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Number 137, April 1998

Security of the WesternHemisphere*International Terrorism and Organized Crime
by Max G. Manwaring

Conclusions- 
International terrorism and organized    crime (ITOC), are engaged in what the Organization of American States (OAS) has recently    defined as "grave common crime." 

- 
ITOC are powerful enough to    destabilize, challenge, and destroy targeted societies and states. The increasing    influence and power of ITOC are generating transnational threats.

- 
The threat posed by ITOC is too great    and too complex for civilian institutions to confront by themselves. The military could    and should assist in internal protection missions if its operational role is carefully    limited by a legal democratic regime.

- 
Today’s security requirements    call for a coordinated and cooperative application not only of all national civilian and    military resources but also those of a variety of international and functional    organizations.

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Because success against ITOC requires    close unilateral and multilateral coordination, the responsibility should devolve to the    OAS.

**The Issues**
Despite the obvious differences between the organizations, tactics,motives, and objectives of the various elements that constitute international terrorismand organized crime (ITOC), all have one thing in common—they are engaged in what theOrganiza-tion of American States (OAS) has recently defined as "grave commoncrime." This situation is more than a complex law enforcement problem. It requiresbroadening the concept of national security from the traditional notion of unilateralterritorial protection to a nontraditional concept of unilateral *and* multilateralprotection of peoples and governments.

ITOC are powerful enough to destabilize, challenge, and destroytargeted societies and states. The continued growth and the increasing influence and powerof ITOC are generating transnational threats. Nations (acting by themselves) are incapableof combating this phenomenon. Today’s security requirements call for a coordinatedand cooperative application of all national civilian and military resources in fullharmony with those of a variety of international and functional organizations. Nationaland international political rivalries can no longer be permitted to inhibit the pursuitand prosecution of the perpetrators of grave common crime.

Because success against ITOC requires close unilateral and multilateralcoordination and cooperation for an effective unity of effort, the only viable approach tothe transnational threat to hemispheric stability and security is to devolve theresponsibility to the OAS. That organization provides a moral position and structuralframework to which member states can devolve the responsibility for the promulgation ofbinding international agreements directed against grave common crime; the development ofan integrated multilateral anti-ITOC action plan; the planning and implementation of acoordinated and legitimized policy; and the establishment of a supportive security regimedesigned to maximize advantage and to compete effectively against ITOC.

There is a certain reluctance to take the broadened definition ofnational security to its logical conclusion and correspondingly broaden the role of themilitary to a controversial internal protection mission. The threat posed by ITOC,however, is too great and too complex for civilian institutions to confront by themselves.The military could and should assist in internal protection missions if it is properlytrained and its operational role carefully limited by a legal democratic regime. In theWestern Hemisphere, the OAS and its various parts—including the Inter-AmericanDefense Board and the Inter-American Defense College—provide a multilateral, legal,and democratic institutional infrastructure that can evolve to help meet the challenges ofcontemporary security and stability problems.
**Assessing the Threat**
The problems imposed by ITOC are indeed legitimate national andinternational security treats. Given the divisive and destructive impact of these problemson societies and governments, more is at stake than traditional law and order. Regionaland world stability and security are at risk.

Within the context of Western Hemispheric security, there are fourissues relating to international terrorism and organized crime: (1) the threat of ITOC andits implications for society and government; (2) the applicability of this threat outsidethe Hemi-sphere; (3) whether the OAS can effectively confront this transnationalphenomenon; and, (4) the role of the Inter-American Defense Board and the military inhelping generate national and international capabilities to deal effectively with ITOC.
**The ITOC Threat**
In the past, national security was a term primarily associated with theprotection of a nation’s territory and vital external interests against externalphysical assault. Now, however, national security has a more extensive meaning thanprotection from external physical aggression. It implies protection, through a variety ofmeans, of vital internal political, economic, and social interests, the loss of whichcould undermine the fundamental values of a society and the stability and existence of astate.

Terrorism and organized crime act as multipliers of all other forms ofviolence and crime. Everyone in a society is affected directly or indirectly, and thebonds that unite a government, its people, and its protective institutions are broken.Where such fragmentation exists, social cohesion is absent, broad-based consensus becomevirtually impossible, and national will****breaks down entirely. Thus,ITOC—regardless of differing terrorist, insurgent, militantly reformist, or criminalbases—divides, corrupts, destabilizes, and destroys societies as well as governments.This has been defined by the OAS as "grave common crime." Consequently, concretenational and international security as well as law enforcement measures must be taken tocombat this threat to national, regional, and world stability.
**Applicability outside the Western Hemisphere**
At least eight facts make ITOC progressively more mobile, flexible,powerful, and universally threatening:
- High profitability provides vast resources for expansion. 
- The apparently declining ability of fragile governments to manage and    protect a modern nation-state allows correspondingly greater opportunity for ITOC growth. 
- Political, economic, social, and ethnic turmoil and environmental    degradation are creating large-scale refugee flows that terrorists and organized criminals    follow and exploit for their own purposes. 
- Border porosity between interdependent states increases mobility and    flexibility and aids expansion of illicit as well as legal enterprise. 
- Virtually unlimited access to improved technology makes it relatively    easier to evade law enforcement and concentrate on growth. 
- The general availability of conventional and more sophisticated    weaponry and the attendant intimidation and corruption allow ITOC to survive the efforts    of national law enforcement organizations and encourage expansion. 
- The efficient and tightly controlled ITOC organizations use the    structural features best designed to generate unity of effort, aid growth, and promote    expansion of influence and power. 
- The relative weakness and disorganization of law enforcement agencies    allow terrorists and criminals a relatively unconstrained level of freedom to expand and    become more effective. 

No single country, not even the United States, can deal with terroristand organized crime growth and expansion—and the concomitant threat—by itself.The effective management of an adequate effort to confront ITOC requires internal andexternal cooperation. Internal cooperation requires the coordination of ways and means ininteragency processes. External cooperation requires the synchronization of ways and meansin international processes. Working together, the nation-states of the Hemisphere and theworld must organize and work toward a unity of effort against the transnational ITOCthreat.
**The Role of the Organization of American States**
One viable approach to the threat in the Western Hemisphere is todevolve responsibility for stability and security to the OAS. That organization provides amoral position and structural framework from which to generate an effective, unifiedanti-ITOC effort.

Once the OAS leadership has created a strategic political anti-ITOCvision regarding exactly where it is going and how it is going to get there, it caninitiate an action plan with a series of treaties and conventions. The immediate objectivewould be to generate "hard law." "Hard" international agreements mustcontain binding commitments by states and enforcement mechanisms that provide harmony,accountability, transparency, and means to impose effective sanctions on noncomplyingmember states.

A comprehensive OAS action plan must also address the ITOC phenomenonwith three different functional strategic-level programs. Activities in these areas mustconstantly demonstrate strict respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the ruleof law. The functional strategic programs are:
- serious political, economic, social, and stability development    programs intended to strengthen the institutions and infrastructures of pivotal member    states and eventually ameliorate the root causes that result in terrorism and organized    crime; 
- massive educational and public relations programs that are designed    to mobilize public opinion and to facilitate the will and ability of the peoples of the    Western Hemisphere to help protect themselves from the terrorist-organized crime threat;    and, 
- concrete national and international security programs that will    develop protective instruments capable of neutralizing the perpetrators of grave common    crime. 

Additionally, there are eight highly interrelated factors thatexperience indicates are key to success against ITOC. These factors operate at a lowerlevel of abstraction than those outlined above but would be an integral part of an OASaction plan. They are:
- a management structure to unify effort at the international level; 
- a management structure to guarantee a unified civil-military effort    at the national level; 
- appropriate utilization of information technology to craft different    versions for every audience segment in an ITOC-targeted society and to influence the    emotions, objective reasoning, motives, and behavior of individuals rather than societies; 
- extension of the scope of the informational instrument of power to    develop knowledge strategies to help bring prosperity to particular individuals rather    than abstract nation-states; 
- a mechanism for oversight and canalization of the military-police    counter-ITOC effort; 
- appropriate training and equipment for the protective instruments of    the state and the international community; 
- plans and programs to enhance the exchange of expertise and other    resources and to continue the development of confidence-building measures for multilateral    cooperation against the common threat; and, 
- greater emphasis on intelligence organizations for direct use against    ITOC and for indirect use against problems like hunger, disaster, and environmental    degradation that can make desperate populations into pawns of ITOC. 

The recommendations outlined above do not constitute an all-inclusivelist of considerations the OAS might incorporate into an anti-ITOC action plan. They areonly a beginning. Each of the above ideas—and others—must be refined andelaborated by competent staff work conducted within the OAS. The present OAS structure,financial resources, and expertise are inadequate to the above tasks, however. Thus,sufficient additional organization, funding, and professional staffing must be generatedto create a critical forum in which member states can define and implement theirlegitimate security and stability concepts.
**The Role of the Military**
Because the Inter-American Defense Board is an organization within theOAS structure, it is logical that it could help deal with the ITOC problem. Nevertheless,civilians are concerned about continued military autonomy and immunities, as well asprevious excesses, while military officers are concerned that the armed forces of theHemisphere might be reduced to mere ornamental structures. Civil-military agreement toallow an internal anti-ITOC role for the armed forces must be based on the idea that themilitary role could be canalized by a legal democratic regime.

Two realities contribute to that civil-military agreement. The firstreality concerns the coercive potential of ITOC. The second relates to the fact that aholistic and integrated national and international civil-military effort is required todeal effectively with ITOC.

First, it is argued that ITOC is conducting a war. That war is anunconventional war that is in fact more destabilizing and destructive than conventionalwar. Thus, ITOC is a serious national security problem. At the same time, terrorists andorganized criminals have the effective organization, growing financial resources, andundisputed will to use all types of weapons—at all levels of sophistication—toachieve their objectives. Logic, coupled with the reality of unconventional war, dictatessome kind of role for the armed forces within a holistic anti-ITOC effort.

Second, it is clear that the defeat of transnational terrorism andorganized crime depends on an integrated unilateral *and* multilateral effort. Inthat context, close consultation with the United Nations, other regional organizations,and INTERPOL is required. Together, the individual components of the responsibleinternational community can provide a multilateral, legal, and democratic institutionalinfrastructure from which to support an effective but limited military role in securityand stability efforts directed against ITOC.
**Policy Implications**
The imperative of investing in effective multilateralism to combat thegrave common crime perpetrated by ITOC implies fundamental foreign and domestic policychanges for every country that might become involved. There must be a commitment tocoordinate all the civil-military instruments of power in a unified effort to deal withthe pervasive ITOC threat. There must also be a commitment to a substantive measure ofregional and international cooperation for the same purpose. Finally, there must beallocation of sufficient political, monetary, and human resources to create the mechanismsthat can and will support a well-planned, well-resourced, and well-synchronized nationaland international anti-ITOC effort.

In the simplest possible terms, the governments of the WesternHemisphere and other regions of the world have three choices. Two are negative, the otherpositive.

First, governments can continue to ignore the threats associated withthe national, regional, and international disequilibrium imposed by ITOC. Second,governments can continue trying to interdict ITOC on an ad hoc, business-as-usual basis.In either of these cases it is not likely that the perpetrators of grave common crime willgo away.

The positive approach is that governments can work through theOrganization of American States or other legitimate international organizations to provideconstructive support and direction for the policy and action changes required to dealeffectively with the transnational threats imposed by international terrorism andorganized crime. If this should be the case, the sooner the better.

Max G. Manwaring is currently an Adjunct Professor of Political Scienceat Dickinson College, a political-military affairs consultant, and a retired U.S. Armycolonel. He has written extensively on "gray area phenomena." For moreinformation contact Dr. Manwaring at (717) 776-9759, or by fax at (717) 776-6909. ThisStrategic Forum is based on the Symposium Report for the Second Annual InteramericanDefense College (IADB)—Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) SecuritySymposium conducted at the National Defense University (NDU) on 24 September 1996. Theauthor has emphasized cogent points and recurring themes developed and elaborated at thesymposium from the perspective of individuals, nations, the Hemisphere, an other regionsof the world. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the symposium participants andaccepts sole responsibility for any errors. 

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institutefor National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These includereports of original research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the results ofunclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.

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