IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:15-MJ-605

vs. : MAGISTRATE JUDGE KING

SHANNON HARROLD, :

Defendant. :

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM RE. “DISPOSAL”

__________________________________________________________________

Shannon Harrold, through undersigned counsel, hereby submits his 

Memorandum on “Disposal” as directed by this Court.

Dated this 16th day of October, 2015.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Deborah L. Williams 

Deborah Williams (AZ 010537)

Federal Public Defender

Federal Public Defender’s Office

10 West Broad Street, Suite 1020

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3469

(614) 469-2999

Deborah_Williams@fd.org

Attorney for Defendant Shannon Harrold

Case: 2:15-mj-00605-NMK Doc #: 10 Filed: 10/16/15 Page: 1 of 5 PAGEID #: 26
 MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Statement of Facts

On September 25, 2015, by criminal Complaint, the government charged 

Mr. Harrold with violating 42 USC 7413(c)(1). Specifically, the government 

alleges that Mr. Harrold “knowingly vented, released, or disposed of a 

hydrochlorofluorocarbon refrigerant into the environment while in the course of 

maintaining, servicing, repairing, or disposing of an appliance.” The government 

claims that Mr. Harrold attempted to steal a commercial air conditioning unit and 

in the process cut the tubing which in turn caused the release of refrigerant into the 

air. 

During the October 9, 2015, preliminary and detention hearing, defense 

counsel argued that the actions alleged in the Complaint do not fall within the 

ambit of 42 USC 7671g because Mr. Harrold is not in the business of maintaining, 

servicing, repairing, or disposing of appliances. This Court asked for briefing on 

the issue of what constitutes “disposal” and why the alleged conduct would not fall 

within the scope of that term. 

Statement of Law

Section 42 USC 7671g prohibits “any person, in the course of maintaining, 

servicing, repairing, or disposing of an appliance or industrial process refrigeration, 

Case: 2:15-mj-00605-NMK Doc #: 10 Filed: 10/16/15 Page: 2 of 5 PAGEID #: 27
to knowingly vent or otherwise knowingly release or dispose of any class I or class 

II substance used as a refrigerant in such applicant...in a manner which permits 

such substance to enter the environment.” See also 40 CFR 82.150, stating that the 

Clean Air Act applies “to any person servicing, maintaining, or repairing 

appliances...” as well as certain other people/companies involved in the business of 

dealing with appliances. Based on the facts alleged and not alleged in the 

Complaint, it appears that Mr. Harrold was not employed as an air conditioning 

technician at the time the charged events allegedly occurred. 

Neither of the relevant statutes -- 42 USC 7413(c), 42 USC 7671g -- define

the term “disposal.” Therefore, “[w]hen a statute does not define a term, we 

typically give the phrase its ordinary meaning.” Mohamad v. Palestinian 

Authority, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 1706-1707 (2012), citing FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S.Ct. 

1177, 1182 (2011). In normal usage, the term “disposal” means the act of getting 

rid of something, or alternatively being available to be used by someone. See 

Cambridge Dictionaries Online,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/disposal. In American 

English usage, it also refers to a waste device attached to the kitchen sink. See 

MacMillan Dictionary, 

www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/disposal. The statute 

speaks to improper disposal of appliances in a manner that would endanger the 

Case: 2:15-mj-00605-NMK Doc #: 10 Filed: 10/16/15 Page: 3 of 5 PAGEID #: 28
environment. There is no indication, nor does it make sense, that the statute intends 

to equate “disposal” with “theft.” 

In looking for similar cases undersigned counsel reviewed hundreds of 

reported cases throughout the country, all involving violations of 42 USC 

7413(c)(1). Those cases revealed that this statute typically is used to prosecute 

cases involving the work practices of construction-related companies, or 

owners/managers of companies involved in other activities regulated by the EPA, 

consistent with the EPA’s mission “to protect human health and the environment --

air, water, and land.” www.epa.gov/region9/enforcement/intro.html. The 

regulation of common theft, on the other hand, is a matter commonly left for 

regulation by the local governments.

On the question of why the word “disposal” should not apply to Mr. Harrold, 

the answer comes down to the normal meaning of the word. In normal usage the 

word “disposal” is not synonymous with “theft.” Further, there is no indication 

that this statute was intended to reach beyond its stated purpose, or beyond the 

mission of the EPA. Accordingly, this statute should not reach the conduct alleged 

in this Complaint.

Case: 2:15-mj-00605-NMK Doc #: 10 Filed: 10/16/15 Page: 4 of 5 PAGEID #: 29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the Defendant’s Memorandum 

was electronically served upon J. Michael Marous, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Office of the United States Attorney, 303 Marconi Blvd., Suite 200, Columbus, Ohio 

43215, this 16th day of October, 2015.

/s/ Deborah L. Williams 

Deborah L. Williams (AZ 010537)

Federal Public Defender

Attorney for Defendant Shannon Harrold

Case: 2:15-mj-00605-NMK Doc #: 10 Filed: 10/16/15 Page: 5 of 5 PAGEID #: 30