United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Public Affairs

Washington, DC 20555

Phone 301-415-8200 Fax 301-415-2234

Internet:opa@nrc.gov

No. 96-55 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

(Thursday, April 4, 1996)

NOTE TO EDITORS:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has issued the

attached letter to Northeast Utilities (NU) requiring certain

information, under oath or affirmation, before restarting its

Millstone 3 nuclear power plant in Connecticut.

The NRC is taking this action based on preliminary results

of a special inspection that has identified design and equipment

deficiencies described in an enclosure to the letter. The

deficiencies are similar in nature to those at Millstone 1 and 2,

both of which are in shut down.

Millstone 3 is required to submit to the NRC, seven days

before restarting from its current refueling outage, actions

taken to assure future operation will be conducted in compliance

with its operating license, NRC regulations and final safety

analysis report for the plant.

Millstone 1 and 2 also are required to provide similar

information and operating assurance to the NRC before being able

to restart.

#

Attachments:

As stated
April 4, 1996

Mr. Robert E. Busch

President - Energy Resources Group

Northeast Utilities Service Company

P.O. Box 128

Waterford, CT 06385

Dear Mr. Busch:

On March 7, 1996, the NRC issued to Northeast Utilities (NU) a

letter describing its review of an internal NU document, "ACR

7007 - Event Response Team Report" (7007 Report), dated February

22, 1996 and requesting additional information on NU's actions

and plans to address the conclusions of the 7007 Report as it

pertains to Millstone Unit 3 and Haddam Neck. At the time we

issued that letter, we did not have a recent inspection history

or findings with regard to Millstone Unit 3 that revealed design

deficiencies similar in number and nature to those of Millstone

Units 1 and 2, but the 7007 Report identified the potential for

similar configuration management conditions at Millstone Unit 3.

Since the March 7, 1996 letter, the NRC has initiated a special

inspection at Millstone Unit 3. Based on the preliminary results

of the portion of the special inspection conducted to date, we

have identified programmatic issues and design deficiencies at

Millstone Unit 3 that are similar in nature to those at Millstone

Units 1 and 2. Examples of some of the deficiencies found in the

special inspection are described in the enclosure to this letter.

In addition, you have recently identified design deficiencies in

the auxiliary feedwater containment isolation valves and the

recirculation spray system that have existed for more than 10

years.

These findings raise substantial questions as to whether the

Millstone Unit 3 facility is being operated and maintained in

conformance with the updated final safety analysis report

(UFSAR), license conditions, and Commission regulations.

Therefore, the NRC requires additional information to be

submitted pursuant to Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f) in writing, under oath or

affirmation, to determine whether or not the license for

Millstone Unit 3 should be suspended, modified, or revoked. The

information is to be submitted no later than 7 days prior to

Millstone Unit 3 restart (prior to criticality) from its current

outage and is to describe actions taken to ensure that future

operation of Millstone Unit 3 will be conducted in accordance

with the terms and conditions of the Millstone Unit 3 operating

license, the Commission's regulations, including 10 CFR 50.59,

and the Millstone Unit 3 UFSAR. This request for information

supercedes our previous request of March 7, 1996.
Waterford Library, Wate

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Sincerely,

Enclosure: Preliminary Inspection

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the original bypass as a compensatory measure. special instruction in an alarm response procedure required by start feature. In addition, the licensee did not maintain a function and it did not address the deletion of an automatic address the substitution of a manual action for an automatic safety evaluation performed was inadequate in that it did not temperature in the MCC/rod control area room cooler ducts. Th

automatic service water booster pump start on high discharge A temporary modification was installed in 1990 that bypass

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demonstrated marginal capacity because t

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