United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Public Affairs, Region I

475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406

Fax: 610/337-5241

Internet: dps@nrc.gov or nas@nrc.gov

I-98-79 July 7, 1998

Contact: Diane Screnci (610/337-5330) FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Neil A. Sheehan (610/337-5331)

NRC PROPOSES $110,000 CIVIL PENALTY AGAINST CONSOLIDATED EDISON

FOR TESTING, REPAIR VIOLATIONS AT INDIAN POINT 2 NUCLEAR PLANT

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a

$110,000 fine against the operator of the Indian Point 2

nuclear power plant for three violations of agency requirements

concerning the accuracy of equipment testing records and

ineffective repairs to safety-related circuit breakers.

Consolidated Edison Company of New York operates the

pressurized-water reactor, which is located north of New York

City in Buchanan, N.Y.

Identified during inspections conducted at the

facility between October 27, 1997, and March 23, 1998, the

violations were discussed by agency staff and utility

representatives during a predecisional enforcement conference

on May 6 at the NRC Region I office in King of Prussia, Pa.

Two of the violations stem from the testing of

equipment. Investigations by both ConEd and the NRC’s Office

of Investigations (OI) concluded that a plant technician failed

to perform certain testing activities and then filled out

documents to indicate they had been carried out.

Specifically, plant records from August 8, 1997,

showed that the technician had inspected 33 emergency battery

lights in the primary auxiliary building, as well as a

verification of two steps in a test of one of the facility’s

emergency diesel generators. Both tests are required under the

plant license or technical specifications issued by the NRC.

The investigations, however, revealed the battery

lights could not have been tested properly because the

technician -- along with another technician assigned to assist

with the task -- was not in the building for a sufficient

period of time. Further, several of the lights’ battery cells

were found to have low water levels 10 days after the tests

were documented as having been completed. That problem would

have been addressed had the lights been properly tested.

Likewise, investigators determined that the emergency
2

diesel generator verification could not have been performed

because the technician did not enter the building where the

generators are housed on the day in question.

In a letter to ConEd detailing the enforcement action,

NRC Region I Administrator Hubert J. Miller wrote that while

the agency was concerned with the technician’s actions, “of

even greater concern is the consideration that the emergency

battery light tests may not have been performed in accordance

with the procedure on multiple occasions in the last several

years.”

“The OI investigation determined that it was not

uncommon for (technicians) to sign records for completion of

actions that they had not personally performed,” Mr. Miller

continued. “It also indicated that the (technicians) did not

have a clear understanding of their responsibility for adhering

to procedures. It appears that there was an informal attitude

toward procedural adherence among the (technicians).”

The third violation pertains to a failure to determine

the cause of and take adequate steps to halt repetitive

problems involving safety-related circuit breakers. The

breakers would be needed to start safety systems during an

accident. Between August 1993 and May 1997, there were

multiple instances in which the Westinghouse 480-volt breakers

did not close on demand.

In May 1997, ConEd assembled a team to address the

problem, but those efforts did not successfully identify the

root cause. Consequently, additional failures occurred in

August and October of 1997.

Stated Mr. Miller: “The potential safety consequences

of the (DB-50) breaker failures are significant because

approximately 60 (DB-50) breakers are installed at Indian Point

2 and are used to provide power to safety-related loads,

including the containment spray pumps, auxiliary boiler

feedwater pumps, residual heat removal pumps and safety

injection pumps. In many cases, these breakers are relied upon

to close automatically, such as in response to a safety

injection signal or upon the occurrence of a loss of offsite

power. Failure of the breakers to close on demand would

require operator action to reset and manually reclose the

breaker to restore the equipment to service.”

The three violations were determined by the NRC to be

Severity Level III. (The NRC issues four levels of violations,

ranging from Level I, which is the most significant, to Level

IV, the least significant.)
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In addition to those infractions, the NRC is issuing

ConEd Notices of Violation, but no fines, for one other Level

III violation and three Level IV violations.

The Level III violation relates to a failure to

establish a testing program that would ensure required systems

and components would perform satisfactorily. Four examples of

deficient testing were identified.

As for the Level IV violations, they involve failure

to take prompt corrective actions for identified deficiencies

and a procedural flaw affecting post-accident safety-related

systems in the containment building, the large concrete

structure surrounding the reactor.

ConEd has 30 days to pay the fine or request in

writing that all or part of the penalty be withdrawn.

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