[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13423

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHNNY ORDAZ, 

a.k.a. Jo,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00070-VMC-AEP-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13423

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After a jury trial, Johnny Ordaz appeals his convictions for 

(1) possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (“Count 1”); (2) possession of a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Count 2”); and (3) felon in possession 

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (“Count 

3”).

On appeal, Ordaz argues the district court erred: (1) by 

denying his motion to dismiss Count 3, in which he challenged the

constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (2) by denying his motion 

to suppress; and (3) by denying his motions for a judgment of 

acquittal on Count 2. Ordaz also argues the district court at trial 

abused its discretion by limiting Ordaz’s cross-examination of an 

officer involved in the traffic stop. After review, we affirm Ordaz’s 

convictions.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 3

We generally review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 

denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment. United States v. 

Vineyard, 945 F.3d 1164, 1167 (11th Cir. 2019). But we review de 

novo the constitutionality of a statute. United States v. Wright, 

607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Ordaz contends that Congress 

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exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting 

§ 922(g)(1).

As Ordaz concedes, however, his facial and as-applied 

challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by 

our precedent. See United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 

1236 (11th Cir. 2008). Specifically, “[w]e have repeatedly held that 

Section 922(g)(1) is not a facially unconstitutional exercise of 

Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause[.]” United States v. 

Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011).

Likewise, our Court has held that § 922(g)(1) is not 

unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm 

only intrastate where the government demonstrates that the 

particular firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Id. 

Here, at trial, the government demonstrated that Ordaz’s 

firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Jeffrey Burt, an agent 

with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,

testified that the firearm found between the driver’s seat and center 

console of Ordaz’s car was manufactured outside of Florida, where 

Ordaz’s crimes occurred. See Wright, 607 F.3d at 715-16 (holding 

the government need show only a minimal nexus between the 

firearm and interstate commerce, such as evidence that the firearm 

was manufactured outside of the state where the defendant 

possessed it).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ordaz’s 

motion to dismiss Count 3.

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II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Next, Ordaz argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress because the police stopped and searched his 

car without probable cause. Ordaz argues evidence obtained as a 

result of the search should have been suppressed.

At a hearing on Ordaz’s motion to suppress, the government 

presented the following testimony of Detectives Joe Petta, John 

Thames, Eric Davis, and Jonathan Kruse. At the time of the traffic 

stop, the detectives were familiar with Ordaz due to his suspected 

involvement in fentanyl distribution and a homicide. Prior to the 

traffic stop, they also knew that Ordaz was a convicted felon. On 

September 5, 2019, detectives saw Ordaz’s gray four-door Infiniti

parked at his mother’s house, and detectives parked nearby to 

conduct surveillance. The tint on the Infiniti’s windows was so 

dark that detectives could not determine the race or sex of the 

driver or how many other people were in the car. As the Infiniti 

exited Ordaz’s mother’s neighborhood, Detective Petta, from his 

undercover police car, saw the Infiniti run a stop sign.

The Infiniti continued to drive toward the next intersection, 

where Detectives Thames, Davis, and Scott Williamson were 

parked in another undercover police car. Detective Petta radioed 

those detectives to tell them that the Infiniti had run a stop sign. 

Those detectives radioed back that they saw the Infiniti run a 

second stop sign. The detectives did not initiate a traffic stop on 

the Infiniti at that time because their vehicles did not have lights or 

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sirens. Instead, they radioed Detective Kruse, whose car had lights 

and sirens, for assistance.

The two undercover police carsfollowed the Infiniti for forty 

blocks until it parked at an apartment complex, at which point 

Detective Kruse arrived in a third police car. As the Infiniti 

attempted to pull out of the apartment complex, Detective Kruse 

activated his lights and blocked the Infiniti’s path. Detective Kruse 

exited his car and approached the Infiniti, but the Infiniti began to 

back up 30 to 40 yards until it reached the end of the parking lot.

Detective Williamson then opened the Infiniti’s driver’s door 

and Ordaz exited the car. Detective Davis, who was standing in 

front of the open driver’s door, saw a firearm with an extended 

magazine between the driver’s seat and center console, and he 

yelled out that he saw a gun. Detective Davis also smelled 

marijuana and saw a marijuana cigarette in the driver’s side door.

At the suppression hearing, Ordaz testified to the following. 

On September 5, 2019, Ordaz went from his mother’s house to an 

apartment complex to meet a friend. As Ordaz left his mother’s 

house, he stopped at the first stop sign. Ordaz then proceeded to 

the next intersection and made a complete stop at the stop sign 

there too. Ordaz was careful to stop at those two intersections 

because they were in a busy area with a lot of accidents. Once he 

arrived at the apartment complex, Ordaz backed into a parking 

spot, called his friend, and then realized his friend was not home.

As Ordaz exited the parking spot, a car pulled in front of 

him. Ordaz was scared because he was recently shot, and he began 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13423

reversing his car. Then Ordaz saw lights in the grill of the car in 

front of him and knew it was the police. Because he was in the 

middle of the parking lot, Ordaz continued to back up until he 

reached a parking spot. Ordaz assumed the window tint on his 

Infiniti was legal because he bought it from a dealership with the 

windows already tinted.

After the hearing, the magistrate judge issued a report and 

recommendation (“R&R”) that Ordaz’s motion to suppress should 

be denied because the officers had probable cause to initiate the 

traffic stop and search Ordaz’s car. The magistrate judge credited 

the officers’ testimony that Ordaz ran two stop signs and that they 

believed his car had illegally dark window tint, which established 

probable cause to initiate the stop. The magistrate judge noted that 

the officers’ testimony was consistent about key events, and that 

the officers’ interest in Ordaz’s involvement in fentanyl distribution 

and a homicide was irrelevant to its probable cause analysis. The 

magistrate judge concluded that Ordaz was not credible because 

he had “substantial motivation to be less than candid in his 

testimony.” Further, the magistrate judge found that the officers 

had probable cause to search Ordaz’s car because the officers 

properly ordered Ordaz out of his car after the traffic stop, 

observed a firearm between the driver’s seat and center console, 

and knew he was a felon unable to possess firearms.

Ordaz objected to the R&R, arguing that the magistrate 

judge erred in crediting the officers’ testimony over his own. 

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Specifically, Ordaz argued that the magistrate judge failed to 

consider the officers’ biases and motives in following Ordaz’s car.

The district court overruled Ordaz’s objections and adopted 

the R&R. The district court found that the officers’ testimony was 

consistent as to the circumstances leading to the traffic stop, and 

that the magistrate judge noted the officers’ potential ulterior 

motives in following Ordaz but still found the officers to be

credible. The district court thus deferred to the magistrate judge’s 

credibility determination and adopted its finding that the officers 

had probable cause to stop Ordaz’s car because he ran two stop 

signs and had illegal window tint on his car.

In this appeal, when faced with a challenge to the denial of 

a motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error and 

the application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Smith, 

459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006). We construe the district 

court’s fact findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party. Id.

First, the district court did not err by finding that the police 

had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop because three officers

testified at a suppression hearing that they saw Ordaz run two stop 

signs, which is a traffic violation under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. 

§ 316.123(2)(a); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As 

a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable 

where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic 

violation has occurred.”).

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Although Ordaz testified that he did not commit these traffic 

violations, the magistrate judge and district court were allowed to 

believe the officers’ testimony to the contrary, and we defer to that 

credibility determination because nothing in their “understanding 

of the facts appears to be unbelievable.” See United States v. 

Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks 

omitted). And while Ordaz argues that the officers initiated the 

traffic stop because they suspected his involvement in unrelated

criminal activity, not a traffic violation, the officers’ subjective 

motivations for initiating the stop “play no role in ordinary, 

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” See Whren, 517 U.S. 

at 813.

Second, the district court did not err by finding that police 

had probable cause to search Ordaz’s car. The automobile 

exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 

“allows the police to conduct a search of a vehicle if (1) the vehicle 

is readily mobile[,] and (2) the police have probable cause for the 

search.” United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). 

Ordaz does not dispute that his car, which he had been driving 

before the officers initiated the traffic stop, was operational. See 

United States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating 

that a car is readily mobile where it is operational). 

The police obtained probable cause to search Ordaz’s car 

after they initiated the traffic stop and ordered him out of the car. 

See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (“[O]nce a 

motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the 

police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle 

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without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of 

unreasonable searches and seizures.”). Detectives testified at the 

suppression hearing that they were aware prior to the traffic stop 

that Ordaz was a felon, and as Ordaz exited his car, Detective Davis

(1) saw a firearm between the driver’s seat and center console;

(2) smelled marijuana; and (3) saw a marijuana cigarette in the 

driver’s door. Based on Ordaz’s status as a felon and the presence 

of a firearm, odor of marijuana, and a marijuana cigarette in the 

car, the police had probable cause to search the car. See United States 

v. Delva, 922 F.3d 1228, 1243 (11th Cir. 2019) (stating probable cause 

exists to perform a warrantless search of a car “when there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in 

the vehicle[.]” (quotation marks omitted)).

Because the traffic stop and search of Ordaz’s car were 

proper under the Fourth Amendment, there was no error in the 

district court’s denial of Ordaz’s motion to suppress evidence 

obtained as a result of that stop and search.

III. SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

On appeal, Ordaz argues that the district court 

impermissibly restricted his cross-examination at trial of Detective 

Thames regarding the circumstances leading to the traffic stop. 

Ordaz contends his lines of questioning of Detective Thames 

would have shown that he did stop at the two stop signs and “would 

have shown that law enforcement really didn’t have [probable]

cause” for the traffic stop that led to the search of his car and arrest.

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We review a defendant’s claim that the district court 

impermissibly limited the scope of cross-examination for a clear 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 

1295 (11th Cir. 2009).

A district court’s discretion to limit cross-examination is 

restricted by a criminal defendant’s right under the Sixth 

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause to cross-examine the 

government’s witnesses. Id. Still, a defendant “is entitled only to 

an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not 

cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 

extent, the defendant might wish.” Id. at 1296 (quotation marks 

omitted). The information the defendant seeks to elicit must be 

relevant. Id. 

Here, the district court already determined after a

suppression hearing that the police had probable cause to initiate 

the traffic stop. As explained above, the district court committed 

no error in that determination. The legal issue of probable cause 

for the traffic stop was not a question of fact at trial for Ordaz to 

re-litigate and for the jury to re-determine. See Bretti v. Wainwright, 

439 F.2d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting the “well-established rule 

that it is for the court, not the jury, to decide whether evidence has 

been illegally obtained”); Burris v. United States, 192 F.2d 253, 

254-55 (5th Cir. 1951) (“[T]he Court correctly ruled that the legality 

of the search warrant and the evidence obtained as a result of its 

execution was a matter of law for its determination. It was 

therefore entirely proper that the Court prohibit cross-examination 

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[at trial] of the witnesses upon this question when before the 

jury[.]”).1

Further, Ordaz was able to ask questions of Detective 

Thames about the traffic stop itself, the search of his car, the 

collection of evidence, and Detective Thames’s police report about 

the stop and evidence seized.

In contrast, Ordaz’s challenged lines of questioning at trial 

all concerned the underlying probable cause basis for the stop, such 

as how long the police followed Ordaz before initiating the traffic 

stop, whether they radioed other deputies for help, the number of 

patrol deputies in the county’s sheriff’s office, whether there were 

opportunities to initiate the stop sooner, and the visibility of the 

emergency lights on Detective Kruse’s police car that initiated the 

stop. Accordingly, because the district court had already 

determined probable cause and the validity of the stop and search, 

we discern no error in the district court’s limitation of Ordaz’s 

cross-examination of Detective Thames.

Finally, we recognize there is a presumption in favor of “free 

cross-examination on possible bias, motive, ability to perceive and 

remember, and general character for truthfulness.” Maxwell, 

579 F.3d at 1296 (quotation marks omitted). For the first time in his 

reply brief, Ordaz argues that the disputed lines of questioning 

1 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 

1981 are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 

1207 (11th Cir. 1981).

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were meant not merely for probable cause, but were to test 

Detective Thames’s credibility generally. A party normally forfeits 

issues not timely raised in his initial brief. See United States v. Smith, 

416 F.3d 1350, 1352 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2005). But even if Ordaz had 

raised this issue in his initial brief, he was not entitled to “unlimited 

inquiry.” See Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1295-96 (quotation marks 

omitted). The jury was able to adequately weigh Detective 

Thames’s credibility given his other testimony on 

cross-examination about the ultimate traffic stop, the number of 

officers participating in that stop, the search of Ordaz’s car and the 

collection of evidence, and the report he wrote about the stop and 

the evidence seized. Ordaz does not explain how a reasonable jury 

would have received a significantly different impression of 

Detective Thames’s credibility had Ordaz been able to pursue 

further the additional lines of questioning. See id.

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

limiting Ordaz’s cross-examination of Detective Thames.

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE ON COUNT 2

Ordaz also contends that the district court erred in denying 

his motions for a judgment of acquittal on Count 2, arguing that 

the government’s evidence was insufficient to show that he 

possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.

We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of 

acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. 

Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether a reasonable trier 

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of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id.

Federal law prohibits the possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 

The “in furtherance requirement demands that the government 

establish that the firearm helped, furthered, promoted, or 

advanced the drug trafficking.” United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 

1322, 1340 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). To do so, 

the government must establish some nexus between the firearm 

and the drug selling operation, including by showing the kind of 

drug activity being conducted, the accessibility of the firearm, the 

status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the firearm 

is loaded, and the proximity of the firearm to the drugs or drug 

profits. Id. at 1340-41.

Intent to distribute can be shown by circumstantial evidence, 

such as the amount of drugs found and the presence of other items 

commonly used for distribution, including scales and money near 

the drugs. United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1392 (11th Cir. 1989); 

United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1076 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting 

that cash, plastic bags, and the lack of paraphernalia used to 

consume drugs can also show the intent to distribute).

Here, after record review, we conclude ample evidence 

established Ordaz possessed a firearm in furtherance of a 

drug-trafficking crime. First, the government’s evidence showed 

that Ordaz possessed fentanyl with the intent to distribute it, 

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including (1) 2.5 grams of fentanyl found in the driver’s side door; 

(2) several sandwich- and dime-sized plastic bags, some of which 

contained fentanyl; (3) two digital scales; and (4) $588 in cash. 

See Poole, 878 F.2d at 1392; Mercer, 541 F.3d at 1076. 

Second, the government’s evidence tied the firearm to 

Ordaz’s drug trafficking, including (1) the firearm was accessible to 

Ordaz, as it was found between the driver’s seat and center console; 

(2) the firearm was in close proximity to the fentanyl, which was 

found in the driver’s side door; (3) Ordaz was a felon and his

possession of the firearm was illegal; (4) the firearm was loaded;

and (5) Detective Petta’s testimony that drug dealers often carry 

firearms to protect drugs, proceeds, and themselves. See Dixon, 

901 F.3d at 1341.

While Ordaz testified that he never sold fentanyl, the 

fentanyl was for his personal use, and the firearm was only for 

self-protection, the jury was free to discredit his testimony and 

conclude that the opposite was true. See United States v. Brown, 

53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen a defendant chooses to 

testify, he runs the risk that if disbelieved the jury might conclude 

the opposite of his testimony is true.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

Further, given the corroborative evidence of his guilt outlined 

above, Ordaz’s testimony may alone establish the highly subjective 

element of his intent to possess a firearm to further a 

drug-trafficking crime. See id. at 314-15.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, a reasonable jury could conclude that Ordaz intended to 

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possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. 

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Ordaz’s motions for a 

judgment of acquittal on Count 2.2

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial 

of Ordaz’s motion to dismiss Count 3, motion to suppress, and 

motions for a judgment of acquittal on Count 2, as well as its 

limitation of Ordaz’s cross-examination of Detective Thames.3

AFFIRMED.

2 On appeal, Ordaz does not raise any legal or factual challenges to his sentence 

on any of his convictions.

3 We grant Ordaz’s motion to file a corrected reply brief. The brief attached 

to his motion simply restates the correct amount of fentanyl found in his possession.

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