relator’s motion 

for continuance. Relator further filed a motion for emergency stay seeking “to prevent 

further proceedings in the trial court and to preserve this Court’s mandamus jurisdiction 

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not 

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 

47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
2

to consider the merits of [this] original proceeding.”

In a criminal case, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish 

both that the act sought to be compelled is a ministerial act not involving a discretionary 

or judicial decision and that there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged 

harm. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (orig. proceeding); 

In re Harris, 491 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); 

In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the 

relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be 

denied. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 

210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). 

Under normal circumstances, “a trial court’s decision to refuse a continuance is 

reversible only for an abuse of discretion,” and thus, the court’s ruling on a motion for 

continuance is discretionary rather than ministerial. Matamoros v. State, 901 S.W.2d 470, 

478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc); see Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (en banc) (stating that “as a general rule the 

determination of whether to grant a continuance lies with the sound discretion of the 

court”). Nevertheless, such decisions may be ministerial when, for instance, a statute 

renders the granting of a motion for continuance to be a ministerial duty. See Collier, 732 

S.W.2d at 346; Ojeda v. State, 916 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, pet. 

ref’d).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, 

the record provided, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relator has not met his 
3

burden to obtain relief. Therefore, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus and the

motion for emergency stay. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a), (d). 

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the

21st day of October, 2022.
CERTIFICATION OF CEO
               PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Anthony Paterra as CEO of Diasense, Inc., (the "Company"),
certify, pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

     (1)  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for
       the quarterly period ended June 30, 2005 (the "Report)
       fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
       15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m
       or 78o(d); and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly
       presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
       and results of operations of the Company.


                                        /s/ Anthony Paterra
                                        Anthony Paterra, CEO

                                        August 15, 2005
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2153

DOUGLAS MICHAEL VANVLEET,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., 

Chief District Judge. (1:10-cv-00523-JAB-PTS)

Submitted: January 13, 2011 Decided: January 18, 2011

Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Douglas Michael Vanvleet, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett 

Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Douglas Michael Vanvleet seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order dismissing without prejudice Vanvleet’s civil 

complaint. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final 

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and 

collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-

46 (1949). The order Vanvleet seeks to appeal is neither a 

final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order

because it is possible for Vanvleet to cure the deficiencies in 

the complaint as noted by the magistrate judge. See Domino 

Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067 

(4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
### §122a. Repealed. Pub. L. 104–186, title II, §204(66), Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat. 1740

Section, acts July 2, 1954, ch. 455, title I, 68 Stat. 403; June 13, 1957, Pub. L. 85–54, 71 Stat. 82; H. Res. No. 831, Eighty-eighth Congress, Aug. 14, 1964, enacted into permanent law by act July 27, 1965, Pub. L. 89–90, §103, 79 Stat. 281, related to reimbursement of House Members for office expenses outside District of Columbia.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Reimbursement of Expenses of House Members; Member of House of Representatives and Member Defined

Section 302(a), (b), and (d) of H. Res. No. 287, Ninety-fifth Congress, Mar. 2, 1977, enacted into permanent law by Pub. L. 95–94, title I, §115, Aug. 5, 1977, 91 Stat. 668, which related to reimbursement to Members of House of Representatives for official expenses incurred in United States, was repealed by Pub. L. 104–186, title II, §203(20)(B), Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat. 1728.
Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-CIV-61445-RAR

STACY A. HILL, and other 

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiff,

v.

TASTE RITE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENT AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on the parties’ Joint Motion for Approval of 

Settlement Agreement and Dismissal of Case with Prejudice [ECF No. 21], filed on October 16, 

2020. Before the Court can approve a settlement of FLSA claims, it must scrutinize the settlement

and determine that it is a “fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA

provisions.” Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982). 

If the settlement reflects a reasonable compromise over FLSA issues that are actually in dispute,

the Court may approve the settlement “to promote the policy of encouraging settlement in

litigation.” Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354. Upon review of the record and the parties’ 

documented basis for a settlement of the FLSA case, including an award of attorneys’ fees to 

Plaintiff’s counsel, the Court finds that the settlement of this action is fair and reasonable and that 

the requested fee is fair and reasonable and not grossly excessive. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Joint Motion [ECF No. 21] is GRANTED.

Case 0:20-cv-61445-RAR Document 22 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/22/2020 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

2. The Settlement Agreement [ECF No. 21-1], which has been duly filed as a record of 

the Court, is APPROVED in its entirety.

3. The case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and any pending motions are 

DENIED AS MOOT.

4. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 21st day of October, 2020.

RODOLFO A. RUIZ II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 0:20-cv-61445-RAR Document 22 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/22/2020 Page 2 of 2