Number 154, January 1999**NATO’s IFOR in Action*Lessons from the Bosnian Peace SupportOperations
by Leighton W. Smith

Conclusions- 
Peace support operations    are difficult and future military leaders must understand the complexities and dangers of    these so-called military operations other than war.

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Most peace support    operations have essential military, civil, and political elements which entail difficult    and distinct responsibilities.

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In Bosnia, the    Implementation Force (IFOR) successfully met the military provisions of the Dayton Accords    because of its robust force, its rules of engagement, and its resolve to use force when    necessary. Yet peace has not yet been secured because of civil and political problems.

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On the civil side, the UN    High Representative has been unsuccessful in coordinating the work of private and    non-governmental organizations because the Dayton Accords did not give him the requisite    authority.

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On the political side,    the five states still talk in divisive, not conciliatory, terms. There remains little    agreement concerning the Dayton Accords.

Three elements—military, civil, andpolitical—seem to be the essentials of the operations in Bosnia; and, these elementsprobably apply to all peace support operations. Each element has difficult and distinctresponsibilities. Yet they are interdependent to the degree that overall success inachieving peace in Bosnia is a function of each element working in harmony with the othertwo. Regrettably, despite great efforts on the part of many, progress in the civil sectorhas been slow; and among the political bodies, nearly nonexistent. That is why Bosnia hasan absence of war rather than the peace the Dayton Accords sought to establish. And thatis why there will be little progress unless and until the political leadership theredemonstrates a willingness to work together to create the conditions for peace.
**Military Success in Bosnia

Historians will likely judge that themilitary provisions of Dayton were successfully implemented. One important reason isbecause of the pre-Dayton dialogue between the military (charged with carrying out themission) and the political leadership (responsible for providing guidance to themilitary). The comprehensive Military Annex, drafted in Dayton with considerable inputfrom the military leaders both from NATO and the U.S. Joint Staff, avoided assigningmissions to the military for which it was not appropriately trained. Moreover, specificevents were laid out in a timeline so that progress toward success could be measured. Theannex, as drafted, was implemented successfully by IFOR. 

As the IFOR commander I was pressured frommany sides to "expand" the mission, to take on additional responsibilitiesand/or to read more into the military role than was actually there. Even so, the harshestof critics familiar with the tenets of the military annex admit that the military missionwas tremendously successful and provided a secure environment in which the other twopillars should have been able to work to achieve their difficult and challenging tasks. Wewere able to make immediate progress in our military tasks because of what I refer to asthe "Three R’s of Success." These are a *Robust Force*, the right *Rulesof Engagement* (ROE), and the *Resolve* to convincingly use the first two when andwhere necessary.

The force was much more robust than itspredecessor, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). IFOR was robust because wewere well-trained, well-disciplined, well-equipped, and well-led even at the most juniorlevels. We were also sized to the job at hand and given the right ROE. In Bosnia, our ROEwere quite broad and robust. Because of that we were able to use the professional forcesassigned to us quickly and convincingly. This allowed us to set the stage in the earlydays of IFOR’s existence and, later, to gain control of situations which might haveotherwise gotten out of hand. The resolve that was needed was not just that which wedemonstrated after deploying into Bosnia. It included the actions we had taken prior toDayton in support of the UNPROFOR. Those pre-deployment actions essentially set the stagefor, and made easier, our entry into one of the most complex situations any commandercould ever face. Three vignettes underscore the Three R’s and provide usefulinformation for future operations.

**Aircraft Down.** The first examplebegan on June 2, 1995 when I was handed a note that read: "aircraft down overnorthwest Bosnia, no further info at this time." Within a few minutes, we learnedthat the aircraft was a U.S. Air Force F-16 out of Aviano, Italy, that it had been shotdown by a Serb surface-to-air missile, and that another pilot saw the missile hit theaircraft just aft of the canopy. The witness saw the aircraft break in two, but did notsee the pilot eject.

I sent a message to the UNPROFORcommander, General Bernard Janvier, to tell him to contact the Serbs with the followingmessage: "You have shot down one of my aircraft, I am coming after the pilot and Iwill kill anyone who attempts to impede us in our mission." The message also saidthat I intended to attack the missile site that had brought down our aircraft if it couldbe located. To his great credit, Janvier not only delivered the message, but wished meluck and any help he could provide in a rescue.

More than 500 missions were flown duringthe next five days in an exhaustive search to locate the downed pilot. I ordered the USS *Kearsarge*to take up a position off the Croatian coast as near to the scene of the search effort ascould be safely executed. The *Kearsarge* had a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft andPersonnel (TRAP) Team on board. I knew we would be expending a lot of effort in searchingfor the downed pilot, and that there was a constant danger of losing another aircraft. Iwanted to provide those conducting the search with the best possible chance of a recoveryshould one of them be forced to eject over enemy territory.

Lieutenant General (now General and Chiefof Staff of the U.S. Air Force) Mike Ryan and I were in almost constant communication aswe tried to sort out the sporadic reports of beepers, sightings of coded signals, and soon. We also had to argue against those who had, by the second or third day, made thedecision that the pilot had not survived. Ryan and I had both spent considerable timeflying in Vietnam and we knew of aviators shot down and declared Killed in Action only toshow up on the front page of the news days later.

Finally on June 8th, Ryan’s telephonecall woke me up. His transmission was very short: "Boss, Basher 52 has just checkedin, we have good comms." I came out of the bed like a shot thinking "rescue,rescue, rescue." Ryan and I agreed on a few initial steps and then we both headed forour command centers.

My first call was to the Amphibious ForceCommander, Captain Jerry Schill, onboard the *Kearsarge*. (Ryan and I had agreed thatthe TRAP was the best initial choice to attempt a rescue. We had a very capable SpecialForces group in Brindisi, Italy, but distance and time were a factor.) I ordered him tohave Colonel Marty Berndt, the commander of the Marine Expeditionary Unit onboard, preparethe TRAP team, but as one would expect, Berndt had already begun doing so.

Over the next couple of hours we gatheredas much information as we could and continued to assess the situation. I weighed therisks, including the obvious physical and mental strain on the pilot, the condition of hisradio battery, the weather (it was marginal but better than it had been in days), and thefact that the media would get wind of all the activities that had already occurred andmake the obvious connection, thus increasing the risks associated with a delay in theattempt. I decided to attempt the rescue.

Almost immediately I learned that we couldnot get fixed wing air cover into the area before daylight. These would be the jets thatwould suppress any enemy air defenses and/or provide close air support should the rescueforce come under attack on the ground. I called Berndt and told him of the choice: go indarkness without the jets, or wait on them and execute the mission in daylight. Heconferred with his people and came back with his decision to wait for the jets. I agreedand gave him the order to execute.

Later that morning, 4 hours and 37 minutesafter first contact, the Marine TRAP team radioed one word that made me as proud to be anAmerican as anything in my life. That word: "pickup."

While the saga of the rescue of ScottO’Grady is an interesting story, the operation itself conveyed two significantmessages. The first was that our forces could execute a very complex and dangerous missionwith near perfection. I believe that was extraordinarily important because I am notconvinced that the North Atlantic Council, the NATO political arm, understood that NATOair forces could pull off such a mission. That it did may have been an important factor inevents that followed in July and September of that same year.

The second message was to the Serbs (andto the Bosniacs and Croats as well) and that was the value we place on the lives of ourpeople. After going into Bosnia as the IFOR commander, I had several high ranking Serbianofficials ask why we made such a big deal out of the O’Grady affair. Why, they asked,did we expend so much effort to rescue just one pilot? And why, they asked, was his safereturn so important? I told them that we place a very high premium on the welfare andsafety of our forces. That, I said, is why we will use the force necessary to carry outour mission and protect the lives of those we are asking to do the job.

**Srebrenica and Sarajevo.** In July1995, the Serbs began closing in on the safe area of Srebrenica. The brutality of thatattack, and the fact that UNPROFOR did not halt the attack (nor could they have,realistically), finally galvanized the international community into accepting that forcewas really the only currency the Serbs would respect. I was given authority to use NATOair forces to bomb targets that were much more extensive than had been contemplated. Mymandate was to launch attacks should the Serbs threaten or fire into any of the fourremaining safe areas.

On 28 August, a mortar shell landed indowntown Sarajevo, killing dozens of civilians and injuring many more. After a series ofphone calls between the UN commander in Sarajevo and me, he cleared the way for attackoperations to begin. The skill and professionalism of our crews, in planning and executingthe series of attacks against the targets we were authorized to strike, was the singlemost important factor leading to the Dayton Peace Accords. The Rapid Reaction Forcedeployed after the hostage-taking incidents of May 1995 was also an important factor, aswere the Croatian-backed offensive by Federation Forces that followed our bombingoperations and the Tomahawk missiles which we fired in late September. But, had our crewsnot delivered their weapons in the responsible and precise way that they did, there wouldhave been collateral damage, possibly resulting in orders to cease and desist. However,there was almost no unintended damage, thus our efforts to deliver not only bombs but alsothe correct signal to the Serbs was successful. The Serbs yielded, not so much because ofthe damage we inflicted but because of demonstrated resolve to apply the powerful militaryat our disposal.

**Relieving UNPROFOR.** Finally, themanner in which we deployed into Bosnia was a major factor in our success. LieutenantGeneral Sir Michael Walker, Commander of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps(ARRC), in my opinion the true hero of IFOR’s successes, and I had agreed that earlydemonstrations of our will to carry out the mandates we had been given would beextraordinarily important. As ground commander, Walker devised a number of ways to dothis. One event was the destruction of six checkpoints around the Sarajevo airport. Withinminutes of my relieving UNPROFOR’s General Janvier, Walker’s men were bulldozingthe checkpoints. Despite moderate resistance, the mission was completed within moments,and with full respect for our "even handedness;" he had knocked over two Serb,two Croat and two Bosniac checkpoints. All of the factions were equally angry that we had"encroached" on their "sovereignty." All had learned a valuablelesson—IFOR was different from UNPROFOR.

Those who might have opposed IFOR saw astrength and a sense of purpose that had not been part of the UNPROFOR makeup. Thedifference was clear: we had a mission with an appropriately sized force, authority to usethat force, and the resolve to use it without hesitation.
**The Absence of Peace

If the military aspects of Dayton were asuccess, why do we not have peace in Bosnia? I believe it is, in part, because there was afailure to recognize the important and complex role of the civil "pillar" and toprovide the UN High Representative (HR) sufficient authority to "implement" hismandate. Finally, there was an assumption that the political leaders who signed the DaytonAccords would actively work to enforce its provisions. That has not happened.

**Civil Problems.** On the civil side,Carl Bildt, the first HR, was given an impossible task. His challenge was to coordinatethe work of hundreds of private volunteer organizations (PVO) and nongovernmentalorganizations (NGO), very few of which wanted any part of being told what to do. Some weresmall, some large. But they all had three things in common: their own governing bodies,their own bank accounts, and their own egos. I recall receiving representatives fromseveral large PVO/NGOs, each of whom made it clear that they were not beholden to Bildt,nor would they subordinate their organizations to his office. This issue was notcompletely resolved when I departed six months later.

And, Bildt had no staff and no plan. Hesaid to me one day, "Admiral, you had a year to plan for this operation, a hugestaff, and the requisite infrastructure to get you into theater, set up and supported. Istarted out with a cell phone in a parking lot a few weeks before we were to beginoperations." And, his task was far more complex and difficult than ours.

Moreover, Bildt lacked authority. He wasgiven a job envisioned to include good faith negotiations by political leaders who wouldbe willing to take personal risks and compromise on hard line positions for the good oftheir country. Regrettably, the leaders were not only unwilling to negotiate anything ingood faith, they tried at every turn to hinder progress. Even simple issues becamecomplex. A good example is the construction of roads and bridges. If IFOR saw a need for abridge or a road to be repaired or built, we took the necessary action. If challenged bythe local authorities or the central government, both of which were routine events, wesimply said that these were militarily essential and pressed on. The HR had no suchauthority and was reduced to negotiating endlessly on every little project.

The lesson is clear. If peace supportoperations are to succeed there must be a full appreciation of the importance of authority(read power to enforce) for those charged with implementing the civil side. And, we cannotmake the assumption that the leaders of former warring factions are going to sit peaceablyat the table and agree on how to apply the considerable resources made available by thosewho are trying to "jump-start" the economic redevelopment of their country.

**Political Divisiveness.** In Bosnia,the third pillar, the political element, has shown itself to be the weakest. Simplystated, until the power brokers in Bosnia begin actively leading their people toward alasting peace, a true peace will be a dream unrealized. They must talk of reconciliation,not divisiveness; they must gain control of the state police apparatus and hold it toacceptable standards of conduct; and they must embrace improvements offered by a worldanxious to help but turned away by petty squabbling over insignificant issues.

None of the five Presidents (of Croatia,Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, the Bosnian Serb Republic, or the Moslem-Croat Federation inBosnia) with whom I met were seriously devoted to the Dayton plan. They all had their own"interpretations," their own "requirements," their own"conditions." There was precious little agreement among the leadership in Bosniaon what had been agreed in Dayton.

So why is this important to the militaryleaders of the future? Because there will be future Bosnias and Rwandas and Somalias andHaitis and each will require a military element to help resolve the crisis. Having thesame "Three R’s" as I had in Bosnia is absolutely essential. Potentialcommanders should never accept anything less than what they think is needed to accomplishthe mission.

All peace support operations will bedifferent, yet each will be similar. A constant in all of them will be the inseparablelink between the military, the civil, and the political pillars. Understanding these linkswill be paramount in developing successful working relations among those who will becharged to successfully implement negotiated settlements.

These are not easy issues and there ismuch work being done to outline "doctrine" on how to succeed in these complexoperations. Despite this work, success remains, in large measure, in the hands of thoseplaced in charge and will depend on how well they understand the environment in which theymust lead.

Admiral Leighton W. Smith, USN (Ret.), was the Commanderin Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe from 1994 to 1996. He assumed command of theNATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) when it relieved the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)in December 1995. This paper is an abridged version of the Hofheimer Lecture Admiral Smithpresented to the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, October 1, 1998. 

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