GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 7, 2005 

Report to Congressional Committees 

Subject: Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections 

Fostering a democratic and publicly elected government in Iraq is a U.S. foreign 

policy priority. According to the President, the United States intends to help Iraq 

achieve democracy and has a vital national interest in the success of free institutions 

in Iraq. Toward that end, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transferred 

power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. With assistance 

from the United Nations (UN) and international community,1

 the interim government 

held a national election for a transitional National Assembly on January 30, 2005. To 

help Iraq prepare for this election, the United States obligated approximately $130 

million to provide assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq 

(IECI),2

 Iraqi nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and political entities. Much of 

this assistance is directed at not only the January 30 elections but also the two 

subsequent elections—a constitutional referendum and political election—scheduled 

before the end of 2005. 

As part of our effort to monitor Iraq reconstruction, we have gathered information on 

efforts to support Iraq’s political transition. This report was initiated under the 

Comptroller General’s statutory authority and is being addressed to the committees 

of jurisdiction. In particular, this report provides information on (1) U.S. assistance 

to Iraq for the elections and (2) improvements in the elections process that 

participating organizations identified for future elections. 

To address these objectives, we interviewed staff and examined documents from U.S. 

agencies, grant recipients, and UN agencies; we also attended a UN conference on the 

January 2005 elections. Our description of elections assistance is limited to programs 

funded through U.S. appropriations for nonsecurity elections assistance, as reported 

in grant agreements and publicly available Department of State and other U.S. 

government reports to Congress.3

 To describe U.S. assistance, we interviewed staff in 

 

1

In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, European Union, and Chile provided technical 

advisers to the IECI to assist in the administration of the January 2005 election. The UN also 

coordinated this technical assistance to prevent duplication of efforts and gaps in the assistance. 2

The IECI is the Iraqi government body responsible for administering these three elections. The CPA 

established the IECI before the transfer of power to Iraqi authorities.

3

Section 2207 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the 

Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (P.L. 108-106) required the Office of Management and 

Budget to submit a report to the Congress every 90 days that updates the use of the funds appropriated 

in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. 
Page 2 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

Washington, D.C., on-site in Amman, Jordan, and by telephone in Baghdad, Iraq. We 

also examined documents such as grant agreements, work plans, performance 

monitoring plans, and periodic reporting from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), the Department of State, the National Endowment of 

Democracy, IFES,4

 the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National 

Democratic Institute (NDI), and other grantees. We traveled to Amman, Jordan, to 

meet with officials from the U.S. government and implementing partners. Due to 

security conditions, we were unable to travel to Iraq. As feasible, we spoke to 

representatives from Iraqi NGOs to obtain information on their U.S.-funded programs. 

Program results and other data in this correspondence are based on reports and 

information from the organizations noted above and our review of U.S. government 

oversight of them. We believe the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

this report. To describe improvements for future Iraqi elections, we attended a UN 

conference at which organizations that helped prepare for the elections identified 

problems and improvements; we also reviewed the UN’s summary report of the 

conference. We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary 

The United States obligated approximately $130 million for nonsecurity assistance to 

help Iraq undertake elections in 2005. The largest U.S.-funded area of nonsecurity 

election assistance was $41.1 million awarded by USAID to IFES to provide technical 

expertise directly to the IECI to help it conduct the elections and make key 

procurements. The Department of State provided $30 million to NDI and IRI to 

advise, train, and help organize democratically oriented political parties. Both USAID 

and the Department of State funded $25.2 million of voter education efforts in Iraq, 

with grants obligated to IRI, Voice for Humanity, and Iraqi NGOs to conduct voter 

outreach. USAID provided an additional grant of $14.2 million to IFES to build an 

Iraqi NGO network to identify and monitor elections-related violence. USAID also 

obligated $14 million to NDI to develop an Iraqi NGO domestic elections monitor 

network. The United States sought the participation of Iraqi women in elections with 

$5.8 million from the Department of State and through USAID’s integrated gender 

strategy. The United States, through the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), also 

helped the Iraqi government provide security to conduct the elections. 

The UN, which coordinated assistance from the international community, convened a 

post-elections conference that included IECI, IFES, UN, and USAID officials to assess 

preparations for the January 30, 2005, elections and to identify areas needing 

improvement before the next elections. Conference participants identified overall 

elections management, media involvement in the elections process, and voter 

education as areas needing improvement. For example, regarding elections 

management, participants noted that reporting systems and communication practices 

among elections headquarters, governorate offices, and district offices need to be 

improved to avoid confusion about official policy guidance. In addition, participants 

suggested that the IECI develop a way to address regional differences in voter 

education. For example, the development of materials by the IECI in languages such 

 

4

IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for Election Systems. 
Page 3 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

as Assyrian and Turkmen would help avoid inconsistencies and inaccurate 

translations of official voter education materials. 

Background 

On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government. 

Under the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 

this interim government was responsible for holding an election for a 275-member 

transitional National Assembly. The election occurred on January 30, 2005, and as a 

result, 12 political entities won at least one seat in the National Assembly (see table 

1). Out of approximately 14.3 million registered voters, almost 8.5 million voted, 

according to State Department reporting. The transitional National Assembly first 

met on March 16, 2005, and subsequently elected the Presidency Council—a 

president and two deputies. 

Table 1: Transitional National Assembly Results from the January 2005 Election

Political entity Number of seats 

Unified Iraq Coalition 140

Kurdistan Alliance List 75

Iraqi List 40

Iraqis 5

Turkman Iraq Front 3

National Independent Cadres and Elites 3

Islamic Action Organization in Iraq/ Central Direction 2

Islamic Group of Kurdistan/Iraq 2

Nation Union 2

Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering 1

National Democratic Alliance 1

Al Rafideen National List 1

Total 275

Source: IFES.

A key function of the National Assembly is to write a draft constitution that the Iraqi 

people will then vote on in a general referendum to be held by October 15, 2005, (see 

fig. 1). If the permanent constitution is approved, elections for a permanent 

government would take place no later than December 15, 2005, and the permanent 

government would take office no later than December 31, 2005. However, if a 

majority of Iraqi voters do not approve the draft constitution or if two-thirds of the 

voters in three or more governorates reject it, the National Assembly will be 

dissolved. Elections for a new National Assembly would then take place by 

December 15, 2005. The new government would continue to operate under the 

transitional law and would be responsible for drafting another constitution. 
Page 4 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

Figure 1: Timeline for Iraqi Elections

June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.

2004 2005

June 28, 2004

 CPA transfers

 power to Iraqi

 interim government

January 31, 2005

 Deadline for transitional

 National Assembly elections;

 governorate council elections

 to be held at same time

August 15, 2005

 National Assembly

 completes draft

 permanent

 constitution October 15, 2005

 General referendum

 for public approval of

 draft constitution

December 15, 2005

 Elections for permanent

 government held

December 31, 2005

 New National Assembly

 and permanent government

 take office

Phase 1: Interim government Phase 2: Transitional government

Source: GAO analysis of the Law of Administration of Iraq for the Transitional Period, March 8, 2004.

U.S. Programs Help Develop the Capacity of Iraqis to Undertake 2005 

Elections 

The United States obligated about $130 million in nonsecurity assistance for the Iraqi 

2005 elections in the areas of elections administration assistance, political party 

development, voter education, elections violence monitoring, domestic monitoring, 

and women’s participation. Most of the major programs related to the elections are 

to continue through the end of 2005. Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of U.S.-

funded areas of nonsecurity elections assistance; enclosure 1 provides a list of the 

grants that fund U.S. electoral assistance to Iraq. In addition to nonsecurity 

assistance, the Department of Defense provided security and logistics support to the 

Iraqi government throughout the electoral process. 
Page 5 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

Figure 2: U.S.-funded Areas of Nonsecurity Elections Assistance5 

Note: Percentages do not add due to rounding. Total U.S. nonsecurity elections assistance is $130.3 

million. 

U.S. Programs Provide Iraq with Elections Administration Assistance 

Of the approximately $130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections, USAID 

obligated more than $41 million, approximately 32 percent, for elections 

administration assistance. USAID provided initial funding for elections administration 

in September and November 2003, with two grants totaling more than $1 million to 

IFES to conduct a pre-election assessment and develop a plan and budget to 

administer the elections. IFES identified Iraq’s electoral needs, including an electoral 

institution, legal framework, voter education effort, and election security. USAID 

also provided two smaller grants to Iraqi authorities to test the reliability of the 

Public Distribution Information System database6 for use in voter registration. These 

assessments helped lay the foundation for future U.S. assistance and, according to 

one IFES official, for executing the January 2005 elections. For example, the IECI 

used the database to develop the voter rolls. 

In September 2004, USAID obligated $40 million to IFES to develop the IECI as an 

elections administrative and regulatory body. This assistance included providing the 

IECI with a legal review of elections regulations, training staff, planning logistics, and 

procuring needed items for the January 30 elections. For example, IFES procured the 

 

5

Obligation amounts are through March 31, 2005. 

6

The Public Distribution System established a database containing information on Iraqis for the 

purposes of distributing food rations under the Oil for Food Program. 
Page 6 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

printed voter registration forms because the IECI lacked appropriate contracting 

processes. IFES also paid to have the voter lists printed and distributed for a public 

challenge period. IFES is continuing such assistance activities to the IECI to support 

the upcoming elections. 

U.S. Programs Assist the Nonpartisan Development of Iraqi Political Entities and 

Parties 

The United States obligated nearly $30 million of the approximately $130 million in 

U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections for political party development and assistance. 

These grants were provided by the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID 

and were implemented by NDI and IRI. The objective of the nonpartisan assistance 

was to build and strengthen movements and parties to build a broad democratic 

coalition that is supportive of a stable, democratic Iraq. Neither NDI nor IRI 

excluded political entities or candidates from their training programs based on their 

political leanings. 

Both State and USAID provided funding to NDI and IRI to assess Iraqi political 

parties’ needs and capacities. NDI and IRI conducted a joint assessment in early 2004 

that provided an analysis of emerging political organizations and the political 

environment for party development in Iraq. The assessment described Iraqi political 

entities, including their staffing, membership, recruitment, finances, and platforms. 

The report made the recommendation that party assistance should never be in the 

form of direct cash assistance but could include access to meeting space, 

telecommunications and internet access, printing, and photocopying facilities. 

NDI’s and IRI’s political party programs have operated since 2003 and include 

training Iraqi leaders and representatives from political entities in organizing a 

campaign, developing a constituency, and understanding IECI regulations. According 

to NDI and IRI sources, the nonpartisan political party assistance programs also 

helped political leaders and representatives develop communication skills such as 

public speaking and message development; the program also helped political parties 

produce commercials and other outreach materials. NDI and IRI conducted group 

workshops and consultations, created resource centers and media centers, and 

issued newsletters and other outreach materials as part of their programs. According 

to NDI reports, NDI provided training to 40 of the 111 political entities running in the 

national elections and to 35 of the 87 women elected to the transitional National 

Assembly. 

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi NGOs’ Capacity to Develop and Implement Voter 

Education Campaign

The United States obligated more than $25 million, approximately 19 percent of the 

total for Iraqi electoral assistance, to voter education activities. Some of these grants, 

including IRI’s voter education program, are scheduled to continue through the end 

of 2005.7

 

7

For more information on the duration of projects, refer to enclosure 1. 
Page 7 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

USAID obligated nearly $24 million to IRI to develop an NGO network, the Civic 

Coalition for Free Elections, to design and implement a national voter education 

campaign to inform and mobilize voters. According to IRI, this network, made up of 

63 NGOs, developed public service announcements for television. For example, IRI 

reported that the coalition organized Iraq’s first televised candidate debates that 

included airing IRI-developed announcements to viewers during station breaks. The 

coalition and other civic groups developed and disseminated thousands of election 

brochures, t-shirts, and posters. The coalition also assisted the Rafadin Women’s 

Coalition with a voter education campaign to emphasize the message that women 

should vote according to their own beliefs. IRI further reported that it worked 

separately with eight Sunni organizations and five women’s organizations to execute 

voter education activities targeting specific groups and geographic regions. For 

example, according to IRI, an Iraqi coalition member organized an elections 

conference for 130 women civic leaders from Kirkuk and Mosul. 

USAID also provided $1 million to Voice for Humanity to implement a voter 

education campaign through the use of media players with pre-recorded messages 

and programming. These messages and programs emphasized elections as a path to 

security and peace. According to Voice for Humanity, it distributed 15,000 such 

devices throughout Iraq through social networks that included tribal sheiks, religious 

leaders, and political leaders in the latter half of January 2005. Further, Voice for 

Humanity estimated that 20 percent of the devices were provided to Sunnis. 

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi NGOs’ Capacity to Systematically Monitor Electionsrelated Violence 

USAID obligated $14.2 million, approximately 11 percent of the nearly $130 million in 

U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections, to IFES to build an Iraqi NGO network that would 

identify and monitor elections-related violence. According to IFES officials, 45 days 

before the January 2005 elections, IFES-trained monitors were operating throughout 

Iraq gathering information on elections-related violence. Once the monitors verified 

the information, they aggregated these incidents into a Web-based database designed 

to track information about where, when, and who had been involved in electionsrelated violence. The program also reported having recruited and hired local staff for 

each governorate and opened regional offices in Baghdad, Erbil, and Basra. IFES 

conflict mitigation program is scheduled to continue through early 2006. 

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi Capacity to Monitor and Report on Electoral Events 

USAID obligated $14 million, approximately 11 percent of the total U.S. assistance for 

Iraqi elections, to develop an Iraqi NGO domestic elections monitor network and 

train party agent elections monitors. NDI reported having provided training and 

assistance to help form the Iraqi Election Information Network (EIN) comprised of 

over 150 NGOs. According to EIN, more than 8,000 domestic monitors were deployed 

on January 30 to approximately 80 percent of polling stations. In February 2005, EIN 

issued and disseminated a final report that described polling center security, ballot 

box integrity, opening and closing of polling stations, voter finger inking, voter 

identity verification, and vote counting. 
Page 8 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

NDI and IRI also provided party agent monitor8

 training through their political party 

assistance programs. IRI created an educational manual in cooperation with IECI to 

inform party officials about the rules surrounding party agent monitors. According to 

IRI, 15,000 copies of the manual were distributed to political parties in the Baghdad 

area. 

U.S. Programs Encourage Women’s Participation in Elections through Multiple 

Programs

The United States obligated more than $5.8 million in grants, primarily through the 

Department of State, for local nongovernmental organizations to encourage women’s 

participation in the electoral process. Grantees reported having provided leadership 

training for women candidates—designed to, among other things, enhance 

candidates’ public speaking and media skills—in Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, and 

Sulaymaniya, as well as follow-up consultations with women elected to national and 

regional legislative bodies. The grants were also used to establish women’s centers 

to organize trainings, provide resources, and build an advocacy network for women. 

Additional grant activities included voter education to increase awareness and public 

support for women’s involvement in the political process. In addition to Department 

of State funding, the U.S. Institute of Peace provided funding to conduct conferences 

to train Iraqi women on candidacy and political participation. USAID has supported 

the participation of women by developing a strategy to incorporate gender 

considerations into each of its grants.9

 

The Department of Defense (DOD) Helped Provide Security and Logistics

In addition to U.S. nonsecurity assistance, DOD provided support to the Iraqi 

government for both security and logistics as part of MNF-I.10 At the time of Iraq's 

elections, more than 159,000 U.S. forces and 24,500 coalition forces were operating 

throughout Iraq as part of MNF-I. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior was responsible for 

providing a secure environment for all phases of elections, preventing threats and 

criminal activities, and facilitating full public participation in the elections. Iraqi 

Armed Forces and Iraqi Police were responsible for providing security at the polling 

sites. MNF-I forces provided support as needed to Iraqi forces.11 Figure 3 depicts the 

security concept developed for the elections. In addition to its security support, DOD 

provided logistics assistance to the Iraqi government, including transporting election 

materials throughout the country to polling places and counting stations. 

 

8

Whereas EIN monitors are considered independent and nonpartisan, party agent monitors represent 

their respective parties while undertaking monitoring activities. 

9

Due to the agency’s integrated approach, we did not determine the amount of USAID’s funding that 

contributes to women’s participation. 

10We did not determine the cost of DOD’s support for the elections because it is embedded in DOD’s 

overall operating costs in Iraq. 

11In a statement to the Congress, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency said that attacks on 

Iraq's election day reached about 300, double the previous 1-day high of about 150 during Ramadan in 

2004. 
Page 9 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

Figure 3: Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s Security Concept for Polling Centers

Polling 

station 

1

Vehicle 

road 

block

Vehicle 

road 

block

Vehicle 

road 

block Vehicle 

road 

block

Polling 

station 

2

Polling 

station 

3

Sources: GAO adaptation of Iraqi Ministry of Interior diagram (data); Nova Development (clip art).

Polling center

IECI IECI IECI

Police 

sentry Police sentry

IECI IECI

Outermost zone: Iraqi 

forces control flow of 

people in and out of 

security zones. 

Coalition forces 

provide area 

security and 

provide 

backup as 

necessary. 

Security 

control

Inside polling center: 

Independent Electoral 

Commission of Iraq 

(IECI) personnel 

search voters entering 

center and control 

voter queue. 

Zone immediately around 

polling center: Iraqi police 

monitor voters entering center, 

prevent vehicles from entering, 

and provide armed security to 

back up IECI searchers.

Note: This is a notional concept diagram illustrating the Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s general plan for 

polling center security. Each polling center was secured according to its configuration and individual 

security needs. 

Participants in UN Conference Noted Improvements Needed before 

Upcoming Elections 

In March 2005, the UN convened a conference to assess the electoral activities and 

preparations that led to the January 30 elections and to define areas requiring 

additional assistance before the next elections. Conference participants included 

IECI, IFES, the UN, USAID, and United Kingdom Department for International 

Development officials; representatives of the international monitoring effort; and 

experts from academia. Conference participants identified areas needing 

improvement, including overall elections management, access to media, and voter 

education. The following summarizes the key areas for improvement that were 

discussed at the conference. 

• IECI management: According to participants in the conference, aspects of 

IECI’s management need to be formalized and strengthened. For example, it 

was rare that IECI headquarters’ instructions were formally issued to the field 

as institutional guidance, resulting in confusion among field electoral 
Page 10 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

administration personnel, who were unable to identify official policy guidance. 

Participants noted that reporting systems and communication practices among 

headquarters, governorate offices, and district offices need improvement. In 

addition, conference participants recommended that management and 

decision-making practices in the IECI Board of Commissioners and Electoral 

Administration ought to be formalized. These include clarifying and defining 

the roles and responsibilities of IECI staff and officials, documenting the 

decisions, and making the decisions accessible. 

• Media issues: According to conference participants, the Chairman of the 

Board of Commissioners should be the only official representative of the IECI 

to the media to convey public information on policy issues. At the time of the 

January elections, more than one board member held press conferences, 

creating confusion as to who could make official IECI statements. 

Participants also agreed that an independent monitoring entity was needed to 

observe and assess media involvement in the electoral process, as well as 

candidates’ and political entities’ electoral activities in the media. A 

monitoring entity would help the IECI understand the media’s role in elections 

and ways to work effectively with the media to convey information. 

• Voter education: Participants noted that voter education efforts needed to 

be improved, particularly throughout diverse regions. Poor translations into 

other languages, such as Assyrian and Turkmen, resulted in inaccuracies and 

showed a lack of sensitivity to these populations. Participants suggested that 

these languages should be used in future elections. In addition, the IECI 

should develop a way to maintain a consistent message regarding the elections 

and electoral process throughout the country while addressing regional 

differences in perceptions and culture. Further, the IECI should work more 

closely with both governmental and nongovernmental groups to assist in 

conducting the voter education campaign to reach a larger number of voters, 

and in strengthening public outreach at governorate and district levels. In 

addition, because of limited access to electricity and television, conference 

participants noted that the use of radio and interactive face-to-face activities 

were needed. 

In addition to these specific recommendations, participants identified the following 

areas that needed improvement. 

• Training: Conference participants believed that training for polling staff, 

security personnel, media officials, and reporters on their roles and 

responsibilities in electoral activities needed to be improved. For example, 

because of insufficient training of polling staff, an unknown number of ballots 

were excluded from the official vote count due to improper processing. 

• International assistance: Conference participants also called for the 

prompt deployment of more international experts to additional locations to 

assist in electoral events. Because of the limited training and experience of 

IECI personnel, international advisers are important in providing assistance 

and advice. 
Page 11 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

• Legal framework: According to participants, establishing mechanisms to 

ensure equity among candidates, including provisions to limit spending and 

report finances, is another area where improvements are needed. 

• Candidate certification: Conference participants stated that the IECI 

needed more resources to verify candidates’ compliance with certification 

requirements. The IECI currently has limited resources, which hampers it 

from investigating candidates’ affiliation with militias. 

• Filing election complaints: According to conference participants, 

expanding the times and locations and better publicizing the procedures for 

filing complaints is also needed. Although there were media reports and 

allegations of voter fraud, the IECI did not investigate because it did not 

receive any complaints through the official process. 

Agency Comments 

We requested comments from the USAID and the Departments of State and Defense. 

USAID provided written comments, which are reproduced in enclosure 2, and 

technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. USAID found the 

report to be factually correct. The Department of State declined to provide written 

comments, but provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as 

appropriate. The Department of Defense declined to comment. 

Concluding Remarks and Observations 

Elections are a critical goal for achieving the U.S. policy objective of a peaceful and 

stable Iraq. As of the issuance of this report, Iraq was on schedule for undertaking the 

referendum by October 15, 2005. The United States also continues to support the 

capacity of Iraqis (including the IECI, civil society groups, and political parties) to 

execute the next set of electoral events by funding IECI technical assistance, voter 

education, political party assistance, conflict mitigation, domestic monitoring, 

women’s participation, and military support. Programs in these areas are scheduled 

to continue through 2005 or the next parliamentary elections. The UN has continued 

its involvement in Iraqi elections, holding a conference in March 2005 where 

participants noted areas requiring additional assistance before the next elections, 

including IECI management, media issues, and voter education. The UN also 

conducted a needs assessment mission in June 2005 for the upcoming constitutional 

referendum and subsequent political elections. 
Page 12 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

We are sending copies of this letter to interested congressional committees. We are 

also sending copies to the Administrator of USAID, the Secretary of State, and the 

Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8979. Contact points for of our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs maybe found on the last page of this report. The GAO 

contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in enclosure 3. 

Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Enclosures - 3 
Page 13 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

List of Recipients 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 
Page 14 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Mitch McConnell 

Chairman 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jim Kolbe 

Chairman 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Page 15 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

Enclosure I 

Table 2: U.S. Assistance for Iraqi Elections by Area of Assistance as of 

March 31, 2005 

ELECTIONS ADMINISTRATION ASSISTANCE: $41.1M 

U.S. agency Grantee Grant name Grant effective dates Obligated amount 

USAID IFES Electoral Technical 

Assistance to the IECI 

September 1, 2004 – 

January 31, 2006 $40,000,000 

USAID IFES Pre-Election Assessment 

in Iraq 

September 5, 2003 – 

October 10, 2003 484,840 

USAID IFES 

Development of detailed 

operation plan and 

corresponding budgets 

for administering 

electoral events in Iraq 

November 5, 2003 – 

December 27, 2003 

557,475 

USAID 

Erbil and 

Sulaymaniyah 

Central Statistics 

Office 

Survey of Public 

Distribution System, 

Kurdistan Region 

June 10, 2004 – 

September 9, 2004 7,070 

USAID 

Governing Council 

– General 

Secretariat 

Supporting creation of 

Voters Register Database 

March 9, 2004 – June 9, 

2004 9,680 

Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005 $41,054,056 

POLITICAL PARTY ASSISTANCE: $30M 

U.S. agency Grantee Grant name Grant effective dates Obligated amount 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

NDI 

Political Party 

Strengthening and 

Coalition Building 

January 1, 2004-

February 28, 2005 $17,687,261 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

IRI Political Party 

Development in Iraq 

February 1, 2004 – 

August 31, 2005 11,724,242 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

NDI 

Democracy Education 

and Organizational 

Development 

August 16, 2003 – 

October 15, 2003 315,364 

USAID NDI 

Iraq: Assessment of 

Political Organizations 

and Parties 

December 1, 2003 – 

January 31, 2004 140,000 

USAID IRI Political Parties’ 

Assessment: Iraq 

December 5, 2003 – 

January 15, 2004 110,000 

USAID 

Coordination 

Committee of 

National 

Democratic Forces 

Conference of National 

Democratic Parties 

January 21, 2004 – 

February 21, 2004 9,494 

Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005 $29,986,361 
Page 16 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

VOTER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE: $25.2M 

U.S. agency Grantee Grant name Grant effective dates Obligated 

amount 

USAID IRI 

Domestic Oversight and Voter 

Education Activities Voter 

Education Campaign 

July 9, 2004 – 

January 8, 2006 $23,900,000 

USAID Voice for Humanity Iraq Small Media Outreach 

Project 

February 1, 2005 – 

April 5, 2005 1,000,000 

USAID Khuramal Cultural 

Center 

Democracy and Elections 

Workshops 

July 8, 2004 – 

8/20/2004 5,320 

USAID Kurdish Institute for 

Elections Elections Seminars July 24, 2004 – October 24, 2004 7,346 

USAID Kurdish Institute for 

Elections 

Translating and Printing of the 

Guidelines to Assist National 

Minority 

October 1, 2004 – 

December 31, 2004 10,433 

USAID Free Women’s 

Association 

Women’s Elections Seminar – 

Baghdad 

June 17, 2004 – 

September 9, 2004 7,998 

USAID Free Women’s 

Association 

Women’s Elections Seminar – 

Ninewa 

June 20, 2004 – 

August 31, 2004 7,998 

USAID Free Women’s 

Association 

Women’s Elections Seminar – 

Kirkuk 

June 17, 2004 – 

August 9, 2004 7,998 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

Kurdish Institute for 

Elections 

Preparation for Constitution 

and Democratic Elections 

February 1, 2005 – 

January 31, 2006 55,000 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

Kurdish Institute for 

Elections Voters’ Civic Education in Iraq October 1, 2004 – September 30, 2005 60,000 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

Center for Nongovernmental 

Organizations 

Election and Democracy 

Education in Mosul 

February 1, 2005 – 

January 31, 2006 38,000 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

Concordia Elections and Constitution 

Workshops 

February 1, 2005 – 

January 31, 2006 34,000 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

Iraqi Organization for 

Human Rights 

Coordination 

Constitutional Awareness 

Campaign in Iraq 

February 1, 2005 – 

January 31, 2006 45,000 

Department 

of State/ 

NED 

Nahrain Electronic 

Encylopedia Informing Iraqi People February 1, 2005 – January 31, 2006 39,000 

Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005 $25,218,093 
Page 17 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

ELECTIONS VIOLENCE MONITORING: $14.2M 

U.S. agency Grantee Grant name Grant effective 

dates 

Obligated 

amount 

USAID IFES 

Domestic Oversight and Voter 

Education Activities – Conflict 

Management and Mitigation 

Program 

July 9, 2004 – 

January 8, 2006 $14,200,000 

Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005 $14,200,000 

DOMESTIC MONITORING: $14M 

U.S. agency Grantee Grant name Grant effective 

dates 

Obligated 

amount 

USAID NDI 

Domestic Oversight and Voter 

Education Activities – Domestic 

Elections Monitors 

July 9, 2004 – 

January 8, 2006 

$14,000,000 

USAID IRI 

Domestic Oversight and Voter 

Education Activities – Political 

Party Poll-watcher Training 

July 9, 2004 – 

January 8, 2006 n/aa

Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005 $14,000,000 

WOMEN’S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: $5.8M 

U.S. agency Grantee Grant name Grant effective 

dates 

Obligated 

amount 

Department 

of State NDI Strengthening Women’s Political 

Participation in Iraq 

September 1, 2004 

– November 30, 

2005 

$1,500,000 

Department 

of State IRI Women’s Leadership Institute September 1, 2004 

– February 28, 2006 1,500,000 

Department 

of State 

Johns Hopkins 

University / SAIS 

Preparing Iraqi Women as Leaders, 

Advocates, and Participants in the 

Political Process 

September 11, 2004 

– December 1, 2005 854,000 

Department 

of State 

Independent 

Women’s Forum 

The Iraqi women’s educational 

Institute 

September 17, 2004 

– September 15, 

2005 

1,300,000 

Department 

of State 

Kurdish Human 

Rights Watch Women and Democracy in Iraq September 23, 2004 – January 6, 2006 550,000 

USIP Woodrow Wilson 

Center 

Building A New Iraq: Women’s Role 

in the Political Process 

December 1, 2004 – 

February 28, 2005 61,780 

USIP Woodrow Wilson 

Center 

Building A New Iraq: Women’s Role 

in the Political Process on the Eve 

of the January 2005” 

June 28, 2004 – 

August 31, 2004 60,970 

USIP 

Women’s 

Empowerment 

Groups 

Women’s Empowerment Project & 

Advancing Women’s Role in 

Politics – Babylon 

October 1, 2004 – 

December 31, 2004 

& October 1, 2004 – 

May 31, 2005 

19,472 

Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005 $5,847,475 

Total obligated as of March 31, 2005 $130,305,985 
Page 18 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

Source: GAO analysis of grant agreements from USAID, the Department of State, NED, and USIP. 

a

IRI’s grant is for both party agent monitor training and for voter education activities. We do not have 

a breakdown between the two components of the grants. IRI’s total amount obligated for this award is 

indicated under Voter Education in this table.
Page 19 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

Enclosure 2 

Comments from the U.S. Agency International Development 
Page 20 GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq 

Enclosure 3 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact: Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979 

Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the individual named above, Tetsuo 

Miyabara, Valérie Leman Nowak, Friendly Vang-Johnson, and Christina Werth made 

key contributions to this report. Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, and 

Mary Moutsos provided technical assistance. 

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