A Challenge for American Policies

incorporate that region into NATO would amount to a betrayal of the people
who suffered under the harsh control of the Soviet Union.

However, that argument appears to be revisionist history. The West did not
fight the Cold War in order to incorporate the former communist region of
Central Europe into the Western alliance. The Cold War was forced on the
West by the aggressive policy of the communist leadership in Moscow; it was
fought to prevent the expansion of communism. Moscow's political and military
domination of the area we again call Central Europe was a manifestation of
Soviet expansionist policy that resulted in Europe being divided into two armed
camps. In fact, today there is good reason to believe that if NATO were to
expand into Central Europe, Europe would again end up divided into two
armed camps. However, it is premature for the West to give up on the original
goal of the Cold War: a leadership in Moscow that eschews expansionism in
Europe and rejects the inevitability of a Europe divided between East and
West.

A Challenge for American Policy Makers

The challenge to the United States is to soberly reassess U.S. -- and Western
European -- interests in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States. In this reassessment, Russia's involvement in Central Asia
and Transcaucasia need not be viewed as a threat to the West, considering the
region's instability and resistance to economic and political reform. Similarly,
Russia does notband should not in the foreseeable futureppose a threat to the
newly formed states of Central Europe, and, therefore, to Western Europe.

In fact, the urgency of bringing the Central European states into the Western
security alliance (through the Partnership for Peace Program or otherwise)
would depend, in part, upon Moscow's military intentions towards the West.

If Russian intentions remain non-threatening, then the major U.S. interest in
Central Europe is making sure this region remains free of threatening military
forcespin other words, keeping the region at least neutral.

From a security viewpoint, NATO needs only to seek actual incorporation of
the newly independent states of Central Europe should Russia adopt an
ultra-nationalist philosophy and decide to confront the West by expanding its
control into Central Europe. In fact, a premature attempt to incorporate these
states into the West might decrease our security by forcing Russia to adopt a
much more confrontational stance. Such an attempt could make the emergence
of an authoritarian, expansionist leadership in Moscow more likely.

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A Challenge for American Policies

© Incorporation (in total or in part) into Russia. (The USSR model.)

© Total political and economic domination by Russia, but nominal
independence. (The old East European model.)

© Direct Russian control (formally or informally) over all security forces,
but political autonomy.

© Russian training and logistical support of indigenous forces, but political
independence. (The "Nixonov" doctrine.)

© Extensive Russian influence over security decisions, but political and
economic independence. (The old Finland model.)

Most likely, Russia will approach each country individually, taking into
account the country's strategic value, likelihood to resist Russia's efforts,
potential drain on Russian resources, and lure to the other major powers.

The American View

A key assumption of United States policies towards the region of the former
Soviet Union is that the Soviet successor states, especially Russia, will develop
policies congenial to the United States if the region as a whole becomes
market-oriented and democratic. However, Moscow's de-emphasis of
integration with the West, combined with escalating instability among its
neighbors, and the fact that many of the successor states have shown no
inclination for political and economic reform, undermines this basic
assumption.

If the U.S. wants to continue following its current policies it should expect more
difficulties in American relations with Moscow. Some Western analysts have
already started to advocate changes to American policies.

It is also premature for the West to give up on the original goal of the Cold War: a
leadership in Moscow that eschews expansionism in Europe and rejects the
inevitability of a Europe divided between East and West.

The sudden change in Russian foreign policy announcements starting last fall
was initially labelled by some in the United States as a return to imperialism.
They urged NATO to quickly expand eastward to incorporate Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and even the Baltic states. Failure to expand was
portrayed as a new form of appeasement. The argument amounted to a claim
that the Cold War had been fought over Central Europe, so failure to

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A Challenge for American Policies

The United States major interest in Ukraine rests with its potential to serve as a
military counterweight to a revanchist Russia. It would serve the interests of
the United States and Western Europe if Ukraine developed into a fully
independent state, buttressed by a large military force, adding to the stability of
Europe. However, Ukraine may not be a viable statepat least, not within its
current borders. And if it is not, no amount of American aid and
encouragement will keep Ukraine whole and sovereign.

Further, the United States ought to consider what would happen to Ukraine's
present military force if the country, in whole or part, reverted to Moscow's
controlpthrough legal incorporation into a greater Russia or by becoming a
willing satellite. The most likely case is that the bulk of the Ukrainian armed
forces would also return to Moscow's controlbeven if present-day Ukraine splits
in two.

Policy Recommendations

The United States should consider:
© Acknowledging that Russia has vital security interests, while opposing
territorial claims by Moscow that would conflict with security interests of
Western Europe and the United States.

© Increasing the priority we place on Russian stability, even at the cost of
the priority we place on near-term marketization.

° Reaffirming that the West has a vital interest in Central Europe
remaining at the least neutral and that the United States does not consider
Russian military dominance over the countries of Central Europe to be an
appropriate Russian vital interest.

© Maintaining a military capability allowing NATO to mobilize forces to
move into Central Europe if a future expansionist-minded Russia indicates
that it might try to do the same thing.

© Continuing strong support for Ukrainian independence but recognizing
that it may not be a viable state and could fragment in the future.

This paper is an abridged version of an article being published in the Fall 1994
issue of Orbis.

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A Challenge for American Policies

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

STRATEGIC FoRuUM

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Number 6, September 1994

A Challenge for American Policies

Russian Vital Interests

James H. Brusstar

Conclusions

¢ In exchange for help in suppressing the parliament last October, Russian
military leaders apparently were granted their position that Russia's own vital
interests -- not cooperation with the West -- be the basis for Moscow's security
decisions.

© The current Russian concept of vital interests rejects the old Soviet dogma
regarding a struggle between two social systems. However, it falls short of
embracing the idea of Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev that it is essential for
Russia to collaborate with the West on security matters. Nor is the concept
dependent on Russia's integration into the Western-dominated international
system.

¢ Although Russia's new security premise increases the chances of the United
States and Russia disagreeing over security issues, the policy is not inherently
confrontational. Russian actions and state-ments so far have reflected a belief
that securing one's vital interests also requires dialogue, compromise, and the
avoidance of conflicts with other powerful nations.

© While most within the Moscow decisionmaking community, including the new,
conservative-dominated legislature, accept the notion that Russian policies
should be based on vital interests, there is still no consensus on how to translate
this principle into action -- particularly in what they call the "Near Abroad."

© Russia's new concept of vital interests represents both a challenge and an
opportunity for American policy, but not necessarily a return to Russian
expansionism. Russia's de-emphasis of integration with the West, combined
with the growing risk that an ultra-nationalist might come to power in Moscow,

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A Challenge for American Policies

challenges the United States to re-examine its policies, not just toward Russia,
but toward the entire region of Europe formerly controlled by the Soviets.

Kozyrev Loses a Policy Fight

Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev postulated the basic premise of Russia's
security policies in December 1991, when Russia, along with Ukraine and
Belarus, abolished the Soviet Union and declared itself an independent state.
Concluding that the major threats to Russia's security were economic and
political isolation, Kozyrev decided that Russia had to pursue revolutionary
economic and political reform and, most importantly, join with the Western
world. Kozyrev believed that Russia could achieve security only through
integration, not confrontation or competition, with the West. Moreover, his
integration strategy advocated development of normal, cooperative relations
with the other former Soviet republics.

Kozyrev's policies came under immediate attack from those who believed that
Russia should entrust guardianship of its security and its place within the
international community only to itself. This group argued that Russian security
policies ought to focus on securing Russian vital interestspespecially in "the
Near Abroad" pnot integrating into an international system controlled by the
West. The debate, which continued for two years, ended abruptly early in the
morning of October 4, 1993, when President Yeltsin rushed to the Ministry of
Defense asking the military to put down the rebellion in the streets of Moscow.
According to knowledgeable sources, in exchange for tanks, Yeltsin made
several concessions to the militarypincluding acceptance of vital national
interests as the basis for future security decisions.

Russian Vital Interests

The Russian concept of vital interests de-emphasizes Kozyrev's idea that
collaboration with the West on security matters is essential, but still rejects the
old Soviet dogma regarding a struggle between two social systems. Further, the
concept is not dependent upon Russia's integration into the Western-dominated
international system.

A Yeltsin advisor maintains that the pursuit of one's own security interests also
requires...avoidance of conflicts with other powerful nations. From this
perspective, it would be wrong to view Russia's policy as inherently
confrontational.

Few Russians have as yet specified what Russia's vital interests might be.

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‘A Challenge for American Policies

However, at a May 1992 Moscow conference on military doctrine,
Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, Chief of the General Staff Academy, listed a
series of national goals[1]
© The neutrality of Central and East European countries or their friendly
relations with Russia;

© Free Russian access to seaports in the Baltics;

o Excluding "third-country" military forces from the Baltics and
non-membership of the Baltic states in military blocs directed at Russia;

© Preventing Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries from
becoming part of a buffer zone separating Russia from the West, South, or
East;

° Maintaining the CIS states under Russia's exclusive influence;
© Preserving good-neighbor relations with states of the Middle and Far East.

Although Russian decisionmakers are still debating specifics, official statements
(and Russian actions) suggest that many of these goals have been accepted in
practice by Russian leaders.

Emphasizing the difference from the approach advocated previously by
Kozyrev, one advisor to Yeltsin has made the point that while Russia wants to
cooperate with the West on security issues, it would not hesitate to pursue its
own policies when national interests are involved. The advisor fully expects that
differences between Moscow and Washington over how to handle international
problems will occur more frequently in the future. But he maintains that the
pursuit of one's own security interests also requires dialogue, compromise, and
the avoidance of conflicts with other powerful nations. From this perspective, it
would be wrong to view Russia's policy as inherently confrontational.

The Implementation Problem

Although most within the Moscow decisionmaking community, including the
new, conservative-dominated legislature, accept the notion that Russian policies
should be based on vital interests, there is still no consensus on how to translate
this principle into action. In fact, Russia continues to struggle with the question
of how best to maintain its influence in the countries of the CIS. Various
approaches have been discussed over the last two years, but no single one seems
to satisfy all needs. The five general models that have been discussed in Russia
are:

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