COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Clem ents, Haley and Beales

JAMES M. STRICKLAND MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0314-07-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS

DECEMBER 18, 2007 TERESA STRICKLAND

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY Frederick G. Rock well, III, Judge (Linda J. Woods; Woods & Ch ristensen, P.C., on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. No brief or argument for appellee.
Appellant James M. Strickland (husband) a ppeals from the findings of the trial court made in connection with its decree of absolute divorce from appellee Teresa Strickland (wife). Essentially, husband challenges 1) the allocation of bankruptcy debt consolidated during the marriage solely to husband, 2) the legal effect of the parties’ separation agreement, and, 3) the amount of child support awarded. Because we fi nd the trial court erred with respect to the allocation of bankruptcy debt, and also find each remaining argument either without merit or procedurally defaulted, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. As the parties are fully conversant with th e record in this case, and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understandin g of the disposition of this appeal. We also note with regard to husband ’s brief that the table of contents, the questions

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - presented, and the section headings are inconsis tent, disorganized, and at times incomplete. Although “[w]e will not search the record for errors in order to interpret the appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a brief,” Buchanan v. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992), we have attempted, where po ssible, to correlate the arguments husband makes and the cases he cites w ith the questions he presents.
I. BACKGROUND “[D]ecisions concerning equita ble distribution and spousal and child support rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will no t be reversed on appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.” Floyd v. Floyd , 17 Va. App. 222, 224, 436 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1993). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to wife, who prevailed below. Anderson v. Anderson , 29 Va. App. 673, 678, 514 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1999). So viewed, the evidence showed that husband and wife were married on Ma y 12, 1990, and had one child born on April 3, 1996. Both parties worked, but husband’s income was subs tantially higher than that of the wife. On October 30, 2002, the parties jointly f iled in bankruptcy court for Chapter 13 relief of debt, and a bankruptcy plan was executed. The effect of the bankruptcy plan was to c onsolidate the parties’ joint federal taxes, utilities bills, hom e mortgage, credit cards, and other debt 1 ; and to establish a repayment schedule of $500 per month taken direc tly from husband’s paycheck until a total of $25,000 had been repaid. The bankruptcy plan was modified on January 23, 2003, but the repayment schedule did not change. Husba nd has made the payments ever since. On November 11, 2003, in anticipation of their separation, husband “commit[ted]” in writing to put their home in wife’s name, to pa y $1,000 per month for wife and daughter, to take wife “off car loan,” to give wife full custody of their daughter, and to “pay all bankruptcy.”

1 Wife conceded at trial that the consolidat ed debts had been incurred by the parties prior to their separation and that the bankruptcy debt was “marital debt,” as she understood the term.- 3 - The parties separated on approximately D ecember 12, 2003. That day, they entered into an “agreement and stipulation in accordance wi th section 20-109 & 20-109.1 of the Code of Virginia” (the agreement). The agreement was prepared by wife’s atto rney and signed by her and husband, who chose not to seek legal advice. The agreement purported to reflect a child support sum “configured using th e child support guidelines,” a nd included provisions for child and spousal support at $500 per month for each, to be paid by husband. Under the heading “Outstanding and Future Obligations,” the pa rties agreed “to be fu lly and individually responsible for . . . any debts incurred by the part ies prior to their separa tion,” making no specific mention of the parties’ bankruptcy debt anyw here in the agreement. Under the heading “Automobiles,” the parties agreed that husband woul d take sole possession of their jointly owned 2002 Kia Sportage (the Kia) and would assume responsibility for all payments and expenses therefor, while wife would be removed from its t itle and lien. A final clause stated that the agreement “contains the entire understanding of the parties, and there are no representations . . . or undertakings other than those expressly set forth” therein. Husband paid wife $1,000 per month from December 2003 through October 2004. Sometime during this period, husband told wife that he would continue to pay the entire bankruptcy debt under the terms of the bankruptcy plan, but that he would “cut back” on the money he was paying to wife and use those funds instead to pay wife’s half of the bankruptcy debt. Although wife did not acquiesce, from October 2004 through November 2006, husband paid only $600 per month; withholding an amount calculated to offset wife’s portion of the bankruptcy debt retroa ctive to December 2003. 2 Sometime prior to April 7, 2004, the Kia was repossessed by creditors for failure to repay the loan, leaving a $5,972.38 debt outstanding on the

2 Husband paid $700 for February of 2005.- 4 - vehicle. On April 7, 2004, the bankruptcy pl an was modified again and $5,972.38 was added by the parties to the bankruptcy debt. On July 26, 2006, wife filed a complaint seeki ng divorce, asking the tr ial court to affirm, ratify, and incorporate the agreement into the di vorce decree. She also filed a motion for the establishment of child and s pousal support arrearages, based on husband’s failure to pay the entire $1,000 per month under the terms of the ag reement since October 2004. Husband filed a cross-complaint, alleging that wife had violat ed the agreement by failing to pay her portion of their joint bankruptcy, and asking th e court not to approve the agr eement with respect to spousal support, or, in the alternative, to credit him with the payment of wife’s portion of the bankruptcy debt. During depositions, husband learned that wife had been pr omoted in her employment and her income at the time of trial was slightly hi gher than husband’s. The record shows no attempt by husband to amend his cross-complaint in order to plead regarding child support. On November 20, 2006, the tria l court granted the parties an absolute divorce, and ordered the agreement be ratified and incorpor ated, but not merged, into the final decree. Custody of the minor child was awarded to wife, with child and spousal support ordered in accordance with the agreement at $500 per mont h each, for a total of $1,000. The trial court made no reference to the bankruptcy debt in th e final decree, which was therefore left for discharge in its entirety by the husband in acco rdance with the terms of the bankruptcy plan. Husband objected to the decree in writing, and also moved the trial court specifically to reconsider the child support portion of the decree. On December 12, 2006, husband’s motion for reconsideration of the child support award was denied on grounds that husband failed in his pleadings to raise child suppor t as an issue in the case. On January 3, 2007, a hearing was held on the parties’ motions to show cause, wherein the trial court addressed issues regarding the support payments dating back to October 2004;- 5 - specifically, whether or not the bankruptcy debt was marital, and if so what offset the husband was permitted. The trial court found that the bank ruptcy debt was husband’s “sole” debt, that he was not permitted an offset against his suppor t obligations, and that the support order was retroactive to the date the agreement was executed. As a result, the trial court determined that husband owed wife support arrearages of over ten thousand dollars plus in terest thereon. An order to such effect was entered on Ja nuary 17, 2007, and this appeal followed.
II. BANKRUPTCY DEBT While admitting that $5,972.38 of the bankruptcy debt was properly allocated as his separate debt, husband asserts that the trial cour t erred in not allowing an offset against his support payments for his repayment of wife’s shar e of what remained. Husband claims, and wife has conceded, that the bankruptcy debt—prior to the addition of th e $5,972.38 traceable to the Kia—was consolidated from debt incurred by the parties during the marriage and before separation. Moreover, the agreement provides th at the parties shall each be responsible for “debts incurred by the parties prior to their sepa ration.” Husband concludes that the trial court’s determination that the entire ba nkruptcy debt was his separate and sole responsibility was therefore plainly erroneous and unsu pported by the evidence. We agree. Code § 20-109.1 provides that [a]ny court may affirm, ratify and incorporate by re ference in its decree dissolving a marriage . . . any valid agreement between the parties, or provisions thereof, concerning the conditions of the maintenance of the parties, or ei ther of them and the care, custody and maintenance of their minor children or establishing or imposing any other condition or consideration, monetary or nonmonetary. After a trial judge ratifie s and incorporates a prop erty settlement agreement into a final decree of divorce, that agreement becomes, “for all purposes . . . a term of the decree, . . . enforceable in- 6 - the same manner as any pr ovision of such decree.” Campbell v. Campbell , 32 Va. App. 351, 356, 528 S.E.2d 145, 147 (2000). [P]roperty settlement agreements ar e contracts and [are] subject to the same rules of formation, valid ity and interpretation as other contracts. In construing the terms of a property settlement agreement, just as in construing the terms of any contract, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusi ons as to the construction of the disputed provisions. Smith v. Smith , 3 Va. App. 510, 513, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986) (citation omitted). Husband argues the evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that the bankruptcy debt was hi s separate debt. See Stumbo v. Stumbo , 20 Va. App. 685, 692-93, 460 S.E.2d 591, 595 (1995) (“[W]hen debt is incurred, a trial court must determine the purpose of expenditure in order to . . . allo cate debt as marital or separate [, and an award based on this determination must have] a proper foundation in the reco rd . . . .”). In the alternative, he claims that any ambiguity in the agreement should be interpreted “most strongl y” against wife, whose attorney drafted its terms. See Mahoney v. NationsBank of Virginia, N.A. , 249 Va. 216, 222, 455 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1995) (“When an ambiguity exists, a court will construe a contract more strictly against the party who prepared it.”). We need not address the merits of these arguments, because we find that the language of the agreement is unambiguous and should be applied as written. See Smith , 3 Va. App. at 513, 351 S.E.2d at 595 (“Where th ere is no ambiguity in the terms of a contract, we must construe it as written.”). The agreement states that “each party” was to remain responsible for “debts incurred by the parties prior to their separation.” Wife has conceded and the evidence shows that the bankruptcy debt fall s squarely within the ambit of the relevant provision of the agreement, and we can detect no evidentiary support on the record for the trial- 7 - court’s conclusion that the bankruptcy debt —excepting the $5,972.38 that husband concedes is his sole responsibility—should have been husband’s alone to bear. 3 We therefore reverse the arrearage determination of the trial court, and remand for reconsideration consiste nt with this opinion.
III. THE AGREEMENT Husband’s brief presents a question as to whether the trial court was permitted to affirm and incorporate the agreement in the face of his allegation that wife was in breach thereof, but contains no correlating argument section; only an unsupported assertion under another heading that “the court is not obligated to affirm, ratif y and incorporate a parties’ separation agreement when asked if there is a dispute. ” Pursuant to Rule 5A:20(e), an appellant’s brief must contain “[t]he principles of law, the argument, and the authorities relati ng to each question presented.”
See Roberts v. Roberts , 41 Va. App. 513, 527, 586 S.E.2d 290, 297 (2003) (“Statements unsupported by argument, authorit y, or citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration.”). Because husband failed to comply with Rule 5A:20(e), we will not address this question. Husband also questions whether the trial court erred when it “found” its order to be “retroactive from the date of th e agreement.” He seems to cont end that the trial court’s order was statutorily precluded from imposing a suppor t obligation retroactive to a time preceding the

3 Because the language of the agreement is unambiguous and purports to be complete, husband’s earlier signed promise, which deals with the same subject matter as the agreement, has no effect. See McComb v. McComb , 226 Va. 271, 274, 307 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1983) (“‘[P]arol evidence of prior or contemporane ous oral negotiations or stipul ations is inadmissible to vary, contradict, add to, or explai n the terms of a complete, unambiguous, unconditional written instrument.’” (quoting Godwin v. Kerns , 178 Va. 447, 451, 17 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1941))); see also Ross v. Craw , 231 Va. 206, 212, 343 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1986) (“‘[W]here an agreement is complete on its face, is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the court is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself.’” (quoting Globe Iron Construction Company v. Bank of Boston , 205 Va. 841, 848, 140 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1965))).- 8 - filing of the complaint on July 6, 20 06. In support of this argument , he cites exclusively to Code § 20-108.1, section B of which states in pertinen t part that “[l]iability for support shall be determined retroactively for the period meas ured from the date that the proceeding was commenced by the filing of an action with any court . . . .” However, husband has not complied with Rule 5A:20(c), which requires that an ope ning brief contain “a statement of the questions presented with a clear and exact reference to th e page(s) of the transcript, written statement, record, or appendix where each question was pres erved in the trial court.” Husband’s brief references appendix pages contai ning his general and specific obj ections to the trial court’s January 17, 2007 order, but nowhere on the cited pa ges does he object to th e trial court’s finding that its order was retroactive to the date of the agreement based on his reading of Code § 20-108.1(B). We therefore will not address this argument. See Barrs v. Barrs , 45 Va. App. 500, 512, 612 S.E.2d 227, 232-33 (2005) (requiring stri ct compliance with Rule 5A:20(c)).
IV. CHILD SUPPORT Husband asserts that the trial court erred in “refusing to hear [husband’s] oral motion” concerning child support. However, the evidence shows that the trial court considered his written objections and ruled thereon, and husband offers no authority to suggest that the trial court was thereafter obligated to hear an oral presentation of his arguments. Husband also contends that the trial court e rred when it refused to consider his motion to reconsider the child support aw ard based on husband’s failure to raise the issue in pleadings. Specifically, he questions whether “[t]he trial co urt erred in not, on his own require recalculation of the guidelines when he was presented with evidence from Mrs. Strickland that there was a significant change in her income since the si gning of the separation agreement three years prior [sic].” Citing Watson v. Watson , 17 Va. App. 249, 251, 436 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1993), husband argues on brief that, prior to entering its decree, the tria l court should have calculated- 9 - the presumptive amount of child support in order to comply with Code § 20-108.1, even despite husband’s failure to plead the chil d support issue. However, each objection the husband made in the trial court as to the child support order was based upon his a llegation that there had been a change in circumstance with respect to wife’s income, and we cannot detect on the record where husband made a timely objection to preserve th e specific statutory compliance argument he makes here on appeal. It is well established that “Rule 5A:18 requires that objections to the trial court’s action or ruling be made with specificity in order to allow the trial court a chance to correct the claimed error.” Torian v. Torian , 38 Va. App. 167, 185, 562 S.E.2d 355, 365 (2002); see also West Alexandria Prop., Inc. v. First Virgin ia Mortgage and Real Estate Inv. Trust , 221 Va. 134, 138, 267 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1980) (“On appeal, though taking the same general position as in the trial court, an appella nt may not rely on reasons whic h could have been but were not raised for the benefit of the lower court.”). We are theref ore barred from addressing this argument, made for the first time on appeal. Finally, husband argues that wi fe’s significant increase in income required the trial court sua sponte to recalculate child support. However, as the trial court recognized, “‘[a] decree cannot be entered in the absence of pleadings upo n which to found the same, and if so entered it is void . . . .’” Gologanoff v. Gologanoff , 6 Va. App. 340, 346, 369 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1988) (quoting Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal Aluminum & Construction Corp. , 221 Va. 1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228, 229 (1981)). “‘Pleadings are as essential as proof, and no relief should be granted that doesn’t substantially accord w ith the case as made in the pleadings.’” Id. (quoting Lee v. Lambert , 200 Va. 799, 802, 108 S.E.2d 356, 358 (1959)). We therefore find no error inhering the trial court’s decision.- 10 - IV. CONCLUSION Having found that the trial court erred in allocating the entirety of the bankruptcy debt to husband, we reverse the arrearage determination and remand for rec onsideration consistent with this opinion and in accordance with the relevant st atutory provisions. Upon all other issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed in part, reversed in part,

and remanded.