IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0903

Filed August 30, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF M.N., 

Minor Child,

S.N., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, 

Adam D. Sauer, District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Sabrina M. Dow, Mason City, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Will Sales (until withdrawal) and Lisa 

Jeanes, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

Jane Wright, Forest City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child—born 

in 2022—under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2023).1 She challenges 

the sufficiency of evidence supporting the grounds for termination, argues 

termination is contrary to the child’s best interests due to the closeness of the 

parent-child bond, and asserts she should have been granted additional time to 

work toward reunification.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The mother, who was described in a medical report as having a “very 

explosive personality,” has a history of mental-health issues. Those include bipolar 

disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, ADHD, conduct disorder, and 

oppositional-defiant disorder. She has also been diagnosed with both alcohol- and 

cannabis-use disorder. In the two years before the child was born, the mother was 

hospitalized at least three times for her mental health, sometimes with suicidal 

thoughts but always with anger issues.

Things did not improve after the child was born in May 2022. The parents 

and child came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human 

Services that August because of the mother’s poor mental health and the family’s 

unstable living arrangements. After the family was kicked out of the home they 

were living in, the mother and child moved into a homeless shelter. The mother 

was then kicked out of the shelter due to her aggressive behavior toward others, 

including the child, who she swore at and called names. When the parents could 

1 The father’s rights were also terminated. He does not appeal. 
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not identify a safe living arrangement for the child, the department obtained an 

order for temporary removal. The child was then placed in foster care, where he 

has remained.

From there through late September, the mother’s visits with the child did not 

go well. At the first visit, police officers had to intervene due to the mother’s 

aggressive behavior. At another, the mother said the child wasn’t hers and refused 

to hold him. The mother did not provide things for the child at visits, telling the 

department that the money she did have “was her vape money.” According to one 

of the department’s reports, “[d]uring all interactions [the mother] is nearly always 

swearing, raising her voice, talking down or arguing with [the father] and the 

[family-centered services] provider, and struggles to bond with” the child. 

The child was adjudicated to be in need of assistance in October. That 

same month, the mother was taken to the emergency room after drinking a pint of 

vodka and possibly taking an entire bottle of prescription drugs. While there, the 

mother admitted to daily use of marijuana. Because of the mother’s 

combativeness, she was placed on an emergency hold and admitted to the 

hospital. Doctors noted signs of depression and suicidal ideation.

Throughout October and November, the mother regularly missed visits and 

resisted services. Her mental health continued to be unstable, with concerns also 

surfacing about her substance abuse. Fast-forward to the permanency hearing in 

February 2023, the mother did not make any meaningful changes. She continued 

to no-show for visits, declined to meaningfully participate in services, and evaded 

drug testing. The mother’s housing and employment circumstances also remained 

unstable. And she took no steps to address her poor mental health. Based on the 
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mother’s lack of progress, the department recommended starting a termination 

proceeding. The court agreed, and the State filed its petition in short order.

At the termination hearing in May, the mother’s only request was that she 

be given six more months to work toward reunification. She testified that she had 

been “keeping [her] head straight,” even though she was not participating in any 

treatment or taking medications for her mental-health issues. When asked 

whether she felt like medication was needed, the mother answered:

I want to be honest, yes and no at the same time. No for the 

simple fact I feel like I’m finally getting everything under control. My 

heads more clear. I am not so stressed other than what’s going on 

with this stuff and with [the father] with the divorce. 

Yet the mother testified she was willing to get a mental-health evaluation and take 

medication if a doctor thought it was necessary. As for housing, the mother said 

that she had just moved in with a friend, though she didn’t know his last name. 

She testified that not having her “own place” was the only barrier to the child being 

placed in her custody. While she hoped “to get it accomplished in the next six 

months,” she questioned whether that was “even possible with it just being a single 

income.” But the mother testified, “I’m willing to try my best if I can.”

The solution-based services worker testified that, while the mother had 

made some progress since she and the father recently separated, she still had the 

same concerns that existed at the beginning of the case. Overall, the worker did 

not believe the mother was able to resume custody of the child, nor would she be 

“any time soon.” The department caseworker agreed, testifying “the concerns 

have kind of been the same from the beginning. Her mental health is still not being 

treated.” And while the mother testified about the steps she planned to take, the 
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caseworker didn’t buy it, noting that “at each hearing she has testified the same 

thing every time that she is going to look into medication, that she is going to look 

into mental health services and has not followed through.”

Following the hearing, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights 

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h), determined termination was in the 

child’s best interests, and found no permissive exception applied. 

II. Analysis

We apply a three-step analysis in conducting our de novo review of 

terminations of parental rights, asking whether (1) a statutory ground for 

termination is satisfied, (2) the child’s best interests are served by termination, 

and (3) a statutory exception applies and should be exercised to preclude 

termination. See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)–(3). If all three steps support termination, the court considers any

ancillary issues raised by the parent, such as whether additional time should be 

granted. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b).

A. Grounds for Termination

The mother challenges the State’s proof of both the statutory grounds for 

termination cited by the juvenile court. We may affirm termination “on any ground 

that we find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 791 

N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). As to termination under section 232.116(1)(h),2the

mother only challenges the final element—that the child could not be safely 

2 The mother’s petition on appeal references section 232.116(1)(f). Because the 

mother only challenges the final element, which is essentially identical to the final 

element of section 232.116(1)(h), we give her the benefit of the doubt and address 

her challenge under the proper ground. 
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returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(h)(4); D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting the statutory language 

“at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”). 

The mother agreed at the termination hearing that there were still barriers 

to immediate reunification and that she needed more time. “This amounts to clear 

and convincing evidence that the child[] could not be returned to her care at the 

time of the termination hearing.” In re A.A., No. 21-1972, 2022 WL 946503, at *3 

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022). And the mother was correct. Her poor mental

health created an ongoing risk of adjudicatory harm, and she took no steps to 

address that issue or others like her substance use, unstable housing, and 

sporadic employment. We conclude the State met its burden for termination under 

section 232.116(1)(h).

B. Best Interests and Statutory Exception

The mother next claims termination is not in the child’s best interests, see 

Iowa Code § 232.116(2), due to the closeness of the parent-child bond and 

detriment resulting from severance. See id. § 232.116(3)(c). 

Properly considering these arguments step by step and first addressing the 

child’s best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the 

best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and 

to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Id.

§ 232.116(2). The defining elements of a child’s best interests are safety and need 

for a permanent home. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).

The mother has put forth little effort to regain custody of the child. She has 

not progressed beyond fully-supervised visits, which she inconsistently attended 
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throughout the case—at one point going two months without a visit. She could not 

provide stability and permanency for herself, let alone the child, and she has done 

little to further the child’s safety, nurturing, growth, and needs. On the other hand, 

the child is integrated into a foster home open to adoption. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2)(b). The child is thriving in this placement, which has tended to his 

needs and will provide him with an opportunity for permanency and stability. We 

conclude termination is in the child’s best interests.

As to the permissive exception cited by the mother, Iowa Code 

section 232.116(3)(c) allows the court to forgo termination when it “would be 

detrimental to the child . . . due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” 

The application of a statutory exception to termination, if one exists, is “permissive, 

not mandatory.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). 

And “the parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an exception.” 

In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). 

The mother simply argues that the evidence “does not show that there was 

never a close relationship between mother and her child.” Even if that were true, 

the evidence also does not show a bond so close that the child would suffer as a 

result of termination. The mother presented no evidence on that issue, and it is 

hard to imagine that termination would be detrimental to the child given his young 

age, extended removal, and limited contact with the mother. We accordingly 

conclude this exception to termination does not apply. 

C. Additional Time

To the extent the mother suggests that she should have been given six 

more months to work toward reunification, she has failed to present any “specific 
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factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which [would] comprise the 

basis for the determination that the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the 

end of” an extension of time. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). “It is not our role to 

advocate what potential circumstances would warrant an extension on the 

[mother’s] behalf, and we decline to do so.” In re A.H., No. 20-1660, 2021 

WL 1399743, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021); accord Inghram v. Dairyland

Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974). So we find her request for an 

extension waived.

In any event, all we have to look at is the mother’s past performance. See 

In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990). The mother has repeatedly stated 

that she is ready to make the changes necessary to have the child returned to her 

custody, but she has never followed through. In other words, while the mother can 

talk the talk, she has never walked the walk. Given the mother’s “past performance 

we are not convinced additional time or services will change” her. Id. So we 

conclude additional time is not warranted.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.