OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Lt Col Michael W. Lamb, Sr.)

Certified by: HQ AFDC/DR (Col Thomas A. Bowermeister)

Pages: 66

Distribution: F

Approved by: TIMOTHY A. KINNAN, Major General, USAF

 Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2–4.4

13 November 1999

BY ORDER OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
i

FOREWORD

Whether it is called upon to respond to crises in the deserts of Saudi

Arabia, the mountains of Bosnia, or along the flooded towns and cities

along the Mississippi River, the Air Force continues to prove indispensable to America’s needs. Its unique people, skills, responsiveness, and

capabilities are the foundation of America’s projection of national power.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-4.4 does not stand alone as

the only doctrine for bases, infrastructure, and facilities. It is essential

that it be read together with AFDDs 1, 2, and 2-4. Together, these doctrine

documents spell out for every Air Force member, from airman basic to

general, what their roles are to project combat power—providing warfighter support.

In this connection, providing bases, infrastructure, and facility support

to our forces is the key to meeting the Air Force’s Title 10 responsibilities

to provide administrative and logistical support to forces assigned to the

combatant commands. To meet these responsibilities and to provide agile combat support when and where needed requires well-trained logistics staffs throughout the Air Force.

This document states the US Air Force’s beliefs on bases, infrastructure, and facilities. Further, the Air Force develops the subsequent operating methods and practices that commanders should

employ at all levels of warfare. With this guidance, Air Force people will

understand and operate as an integral part of the overall Air Force mission in

combat support. This document spells out what we, the United States Air

Force team, expect from our members, commanders, and leaders and the

principles by which they can most successfully provide support to the

warfighter.

 TIMOTHY A. KINNAN

 Major General, USAF

 Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center

 13 November 1999
ii
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... v

CHAPTER ONE—

Basing, Infrastructure, and Facilities (BIF)—Fundamentals ......... 1

General ............................................................................................... 1

Bases ............................................................................................... 1

Infrastructure ................................................................................. 6

Facilities ......................................................................................... 7

Warfighting Attributes of Expeditionary Basing ................................. 9

Security ........................................................................................ 10

Maneuver and Mobility .................................................................11

Surprise ........................................................................................ 12

Mass and Economy of Force......................................................... 12

Rear Area Operations ....................................................................... 12

Rear Area Management .................................................................... 14

Rear Area Movements ...................................................................... 15

Agile Combat Support ...................................................................... 15

Operational Concepts ................................................................... 16

Infrastructure Development ........................................................ 17

Base Defense ................................................................................ 19

CHAPTER TWO—Planning ............................................................... 21

Key Factors ....................................................................................... 21

Considerations .................................................................................. 22

Garrison Mode .............................................................................. 24

Expeditionary Mode ..................................................................... 25

Threats and Vulnerabilities .............................................................. 27

Expeditionary Airbase Planning ....................................................... 28

Forward Operations Base Planning .................................................. 32

Strategic Basing................................................................................. 34

CHAPTER THREE—Employment.................................................... 37

General ............................................................................................. 37

Support Functions ............................................................................ 37

Command And Control (C2) ............................................................ 39

Governing Concepts ..................................................................... 42

Expeditionary Command and Control ......................................... 43

Contingency Operations .............................................................. 43

EPILOGUE ........................................................................................... 47
iv

Suggested Readings ............................................................................ 49

Glossary ............................................................................................... 51
v

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) delineates the fundamental principles and operational-level Air Force doctrine for basing, infrastructure, and facilities (BIF).

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National

Guard (ANG), and civilian Air Force personnel. This doctrine is authoritative but not directive. Commanders should exercise judgment when

applying this doctrine to accomplish their missions. It is intended to

assist commanders and all active duty, Air Force Reserve, ANG, and civilian Air Force personnel in planning and conducting operations to accomplish assigned missions.

SCOPE

Air Force basing, infrastructure, and facilities doctrine provides guidance for Air Force commanders in their roles of fulfilling Department of

Defense (DOD) missions. A common doctrine helps ensure all elements

of a command have a common baseline for developing and conducting

operations. Doctrine is a guide for the exercise of professional judgment

rather than a set of inflexible rules. It describes our understanding of the

best way to do the job. The doctrinal statements in this document are

general—they are to be implemented through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as well as unified and major command, field operating

agency, and unit concepts of operations, operations plans, and other supporting documents.

We cannot become confused about the fundamental purpose of

our armed forces. That purpose is their readiness to fight and win

our nation’s wars. As we reshape and train our forces, it must be for

this purpose above all others.

General Ronald R. Fogleman

former Chief of Staff, USAF
vi
1

CHAPTER ONE

BASING, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND

FACILITIES (BIF)—FUNDAMENTALS

GENERAL

Combat support provides the foundation that enables global engagement and is a linchpin that ties together Air Force core competencies. It

includes those actions taken to create, deploy, employ, generate, sustain,

protect, and redeploy aerospace personnel, assets, and capabilities through

all peacetime and wartime military operations. The fundamental mission for BIF incorporates the unique contributions and capabilities of aerospace power: speed, flexibility, versatility, and global reach.

Each major combat support function has a role in the integrated combat support process. The commander should be familiar with these functions, as each will have an impact on the decisions regarding BIF. Table 1

briefly describes the role of each function. While each is critical and

necessary, the impact may vary according to the operations a commander

may have to support.

In 1991, the US military’s combat success in Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM and the extraordinary six-month buildup of combat forces and

infrastructure before actual hostilities between coalition forces and Iraq commenced have been well documented. Indeed, numerous lessons have been gleaned

from these combat experiences. First, if the Gulf War is an example, aerospace

power in future conflicts may not receive the proper emphasis; we made it look

easier than it was. Second, we should not forget we benefited by an extensive

compatible infrastructure that was readily available and abundant host-nation

support. Third, we had six months to prepare. Coalition forces had available

airfields, ports, prepared infrastructure, adequate fuel supplies, unopposed landings, widespread public support, and minimal friction from external sources.

Although these conditions were elements leading to overwhelming success, planners should not expect such conditions to avail themselves in future military

operations.

Multiple Sources
2



	




	
 

	


				

			

	



	 	 	 	 	 	

	
					

	 	 	 	  	 	


		

		

			

	
    	
 	
 		

 
 



   	 


	 		
	

			
 			


	

	
		


			

		


 	
		!
	!

	 		! 
	!"	 

	
	!		!	
		

    	 # 	
  

$
	
			

		

	
			
	

	






	
		


	


		%		
	


	

				
	
	


		

	
  
	  
 	 	  	


 	
  	  
 	
 	

 

	
	
		




	

		

		

	

	&	



		



	 '			



	
	
	

			 '				


	
 	
  	   (






		

 	  	)	
 

  


			
		
		

	 
	


		 		

 
 





	





		


				*

	
				


		 	 
3

Bases

A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported.

Bases can also be defined as installations containing facilities and infrastructure. Bases vary in size, location, and operations. Infrastructure is a

term generally applicable to all fixed and expeditionary installations, fabrications, facilities, and processes that support and control military forces

and military adjuncts. A facility is a real property entity consisting of one

or more of the following:

 A building.

 A structure (including temporary structures like tentage).

 A utility system.

 Pavements.

 Underlying lands.




	



 + 
	
				



 	
	 	

	
	
			

	

		 	
			 
	
		)	

,




 	 	   		   

	  
  		

	
(				


	 	 		 	


	

 	
	

			


	

	

			

			

)




 	
				

! 	
 	 	 	  
 	
  	

	
 	
 	  
 	 

			

 	
				
	 

	
		


		

"	

	
#

 

	
 

$ -			


4

The typical air operation contains a core infrastructure and support

activity that includes aircraft, runways, support personnel, and a command post. Core functions of bases usually include providing power, fuels, ordnance, water, civil engineers, security, services, medical, and command and control. The primary elements of an airbase are:

 Aircraft operating surfaces, operational facilities, and associated air traffic control and navigational aids.

 Industrial areas for inspection, maintenance, test and evaluation, and

repair of aerospace vehicles and associated equipment.

 Logistical support areas for the storage and dispensing of materials,

equipment, consumables (i.e., fuels, oils, and lubricants) along with

ground vehicle operations, maintenance, and repair.

 Headquarters and administrative facilities for command and personnel support.

 Communications and information systems support.

 Food service and dining facilities.

 Industrial areas to include utility systems and facilities.

 Unaccompanied and accompanied family housing.
5

 Medical facilities.

 Security and fire protection facilities.

 Community support facilities (e.g., postal, retail sales, recreational,

religious, health, and welfare).

 Lodging facilities.

Bases can be further characterized by the weapon system or weapon

support system that forms the major operating focus of the base or installation:

 Aerospace Operations. The primary purpose of bases in this category is to support operational missions based on predominant use

and mission suitability. This category includes the base and airspace,

ranges, and facilities.

 Information Operations. The primary purpose of bases in this category is to provide operations and technical support for offensive and

defensive information warfare operations, information operations support, and command and control.

 Industrial. The primary purpose of bases in this category is

to provide highly technical support for depot-level maintenance, research, and development. This category includes

depots, product centers, and

laboratories.

 Medical Centers, Contingency/Theater Hospitals.

The primary purpose of bases

in this category is to provide

medical care. This category

could also include aeromedical

evacuation staging areas or a

stand-alone air transportation

hospital (SAATH).

 Education and Training. The

primary purpose of bases in this

category is to support technical training, flying training, and education. This category could also include special use airspace, ranges,

and facilities.
6

 Test and Evaluation. The primary purpose of bases in this category

is to support test and evaluation of weapons and weapon systems. This

category includes the base, associated test and evaluation airspace, electromagnetic frequencies, ranges, and facilities.

Bases are labeled by function and intensity of the operations within

these characterizations. The intensity of operations drives associated requirements for funding, personnel support, and weapon system operations. Base functional identities include:

 Main Operations Bases (MOB). Main operations bases are characterized by highly developed infrastructure and support activities. These

bases cover the varying extremes in operating environments with a

high degree of sophisticated infrastructure.

 Collocated Operations Bases (COB). Collocated operations bases

are usually owned and operated by an ally. These bases vary in accessibility, readiness, infrastructure, and support activity. These bases

include installations that support the Air Force Reserve and ANG.

 Forward Operations Bases (FOB). Forward operations bases range

from bases that are usually austere with little or no infrastructure to

some that are well developed. Usually, these bases are minimally maintained with limited support capabilities. Within this category are en

route support bases, forward operating locations, bare bases, and forward arming and refueling locations. The worst case is a bare base,

defined as a site with a usable runway, taxiway, parking areas, and a

source of water that can be made potable. It must be capable of supporting assigned aircraft; providing landing/recovery surfaces; and

providing sufficient space for other mission essential features such as

a logistical support and services infrastructure composed of people,

facilities, equipment, and supplies. A bare base requires mobile facilities, utilities, and support equipment that can be rapidly deployed and

installed, and be available to transform—virtually overnight—undeveloped real estate into a survivable, operational airbase.

Infrastructure

Infrastructure is the provision of services, processes, facilities, and related support required for developing, generating, sustaining, maintaining, and recovering aerospace power. Infrastructure is a collection of

physical elements, such as squadron operations buildings, and processes,
7

such as the military personnel flight operations. Infrastructure supports

operations across the spectrum of conflict and in both garrison and expeditionary environments. Infrastructure includes:

 Installations.

 Logistics.

 Personnel services.

 Health services support.

 Headquarters and headquarters support functions.

 Science and technology programs.

 Test, evaluation, and target facilities and ranges.

 Electromagnetic frequencies.

 Non-unit training.

 Acquisition, contracting, and financial services support.

 Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I)

systems.

 Installation support functions.

 Community support functions.

 Depot maintenance.

 Associated aerospace support systems.

Infrastructure supporting operations, regardless of the type of mission,

should be the focus of initial planning and development. As the mission

evolves, more emphasis may be needed in the other infrastructure areas

to support mission accomplishment, morale, quality of life, and to ensure

the provision of essential services.

Facilities

Facilities are registered elements of real property. Usage and cost reports are associated with their procurement, operation, improvement,

and disposal. The following are types of facilities:

 Buildings.

 Family housing to hospitals.

 Maintenance hangars to munitions igloos.

 Utility systems.

 Electricity, water, and waste systems.
8

 Fuel storage and distribution.

 Heat and cooling plant systems.

 Communications and information systems.

 Pavements.

 Runways, ramps, and taxiways.

 Roads, parking lots, and sidewalks.

 Underlying lands.

 Flora and fauna.

 Natural and cultural resources.

Deployed operations present unique challenges for the provision of

facilities. Foremost, before the deployment of the main force, advance

teams operating with the geographically designated contract construction agent (CCA) coordinate the use of host-nation (HN) lands and facilities. While this can be accomplished in advance under the terms of HN

agreements, the actual deployment still requires coordination and may

require liaison with the State Department. Use of HN lands and facilities

requires agreement on the length of use, existing condition of the lands

and facilities, security, force protection, and general environmental condition of the site, along with an agreement on post-use recovery and return of facilities.

The provision of buildings, utility systems, and pavements in the deployed environment can occur in varying phases representing the stages

of the mission and types of facilities. The first phase, called expedient,

covers the initial deployment of forces to the forward location. Facilities

in this phase are both preexisting HN assets (runways and aircraft shelters) and mobility equipment in the form of tents and other bare base

equipment items. Facilities constructed using initial standards are intended for immediate austere operation use by units upon arrival in theater for a limited time up to 6 months dependent on the type of facility.

Maximal use of reachback logistics and HN facilities systems how we can

reduce the deployed footprint. Reachback is that capability allowing commanders to obtain or coordinate support from units not physically located with the forward force. By leveraging advances in communications

technology, reachback capabilities make it possible to use continental US

(CONUS) and/or rear-based assets and organizations to perform various

functions in support of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) operations.

Effective use of reachback will reduce the number of personnel and amount

of equipment, which deploy to the area of responsibility (AOR), reduce
9

airlift and support requirements, and will positively affect a commander’s

ability to protect the deployed force. Reachback is predicated on global

communications, rapid global mobility, and time-definite resupply capabilities.

Temporary standard construction facilities are intended to replace initial standard facilities and to increase efficiency of operations for use up

to 24 months. Examples include replacing tents with relocatable hardwall

structures and replacing smaller generators with central power plants.

The use of civil augmentation contracts such as the Air Force Contract

Augmentation Program (AFCAP) can augment or reduce deployed forces

engaged in sustainment activities and the operation of temporary facilities for military operations other than war (MOOTW) and humanitarian

relief operations (HUMRO). AFCAP is a contingency type of contract and

is not intended to replace inherently military missions such as force

beddown.

In the permanent phase, deployed environments mirror facilities built

for MOB locations. Their construction entails detailed design, coordination with HN authorities, and programmatic action to fund construction.

Facilities in deployed locations must satisfy force protection, durability,

functional, and quality of life issues.

WARFIGHTING ATTRIBUTES OF EXPEDITIONARY

BASING

Aerospace power is only available through the coordination of the total

warfare system: the weapon system, the weapon support system, and the

It was not until the 1950s that military planners developed techniques to prepackage base support equipment that was predominantly World War II hardware.

This equipment consisted mainly of tents, field kitchens, medical facilities, power

generators, cots, desks, and other equipment. It was bulky, heavy, and required

excessive time to position and erect. This initial deployment kit was given the

nickname Gray Eagle. In the mid-1960s, more equipment was added to the package and some were redesigned to make them more air transportable, and the

name was changed to Harvest Eagle. Harvest Falcon and Harvest Eagle are the

two primary bare base equipment programs. Harvest Falcon provides complete

facilities for long duration bare base flying and support operations. These assets

were intended for use in SWA [Southwest Asia], but may be deployed to any

theater if required. Harvest Eagle provides facilities for bare base living and

working or for supporting additional requirements at an existing installation.

These assets were intended for use in the European and Pacific theaters, but may

be deployed to any theater.

Multiple Sources
10

basing system. Air Force leaders should recognize the importance and

synergy of the basing system in staging, delivering, and sustaining combat power. Aerospace power capabilities depend on cutting-edge delivery

systems and their complementary basing systems with an up-to-date, efficient infrastructure. The basing system includes the infrastructure, personnel, materiel, information, and other resources needed to sustain operation of the weapon and weapon support systems.

The Air Force generates, flies, fights, and controls its warfighting resources from its bases. The processes, systems, and training of base-level

organizations, whether deployed or in garrison, and their ability to enhance the effectiveness of the warfighter’s capabilities is known as the

“Blue Order of Battle.” It is here that aerospace power is most dependent

and most vulnerable. The base must not only withstand aerial and ground

attacks; it must also be capable of supporting concentrated and prolonged

air activities against the enemy. Base survival is not enough—the base

must be operable and capable of supporting its missions.

The following are principles that guide the commander in development of BIF:

Security

Security means to

protect friendly forces

and their base operations from enemy action. The commander

can not afford to focus

solely on physical security, but also has to

secure the base netIn two years of war in Korea, no single factor had so seriously

handicapped Fifth Air Force operational capabilities as the lack of

adequate air facilities. Operations from short and rough runways

damaged and deteriorated combat aircraft, posing inordinate

maintenance, supply, and attrition burdens upon the combat wings

and tactical air force.

Robert Futrell

The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953
11

work from cyber attacks. The commander should ensure staff planning

is detailed and completely reflects a thorough understanding of enemy

strategy, tactics, and doctrine. This improves security and reduces vulnerability to surprise. Security results from the measures taken by the

commander to protect his unit and its resources from attack, surprise,

observation, detection, interference, espionage, sabotage, and harassment.

Establishing and maintaining protective measures against hostile acts

achieves security, or it may be assured by deception operations designed

to confuse and dissipate enemy attempts to interfere with the forces being secured. For additional information about security, see the AFDD on

Force Protection.

Security and, more specifically, base operability and defense are part

of the primary missions of combat support. Support is provided through

the integrated efforts of airbase operability and defense, logistics, information protection, and combat support. Whether fighting from a long

established base or a deployment location, support and operational components should be tailored to counter known and anticipated threats. As

the threats increase, the commander may take passive defensive measures such as dispersal, camouflage, deception, armoring (personal), immunizing, public health protection measures, hardening to preserve forces,

or active defensive measures such as increased surveillance and other

security enhancements. Just as much as operational forces, support forces

should be prepared to operate in likely threat conditions. The chemical

and Scud missile threats encountered during Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM reinforced the importance of base defense concepts, organizations, equipment, and training.

Maneuver and Mobility

Maneuver and mobility are the actions taken to place an enemy in a

position of disadvantage through flexible application of combat power.

The commander should continue to provide timely, responsive support

to the full range of contingencies and conflicts and to support joint forces

as well as multinational efforts.

When a crisis erupts anywhere around the world, the United States

will need to rapidly deploy forces from its bases to deter a potential aggressor or defeat an adversary. Our ability to move rapidly to any spot on

the globe ensures that we can respond quickly and decisively to unexpected challenges. When an operation must be carried out quickly, airlift

and aerial refueling will be key players. Mobility builds the air bridge for
12

joint forces, enables multinational peace efforts, or speeds tailored forces

wherever they are needed. Deployment is an important combat force

multiplier providing strategic maneuver. Mobility requirements are the

drivers that determine the types of basing a commander will need to meet

the mission. For additional information on mobility, see the AFDD on

Air Mobility Operations.

Surprise

Surprise is the principle of attacking at a time, place, or in a manner

for which the enemy is not prepared. The flexibility and versatility inherent in rapid global mobility allow us to achieve surprise, one of our strongest advantages. The essential premise in agile combat support (ACS) is

the ability to move airbase capabilities between wings. This flexibility

allows for aerospace power logistics flexibility. ACS allows the commander

to meet air operation objectives and airbase operational objectives of

employment, generation, sustainment, protection, and redeployment.

Rapid global deployment allows surface forces to reach foreign destinations quickly, seizing the initiative and allowing the commander to define the time and place of assault. The ability to deploy rapidly and sustain the forces allows the commander the element of surprise. To maximize surprise while sustaining forces, the commander should plan for

providing appropriate base support, infrastructure, and facilities that allow seizing and maintaining the initiative.

Mass and Economy of Force

The principles of war call for concentration of combat power at a decisive time and place. The principle of mass is fundamental in all military

operations for the commander to achieve desired and decisive results.

While ensuring decisive combat power is available, rapid global deployment and ACS provide for the right mix at the right time and right place

to support operational or strategic objectives. The commander should

determine which basing modes provide the right mix at the right time at

the right place to support the forces in any given situation.

REAR AREA OPERATIONS

Recalling that bases are those localities from which operations are projected or supported, the commander should understand that rear area

operations play a vital role in combat support and formulate the baseline
13

of bases, infrastructure, and facilities development. Agile combat support requires the correct sizing of the forward deployed logistics footprint

through reductions in logistics forces, facilities, equipment, and supplies.

These reductions enable significant enhancements to force protection,

services, health services, joint logistics policies, structures, and processes

in inventory management, engineering, maintenance, and infrastructure

improvements. Rear area operations include:

 Force Protection Measures. Commanders at every level should take

all reasonable measures, including camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, hardening, and movement, to avoid becoming engaged

with forces that could disrupt forward support of combat forces. Force

protection measures will:

 Prevent or minimize enemy interference with communications

and information systems.

 Protect personnel and facilities. Commanders should ensure units

take active and passive measures that protect themselves and high

value assets in the joint rear area (JRA).

 Protect lines of communications (LOC). Protection of land, water, and air routes within the JRA connect an operating military

force with its theater base of operations is essential to sustaining

aerospace forces.

 Find, fix, contain, and defeat enemy incursions. The commander

should maintain situational awareness (SA) through all means of

ISR, counter-reconnaissance, law enforcement agency support,

use of military force, and detection to anticipate and locate enemy incursions.

 Plan and execute area damage control. Commanders at all levels

should prepare plans, establish specific responsibilities, and ensure all available assets are prepared for operations to ensure continuous support and restoration of assets.

 Assess and prioritize protective measures. Commanders should

assess and prioritize bases for protection and damage repair to

ensure operational and logistics planners are able to identify key

bases, establish security and area defense requirements for those

bases, and to position other assets. These measures should include employment of environmental intelligence including chemical and biological detection measures and support mechanisms

to guard against subversive biological and/or chemical attacks.
14

 Communications and Information. The commander should maintain interoperable, secure, reliable, flexible, and survivable intertheater

and intratheater networks to accomplish the mission.

 Intelligence. Commanders need effective collection, analysis, and

distribution of intelligence and counterintelligence for planning and

conducting successful force protection operations. Counterintelligence

is particularly effective in identifying espionage, sabotage, subversion,

and terrorist threats.

 Sustainment. Logistics integrates strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level logistics operations. To support the commander in chief’s

(CINC) strategy, logistics must balance the necessity for security with

the logistics principles of responsiveness, simplicity, sustainability,

survivability, flexibility, economy, and attainability. Identifying logistics principles necessary for the successful execution of an operational

plan is critical to the joint rear area logistics system. A commander

should be familiar with these guiding logistics principles. Operationally, theater logistics constraints may dictate the rate of buildup or

theater movement, overall size of the combat force, the depth of any

attack, or the speed of advance. Often, the commander is faced with a

conflict between various principles, operational requirements, and rear

area security.

REAR AREA MANAGEMENT

Effective rear area management is critical to the success of rear area

operations because of the security implications when positioning assets

may provide protection for the operations area or when determining locations for vital support facilities that require security assistance. A

commander’s primary area management responsibility is to ensure units

are positioned and stationed and facilities are made with due consideration for force protection. Factors affecting unit positioning include the

implications of the current threat assessment, the suitability and survivability of available facilities, and the subordinate unit’s mission requirements. Commanders should use these factors and threat and vulnerability assessments to determine whether units should be dispersed, thereby

enhancing their survivability or be grouped together for mutual support.

These considerations include:

 Clustering. Clustering support activities or bases reduces vulnerability to ground attack but can increase vulnerability to air, artillery, missile, and/or nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) attack. Clustering
15

also increases the vulnerability to mortar attacks (a ground attack) and

makes targets more attractive for terrorists.

 Location. Locating key facilities away from high-speed routes minimizes vulnerability to enemy ground penetrations but may also reduce accessibility to units requiring support.

 Dispersal. Dispersing critical supplies such as fuel, ammunition, and

spare parts reduces the risk of loss but also reduces the ease and speed

of distribution. Dispersal also increases the security requirement.

REAR AREA MOVEMENTS

Commanders should maintain movement control, keep LOCs open,

protect key reception and transshipment points, and obtain host-nation

support (HNS) to preserve freedom of movement throughout the JRA.

Such movements could involve:

 Receipt of combat forces and their movement to forward areas.

 Movement of materiel, replacement personnel, and support forces.

 Evacuation of patients, other casualties, and human remains.

 Evacuation of US nationals and other noncombatants, or allied/coalition partners.

 Evacuation of enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, detainees,

and refugees.

 Retrograde of materiel.

AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT

ACS is an Air Force core competency and although not doctrine, it

underpins global engagement and provides the foundation for the other

Air Force core competencies. As discussed in AFDD 1, Air Force Basic

Agile Combat Support is the cornerstone of global engagement

and the foundation for other Air Force competencies. Agile combat

support creates, sustains, and protects all air and space capabilities

to accomplish mission objectives across the spectrum of military

operations. Agile combat support provides the capabilities that

distinguish air and space power—speed, flexibility, and global

perspective.

 Lieutenant General William P. Hallin, USAF

 Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics
16

Doctrine, it includes the processes that create, sustain, and protect all aerospace capabilities to accomplish mission objectives across the spectrum

of military operations. ACS supports the capabilities that distinguish aerospace power—speed, flexibility, and global perspective.

ACS supports “how” Air Force assets are organized, trained, equipped.

It is also “how” we operate, conduct, and support Air Force, joint, and

coalition operations. Expeditionary Combat Support improves responsiveness, deployability, and sustainability of US forces through aerospace

power, enabling a paradigm shift from massive forward-deployed support

to support forces tailored and poised for rapid deployment.

It includes and stresses improved command and control of resources

that will allow aerospace forces to deploy and operate with reduced quantities of materiel tailored for any operational scenario. In short, agile

combat support focuses on Air Force capability to rapidly get to the fight

or respond to short-notice emergencies, ready to sustain the force as it

engages.

Operational Concepts

Based on Joint Chiefs of Staff direction, unified, specified, and component commands develop operation plans (OPLANs) which delineate operational parameters for US military forces under various contingency

conditions. These documents identify basing options for US forces that

currently reflect the philosophy of anticipating regional conflicts rather

than major theater war or global conflicts. Plan taskings provide baseline

requirements in determining the potential scope and assets associated

with these operations. OPLAN annexes will provide detailed information

relative to base infrastructure shortfalls and requirements.

Base support functions cover a broad spectrum of required capabilities. Support agencies, in most cases, perform their normal assigned tasks

as modified by base development activities and subsequent operations.

Agile combat support must focus on giving the combat commander,

or Air Force component to the warfighting CINC, the capability to

bring air power decisively to the table, doing it very rapidly, with a

small footprint, and with a streamlined investment in infrastructure.

Lieutenant General William P. Hallin

Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics
17

Support functions should be tailored to the criteria of utility, air transportability, survivability, serviceability, and austerity for possible bare

base operations to the extent unit capabilities are closely related to the

operational environment. Maximum flexibility and responsiveness should

be assured at all times.

Combat operations require highly responsive and agile forces. Support

should be designed to maximize agility, thereby reducing the initial footprint and airlift requirement. Needs of the deployed forces can be met

through reachback to the CONUS, with sustainment beginning immediately upon arrival. Reachback encompasses the complex network that

transfers information regarding weapons systems status and requirements.

It is the concept whereby the CINC’s staff and deployed (expeditionary

mode) units seek support from rear or CONUS-based (garrison mode)

organizations. Deployed units transmit requests for support and status

reports back to CONUS. The status reports provide the mechanism for

prioritization of requests and order of replenishment. This process should

be supported by information systems that ensure the top priority requirements are automatically identified and delivered by the fastest transportation mode. The success of reachback depends on seamless data flow

from the forward location through the entire support pipeline.

Basing, wherever located and for whatever mission, is therefore a key

component of the Air Force’s global engagement vision. The Air Force

plays a pivotal role by providing the availability of CONUS-based and forward-deployed MOBs, COBs, and FOBs. The commander should ensure

the base infrastructure meets the needs of current and future weapon

systems for launch, recovery, and rapid turn-around.

In summation, bases may be required for the following purposes:

 Bed down the force structure in CONUS and overseas to meet warfighting, force projection, training, and support requirements.

 Provide throughput for intertheater airlift and/or intratheater airlift.

 Support overseas presence.

Infrastructure Development

Forces deployed to developed areas should be able to capitalize on the

established infrastructure and use existing resources. Use of all methods

such as joint logistics plans (JLP), preexisting HNS agreements, and
18

acquisition cross-Service agreements (ACSA) to obtain HNS in manpower,

medical, host support services (HSS), equipment, and material should be

maximized within the constraints of security. Forces deployed to less

developed areas must rely more on construction of new but austere, initial, or temporary facilities in accordance with established base development criteria. HNS should always be actively sought but will normally be

less available than in developed areas.

The effective use of all approaches to obtain HNS leads to a decreased

logistics footprint and increased survivability, enhancing the capability

of forces to maintain successful combat operations on any location or

during humanitarian operations. Many HNs can provide valuable support for conducting force protection operations. However, force protection planning should precede any planning for HNS. Use of non-US resources off base increases likelihood of enemy/terrorist attack success

and must be weighed heavily against considerations regarding off-base

lodging, health care support, and other services. On the other hand, HNS

can significantly reduce the deployment of airlift flow in the early stages

of a contingency and allow for a more rapid build-up of combat power.

The commander should consider HN capabilities in the planning and

conduct of force protection operations. HN personnel and organizations

can frequently perform many functions as well as, or better than, US

personnel or units because of their familiarity with language, local
19

customs, terrain, transportation networks, communication networks, facilities, and equipment. Through (but not limited to) such vehicles as

support agreements, ACSA, and JLP, the HN provides specific support in

prescribed conditions. In general, HNS is highly situational and heavily

dependent on both the operational capabilities of the HN and its support

for US policies. The commander should determine functional types and

levels of HNS that can be accepted with a high assurance that the HN will

be able to deliver on the commitments. Factors that should be considered

include:

 Capability, dependability, and willingness of the host nation to provide and sustain resources (especially food and water sources, storage,

and distribution centers/assets).

 Quality and compatibility of HNS materials and services provided for

infrastructure construction, repair, and maintenance.

 Shortfalls in US forces supplemented by HNS and reductions in US

forces made possible by using HNS.

 Effects of HNS on the political structure within the host nation.

 Effects on security, to include operations and communications and

information security and force protection concerns.

 HN international agreements and treaties that specify US involvement

in the deployed area.

 Capability of US forces to accept and manage HNS.

 Availability of HNS in the type and quantity agreed upon across the

range of military operations.

 Capability of US forces to supplement and assist HN forces executing

rear operations.

Base Defense

The commander is responsible for having sufficient forces capable of

contributing to the security and defense of the rear area as part of his or

her responsibilities for force protection and coordinates these forces to

best capitalize on their combined capabilities, synergies, and mutual

supportiveness, while minimizing the vulnerabilities of each. The installation commander has the overall responsibility for defense of the base

against attack by surface forces or terrorists. Hosted forces from other

Service or functional components may be tasked to contribute to the overall

base defense, commensurate with their capabilities and the circumstances.

Commanders of base clusters are responsible for coordinating the defense
20

of those bases and integrating base defense plans into a base cluster

defense plan. For additional information, see the AFDD on Force

Protection.

The commander’s specific responsibilities for installation defense at

the tactical level include the following:

 Establishing a base defense operations center (BDOC) and alternate

BDOC that serves as the base’s tactical operations center and focal point

for security and defense and provides assistance with the planning,

direction, coordination, integration, and control of base defense efforts.

 Planning for employment of transient forces by ensuring base defense

plans include provisions for augmenting the regularly assigned base

defense forces present at the base during an attack or when the base is

threatened with attack. Coordinating with the JRA commander to ensure security measures are in compliance and compatible with JRA

governing security plans.

 Ensure adequate defensive measures exist or will be provided through

coordination with both US and HN security forces and civil engineering. These defensive measures include aircraft revetment, defensive

fighting positions, blast protection for critical facilities, and structures

to resist forced entry by hostile vehicle/personnel through any gates

onto the base. Ensure coordination with the medical control center

(MCC) and survival recovery center (SRC).

Commanders should be aware of tenant forces’ responsibilities at a

base:

 Participating in the preparation of base defense plans.

 Providing, staffing, and operating base defense facilities in accordance

with the base defense plans.

 Conducting individual and unit training of assigned and attached forces,

as necessary, to ensure their readiness to perform their assigned tasks

in defense of the base.

 Providing appropriate facilities and essential personnel for a BDOC for

the installation commander, and providing liaison and support as necessary.

 Providing for the internal security of the command.
21

CHAPTER TWO

PLANNING

KEY FACTORS

From peacekeeping, to aiding developing nations, to conducting

counterdrug operations, the military continues to adapt to evolving missions. Combat support infrastructure and processes must, therefore, evolve

continuously to support the new spectrum of demands. Commanders

should create robust, responsive, and flexible combat support systems

within current budgetary constraints for successful support of future combat operations.

An operational risk management (ORM) predeployment mission risk

assessment should be accomplished as soon as possible in the planning

stages to identify and mitigate any risks associated with the operation.

The use of ORM during the planning process will not only enhance mission effectiveness at all levels while preserving essential assets, but will

also provide a logical process to identify and exploit opportunities with

the greatest return on the investments of time, dollars, and personnel.

To begin effective operations in a forward location, deployed forces

should rely on war reserve materiel (WRM) and critical functional experts such as those listed in Table 1.

Use of HNS, such as ACSA, to acquire equipment and supplies, through

payment in cash (PIC), equal value exchange (EVE), or replacement-inkind (RIK) commitments from allied hosts or coalition partners has the

potential to ease, not eliminate, requirements for certain types of WRM

or bare base assets. Depending on supply availability and required delivery

lead times, contingency contracting officers should also take advantage

of local allied business entities and contract networks that are familiar

with the markets and asset availability. The more that can be acquired

What is quite beyond argument is that bright and shiny equipment

manned by battle-worthy and dedicated men is not going to frighten

or deter a potential aggressor, unless he can perceive that all these

components of support are also in the order of battle.

 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton
22

locally without risk to health (after assessment by deployed medical team

advisors) and security, the less must be stored and maintained in ready

condition, reducing the logistics transportation requirements. This also

reduces the inventory, the cost of assets by eliminating initial purchase

cost, maintenance, inspections, and depreciation of assets. As previously

mentioned, it also decreases airlift requirements. However, equipment

and material from the HN may be substandard and should be checked

before utilization to ensure compatibility with deployed assets, and that

it can be safely operated and maintained by US personnel.

CONSIDERATIONS

The Air Force rapid mobility concept

is to deploy a force, complete with shelters and facilities, capable of independently supporting and launching sustained combat operations with the same

independence as fixed theater installations. This concept presents challenges

to the engineers, planners, and developers who have the ultimate responsibility of base, infrastructure, and facilities development. Consequently, a conceptual planning guide (CPG) found in

the AFH 10-222 series publications has

been developed to highlight key features

and considerations associated with forward base planning, to describe the

types of shelters, utilities, and support

items available for bases, and to address

the general procedures for installing and erecting these assets. The CPG

provides a concept of employment and a sequence for bare base construction. It addresses the issues most likely to be encountered and gives

guidance so some important issues will not be overlooked.

The Harvest Falcon mobile package has provided support for several major

multinational exercises through the 1980s and during the Iraq War in 1990-91.

Sufficient Harvest Falcon equipment exists to support approximately 55,000

personnel. The vast majority of the assets are prepositioned overseas for Southwest Asia support. A small number of assets (to support approximately 2,200

personnel) are available in Europe and US for worldwide deployment.

Multiple Sources
23

The CPG primarily addresses potential FOB locations where it is not

anticipated that any form of major host-nation support or other Service

support will be available, i.e., aerospace forces standing alone at a bare

base installation which is a situation normally viewed as a worst case

scenario. In many cases, however, a FOB could be the host of several

diverse occupants such as host nation military units, host nation civilian

agencies, allied military units, and forces from other US services. Commanders should consider such planning factors as facility usage, equipment and vehicle allocations, work taskings, and manpower support that

will have to be worked out to the agreement of all parties. These factors

have an immediate affect on a planner’s initial efforts and should be addressed early in the FOB development process because they could have

an impact on such issues as airlift flow of base assets, sequence of construction, projected use of local materials, and allocation of mobile facility assets.

Additional data should also be gathered to determine site-specific characteristics such as existing facilities, airfield configuration, water sources,

topography, climate, soil conditions, vegetation, endemic diseases, or

environmental pollution. Major commands (MAJCOMs) and numbered

air forces/Air Force forces (NAF/AFFORs) and deploying units have primary responsibility for developing base support plans (BSP) with sitespecific layouts. For potential base locations named in OPLANs, units

responsible for site-specific planning are easily identified since they will

be shown as deploying forces in the time-phased force and deployment

list (TPFDL). For short notice deployments which have not been

preplanned, units responsible for site specific planning will be those first

on the scene. Therefore, employment planning is completely reliant on

databases cataloging previously accomplished BSP, standardized site surveys, and specifically outlined concepts for employment execution in the

AFFOR operation order (OPORD). Regular updates to all supporting plans

should be accomplished to ensure currency and accuracy.

Site specific data should be gathered from intelligence sources or firsthand observation before laying out plans since a well planned and executed deployment hinges on the planner’s ability to produce a comprehensive site layout. In this data gathering process, one of the first pieces

of necessary information to obtain is the threat analysis for the base. It is

essential to know whether the base is located in a forward or rear area,

even when the distinction between the two is blurred, because:
24

 Aircraft must survive while on the ground.

 Aircraft must be able to get airborne to perform their mission during

and after attack.

 Logistics and communications infrastructure must survive to sustain

future air operations.

 Personnel must survive and operate in spite of the rigors of environmental stressors induced by climate, geography, endemic disease, combat, and extended hours.

It is equally important commanders know and understand in what mode

the base will be operating such as garrison mode (existing fixed location)

or expeditionary mode (contingency location).

Garrison Mode

A garrison base represents the traditional concept of an Air Force base

(AFB), with developed infrastructure, permanent facilities, and an established workforce. As such, the garrison mode generally applies to active,

reserve, and National Guard installations and depots, training centers,

and test ranges.

Operations at garrison bases represent their functional organizations

that comprise one or more primary missions. A garrison base may have

a power projection mission, such as a wing equipped with combat aircraft, a depot function mission, and an associated guard or reserve unit

mission. The inclusion of families and their related support structures

drive planning, programming, and operating requirements not seen at

forward operating bases or mobility sites. At garrison bases the maintenance of a sense of community and the perception of the overall quality

of life can affect readiness and mission accomplishment.

In addition to these internal relationships, garrison bases are affected

by community relationships. Every Air Force base is part of a larger

community. Base operations consider impacts to the community and

environment through environmental management programs involving

hazardous materials, waste, toxic substances, water, noise, endangered

species, old pollutant sources, and other media. As a component of the

community, bases also impact social, economic, and political structures.

As an example, unconstrained expansion of the surrounding civilian community may create noise and safety issues that could result in flight and

mission constraints. However, a team effort at all levels may result in
25

community involvement that mutually supports and enhances base and

civilian communities.

Another characteristic of garrison mode basing is the formal nature in

which infrastructure and facilities are programmed, developed, operated,

and maintained. A typical garrison base will have a base master plan

describing the present and future conditions, constraints, and development plans for the installation. From these plans, combined with mission related requirements, will come the budgetary inputs to execute work

through various programs, including military construction (MILCON) and

operations and maintenance (O&M).

Infrastructure and facility related work on a garrison base can be described as a continuous, cyclical process involving programming, design,

construction, operation, maintenance, demolition, and back to programming. Each of these elements consists of subcycles and pairings to generate and control their activities.

A final characteristic of garrison mode bases is they can be the home of

deploying forces. While in garrison mode, deployment forces engage in

training and perform operational support missions, including base maintenance, fire protection, food service operations, aircraft maintenance, communications, and base supply services. Many of the operational support

missions duplicate the missions performed in expeditionary environments.

Expeditionary Mode

In situations where US forces deploy to a host nation as an expeditionary

force to MOBs, COBs and FOBs, they become tenants with specific facilities

and areas of the base made available. Under these conditions, the HN usually shares the airfield (runway, taxiways, and parking aprons), but available airfield buildings and base support facilities may be limited. The commander should plan and develop the US portion of the base to accommodate the deployed forces, factoring in renovation, maintenance, and repair

requirements for existing facilities and infrastructure. At locations where

the US is offered an unoccupied host-nation base, the civil engineer and

base communications officer can usually expect a significant amount of

renovation, maintenance, and repair effort to meet minimum deployment

requirements. Joint support agreements, status-of-forces agreements, or

other country-to-country agreements will dictate tenant and host responsibilities throughout the deployment. In some cases, informal agreements

with on-scene HN officials may be all that is required.
26

The commander should plan and develop a comprehensive package to

ensure all infrastructure aspects of the deployment are met. Normally,

the HN and the United States will have agreed to the provision of specific

land, facilities, and other infrastructure to meet the deployment’s

  

  	 


 	 	
  







27

mission needs. Conditions range from full facility and utility support to

nothing but a bare piece of land which happens to be at the right location. Besides land and facilities, HN agreements may specify labor, supplies, equipment, and base services the host nation will provide. For situations where no preexisting agreement is in-place for provision of HNS at

a deployed location, also check to see if there is an existing ACSA with

the HN. Even if there is no HN support agreement, at most locations

nationals can provide contracted services such as refuse and hazardous

waste collection, construction equipment rental, supply delivery, custodial

support, and varying degrees of construction, base maintenance, and utility

systems support. ACSA is the most expeditious way to make this happen. The commander should clearly define standards and requirements and ensure these are enforced. Depending on the deployment mission and identified threats, force protection measures may mitigate extensive use of local national labor.

In order to reduce forward-deployed inventories, a rigorous base support planning effort is necessary. This will allow assessment of what a

deploying force must bring with it, vice what it can obtain locally. This

includes support provided through local rental or leasing agreements, or

HN support agreements. There are opportunities to acquire many resources through these means instead of buying and stockpiling them as

WRM.

HN constraints must be considered during support planning as local

laws, customs, and support agreements may limit access to local resources.

HN constraints may also limit what can be brought into a country. Advance

planning and training can minimize the impact. Although one goal of

agile combat support is to reduce forward-deployed inventories, even under

the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) concept, these stocks cannot be

entirely eliminated. Deploying forces must still rely on some prepositioned

assets to prepare deployed forces for immediate operations and rely on

sustainment to begin immediately.

THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES

Threat and vulnerability assessments should be obtained from the

responsible intelligence and force protection personnel. The possible types

of attacks, their intensity, and types of weapons that could be used should

be known or at least estimated. A threat assessment can help commanders determine whether individual facilities and facility groupings should

be dispersed or nondispersed, whether electrical and water plants will be
28

dispersed or centrally located, whether expedient

hardening will be performed,

or whether rapid runway repair sets will be required. In

some forward areas the nature

of the threat may make it

necessary to plan camouflage and decontamination

capabilities. The nature of

the threat and associated vulnerabilities should influence

the commander’s BIF decisions. All combat support functions should

obtain threat and vulnerability assessments.

For example, medical and health threat assessments consider intelligence

factors when planning for the employment of humans within certain

environments. Environmental stressors, including endemic disease and

other detriments to health, must be considered for both infrastructure

and public health planning. Survival against conventional, biological,

and chemical attack should also be considered. Selection of operational

and support locations (including lodging, feeding, hospitalization, alternate medical facility, communications and information, and other

support functions) should be gauged against threat and potential threat

indicators.

EXPEDITIONARY AIRBASE PLANNING










Before World War I

The procedures used for establishing airfields have remained relatively unchanged throughout the years. In the choice of locations for airbases, then as

now, certain basic requirements were considered. The basic requirements included weather, transportation networks, urban proximity, and physical conditions of the site (terrain, soils, existing facilities, and infrastructure). For the

earliest bases, the Army used a number of methods to choose locations; selection

by boards of officers, collocation with an existing reservation, leasing, and acceptance of proposals from local business groups. In searching for a site, the following criteria were often used:

 Climate.

 Proximity to industry and transportation.

 Character of the land for experimental flying.

 Facilities for over-water flying.
29

There are several types of installations on which US forces may have to

operate during wartime or contingencies. Regardless of the quality and

extent of base facilities, it must meet one basic common criterion—can it

support its wartime and contingency missions adequately?

The standards of construction, established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS), determine the types of materials and construction techniques used

in wartime or contingency operations. These construction standards are

designed to minimize engineer effort while providing facilities of a quality consistent with the mission requirements, personnel health and safety,

and the expected availability of construction resources. The two types of

construction standards most commonly applied to wartime operations

are initial standards and temporary standards:

 Relatively austere facilities and utilities, intended for use during the

first six months of a conflict, characterize the initial standard. Examples

of these facilities are

tents, slit trench latrines,

and low voltage electrical distribution systems.

 Facilities and utilities of

a more substantial nature characterize the

temporary standard.

They are intended to

increase efficiency of

operation and their use

is normally up to 24

months. Examples of

 Trained mechanics in the locality.

 Factors affecting the health, happiness, and cost of living.

 Based on these criteria, bases at Langley Field, Kelly, the Philippines, and

others were established in the years before America’s entrance into World War I.

 Multiple Sources
30

these types of facilities include wood frame buildings, rigid fuel tanks,

and paved roads.

Harvest Eagle and Harvest Falcon mobile facility assets are considered

to be initial construction standards. This connotation, however, does not

mean they will be totally replaced after six months; but rather they will

be used by Air Force forces at the onset of a conflict. It is not inconceivable

that some of these mobile assets will last several years before needing

replacement.

While standards of construction dictate the type of facility to be used,

wartime planning factors dictate the scope of facilities. These factors are

also provided by JCS. When the JCS planning factors are applied, they

will normally yield substantially smaller facility scopes than do the factors used for peacetime O&M or MILCON planning and construction. Most

of the planning factors are applied against the numbers of aircraft or

population to be at an installation. In some cases, however, the planning

factor itself provides the facility scope.

The expeditionary airbase planning process provides the commander

with a methodology for determining wartime airbase facility and utility

requirements. The planning process identifies the necessary attributes

of the assets chosen to fulfill the requirements and evaluates the effectiveness of an installation’s collective facility and utility network in

supporting the operational mission of the base. The process itself is somewhat mechanical; however, there are decision points at various intervals

that are best addressed by personnel familiar with contingency operations. Once the process has been completed for a particular airbase, the

commander can be relatively sure the facilities, communications and

information, and utilities networks provided have been balanced with

the mission requirements, threat conditions, and operational needs of the

mission.

The primary mission of an installation is usually straightforward, e.g.,

a base supporting counterair operations, an aerial port, a strategic bomber

base, medical facility, etc. The commander should keep in mind, however, other missions or requirements might be present. For example, most

bases will eventually be resupplied by air; therefore, the capability to

handle large frame aircraft must be considered. Some bases may also

serve as staging bases for ground forces, which may affect support operations. These types of options should be carefully considered before planning can begin. The commander and planner can find this mission-
31

related information from the aircraft operations planners at unit level

and the all-Service timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD)

associated with the airbase in an OPLAN or OPORD. If all potential missions cannot be reasonably well defined, some assumptions may have to

be made by the commander with respect to total mission requirements.

Considerable data is necessary if the overall base situation is to be fully

understood. The number and types of aircraft, base population over time,

transient forces, and expected duration of the operation can be obtained

from the OPLAN being considered. Information concerning the base

itself is also required. This can take the form of base maps, aerial photographs, construction drawings, past site surveys, and data contained in

various documents accumulated by the intelligence office. In some cases,

BSPs or joint support plans may be available. Sometimes a member of

the deploying unit or someone from the MAJCOM or NAF/AFFOR staff

who has been to the installation can provide current information. All

sources should be investigated, including those of the HN.

The next step, after all the sources of data have been tapped as much

as possible, is to analyze the data. This analysis of the base situation,

threat, and mission provides an overall framework upon which to base

more detailed efforts. The analysis should be reviewed by the commander

to ensure no major items have been overlooked and the planning is headed

in the right direction to meet mission requirements.

Planners should ensure adequate bare base assets are available, either

prepositioned or deployable from CONUS. Planners should also ensure

the bare base assets are designed to function independently with no

external support for a limited period of time until logistics sustainment is

established. As an example, prepositioned or deployed generators must

be capable of starting when needed and operating without major repairs

for a set period.

Expeditionary airbase planning principles, published in various planning guides, are precepts derived and validated from past experience and

application. In the context of the expeditionary airbase planning process,

they are compared against the basic requirements that have been calculated to see what special considerations should be made with respect to

satisfying the facility or utility need. It is probable not all principles will

be applicable to all facility and utility system requirements. In fact, there

may be some facilities or utilities that none of the principles will relate to.

Nevertheless, if time permits, it is prudent to look at each identified
32

facility and utility individually when the principles are applied. This

action gives the commander a more complete product and lessens the

chance something will be overlooked.

The expeditionary airbase planning process provides a credible compilation package of facility and utility requirements and is particularly

viable when several options including construction are available for satisfying facility needs over extended periods. In an FOB situation where

mobile facility assets are the only option initially, the number of assets

made available in the deployment packages essentially predetermines

facility scopes.

FORWARD OPERATIONS BASE PLANNING

A FOB could range from a bare field with a well to a fully developed

Soviet airfield in Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is impossible to state definitely in advance what personnel should be included in the forces setting

up a FOB. Planners should perform a careful analysis of the environment

and probable requirements before determining the composition of these

forces. In an expeditionary mode, the worst case scenario a commander

will face is to deploy to an austere FOB—a bare base. A bare base deployment normally takes place with the phased movement of three distinct

forces —the advance echelon, the initial force, and the follow-on force.

 Advance Echelon (ADVON). The ADVON team should be the first

element to arrive at the bare base location. This team should be totally

independent and multidisciplined with both operational and support

personnel represented. The team usually includes a combat control

element; an engineer site survey team; a services team; and a public

World War I

 The initial deployment of the 1st American Expeditionary Force to France

encountered a multitude of challenges with regard to basing, infrastructure, and

facilities. The first challenge occurred at the ports of debarkation where no

provisions had been made to billet the incoming forces, re-form units, and move

them out of the staging areas. When coupled with the degraded transportation

infrastructure, the average time of a unit from arrival to reporting ready for

combat was over one month. During this time the unit, ranging from companies of 100 men to battalions of over 1,000 were expected to find their own

shelter, provisions, and logistics. As American involvement in the war progressed, infrastructure and staging bases were rapidly developed to reduce the

processing time and provide basic sustainment to deploying forces.

Multiple Sources
33

health team with equipment and vehicles; mobile communications with

weather element; and materiel maintenance, medical, and aeromedical

evacuation (AE) personnel as required. Security force elements with

vehicles will also be included. If the initial analysis of the situation

indicates local liaison, services, and supplies will be required to establish the base, then legal and contracting personnel should be included

on the ADVON team. The ADVON team develops the base layout plan;

sets up command, control, and communications; installs navigational

aids; and establishes an aerial port function that will off-load the initial

force and its hardware when they arrive. Once the ADVON force is

satisfied the bare base location can support the required mission

activities, deployment of the initial force can begin.

 Initial Force. The

initial force may contain the first aircraft

squadron with limited operations,

maintenance, and

support functions;

mobility equipment;

and spares kits. As

these forces arrive,

they will set up their

own shelters with the

technical assistance of civil engineers. Civil engineers also have the

responsibility for installing the above ground utility systems. Initial

communications and information systems will be set up. Aerospace

medicine and limited emergency medical care teams will also accompany initial force elements.

 Follow-on Force. The follow-on force may contain additional aircraft

squadrons, and an upgraded maintenance capability including functions such as propulsion, environmental, and missile maintenance.

Support functions such as security forces, health services support,

supply, vehicle maintenance, communications and information, civil

engineering, contracting, and financial services are expanded to give

the base a full operational capability.

There are two distinct phases of employment during a bare base operation: the erection and construction phase, and the operation and maintenance phase. The first phase is more manpower intensive than the

second phase. The number of civil engineer personnel required during
34

the erection and construction phase may not change radically with missions requiring lower populations because the tasks of preparing taxiways

and runways, installing runway lights, constructing petroleum, oils, and

lubricants (POL) and ammunition areas, and installing utility systems

remain relatively constant regardless of base population. However, for

some other support functions such as communications, the size of the

base population may have a direct effect on the number of personnel

required to accommodate them, especially during the initial installation

of the base network.

STRATEGIC BASING

Strategic basing under the auspices of BIF has two aspects. The first is

the decisions made regarding basing during garrison mode operations.

These decisions reflect the need to provide a desired level of support to

the base population and the supported weapon system. The second aspect

of strategic basing occurs in expeditionary environments and encompasses

two sub-set considerations. One sub-set is the actions taken to ensure

rapid exploitation of basing opportunities is accomplished in support of

the mission. The other sub-set is those actions taken to deny an adversary the same set of advantages. Collectively these two sub-sets form the

principal of asymmetrical basing.

Strategic basing in the garrison mode of operations seeks to strike a

balance between the often-competing demands to increase efficiency while

maintaining a high quality of life and sense of community. A successful

balancing of these requirements yields a base that is operationally effective, promotes quality of life, operates efficiently, and is environmentally

sound. Strategic basing requires thoughtful long-range planning to

insure the fiscal and physical resources are available to provide the infrastructure to operate the installation. The procurement of resources is

drawn from a plethora of sources, ranging from military construction

accounts to commercialization projects. Resource allocation is based on

a spectrum of base operations which is driven by contextual factors that

include the mission, geography, demographics, economics, and force protection considerations.

Asymmetrical basing seeks, at a physical level, to apply some of the

principles of war—surprise, security, mass—to determine the best location to rapidly establish aerospace power and decisively prosecute the

aerospace mission across the spectrum of operations. Asymmetrical

basing encompasses the tenets of agile combat support to minimize the
35

deployed force while maximizing the ability of an installation to conduct

operations. As such, asymmetrical basing is not one base, but rather a

network of bases operating in concert to provide, sustain, operate, and

recover aerospace assets. For every forward location, several supporting

bases reaching back to CONUS locations may be required.

Asymmetrical basing depends on the concepts and employment of

expeditionary forces. The capability theses forces bring to asymmetrical

basing is the ability to conduct rapid global deployments using task-tailored forces. These task-tailored forces require less logistics sustainment

and physical space, which broadens the range of locations from which

expeditionary forces can operate. The high level command, control, communication, and computers (C4) support enable basing decisions to be

made in real time. Robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) which can locate adversary vulnerabilities and capabilities can further refine these decisions. This mixture can be used to determine which

basing option brings the greatest combat power to bear, or identifies the

key point for humanitarian operations, or the optimum location for en

route support. The ability to rapidly deploy and engage, combined with

real-time command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), is a fundamental cornerstone

of asymmetrical basing.

Asymmetrical basing can also be used as an operational capability

against an adversary. By denying them information on our intentions, by

reducing their infrastructure, and by degrading the critical nodes that

support base operations, we gain an operational advantage. Thus, while

we increase our presence and capability in the AOR, our adversary

becomes increasingly limited in their ability to employ aerospace power.

This cascading failure of denied airbases, reduced sortie generation rate,

and increasing mission ineffectiveness directly enhances our ability to

achieve air dominance. With air dominance established, forces—both terrestrial and aerospace—can devote greater effort to bringing the adversary to their culminating point and terminating the conflict.
36
37

CHAPTER THREE

EMPLOYMENT

GENERAL

Operational commands require combat support to provide them the

flexibility to employ their weapons systems without dependence on others. The support provided by civil engineers encompasses everything

from force beddown and routine operations and maintenance, to emergency and follow-on war damage repairs of the bare base. Each MOB,

COB, or FOB our forces will deploy to will have different site conditions,

airfield layout, and other criteria that will dictate the degree of site preparation and engineering effort needed to sustain the base complex, once

developed. A typical forward operating base that is considered a bare

base could be a commercial airport or allied military airfield on which

the Air Force is given use of the runways, a water source, and an area for

erection of bare base facilities. In some cases, there may be some

preexisting facilities and services that could be used instead of mobility

support at locations such as an allied airfield. The commander should

consider these factors; because they will dictate the overall level of effort

needed to establish, operate, and recover a bare base.

SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

A commander should consider and plan for necessary support and the

associated functions (Table 1) that will be required by the base, whether a

MOB, COB, or FOB. For example, services PRIME Readiness in Base

World War II

In January 1939, the Army Air Corps had only 17 airbases, 4 air depots, and 6

bombing and gunnery ranges. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Army

Air Forces (AAF) began moving into new fields to disperse their aircraft and

provide for dispersed operations on existing fields. The continued growth in the

AAF meant an increase in facilities and several procedural changes. Methods of

quick and cheap construction were sought to reduce construction times and expense, such as Quonset huts and tarpaper buildings. By 1943 the AAF operated

from 2,252 installations within the United States. In every theater, engineers

constructed airfields in all types of terrain, ranging from crushed coral on Tinian

Island to rain forest in South America to sand in North Africa. By the end of the

war, 1,435 airfields located in 67 foreign countries had been used, built, or improved by the AAF.

Multiple Sources
38

Services (RIBS) personnel play a vital and necessary role in time of war.

A PRIME RIBS team is a force whose primary wartime mission is to provide support to the base populace for both operational and humanitarian

missions. PRIME RIBS are prepared to fulfill their mission requirements

across the spectrum of operations and under a full range of environments.

In addition to providing the vital functions of food service, lodging, and

mortuary support, PRIME RIBS also provides fitness, recreation, and field

exchange programs. A contingency contracting officer who is responsible for acquiring resources necessary to the development of a bare base

situation is essential when organic means are not available. Contracting

provides the necessary construction, services, and commodities support

to ensure sustainment of operations in the AO.

Other examples are medical and public health care resources, which

are essential for ensuring environmental quality control of facilities as

well as health maintenance of personnel. The size and capabilities of

medical support are dependent on numerous factors,

including population size

and type (for humanitarian

support considerations),

threat (from disease,

nonbattle injury, and enemy attack), distance from

supporting medical units,

evacuation distances and

time of response, as well as

other indicators. Initial reVietnam

In the early days of the Vietnam War, large numbers of US Air Force strike

aircraft were deployed to bases where pavement for aircraft parking was at a

premium. Aircraft were parked wingtip to wingtip, vulnerable to an accidental

explosion or enemy attack. In May 1965, a bomb accidentally exploded at Bien

Hoa Air Base and destroyed 40 unprotected aircraft. In response to this accident

and other factors, the Air Force was tasked to expand its basing footprint in

Vietnam, to create an organic capability to construct airfields, and to develop

dedicated base readiness personnel. From this directive came Rapid Engineer

Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE), the

Air Force’s heavy construction and engineering force. As an example of RED

HORSE’s capabilities, the 820th RED HORSE deployed to Tuy Hoa AB in October

1966 where the unit constructed 170 aircraft revetments, 120,000 square feet of

buildings, and 175,000 square yards of AM-2 matting.

Multiple Sources
39

sponse would focus on public health and limited emergency care. Follow-on elements would be sized and focused towards early stabilization,

minimal holding/staging, and rapid evacuation.

Contracting and financial services are also employed to provide the

means of locally procuring goods and services for sustained operations at

forward locations. Financial services personnel also provide pay inquiry,

check cashing, currency exchange, and other services to deployed and

transient personnel.

These are just a few examples of the support functions that would be

employed. The commander should be familiar with the functions that

are essential and vital to the success of the mission as well as to the operation of the base, no matter what type it may be.

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

Command and control (C2) in the Air Force is based upon a set of three

parts: the C2 elements, the C2 processes, and the C2 environments. The

elements include organizations (or C2 centers like the aerospace operations center (AOC) at the theater/operational level and expeditionary

operations center (EOC) at the installation level). Command relationships as defined by doctrine, concepts of operation, OPLANs, and OPORDs

define the responsibilities and give the authority for C2 centers and their

commanders to execute C2 processes. The systems/modalities assist in

the execution of the processes, which includes sensing, deciding and

executing within the C2 environments at the global, theaterwide, and

installation/unit

levels.

At the theater

or operational

level, US Air Force

forces are presented to the various theater CINCs

in a single, capabilities-based entity—the Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force

(ASETF). The 

 !
40

ASETF consists of fielded forces often from AEF, a Commander Air Force

Forces (COMAFFOR), and the AFFOR/AOC staffs.

The COMAFFOR’s headquarters organization should be tailored to meet

specific mission requirements and is the primary agent for airbase and

installation employment, generation, sustainment, force protection planning, and redeployment. At minimum, it should contain a Service

component AFFOR/AOC staff providing C2 for US Air Force forces. When

dual-hatted as joint force air component commander (JFACC), the

COMAFFOR will require a robust staff, including an A-Staff, special staff,

joint aerospace operations center (JAOC) with a JAOC director, and

Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). For more information on this

subject see AFDD 2.

The AFFOR A-Staff provides comprehensive C2 of US Air Force forces

at theater airbases organized into an ASETF. These aerospace forces are

presented to theater commanders for employment across the spectrum

of operations and the phases of global engagement operations. The AFFOR

A-Staff supports the COMAFFOR as the senior operational-level component warfighter with established operational control (OPCON) and

administrative control (ADCON) of assigned/attached AF forces.

When aligned to support a theater CINC, the AFFOR staff provides a

capable, ready, theater-smart C2 element for the COMAFFOR. The key

AFFOR tasks include:

 Preparing the operational environment.

 Building the air bridge and force beddown.

 Installation/airbase employment and generation.

 Force protection, force C2, and force sustainment.

 Operating location buildup.

 Operating location recovery, redeployment, and reconstitution.

The AFFOR A-Staff provides C2 across a broad scope of functional

areas for the COMAFFOR. Primarily focused on support to the fighting

forces, the lion’s share of AFFOR staff work is accomplished in the rear,

reachback C2 node in a split-based headquarters. Command relationships between the AFFOR and its subordinate, lateral, and higher headquarters staffs need to be clearly established, especially as we migrate to

collaborative, split-based C2 activities. In case of reachback C2 to support

the deployed AFFOR, the COMAFFOR must have the same degree of
41

control over the reachback staff as he does over the deployed staff. The

AFFOR staff, whether deployed, in garrison, involved in a low-scale peacekeeping operation, or fighting a major theater war, is all about command

and control. The history of warfare clearly shows that C2 has always

been much more than a mere enabling ingredient for success. The

nature of human conflict simply requires effective C2 for victory.

Command and control for bases organizes and delivers support in both

garrison and expeditionary environments. In both environments C2 is

exercised in connection with a spectrum of deliberate activities from refuse

collection to crisis response to the restoration of communication services

following a hurricane. Base C2 also operates in conjunction with internal

and external relationships. In garrison mode, these relationships can

include military dependents and state regulatory agencies. The key C2

processes at installations in a garrison mode include unit administration/

support; unit maintenance readiness; mission generation/support; mobility generation; emergency warning and response; recovery/reconstitution; reporting; and force protection. In the expeditionary mode, C2

relationships can include the joint force commander (JFC), multinational

forces, and host-nation liaisons. The essential C2 processes at installations in an expeditionary mode include unit administration/support;

reception, integration, and employment; mission generation/support;

sustainment requirements generation; emergency/attack warning and

response; reporting; redeployment; and force protection.

Korea

 On 25 June 1950, North Korean troops, supported by Soviet-supplied tanks

and artillery, advanced across the 38th parallel, routing the lightly armed South

Koreans. The immediate tasks facing Far East Command and its air component,

the Far East Air Force, were to provide equipment for the embattled South Koreans and to evacuate the American personnel. Fighters and bombers of the Far

East Air Forces contributed to the evacuation by protecting the ships and aircraft carrying the refugees to Japan. Later phases of the war featured sea-saw

combat on the ground and a protracted air campaign in the skies of North and

South Korea.

The Korean War presented tremendous challenges for the fledgling Air Force.

One of the challenges was a lack of bases and supporting infrastructure in South

Korea. This forced operations to be conducted from Japan, which dramatically

limited combat sorties and loiter time on station. To meet the operational

requirements, the Air Force constructed or improved 53 bases on the Korean

peninsula and expanded others in Japan. Expanding bases in Korea helped the

Air Force achieve air superiority over the peninsula.

Multiple Sources
42

Governing Concepts

C2 for bases should follow these governing concepts:

 Agility and Survivability. For both garrison and expeditionary locations, C2 for bases should maintain agility to meet the demands of

changing circumstances and mission requirements, and to counter the

effects of surprise. Agility can be achieved through efficient organizations; centralized planning combined with decentralized execution, and

clear communications. In expeditionary environments, agility can be

achieved through the use of the several sub-principles:

 Reachback to nondeployed elements for logistics sustainment and

C2 systems to reduce deployed requirements and enable more

expeditious employment.

 HN, military-to-military (through use of the ACSA program), and

contractor support, where appropriate, to reduce deployed

personnel and logistics requirements.

 Employment of technologically advanced systems (aircraft, delivery

systems, lodging, etc.) to reduce the physical support requirements.

 Simplicity. Removing obstacles to clear communication and coordination is part of the governing principle of simplicity. Simplicity in

organization allows commanders to deliver base support with a minimum of overhead and staff functions. This simplicity also can reduce

cost and make the function more responsive to customer requirements.

Simplicity in base organization can also take the form of integrated

plans, programs, and policies.

 Unity of Effort. Bases, infrastructure, and facilities must be aligned

and operated in a manner that achieves synergy with the other

elements of aerospace power. One method to achieve this synergy is

through unity of effort, which is derived from such sources as

commander’s intent, mission orders, and training.

 Security. Bases, both in a physical and operations sense, are a prime

factor in security. In a physical sense, the design, construction, and

operation of a base can either enhance or degrade security. Likewise,

the responsibility for providing security is assigned to the leadership of

the base system. While typically associated with the expeditionary

environment, the principle of security applies equally to garrison

locations.
43

Expeditionary Command and Control

For the Air Force, expeditionary base support mirrors the functions,

roles, and responsibilities of the garrison environment. The primary differences between the two environments are the lack of dependents in

expeditionary locations and the temporary nature of construction and

infrastructure development. Additional differences, especially in overseas locations, include an increased threat level and potential for hostile

activities and specific requirements to coordinate actions with joint and

multinational forces.

The command and control arrangement in expeditionary environments

may reflect various staffing structures. A sound C2 structure similar to

that found in a typical expeditionary wing or group will reduce confusion

and enable reachback to similar staff structures at nondeployed locations.

However, deployed Air Force elements may not be operating independently in the deployed AOR. If the deployed forces are part of a joint or

combined task force, the C2 structure may reflect the typical joint headquarters organization. Such an arrangement aligns the deployed Air Force

elements into a C2 structure that mirrors the joint force system. In the

joint environment, the traditional group organization is usually replaced

by an A-staff alignment that mirrors J-staff organization. Within the joint

structure, the A-4 Logistics Director is the point of primary responsibility

for the provision of base support. Within the A-4 organization are the

functions of Civil Engineers, Supply, Services, and Transportation. The

Security Forces function is aligned under the A-3 Operations Director, as

are the operational squadrons (e.g., deployed fighter squadrons). The

A-6 Communications Director integrates all deployed communications,

computer, and command systems into one organization with a focus on

mission support requirements. Use of this type of C2 structure can

reduce deployed manpower and staff functions.

Contingency Operations

For expeditionary environments, the focus of base support C2 in contingency operations is twofold: 1) preserve and maintain essential

services, and 2) repair and restore mission critical systems as expeditiously

as possible. Every element of deployed base support has a combat or

contingency role. To facilitate C2 operations in contingency situations,

the following are generally used:
44

 Installation Operations Centers. Each separate installation whether

headed by a wing or group has an EOC to ensure positive control over

its assigned forces. Additionally, the EOC is the focal point for resource

allocation, mission tasking, status reporting, and decision making.

Below the EOC are unit/group or squadron level operations centers.

They may be characterized as unit or functional and may serve as both

(as in the case of the medical control center [MCC] that is both a unit

and functional operations center). They include the EOC’s organic

survival recovery center (SRC), the aforementioned installation health

service MCC, the damage control center (DCC), the Security Forces

BDOC, the maintenance operations center (MOC), and logistics readiness

center (LRC). At joint supported installations, some of the functions of

the EOC may be combined. In addition, to the physical resources of

base support, medical and personnel operation centers track and

report personnel casualty status, individuals requiring aeromedical

evacuation, and status of personnel replacements.

 Priority of Defense and Repair. One of the prime functions of the

SRC and DCC is to determine which facilities and processes are mission essential and in what order these facilities and processes will be

restored to service if damaged or destroyed. Figure 3.1 lists the

notional damage repair priorities for base systems. Specific facility

repair priorities are determined by the senior AF commander on the

installation.


"	#$"





Notional Damage Repair Priorities

 Runways and aircraft taxiways.

 Command posts and operations centers.

 Mission essential infrastructure—fuel systems, munitions handling, and airfield con-

 trol systems.

 Critical utility systems—water, electrical power, and communication and informa-

 tion systems.

 Operational maintenance and repair facilities.

 Hospitals and decontamination facilities.

 Defensive positions, obstacles, barriers, and shelters.

 Lodging and support facilities.
45

 Force Protection. As part of the effort to mitigate damage to critical

resources and personnel, commanders are charged with the responsibility to ensure force protection measures are implemented. The

implementation of force protection is a cross-functional responsibility

among the commanders, Security Forces, Intelligence, Office of

Special Investigations (OSI), public health, civil engineers, and other

elements as needed. Figure 3.2 lists some of the initial work priorities

for base defense in support of force protection that should be considered by commanders.


"	#%$





	



 Emplacing obstacles and barriers.

 Establishing hard perimeter with maximum stand-off zones, and

strict entry/exit control points.

 Hardening structures and shelters.

 Protecting infrastructure, public health, utility, and facility systems.

 Establishing redundant capabilities for essential systems.

 Camouflage, concealment, and deception measures including physical protection sensors/alarms, biochemical detectors, and surveillance systems.
46
47

EPILOGUE

Bases, infrastructure, and facilities provide direct, tangible combat

support for the warfighter. This translates directly to combat capability

with sustained aerospace weapons systems and personnel in any theater

at any command level, in any operation. Tangible resources (people,

materiel, and facilities) are combined with intangible resources (time and

information) to produce a capability that can be employed and properly

sustained by commanders at all levels.

Combat power projection is the end result of the global engagement

philosophy. Global engagement has transformed the way the Air Force

views combat support and the requirements to ensure that decisive

combat power is readily available. Rapid global deployment and agile

logistics provide for the right mix of resources and capabilities at the right

time and right place to support operational or strategic objectives.

War-fighter support is the ultimate objective of combat support. Providing the right item at the right time at the right place in the right quantity

is the ultimate objective for basing, infrastructure, and facilities doctrine.

The Air Force continues to lead the way with its combat support vision,

organizational relationships, and concepts of operation well into the

future.

At the Very Heart of Warfare lies Doctrine48
49

Suggested Reading

Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War-Logistics from Wallerstein to Patton,

Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1977.

William G. Pagonis, Lt Gen, USA (Ret), Moving Mountains-Leadership and

Logistics from the Gulf War, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA,

1992.

Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian

Army, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1978.

Air Force Phamplet (AFPAM) 10-219, Volume 5, Bare Base Conceptual Planning Guide, 1 June 1996.

Air Force Handbook (AFH) 10-222, Volume 1, Guide to Bare Base Development, 1 July 1996.

AFPAM 91-216, USAF Safety Development and Contingency Pamphlet, 1 December 1998

	


	



















 




	!




""




#$

 %


&





!$



 



#

#





 %
'




		

'



50
51

Glossary

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAF Army Air Forces

ACS agile combat support

ACSA acquisition cross-Service agreement

ADCON administrative control

ADVON advance echelon

AE aeromedical evacuation

AEF Aerospace Expeditionary Forces

AFB Air Force base

AFCAP Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

AFDD Air Force doctrine document

AFFOR Air Force forces

AFH Air Force handbook

AO area of operations

AOC aerospace operations center

AOR area of responsibility

ASETF Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force

BDOC base defense operations center

BIF basing, infrastructure, and facilities

BSP base support plan

C2 command and control

C4 command, control, communications, and computers

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CCA contract construction agent

CINC commander in chief

COB collocated operations base

COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces

CONUS continental United States

CPG conceptual planning guide

DCC damage control center

DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces

EAF Expeditionary Aerospace Force

EOC expeditionary operations center

EVE equal value exchange
52

FOB forward operations base

HN host nation

HNS host-nation support

HSS host support services

HUMRO humanitarian relief operation

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JAOC joint aerospace operations center

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JLP joint logistics plan

JRA joint rear area

LOC lines of communications

LRC logistics readiness center

MAJCOM major command

MCC medical control center

MILCON military construction

MOB main operations base

MOC maintenance operations center

MOOTW military operations other than war

NAF number air force

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

O&M operations and maintenance

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operational order

ORM operational risk management

OSI Office of Special Investigations

PIC payment in cash

POL petroleum, oils and lubricants

PRIME BEEF Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force

PRIME RIBS Prime Readiness in Base Services
53

RED HORSE Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer

RIK replacement in kind

SA situational awareness

SAATH stand-alone air transportation hospital

SRC survival recovery center

SWA Southwest Asia

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

WRM war reserve materiel

Definitions

acquisition and cross service agreements. Bilateral agreements with

foreign governments to acquire or transfer military logistics support, supplies, and services on a reciprocal basis. Also called ACSA. (JP 1-02)

agile combat support. An Air Force core competency which encompasses the process of creating, sustaining, and protecting all aerospace

capabilities to accomplish mission objectives across the spectrum of

operations. Also called ACS. (AFDD 2-4)

airbase defense. Those measures taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, airbases to ensure the senior

commander retains the capability to accomplish assigned missions.

Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency. AFCESA is a center of

excellence dedicated to assisting the Air Force and Civil Engineers worldwide. The AFCESA mission is to provide the best tools, practices, and

professional support to maximize Air Force Civil Engineer capabilities in

base and contingency support. Also called AFESA.

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically

encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but

should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their

missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)
54

A-Staff. The COMAFFOR headquarters should usually be comprised of

normal staff directorates, A– 1 through A– 6, as well as a special staff. The

A-staff structure is used instead of the more “traditional” Air Force staff

designations (DO, LG, SC, etc.) to more readily identify the Air Force component staff equivalents of the corresponding J-staff functions. (AFDD 2)

bare base. A base having minimum essential facilities to house, sustain,

and support operations to include, if required, a stabilized runway, taxiways, and aircraft parking areas. A bare base must have a source of water

that can be made potable. Other requirements to operate under bare base

conditions form a necessary part of the force package deployed to the

bare base. (JP 1-02)

base development (less force beddown). The acquisition, development, expansion, improvement, and construction and/or replacement of

the facilities and resources of an area or location to support forces

employed in military operations or deployed in accordance with strategic

plans. (JP 1-02)

base support plan. The base level planning accomplished to support

combatant commands wartime operation planning, as well as MAJCOM

supporting plans. It cuts across all functional support areas in a consolidated view of base missions, requirements, capabilities, and limitations

to plan for actions and resources supporting war and contingency operations, including deployments, post deployment, and employment activities. Also called BSP.

camouflage, concealment, and deception. The use of concealment,

disguise, and decoys to minimize the possibility of detection or identification of troops, material, equipment and installations. It includes taking

advantage of the natural environment as well as the application of

natural and artificial materials.

collocated operations base. A base, usually owned and operated by an

ally, that contains an active or reserve airfield designated for joint or unilateral use by US Air Force wartime augmentation forces or for wartime

relocation of US Air Force in-theater forces. COBs are not US bases. Also

called COB.

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a

properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are
55

performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the

accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1– 02)

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural

disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due

to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid

response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of

personnel, installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02)

contingency plan. A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably

be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. (JP

1-02)

conventional weapons. A weapon which is neither nuclear, biological,

nor chemical. (JP 1-02)

decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area

safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing

chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging

to or around it. (JP 1-02)

deploy. To relocate a unit, or an element thereof, to a desired area of

operations or to a staging area. Deployment will be accomplished with

all required personnel and equipment. Deployment begins when the first

aircraft, personnel, or item of equipment leaves the home base. The force

is deployed when the last component of the unit has arrived. Also called

deployment. (JP 4-0)

disaster control. Measures taken before, during or after hostile action

or natural or man-made disasters to reduce the probability of damage,

minimize its effects, and initiate recovery. (JP 1-02)

exercise. A military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution. It is carried out for the purpose

of training and evaluation. It may be a combined, joint, or single-Service

exercise, depending on participating organizations. (JP 1-02)

facility. A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following:

a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land.

(JP 1-02)
56

force beddown. The provision of expedient facilities for troop support

to provide a platform for the projection of force. These facilities may

include modular or kit-type facility substitutes. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members,

civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all

locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated

application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security,

personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02) Because terminology is

always evolving, the Air Force believes a more precise definition is: [Measures taken to prevent or mitigate successful hostile actions against Air Force

people and resources while not directly engaged with the enemy.] [Italicized

definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for

clarity.]

forward operations base. In special operations, a base usually located

in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and

control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical

operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an

anchorage, or a pier. A forward operations base may be the location of a

special operations component headquarters or a smaller unit that is

controlled and/or supported by a main operations base. Also called FOB.

(JP 1-02)

Harvest Eagle package. Harvest Eagle is a housekeeping package

designed to support activities in remote areas where it is not feasible to

preposition assets. A complete Harvest Eagle package is designed to

support 550 people at a single beddown location. However, a set can be

broken down into smaller subsets to meet lesser needs of a smaller

deployment. A Harvest Eagle package is designed to be deployed

incrementally to permit flexibility in establishing base-type support requirements for any combination of bare base contingency plans. The

Harvest Eagle sets in the Air Force inventory are dispersed in three areas:

USAFE, PACAF, and in the CONUS. The sets in the CONUS are worldwide

deployable assets that are maintained and stored at Holloman AFB. (JP 1-

02)

Harvest Falcon package. A Harvest Falcon package is comprised of

housekeeping, industrial, and flightline support assets. These assets may
57

be deployed to a bare base. They are dispersed in two locations: CENTAF

AOR and in the CONUS. CENTAF’s assets are prepositioned in several

sites in support of the CENTAF mission. The sets in the CONUS are maintained and stored at Holloman AFB, NM and are worldwide deployable

assets. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a

nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or

emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between

nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

high threat area. An area, which, because of its location or strategic

targets, is highly susceptible to enemy, attacks.

joint support plan. A plan for the reception and beddown of forces

which is collectively developed by the host nation, the theater in-place

sponsor, and the affected augmentation unit. The plan outlines all facets

of operations at a collocated operating base to include personnel, facilities, and equipment. Also called JSP.

limiting factor. A factor or condition that either temporarily or permanently impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are

transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, and

malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance,

transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc. (JP 1-02)

main operations base. In special operations, a base established by a

joint force special operations component commander or a subordinate

special operations component commander in friendly territory to

provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistical

support to special operations activities in designated areas. Also called

MOB. (Joint Pub 1-02) [A base on which all essential buildings and facilities

are erected. Total organizational and intermediate maintenance capability

exists for assigned weapon systems. The intermediate maintenance capability

may be expanded to support specific weapon systems deployed to the MOB.]

{Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is

offered for clarity.}

mobility. A quality or capability of military forces which permits them

to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their

primary mission. (JP 1-02)
58

mutual support. That support which units render each other against an

enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each

other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02)

nuclear, biological and chemical defense. The methods, plans, procedures and training required to establish defense measures against the

effects of attack by weapons of mass destruction. Also called NBC

defense. (JP 1-02)

operations plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operations

Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by

combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate

commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing

unified commander. Operation plans are prepared either in a complete

format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can

be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data

(TPFDD) file. a) OPLAN—An operation plan for the conduct of joint

operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation

order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to

execute the CINC’s strategic concept and a movement schedule of these

resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified

in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation.

The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and

TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution

System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats.

Also called OPLAN. b) CONPLAN—An operation plan in an abbreviated

format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert

it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s strategic

concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the

combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

Also called CONPLAN. c) CONPLAN with TPFDD—A CONPLAN with

TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed

planning for phased deployment of forces. (JP 1-02)

Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces. A Headquarters US Air Force,

major command (MAJCOM), and base-level program that develops and

maintains a highly skilled, agile military combat support civil engineer

force capable of rapid responses in support of for worldwide contingency

operations. It assigns civilian employees and military personnel to both
59

peacetime real property maintenance and wartime engineering functions.

Also called Prime BEEF.

Prime Readiness in Base Services. A Headquarters US Air Force, major

command (MAJCOM), and base-level mobility program that organizes

and trains Services military forces for wartime and peacetime contingency

support roles worldwide. Also called Prime RIBS.

repair of aircraft operating surfaces. The process of using construction

equipment, tools, portable equipment, expendable supplies, and temporary surfacing materials to provide a minimum runway, taxiway, or aircraft

parking area through expedient repair methods. Also called RAOS.

reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, equipment, or materiel from Air Force organizations that

are not forward deployed. (AFDD 2)

RED HORSE. These units are wartime-structured to provide a heavy

engineer capability. They have a responsibility across the area of operations, are not tied to a specific base, and are not responsible for base

operation and maintenance. These units are mobile, rapidly deployable,

and largely self-sufficient, for limited periods of time. (AFDD 2-4)

survivability. Capability of a system to accomplish its mission in the

face of an unnatural (man-made) hostile environment. Avoidance, hardness, proliferation, or reconstitution (or a combination) may achieve

survivability. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment list. Appendix 1 to Annex A of the

operation plan. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support

the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean

area. It may also be generated as a computer listing from the time-phased

force and deployment data. Also called TPFDL. (JP 1-02)

war reserve materiel. Materiel required in addition to primary operating

stocks and mobility equipment to attain the operational objectives in the

scenarios authorized for sustainability planning in the Defense Planning

Guidance. Broad categories are: consumables associated with sortie

generation (to include munitions, aircraft external fuel tanks, racks, adapters,

and pylons); vehicles; 463L pallet systems; materiel handling equipment;

aircraft engines; bare base assets; individual clothing and equipment; munitions and subsistence. Also called WRM.
60