United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Lisa Donaldson, Plaintiff,

v.

Carnival Corporation, Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 20-23258-Civ-Scola

Order On Motion to Dismiss

This matter arises from damages the Plaintiff, Lisa Donaldson, sustained

from a slip and fall incident while a passenger aboard the Carnival Dream. (ECF 

No. 8 at ¶¶ 13-14.) Donaldson has asserted nine counts against Carnival 

Corporation (“Carnival”) and in response, Carnival has moved to dismiss the 

Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety, contending the Plaintiff has failed to state any

claims upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). 

After careful review of the complaint, the briefing, and applicable legal authorities, 

the Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendant’s motion, as further 

set forth below. (ECF No. 13.)

I. Background

Donaldson was a passenger on the Carnival Dream in October 2019. (ECF 

No. 8, at ¶ 12.) While aboard the Dream, Donaldson slipped and fell while 

descending stairs between deck 11 and deck 10 on “wet and/or unreasonably 

slippery and poorly maintained steps.” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 14.) After her first slip, the 

Plaintiff stood up and attempted to continue down the stairs, only to slip and fall 

again. (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff claims that the stairs were set up in such a 

way that it was “difficult for Plaintiff to decern [sic] that [the stairs] were wet 

and/or slippery prior to Plaintiff’s fall” and further asserts that the “handrails were 

unreasonably slippery and/or otherwise inadequate to prevent or mitigate 

Plaintiff’s incident.” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 14.) As a result of her falls, the Plaintiff claims 

to have suffered “severe injuries that include . . . fractures and/or a trimalleolar 

fractur [sic] to her left ankle, torn ligaments, torn tendons, . . . and/or other 

damages/injuries.” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 14.) Donaldson also claims that Carnival failed 

to provide the Plaintiff with adequate medical care. (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff 

contends that the dangerous conditions on the steps between decks and 11 and 

10 “were known or should have been known by Defendant because Defendant’s 

crew members regularly used this area . . . and because of the lengthy period of 

time the conditions existed,” among other reasons. (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 15.)

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II. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must 

accept all the complaint’s allegations as true, construing them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 

2008). A pleading must only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In assessing the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s 

allegations, the Court is bound to apply the pleading standard articulated in Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). That is, the complaint “must . . . contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Am. Dental 

Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570). “Dismissal is therefore permitted when on the basis of a dispositive 

issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of 

action.” Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotations omitted) (citing Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 

992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it 

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

A court must dismiss a plaintiff’s claims if he fails to nudge his “claims across the 

line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive dismissal. See Id.

at 555. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, 

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery 

for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

III. Analysis

A. Counts I (Negligent Hiring and Retention) and II (Negligent Supervision 

and Training)

The Plaintiff argues that Carnival “breached the duty of reasonable care 

owed to Plaintiff and was negligent through negligently vetting, selecting, hiring, 

and/or retaining its crewmembers responsible for inspecting, cleaning, and/or 

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maintaining the subject area and the vicinity.” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 36.) Accordingly, 

the Plaintiff argues that Carnival “knew or should have known that the ship’s 

crewmembers were dangerous and incompetent and liable to do harm to its 

passengers.” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 41.) Moreover, the Plaintiff alleges that “prior to and 

during the course of employment . . . Defendant became aware or should have 

become aware of problems with said crewmembers that indicated their unfitness 

and/or predisposition to failing to adequately inspect, clean, and/or maintain” the 

ship” because the “Defendant received complaints of these crewmembers’ 

incompetence and/or was otherwise aware they lacked” qualification. (ECF No. 8, 

at ¶ 63.) The Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the Plaintiff’s allegations 

are nothing more than “vague, general statements of law” that fail to state a claim 

under applicable pleading standards. (ECF No. 18, at 2.)

The Court agrees with the Defendant. The Plaintiff has failed to adequately 

state a claim under Counts I and II as the Court finds the Plaintiff’s pleadings are 

“fact-free, wholly conclusory, boilerplate allegations” that the cruise line knew or 

should have known about alleged deficiencies with respect to its crewmembers, 

and therefore do not do enough to plead facts making its claims plausible rather 

than merely possible. Doe v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 16-cv-23733, 2016 WL 

6330587, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016) (Ungaro, J.); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. As 

this Court recently stated, where a Plaintiff’s pleading could be “interchangeably 

alleged against any cruise line defendant” the Plaintiff has failed to adequately 

state a claim. Christie v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 20-22439-Civ, 2020 

WL 6158815, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2020) (Scola, J.). The Plaintiff offers no 

specific facts as to the Defendant’s crewmembers showing any alleged negligence 

in support of Counts I and II. Such threadbare allegations fail to satisfy federal 

pleading standards. 

While the Plaintiff alleges that Carnival should have been aware of supposed 

deficiencies with its crew, due to alleged “complaints,” the Plaintiff provides 

absolutely no details of complaints or facts specific to the Dream, the Dream’s 

crew, or even with respect to Carnival as a company in support of its allegations. 

In fact, the Plaintiff offers nothing, other than stating such complaints apparently 

exist. The Plaintiff cannot simply state there are “prior incidents and/or 

complaints” in support of its claims without more. See Sanlu Zhang v. Royal 

Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 19-20773-CIV, 2019 WL 8895223, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 

Nov. 15, 2019) (Scola, J.)(finding prior incidents must have an “apparent 

connection” to the plaintiff’s case, and that the plaintiff must include factual 

allegations showing how prior incidents put the cruise line on notice of a 

dangerous condition regarding the specific incident at issue); see also Polanco v. 

Carnival Corp., No. 10-21716-Civ., 2010 WL 11575228, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 

2010) (Jordan, J.) (finding allegations to be “meager” and “wholly conclusory” 

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where a plaintiff provides “no details about the similar past incidents” mentioned 

in the complaint.). 

In sum, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff cannot simply state that the 

Defendant has been negligent and advance boilerplate allegations supporting its 

negligence claims where those claims are devoid of any facts. Accordingly, the 

Court dismisses Counts I and II of the amended complaint.

B. Counts III (Negligent Failure to Warn), V (Negligence Based on Vicarious 

Liability), and VI (Negligent Failure to Take Reasonable Measures for 

the Safety of the Plaintiff).

The Plaintiff next alleges that Carnival is liable for negligent failure to warn 

and for negligent failure to take reasonable measures for the safety of its 

passengers. (ECF No. 8, at ¶¶ 70-85; ¶¶119-130.) In its motion, Carnival argues 

that Donaldson leaves “Carnival guessing as to what the alleged risk-creating 

condition is by claiming a multitude of breaches . . . in a conclusory, vague, 

boilerplate fashion” and moreover that any claims of “prior incidents” are too 

conclusory or vague to establish that Carnival had notice of the alleged dangerous 

condition. (ECF No. 13, at 8-9.) The Plaintiff disagrees with the Defendant, arguing 

its allegations that the dangerous conditions were known or should have been 

known by Defendant because “the Defendant’s crew members regularly used this 

area and were familiar with the dangers . . . , because of the lengthy period of time 

the conditions existed, the amount of water present in the subject area, the fact 

that passengers were known to use the subject area . . . , prior incidents and/or 

complaints . . . , and/or other reasons.” (ECF No. 15, at 7-8.) 

For purposes of this motion, the parties agree that maritime law applies to 

the instant action. (ECF No. 13, at 3; ECF No. 15, at 3.) Under federal maritime 

law, to prevail on a tort claim “‘a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant had a 

duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury; (2) the defendant breached 

that duty; (3) the breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; 

and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm’”. Kulakowski v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 

Ltd., No. 16-21375-Civ, 2017 WL 237642 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2017) (King, J.) 

(quoting Smith v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 620 F. App’x 727, 730 (11th Cir. 

2015)). The duty owed by a ship owner to its passengers is “ordinary reasonable 

care under the circumstances.” Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 

1322 (11th Cir. 1989). As a “prerequisite to imposing liability” the Plaintiff must 

allege that Carnival had “actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating 

condition.” Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322.

As above, the Court once again finds the Plaintiff’s complaint to be entirely 

conclusory. The Complaint provides no details supporting the Plaintiff’s 

allegations that the Dream’s crew members regularly used the stairs between 

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decks 11 and 10, that the alleged dangerous condition existed for a “lengthy period 

of time,” or that prior incidents or complaints exist as to this alleged dangerous 

condition. Here, as above, the Plaintiff simply states that such prior incidents and 

complaints exist without providing more. Certainly, it is possible that such 

complaints exist, but that does not mean the Plaintiff has met its burden in 

satisfaction of federal pleading standards. Doe, 2016 WL 6330587, at *3; see also 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The Plaintiff could offer information in its complaint such as 

having observed crewmembers used the stairs where the Plaintiff was injured or 

information to support the “lengthy period of time” the alleged dangerous 

condition existed; however, the Plaintiff offers no such information in her 

complaint. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately 

allege that Carnival was on actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating 

condition under Counts III and VI. 

For the similar reasons stated with respect to Counts I and II, the Court 

finds that Counts III and Counts VI of the Plaintiff’s complaint should be 

dismissed. As Count V of the Plaintiff’s complaint appears to be based on the same 

information underlying Counts III and VI, the Court dismisses Count V of the 

complaint for the same reasons it dismisses Counts III and VI. See, e.g., Medina 

v. United Christian Evangelistic Ass’n, 2009 WL 653857, at *3 (S.D. Fla. March 10, 

2009) (Cooke, J.) (dismissing analogous vicarious liability claim for same reasons 

as dismissing underlying tort). 

C. Counts IV (Negligent Design, Installation, and/or Approval)

The Court now turns to Count IV of the Plaintiff’s complaint, which argues 

the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff based on negligent design of the area in 

which the Plaintiff was injured. In support of its claim, the Plaintiff says its

allegations that “the subject stairs and handrails were uneven” are sufficient to 

state a claim for negligent design. (ECF No. 15, at 9.) Carnival, on the other hand, 

argues that the complaint alleges “[e]very single hypothetical flaw of a shipboard 

stairway . . . in quick succession” and aside from these “bare conclusory 

allegations” the complaint is “devoid of facts to support a claim for negligent 

design.” (ECF No. 13, at 11.) For reasons other than those advanced by the 

Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim sufficient 

to survive a motion to dismiss on its claim for negligent design. The Court notes 

that it found particularly unhelpful the Plaintiff’s argument that the Defendant 

should have clarity with respect to the Plaintiff’s claims because “Plaintiff’s 

counsel has litigated numerous cases against it.” (ECF No. 15, at 9.)

In order to adequately state a claim for negligent design, a plaintiff must 

advance facts that support a finding that the defendant “‘actually designed’ the 

dangerous condition at issue.” Gordon v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 18-cv-22334, 

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2019 WL 1724140, at * (S.D. Fla. April 15, 2019) (Moore, J.) (quoting Rodgers v. 

Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 410 F. App’x 210, 212 (11th Cir. 2010)). Under the law of 

the Eleventh Circuit a cruise line “can be liable only for negligent design . . . if it 

had actual or constructive notice of such hazardous condition.” Groves v. Royal 

Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 463 F. App’x 837, 837 (11th Cir. 2012). 

While the Plaintiffs allegations are not well developed, they do withstand

scrutiny at the motion to dismiss stage. Indeed, this Court has previously held 

that where a plaintiff, as here, alleges that a cruise line defendant “specifi[ed], 

approv[ed] and/or accept[ed]” and was “intimately involved with and ultimately 

approved . . . the design” of the area that caused injury to a plaintiff, the plaintiff 

has stated allegations that are generally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 

Castillo v. NCL Bahamas Ltd., No. 1:17-CV-23545, 2018 WL 1796260, at *4 (S.D. 

Fla. Jan. 5, 2018) (Garber, Mag. J.), report and recommendation adopted by 2018 

WL 1795442 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2018) (Scola, J.). Here, the Plaintiff’s complaint 

puts forth allegations similar to those advanced in Castillo, and more. For 

example, the complaint states that the “Defendant participated in the design 

process” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 88); “approved of the Carnival Dream, including providing 

specifications to the shipbuilder” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 89); and “Defendant maintains 

the contractual right to participate, review, modify, and/or reject the design plans” 

(ECF No. 8, at ¶ 91). Taking these allegations as true, as the Court must at this 

stage, the Court finds that these allegations support a finding that Carnival may 

have “actually designed” the staircase where Plaintiff was injured and accordingly, 

Carnival may have been on actual or constructive notice of the danger posed by 

the staircase in question sufficient to support a claim for negligent design. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for 

negligent design and therefore denies the request to dismiss Count IV of the 

Complaint. 

D. Counts VII (Vicarious Liability for Negligence of the Ship’s Medical 

Staff); VIII (Apparent Agency for the Acts of the Ship’s Medical Staff); 

IX (Assumption of Duty for the Negligence of the Ship’s Medical Staff)

The final claims advanced by the Plaintiff relate to the ship’s medical staff. 

The Plaintiff alleges that the Dream’s medical staff breached its duties by “failing 

to adequately supply and equip its medical center to be able to adequately 

examine, diagnose, and treat Plaintiff’s injuries” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 145); and failing 

to treat the Plaintiff “in a reasonable amount of time” (ECF No. 8, at ¶ 146), among 

other reasons. (See ECF No. 8, at ¶¶ 147, 165, 178 (advancing identical allegations 

under Counts VII, VIII, and IX).) 

Once again, the Court finds the Plaintiff’s claims with respect to the 

Defendant’s medical staff to be threadbare. The Defendant provides no facts 

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whatsoever as to how the Defendant failed to provide adequate medical care and 

why the care that was provided was not provided in a timely fashion. For instance, 

the complaint could detail, what time the Plaintiff fell, what time the Plaintiff was

attended to by the ship’s medical staff, who from the medical staff attended to the 

Plaintiff, how the Plaintiff was taken from the site of her accident to the ship’s 

infirmary, the measures taken by the ship’s medical staff to treat the Plaintiff, and 

how any of those facts contributed to the Plaintiff’s injuries. The Plaintiff’s 

complaint provides none of this information and therefore fails to satisfy applicable 

federal pleading standards. For reasons stated above, the Court finds the Plaintiff’s 

conclusory and boilerplate allegations fail to state a claim. Accordingly, the Court 

dismisses Counts VII, VIII, and IX of the Plaintiff’s complaint. 

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part, as to Counts I, II, 

III, IV, V, VII, VIII, and IX and denies in part, as to Count IV, Carnival’s motion 

to dismiss (ECF No. 13).

Done and ordered, in Miami, Florida on November 18, 2020.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

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