UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1052

RONALD SATISH EMRIT,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

OFFICE DEPOT, INC.,

 Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. 

(8:13-cv-02297-RWT)

Submitted: February 27, 2014 Decided: March 5, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald Satish Emrit, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ronald Satish Emrit appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing his civil action for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies and to comply with a court order. 

Finding no reversible error for the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

Emrit filed an employment discrimination complaint

against Defendant Office Depot, Inc., asserting that he had

experienced employment discrimination due to an unspecified

disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (2012). The district court 

ordered Emrit to particularize his complaint within twenty-one 

days to demonstrate that he had exhausted his administrative 

remedies and received a “right to sue” letter from the Maryland 

Human Rights Commission (“MHRC”) (recently renamed the Maryland 

Commission on Civil Rights) or the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”).*

 In response, Emrit filed multiple 

pleadings attempting to challenge the exhaustion requirement. 

He also amended his complaint as a matter of course, see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1), to clarify that his original claims were 

 * This court previously dismissed Emrit’s appeal of this 

order as interlocutory. See Emrit v. Office Depot, Inc., __ F. 

App’x __, 2013 WL 6153786, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 25, 2013) (No. 

13-2141). 
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brought under the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006), and to articulate 

new claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) and alleged violations of the National Labor Relations 

Act (“NLRA”), see 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012). The district 

court dismissed Emrit’s action for failure to comply with its 

prior order and to exhaust administrative remedies. 

On appeal, Emrit argues that he should not have been 

required to seek administrative review as a prerequisite to 

filing his complaint. It is well settled that a plaintiff is 

required by statute to exhaust his administrative remedies 

before filing suit under Title VII or the ADA. See Sydnor v. 

Fairfax Cnty., Va., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012) (ADA); 

Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2005) 

(2005) (Title VII). Emrit asserts in a conclusory fashion that 

the exhaustion requirement is “unconstitutional,” but he does 

not explain the basis for this claim—including which

constitutional provision the requirement purportedly violates. 

Contrary to Emrit’s assertion, he was not required to exhaust 

remedies with the National Association for the Advancement of 

Colored People or the Department of Justice, and neither the 

EEOC nor the MHRC were required to represent Emrit in his suit. 

Because it is clear that Emrit did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies as to his ADA and Title VII claims, and 
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he failed to comply with the court’s order directing him to 

establish such compliance, we find no error in the court’s 

dismissal of these claims.

Emrit’s IIED and NLRA claims, raised in his amended 

complaint, were not subject to the same exhaustion requirement 

as his employment discrimination claims. However, we may affirm 

the district court’s judgment on any basis clearly appearing 

from the record. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 

943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). Insofar as Emrit fairly challenges 

the dismissal of these claims, we conclude they clearly lack a 

valid legal basis, and the district court committed no 

reversible error in dismissing them. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) (2012) (permitting court to dismiss 

case sua sponte when it is “frivolous” or “fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted”); see also Manikhi v. Mass 

Transit Admin., 758 A.2d 95, 113-15 (Md. 2000) (describing 

elements of IIED claim); Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 

1216-17 (Md. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring showing that conduct was 

“so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 

intolerable in a civilized community” (internal quotation marks 

omitted), and recognizing circumstances where workplace 

harassment is insufficient to establish IIED). 
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED