U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION March 1978

REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

I'll

11 

REGULATORY GUIDE "5

STANDARD FORMAT AND CONlk-.,?OFQAFEGUARDS

CONTINGENCY PLANS F YCLE FACILITIES

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USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Comments should be sent to the Secretarv of the Commission, US. Nuclear Regu- Regulatory Guides are iwsued to describe and make taibbe to the public rethods latory Commission, Washington. DC. 20555. Attention: Docketing and Service

eceptawb to the NRC staff of implementing gpecific Parts of the Commotion's Branch.

regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions

or pOetuiated accidents, or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory Guides

re not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them is not required. t. Power Reactors 6. Products

Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be accept- 2. Research and Tesi Reictors 7. Transportation able if they provide a besn for the findings requisite to the iseuance or continuance 3. Fuels nd Materials Facilities 8. Occupational Heahh of a permit or i-cons by the Commission. 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust Review 5. Materialsarid Plant Protection 10. Generat Comments and stjestiorr for improvermnts in thes guides are encouraged at all

ftins, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments end Requests for single copies of ssued guides lwhich may be repoduced I or for place- to reflect new information or experience. However, comments on this guideif mant on an automatic distribution list for single copies of future guide in specific received within about tfo months after its istuance, will be particularly useful in divisions should be made in writing to the US. Nucleer Regulatory Commiseon,

evaluating the ned for en early revision. Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention Director. Division of Document Control.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Applicability ........................................................ ii

Use of the Standard Format ....................................................... ii

Style and Composition ............................................................ iii

Physical Specifications of Submittals ............................................ iii

Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages ........................................ iv

Number of Copies ................................................................. iv

Public Disclosure ................................................................ v Compatibility .................................................................... v

CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Perceived Danger ............................................................ 5.55-1

1.2 Purpose of the Plan ......................................................... 5.55-1

1.3 Scope of the Plan ........................................................... 5.55-1

1.4 Definitions ................................................................. 5.55-2

CHAPTER 2 GENERIC PLANNING BASE ....................................................... 5.55-2

CHAPTER 3 LICENSEE PLANNING BASE

3.1 Licensee's Organization for Safeguards Contingency Response ................ 5.55-3

3.2 Physical Layout ............................................................ 5.55-3

3.3 Law Enforcement Interface and Assistance ................................... 5.55-3

3.4 Policy Constraints and Assumptions ......................................... 5.55-4

3.5 Control and Communications ................................................. 5.55-4

3.6 Safeguards System Hardware Considerations .................................. 5.55-5

3.7 Administrative and Logistical Considerations ............................... 5.55-5

CHAPTER 4 RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX ...................................................... 5.55-6

CHAPTER 5 PROCEDURES SUMMARY ......................................................... 5.55-7

SUPPLEMENT: A REPRESENTATIVE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A FUEL CYCLE PLANT ..... 5.55-8
INTRODUCTION

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC), directed the NRC, among other things, to develop contingency plans "...for dealing with

threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive

wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from all activities licensed under the-Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended...."

The principal requirements for the development of safeguards contingency plans for licensed

fuel cycle facilities are found in 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization

Facilities"; Part 70, "Special Nuclear Materials"; and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants

and Materials." Paragraphs 10 CFR 50.34(d) and 10 CFR 70.22(j) identify the requirements for a

safeguards contingency plan. Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 identifies the criteria to be followed

in developing the contingency plan.

A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a document that provides guidance to licensee

personnel and identifies procedures to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of

threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities. An

acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and

actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures,

and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and (3) a specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and

action.

A safeguards contingency plan consists of five elements: (1) Background, (2) a Generic

Planning Base, (3) a Licensee Planning Base, (4) a Responsibility Matrix, and (5) Procedures.

The Background contains the purpose and scope of the plan, describes the environment

within which the plan will be put into effect, and defines the terms used.

The Generic Planning Base contains a list of events to be planned for and the associated

objective to be reached for each event. It may also include for each event an overview of the

general types of decisions and actions and other generic information helpful to the licensee in

clearly presenting the planned responses to reach the objective.

The Licensee Planning Base contains the planning information peculiar to a given licensee

including his organizational entities for contingency response tasking, facility descriptions

and locations necessary for response planning and coordination, command and control functions,

etc.

The Responsibility Matrix is a format used to specify the assignment of specific decisions

and actions that each organizational entity takes to effect such response.

i
For each organizational entity, the decisions and actions, as assigned in the Responsibility Matrix, are finally summarized in a Procedures Summary for that entity. The Procedures

Summaries that result are simplified presentations of the assigned responsibilities for use in

training and implementing the plan. The Procedures Summary, although part of the contingency

plan, does not have to be submitted to the NRC for approval (see Chapter 5 ).

This regulatory guide prescribes the proposed standard format for the safeguards contingency plan. It also contains an example contingency plan, included as a supplement, to illustrate

the guide's application. This guide may be revised to reflect comments received and additional

staff review.

Purpose and Applicability

This standard format and content document has been prepared to aid in ensuring completeness

of planning and presentation and to simplify the NRC review of the safeguards contingency plan.

It applies to fuel cycle licensees who are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.50 and

§ 73.60 (proposed 10 CFR § 73.45 and § 73.46, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977).

This document describes the information required for a plan. Information submitted will

be reviewed for completeness on the basis of unique site considerations and the contents of

this guide. If an application does not provide a reasonably complete presentation of the

required information, final review will be delayed until the needed information is provided.

It is anticipated that the safeguards contingency plan will be submitted as an attachment to

the physical security plan. To the extent that the topics in the contingency plan are treated

in adequate detail in a licensee's approved physical security plan, they may be incorporated by

cross reference to the security plan. The applicant or licensee should include additional

information as appropriate. It is also the responsibility of the applicant or licensee to be

aware of new and revised NRC regulations.

Information and procedures delineated in regulatory guides in Division 5, "Materials and

Plant Protection," and technical reports and appropriate to certain sections of the physical

security plan submitted under Paragraph 50.34(c) of 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR § 73.50 or § 73.60

(proposed 10 CFR § 73.45 and § 73.46, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977) may be incorporated by

reference. The applicant should discuss his plans and programs with the NRC staff before

preparing his contingency plan, giving particular emphasis to the depth of information required

for this plan.

Use of the Standard Format

The standard format and content is described in succeeding chapters and is illustrated in

the example plan presented in the supplement.

If the applicant or licensee chooses to adopt the standard format and content, he should

follow the numbering system of this document at least down to the level of subsection (i.e.,

3.4.1). Certain subsections may be omitted from an application if they are clearly unnecessary

ii
for providing a complete plan or if they are needlessly repetitive. In such cases appropriate

adaptation of the standard format to accommodate the particular circumstances is permissible.

The applicant or licensee may wish to submit in support of his contingency plan information that is not required by regulations and is not essential to the description of the physical

protection program. Such information could include, for example, historical data submitted in

demonstration of certain criteria, discussions of alternatives considered, or supplementary

data regarding assumed models, data, or calculations. This type of information should be

clearly labeled and provided as an attachment to the submittal so that it will not be considered as a license condition.

Style and Composition

The applicant or licensee should strive for a clear, concise presentation of information

that portrays the general perspective and concepts of the basic plan. Details about specific

aspects of the plan may be relegated to the appendices to enhance the clarity of the presentation in the basic plan and to facilitate updating and maintenance of the information.

Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be avoided.

Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent throughout the submittal and should be

consistent with generally accepted usage unless otherwise defined in the document.

Drawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may be presented more

adequately or conveniently by such means. In general, these illustrations should be located in

the section where they are first referenced. Care should be taken to ensure that all information presented in drawings is legible, that symbols are defined, and that drawings are not

reduced to the extent that they cannot be read by unaided normal eyes.

A table of contents should be included in each submittal.

Physical Specifications of Submittals

All materials submitted in a safeguards contingency plan should conform to the following

physical dimensions of page size, quality of paper and inks, numbering of pages, etc.:

1. Page Size

Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches.

Drawings and graphics: 8-1/2 x 11 inches preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable provided the finished copy when folded does not exceed 8-1/2 x 11 inches.

2. Paper Stock and Ink

Suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density for handling and for

microfilming.

iii
3. Page Margins

A margin of no less than one inch should be maintained on the top, bottom, and binding

side of all pages submitted.

4. Printing

Composition: text pages should be single spaced.

Type face and style: must be suitable for microfilming.

Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically reproduced.

Pages may be printed on both sides with the images printed head to head.

5. Binding

Pages should be punched for looseleaf standard 3-hole binder.

6. Page Numbering

Pages should be numbered sequentially.

7. Format References

In the application, references to this Standard Format should be by chapter and

section numbers.

Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages

The updating or revising of data and text should be on a replacement page basis.

The changed or revised portion of each page should be highlighted by a vertical line. The

line should be on the margin opposite the binding margin for each line changed or added. All

pages submitted to update, revise, or add pages to the plan should show the date of change.

The transmittal letter should include an index page listing the pages to be inserted and the

pages to be removed. When changes or additions that affect the table of contents are made,

pages for a revised table of contents should be provided.

Number of Copies

The applicant or licensee should (1) submit 6 copies to the Director, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, or

(2) file them in person at the Commission's office at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C., or

at 7915 Eastern Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland.

iv
Public Disclosure

The NRC has established that safeguards contingency plans contain information of a type

specified in 10 CFR § 2.790(d) and shall be subject to disclosure only in accordance with the

provisions of 10 CFR § 9.12.

Compatibility

The applicant or licensee should ensure that the contingency plan is compatible with the

other sections of his application. Reference to sections in the physical security plan may be

made in response to information requested by this guide.

v
1. BACKGROUND

1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER

Provide a statement of the perceived danger to the security of licensee personnel and

licensee property posed by the possibility of attempts to commit industrial sabotage or to

steal strategic special nuclear material. The adversary attributes assumed for safeguards

contingency planning stem from those specified by NRC as a basis for current safeguards system

design or upgrading. The statement contained in 10 CFR § 73.55(a) or subsequent Commission

statements will suffice. The information is included in the safeguards contingency plan for

ready reference and clarity with regard to the adversary capabilities that are assumed to

oppose the performance of the primary security mission of the plan. The applicant or licensee

should examine his operation to determine its vulnerabilities in light of the threats postulated by the Commission. This examination is to make the applicant or licensee more aware of

the total scope of response and will facilitate the generation of events in the Generic Planning

Base.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

State the general aims and and purposes underlying the implementation of the plan, e.g.,

general uses intended for the plan, the particular plant site covered, etc.

1.3 SCOPE OF THE PLAN

Discuss the scope of the plan by addressing the following information:

The general types of contingencies that have been considered, i.e., theft, sabotage,

threats.

The primary security mission (task to be accomplished) in response to an adversary action

and the general operational concepts or approach to performing the mission. The mission statement simply reveals what is to be accomplished and when and why. The operational concept

presents an overview of how the mission is to be accomplished. Also, for clarity of intent,

the operational concept may indicate explicitly the conditions under which the plan might be

executed, e.g., night, day, all weather, natural disasters, fires, site evacuations, etc.

Where annotated diagrams or maps of the plant site layout and surrounding areas will be

helpful for quickly identifying reference locations, rallying points, movement routes, designated

security sectors, etc., they may be included here or referred to if included elsewhere in the

plan.

5.55-1
1.4 DEFINITIONS

Alphabetically list the terms and the corresponding definitions used in describing the

operational and technical aspects of the plan.

2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE

Identify those events that signal the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency

according to how they are first perceived by the licensee's personnel. A'sufficient number of

events should be identified to cover the range of possible safeguards contingencies that are

envisioned. Generic specification of the events is suggested to limit the number that are

required for the plan. Refer to Appendix C of the supplement for examples illustrating the

manner of specifying these events.

For each event identified, specify the objective to be accomplished by the operational

elements when they respond to that particular event. In selecting an objective, consideration

should be given to uncertainties about the situation that generally will prevail as of the time

the subject events occur. For example, if information available at the time is likely to be so

vague that the operational elements will be uncertain whether or not an adversary incursion is

in progress, an appropriate objective for the event would involve determining what the actual

situation is. Attainment of this objective would in turn clarify the situation and lead to the

next event and objective most appropriate for the continued response in order to accomplish the

primary security mission reflected in Section 1.3.

In addition to the required information above, other information may be included in the

generic planning base that is helpful to the licensee (or applicant) in preparing or clearly

presenting the general nature of the planned responses to achieve the selected objectives. For

example, listing of the categories of actions or the general approach that will be taken by the

overall response organization to accomplish a given objective may be helpful in planning,

assigning, and subsequent training of personnel in the specific response actions developed in

the Responsibility Matrix relating to that objective. Such listing would be tantamount to

presenting a limited operational concept that is specifically applicable to the attainment of

the particular objective. Another type of information that may be helpful for ready reference

is an illustration that shows sequential relationships among all the generic events and

objectives utilized for planning. A version of this type of information is shown in Appendix C

of the example plan contained in the supplement.

3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE

In successive paragraphs, briefly present information about the licensee's organization,

infrastructure, capabilities, constraints, law enforcement assistance, and other considerations

that bear upon the execution of the contingency responses of the plan. Only current capabilities should be reflected to ensure realistic prospects for plan execution in the event of a

contingency during the current period. If applicable, reference may be made to parts of the

physical security plan where pertinent informaton is adequately presented, rather than repeating

the particular information in the safeguards contingency plan. Types of information that

5.55-2
should be considered for inclusion in the plan are further described below. Use additional

paragraphs as necessary to present other pertinent information.

3.1 LICENSEE'S ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE

Provide a description of the organization adopted for purposes of planning, assigning, and

conducting coordinated safeguards contingency response actions to attain the specified objectives

presented in the Generic Planning Base. This task organization should reflect the personnel

composing the various operational entities that appear in the Responsibility Matrix and Procedures Summaries; these are the entities tasked in the plan that implement detailed contingency

response actions. The minimum composition of each operational entity over a 24-hour manning

period should be indicated, as well as any special equipment that would be available with the

entity. The designated leader and alternate leader of an operational entity may be identified

implicitly by first and second placement on the respective listing or by explicit identification

within the listing. Procedures for alerting and marshalling off-duty personnel, as applicable,

should also be presented.

3.2 PHYSICAL LAYOUT

Operations maps (or appropriate diagrams) showing the layout of the plant and site features

and the surrounding local geographic areas may be included here or elsewhere in the plan (e.g.,

Section 1.3 in connection with the operational concept). If included elsewhere, merely refer

to the particular location in this paragraph. The purpose of this type of information is to

provide the response forces with an easily referenced graphical display of positional information that will serve as a common reference for rapidly coordinating response operations during

execution. In that regard, planned locations (such as alternative rallying points, control

and coordination points, law enforcement agency (LEA) locations, movement routes, road block

locations, etc.) may be identified by annotated coding on the map. This will facilitate fast

and accurate communication of the actual situation and thereby assist coordinating and adjusting

response operations as appropriate to the actual situation.

3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE AND ASSISTANCE

Identify each separate law enforcement agency with which arrangements have been made for

safegurds emergency assistance. For each agency, state the modes and points of contact,

describe the notification procedure, state the expected response in terms of manpower as a

function of time, and state the equipment that responding personnel will possess. Describe the

general marshalling procedures and channels established for coordination with arriving LEA

onsite and while enroute. In addition, describe any additional special capabilities that will

be available such as helicopters, offsite roadblocks, hot pursuit arrangements, Special Weapons

and Tactics (SWAT) teams, hostage negotiation expertise, bomb disposal expertise, and LEA communications facilities that will be used to coordinate response activities. Indicate the

principal law enforcement official or agency for requesting and coordinating additional LEA

response as required.

5.55-3
As applicable, provide similar information on the interface and assistance of bomb disposal

units with which direct arrangements have been made. |

3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Identify laws and company policies that will substantially constrain or otherwise influence

execution of response actions during contingency situations. This may include, but need not be

limited to, the following areas as applicable:

a. Extent to which local, county, and State law enforcement will be depended on to

protect plant properties and employees against adversary intrusion and theft incidents.

b. Extent to which company employees will be allowed to perform hazardous physical

security duties to accomplish safeguards contingency response actions.

c. Extent to which off-duty employees and employee property may be counted upon in

response to security contingencies.

d. Whether licensee personnel or local LEA are in charge of coordinating overall joint

onsite response.

e. Role of licensee personnel in local offsite LEA operations.

3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

Information concerning the planned control arrangements and the use and operation of the

various means of communication (licensee and LEA as applicable) during safeguards contingency

response operations is included in this section. Emphasis should be on the planned operating

procedures that are to apply for coordination of the various operational entities involved.

The information on control arrangements should clearly reflect who controls what and when.

Also, as applicable, the manner of passing control from one point of leadership to another

during progress of a contingency situation should be specific. The leader of any operational

entity is presumed to be in control of that entity unless otherwise specified. Primary and

alternate locations of key control points and individuals and the manner of announcing the use

of an alternate location rather than the primary one are appropriate items to be addressed.

With regard to communications, the allocation, control, and usage of the various means of

communications should be specific along with any special instructions that apply regarding

operation of the equipment. As applicable, the specification and use of various codes or

various features of the alarm system for rapid communication of situational information also

are appropriate items for this section.

5.55-4
3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS

Information of operational significance to the utilization of safeguards systems equipment

may be included here or elsewhere in the plan, as desired for clarity. For example, the location

of available special weapons and protective equipment might be indicated here or in the section

on administrative and logistical considerations. Also, information concerning communications

equipment might be more appropriately included in the control and communicatons section than

here. Information of interest in this section is the type that is necessary to coordinate

commitment or use of the equipment during contingency response operations, e.g , its location

if not installed, who obtains it, what operating modes apply and when, the readiness state

maintained, etc. Descriptive information on system configuration, technical performance

characteristics, and installed locations may be included by reference to appropriate parts of

the physical security plan if such information is felt necessary in the interest of clarity.

If no information is included in this section, the simple statement, "This section not used,"

should be inserted.

3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Describe any special arrangements and practices that are maintained or implemented to

ensure adequate administrative and logistical support during response to safeguards contingency

events.

The descriptions should include provisions for ensuring that all equipment and expendable

supplies needed to effect a successful response to a safeguards contingency will be easily

accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient supply. Particular attention should be

focused on extra supplies and equipment such as radio batteries, ammunition, special weapons,

gas masks, body armor, and helmets that could substantially affect the effectiveness of

response personnel.

Include also the planned arrangements for provision of necessary emergency services during

safeguards contingency operations, such as medical evacuation and treatment of casualties and

health physics. In that regard, existing emergency plans and preparations for provision of

such services may be applicable, provided they are not dependent upon the availability of

personnel who are important or essential to the safeguards contingency response actions.

4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Develop a Responsibility Matrix corresponding to the Generic Planning Base. The tabulations in the Responsibility Matrix should provide an overall picture of the response actions

and their interrelationships.

5.55-5
The Responsibility Matrix, illustrated below, is an array format to facilitate systematic

presentation and crosscheck of the contingency response actions planned for each operational

element. The three dimensions depicted are: "Events," "Operational Elements," and "DecisionsW

Actions."

Event n

Event 3

Event 2

Event 1 j

Operational

Elements

.2 o

Each Event should correspond to one of the contingency events selected in the Generic

Planning Base (Chapter 2). The Decisions-Actions for each Event should delineate the decisions

and actions and their assignment to the responsible Operational Element (Sections 3.1 and 3.3)

so as to gain the objective associated with that Event in the Generic Planning Base.

One or more pages may be used to present the contingency actions associated with each

event, depending upon the number of operational elements involved in the plan and the amount of

column width allocated for each operational element. The matrix format shown in the representative fuel cycle safeguards contingency plan contained in the Supplement has spaces for 10

different operational elements on two pages of presentation for each contingency event; however,

more or less may be used as necessary.

It may be noted that the example matrix contained in the Supplement also shows the objective

associated with each contingency event in two places: the first column and at the top in one

other column. This presentation is for ease of reference. The first column permits quick

reference during development and maintenance of the plan, and the other column serves to identify

the particular operational element which decides when that objective has been attained.

Safeguards responsibilities shall be assigned in a manner that precludes conflicts in

duties or responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards

contingency.

5. 55-6
5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY

Develop a Procedures Summary for each operational element that summarizes the actions from

the Responsibility Matrix for assignment to that operational element. The set of Procedures

Summaries that results is to aid in the assignment and training of tasks for effective implementation of the plan. The Procedures Summary, although part of the contingency plan, does not

have to be submitted to the NRC for approval. It will be prepared and maintained at the

licensee's facility and will be inspected by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to

ensure compliance with the Responsibility Matrix.

Each Procedures Summary should provide clear and concise statements of the general

responsibilities of the operational element during any safeguards contingency and of the

specific actions assigned with respect to the range of contingency events covered in the plan.

In that regard show where a task begins and follow its progress through each operational

element until the task is completed; i.e., show the actions that each of the operational

elements accomplishes to carry out the task. In summarizing actions from the Responsibility

Matrix, a given set of summary statements may be used to cover more than one event when the

events involved require the same or effectively the same type of actions. Also, where a given

action is found to be common procedure for a number of operational elements, regardless of the

specific contingency, that action may be included in a summary grouping of standard operating

procedures for presentation in each of the Procedures Summaries. Statements of standard

operating procedures may also reflect information of general interest to all operational

entities, for example, the assignment of overall control responsibilities.

Choice of the language used to prepare the Procedures Summaries should take into account

on-the-job terminology.

To facilitate operations, the licensee may wish to condense key portions of the Procedures

Summary to checklist formats according to stages of increased preparedness to respond. For

example, events deemed to require a comparable level of preparedness may be grouped under some

predetermined alert code, e.g., yellow alert for conditions that are not perceived as imminent

but that do require an enhanced state of readiness (some expressed threats, non-threatening

civil demonstrations, unresolved perimeter alarms, etc.). When the condition is evaluated and

deemed to require an enhanced state of readiness, the alert posture is increased to an appropriate higher level, e.g., orange or red. In effect, the events are grouped in alert

categories by their sensitivity and assessed immediacy. To achieve the assigned alert status,

checklists are used by each operational element as reminders to perform specifically assigned

duties.

5.55-7
SUPPLEMENT

A REPRESENTATIVE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN

FOR A FUEL CYCLE PLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Perceived Danger ........................................................... 5.55-9

1.2 Purpose of the Plan ........................................................ 5.55-9

1.3 Scope and Operational Concept of the Plan .................................. 5.55-9

1.3.1 Types of Contingencies and Responses Considered ..................... 5.55-9

1.3.2 Operational Concept in Response to an Adversary Incursion ........... 5.55-10

1.4 Definitions .................................. 5.55-10

CHAPTER 2 GENERIC PLANNING BASE .............................. 5.55-12

CHAPTER 3 LICENSEE PLANNING BASE

3.1 Licensee's Organization for Safeguards Contingency Response .5.55-13

3.2 Physical Layout .5.55-13

3.3 Law Enforcement Interface Assistance .5.55-13

3.4 Policy Constraints and Assumptions .5.55-14

3.5 Control and Communications .5.55-14

3.5.1 Transition Control Procedure .5.55-14

3.5.2 Primary and Alternate Locations .5.55-15

3.5.3 Site Radio Comm Net .5.55-15

3.5.4 Local Police Net .5.55-16

3.5.5 Silent Alarms and Intercoms .5.55-16

3.6 Safeguards Systems Hardware .5.55-17

3.7 Administrative and Logistical Planning .5.55-17

3.7.1 Radio Batteries .5.55-17

3.7.2 Arms and Ammunition .5.55-17

3.7.3 Emergency Services .5.55-17

CHAPTER 4 RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX ...................................................... 5.55-17

CHAPTER 5 PROCEDURES SUMMARY ......................................................... 5. 55-17

APPENDIX A - ALPHA SITE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS ......................................... 5.55-18

APPENDIX B - LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE .............................................. 5.55-20

APPENDIX C - EVENTS AND OBJECTIVES FOR CONTINGENCY RESPONSES .......................... 5.55-22

APPENDIX D - COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES ................................................ 5.55-32

APPENDIX E - RESPONSIPILITY MATRIX ....... . .......................................... 5.55-35

APPENDIX F - PROCELDJRP.S SUMMARY ...................................................... 5.55-80

5.55-8
1. BACKGROUND

1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER

For planning purposes, it is assumed that an adversary incursion against REP Plant could

occur at anytime, with little or no prior warning, to steal SNM or to commit industrial

sabotage or to seize and hold areas of the plant until stated demands are met. Also, as a hoax

or with serious intent, a potential adversary could threaten to steal SNM from or to sabotage

the plant.

Potential adversaries may be well-trained and dedicated external persons without employee

access to REP Plant protected areas or knowledgeable internal persons with the normal REP Plant

employee credentials. An external adversary may include one to a small group of armed or

unarmed individuals. If the adversary is armed, it is assumed the weapons types could vary

from hand guns to shotguns to mixtures of weapons such as automatic rifles and explosives.

Tactics employed could vary from those commonly used by criminal elements in armed robberies or

extortions to infantry squad-level tactics involving coordinated team movements and use of

weapons, as might be employed by well-trained terrorists. External adversaries might also be

assisted by an unarmed internal adversary acting in collusion.

Internal adversaries are assumed to include unarmed individuals who may be acting in

collusion. One of the individuals may have daily authorized access to VAs or the MAA. Attempts

at diversion or sabotage may be covertly executed over a period of time. However, one-time

attempts might also be undertaken, possibly in conspiracy with an external adversary. Acts of

guile and subterfuge may be expected to cover the internal adversary's actions. In general,

nonviolent methods may be employed, but unarmed assault upon REP Plant employees might also

occur in furtherance of the adversary's mission.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

This document presents the safeguards contingency plan of a Representative Plant located

on Alpha Site. The plan was prepared to guide and coordinate response actions by employees at

Alpha Site against perceived or actual threats or attempts to (1) steal special nuclear material

from the Representative Plant or (2) sabotage the plant's facilities.

1.3 SCOPE AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE PLAN

1.3.1 Types of Contingencies and Responses Considered

Responses to deal with and prevent successful execution of threats and attempts of theft

of SNM and industrial sabotage are covered in the plan. The plan also includes mechanisms

for initiating emergency plans to deal with radiological releases resulting from successful

sabotage attempts, but it does not include the emergency plan operations themselves.

5.55-9
1.3.2 Operational Concept in Response to an Adversary Incursion

The primary security mission at REP Plants is to protect the plant facilities at all

times, to prevent the theft or diversion of SNM, and to prevent the sabotage of plant equipment.

This mission is performed on a day-to-day basis by the security organization and facilities

such as the access and egress control system operating in conjunction with the physical barriers

and alarm systems that cover the protected area, the VAs, and the MAA.

To deal decisively with an adversary incursion against an REP Plant and thereby accomplish

the mission under these extraordinary circumstances, the LLEA emergency response force will be

requested immediately upon verification of such an incursion. While the LLEA response is

developing, the Alpha Site security force will respond to ascertain and assess the adversary

situation and, depending upon the perceived strength and nature of the incursion, to detain,

neutralize, or delay the adversary until the LLEA arrives.

The Alpha Site security force will endeavor to fulfill the above role by intercepting an

external adversary prior to penetration into Buildings 8, 10, or 7 (Figure 1). In the event

the external adversary penetrates any of these buildings, and in cases of internal adversaries,

the security force will attempt to intercept the adversary within the building or upon exit

from the building, again depending upon the adversary's nature and strength. Concurrent with

these actions, the security force will maintain a flow of situational information among

themselves and REP Plant management to coordinate the onsite response actions, and to the LLEA

response force to facilitate their effectiveness upon arrival.

As the situation develops, REP Plant security employees will assist in delaying the adversary

whenever possible without jeopardizing their personal safety. In this regard, they will lock

doors as necessary to secure the MAA and VA, deny information to the adversary, and report

adversary and situational circumstances to REP Plant MGMT to assist in illuminating the situation.

1.4 DEFINITIONS

Terms and expressions appearing throughout the plan are alphabetically listed and defined

below for ease of reference:

Term Definition

(A) Notation that indicates an action is always taken; the action

may be a hedge against uncertainty or necessary in light of

the situation.

(C) Notation that indicates an action may or may not be taken

depending upon obvious circumstances of the situation.

CAS Central Alarm Station, Building 10, at Representative Plant.

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation.

LEA Law Enforcement Agency.

5. 55-10
I-- ---- SAS I Site Security Office I /Bldg. 41

I FT1

I &\PSite MGMT I

I I Access Road

I rREP PLANT Bldg. 7

CAS, Bldg. 10

REP PLANT MGMT I REP PLANT ADMIN

REP PLANT MAA I

Bldg. 8

I I

I I

L - -Alpha Site Boundary j

FIGURE 1 REP PLANT AT ALPHA SITE

5. 55- 11
LLEA

Local Police Net

Local Law Enforcement Agency.

A mutual assistance police radio net operated by LLEA in the

general vicinity of Alpha Site; Alpha Site guard force can

enter/monitor this net.

MAA Material Access Area.

MCA Material Control and Accounting System.

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region _ , Office of

Inspection and Enforcement.

Off-Dy Guards

REP Plant

REP Plant ADMIN

REP Plant Bldg. 7

REP Plant MAA

REP Plant MGMT

RESPN Team

SAS

Site MGMT

SNM

Site Radio Comm Net

Guards of the two normally off-duty shifts of the guard force

at any given time.

Representative Plant at Alpha Site.

Representative Plant employee group in the Administrative

Area of Building 8, Alpha Site.

Representative Plant employees in Building 7 area, Alpha Site.

Representative Plant employees in the Material Access Area of

Building 8, 4lpha Site.

Senior onsite manager, REP Plant, with designated staff

assistants at any given time.

Alpha Site guards and volunteer employees who constitute an

armed security response team to assist in safeguard of REP

Plant facilities and materials in an emergency.

Secondary Alarm Station in Alpha Site Security Office,

Building 4.

The Alpha Site manager with designated staff assistants at

any given time.

Special Nuclear Material.

An operational radio net operated at Alpha Site by the site

guard force.

VA Vital Area.

2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE

Alpha Site Operational Elements indicated in Section 3.1 will respond as a team to events

that either suggest or reveal an adversary incursion against REP Plant. The types of events

experienced and the clarity of the situation at the time will depend on the nature of the

incursion, the state to which the situation has progressed, and the amount of interaction that

has occurred between the adversary and the operational elements. Therefore, the total response

over time is a dynamic process conditioned by the circumstances of the situation as it

progresses from start to finish.

For planning purposes, a set of 24 events has been selected to cover the range of events

that will trigger contingency response actions. For each of these events, an objective has

been selected that specifies the main purpose to be accomplished by the operational elements in

response to the particular event. In general tnere are two types of decision/action sequences

reflected in these objectives: (1) assessment decision/action sequences to determine the

5.55-12
situation and (2) preventive decision/action sequences against perceived attempts to steal or

sabotage.

Appendix C summarizes the events and the corresponding objectives and codes each combination for ease of reference.

3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE

3.1 LICENSEE'S ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE

The following operational elements are the organizational entities at Alpha Site adopted

for purposes of assigning and executing security response tasks and procedures identified in

this plan. Detailed composition of the operational elements is indicated in Appendix A.

Functional Category

Security Forces

Operational Elements

Management

REP Plant Operations

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

CAS

SAS

RESPN Team

Off-Dy Guards

Site MGMT

REP Plant MGMT

REP Plant ADMIN

REP Plant MAA

REP Plant Bldg 7

3.2 PHYSICAL LAYOUT

See Figure 1, Subsection 1.3.2.

3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE ASSISTANCE

The following police forces have agreed to respond to Alpha Site's request for emergency

law enforcement assistance to deal with adversaries who commit unlawful acts against Alpha Site

property and/or employees. Appendix B presents the police response capabilities and the procedure

for requesting emergency assistance.

Category

LLEA

Force

Red Town Police (Primary Contact)

White Town Police

Blue Town Police

County Iron County Police

State Steel State Police

In addition to the above area police, the local office of the FBI will provide FBI agents

to investigate and deal with Federal crimes committed against REP Plant and to assist the area

police as requested.

5. 55-13
3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The following company policy constraints and assumptions are reflected in this plan and

will influence the conduct of operational activities during execution:

a. REP Plant will depend upon local, county, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies

to the maximum extent possible to protect Plant properties against adversary incursions and to

recover stolen company property.

b. The employment of firearms against adversary incursions by Alpha Site employees will

be governed by Steel State law. In general, this law permits a private citizen to employ

firearms in those circumstances where the citizen has a reasonable belief that it is necessary

in self defense or in defense of others when there is an immediate threat of death or grievous

bodily injury.

c. Company operations to achieve contingency plan objectives will be conducted in a

manner that avoids personal injury to company employees and other innocent bystanders.

d. Needless destruction or damage to company property and to other private and public

properties will be avoided.

e. Excepting guards, no company employee can be directed to perform hazardous physical

security duties to protect REP Plant; however, company employees who volunteer may perform such

duties during emergency situations.

f. No company employee is expected to contribute his own personal property or off-duty

time to support active contingency plan operations.

3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Transition Control Procedure

a. REP Plant MGMT will direct the overall response actions of REP Plant in coordination

with the Alpha Site Security Supervisor, who will coordinate the overall response of the security

force.

b. Early security force response actions will be coordinated by the CAS if the response

is directed to the REP Plant protected area. The SAS will coordinate the early response if it

is directed to other Alpha Site locations.

c. During the early response period, the Security Supervisor will coordinate with the

CAS and SAS to assume overall control of the security force response as soon as practical

during the situation development.

d. Early offsite police response will be coordinated by Red Town Police. Initial contacts

with Red Town Police will be by the CAS, or alternatively by the RESPN Team or CAS in the event

such is necessary because of communications problems with the CAS.

5.55-14
e. Coordination with the local police response force onsite will be accomplished by way

of the Security Supervisor and the Red Town Police. The Red Town Police will continue to

coordinate the police response actions onsite.

3.5.2 Primary and Alternate Locations

a. REP Plant MGMT

Primary Locations:

Alternate Location:

REP Plant Administrative Area

Building 8

Telephone (400) 374-6300 Ext. 693

SAS, Site Security Office

Building 4

Telephone (400) 374-630)

Ext. 211 or Ext. 316

b. Alpha Site Security Supervisor

Primary Location:

Alternate Location:

SAS, Site Security Office

Building 4

Telephone (400) 374-6300

Ext. 211 or Ext. 316

CAS

Building 10

Telephone (400) 374-6300

Ext. 540

c. Police Coordination Point on Alpha Site

Primary Location:

Alternate Location:

SAS, Site Security Office

Building 4

Telephone (400) 374-6300

Ext. 211 or ext. 316

CAS

Building 10

Telephone (400) 374-6300

Ext. 540

d. Use of alternate locations in lieu of the primary locations will be reported to and

coordinated with the security supervisor.

3.5.3 Site Radio Comm Net

The Site Radio Comm Net comprises seven stations, six of which are portable. Call designations, initial location of equipment, number of channels, and uses of the stations are indicated

below. Unit 100 at the CAS is the base station for net control. Appendix D outlines communications procedures.

Station

Designation

Unit 100

(Nonportable)

Unit 200

(Portable)

Initial

Location

CAS

CAS

Number of

Channels

2

2

Uses

Channel 1: Net Base Station

2: Local Police Net

Channel 1: Patrols and RESPN Team

2: Local Police Net

5.55-15
Unit 300 CAS 2 Channel 1: Patrols and RESP Team

(Portable) 2: Local Police Net

Unit 400 CAS 2 Channel 1: Utility and Backup

(Portable) 2: Local Police Net

Unit 500 SAS 2 Channel 1: RESPN Team

(Portable) 2: Local Police Net

Unit 600 SAS 2 Channel 1: RESPN Team

(Portable) 2: Local Police Net

Unit 700 SAS 2 Channel 1: SAS

(Portable) 2: Local Police Net

3.5.4 Local Police Net

There are nine stations as indicated below in the local police net, with the net control

base station being operated at Blue Town. As indicated in paragraph 3.4.3 above, Channel 2 of

the Site Radio Comm Net links with the local police net. Primary points of contact for the

Alpha Site Security Force on entering the local police net using Channel 2 are Red Town Base

and Car #4. Appendix D outlines the procedure.

Station Designation Use

Blue Town Base Net Control Base Station and

Blue Town Control

Car #1 Blue Town Police Response

Car #2 Blue Town Police Response

Red Town Base Red Town Control

Car #3 Red Town Police Response

Car #4 Red Town Police Response

White Town Base White Town Control

Car #5 White Town Police Response

Car #6 White Town Police Response

3.5.5 Silent Alarms and Intercoms

a. Silent alarm from CAS to SAS will be used by CAS to initially request RESPN Team

response; followup communications will be via normal telephone channels.

b. Intercom within Building 8 will be used by REP Plant MGMT to alert and pass information to REP Plant ADMIN and REP Plant MAA elements. Normal telephone channels to Building 7

will be used in this regard for REP Plant Building 7 elements.

c. Intercom between CAS and Building 8 will be used for rapid communication of alert and

other information in addition to normal telephone channels.

5. 55-16
3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS HARDWARE

This paragraph not used.

3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL PLANNING

3.7.1 Radio Batteries

Portable radio batteries will be charged continuously when units are not in use. Spare

replacement batteries will be available at the CAS and SAS.

3.7.2 Arms and Ammunition

Extra ammunition for individual weapons will be available at the CAS and the SAS. Additionally, there are six 12-gauge shotguns with ammunition available, two at the CAS and four at

the SAS.

3.7.3 Emergency Services

The manager of health and safety services (Building 6, Telephone (400) 374-6300, Ext

740) will be prepared to furnish health physics, medical evacuation, firefighting, traffic

control, and other emergency services in accordance with standard site emergency procedures.

Site security forces will not be relied upon in effecting such preparations in order to ensure

their availability for conducting safeguards contingency operations.

4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Within the context of the general responsibilities assigned to each operating element, the

planning of detailed tasks to support the attainment of the contingency objectives (specified

in the Generic Planning Base, Appendix C) has been accomplished through use of the Responsibility Matrix in Appendix E.

5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY

To facilitate training and plan implementation, a Procedures Summary for each operating

element is contained in Appendix F. These procedures present the general responsibilities of

the operating elements, the applicable standard operating procedures, and summaries of the

contingency task sequences that are assigned to the elements in the Responsibility Matrix

(Appendix E). In the event security contingencies that are not reflected in the contingency

task sequences occur, operational elements will coordinate their response in accordance with

the general responsibilities and standard operating procedures indicated in the procedures

summary so as to accomplish the primary security mission (Subsection 1.3.2).

5.55-17
APPENDIX A

ALPHA SITE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

Alpha Site Operational Elements are manned normally as indicated below over a 24-hour

period. Guard personnel are assigned to shifts in rotation from the list of Enclosure 1.*

Enclosure 1 also lists telephone numbers and addresses to expedite off-duty contacts. Enclosure 2 specifies the "chain-alert" procedure for alerting key personnel in the REP Plant

security program who are off duty.

Operational

Element

1. CAS

2. SAS

3. RESPN Team

4. Off-Duty

Guards

1

First Shift

(8:00 am - 4:00 pm)

Security Supv.

Guard

*R. C. One

**J. J. Two

:*W. E. Three

Guard

Security Supv.

Guard

Guard

Guard

Security Supv.

Guard

Guard

Guard

W. L. Four

P. J. Seven

R. T. Eight

2

Second Shift

(4:00 pm - 12:00 pm)

Guard

Security Supv.

Guard

Guard

**R. C. One

**J. J. Two

**W. E. Three

Security Supv.

Guard

Security Supv.

Guard

Guard

Guard

C. C. Five

D. R. Nine

M. L. Ten

3

Third Shift

(12:00 pm - 8:00 am)

Guard

Security Supv.

Guard

Guard

**R. C. One

**J. J. Two

**W. E. Three

Security Supv.

Guard

Security Supv.

Guard

Guard

Guard

J. K. Six

B. W. Eleven

R. H. Twelve

5.

6.

7 .

Site MGMT

REP Plant

REP Plant

8. REP Plant MAA

9. REP Plant

Bldg. 7

Totals:

Guard Force

Volunteers

Management

Staff

10

3

3

10

3

3

10

3

3

Enclosures:

*1. Telephone and Address Roster

2. Off-Duty Alert Procedure

Omitted in this example.

RESPN Team volunteers from professional staff.

5.55-18
ENCLOSURE 2

APPENDIX A

ALERT PROCEDURE, KEY OFF-DUTY PERSONNEL

1. PURPOSE

The purpose

key personnel of

codes and a chain

of this alert procedure is to quickly and reliably pass alert information to

the REP Plant security program who are off duty. To accomplish this, alert

sequence for communicating the codes will be employed.

2. ALERT CODES

Code

GREEN

YELLOW

ORANGE

RED

Meaning

Return to normal state; no alert

Standby; be prepare to depart immediately

for Alpha Site to assist in dealing with an emergency situation.

Assemble immediately at Alpha Site Security

Office to assist in dealing with an emergency

situation; arms are not required.

Assemble immediately at Alpha Site to assist

in dea ing with an emergency situation; arms

are required.

3. CHAIN-ALERT PROCEDURE

To rapidly disseminate the above alert codes, alert groups are organized as indicated

below. The SAS will trigger the alert procedure for off-duty personnel by contacting the top

listed person in each of the off-duty groups, or alternatively the next lower person in the

group, and communicate to him the appropriate alert message code, e.g. , "This is the SAS;

ORANGE alert as of 10:30 p.m." The person contacted by the SAS in each group is responsible

for communicating the alert to others of that group and for starting his response to the substance of the alert message within 5 minutes after his receipt of the alert.

ALERT GROUP 1:

*R. C. One

*J. J. Two

*W. E. Three

*P. J. Seven

Security Supervisor

Guard

ALERT GROUP 2 (Those on Second Shift)

Off-Duty Phone

Security Supervisor

Guard

Guard_

Guard_

ALERT GROUP 3 (Those on Third Shift)

Security Supervisor

Guard

Guard_

Guard

Volunteers from professional staff.

5. 55-19
APPENDIX B

LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE

1. POLICE RESPONSE FORCES

a. Onsite Response

The following listed police capability is planned by the law enforcement agencies

indicated for immediate response to emergency requests for police assistance at Alpha Site.

The strength of the response will depend upon adversary strength and the circumstances of the

particular situation.

Force

Red Town Police

White Town Police

Blue Town Police

Iron County Police

Steel State Police

Strength

2 Officers within

5 minutes

4 Officers within

10 minutes

4 Officers within

15 minutes

4 Officers within

30 minutes

Equipment

Each equipped with pistol and shotgun, riot control and gas equipment,

radio, and police cruiser.

Equipped with pistols, shotguns,

and rifles, 2 police cruisers with

radios.

Equipped with pistols, automatic

rifles, 4 police cruisers with

radios.

b. Area Response

In addition to the above onsite response, county and State police are prepared to

cordon off the immediate and general area of Alpha Site if warranted by the situation by

establishing road blocks and traffic checkpoints as indicated on the enclosed* map. Times

required from receipt of request until establishment of the respective operations are indicated

below:

Operation

Road Blocks A,B,C

Road Block D

Traffic Check Points

1 through 7

Time to Set Up

10 to 15 Minutes

Within 10 Minutes

20 to 30 Minutes

Responsibility

Iron County Police

Iron County Police

Steel State Police

When the traffic checkpoint operations are executed, Steel State Police will place a

police helicopter (BAT-4) in operation over the general area of Alpha Site to assist in communications and in chase operations that might ensue. County and State police cruisers will monitor

Channel 3 for communications with BAT-4.

c. FBI Response

FBI agents from Purple City FBI Office will assist local, county, and State police

operations where possible and will investigate infractions of Federal law against Alpha Site.

Omitted in this example.

5.55-20
In general, special agents can be active at Alpha Site within 1 to 3 hours after notification

of the FBI. Special SWAT Team capabilities and negotiating skills are available with the FBI

response if needed.

2. ALPHA SITE INTERFACE WITH POLICE

a. Contact Points to Request Police Assistance

Red Town Police is the principle point of contact for Alpha Site to obtain and

coordinate with police response forces. Requests for police response can be made by telephone

or by radio to the following points of contact:

Telephone Red Town Chief of Police

Telephone_

Radio (Site Alpha Channel 2) Red Town Base

b. Information with Requests

When police response is requested, the following information should be provided to the

police to the extent that it is known in order that an appropriate response force can be assembled.

- Approximate number of adversaries.

- Adversary weapon types (i.e. , unarmed or armed with pistols, shotguns, rifles,

automatic weapons, etc.).

- Adversary mood (i.e., peaceful, violent).

- Adversary general activity (e.g., breaking into plant, demonstration, etc.).

c. Police Force Assembly and Response

Based on information furnished by Alpha Site, Red Town Police will request additional

police response assistance as needed to deal with the situation on Alpha Site. Police response

forces will assemble at Alpha Site without delay, obtain latest information on the situation,

and then move to deal with the adversary. Red Town Police will coordinate police response

actions onsite. Alpha Site Security Officer will serve as the principal point of contact for

coordination between Alpha Site Operational Elements and the police response force.

Requests for county and State police action to establish road blocks and traffic

checkpoints will be made through Red Town police as indicated above. Information to facilitate

identification of adversary, such as number and descriptions of persons and their transportation, license numbers, etc. , should be provided with such requests.

5.55-21
APPENDIX C

EVENTS AND OBJECTIVES FOR CONTINGENCY RESPONSES

ID

Code Events

P1 A threat to steal SNM from REP Plant or to

sabotage REP Plant is received via message or third party report.

P2 An accumulation of anomalies suggests someone

might be planning to steal SNM from REP Plant.

P3 An offsite civil disturbance is occurring that

could evolve into an attempt to penetrate REP

Plant or that could be a cover for such an attempt.

P4 REP Plant management perceives that P1 or P2

type of event is a serious threat to steal or

to sabotage at REP Plant.

P5 A duly constituted authority warns REP Plant

that an expressed or implied threat constitutes a serious threat to steal SNM or to sabotage at

REP Plant.

REP Plant Response Objectives

Determine if the threat as

perceived is serious.

Determine if the threat as perceived is serious.

Determine if the threat as

perceived is serious.

*Conditional Jumps if

Affirmative Negative

To P4 None

To P4 None

To P9 None

C,

LnU1,I

U.,

Prevent theft of SNM or sabotage

of vital equipment.

Prevent theft of SNM or sabotage

of vital equipment.

To P7, P8, P10,

P11, P12, P13,

P14, P15, P20,

P21

To P7, P8, P10,

P11, P12, P13,

P14, P15, P20,

or P21

None

None

P6 A duly constituted authority informs REP Plant

that a threat to use SNM has occurred that

warrants an item count inventory at REP Plant.

Determine if licensed SNM is,

missing from REP Plant.

To P23 None

P7 An indication suggesting a possible imminent or

in-process penetration of REP Plant is received

at the CAS.

Determine the perceived magnitude

of danger to REP Plant.

To P17, P18, or

P19

None

S

See Enclosure 1, Appendix C.
APPENDIX C (Continued)

ID

Code Events

P8 An indication suggesting a possible imminent or in-process penetration of REP Plant is perceived on Alpha Site by other than the CAS.

P9 A civil disturbance escalates in intensity or proximity and is perceived as a possible imminent

penetration of REP Plant.

REP Plant Response Objectives

Determine the perceived magnitude

of danger to REP Plant.

*Conditional Jumps if

Affirmative Negative

To P17 None

P10 An emergency evacuation of REP Plant occurs.

P11 Material control and accounting records are damaged, destroyed, altered, or missing.

P12 An intrusion alarm located at the MAA or a VA

annunciates, suggesting the possibility of SNM

In theft or sabotage in progress. e~n

enI

Determine the perceived magnitude

of danger to REP Plant.

Determine the perceived possibility of SNM theft or sabotage.

Determine the perceived

possibility of SNM theft.

Determine the perceived possibility of SNM theft or sabotage.

Determine the perceived

possibility of SNM theft.

Determine the perceived

possibility of SNM theft or sabotage.

Determine the perceived possibility of SNM theft or sabotage.

To P17

To P21 None

None

To P16

To P16 None

None

P13 The SNM detector or the metal detector in REP

Plant Administrative area annunciates, suggesting

the possibility that internal theft of SNM is in

progress.

P14 An event occurs which temporarily degrades certain

security safeguards and suggests that an opportunity

exists for an attempted theft or sabotage at REP

Plant.

P15 A personnel disturbance occurs at REP Plant

that might be a cover for an attempted theft or sabotage.

To P16 None

To P16 None

To P16 None

P16 REP Plant Management perceives a possibility of an internal theft or sabotage attempt.

Prevent theft of SNM or sabotage of

vital equipment.

To P24 or P22 None

See Enclosure 1, Appendix C.
APPENDIX C (Continued)

ID

Code Events

P17

P18

P19

A penetration of REP Plant is in progress or is

perceived as imminent.

REP Plant has been penetrated, and the plant is

held hostage.

REP Plant protection was overcome by an external

attack; the adversary penetrated into the plant

and then escaped.

REP Plant Response Objectives

Prevent theft of SNM or sabotage

of vital equipment.

Prevent theft of SNM or sabotage

of vital equipment.

Determine if SNM has been stolen

or radioactivity dispersed.

*Conditional Jumps if

Affirmative Negative

To P18 or P19

To P19 or P22

To P24 or P22

None

None

None

L,

L"

P20 Physical evidence at REP Plant suggests possibilities that a previously undetected intrusion and

theft of SNM has occurred.

P21 Material control and accounting system indicates

the possibility of theft of SNM.

P22 REP Plant has suffered sabotage resulting

in dispersal of radioactivity.

P23** REP Plant MGMT determines from the Material

Control and Accounting System that SNM is missing.

P24** REP Plant Management determines that SNM has

been stolen.

Determine if SNM has been stolen.

Determine if SNM has been stolen.

Restore protection to remaining SNM.

Submit required reports to NRC;

request recovery.

Submit required reports to NRC;

request recovery.

To P24

To P23 None

None

To P23 None

See Enclosure 1, Appendix C.

*"Not included in Responsibility Matrix; the Federal Government (FBI) is responsible

for investigations to recover SNM.
Enclosure 1

Appendix C

EVENT/OBJECTIVES INTERRELATIONSHIPS

( P7,8,10,11,12,13,14,15,20,21 94 Ye.ws An'empt

%--- Atep- ~ . I

5. 55-25
f N/ u/hty Pr- / [

) ceies 8 Threat

( P7,8,10,11,12.13,14.15JO21 -

Prevent

Theft or Sabotage

Yes , Any - No Attempt - 1 - +E N.- -

I

1s

5.55-26
[From: P31

5.55-27
5. 55-28
[From: P10, P12, P13, P14, P151

[From P7, P8, PS]

[From: P7, P17]

5. 55-29
[From: P7,P17,P181

[From: P111

[From: P16, P18, P191

5. 55-30
No Licensee

Objective

No Licensee

Objective

5. 55-31
APPENDIX D

COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES

1. PURPOSE

To outline procedures for use of radio equipment by the Alpha Site security force.

2. EQUIPMENT

Radio equipment for the security force includes one stationary and 6 portable transmitterreceiver units. Each unit can be operated on one of two possible channels by setting the

frequency selector switch to the Channel 1 or Channel 2 position. Channel uses are as follows:

Channel 1

Channel 2

- Site Radio Comm Net

- Local Police Net

3. SITE RADIO COMM NET

a. All units will operate normally in the Site Radio Comm Net - i.e., Channel 1 for

coordination and direction of Alpha Site security force operations. Station designations and

normal employment are as follows:

Station

Designation

Unit 100

(Nonportable)

Unit 200

(Portable)

Unit 300

(Portable)

Unit 400

(Portable)

Unit 500

(Portable)

Unit 600

(Portable)

Unit 700

(Portable)

Initial

Location

CAS

Employment

Site Radio Comm Net Base Station

CAS Patrols or RESPN Team

CAS Patrols or RESPN Team

CAS Utility and Backup

SAS RESPN Team

SAS RESPN Team

SAS

b. Communication Code Words:

ROGER

SAS

Meaning

I have received your transmission OK.

I have received your request, and I will comply

with the request.

I have finished transmitting and am awaiting

your reply.

WILCO

OVER

5. 55-32
OUT I have finished transmitting this message, and

the channel is now free for others to use.

REPEAT Repeat your transmission. I did not receive it.

REPEAT AFTER Repeat your transmission after the word

I did not receive it.

AFFIRMATIVE The answer to your question is yes.

NEGATIVE The answer to your question is no.

C. Net Call Sign: ALPHA 6

The net call sign will be used whenever a unit terminates his transmission with

"Out", thereby indicating that he has finished use of the Channel at that time, e.g.,

"This is ALPHA-6 Unit 400; wilco; out."

d. Base Station Control:

Unit 100 at CAS is the Net Base Station and must be aware of every unit that is

active in the net. Therefore, all units will report entry into and departure from the net to

the base station, e.g.,

Unit 300 reports entry:

Unit 300: "Unit 100, this is Unit 300; entering net; over."

Base: "This is ALPHA-6, Unit 100; Roger; out."

Unit 300 reports departure:

Unit 300: "Unit 100, this is Unit 300; am switching to Channel 2; over."

Base: "This is ALPHA-6, Unit 100; Roger; out."

e. Operating Constraints:

1. Units will not use the channel whenever it is being used by other units. Termination of a transmission with "over" indicates the channel is still in use and has not been

released for others to use. Termination of a transmission with "out" indicates the channel has

been released for others to use.

2. Units will minimize transmission time by shortening conversation exchanges and

keeping message content as short as possible consistent with clarity in meaning.

4. LOCAL POLICE NET

a. Site Radio Comm Net Units can enter the Local Police Net by switching to Channel 2 and

reporting entry to Blue Town Base Station, e.g.,

"Blue Town Base, this is ALPHA-6, Unit 600; entering Net; over."

When Blue Town Base acknowledges the entry, the ALPHA-6 Unit is recognized as active

in the net.

5.55-33
b.

unit that

c.

The "ALPHA-6 Unit " designation will always be used to identify an Alpha Site

is operating in the Local Police Net.

Local Police Net station designations and identities are as follows:

Station Designation Identification

Blue Town Base Net Control Station and Blue Town Police Control.

Car #1 Blue Town Police Response

Car #2

Red Town Base Red Town Police Control

Car #3 Red Town Police Response

Car #4

White Town Base White Town Police Control

Car #5 White Town Police Response

Car #6

d. Site Radio Comm Net units will report departure from the Local Police Net to Blue

Town Base.

5. TESTS AND MAINTENANCE

a. CAS and SAS will perform a communication check with both channels of each unit that

is not in use at least once per shift.

b. Portable units will be charged continuously when the units are not in use.

5.55-34
APPENDIX E

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

5.55-35
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P1-I

Vn U,

e-n

1 2 3 4 5 EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

THREAT TO STEAL SNM

FROM REP PLANT OR TO

SABOTAGE RECEIVED VIA

MESSAGE OR THIRD

PARTY REPORT

Objective < -General Task >

DETERMINE IF THREAT Report all threat information to REP P1ant MGMT

AS PERCEIVED IS and Alpha Site Se urity Officer without delay. (A) SERIOUS _- ... - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
An

U,

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P1-2 _ .

6 7 8 9 10 LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REPPLANTADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

DETERMINE IF THREAT

AS PRCEIED I Assist REP Plant's SERIOUS 

assessment of

threat as - Assemble available <--General Task information requested. (A) on

threat & adversary

(A)

- Report threat to Report al threat information t REP NRC; to company Plant MGMT and Alpha Site Secur ity headquarters; to Officer without delay. law enforcement

agencies as applica

ble;.request any _ ----------- pertinent information that might be

available. (A)

Analyze available

information to

assess threat. (A)

Decide if threat

should be considered

serious. (A)

If threat is

perceived serious,

go to Event P4. (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P2-1

cn

CI cof

1 2 3 4 5 EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

ACCUMULATION OF < -General Task

ANOMALIES SUGGESTS

SOMEONE MIGHT BE PLAN- Repo t any observed anomaliys and suspicions NING TO STEAL SNM rela ed thereto to REP Plan MGMT and Alpha FROM REP PLANT. Site Security Officer. (A)

Ob-ectiveDETERMINE IF THREAT

S PERCEIVED IS SERIOU
(A7

wI

'7

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX 2-2

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

ETERMINE IF THREAT

S PERCEIVED IS

ERIOUS. NA

< _ -General Task >

- Assemble available Rep rt any observed anomalies and suspicions information on related thereto to REP Pla t MGMT and Alpha reported anomalies Sit Security Officer. (A)

and the circumstances surrounding

their occurrence.

(A) __ --___ - ---_ _-- -- -- -- -- --_ - -

- Analyze the available information to assess the threat

that is inferred.

(A)

- Decide if the

inferred threat

should be considered serious. (A)

- If threat is

perceived serious,

o to Event P4.
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P3-i

1

CAS

2

SAS

3

RESPN TEAM

4

OFF-DY GUARDS S EVENT SITE MGMT

tt I I 4" 4"

AN OFFSITE CIVIL DISTURBANCE IS OCCURRING

THAT COULD EVOLVE INTO

AN ATTEMPT TO PENETRAT

REP PLANT OR THAT

COULD BE A COVER FOR

SUCH AN ATTEMPT.

Objective:

DETERMINE IF THREAT

AS PERCEIVED IS

SERIOUS.

I . .

-General Task | >

Inform REF

Security

civil disi

without d( _ - _- - -- -

Plant MGMT and Alpha

fficer about known off,

urbances and related ir

lay. (A)

- Monitor civil disturbance situation

via local police or

other offsite

sources; keep REP

Plant MGMT informed,

as appropriate. (A)

ite

ite

formation

U,

I.V

Cl

en

U,

- When directed by

Alpha Site Securit

Officer, move to

scene of disturbance; monitor and

report situation

to SAS. (A)

I ______________ J. I I
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P3-2

En

Cn

-I

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

DETERMINE IF THREAT

AS PERCEIVED IS

SERIOUS ---General Task

- As applicable, Inform R Plant MGMT and Alph Site Security inform Alpha Site Officer bout known offsite ci 1 disturbances

Security Officer of and relaed information withou delay. (A) civil disturbance

and related information. (C)

- Report circumstance As applicable, of disturbance to inform REP Plant NRC and to company about civil dis- headquarters as turbance and appropriate. (C) related information. (C)

- Monitor and assess circumstances of

disturbance. (A)

-.Decide if disturbance as perceived

should be considere

a serious threat.

(A)

- If threat is perceived serious, go

to Event P9.
Un

i.

UI

Un

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

1 2 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

REP PLANT MGMT PERCEIVES THAT EVENT P < -General Task > R P2 CONSTITUTES

SERIOUS THREAT TO Perform additional sec rity - Maintain on-call - Be prepared to proSTEAL SNM OR TO surveillance of REP Pl nt as alert status as vide emergency

SABOTAGE. directed by Alpha Site Security directed by SAS. supporting services

Officer or REP Plant M MT. (A) (A) when requested by

REP Plant MGMT. (A)

Objective:_ _____ _

PREVENT THEFT OF SNM

OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL

EQUIPMENT. - Brief On-Duty and Of -

Duty Guards about

threat. (A)

Reinforce REP Plant

Building 10 and guar

patrols as directed

by Alpha Site Security Officer or REP

Plant MGMT. (A)

Place Off-Duty Guard on

on-call alert as dir ted

by Alpha Site Securi

Officer or REP Plant

MGMT. (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P4-2

f I

6

REP PLANT MGMT

7

REP PLANT ADMIN

8

REP PLANT MAA

9

REP PLANT BLDG 7

10

LOCAL*COUNTY-STATE

LAW ENFORCEMENT

.... t + _ I . PREVENT THEFT OF SNM

OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL

EQUIPMENT < |--- Ceneral Tasks >

U1

nI

en

Report assessment o1

threat to NRC; to

company headquarter!

to Site MGMT. (A)

In coordination wit

company headquarter

and Site MGMT as appropriate, inform

local, county, and

State law enforceme

of threat, and

request assistance as applicable. (A)

Direct REP Plant an Alpha Site Security

Officer to increase

vigilance as appropriate to situation

(A)

Monitor on-going

threat situation an be prepared to take

further action as appropriate. (A)

(1)

(2)

Perform additional SE

veillance of REP Plar

by Alpha Site Securit

REP Plant MGMT. (A)

urity suras directed

Officer or

in securing

areas, and

J. (A)

Be prepared to

REP Plant MAM,

buildings when

assist

vital

alerte

-Be prepared to

respond to REP

Plant's request

for assistance.

(A)

t

I- ____________ J _____________ L

-
I -i.,.

I,

e,

U,

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

1 2 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

DULY CONSTITUTED < -General Task

AUTHORITY PERCEIVES

THAT AN EXPRESSED OR Perf rrn additional security surveillance -Maintain on-call - Be prepared to pro- INFERRED THREAT CON- of R P Plant as directed by Alpha Site alert status as vide emergency supSTITUTES A SERIOUS Secu ity Officer or REP Pla t MGMT. (A) directed by SAS. (A) porting services THREAT TO STEAL SNM when requested by FROM REP PLANT OR TO REP Plant MGMT. (A)

SABOTAGE REP PLANT.

Objective:

PREVENT THEFT OF SNM - Brief On-Duty and

OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL Off-Duty Guards

EQUIPMENT about threat. (A)

- Reinforce REP Plant

Building 10 and guar(

patrols as directed

by Alpha Site Security Officer or Rep

Plant MGMT. (A)

- Place Off-Duty Guard! on

on-call alert as

directed by Alpha

Site Security Officer

or REP Plant MGMT.

(A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Pr,-?

Cn

En

.0.I

nI

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

PREVENT THEFT OF SNM -General Tasks > OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL

EQUIPMENT. (1) Perf rm additional security surveillance - Be prepared to

of RP Plant as directed bv Alpha Site respond to REP

Security Officer or REP P1 nt MGMT. (A) Plant's request - Report assessment o for assistance. (A) threat to NRC; to (2) Be prepared to assist in s curing REP

company headquarter!; Plan MAA, vital areas, ani buildings

to Site MGMT. (A) when alerted. (A)

In coordination wit

company headquarter

and Site MGMT, as appropriate, inform

local, county, and

State law enforcement of threat, and

request assistance

as applicable. (A)

- Direct REP Plant an Alpha Site Security

Officer to increase

vigilance as appropriate to situation.

(A)

- Monitor on-going

threat situation an

be prepared to take

further action as

appropriate. (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX p6-1

cn

(n

U'

U'

12 3 4 5 EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

A DULY CONSTITUTED NA NA NA NA NA AUTHORITY PERCEIVES

THAT A THREAT TO USE

SNM WARRANTS AN ITEM

COUNT INVENTORY AT

EP PLANT.

Dbjective:

ETERMINE IF REP PLANT

LICENSED MATERIAL IS

HISSING.
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P6-2

J7910

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REPPLANTMAA REPPLANTBLDG7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

DETERMINE IF REP

PLANT LICENSED MATEUIAL IS MISSING.

- Direct conduct of

item count inventor)

(A)

- Report results of

inventory action

to NRC. (A)

Accomplis

in accord

cedure.

__ _ _______ ___

--General Task

h item count inventory

with REP Plant invent

(A)

...___________________

_- NA

of SNM

Dry pro-

__________-

U'

(A

L"

I4.1
P7-1 RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

EVENT 

II1 

CAS SAS 

2 J3 

RESPN TEAM OFF-DY 

4 

GUARDS j5SITE MGMT

-I I1

INUICATION OF IMMINENT OR ACTUAL PENETRATION

RECEIVED AT CENTRAL

ALARM STATION - e.g.:

- Intrusion Alarm(s)

annunciate.

- CAS guard observes.

- CAS guard hears

extraneous noise(s)

in exclusion area.

- Combination of abov

Objective:

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

MAGNITUDE OF DANGER.

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

MAGNITUDE OF DANGER NA NA

1-GeneralTask-4

I I -

Alph

el em

Comm

retu

Ln

c.n

co--

-Check false alarm

possibility with

CCTV if fence alarm

is involved; report

false alarms to SAS

(A)

-If an obvious false

alarm situation doe!

not exist, actuate

silent alarm to SAS

to summon assistance

of response team. (/

-Lock Building 10. (C

-Direct RESPN Team t

REP Plant security

sector of concern;

monitor situation;

receive reports. (A

Site Security Force 0

nts enter and monitor

Net from receipt of al n to normal duty state

- If silent alarm

annunciates or no false alarm is re- ported from CAS,

dispatch response

team to investigate

and report situatioi

(A)

CAS

(cont'd)

erational

ite Radio

rt until

(A)

- Move to scene as directed; observf

investigate situe

tion. (A)

I. - Report on-scene

situation over site radio commur ication net. (A)

Assess situation

and decide magnitud4

of danger. (A)

- If danger is

perceived, go to

Event P17. (A)

Continued

L ________________________ I. ___________________
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P7-2

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

NA NA NA NA NA

c.

cn

D1

(71

._ I. I_ . _
Ln

en

C0

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

12 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

INDICATION OF IMMINENT ETERMINE PERCEIVED NA NA

OR ACTUAL PENETRATION MAGNITUDE OF DANGER

PERCEIVED ON SITE

BEFORE CENTRAL ALARM

TATION - e.g.: < --- General Task

- Armed persons Alph Site Security Force O erational

reported on site. Elemeits enter and monitor Site Radio

Comm et from receipt of al rt until - Recognized criminals returi to normal duty state. (A) reported on site. - As applicable, As applicable, alert - Move to scene as

alert SAS. (C) CAS. (C) directed; observe/

)bjective: investigate - Lock Building 10. Dispatch response situation. (A)

DETERMINE PERCEIVED (A) team to investigate MAGNITUDE OF DANGER. and report situation. - Report on-scene

(A) situation over

site radio commuMonitor/assess situa- nication net. (A) tion; decide magnitude

of danger. (A)

If danger is perceived, go to Event

P17. (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P8-2

en

01

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

NA NA NA NA NA
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P9-1

!.

U, Lnl en

"II

1 2 3 4 5 EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

CIVIL DISTURBANCE ESCA ETERMINE PERCEIVED LATES IN INTENSITY OR AGNITUDE OF DANGER. PROXIMITY AND PERCEIVE

AS POSSIBLE IMMINENT < General Task > PENETRATION OF PLANT - e.g .: Alpha Sit Security Force Operati nal Elements

enter and onitor Site Radio Comn Net from - Labor strike violenc receipt o alert until return to ormal duty or vandalism. state. (P)

_-- L

- Mob violence or - As applicable, aler - As applicable, - Move to scene as vandalism. SAS. (C) alert CAS. (C) directed; observe/

investigate situati n. Developed via P3. -Lock Building 10. - Dispatch RESPN Team (A) (A) to investigate and

report situation. Report on-scene b ective: (A) situation over site

radio communication ETERMINE PERCEIVED Monitor/assess situa net. (A) MAGNITUDE OF DANGER. tion; decide magnitude of danger. (A)

If danger is per- ceived, go to

Event P17.
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Pq _2

6 7 8 9 10

6 7 8 9LOCAL-COUINTY-STATE

REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

- As applicable, direft NA NA NA NA

Security Officer to %

monitor and assess

offsite civil disturbance to determi e

magnitude of danger

to plant. (C)

(F,

L"

Ln
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX Pi 0-1

0n

n,

n"I U-i

1 2 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

EMERGENCY EVACUATION - General Task > - Be prepared to - Be prepared to pro- PLANT OCCURS, e.g.: assemble as vide emergency sup- Alpha Sit Security Force Opera onal Elements directed by Security porting services - Fire Alarm enter and monitor Site Radio Con Net from Officer (SAS). (A) when requested by receipt o alert until return t normal duty REP Plant MGMT and - Criticality Alarm state. (A) to execute site _- ------------------- emergency plans - Actuate silent ala - Deploy RESPN Team - Move to REP Plant when required. (A) Objective: to summon assistanc to observe exclusion area, observe excli- RESPN TEAM

of RESPN Team. (A) area and report sion area, and (cont'd)

DETERMINE PERCEIVED suspicious events monitor emergency

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT - Lock Building 10; and security exits until secure . - Survey the area an OR SABOTAGE. allow no one to pas breaches. (A) (A) recover and secure through to parking questionable items

lot unless authorizd- Assemble and post - Investigate observ d until appropriatel

by REP Plant MGMT. normally Off-Duty or reported suspi- relieved of them bt

(A) Guards to provide cious events. (A) REP Plant MGMT. (

additional securit. - Monitor exclusion as warranted by th- Take action to appie- area with CCTV. (A) situation. (C) hend any person wh

endeavors to hide - Report to REP Plan items, or to pass

MGMT and Security items to the outsi e Officer (SAS) any of perimeter fence

incidents of attemped (A)

hiding of items or

passage of items ou- - Monitor/report sit a- side of perimeter tion to CAS and Se ur- fence. (A) ity Officer (SAS). A)

- Direct RESPN Team

areas of suspicious

activity. (A)

Continued
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P10-2

e1

en

II CI

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

DETERMINE PERCEIVED eneral Tasks- > NA POSSIBILITY OF THEFT 

OR SABOTAGE. N (1) Report t REP Plant MGMT suspicious events and

security breaches, particularly regarding attempts

to hide tems or to pass items o the outside of - Monitor and assess the periteter fence. (A) ongoing situation; _ _ _-_-_-_ decide if circumstances of emergenc (2) Assist a sessment of situation aith regard to alarm could be security implications, in coordination with cover for an attemp REP Plan MGMT. (A)

at theft or sabotage

(A)

- If possible theft o SNM or sabotage is

perceived, go to

Event P16. (A)
al

en

I"I

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

1 2 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

MATERIAL CONTROL AND NA NA NA NA NA

ACCOUNTING RECORDS

DAMAGED/DESTROYED/

ALTERED/MISSING.

Objective:

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT.
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

6

REP PLANT MGMT

_ I -

7

REP PLANT ADMIN

8

REP PLANT MAA

9

REP PLANT BLDG 7

10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

LAW ENFORCEMENT

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT.

LA NOCMN

-- General Task | > NA - Report MCA record

situation to NRC.(A

Ln

VI'

I"I

(3

Assemble and assess

information on the

circumstances surroL

ing the damage or

destruction of the

MCA records. (A)

Reconstruct damaged

destroyed MCA reco

through use of company's *CA records

REP Plant records.

Direct inventory ac

as necessary to con

reconstructed REP P

records. (A)

Resolve differences

between inventory d

and record data;

decide if damage or

destruction situati

might be cover for

attempted theft.(A)

Assist cc

actions i

(A)

ndiduct of SNM audit and inventory accord with REP Plan[ procedures.

ion

irm

ant

I

-Report results of

assessment to NRC.(

- If possible theft ol

SNM is perceived, gC

to Event P21. (A)

-
en

t-l Ls

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

12-1

12 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

INTRUSION ALARM LOCATE < -- General Task NA NA

T A MAA OR VA ANNUNCIATES INDICATING Alpha Sit Security Force Operational Elements

POSSIBILITY OF SNM enter and onitor Site Radio Com Net from

THEFT OR SABOTAGE IN receipt o alert until return to normal duty

PROGRESS - e.g.: state. (A)

MAA or VA emergency _ _-- -- exit is opened with- Actuate silent alarm Dispatch RESPN Team - Move to scene as

out prior notifica- to summon assistanc to investigate and directed; observe/

tion that such openi of RESPN Team. (A) report situation investigate circumis properly author- (A) stances of alarm

ized. Lock Building 10; situation in coorallow no one to pas dination with REP

through to parking Plant. (A)

)bjective: lot unless cleared

by REP Plant MGMT. - Report on-scene

DETERMINE PERCEIVED (A) situation to CAS an

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT Security Officer

)R SABOTAGE. Monitor exclusion (SAS). (A)

area with CCTV. (A)

Lock doors and rese

Direct RESPN Team t alarm system in

area of suspicious coordination with

activity. (A) REP Plant. (A)

Report situation to

REP Plant Managemen

and Security Office

(SAS). (A)
D,

Ln

P12-2

6

REP PLANT MGMT

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT

OR SABOTAGE.

- Investigate circumstances of alarm

situation in coor- dination with RESPN

Team. (A)

- Assess situation;

decide if circumstances of event

indicate possible

attempted theft or sabotage. (A)

- If possible theft

of SNM or sabotage

is perceived, go to

Event P16. (A)

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

7 8 9

REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7

_eneal Task 

>

Assist REP Plant MGMT and RESPt Team

investigate alarm situation, as applicable.

(A)

---------------------- --------------- I

10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

LAW ENFORCEMENT

NA

I
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P13-1

U,

c-n

C0

12 3 4 5 EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

SNM DETECTOR OR METAL < -General Task NA NA DETECTOR AT ENTRANCE

TO MAA ANNUNCIATES, Alpha Sit Security Force Operat onal

INDICATING INTERNAL Elements nter and monitor Site adio

THEFT MAY BE IN Comm Net rom receipt of alert u til

PROGRESS. return to normal duty state. (A ...

bjective: Check false alarm - Dispatch RESPN Team - Move to scene as situation via inter to investigate and directed; observe/ DETERMINE PERCEIVED com to REP Plant report situation. investigate circum- POSSIBILITY OF THEFT. ADMIN. (A) (A) stances of alarm

situation in coordi - If no false alarm, nation with REP

actuate silent alar Plant. (A)

to summon assistanc

of RESPN Team. (A) - Report on-scene

situation to CAS - Lock Building 10; and Security Office

allow no one to pas (SAS). (A)

through to parking

lot unless cleared ty

REP Plant MGMT. (A)

Monitor exclusion

area with CCTV. (A)

Direct RESPN Team t area of suspicious

activity. (A)

Report situation to

REP Plant MGMT and

Security Officer

(SAS). (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P13-2

6 7 I 1

6 7 8 9LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADM IN REPPLANTMAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

. 1 8_ OA-OUTTT

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT.

- Investigate circumstances of alarm

situation in coordination with RESPN

Team. (A)

- Assess situation;

decide if circumstances of event

indicate attempted

theft. (A)

- If possible theft oi

SNM or sabotage is

perceived go to

Event P16. (A)

< _ -General Task - NA

Assist RI

investigi

cable. i

P Plant MGMT and RESPI

te alarm situation, a!

Team

appliLn

Ln

n

M

I L ______________
C." U,

Ia,

(TI

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P14-1

12 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

EVENT OCCURS THAT < General Task NA NA

TEMPORARILY DEGRADES

CERTAIN SAFEGUARDS AND Alpha Sit Security Force Operat onal Elements

SUGGESTS OPPORTUNITY enter and onitor Site Radio Com Net from

FOR ATTEMPTED THEFT OR receipt o alert until return to normal duty

SABOTAGE, e.g.: state. (P)

- Guard incapacitated As applicable, - As applicable, - Provide additional

report event to REP report event to REP security as directe - Communication Plant MGMT. (C) Plant MGMT. (C) by CAS and Security

disrupted Officer (SAS). (C)

- Alarm system deacti- Request RESPN Team - Dispatch RESPN Team

vated assistance if addi- to provide additional

tional security meas- security as applicable. - Power failure ures are warranted (C)

by the situation.

- LLEA route to site (C)

blocked

Dbjective:

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT

)R SABOTAGE.
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P14-2

1 * - - * - -- - . - -. r

6

REP PLANT MGMT

7

REP PLANT ADM IN

8

REP PLANT MAA

9

REP PLANT BLDG 7

10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

LAW ENFORCEMENT

I L

U'

L"

en

oW

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT

OR SABOTAGE.

- In coordination wit

Security Officer,

direct security

measures as warrant

by the situation.

(A)

- Initiate coordinati(

with local police a!

warranted by situation. (C)

- Assemble and assess information on circumstances of the

event; decide if ev indicates possible

attempt at theft or sabotage. (A)

- If possible theft o SNM or sabotage is

perceived, go to

Event P16. (A)

Assist a

of inter

priate. _ _ _ _ _ _--

sessment of situation

upted services and sei

C)

and restoration

urity, as appro-

< eneral Task

d

Coordinate with

Alpha Site to modify

plans for assistance, as appropriate. (C)

in

nt

I ____________ j ____________
enL"7

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

12 3 45

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

PERSONNEL DISTURBANCE - Request Security - Dispatch guard patro NA NA NA

OCCURS AT REP PLANT Officer to send as requested by REP

WHICH MIGHT BE COVER guard assistance Plant MGMT. (C)

TO ATTEMPT THEFT OR as directed by REP

SABOTAGE, e.g.: Plant MGMT. (C)

- Instigated fight. Request local polic - Request local police

assistance as assistance as direct d - Highly vocal and directed by REP by REP Plant MGMT.

irrational behavior. Plant MGMT. (C) (C)

bjective:

DETERMINE PERCEIVED

POSSIBILITY OF THEFT

OR SABOTAGE.
a,I

.I

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P 1 5 - 2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

DETERMINE PERCEIVED < -- General Task > - Be prepared to POSSIBILITY OF THEFT respond to Alpha OR SABOTAGE. Assist a sessment of situation and quieting Site's request

of distu bance, as appropriate. (C) for assistance. - Assess and deal wit] _ ---- _--__---_-----(A)

disturbance as appl -

cable; send for

guard assistance as required. (A)

- Direct CAS or SAS a

appropriate; call

local police if

warranted by

situation. (C)

- Assemble and assess

information on circumstances of

disturbance; decide

if disturbance is cover for attempt t

steal or sabotage.

(A)

- If possible theft o

SNM or sabotage is

perceived, go to

Event P16. (A)
F,

Ln

at

o'f

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX _P l 6 - 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1 2 3 4 5 EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

PERCEIVED POSSIBILITY - As applicable, - Alert CAS and REP - Provide security to NA - Be prepared to pro- OF INTERNAL THEFT OR actuate silent Plant, as appro- REP Plant as direct ed vide emergency sup- SABOTAGE, e.g.: alarm to summon priate. (A) by Security Officer porting services

assistance of RESPN SAS and CAS. (A) when requested by - Developed via PlO, Team. (A) - Call local police REP Plant MGMT and

P12, P13, P14, and as warranted by - Prevent unauthorized to execute site

P15 based on REP - As applicable, lock situation. (C) passage of SNM from emergency plans Plant MGMT decision. Building 10 and REP Plant. (A) when required. (A)

alert REP Plant - Brief and deploy

MGMT. (A) On-Duty Guard force - Monitor and report

Objective: as appropriate,. (C) situation to Secur- - Monitor and report ity Officer (SAS),

PREVENT THEFT OF SNM situation to REP - Monitor and report REP Plant, and CAS.

OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL Plant MGMT and SAS. situation to REP (A)

EQUIPMENT. (A) Plant MGMT and CAS.

(A) - Apprehend individuals - Prevent unauthorize attempting sabotage

passage of SNM from of REP Plant or REP Plant via Build unauthorized remova ing 10. (A) of SNM from REP

Plant. (A) - Call local police a

warranted by situation when directed

by REP Plant MGMT.

(C)
U' Ul

VI

P16-2

EVENT

PREVENT THEFT OF SNM

OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL

EQUIPMENT.

- Alert Alpha Site

Security Officer.(A

- Di-ect immediate

action to restore

safeguards and to secure REP Plant

exclusion area and

MAA. (A)

- Direct search of RE

Plant exclusion are and areas immediate

contiguous to exclu

sion area for

diverted SNM or for

sabotage evidence.

(A)

- Assess circumstance

of situation to hel

law enforcement aut

ities identify and

apprehend adversari

(A)

1

CAS

<I

2

SAS 3 4 RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS

> - Be prepared to

respond to Alpha d restoration Site's request for

Plant MGMT. (A) assistance. (A)

5 SITE MGMT

-4eneral Tasks -

(1) Assist as essment of situation a of safegu rds as directed by REPj

(2) Assist se

and for e Plant MGK

(3) Assist aci

directedI

irch of

fidence

. (A)

REP Plant area or diverted SNM

of sabotage as tirected by REP

REP PLANT MGMT

(Continued)

Direct the accompl

ment of inventory

actions as necessa to verify inventor

presence. (A)

As warranted,

report situation r- and status of SNM

and sabotage to

NRC. (A)

If sabotage

occurred, go to

Event P22. (A)

:omplishment of invento

y REP Plant MGMT. (A)

shRESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

'y actions as

Y

Continued L ____________ I- ___________ !. ____________ I ____________
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P17-1

EVENT2 1 3 1 4 5 EVENT CAS jSAS j R ESPN TEAM j OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

PLANT PENETRATION IN

PROGRESS OR PERCEIVED

AS IMMINENT.

-Developed via P7,

P8, P9.

Objective:

PREVENT THEFT OF SNM

OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL

EQUIPMENT.

As applicab'

SAS and REP

MGMT. (A)

Protect the

Enter local

le, warn

Plant

CAS. (A)

police

Ln

a,I

00

net; report situation; request police

assistance. (A)

Request police execute offsite road

block plans if

warranted by situation. (C)

Report police situation to REP Plant

MGMT and SAS. (A)

As possible, observ

and report adversary

strength, description, location, and

activity over site

radio communication

net and local police

net. (A)

- As applicable, warn

CAS and REP Plant

MGMT. (A)

- Accomplish CAS's

notification of

police if warranted

by situation. (A)

- As adversary situation permits, commit

RESPN Team to

apprehend adversary or delay adversary

until police

arrival. (A)

- Alert Site MGMT aboul

the situation. (A)

- If warranted by situi

tion, assemble and

brief Off-Duty Guard!

(C)

Observe and report

adversary strength,

description, location, activity over

site radio communication net. (A)

As directed by

Alpha Site Security

Officer, apprehend

adversary or delay

until police

arrival. (A)

When alerted by Alpha

Site Security Officer (SAS), assemble

at site as directed.

(A)

Be prepared to

accomplish guard

security functions

assigned by Security

Officer. (A)

Establish and maintain liaison with

REP Plant MGMT to

keep appraised of

the situation. (A)

Provide emergency

supporting services

and execute site

emergency plans as warranted by the

situation. (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P17-2

6

REP PLANT MGMT

PREVENT THEFT OF SNM

OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL

EQUIPMENT.

- Depending upon situ

tion direct evacua- tion by REP Plant

personnel from REP

Plant area, or assembly of personnel into central rooms of ADMIN area

(A)

- Monitor/assess on- going situation; in

coordination with

Alpha Site Security

Officer, direct

additional security measures as require

by situation. (A)

- Report situation to

NRC. (A)

I ,

7

REP PLANT ADMIN

8

REP PLANT MAA

9

REP PLANT BLDG 7

10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

LAW ENFORCEMENT

I I

I e n r l_ _ _ I _ _ _ _ _ _ I__ < eneral Tasks - I I

(1)

(2)

On alert immediately lock ala med doors

that migit happen to be open. 1(A)

Execute pvacuation or assembly

by REP Plant MGMT. (A) as directed

Ln

Un

U3

Request additional

police assistance as warranted by

situation. (A)

Assemble police forc

without delay at

Alpha Site. (A)

Obtain situation

information from

Alpha Site CAS, and

Security Officer.(A)

Establish offsite

road blocks of

principal routes

from Alpha Site as warranted by situation. (C)

Execute police plans

to apprehend adversaries. (A)

- If plant

* and held

to Event

is penetra

hostage, g

P18. (A)

ed

:ed - If plant is penetra

and the adversary

escapes, go to Even

P19. (A)

_ _I
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P18-1

VICn V}

U,

12 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

PLANT PENETRATED AND < Ge eral Tasks > HELD HOSTAGE. - Continue to protect - Assemble and brief - Provide emergency

CAS and keep Build- normally On-Duty (1) Accomplis and main- supporting services

-Developed via P17 ing 10 locked. (A) Guards as warranted tain depl yments as and execute site

by situation. (C) directed y Security emergency plans as - Monitor intercom to Officer a d SAS. (A) warranted by the

Objective: REP Plant ADMIN - In coordination with situation. (A) area and alarm sys- Alpha Site Security (2) Observe a d report REP

PREVENT THEFT OF SNM tem; report infor- Officer and police, Plant sit ation to - Be prepared to

OR SABOTAGE OF VITAL mation to Alpha deploy RESPN Team Security ffficer and SAS. accomplish REP Plan

EQUIPMENT. Site Security Offi- and normally Off- (A) MGMT actions in the cer (SAS). (A) Duty Guards to main- -- event REP Plant

tain all around MGMT is unavailable - Monitor local polic observation of REP due to hostage

net to keep apprais d Plant area and to situation. (A)

of on-going situa- isolate REP Plant

tion. (A) area from traffic

and unauthorized

personnel. (A)

- Monitor situation;

keep REP Plant MGMT,

site MGMT, and polic

informed as appropriate. (A)

- Keep deployed guard

force and CAS inform d

of police activities

and plans as necessa

for guard response a d

safety. (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX .P18-2

6 7 8 9 10 LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

I

lfnr-p- _ __... I

0n

Cn

II

MEVLuI IFLFi UF SNM

R SABOTAGE OF VITAL

QUIPMENT.

Monitor/report situa

tion to NRC and to

Alpha Site Security

Officer and police

authorities as appro

priate. (A)

Establish communications with adversary

and conduct negotiations until police

arrival. (A)

Arrange for personne

evacuation of REP

Plant as applicable.

(A)

As required by polic

sitgation, request

NRC arrange Federal

assistance from FBI

to negotiate plant's

release and adversar

surrender. (A)

Assist police and

FBI, as applicable,

negotiate with adver

sary. (A)

(1) Keep alarfed doors locked as applicable. (A)

(2) Evacuate tEP Plant employees REP Plant MGMT. (A)

asidirected by

(3) Communica e with adversary only by REP Pl nt MGMT. (A) as directed

< _eneral Tasks Execute police plans

to negotiate release

of plant and hostages and the surrender of the

adversary. (A)

Establish and maintain onsite and offsite road blocks and

other police deployments as required

to ensure capture of

adversary after

plant is released.

(A)

_____________ ___ ___t...____-_- ____---- - ._I...__- _- _- __- _- _ REP PLANT MGMT

(Cont'd)

- If adversary escape

go to Event P19.(A)

- If any sabotage, go to Event P22. (A)

.

Coniud1 L _________ L _________ L _________
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

PiQ-1

'I

CAS

2

SAS

3

RESPN TEAM

4

OFF-DY GUARDS

5

EVENT SITE MGMT

*1 t I t t

PLANT PROTECTION OVER-

,OME BY EXTERNAL

TTACK, ADVERSARY

'ENETRATION AND ESCAPE

1AS OCCURRED

-Developed via P17 or

P18.

)bjective:

)ETERMINE IF SNM HAS

3EEN STOLEN AND/OR

lADIOACTIVITY DISPERSE

< General Tasks >

L1n L'

U.,

Report to Alpha

Site Security Officer (SAS) observations of adversary

escape inclusive of:

(A)

(1) Transportation

description and

registration number,

(2) Strength and

description of

adversaries departing.

(3) Description of

containers, packages, items carried

during departure

from plant by

adversaries.

(4) Loadout of

adversaries and

cargo into transportation.

Accomplish and main.

tain REP Plant security deployments as

directed by Alpha

Site Security Officer (A)

- Report

damage

MGMT.

REP Plant

to REP Plant

(A)

Monitor and report

escape situation to

police as appropriate

(A)

(1) Report to

Security

observati

sary esca

of: (A)

(a) Trans

tion and

number.

Alpha Site

fficer (SAS)

ns of adverle inclusive

iortation descriplegistration

In coordination with

REP Plant MGMT,

deploy guard force tC

protect exclusion

area and to assist

radiological survey.

(A)

Assist REP Plant MGM'

conduct after-action

interviews of guard

force to determine

description of

adversary attack and

escape. (A)

- Provide emergency

supporting services

and execute site

emergency plans as

warranted by the

situation. (A)

(b) Stren! th and description

of advers ries departing.

(c) Descr

packages,

during de

by advers

ptlon of containers,

items carried

'arture from plant

ries.

(d) Loadoj t of adversaries,

and cargo into transportation.

(2) Accomplis

Plant sec

as direct

Security

and maintain REP

rity deployments

d by Alpha Site

ifficer. (A)

s .5.5- .5. 5 .5. _________________ 4.
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P19-2

Ue

01-A

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

DETERMINE BEEN STOLEN IF AND/OR SNM HAS < ___rieneral Tasks> Pursue and apprehend adversaries in coor- RADIOACTIVITY 

PERSED. 

DIS- (1) Observe a y REP Plant damage or likely dination with State radiologi al hazards caused by adversary and county police

-Moni tvr/report and report to REP Plant MGMT. A) authorities. (A)

Alpha 

escape 

Site 

situation 

Security 

to (2) Execute p rtinent radiological mergency Assist FBI investiOfficer and plans as irected by Manager RE Plant gation to recover police (A) any stolen SNM. (A) authorities; reques offsite apprehensio . (3) Secure MAk and VA in accord wit REP Plant (A) procedure (A)

Direct radiological (4) Report an( SNM theft by adversay to REP survey of REP Plant Plant MGM . (A) damage and execute

emergency plans as (5) Assist co duct of SNM inventory in accord appropriate. (A) with REP lant procedure. (A)

Coordinate with _ ___ _ _ --------------- Security Officer to

deploy guard force REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT MGMT for protection of (Cont'd) (Cont'd) uncovered REP Plant

exclusion area. (A) - Assemble and assess - If sabotage occurred, information to go to Event P22. Conduct inventory estimate quantity/ (A) and accounting of type SNM stolen

SNM. (A) and radioactivity

Conduct interviews dispersed. (A) of guards and REP - Report situation

Plant employees to and status of SNM determine If SNM and dispersal to

theft observed. (A) NRC. (A)

Continued > Continued
Ul

U'-

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P20-1.

12 3 45

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE - Report circum- - Provide additional - Provide additional NA NA

INDICATES POSSIBILI- stances of situa- guards to secure security to REP

TIES OF UNDETECTED tion to REP Plant REP Plant as war- Plant as directed

INTRUSION AND THEFT OF MGMT and Security ranted by situation. by CAS and Security

SNM, e.g., Officer (SAS) as (A) Officer (SAS). (A)

applicable. (C)

- Hole in fence.

- Request SAS provide

- Vault door found additional guard

unlocked. assistance as

needed to restore

- Unexplained debris REP Plant security.

or artifacts in (A)

vault.

- Missing item(s).

Objective:

DETERMINE IF SNM HAS

BEEN STOLEN.
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P20-2

6

REP PLANT MGMT

-I.

7

REP PLANT ADMIN

8

REP PLANT MAA

9

REP PLANT BLDG 7

10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

LAW ENFORCEMENT

NA

DETERMINE IF SNM HAS

BEEN STOLEN.

- Direct immediate

action to restore

< --- + -- _eneral Tasks | - - >

(1)

(2)

Secure R P Plant area and SNM, 1s appro- priate. I(A) l

F,

U,

C."

'.41

_,

compromised safeguards and to secur REP Plant exclusion area and MAA. (A)

- Direct conduct of

SNM inventory to ascertain quantity

and type losses,

if any. (A)

- Assess circumstance

and contributing

factors of incident

and take necessary

corrective actions.

(A)

- Report incident and

SNM status to NRC, as appropriate. (C)

Assist in conducting SNM inven try in

with REP Plant procedure. (A) t

(3) Assess ci

factors c

recommend

rective _ - _--- -

rcumstances and contri

f incident as appropri or accomplish necess ctions. (A)

_ _ _--

buting

ate;

ry coraccordance

£ _________________________________________ t______________________________________ r __________________________________________
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

F'21 -1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1 2 3 4 5

EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

. I

MATERIAL CONTROL AND NA NA NA NA NA

ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

INDICATES POSSIBLE

THEFT OF SNM, e.g.,

- MCA records differ

from company records

- Excessive MUF

- Missing item(s)

- Developed via Pll

Objective:

DETERMINE IF SNM HAS

BEEN STOLEN.

ii I _ _ _ __ _ _ _
I.1

-.4

n.

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE

REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

DETERMINE IF SNM HAS < -General Task- > NA

BEEN STOLEN.

Assist ccnduct of SNM audit an inventory - Direct audit of REP actions in accord with REP Plant procedures.

Plant records and (A)

crosscheck with _- - - - - - - - - - company records. (A

- Direct reinventory

action as necessary

for locating possible erroneous data

from previous

inventory actions.

(A)

- Report estimated

quantity and type

SNM missing in

accord with NRC

procedure. (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX P22-1

en(.

en

co

12 3 4 5 EVENT CAS SAS RESPN TEAM OFF-DY GUARDS SITE MGMT

PLANT HAS SUFFERED - Report to REP Plant - Coordinate with CAS - Obtain location of - Assemble as directed - Provide emergency SABOTAGE RESULTING IN MGMT and Security and REP Plant MGMT t radiological hazard by Security Officer. supporting services

DISPERSAL OF RADIO- Officer observa- obtain location of areas from SAS or (A) and execute site

ACTIVITY, e.g., tions of: (A) radiological hazard CAS. (A) emergency plans as areas; keep guard - Provide REP Plant warranted by situa- - Developed via P18, (1) Extent of dam- force informed. (A) - Proceed to REP security for exclu- tion. (A)

age to REP Plant Plant; inspect sion area as directs - Sabotage event facilities. - Dispatch RESPN Team perimeter fences by Security Officer. occurs without to inspect REP Plant and buildings for (SAS). (A)

external attack. (2) Physical secur- perimeter fences and damage, avoiding

ity deficiencies in building damage. (A) radiological hazard;.

fences, buildings, (A)

Objective: and alarm systems. - Assess REP Plant

damage, physical - Report REP Plant

RESTORE PROTECTION TO - In coordination security deficien- damage and physical

REMAINING MATERIAL. with REP Plant MGMT cies, and radiologi- security deficienand Security Offi- cal hazard informa- cies to Security

cer, obtain loca- tion to determine Officer. (A)

tion of radiological suitable deployment

hazard areas and of guards. (A) - Provide security fo

keep guard force REP Plant exclusion

informed of these - Report REP Plant dam area as directed by

areas, as appli- age and physical Security Officer

cable. (A) security deficien- (SAS). (A)

cies to REP Plant

MGMT. (A)

- Assemble normally Of

Duty Guards, as required to augment

On-Duty Guards. (A)

- Deploy guards to

secure REP Plant

exclusion area. (A)
RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

P22-2

Ul

cun

II

to0

6 7 8 9 10

LOCAL-COUNTY-STATE REP PLANT MGMT REP PLANT ADMIN REP PLANT MAA REP PLANT BLDG 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT

RESTORE PROTECTION TO < - General Tasks- > Be prepared to REMAINING MATERIAL. respond to Alpha

(1) Execute Pertinent radiological safety Site's request for Direct execution of emergence plans. (A) law enforcement pertinent radiologi assistance. (A) cal safety emergenc (2) Report biilding damage and phy ical

plans. (A) security deficiencies to REP P ant MGMT

in accor with procedure. (A) -As applicable, dire t

guard force and REP (3) Post wat hman as required to socure MAA

Plant to secure the and vita areas. (A)

plant and SNM. (A)

(4) Coordina e with Security Offic r to

Assemble/assess REP obtain d sired guard support i accord

Plant damage, phys- with REP Plant procedure.

ical security _-- deficiencies, radio

logical hazard

information. (A)

Establish prioritie

for repair of REP

Plant damage and

physical security

deficiencies. (A)

- Arrange for emergency site services

and other services

as required to

restore REP Plant

physical security.

(A)

- Report situation to

NRC. (A) _ _
Appendix F

PROCEDURES SUMMARY

This approach provides a ready reference to specific task sequences for each operating

element of the contingency plan. This summary of procedures, responsibilities, and task

sequences are given in the nine enclosures as listed below:

Enclosure 1. Security Officer's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 2. CAS's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 3. SAS's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 4. RESPN Team's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 5. Off-Duty Guards; Procedures Summary

Enclosure 6. Site Management's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 7. REP Plant MGMT's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 8. ADMIN, MAA BLDG 7 Personnel's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 9. LEA's Procedure's Summary

5.55-80
Enclosure 1

Appendix F

SECURITY OFFICER'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the Security Officer. The context and background perspective of these

duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. SECURITY OFFICER'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Plans, directs, and coordinates the overall task organization, disposition, movements,

and response operations of the site security force, i.e., the CAS, SAS, RESPN Team, and Off-Dy

Guards.

b. Coordinates with REP Plant MGMT and Site MGM7 as necessary to enhance security operational readiness and to effectively execute security response operations.

c. Requests LEA assistance and coordinates with LEA providing response assistance as neces-

'2I to effectively plan and execute security response operations.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel ir coordinan with the Security Officer.

b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security

force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency

situation.

c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's

protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations

other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will be

accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red

Town Police coordinate overall police response operations.

5.55-81
f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station

for control of the net.

g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net

from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert.

h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to

each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms,

messenger, voice.

i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination

by observing and reporting on:

Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities.

Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation.

j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically

authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever:

An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.

A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known

criminals on site; threatening civil disturbances exist; etc.

An emergency evacuation of plant exists; or a perceived possibility of an

internal theft attempt exists.

An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists.

4. SECURITY OFFICER'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER:

Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,

Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or because of observed anomalies

or other suspicious situations at the plant, or

Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT or other authority,

THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL:

a. Keep the REP Plant MGMT informed of the threat and all available information concerning

the threat.

5.55-82
b. Perform onsite investigative effort as indicated by the situation and make offsite

queries as requested by REP Plant MGMT to assemble additional information on the threat situation.

c. Dispatch RESPN Team observers to scene of civil disturbances or other suspicious

activity allegedly threatening the plant to monitor and report information on the seriousness of

the perceived threat.

d. Advise and assist REP Plant MGMT in assessing the seriousness of the threat.

e. If threat is perceived serious by REP Plant MGMT or is reported to be serious by other

duly constituted authority, coordinate with REP Plant MGMT and Site MGMT to implement increased

security readiness measures appropriate to the perceived threat, e.g.,

* Increase on-duty guard strength, and issue necessary arms and communication

equipment.

* Increase number and frequency of security patrols and checks.

* Alert LEA response forces as to the seriousness of the perceived threat.

* Increase frequency of queries to pertinent LEA or other pertinent agencies

for threat status and early warning information and for continued threat

assessment.

* Place Off-Duty Guards on standby alert.

* Review alert procedures and emphasize operational tactics as applicable to

the situation.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER:

Receives a report from the CAS or SAS, or otherwise learns of a serious imminent or

on-going attempt by an adversary to penetrate the plant, or

Learns that an on-going civil disturbance or other suspicious activity is believed to

be a serious imminent threat to penetrate the plant,

THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL:

a. Monitor, assemble, and assess information on the adversary situation and the site

security force situation as necessary to adjust, coordinate, and direct the on-going security

force response operations to stop or effectively delay the adversary.

b. Ensure that LEA assistance is requested and that responding LEA are kept informed of

the adversary and security force situation, and recommend avenues of aDDroach to the LEA for

their initial contact with the adversary.

5.55-83
c. Ensure that Off-Duty Guards are alerted, marshalled, and deployed as appropriate to the

situation.

d. Establish a joint coordination point on site with the response LEA to enhance communication and to achieve close coordination of security force activity with the LEA response actions.

e. Ensure that REP Plant MGMT is kept informed of the adversary and response force situations and recommend dispositions and activity for REP Plant personnel appropriate to the

situation.

f. If the plant is seized and held hostage,

* Assist REP Plant MGMT, Site MGMT, and LEA (as indicated by the situation) to

establish communications with the adversary for negotiations.

* Recommend LEA dispositions and activity (e.g., road blocks, involvement of

other LEA, chase helicopter capability) to prevent adversary escape with SNM

and to isolate the plant area.

* Dispose the security force to support LEA on site dispositions and activity

and to observe and report on the adversary situation.

* Recommend to the LEA and to REP Plant MGMT the FBI assistance that should be

requested, e.g.,

- Federal expertise in adversary negotiations,

- SWAT team capability,

- Federal investigative activity regarding adversary ID and background.

g. If adversary penetrates and escapes from the plant,

Ensure that LEA response is immediately informed of the adversary escape

situation, i.e.,

- Egress route and last seen direction of movement,

- Transport description and license number,

- Number of persons involved and description(s),

- Articles carried and their location in the transport.

5. 55-34
* Request LEA to execute road blocks and hot pursuit operations to apprehend the

adversary for recovery of any SNM in his possession.

* Coordinate with REP Plant MGMT to assist him (guard interviews, reports, etc.) in

determining if SNM has been stolen or if radioactivity has been dispersed.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SECURITY OFFICER:

Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, e.g.,

- Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal alarms annunciate,

- An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance (fight, irrational behavior, etc.)

occurs in the plant, or

- An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading

incident occurs,

THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL:

a. Coordinate with the CAS, SAS, and RESPN Team to determine the circumstances of the

incident and the status and activity of the RESPN Team deployment if any.

b. Coordinate with REP Plant MGMT to assist him in assessing the situation and to determine internal security implications and needs.

c. Ensure that the RESPN Team and other security elements deployed (including Off-Duty

Guards) are adequate to control the situation and to provide required security surveillance of

the protected area, as indicated by the situation.

d. Monitor the situation; report to REP Plant MGMT the circumstances of attempted hiding

or removal of items from the protected area or of suspicious attempts to exist from the protected area.

e. Ensure that LEA assistance, as determined in consultation with REP Plant MGMT, is

requested to deal with perceived adversaries or other persons involved in the situation.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE SECURITY OFFICER:

Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected

intrusion of the plant might have occurred, e.g.,

- Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof,

- Damaged plant doors or windows,
Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive contamination external to plant,

THE SECURITY OFFICER WILL:

a. Assemble information on the location and nature of plant damage and assess the security

requirements stemming from such damage.

b. Coordinate as required to keep REP Plant MGMT informed of the plant damage and security

requirements and to determine the location and extent of existing radiological hazards and

restrictions.

c. Organize and dispose the security force as necessary to restore or cover degraded plant

security protective features and to assist in isolating areas of radiological hazard.

d. Keep security force informed of existing radiological hazards and restrictions.

e. Recommend to REP Plant MGMT temporary repairs and the priority of permanent repairs to

restore the effectiveness of damaged plant security protective features.

5.5S-86
Enclosure 2

Appendix F

CAS'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the CAS. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. CAS'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

CAS will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with SAS and PLP

Plant MGMT. SAS will keep the Site Security Officer informed of CAS actions as appropriate to

the situation.

a. Summon and direct RESPN Team immediately upon sensing the possibility of an adversary

incursion in order to assess and deal with the situation.

b. Summon police response force to deal with the adversary immediately upon becoming aware

of an actual incursion.

c. Block unauthorized passage via Building 10 to prevent escape with SNM.

d. Prevent adversary penetration of Building 10 to protect the surveillance, communications,

and alarm systems.

e. Monitor the alarm system, the intercom, the CCTV, and the radio nets to be continually

appraised of the situation and to acquire and report information on the adversary and the adversary situation.

f. Report to SAS and REP Plant MGMT observed damage or breaches of plant physical security

and recommend actions to provide interim security as needed.

g. Acquire information on radiological hazard areas, as applicable, from the Security

Officer and REP Plant MGMT and keep guard force informed as to the location of such areas.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.

5.55-87
b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security

force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency

situation.

c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's

protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations

other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will be

accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red

Town Police coordinate overall-police response operations.

f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station

for control of the net.

9. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net

from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert.

h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each

other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger,

voice.

i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination

by observing and reporting on:

Adversary strength, descriptions, dispositions, and activities.

Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation.

j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically

authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever:

An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists,

A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known

criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances, etc.,

An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal

theft attempt exists,

An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists.

5.55-88
4. CAS'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:

* Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,

* Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or because of observed anomalies

or other suspicious situations,

* Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT or other authority,

THE CAS WILL:

a. Report all information about the perceived threat without delay to the Security

Officer (SAS).

b. Perform additional security surveillance at CAS as directed by the Security Officer

(SAS).

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:

* Receives an indication of a possible plant penetration such as:

- Annunciation of an intrusion alarm,

- Extraneous noises occurring in the exclusion area,

- Suspicious acts observed in or near the exclusion area, or

- Security Officer (SAS) or RESPN Team warning of a dangerous onsite situation,

THE CAS WILL:

a. Check false alarm possibilities with the CCTV.

b. If false alarm is not obvious, summon assistance of the RESPN Team by actuating the

"silent" alarm.

c. Direct the RESPN Team to the plant security sector of concern; monitor the situation

and receive RESPN Team reports over the Site Radio Comm Net.

d. Assess the situation to determine if danger of plant penetration exists.

5.55-89
e. If danger does exist, protect the CAS against adversary penetration.

f. Warn REP Plant MGMT of danger over the intercom system.

g. Enter Local Police Net; report situation (adversary strength, weapons, mood, and

activity); request police response force assistance.

h. Monitor adversary situation and police response force developments over the site and

police nets; keep Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT informed.

i. If plant is penetrated, monitor intercom and the plant alarm systems to acquire and

report information on adversary activity within the plant.

j. If adversary escapes from plant, request the police to establish offsite road blocks

and check points and to execute chase plans as warranted by situation.

k. Report observations of adversary escape to the Security Officer, including:

- Egress route and last seen direction.

- Transport description and license number.

- Number of persons involved and descriptions.

- Description of articles carried by adversary on departure.

- Location of adversary and cargo in the transport.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:

Receives an indication of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the

plant, such as:

- An internal alarm or an emergency door alarm of the MAA or a VA annunciates,

- The SNM or metal detector at entrance to the MAA annunciates,

- An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance (fight, irrational behavior,

etc.) occurs in the plant, or

- An unexpected power or communication outage occurs,

THE CAS WILL:

a. Check false alarm possibilities, as applicable, via telephone or intercom to plant.

5.55-90
b. If false alarm is not obvious, summon assistance of the RESPN Team by actuating the

"silent" alarm.

c. Prevent unauthorized passage of SNM from the plant via Building 10.

d. Direct RESPN Team to the assistance of REP Plant MGMT or to general surveillance of

plant's exterior and protected area, as warranted by the situation.

e. Observe exclusion area with CCTV and alert RESPN Team regarding location and nature

of suspicious activity, such as:

- Attempted movement by persons from the protected area to the outside or

- Attempted hiding of items or passage of items to outside of perimeter fence.

f. Monitor and report situation to Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT; recommend

additional security precautions as appropriate.

g. When authorized by the Security Officer (SAS) or REP Plant MGMT, enter Local Police

Net; report nature of situation and request pcice assistance at plant.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CAS:

* Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected

intrusion of the plant might have occurred, such as:

- A hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof

- Damaged plant doors or windows,

* Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive contamination external to plant,

THE CAS WILL:

a. Report location and nature of the damage or physical evidence to the Security Officer

(SAS) and REP Plant MGMT and recommend additional security measures as appropriate.

b. Obtain locations of radiological hazard areas from Security Officer (SAS) or REP Plant

MGMT and keep security force elements informed of such areas as applicable.

5.55-91
Enclosure 3

Appendix F

SAS'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1.0 PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the SAS. The context and background perspective of these duties are

presented in the basic plan.

2.0 SAS'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The SAS will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with CAS and

REP Plant MGMT. SAS will keep the Site Security Officer informed of CAS and SAS actions as

appropriate to the situation.

a. Monitor the on-going situation and be prepared to assume responsibilities of CAS as

indicated by the situation.

b. Alert and commit RESPN Team, as indicated by the situation, to reinforce CAS or REP

Plant security, to monitor or assess onsite security incidents, or to deal with an adversary

incursion until effective police arrival.

c. Summon and brief LEA response force to deal with adversary incursions against REP Plant

or potential adversaries that are onsite.

d. Alert, assemble, and commit Off-Duty Guards as indicated by the situation to reinforce

CAS or REP Plant security.

e. Prevent adversary penetration of SAS area to protect surveillance, communications,

and alarm systems.

f. Maintain liaison with local police and other security forces, as indicated by the

situation, to monitor and assess offsite civil disturbances or other suspicious activity and

to obtain early warning of possible incursions against REP Plant.

3.0 STANDARD PROCEDURES

a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.

5.55-92
b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of

security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of

a contingency situation.

c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's

protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

d. The SAS coordinates initial security force repsonse actions directed at site locations

other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

e. Coordination of Security Force Operations with LEA response force operations will be

accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red

Town Police coordinate overall LEA response operations.

f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net.

g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net

from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert.

h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each

other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger,

voice.

i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination

by observing and reporting on:

* Adversary strength, description, disposition, and activities.

Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation.

j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically

authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever:

* An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.

A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known

criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc.

An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal

theft attempt exists.

An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists.

5.55-93
4.0 SAS'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SAS:

* Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,

* Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or because of observed anomalies

or other suspicious situations, or

* Is informed that a serious threat exists by REP Plant MGMT or other authority,

THE SAS WILL:

a. Report all information about the perceived threat without delay to the Security Officer

and keep REP Plant MGMT informed as applicable.

b. Contact local police and other sources as necessary to monitor the status of civil

disturbances and pertinent offsite suspicious activity of concern to REP Plant security.

c. Implement additional security surveillance of REP Plant and CAS as directed by the

Security Officer, e.g.,

* Brief On-Duty and Off-Duty Guards and RESPN Team elements concerning the threat

and readiness preparations,

* Place Off-Duty Guard on standby alert, and

* Reinforce the CAS, the RESPN Team, and the patrol security of REP Plant.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SAS:

Receives an indication of a possible plant penetration, such as:

- Annunciation of the silent alarm from the CAS, or otherwise reported by the CAS,

- Annunciation of plant alarms without followup information from the CAS,

- Suspicious acts or noises reported in or near the plant or on site, or

- Civil disturbance or other suspicious situation on site, or being directed at the

site.

THE SAS WILL:

a. Marshall and dispatch the RESPN Team to investigate and report on the situation.

5.55-94
b. As applicable, alert the CAS and the Security Officer about the situation and keep

them informed of investigative results.

c. Monitor and assess the situation to determine if there is danger of an attempted plant

penetration.

d. If an attempted plant penetration is perceived or appears to be imminent,

* Commit the RESPN Team to stop or to delay the adversary, depending upon the relative situation of the adversary and the RESPN Team.

* Request assistance of the LEA response force if it has not been requested already

by the CAS or if the perceived adversary is still off site or is on site but not

yet at the plant's exclusion area.

* During its deployment to the site, keep the LEA response force informed of the

site security and adversary situations and other information as directed by the

Security Officer.

* Alert, marshall, brief, and assist in the deployment of the Off-Duty Guards as

directed by the Security Officer.

* Alert and keep Site MGMT informed of the situation.

Prevent penetration of the SAS by the adversary.

e. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary, monitor the situation and:

Brief and deploy the RESPN Team and the marshalled Off-Duty Guards as directed by

the Security Officer to assist onsite LEA maintain surveillance of the plant's

protected area and isolation of the plant from unauthorized traffic and persons.

Keep the Security Force, REP Plant MGMT, and Site MGMT informed of the situation

to enhance effective coordination of the activities supporting negotiation efforts

and preventing adversary escape with SNM.

f. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes,

Immediately report information on the escape situation to the LEA, i.e.,

- Egress route and last seen direction of movement,

- Transport description and license number(s),

5.55-95
- Number of persons involved and descriptions,

- Description of articles carried by adversary on departure, and

- Location of adversary and cargo in the transport.

* Request the LEA to execute road blocks and hot pursuit operations to apprehend the

adversary for recovery of any missing SNM.

g. Assist in conducting after-action interviews of the Security Force as directed by the

Security Officer.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THE SAS:

Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, e.g.,

- Attempt is reported from CAS, REP Plant MGMT, or the Security Officer,

- Intrusion alarm, door alarm, or MAA portal alarm annunciates,

- An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance (fight, irrational behavior,

etc.) occurs in the plant, or

- An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading

incident occurs,

THE SAS WILL:

a. Alert and dispatch RESPN Team if warranted by the situation to:

* Investigate and report on alarm situations and take action as required to prevent

an internal adversary's (1) escape with SNM or (2) sabotage of the plant.

* Observe evacuations of the plant buildings for any suspicious activity (e.g,,

obvious security breaches, attempted hiding or passage of items in the protected

area, attempted exit via protective fences, etc.) and report and investigate any

such activity.

b. Dispatch guard assistance when requested by REP Plant MGMT to assist in dealing with

internal disturbances.

c. Marshall Off-Duty Guards and request LEA assistance as directed by the Security Officer.

d. Brief and deploy the security force as directed by the Security Officer to compensate

for degraded plant safeguards capability.

5.55-96
4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SAS IS INFORMED OF:

* Physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might

have occurred, e.g.:

- Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, or the roof

- Damaged plant doors or windows, or

* Damage that results in radioactive contamination external to plant,

THE SAS WILL:

a. Coordinate with CAS, Security Officer, and REP Plant MGMT as necessary to obtain information on radiological hazard areas; keep guard force informed of such areas.

b. Dispatch RESPN Team to inspect the plant area for damaged protective fences and

buildings and to recommend security arrangements required to restore adequate protection; keep

Security Officer and REP Plant MGMT informed of such information.

c. Marshall and deploy Off-Duty Guards and RESPN Team elements as directed by the

Security Officer to secure damaged plant areas and to isolate hazardous radioactive areas.

5.55-97
Enclosure 4

Appendix F

RESPN TEAM'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the RESPN Team. The context and background perspective of these duties

are presented in the basic plan.

2. RESPN TEAM'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The RESPN Team will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with

CAS and SAS. SAS will keep the Site Security Officer informed of RESPN Team actions as appropriate to the situation.

a. Be prepared to arm, to communicate, and to respond immediately when alerted and to

summon LEA response force as dictated by the situation.

b. Intercept, assess, report, and deal with perceived adversary incursions against REP

Plant until effective LEA arrival in order to prevent theft or plant sabotage.

c. Monitor and report on pertinent civil disturbances and other suspicious situations

to assist in assessing their danger to REP Plant.

d. Secure and protect damaged plant areas or plant areas with degraded safeguards capability, as directed by the Security Officer.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.

b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of

security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of

a contingency situation.

c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's

protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

5.55-98
d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations

other than the REP plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

e. Coordination of security force operations with LEA response force operations will be

accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present. Red

Town Police coordinate overall LEA response operations.

f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base

station for control of the net.

g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net

from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert.

h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each

other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger,

voice.

i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination

by observing and reporting on:

* Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities.

* Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation.

j. The

authorized by

CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically

the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever:

* An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.

* A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known

criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc.

* An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal

theft attempt exists.

* An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists.

4. RESPN TEAM'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE RESPN TEAM:

Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,

Is informed by the SAS or Security Officer that a civil disturbance or other suspicious

situation might constitute a threat against the plant, or

5.55-99
Learns from the Security Officer or other authority that a serious threat actually

exists against the plant,

THE RESPN TEAM WILL:

a. As applicable, report all threat information to the Security Officer (SAS) without

delay to assist in initial and continuing assessment of the threat situation.

b. When directed by the Security Officer (SAS), accomplish on-scene monitoring of the

civil disturbance or suspicious situations to obtain and report information for early warning

and for assessing the seriousiness of the inferred threat.

c. Accomplish deployments and additional security surveillance of the plant as directed

by the Security Officer (SAS).

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE RESPN TEAM:

Receives an indication of a possible plant penetration, e.g.,

- CAS or SAS requests assistance to investigate an annunciating intrusion alarm,

suspected noises, or other suspicious circumstance in or near the plant's protected area,

- SAS indicates that a civil disturbance or suspected group or person is either

on site or expected to arrive on site, or

- Security Officer (SAS) informs that an attempt to penetrate the plant is imminent

or in progress,

THE RESPN TEAM WILL:

a. Rendezvous as directed by the Security Officer (SAS) for necessary arms, communication

equipment, and briefing on the situation.

b. Move to area of concern via routes affording concealment and cover appropriate to the

situation; coordinate with CAS and SAS as necessary to check communications, to obtain additional

information needed for tentative deployment planning, and to report progress and plans.

c. On arrival at scene, observe and investigate the situation to determine if an adversary

attempt to penetrate the plant is underway or imminent and to determine a suitable deployment

for the RESPN Team; report the situation to CAS or SAS as appropriate.

d. If an attempt to penetrate the plant is perceived or reported to the RESPN Team by

appropriate authority,

5. 55-100
* Deploy the RESPN Team to apprehend, stop, or delay the adversary, depending upon

the adversary's relative strength and dispositions and the need for protective

cover and concealment for the RESPN Team.

* Conduct operations as necessary to apprehend, stop, or delay the adversary until

the LEA response force arrives.

* Keep the Security Officer (SAS) informed of the situation and request reinforcements as dictated by the situation.

e. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary, accomplish deployments and

security measures as directed by the Security Officer (SAS) to prevent adversary escape with

SNM; continue to observe and report the situation.

f. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes, immediately notify the Security

Officer (SAS) of the observed escape situation, i.e.,

* Egress routes and last seen direction of movement,

* Transport description and license number(s),

* Number of persons involved and descriptions,

* Description of articles carried on departure, and

* Location of adversary and cargo in the transport.

g. Accomplish deployments and security measures as directed by the Security Officer (SAS)

to restore or maintain protection of the plant.

h. Accomplish tasks in paragraph 4.3 below if plant damage or dispersed radioactivity

exists, or if physical evidence is reported which suggests that a previously undetected intrusion

might have occurred.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE RESPN TEAM IS INFORMED OF OR OBSERVES:

* Physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the plant might

have occurred, e.g.,

- Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof,

- Damaged plant doors or windows, or

- Damage that results in radioactive contamination external to plant,

5.55-101
THE RESPN TEAM WILL:

a. Report location and nature of the damage or physical evidence to the Security Officer

(SAS) and provide additional security as directed.

b. Isolate hazardous radioactive areas.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE RESPN TEAM:

Is alerted by the CAS or REP Plant MGMT of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM

or to sabotage the plant, such as:

- Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal alarms annunciate,

- An emergency evacuation or other type of disturbance (fight, irrational behavior,

etc.) occurs in the plant, or

- An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading

incident occurs,

THE RESPN TEAM WILL:

a. Deploy to the scene as directed by the CAS or Security Officer and investigate situation.

b. Report on-scene situation to CAS and Security Officer.

c. Lock doors and reset alarm system in coordination with REP Plant MGMT.

d. Provide additional security as directed by CAS and Security Officer.

e. Apprehend individuals attempting sabotage of REP Plant or unauthorized removal of SNM

from REP Plant.

5. 55-102
Enclosure 5

Appendix F

OFF-DUTY GUARDS' PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequencies normally accomplished by the Off-Duty Guards. The context and background perspective of these

duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. OFF-DUTY GUARDS' GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The Off-Duty Guards will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination

with SAS:

a. Be prepared to execute alert procedures and assemble when directed by SAS.

b. Reinforce the CAS or REP Plant security as applicable.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.

b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security

force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.

c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's

protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations

other than the REP plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will

be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present.

Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations.

f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base station for control of the net.

5.55-103
g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net

from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert.

h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to

each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms,

messenger, voice.

i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination

by observing and reporting on:

* Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities.

* Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation.

j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically

authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever:

* An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.

* A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known

criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc.

* An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal

theft attempt exists.

* An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists.

4. OFF-DUTY GUARDS' CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE OFF-DUTY GUARDS ARE PLACED ON ALERT STATUS BY THE SECURITY OFFICER (SAS):

THE OFF-DUTY GUARDS WILL:

a. Assemble at the designated point as soon as possible and be prepared to accomplish

guard security functions.

b. Accomplish and maintain security deployments and duties as directed by the Security

Officer or SAS.

5.55-104
Enclosure 6

Appendix F

SITE MANAGEMENT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the Site MGMT. The context and background perspective of these duties

are presented in the basic plan.

2. SITE MGMT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Site MGMT will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with

Security Officer (SAS) and REP Plant MGMT:

a. Monitor on-going situation.

b. Provide emergency supporting services.

c. Execute site emergency plans as indicated by the situation.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.

b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security

force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.

c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's

protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations

other than the REP plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will

be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present.

Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations.

5.55-105
f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base

station for control of the net. L

g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net

from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert.

h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to

each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms,

messenger, voice.

i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination

by observing and reporting on:

Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities.

* Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation.

j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically

authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever:

An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.

* A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known

criminals on site; threatening civil disturbances exist.

An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal

theft attempt exists.

An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists.

4.0 SITE MGM'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES:

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SITE MGMT RECEIVES OR LEARNS OF AN EXPLICIT THREAT AGAINST THE PLANT,

THE SITE MGMT WILL:

Report all information about the perceived threat without delay to the Security Officer and

REP Plant MGMT.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SITE MGMT IS INFORMED:

* That a serious threat against the plant exists or

* That an emergency evacuation of the plant occurs,

5.55-106
THE SITE MGMT WILL:

Be prepared to provide emergency supporting services when requested by REP Plant MGMT and

to execute site emergency plans when required by the situation.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT SITE MGMT LEARNS THAT A PLANT PENETRATION IS IN PROGRESS OR IS PERCEIVED

AS IMMINENT,

THE SITE MGMT WILL:

a. Establish and maintain liaison with REP Plant MGMT to keep appraised of the situation.

b. Provide emergency supporting services and execute site emergency plans as warranted

by the situation.

c. If the plant is penetrated and held hostage, be prepared to accomplish REP Plant MGMT

actions in the event REP Plant MGMT is unavailable due to hostage situation.

5.55-107
Enclosure 7

Appendix F

REP PLANT MGMT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the REP Plant MGMT. The context and background perspective of these

duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. REP PLANT MGMT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

REP Plant MGMT will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with

Site MGMT, NRC, and local, county, and State police:

a. Assess threats made against REP Plant to determine their seriousness.

b. Increase security readiness as appropriate to prevent theft of SNM or sabotage at REP

Plant whenever threatened adversary incursions are serious.

c. Monitor and assess incursion situations and direct security and REP Plant operations

as necessary to prevent theft of SNM or sabotage.

d. Conduct extra SNM inventories and other MCA operations indicated by the situation to

assess theft or diversion possibilities or to determine if SNM is missing.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall response actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.

b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of

security force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of

a contingency situation.

c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations

other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

5.55-108
d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations

other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will

be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present.

Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations.

f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base

station for control of the net.

g. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net

from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert.

h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to each

other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms, messenger,

voice.

i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination

by observing and reporting on:

* Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities.

* Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation.

j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and allows no person to pass unless specifically

authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever:

* An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.

A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known

criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc.

An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal

-theft attempt exists.

An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists.

4. REP PLANT MGMT'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT:

Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,

* Infers that a threat exists from a civil disturbance or because of observed anomalies

or other suspicious situations at the plant, or

5. 55-1 09
Is informed that a serious threat exists by duly constituted authority,

THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:

a. Have the Security Officer arrange monitoring of the civil disturbance or suspicious

situation to assess the extent of danger to the plant, as applicable.

b. Assemble available information on threat and adversary.

c. Report threat to NRC, to company headquarters, and to law enforcement agencies as

applicable and request any pertinent information that may be available.

d. Assess available information to determine if threat is serious; if threat is perceived

serious or determined serious by duly constituted authority,

- Report assessment to NRC, to company headquarters, and to Site MGMT.

- Coordinate with company headquarters and Site MGMT as appropriate to inform

local, county, and State law enforcement of threat and to request assistance.

- Direct increased plant security appropriate to situation via Security Officer.

- Monitor on-going situation and be prepared to take further actions as necessary.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT:

Is requested by duly constituted authority to perform an item count inventory in

relation to a threat posed elsewhere,

THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:

a. Direct the conduct of the item count inventory and

b. Report results to NRC.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE REP PLANT MGMT:

Receives a report from the Security Officer, CAS, or SAS or otherwise learns of an

imminent or ongoing attempt by an adversary or civil disturbance to penetrate the plant,

THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:

a. Depending upon situation, direct evacuation of plant personnel from plant area or

assemble personnel into the protection of central rooms in plant area.

5.55-110
b. In coordination with Security Officer, continue monitoring and assessment of on-going

situation; direct additional security measures as required by situation.

c. Report situation to NRC.

d. If plant is seized and held hostage,

* Report situation to Security Officer, police authorities, and NRC as appropriate.

Establish communications with adversary and direct negotiations until police

arrive.

* As required by police situation, request NRC arrange Federal assistance from FBI to

negotiate plant's release and adversary surrender.

* Assist police and FBI; as applicable, negotiate with adversary.

e. If adversary escapes,

* As appropriate to situation, monitor and report escape situation to Security

Officer and police authorities; request offsite apprehension.

* Direct radiological survey of plant damage.

* Coordinate with Security Officer to deploy guard force for protection of uncovered

plant exclusion area.

* Conduct inventory and accounting of SNM.

* Conduct interviews of guards and plant employees to determine if SNM theft was

observed.

* Assemble and assess information to estimate quantity/type SNM stolen and radioactivity dispersed.

* Report situation and status of SNM and dispersal to NRC.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT THE REP PLANT MGMT:

* Learns of a possible internal attempt to steal SWM or to sabotage the plant, such as:

- Internal intrusion alarms, door alarms, or MAA portal alarms annunciate,

- An emergency evacuation or other type of disturbance (fight, irrational behavior,

etc.) occurs in the plant, or

5.55-111
- An unexpected power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading

incident occurs,

Observes or is informed of physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected

intrusion of the plant might have occurred, such as,

- Hole in perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof,

- Damaged plant doors or windows,

THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:

a. Coordinate with the Security Officer as necessary to determine the circumstances of

the incident and the present status and activity of the security force; request law enforcement

and immediate guard assistance as indicated by the situation.

b. Assemble and assess available information on the incident to determine if it is associated with an attempted theft or sabotage.

c. Direct additional security measures and plant actions as required by the situation, e.g.,

- Restore safeguards and security for plant exclusion area, MAA, and VA,

- Search Plant exclusion and contiguous areas for diverted SNM,

- Conduct inventory and accounting of SNM, and

- Assess circumstances of situation to assist law enforcement investigators to

identify and apprehend adversary.

d. As warranted, report situation and status of SNM and dispersal to NRC.

4.5 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT:

Is aware of plant damage that results in radioactive contamination,

THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:

a. Assemble information and assess damage, security deficiencies, and radiological hazard.

b. Commence radiological safety emergency plan procedures as applicable.

c. Secure the plant and restore safeguards to MAA and exclusion areas.

d. Establish priorities for temporary and permanent repairs to plant and security systems.

5.55-112
e. Report situation to NRC.

4.6 IN THE EVENT THAT REP PLANT MGMT:

* Learns that material control and accounting records have been damaged, destroyed,

altered or are missing, or

* Is advised that the material control and accounting system indicates a possible theft

of SNM,

THE REP PLANT MGMT WILL:

a. Report situation to NRC.

b. Assemble and assess information on damage, destruction, or discrepancies pertaining to

MCA records.

c. Reconstruct records if applicable.

d. Direct audit and inventory as necessary to locate possible erroneous data from previous inventory actions.

e. Resolve differences between inventory data and record data.

f. If SNM is unaccounted for, report type and quantity missing to NRC.

5.55-113
Enclosure 8

Appendix F

ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the ADMIN, MAA, and BLDG 7 personnel. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 personnel will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in

coordination with REP Plant MGMT.

a. Upon receiving alert of a possible adversary incursion, immediately lock doors to MAA

and VA, as applicable, to protect against possible SNW theft or sabotage, and be prepared to

assemble or to evacuate as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

b. Observe for and report information on adversary activities or suspicious events to REP

Plant MGMT to assist in assessment of the on-going situation, and to detect attempts to steal or

divert SNM or to sabotage.

d. Assist in conducting SNM inventories and other operations as directed by REP Plant MGMT

to assess possibilities of theft or to determine if SNM is missing.

d. Report damaged or unprotected areas in REP Plant buildings, and provide protection to

restore security as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

a. REP Plant MGMT directs the overall repsonse actions of REP Plant personnel in coordination with the Security Officer.

b. The Security Officer coordinates with the CAS and the SAS to assume control of security

force response operations as soon as practical during the initial response period of a contingency situation.

c. The CAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at the REP Plant's

protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

5.55-114
d. The SAS coordinates initial security force response actions directed at site locations

other than the REP Plant's protected area until control is assumed by the Security Officer.

e. Coordination of security force operations with police response force operations will

be accomplished through the Security Officer to the senior Red Town Police official present.

Red Town Police coordinate overall police response operations.

f. The CAS operates continually in the Site Radio Comm Net to serve as the net base

station for control of the net.

9. Site security force operational elements enter and operate in the Site Radio Comm Net

from receipt of a contingency alert until the Security Officer terminates the alert.

h. As required by the situation, operational elements alert and pass information to

each other by the fastest available means, i.e., radio, telephone, intercom, silent alarms,

messenger, voice.

i. All operational elements report the situation for purposes of operational coordination

by observing and reporting on:

* Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities and

Onsite dispositions and activity opposing the adversary situation.

j. The CAS maintains Building 10 locked and aflows no person to pass unless specifically

authorized by the REP Plant MGMT or the Security Officer whenever:

An unresolved CAS alarm situation exists.

* A threatening situation is perceived to exist, e.g., armed persons or known

criminals on site, threatening civil disturbances exist, etc.

* An emergency evacuation of plant exists or a perceived possibility of an internal

theft attempt exists.

* An adversary penetration of plant is imminent, in progress, or exists.

4. ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAM, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL:

Receive or learns of an explicit threat against the plant,

Are informed by the SAS or Security Officer that a civil disturbance or other suspicious

situation might constitute a threat against the plant, or

5.55-115
Learn from the Security Officer or other authority that a serious threat actually

exists against the plant,

THE ADMIN, MAM, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL:

a. Report to REP Plant MGMT and Security Officer without delay all threat information

or knowledge of civil disturbances and other suspicious events.

b. Perform additional security surveillance of plant as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

c. Be prepared to assist in securing REP Plant MAA, vital areas, and building when

alerted.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL:

Observe or are informed that a plant penetration is in progress or is perceived

iniminent,

THE ADMIN, MAM, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL:

a. When alerted, immediately lock alarmed doors that might happen to be open.

b. Execute evaucation or assembly as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

c. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary,

* Keep alarmed doors locked as applicable.

* Evacuate REP Plant employees as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

* Communicate with adversary only as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

d. If the adversary penetrates the plant and escapes,

* Report to REP Plant MGMT any observed plant damage or likely radiological hazards

caused by the adversary.

* Execute pertinent radiological emergency plans as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

* Secure MAM and VA in accordance with REP Plant procedures.

Report any observed SNM theft by adversary to REP Plant MGMT.

* Assist in conduct of SNM inventory in accordance with REP Plant procedure.

5. 55-116
4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAM, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL:

Learn of a possible internal attempt to steal SNM or to sabotage the plant, e.g.,

- Material control and accounting records are damaged, destroyed, altered, missing

or the accounting and control system indicates a possible theft,

- CAS, REP Plant MGMT, or the Security Officer reports,

- Intrusion alarm, door alarm, or MAA portal alarm annunciates,

- An emergency evacuation or other type disturbance (fight, irrational behavior,

etc.) occurs in the plant,

- An emergency power outage, communication outage, or other safeguards degrading

incident occurs,

Learn of physical evidence suggesting that a previously undetected intrusion of the

plant might have occurred, e.g.,

- Hole in the perimeter fence, a plant wall, the roof or

- Damaged plant doors or windows,

THE ADMIN, MAM, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL:

a. As applicable, report to REP Plant MGMT any observed security breaches or suspicious

activity, particularly regarding attempts to hide items or to pass items outside the perimeter

fence.

b. Assist in the assessment of the situation and restoration of safeguards and services

as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

c. Assist in search of REP Plant area for diverted SNM and for evidence of sabotage as

directed by REP Plant MGMT.

d. Assist accomplishment of inventory actions as directed by REP Plant MGMT.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT ADMIN, MAM, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL ARE INFORMED OF:

Damage that results in radioactive contamination,

THE ADMIN, MAA, BLDG 7 PERSONNEL WILL:

a. Execute pertinent radiological safety emergency plans.

5.55-117
b. Post watchman as required to secure MAA and VA and coordinate with Security Officer

to obtain desired guard support.

c. Report damage and physical security deficiencies to REP Plant MGMT.

5.55-118
Enclosure 9

Appendix F

LEA'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and task sequences that are requested

of the pertinent LEA in the planned contingency situations. The context and background perspective of these actions are presented in the basic plan.

2. LEA'S GENERAL FUNCTIONS

The LEA have an overall responsibility to maintain law and order within their respective

jurisdictional areas. With their available resources they endeavor to prevent illegal activities,

solve crimes, and apprehend law breakers. Within the context of their law enforcement responsibilities, applicable LEA, in the near vicinity of NRC licensed facilities requiring Part 73

physical protection, have been requested to perform the functions listed below in response to

contingency situations.

a. Provide investigative assistance to check on a suspicious situation.

b. Provide a response force to deal with unlawful adversary actions against nuclear

facilities within their jurisdiction.

c. Provide traffic control and area isolation (cordon) as required by the situation.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

Red Town Police have been requested to:

a. Be prepared to respond as soon as possible to a request for law enforcement assistance

from the plant.

b. Marshall and coordinate assistance from other law enforcement jurisdictions as

required to deal with unlawful incursions against the plant.

c. Report any available information to the REP Plant MGMT, NRC, and the FBI that is

indicative of possible danger to the plant or personnel.

d. Coordinate law enforcement plans and response operations with the Security Officer.

5.55-119
4. LEA'S TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:

* An explicit threat against the plant,

* A civil disturbance or other suspicious situation that might constitute a threat

against the plant, or

* A serious threat that is believed to exist against the plant,

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:

a. Provide any available information relative to the situation.

b. Assist REP Plant MGMT in assessment of the threat as requested.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA:

* Is advised of an event that requires temporary changes in LEA response plans,

- Blocked LLEA route to site,

- Communication outages,

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:

a. Coordinate with the Security Officer.

b. Modify their plans for assistance as appropriate.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:

A plant penetration that is in progress or is perceived as imminent,

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:

a. Request additional police assistance as warranted by the situation.

b. Assemble a police force without delay at the plant site.

c. Coordinate with the Security Officer to obtain situation information needed for effective direction of LEA resource operations.

5.55-120
d. Establish offsite road blocks as required by situation.

e. Execute police plans to apprehend adversaries.

f. If the plant is seized and held hostage by the adversary,

* Execute police plans to negotiate release of plant and hostages and the surrender

of the adversary.

* Establish and maintain road blocks on site and off site and other deployments as

required to ensure capture of adversary if an escape is attempted.

g. If escape from plant is underway,

* Pursue and apprehend adversaries in coordination with State and county police

authorities.

* Assist FBI investigation to recover any stolen SNM.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:

* Sabotage that has resulted in dispersal of radioactivity,

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:

Assist in isolation of radiological hazards area by providing traffic and crowd control

as necessary.

5.55-121 5 -U. GOMRNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 378 720-387/45 I-S
UNITED STATES

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COMMISSION