In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 21, 2023

S23A0214. KING v. THE STATE.

 WARREN, Justice.

After a jury trial in January 2020, Rico Jabar King was 

convicted of the malice murder of Michael Brooks and possession of 

a firearm during the commission of a felony based on shooting 

Brooks.1 King raises four claims of error on appeal: (1) that the trial 

court erroneously denied King’s motion for a new trial on the 

 1 The crimes occurred on March 28, 2018. On May 24, 2018, a DeKalb 

County grand jury indicted King on four counts: malice murder, felony murder, 

aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. 

After a jury trial from January 14 to 23, 2020, King was found guilty on all 

counts. On January 23, 2020, King was sentenced to life in prison without the 

possibility of parole for malice murder and 5 years to be served consecutively 

for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The remaining 

counts either were vacated by operation of law or merged with other counts. 

King filed a timely motion for new trial on February 18, 2020, which he 

amended on April 13, 2022. On June 22, 2022, the trial court denied King’s 

amended motion for new trial. King timely filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 

2022, in the Court of Appeals, which was transferred to this Court on October 

5, 2022. The case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in 

December 2022 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 
2

“general grounds”; (2) that the trial court should not have allowed

witness testimony and closing arguments about voluntary 

intoxication; (3) that the trial court plainly erred by admitting 

character evidence about King’s alleged past alcohol and illegal drug 

use; and (4) that King received constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

As explained more below, we conclude that King’s general 

grounds claim fails. The trial court did not plainly err by allowing 

witness testimony about voluntary intoxication, and King waived 

his claim that the trial court should not have allowed closing 

arguments about voluntary intoxication. King also affirmatively 

waived his claim that the trial court erred by admitting purported 

character evidence about King’s past alcohol and illegal drug use. 

And King has failed to show that he received constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore affirm King’s 

convictions. 

1. (a) The evidence presented at trial showed the following. 

On March 28, 2018, just before noon, Brooks was walking down the 
3

sidewalk on Glenwood Road in DeKalb County. King was in his 

black pickup truck driving down Glenwood Road in the same 

direction. Shortly after passing Brooks, King pulled into the parking 

lot of a restaurant and parked his truck parallel to the road. Once 

Brooks walked past King’s passenger-side window, King fired a shot 

at Brooks with a .40-caliber pistol. 

A witness who worked at a shopping center on the corner of 

Glenwood Road heard the gunshot. He looked out the window and 

“saw a guy fall down right beside the pickup truck that was over at” 

a restaurant. He then saw Brooks2 “pushing himself down the 

sidewalk” before King stepped out of the pickup truck with a gun. 

Brooks stood up. 

That witness and three other witnesses saw Brooks try to make 

his way across Glenwood Road before he was shot again, causing 

him to fall down in the street. One of the witnesses testified that 

the shooter, whom she identified at trial as King, then “stood over 

 

2 None of the eyewitnesses knew Brooks or King, and only one identified 

King at trial. 
4

[Brooks], and emptied his whole clip.” Two of the witnesses watched 

the shooting from inside a shop on Glenwood Road and testified that 

they were beating on a window as they watched; once King was done 

shooting, he looked at them, nodded his head, and walked away.

After the shooting, King walked back to his pickup truck 

without a sense of urgency and drove off. None of the witnesses had

heard or seen any other interaction between King and Brooks before 

the shooting. 

Multiple people called 911 to report the shooting and police 

quickly responded. Shortly thereafter, three police officers spotted

King’s pickup truck driving down the road. The officers attempted 

to stop the pickup truck, but King continued to drive at around 30 

to 40 miles per hour, without obeying traffic lights or stop signs, for 

a few miles before pulling into a gated apartment complex. King 

attempted to enter the gate code. Although King at first did not 

respond to police commands to exit the truck, the officers eventually 

were able to remove him from the truck and take him into custody. 
5

Back at the crime scene, Brooks’s body was found in the middle 

of the road. He had been shot 13 times and died as the result of the 

gunshot wounds. The medical examiner later determined that the 

manner of death was homicide, and the parties later stipulated that 

the gun used to shoot Brooks was a .40-caliber handgun recovered 

from King’s pickup truck. 

(b) Later on the day of the crimes, Detective Keith McQuilkin 

interviewed King at DeKalb County police headquarters. Detective 

McQuilkin read King his rights under Miranda,3 which King 

waived. A recording of this interview was played for the jury. In 

the interview, King stated that the police stopped him because he 

“shot someone.” King said that he shot Brooks with his .40-caliber 

Smith & Wesson handgun, which he left in his pickup truck. When 

Detective McQuilkin asked what happened, King said he “really just 

shot him” and that he “murdered him.” Among other things, King, 

in explaining why he shot Brooks, said, “I guess I had to kill the 

 

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
6

baby;”4 that he thought Brooks was the devil; and that he thought 

Brooks was going to kill him, but Brooks did not say anything to 

make King think that. King also went back and forth between 

saying that he did and did not know Brooks.5 

King was charged with malice murder, felony murder, 

aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during commission 

of a felony in connection with Brooks’s killing.

(c) King asserted insanity as a defense at trial, arguing that he 

lacked the ability to distinguish between right and wrong during the 

commission of the crimes. King called multiple witnesses at trial to 

support that defense.

Three of those witnesses provided expert testimony. The first 

was Dr. Matthew Norman, a licensed psychiatrist, whom the trial 

court qualified as an expert in psychiatry, forensic psychiatry, and 

 

4 As explained in Division 1(c), a psychiatrist testified at trial that, in his 

opinion, King thought that Brooks was a “baby” version of King. King was 42

years old and Brooks was 29 when the crimes occurred. 

5 Detective McQuilkin ultimately determined that King and Brooks did 

not know each other. 
7

psychiatric pharmacology. He testified that there was “clear 

evidence that [King] was psychotic” on the day of the crimes, and 

that someone experiencing King’s symptoms would have had 

“difficulty” distinguishing between right and wrong on the day of the 

shooting. 

In Dr. Norman’s opinion, King’s “thinking at the time of the 

incident” was that King “essentially heard a voice that [Brooks] was 

[King’s] baby form” and that King was “command[ed]” to “kill his 

baby self” in order to save King. Dr. Norman thought that King’s 

psychosis was caused by a weight-loss pill that King had been taking 

called phentermine. Dr. Norman noted that King had been 

prescribed 30 phentermine pills in March 2017, a year before the 

crimes, and then again in March 2018, the same month of the 

crimes. He recounted evidence that King was taking the pills daily, 

but noted that this information was based only on King’s selfreports.

Dr. Norman agreed that there is “not a lot” of research into the 

relationship between phentermine and psychosis. He testified that 
8

there had been “a total of nine . . . documented individual cases” of 

“phentermine-related psychosis” since the drug hit the market in 

1959, making it a “known side effect, but not a common” one. But of 

the nine people whose phentermine-related psychosis was reflected 

in published reports, five of them were “taking more than the 

prescribed dosage,” two had “a history of psychiatric illness or they 

had a family history of psychiatric illness,” another was taking the 

prescribed dose of phentermine but “he bought it off the street . . . so 

there is no guarantee” that it was actually phentermine and he was 

also taking methadone at the same time, and another “had a past 

history of depression, and she was taking it with marijuana.” Dr. 

Norman later testified that psychosis was listed as a side effect of 

phentermine on the package insert—a published informational 

document reflecting a “combination of what the FDA and the 

manufacturer have agreed” needs to be listed—and that the 

placement of the psychosis side effect’s listing on the package insert 

reflected that it was the least common side effect listed. 
9

King also called Dr. Margaret Flanagan, a licensed 

psychologist with the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and 

Developmental Disabilities, and the trial court qualified her as an 

expert in psychology and forensic psychology. Among other things, 

Dr. Flanagan concluded that someone experiencing “the symptoms 

that [King] reported that he experienced” at the time of the crimes

would not know the difference between right and wrong. Although 

Dr. Flanagan would not “speak directly” to the cause of King’s 

mental state because that is a “medical issue” and Dr. Flanagan is 

“not a medical doctor,” she thought that phentermine was the 

“likely” cause of King’s mental state. 

Dr. Amy Gambow, a licensed clinical psychologist working at 

Georgia Regional Hospital, was qualified as an expert in psychology 

and forensic psychology. King’s counsel asked Dr. Gambow whether 

someone “showing the symptoms and the mental processes” that 

King displayed would be able to “distinguish between right and 

wrong,” to which she responded, “it does not seem so.” Dr. Gambow

“determined that the cause of the psychosis was from phentermine.” 
10

King also introduced testimony from two lay witnesses: his 

wife, Angela, and his girlfriend, Holly Hill.6 Angela and King had 

been married for about 18 years before the crimes. She testified that 

aside from the few weeks leading up to the shooting, King had never 

shown “symptoms of mental illness or bizarre behavior” and had not 

to her knowledge “ever [been] diagnosed with any major mental 

illness.” The night before the crimes, however, King was acting 

“strange.” Angela also testified that King had been taking 

phentermine, and that when she gave King’s pill bottle to his prior 

lawyer, “there might have been like six” pills left in the bottle.7

Hill, who worked with King, had known him for a little over a 

year before the crimes; they had been in a relationship for “maybe 

like six months” before the crimes. She testified that King had not 

 

6 Evidence was presented that King was having an extramarital affair 

with Hill. 

7 According to the State’s expert who testified later at trial, Dr. Randall 

Tackett, King should have had 14 phentermine pills in the bottle if he were 

taking one a day as prescribed.
11

shown any “symptoms of mental illness or any strange behavior” 

around her until “maybe like the two weeks before” the crimes.

King did not testify in his own defense. 

(d) In rebuttal, the State offered the expert testimony of Dr. 

Randall Tackett, a professor at the University of Georgia College of 

Pharmacy who had worked in the fields of pharmacology and 

toxicology for “a little over 40 years.” The trial court qualified Dr. 

Tackett as an expert “in the field of pharmacology, toxicology, and 

regulatory affairs.” He explained that pharmacology “looks at how 

drugs produce their effects” and that toxicology “focuses more on the 

side effects or the adverse effects not only of drugs but also of 

chemicals and different substances.” 

Dr. Tackett testified that King was prescribed 30 phentermine 

pills and that had he been taking one a day as prescribed, there 

would have been 14 left on the day of the crimes. He also testified 

that taking “more than the prescribed dosage . . . would greatly 

increase the potential” for phentermine to cause psychosis. Dr. 

Tackett testified that if King “was taking the drug as prescribed[,] 
12

that it would not have caused psychosis.” But “if he was taking more 

of the drug than was prescribed, then that is a potential for causing 

the psychosis.” Even so, Dr. Tackett still “would not expect the 

psychosis to be prolonged to the extent that” King’s psychosis 

reportedly was. Dr. Tackett clarified that he did not evaluate 

“whether [King] was psychotic,” but examined whether King’s 

“reported psychosis” was caused by phentermine. 

The jury convicted King on all counts. He was sentenced to life 

without the possibility of parole for malice murder and five years to 

be served consecutively for possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a felony.

2. King contends that the trial court committed reversible 

error when it failed to grant his motion for a new trial. Specifically, 

he argues that the trial court should have exercised its discretion as 

the thirteenth juror and granted King’s motion for new trial “in the 

interest of justice.” That argument implicates the “general grounds” 

for obtaining a new trial under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 & 5-5-21. 
13

“When these so-called ‘general grounds’ are properly raised in 

a timely motion for new trial, the trial judge must exercise a broad 

discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 

456 (883 SE2d 357) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

Sitting as the thirteenth juror “requires the judge to consider 

matters typically reserved to the jury, including conflicts in the 

evidence, witness credibility, and the weight of the evidence.” Id. 

But, contrary to King’s argument, “the merits of the trial court’s 

decision on the general grounds are not subject to our review,” id.,

and the decision to grant a new trial on the general grounds “is 

vested solely in the trial court.” Ward v. State, No. S23A0139, 2023 

WL 3468140, at *4 (Ga. May 16, 2023) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). 

To the extent King argues the trial court failed to exercise its 

discretion as the thirteenth juror, we disagree. In its order denying 

King’s motion for a new trial, the court expressly rejected King’s 

general grounds claim because it found that “the weight of the 

evidence does not preponderate heavily against the verdict and the 
14

verdict was not contrary to the evidence or the principles of justice 

and equity.” King’s general grounds claim therefore fails.8 See 

Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 843 (828 SE2d 327) (2019) (trial court 

properly exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror when “[i]n 

its order denying the motion, the trial court referred to the 

numbered paragraphs in which Appellant asserted the general 

 

8 King does not separately enumerate as alleged error that the evidence

was insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 

560) (1979). However, in the past, in evaluating a trial court’s denial of a 

motion for new trial on the general grounds, see OCGA §§ 5-5-20 & 5-5-21, we 

have performed or referenced a constitutional due process sufficiency-of-theevidence review under Jackson. See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 315 Ga. 467, 

474 (883 SE2d 351) (2023); Bundel v. State, 308 Ga. 317, 318-319 (840 SE2d 

349) (2020); Lewis v. State, 296 Ga. 259, 261 (765 SE2d 911) (2014). But see 

Caviston v. State, 315 Ga. 279, 282-284 (882 SE2d 221) (2022) (limiting the 

general-grounds analysis to evaluating whether the trial court exercised its 

discretion when the defendant did not make a Jackson sufficiency argument 

as part of his general-grounds enumeration or separately). We have done so 

despite our recognition that the general grounds and a constitutionalsufficiency-of-the-evidence claim under Jackson are “two distinct legal 

arguments” and “require the trial court to apply distinct legal standards.” See 

Casey v. State, 310 Ga. 421, 425 (851 SE2d 550) (2020). We have also done so 

notwithstanding our statements that “[t]he merits of the trial court’s decision 

on the general grounds are not subject to our review.” Ridley, 315 Ga. at 456. 

Although many of us question whether it is proper for this Court to 

import Jackson into an appellate review of the general grounds (or to otherwise 

rely on Jackson as part of that analysis), we need not determine the propriety

of that practice today. King’s general grounds claim fails in all events because 

the trial court exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror, and because the 

evidence against King was constitutionally sufficient to affirm his convictions. 
15

grounds in his motion and then said, ‘the State presented ample 

evidence to support the jury verdict and . . . the evidence was not 

sufficiently close nor represents a failure of justice in general’”)

(alteration in original). See also Ward, No. S23A0139, 2023 WL 

3468140, at *4 (“We presume, in the absence of affirmative evidence 

to the contrary, that the trial court did properly exercise such 

discretion.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

3. King contends that the trial court erred by admitting 

testimony and allowing argument about voluntary intoxication.9 

First, he argues it was improper for the State to question witnesses 

and make closing arguments about voluntary intoxication. 

Second, King argues that, even if voluntary intoxication

generally was a permissible subject, certain testimony and 

arguments were improper because the State misstated the law of 

voluntary intoxication and the trial court should have issued an 

 

9 In King’s brief, this enumeration’s heading complains about the trial 

court’s charge on involuntary intoxication, but the entirety of the substantive 

argument following the heading pertains to voluntary intoxication. We 

therefore construe King’s contention as pertaining to voluntary intoxication.
16

instruction clarifying the relationship between voluntary 

intoxication and an insanity defense. For the reasons below, King’s 

arguments fail.

(a) Some additional background is necessary before 

addressing King’s arguments. At trial, both the State and King 

asked multiple witnesses about voluntary intoxication, with respect 

to both illegal and prescription drugs. King’s counsel first asked Dr. 

Norman why he evaluated “illegal drug use” when he interviewed 

King. Dr. Norman responded that “voluntary intoxication, taking 

an illegal substance and getting intoxicated on that and that making 

our thinking go awry, is not an excuse.” King followed up by asking 

“hypothetically if someone just gets high on cocaine or high on 

crack[,] becomes psychotic and kills someone, is that voluntary 

intoxication?” Dr. Norman said that is “up to the law. But in my 

opinion as an examiner, that is voluntary intoxication.” On crossexamination, Dr. Norman agreed that “if someone misuses, abuses, 

overuses phentermine and became psychotic and killed someone, 

that would be voluntary intoxication[,]” “which is not a defense.” 
17

Then, in questioning Dr. Flanagan, King asked whether 

“voluntary intoxication [is] a legitimate cause for being found [not 

guilty by reason of insanity.]” Dr. Flanagan said, “No.” On crossexamination, the State asked whether insanity caused by 

“misusing” or “abusing” a prescription drug is “voluntary 

intoxication,” which is “not a defense.” Dr. Flanagan said, “That’s 

correct.” 

Last, in questioning Dr. Gambow, King asked whether 

“voluntary intoxication [is] grounds for not guilty by reason of 

insanity.” Dr. Gambow said it “is not.” On cross-examination, the 

State asked whether voluntary intoxication caused by illegal drugs 

or abusing a prescription is a defense, and Dr. Gambow agreed that 

it is not. 

King argued in closing that there was no evidence of voluntary 

intoxication. The State, by contrast, argued in closing that if the 

jury found that King “was lacking in mental capacity due to 

voluntary intoxication,” such a finding would not support a defense 

for King. In doing so, it emphasized the evidence suggesting that 
18

King was taking more phentermine than prescribed. King did not 

object to any of the above statements at trial.

(b) King contends that the trial court erred by allowing the 

State’s closing arguments about voluntary intoxication because 

those arguments were unsupported by the evidence and contained 

misstatements of the law. But King did not object at the time, so 

these claims are waived. See Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 236-237

(862 SE2d 285) (2021) (failure to object to closing arguments 

amounts to waiver); Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 328-329 (781 SE2d 

772) (2016) (holding that the defendant “waived review of his 

arguments relating to the allegedly improper closing argument here 

due to his failure to object below” because plain-error review does 

not apply to closing arguments).

(c) King’s claims that the trial court erred by allowing witness 

testimony about voluntary intoxication and not issuing a clarifying

instruction about the relationship between voluntary intoxication 

and King’s insanity defense are not preserved for ordinary appellate 

review because King did not object at trial to the relevant testimony 
19

or request a clarifying instruction. We nonetheless review these 

claimed evidentiary and instructional errors for plain error. See 

Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 863-864 (849 SE2d 191) (2020)

(evidentiary errors); Choisnet v. State, 295 Ga. 568, 571-572 (761 

SE2d 322) (2014) (instructional errors).

The plain-error standard has four prongs. 

First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of 

“[d]eviation from a legal rule”—that has not been 

intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., 

affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal 

error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to 

reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected 

the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary 

case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the 

outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fourth and 

finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the 

appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error—

discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error 

“‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.’”

Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 636 (884 SE2d 346) (2023) (quoting 

Gates, 298 Ga. at 327).

(i) We first address King’s claim that it was improper for the 

trial court to admit the State’s evidence about voluntary 
20

intoxication. At trial, King asked all three experts he called about 

voluntary intoxication and incorporated arguments about the lack 

of voluntary intoxication into his closing. Therefore, King has 

affirmatively waived this claim and as a result has failed to show 

that the trial court plainly erred. See Griffin, 309 Ga. at 863-866

(defense affirmatively waived objection to prosecution eliciting 

testimony about defendant’s racism because the defense made a 

strategic decision not to object to this evidence, and instead 

attempted to use it “to bolster his claim of self-defense and to 

undermine the State’s case”); Taylor v. State, 302 Ga. 176, 180-181

(805 SE2d 851) (2017) (defense affirmatively waived objection to the 

State’s witness testifying about “his opinion on the issue of selfdefense” because the defense deliberately introduced the topic of 

self-defense by asking the witness “several questions about his 

opinion about the viability of a self-defense claim”).

(ii) We next address King’s arguments that testimony about

voluntary intoxication contained incorrect statements of law and 

that the trial court should have issued an instruction clarifying the 
21

relationship between voluntary intoxication and an insanity

defense. This claim fails because King cannot satisfy the plain-error 

test’s third prong: that the alleged error “likely affected the outcome 

of the trial.” Choisnet, 295 Ga. at 572 (citation and punctuation 

omitted). 

King complains that expert witnesses testified that voluntary 

intoxication is not a defense without noting the exception that 

voluntary intoxication can be a defense when the intoxication 

results in a “permanently altered” “brain function so as to negate 

intent.” Perez v. State, 309 Ga. 687, 690 n.2 (848 SE2d 395) (2020)

(quoting Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 491 (371 SE2d 384) (1988) and 

Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 578 (690 SE2d 406) (2010)) (punctuation 

omitted). But King did not argue at trial, nor does he argue on 

appeal, that the jury was likely to have found that he met the 

requirements of that narrow exception. In fact, he argued at trial

that he was not voluntarily intoxicated. And now on appeal, he 

reiterates that his “sole defense” at trial was “temporary insanity”—

a claim that is hard to square with his new contention about an
22

exception to voluntary intoxication that would require his brain 

function to be permanently altered for the exception to apply. See 

Perez, 309 Ga. at 690 n.2. Moreover, King also has not pointed to 

any evidence suggesting he has such permanent brain alteration. 

Under these circumstances, King has not carried his burden under 

the plain-error test’s third prong to show that the jury hearing that 

voluntary intoxication is not a defense, without the trial court giving 

a clarifying instruction about the exception to that general rule,

“likely affected the outcome of the trial.” See Choisnet, 295 Ga. at 

572-573 (holding that the trial court’s instruction on a delusional 

compulsion, “even granting” that it was incomplete, was “unlikely” 

to have affected the trial’s result because the defendant’s expert 

testified that the defendant “may have been” psychotic during the 

crimes and the State’s expert testified that he “did not believe” the 

defendant was acting under a delusional compulsion). 

4. King contends that the trial court also erred by allowing 

testimony about King consuming illegal drugs and alcohol—

testimony he labels as improper character evidence barred by OCGA 
23

§ 24-4-404. This claim fails under plain-error review because King 

affirmatively waived it. 

(a) At King’s trial, multiple witnesses testified about whether 

King was known to consume drugs and alcohol. For example, King 

asked Dr. Norman whether he “address[ed] illegal drug use” when 

he interviewed King; Dr. Norman said that he did. King’s counsel 

then asked whether there was “a note anywhere in the medical 

records that suggested that [King] might have used cocaine.” Dr. 

Norman said yes, explaining that a medical record from while King 

was in jail reflected that, while meeting with a physician, “King

admitted to using crack cocaine, smoking marijuana, and drinking 

alcohol,” and another medical record reflected that King later met 

with the same physician again and retracted that admission. 

Dr. Norman testified that certain other medical records also 

showed that King denied using cocaine. Dr. Norman went on to say 

that King “certainly tried” to convince Dr. Norman that it was 

“completely impossible” for him to use drugs because King got his 

commercial driver’s license in 1996 and that King had been subject 
24

to random drug tests because of his job as a truck driver but he had 

“never had any issues,” which King “used . . . as evidence that he did 

not use cocaine.” The State asked Dr. Norman about those same 

medical records reflecting King’s admission to consuming cocaine, 

marijuana, and alcohol. The State asked the same of Doctors 

Flanagan and Gambow on cross-examination and asked similar 

questions while examining the doctor to whom King made that 

admission.

King also asked Hill, among other things, whether she knew 

“King to use any illegal substance” and whether he was “subject to 

random drug screens” at work. Hill answered no to the first and yes 

to the second question. King also asked whether she knew him to 

drink alcohol and get intoxicated, and Hill responded that King 

drank “socially” and did not get intoxicated. And in response to a 

question from the State on cross-examination, Hill testified that 

King ordered at least one margarita at lunch the day before the 

murder. King’s trial counsel did not object to any of the above 
25

statements and argued in closing that there was a lack of evidence 

of King’s voluntary intoxication. 

(b) This enumeration is not preserved for ordinary appellate 

review: because King did not object to the relevant testimony at 

trial, we review it only for plain error. See Griffin, 309 Ga. at 863-

864. And King’s argument fails under that review because, having 

introduced the issue of his alcohol and illegal drug use and argued 

as part of his defense that there was a lack of evidence of voluntary 

intoxication, King affirmatively waived this claim—thus failing the 

first prong of the plain-error test. See id.; Taylor, 302 Ga. at 180-

181. 

5. King contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution in four respects: for failing to (1) properly obtain 

certification of medical records from while King was incarcerated for 

the crimes; (2) object to character evidence about King’s alcohol and 

drug consumption; (3) object to an alleged “golden rule” violation; 
26

and (4) object to misstatements about the definition of voluntary 

intoxication and failing to request a clarifying instruction. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant generally must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to 

the defendant. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356

(689 SE2d 280) (2010). To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant 

must demonstrate that his attorney “performed at trial in an 

objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and 

in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 

Ga. 339, 344 (745 SE2d 637) (2013). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687-688. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must 

establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s 

deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been 

different. See id. at 693-694. “If an appellant fails to meet his or 

her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the 
27

reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.” 

Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 533-534 (690 SE2d 801) (2010). 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed 

questions of law and fact, and “a trial court’s factual findings made 

in the course of deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

will be affirmed by the reviewing court unless clearly erroneous.” 

Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816, 818 (809 SE2d 738) (2018) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). Conclusions of law based on those facts are 

reviewed de novo. See Bright v. State, 292 Ga. 273, 274 (736 SE2d 

380) (2013).

(a) King contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

properly to obtain certification of medical records from the time of 

King’s incarceration, preventing their admission under the so-called 

business records exception to the rule against hearsay. See OCGA 

§ 24-8-803 (6). King argues that his trial counsel’s failure to obtain 

proper certification was constitutionally deficient because counsel 

had ample time to do so and the decision not to obtain proper 

certification was not a part of her trial strategy. He further argues 
28

that he suffered prejudice as a result because the jurors were unable 

to review the records themselves and instead had to rely on 

testimony about what the records contained, and the jury might not 

have found the witnesses’ testimony about the records credible. 

Assuming without deciding that his trial counsel was deficient in 

this respect, King has failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice. 

At trial, while questioning Dr. Norman, King sought to admit 

certified medical records from King’s post-arrest visit to Central 

State Hospital. The court did not admit those records but suggested 

to King’s trial counsel that if she wanted them admitted into 

evidence, she should “start making some efforts” to obtain proper 

certification. Even though the medical records themselves were not 

admitted into evidence, Doctors Norman, Flanagan, and Gambow 

testified that they reviewed those records, and Dr. Flanagan and Dr. 

Gambow testified about the contents of the records. 

King’s trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing 

and said that she discovered there was an issue with getting the 

relevant medical records certified “right before trial.” Knowing “that 
29

[the] doctors were going to be able to testify about” the records, 

which is “what mattered,” she did not seek a continuance to obtain 

certification so that the records themselves could be admitted. 

When asked whether there were “items in the medical records that 

tended to support” King’s defense that were not “discussed by each 

of the doctors,” she said “not that I recall, no.” King did not admit 

the medical records into evidence at the motion for new trial stage, 

and the trial court held that King did not suffer any prejudice from 

counsel’s alleged deficiency in failing to obtain certified copies of the 

records and admitting them into evidence. 

Here, King has failed to show prejudice because he has failed 

to show that there is a “reasonable probability” of a better result had 

his trial counsel admitted those medical records. Foreman v. State, 

306 Ga. 567, 570 (832 SE2d 369) (2019) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). King did not admit the medical records at the motion for 

new trial stage, nor has he pointed to anything contained in the 

records that would have been useful to him that the jury did not hear 

at trial. We are accordingly left to speculate about the records’ 
30

contents and their utility to King, whether by corroborating the 

witnesses’ testimony about the records or providing additional, 

helpful information. But speculation is insufficient to show 

prejudice. See id. at 570-571 (defendant failed to show prejudice 

from his trial counsel not calling a certain witness and putting a 

photograph of the witness into evidence at trial when the defendant 

did not have the witness testify at the motion for new trial hearing 

and did not put a photograph of the witness into the motion for new 

trial record). Accordingly, this claim fails.

(b) King contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by not objecting to testimony about his drug 

and alcohol consumption as improper character evidence. This 

claim was not raised at the motion for new trial stage, when King 

had new counsel, so it is waived. See Elkins v. State, 306 Ga. 351, 

361(830 SE2d 217) (2019). 

(c) King argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by not objecting to an alleged “golden rule” violation. See 

Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505, 512 (801 SE2d 782) (2017) (defining 
31

the “golden rule”). Because we see no violation of the “golden rule,” 

we conclude that King’s trial counsel was not constitutionally 

deficient in this regard. 

During closing, the prosecutor said the following: 

Close your eyes. I want you to envision it being a 

beautiful spring morning here in Decatur, Georgia, March 

28th, 2018. The sun is out. 

The weather was nice. Michael Brooks is walking 

along Glenwood [Road] in Decatur, Georgia. He was 

walking to the bus stop to go home to meet his mom, 

Hannah Pittmon, to help her clean that day because she 

owned a cleaning business. He was walking. I want you 

to imagine a pickup truck driving down Glenwood 

Westbound, seeing Michael, making a U-turn right at 

Hooper Street, driving back down and passing Michael, 

turning into the parking lot of [the restaurant], and lying 

in wait for him to walk by. I want you to picture Michael 

walking and passing that pickup truck. I want you to 

envision this sound as Michael walks by. I want you to 

envision Michael dropping to the ground and sliding along 

that sidewalk after being shot. I want you to picture him 

being able to pick his injured body up and run away from 

the danger and try to run to safety, but collapsing again 

because of the injury he just sustained. I want you to 

picture the defendant getting out of his truck and chasing 

Michael into the middle of that road and standing over 

him and shooting him multiple times over and over and 

over and over and over and over again, and unloading his 

clip. I want you to picture [multiple witnesses] watching 

in horror. I want you to hear the women yelling, no, from 
32

inside of that salon. I want you to continue to walk with 

me down this lane of horrible memories. I want you to 

picture these people, these witnesses, running to 

Michael’s aid, but it’s too late. I want you to picture the 

defendant walking away after nodding his head like, 

yeah, I did that, getting in his truck and driving off. I 

want you to envision the trauma that these people 

probably still experience because of what they witnessed. 

I want you to picture Ms. Pittmon getting that call that 

day from a detective telling her that her son was 

murdered and him walking out of her life for eternity. 

Then I want you to picture the defendant, as he put it on 

a jail call, walking because y’all find him not guilty. I 

want y’all to picture him walking amongst us at some 

point in time in the future because y’all find him not 

guilty by reason of insanity. Now, I want you to open your 

eyes from that nightmare, and I want y’all to go back to 

the jury deliberation room after the judge gives you the 

law and find him guilty.

King claims the State violated the “golden rule” when it asked the 

jury to imagine King “walking amongst us at some point in time in 

the future because [the jury found] him not guilty by reason of 

insanity.”10

 

10 King does not contend that the State’s closing argument included 

commentary about his “future dangerousness.” See, e.g., Wyatt v. State, 267 

Ga. 860 (485 SE2d 470) (1997). We express no view on that issue, including 

about whether an argument about future dangerousness would be undermined 

by recent legal developments.
33

Under Georgia law, “golden rule” violations occur when a party 

asks the “jurors to place themselves in the position of the victims.” 

Menefee, 301 Ga. at 512. But the prosecutor here did not ask the 

jurors to place themselves in the victim’s position, so a “golden rule” 

objection would have failed. See Rucker v. State, 291 Ga. 134, 138

(728 SE2d 205) (2012) (concluding that the prosecutor did not violate 

the “golden rule” when the defendant raised an insanity defense and 

the State pointed “out the number of potentially dangerous people 

like [him] in society” and said, “Are we really so sure of this science 

of forensic psychology and psychiatry that we bet our lives on it?”); 

Sanders v. State, 290 Ga. 637, 640 & n.3 (723 SE2d 436) (2012)

(concluding that a prosecutor did not violate the “golden rule” by 

stating that “it could have been anybody” whom the defendant 

killed), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in 

State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 736 (827 SE2d 892) (2019). And because 

failing to make a meritless objection is not constitutionally deficient, 

Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 466, 471 (877 SE2d 568) (2022), this claim 

fails. 
34

(d) King contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by not 

objecting to alleged misstatements about the definition of voluntary 

intoxication and not requesting a clarifying instruction about the 

interaction between voluntary intoxication and insanity—the same 

statements at issue in his second enumeration of error. Assuming 

without deciding that his trial counsel was deficient, King has failed 

to show he was prejudiced. 

As with King’s second enumeration of error, King takes issue 

with witness testimony and the State’s argument that voluntary 

intoxication is not a defense. A more accurate statement of law, he 

argues, would have included that voluntary intoxication is a defense 

“in the extreme situation” where the intoxication results in a 

“permanently altered” “brain function so as to negate intent.” See 

Perez, 309 Ga. at 690 n.2.

But King has failed to show that there is a reasonable 

probability that he would have achieved a better result at trial but 

for this assumed deficiency. See Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 728

(873 SE2d 166) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed, 
35

King’s argument suffers from the same defect as in the second 

enumeration: the theory of King’s defense at trial was that he was 

temporarily insane and that he was not voluntarily intoxicated at 

all; he did not argue that he suffered from permanent brain damage 

preventing him from manifesting intent, and he has not pointed to 

any evidence at trial (nor have we identified any) that would have 

supported that theory. Thus, King has failed to show that, had the 

jury been aware that voluntary intoxication could potentially be a 

defense in an “‘extreme situation,’” Perez, 309 Ga. at 690 n.2, there 

is a reasonable probability he would have achieved a better result at 

trial. See Choisnet, 295 Ga. at 572-573; Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 

246 (869 SE2d 423) (2022) (“The test for prejudice in the ineffective 

assistance analysis is equivalent to the test for harm in plain[-]error 

review.”) (cleaned up). See also Munn, 313 Ga. at 723, 728 

(defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel not requesting jury 
36

instruction on justification when the evidence of justification was 

weak). This enumeration therefore fails.11 

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. 

 

11 Citing State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020), King also 

argues that the cumulative effect of the errors and deficiencies in his case

affected the outcome of his trial even if none did alone. Assuming one error in 

the plain-error context (that the trial court admitted testimony misstating the 

law of voluntary intoxication) and two deficiencies in the ineffective assistance 

of counsel context (the first concerning trial counsel’s failure to obtain properly 

certified medical records and the second also concerning the misstatements of 

the law of voluntary intoxication), King “has not demonstrated a reasonable 

probability that, but for these failures, the outcome of the proceeding would 

have been different.” See Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 334 (877 SE2d 202) 

(2022) (cumulative effect of a presumed clear error by the trial court not giving 

an accomplice corroboration charge, a presumed deficiency by trial counsel for 

not requesting that charge, and a presumed deficiency by trial counsel for not 

objecting to hearsay was insufficient to establish cumulative error).