1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-61386-CIV-UNGARO/REID

 16-60007-CR-ZLOCH

CARLINE MAURICE

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 /

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER

CARLINE MAURICE’SMOTION UNDER 28 USC § 2255 TO VACATE, SET

ASIDE OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY

The United States of America respectfully submits that petitioner Carline Maurice’s 

Motion To Vacate, Set Aside Or Correct Sentence, DE 11, should be denied, since its claims are

refuted by the record and otherwise fail to state sufficient grounds for relief.

INTRODUCTION

A grand jury charged the movant and codefendants with conspiracies to commit wire fraud 

and identity theft, and with substantive wire fraud and identity theft violations. CRDE 3. These 

charges addressed a fraudulent tax refund scheme that used the personal information of deceased 

individuals to make false claims for tax refunds. Id. 

Movant and her codefendants each exercised their right to a jury trial. The jury convicted 

movant and codefendant Maurice Exavier of all counts charged in the indictment. CRDE 99, 100. 

A third codefendant, Jimmy Alexandre, was acquitted.

Movant received a sentence of incarceration for 132 months. CRDE 136:2. She

appealed. Her conviction was affirmed. United States v. Exavier, 783 Fed.Appx. 849 (11th Cir. 

 

1 Docket entry (DE) 1 is under the civil case number; docket entries under the criminal case 

number appear with the prefix “CRDE”.

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2019). That opinion summarized the evidence from movant’s trial as follows:

Exavier and Maurice were principals of Broward Financial Services, LLC (“BFS”), 

Advance Tax and Accounting Services, Inc. (“ATAS”), and Advance Tax and 

Accounting Services 2 (“ATAS2”). All three companies provided tax preparation 

services. Alexandre worked as a tax preparer for a separate business called “Mr. 

Cash and Associates” (“Mr. Cash”). The government alleges that through these 

businesses, defendants arranged to file false tax returns on behalf of deceased 

individuals and have refund checks deposited into bank accounts that Exavier and 

Maurice controlled.

To facilitate electronic filing, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) assigns 

individual tax preparers a Preparer Tax Identification Number (“PTIN”). Similarly, 

the IRS assigns tax preparation businesses an Electronic Filing Identification 

Number (“EFIN”). Both the EFIN and PTIN are specific to that business or 

individual, and cannot be transferred or reassigned. When a tax preparation 

business files an electronic return, it must include both the EFIN for the business 

and the PTIN for the individual tax preparer.

In 2003, the IRS issued an EFIN to BFS. In March of 2008, the IRS issued a PTIN 

to Exavier so that he could file tax returns for BFS clients. In 2009, in addition to 

tax preparation services, BFS obtained a state license as a money services business 

to offer check cashing services for tax preparation clients. The EFIN for BFS 

became inactive in November of 2010, and the IRS suspended its authorization to 

file tax returns electronically.

 

In July of 2010, Exavier and Maurice established ATAS, with Maurice as president 

and Exavier as vice president. The IRS issued an EFIN to ATAS.

On September 10, 2010, a Florida corporation called The Tax Doctors of Broward 

County reorganized to become ATAS2, with the same business address as ATAS. 

On September 30, 2010, the IRS issued an EFIN to ATAS2.

In early 2011, ATAS electronically filed 158 income tax returns seeking $536,430 

in refunds for deceased individuals. In this same period, ATAS2 electronically filed 

312 returns for deceased individuals claiming $1,069,752 in refunds. All of these 

refunds were filed under EFINs for ATAS and ATAS2 and Maurice’s PTIN. Each 

return included the correct name, birth date, and social security number of the 

decedent, but listed false information regarding employment, income, contact 

information, tax credits, deductions, and dependents. The IRS did not actually owe 

refunds on any of these returns.

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In transactions involving a paid tax preparer, a taxpayer can direct the IRS to 

deposit the refund in the bank account of a designated third party. The third party 

pays the tax preparer directly, then deducts a processing fee and pays the balance to 

the taxpayer. ATAS and ATAS2 used Santa Barbara Tax Products Group 

(“SBTPG”) to process refunds and pay tax preparation fees. SBTPG sent blank 

checks to ATAS and ATAS2 and when it received refunds from the IRS, 

authorized them to print cashier’s checks for the taxpayers. The government 

claimed that defendants used this arrangement so that Maurice and Exavier could 

deposit refund checks for deceased individuals into accounts which they controlled.

On January 19, 2011, after reviewing nine tax returns that had been filed for 

deceased individuals under the ATAS EFIN, SBTPG terminated its relationship 

with ATAS. Other than a few refund checks that issued before it discovered the 

fraud, SBTPG did not actually issue refunds for the fraudulent returns that ATAS 

and ATAS2 had filed. SBTPG did deposit tax preparation fees into their bank 

accounts, however, with ATAS receiving approximately $54,457 and ATAS2 

receiving $245,569. Of the $54,457 which ATAS received, $4,000 was traced to 

Maurice and $2,000 to Exavier, with the balance largely used to pay “1099 

commissions” to various unspecified individuals. Of the $245,569 which ATAS2 

received, $10,000 was transferred to Maurice through checks, $59,000 was 

transferred to Exavier through checks, $5,000 was transferred to a BFS bank 

account, and nine checks totaling $20,350 were made payable to cash. The balance 

apparently remained in the ATAS2 account or was not directly traceable to 

defendants.

Alexandre worked as a tax preparer for Mr. Cash in early 2011. He received 

permission from the company’s owner, Yanel Laroche, to file electronic tax returns 

for his “friends,” i.e., tax preparers who had lost their EFINs but who nevertheless 

wished to service some 1,000 clients. Between January 28 and March 3, 2011, 

Alexandre filed 363 tax returns electronically under Mr. Cash’s EFIN and his own 

PTIN. Of those 363 tax returns, 345 sought refunds amounting to $1,708,910 in the 

names of deceased individuals. Like the fraudulent returns which ATAS and 

ATAS2 filed, Alexandre’s returns contained the correct names, birth dates, and 

social security numbers of the decedents, but listed false information regarding 

employment, income, contact information, tax credits, deductions, and dependents.

For Alexandre’s returns, Mr. Cash used SBTPG to process refunds and pay tax 

preparation fees. In March of 2011, SBTPG contacted Laroche to alert him that tax 

returns had been filed for “dead people” under Mr. Cash’s EFIN. Laroche 

discovered that Alexandre had prepared all of those tax returns. When SBTPG 

detected the fraud, it had already authorized checks for many of the refunds 

claimed in those returns. Among them, SBTPG had authorized $555,939 in refunds 

on 161 checks that were printed in the Mr. Cash office and deposited into a BFS 

business checking account that listed Exavier and Maurice as authorized 

signatories. Alexandre, who did not have a physical office at Mr. Cash, was the 

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only individual who had picked up refund checks that SBTPG issued for the 

fraudulent returns. SBTPG paid $965,585 in refunds that the IRS funded for the 

345 fraudulent tax returns that Alexandre prepared in early 2011.

Approximately 97 percent of the checks deposited into the BFS business checking 

account in the first quarter of 2011 were tax refund checks. At trial, IRS Special 

Agent Bradley Cohen testified that in addition to the 161 refund checks related to 

Alexandre’s returns, BFS deposits included 491 refund checks totaling $1,785,683 

from returns filed by tax preparers other than defendants, ATAS, ATAS2, or Mr. 

Cash. Of this amount, $639,610 was transferred to another BFS account which 

listed Maurice and Exavier as signatories. From that account, checks totaling 

$57,250 were paid to Maurice, $40,500 to Exavier, $19,000 to Exavier’s wife, 

$4,000 to ATAS, and $360,298 to cash. Of the checks made payable to cash, 

$28,000 was traced to a joint account that belonged to Exavier and his wife. Agent 

Cohen did not opine on the legitimacy of all of the refund checks from other tax 

preparers, but he analyzed 100 of the 491 refunds. He found that more than 60 of 

the refund checks were for deceased individuals and that 18 of them were for 

incarcerated individuals, two of whom were serving life terms.

Agent Cohen testified that documents from the Office of Financial Regulation had 

listed BFS as a check cashing and money transmitter business. Agent Cohen 

testified that in November of 2009, when Exavier applied for a Florida business 

license, he represented that his check cashing operation was limited to cashing 

checks for tax clients. Agent Cohen testified that in February of 2012, when he 

went to visit the principal place of business which BFS listed on its annual report, 

he did not see any sign which represented that check cashing services were offered 

there. Agent Cohen testified that from 2010 through 2016, BFS moved several 

times to and from the most recent address on record with the State of Florida (2033 

University Drive, Sunrise, Florida) and where ATAS and ATAS2 were located 

(930 and 938 N.E. 62 Street, Oakland Park, Florida).

. . . 

Maurice . . . did not testify. Through counsel, she suggested that someone had 

forged her signature, established bank accounts in her name, and used her PTIN 

without her knowledge. A handwriting expert testified that “she didn’t write the 

signature on certain of the documents that were submitted” and that as to other 

documents, his findings were “inconclusive.” The expert eliminated Maurice as the 

signatory on three documents, including two checks, but he could not eliminate her 

as the person who signed the remaining documents.

783 Fed. Appx. At 852-55 (emphasis added).2

 

2 A detailed summary of the evidence is also available from the government’s responsive brief on 

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As reflected the final paragraph of the summary above, movant’s trial counsel attacked the 

prosecution’s case during trial with challenges to the sufficiency of the government’s evidence. 

Defense attacks included trial counsel’s efforts to demonstrate that movant’s PTIN was not 

confidential and could have been used by others. As early as his opening statement, defense 

counsel remarked:

And now this thing, this euphemism again about a [PTIN]. It’s on the tax returns. 

They can’t be confidential if it’s made public. You pull it up. You can see it. It’s 

an identifier for the tax return. . . . it was routine in certain businesses . . . that the 

[PTIN] would be used.

DE 159:31. Various prosecution witnesses testified, however, that the IRS required that PTIN’s 

be maintained securely, that they were not public records, and that they could not be researched 

online. DE 159:103-04, 105, 106; DE 160:8; DE 162:48 (not possible to Google a PTIN), 159 (a 

PTIN is “not a public record”). Movant’s attorney cross-examined these witnesses concerning 

PTIN confidentiality, DE 159:139-41; DE 162:48, and was able to elicit testimony that a taxpayer 

requesting a copy from the IRS of the taxpayer’s own previously filed return would then be able to 

see the preparer’s PTIN. DE 159:140-41. Defense counsel’s challenge to the confidentiality of 

movant’s PTIN formed part of an effort to argue that fraudulent returns using her PTIN could have 

been filed by someone other than movant.

Counsel for movant also attempted to cast doubt on evidence of movant’s connection to 

bank accounts associated with the fraud scheme. See CRDE 159:31 (in opening statement, listing 

deficiencies in prosecution evidence, stating “not any monies” connected movant to the fraud). 

As reflected in the opinion quoted above, movant’s counsel asserted through cross-examination 

that movant lacked knowledge of the accounts. CRDE 163:41-42 (bank employee did not 

 

appeal, available at 2018 WL 10471119.

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directly contact movant regarding accounts opened in her name). He also asserted that the 

prosecution did not provide adequate evidence that movant received fraud proceeds or funds from 

the relevant accounts. CRDE 163:156 (questioning who cashed checks payable to movant). 

Counsel’s attack on the government’s financial evidence included objections its admission, where 

movant’s counsel argued:

Your honor, I have a substantial issue with the government's theory to total these 

moneys flowing to my client when the checks that are in her name in thousands of 

dollars are not hers, she did not author them. The government doesn't have the 

indication that she did. They don't have any indication that merely because of her 

name on them, and they are obvious forgeries.

So to allege or give the jury the impression that she received these moneys on these 

checks that -- these are not the same people, but these are accounts that have her 

name on it. And I think that it's inappropriate and it certainly misleads the jury.

To throw a number out there 57,000 when I've got 7,500, 2,000, 7,000, 1,800, 6,000 

that are not -- although my client's name is on it, these are not negotiated or signed 

off by her. Someone else signed them. And flipping the page briefly, I was aware 

that the pretrial order had a 14-day Daubert on it. I hired a handwriting expert. I 

gave that report to the government. I gave it to Mr. Kulik and to Mr. Wilcox. It is an 

open question. There are forgeries that have my client's name on them.

I think it's 403, prejudicial to us to have that number on a piece of paper. And the 

jury is going to have a computer. They can make their own comparisons to how 

much money went to my client. I don't have a dog in the hunt with respect to the 

other defendants. Where my client is concerned, we have bona fide grounds that 

these are not moneys that went to her. They certainly weren't signed by her. We 

submit it's unduly prejudicial, Your Honor.

CRDE 163:87-88. 

The court overruled the objection. CRDE 163:88. The jury was not persuaded by 

counsel’s challenges. As noted above, the jury convicted movant on all counts charged, and 

movant appealed. Movant’s attorney filed a brief, available at 2017 WL 1406661, claiming that 

the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient and the district court erred by declining to sever 

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movant’s trial from that of her codefendants. See also 783 Fed.Appx. at 852 (listing movant’s 

claims). Movant also joined Exavier with the claim that certain information had supposedly been 

withheld from the defense. After the United States filed its brief in opposition, movant’s counsel 

filed a reply brief, available at 2018 WL 3018243. The Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion 

affirming movant’s convictions on July 30, 2019.

Within a year of that decision, movant timely filed her Section 2255 petition, which was 

docketed on July 10, 2020. 3 DE 1. In that petition, movant makes the following three claims in 

an attempt to vacate her conviction: 1) her attorney failed to communicate an unspecified plea 

offer from the United States; 2) her attorney failed to raise a defense at trial based on her PTIN’s 

lack of confidentiality and the inadequacy of evidence connecting her to bank accounts and fraud 

proceeds; and 3) her attorney failed to consult with movant about issues to raise on appeal, 

resulting in the omission of certain arguments that movant wanted to make.

Movant’s claims concerning her PTIN and counsel’s challenges to financial evidence are

refuted by the record. Her remaining claims, as explained below, do not provide a sufficient basis 

for relief. All of movant’s claims should be summarily denied.4

 

3 The one-year limitations period runs from the last of four specified events: 1) the date on which 

the judgment of conviction becomes final; 2) the date on which the impediment to making a 

motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; 3) 

the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could 

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1)-(4).

4 Movant has not requested a hearing, and none is warranted, since the record clearly refute 

movant’s claims or as explained in this response, her claims do not state sufficient grounds for 

relief.

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LEGAL ANALYSIS

 I. Movant Received Effective Assistance Before The Trial Court

To evaluate movant=s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must apply 

the standards announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which held that Athe 

proper standard of attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance,@ and that the 

burden is on a criminal defendant to show that Acounsel=s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.@ Id. at 667-88. To determine if a defendant has met this burden:

a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the 

reasonableness of counsel=s challenged conduct on the facts of the 

particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel=s conduct. A 

convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are 

alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 

judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all of 

the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the 

wide range of professionally competent assistance.

Id. at 690. 

The burden of proof for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel remains on the 

petitioner throughout a habeas corpus proceeding. Roberts v. Wainwright, 666 F.2d 517, 519, n.3 

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878 (1982); Jones v. Kemp, 678 F.2d 929, 932 (11th Cir. 1982). 

There is a strong presumption that trial counsel provided adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable, professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688-90. Unless movant can demonstrate prejudice, no relief or evidentiary hearing is called for 

concerning his claims. Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1471, n.7 (11th Cir. 1988)(en banc), 

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). 

To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for 

counsel=s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. E.g.,

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Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1293 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish prejudice in the context of a 

guilty plea, movant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, she would not 

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 

(1985). Notably, “counsel owes a lesser duty to a client who pleads guilty than to one who 

decides to go to trial, and in the former case counsel need only provide his client with an 

understanding of the law in relation to the facts, so that the accused may make an informed 

decision and conscious choice between accepting the prosecution’s offer and going to trial.” 

Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984); Searcy v. Florida Dep’t of 

Corrections, 485 Fed.Appx. 992, 997 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Movant fails to meet both of the requirements of Strickland, sometimes called the 

performance prong and the prejudice prong. Failure to show either prong should result in denial 

of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the court need not even reach both prongs, if 

either one fails. See Michael v. Crosby, 430 F.3d 1310, 1319-1320 (11th Cir. 2005). In Michael, 

the Court stated:

Under Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)], in order to 

demonstrate that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must show (1) 

deficient performance by counsel and (2) a reasonable probability 

that counsel=s deficient performance affected the outcome of the 

trial. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. If a defendant 

fails to make a showing as to either performance or prejudice, she is 

not entitled to relief. Id. at 697, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674. Thus, we need not address the prejudice prong if we 

find that the performance prong is not satisfied. Turner v. Crosby, 

339 F.3d 1247, 1279 (11th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034,

124 S.Ct. 2104, 158 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004); Holladay v. Haley, 209 

F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.2000) ( ABecause both parts of the test 

must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth 

Amendment, the court need not address the performance prong if 

the defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong, or vice versa.@

(citation omitted)).

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In movant=s case, both prongs fail. While noting that a petitioner retains the burden of proving by 

a preponderance of the evidence that her counsel=s performance was unreasonable, the Eleventh 

Circuit has also emphasized that judicial scrutiny of a lawyer=s performance Amust be highly 

deferential.@ Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000)(en banc). There is a 

strong presumption in favor of competence, making a habeas petitioner=s burden of persuasion a 

heavy one. Id. The presumption of competence remains even where the record is silent or 

ambiguous. Id. at 1315, n.15. Even where the petitioner presents some evidence to the contrary, 

the government never has the burden of showing competence. Id. at 1315. Where courts 

examine the performance of experienced trial counsel, the presumption of competence is even 

stronger. Id. at 1316.

In fact, the degree of incompetence that would warrant relief must be extreme. A 

petitioner must show more than the best possible strategy for his case, or even a better strategy than 

what his lawyer pursued. Instead, movant must demonstrate that no competent counsel would 

have done what his attorney did. See Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 

1998). AEven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular case in the same 

way.@ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Effectiveness has nothing to do with what the best lawyers 

would have done, or even with what most good lawyers would have done. The inquiry is whether 

some reasonable lawyer could have acted, under the circumstances, as defense counsel acted. 

Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995)(en banc). 

 Against such standards, movant faces significant obstacles. Her efforts to overcome them 

fail. Movant fails to show either deficient performance on the part of counsel or any resulting 

prejudice.

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A. Movant Provides Inadequate Grounds For Relief Based On An Allegedly 

Uncommunicated Plea Offer

Movant protests that in a post-conviction conversation, her attorney made a passing 

reference to an unspecified “deal” that movant should have taken. DE 1:14. According to 

movant, she was never informed of any deal offered by the government. Id. Without additional 

information or explanation, movant appears to argue that this limited information depicts 

ineffective assistance from her lawyer. It does not.

Movant’s claim about her attorney’s supposed remark is simply speculative. It does not 

establish that the prosecution ever extended a formal plea offer. Moreover, movant does not 

identify the terms of any supposed offer, or what terms, if any, she would have accepted. Movant 

does not claim that if she had known of an offer, she would have chosen not to exercise her right to 

trial. Additionally, movant has made no attempt to show that the Court would have accepted the 

terms of any offer, or that these unknown terms would have resulted in a lesser sentence. These 

omissions are significant, and defeat movant’s claim.

To prevail on a claim of deficient performance based on counsel’s failure to communicate 

a plea bargain, a defendant must show, at a minimum, not only that she would have accepted an 

offer which counsel failed to communicate, but also that the prosecution would not have 

withdrawn the offer and the court would have accepted it. E.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.134

(2012); see also Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 2014)(rejecting 

defendant’s claim that he would have accepted a 15-year plea bargain as “wholly speculative” 

since it was unclear what terms the prosecution would have offered)(the lack of definition in a 

plea offer makes it substantially harder to determine it likely that a plea acceptable to the defendant 

would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept 

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it); Scott v. United States, 325 Fed.Appx. 822, 825 (11th Cir. 2009)(affirming district court’s denial 

of Section 2255 petition without a hearing where movant did not allege prosecution was amenable 

to negotiating away statutory sentencing enhancement). Movant must also show that acceptance 

of an uncommunicated offer would have resulted in a less severe conviction or sentence. Osley, 

751 F.2d at 1222, quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012).

Movant’s petition addresses none of these factors. Even its description of an unspecified, 

passing, post-conviction reference by counsel to a “deal” is not enough to establish that the deal in 

question, if any, concerned a pre-trial offer of a plea bargain. Accordingly, the claim about 

communication of an alleged plea bargain is deficient, and should be denied.5

B. The Record Refutes Movant’s Claims About Her Trial

Movant claims that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge prosecution 

claims about the confidentiality of PTIN’s. In fact, counsel made repeated attempts to establish 

reasonable doubt with assertions that movant’s PTIN was accessible to others, beginning with his 

opening statement. DE 159:31. Counsel also questioned government witnesses who rejected his 

efforts to dispute the confidentiality of PTIN’s. CRDE 159:103-06, 154; DE 160:8; CRDE 

161:48, 159. Nevertheless, defense counsel was able to elicit testimony that in the limited 

circumstances where a taxpayer 1) requested a copy of his or her own return, 2) from the IRS, 3) 

after filing, the PTIN would appear on that copy of the return. CRDE 159:139-41. When 

 

5 Other claims in movant’s petition alleging her attorney’s failure to suggest that others rather than 

movant committed the charged offenses are effectively protestations of innocence, and undermine 

even the inference that movant would have accepted any plea bargain if one had been offered. 

See, e.g., Osley, 751 F.3d at 1224 (repeated claims of innocence, while not dispositive, are relevant 

considerations for whether a plea bargain would have been accepted). Unlike her choice at trial, 

movant testified at her sentencing, where she also disputed the evidence against her in a manner 

inconsistent with assuming responsibility for the offenses of conviction. DE 132:1-9. Her 

persistent denials do not support the likelihood that movant was prepared to admit guilt as part of a 

plea bargain.

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codefendant Alexandre testified, movant’s counsel elicited that when Alexandre prepared returns, 

he never had to type his own PTIN. CRDE 163:155 (implying that tax preparation software 

pre-filled the PTIN which would somehow make it less confidential).

Movant’s claim that counsel failed to challenge the confidentiality of PTIN’s simply is not 

true. For that reason, the claim is meritless, provides no basis for relief, and should be denied.

Movant also objects that the fraudulent tax returns filed with her name as the preparer did 

not contain her signature, and counsel “failed to object to the verification of Petitioner’s signature 

on the filed tax returns.” DE 1:15. The record also refutes this claim.

For example, during movant’s trial, the United States called Kristy Morgan, an IRS 

employee who had the role, among others, of records custodian. CRDE 159:94-96. Movant’s 

counsel cross-examined Ms. Morgan, asking whether, during a review of exhibits before taking 

the stand, she saw “a single signature on any return with Carline Maurice’s name on it, a 

handwritten signature?” DE CR159:152. Thus, counsel did, in fact, challenge movant’s 

connection to returns with her name as the preparer, based on the absence of a signature.6 Defense 

counsel also questioned other witnesses, such as relatives of deceased taxpayers, about the absence 

of movant’s signature on returns. E.g., CRDE 159:53-54. Once again, the record refutes

movant’s contention that her attorney did not address the lack of her signature on returns 

identifying her as the preparer. This claim is also meritless. 

Movant also objects to the trial testimony of government witness Leonie Palmer Pascoe. 

Movant does not connect Ms. Pascoe’s testimony to any claim of deficient performance by 

 

6 The returns in movant’s case were filed electronically. IRS witness Morgan responded to 

counsel’s question with the answer that electronically filed returns do not contain handwritten 

signatures. DE 159:152. Instead, the PTIN functions as a signature for electronically filed 

returns. DE 159:103. Movant’s premise that the absence of a handwritten signature provides 

vindication is faulty.

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counsel. Instead, movant appears to argue that the testimony of Pascoe, a personal banker who 

processed account opening requests for accounts connected to the charged offenses, was suspect. 

Movant claims that Pascoe dated codefendant Exavier and committed fraud by opening accounts 

in movant’s name without movant’s knowledge or consent. DE 1:15.

Movant does not claim that the prosecution suppressed impeaching evidence concerning 

Pascoe, and there is no basis for such a claim.7 Since movant challenged the sufficiency of the 

evidence for conviction in her direct appeal, she cannot use her collateral attack to relitigate the 

sufficiency of that evidence. United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. 

denied, 531 U.S. 1131 (2001). A claim on merits that the quality of Pascoe’s testimony somehow 

made the government’s evidence insufficient cannot support relief and is not available under 

§ 2255 in this case.

Movant does not identify any part of the record or other evidence to support her conclusion 

that Pascoe allowed accounts to be opened in movant’s name without her knowledge or consent. 

Pascoe did testify that she allowed codefendant Exavier, for some but not all accounts, to take a 

few signature cards from the bank for movant to sign, doing so because Exavier was a well-known 

and trusted customer at the time. Whatever conclusions can be drawn from such testimony, it was 

elicited on direct examination by the prosecution, CRDE 163:29-30, and also on 

cross-examination by counsel for movant, id. at 37, 41. Movant does not show or appear to 

explain how her counsel performed deficiently or caused prejudice with respect to Pascoe. Even 

if characterized as a deficient performance claim, Pascoe’s testimony does not provide a basis for 

relief.

 

7 The trial court sustained codefendant Exavier’s objection to testimony that Pascoe had a 

personal or intimate relationship with Exavier. CRDE 162:157-59; 163:47-48.

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Movant unfairly criticizes her attorney for failing to present evidence that movant did not 

engage in online banking. The source for such evidence, however, was movant herself. CRDE 

168:98 (during her sentencing hearing, movant herself testified that in 2011, she did not utilize 

online banking). At trial, however, movant made a knowing, voluntary and informed decision not 

to testify, as reflected in a colloquy with the trial judge. CRDE 166:67-74. During her colloquy, 

which occurred after movant was placed under oath, movant confirmed that she did not wish to 

testify. Additionally, she acknowledged that she was satisfied with her attorney in the way that he 

had represented her throughout the trial. CRDE 166:71. 8 The decision not to testify was 

movant’s alone. She does not and cannot explain how her attorney performed deficiently at trial 

because she exercised her right not to testify to the evidence she now complains is absent. The 

record from movant’s case again contradicts her claim.9

II. Movant Received Effective Assistance On Appeal

Movant also maintains that the same attorney who represented her during trial provided 

ineffective assistance in connection with her appeal. With respect to such claims, it is well 

established that appellate counsel is not required to raise all non-frivolous issues on appeal. 

Payne v. United States, 566 F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009)(citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 

745, 751-54 (1983)). It is Adifficult for a defendant to show his counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise certain issues on appeal, particularly if counsel did present other strong issues.@ Id. 

 

8 Such a sworn statement should be subject to a strong presumption that it is true. See, e.g., 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th 

Cir. 1994); United States v. Niles, 565 F. App’x 828 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. 

Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 800 n. 8 (11th Cir. 1987)(strong presumption that statements 

made during plea colloquy are true).

9 Movant’s repeatedly inaccurate representations of her trial provide a reason to question her 

accuracy overall and with respect to her claims about plea bargaining.

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Moreover, “[e]xperienced advocates have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker 

arguments on appeal.@ 463 U.S. at 751-52.

Movant complains that her attorney did not object to the consolidation of her case on

appeal with the appeal of her codefendant, Maurice Exavier. She also objects that counsel did not 

make specific arguments that she instructed him to raise.

Movant makes only a perfunctory objection concerning the consolidation of appeals. Her 

petition does not explain why it would have been appropriate for counsel to object, and does not 

demonstrate that any such objection would have been granted if it had been made. Movant fails to 

explain how consolidation caused any harm to her chances of prevailing on appeal. Because she 

fails to indicate any prejudice whatsoever from consolidation, movant’s claim must fail. 

Additionally, whether or not to agree to consolidate appeals by codefendants is the type of 

strategic decision to which reviewing courts afford great deference, and movant does not even 

suggest a reason why such deference should be withheld in the instant case.

Movant contends, as with her objections to counsel’s trial performance, that he failed to 

assert the absence of evidence connecting her to fraudulently filed tax returns or to the scheme to 

defraud. This contention is also inconsistent with the record. Movant’s counsel submitted a brief 

on appeal that challenged the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence. 2017 WL 1406661 at *6, 

10, 14-15. That brief stated, “the evidence that was presented was filled with lack of evidence 

connecting the Appellant to any of the activity complained of by the Prosecution, to wit, no 

evidence that the Appellant knew the acquitted co-defendant no evidence that the Appellant signed 

any fraudulent check, tax return or that she was involved in the setting up of the systems or entity 

used to commit the fraud.” Id. at 14. Such language encompasses the same claims that movant 

argues her lawyer failed to make, namely, that she was not sufficiently connected to the fraudulent 

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returns or to any “system or entity” used to commit the fraud (such as, for example, a bank account 

receiving proceeds from the scheme). Whether or not counsel used the precise language movant 

wanted him to employ, the court of appeals was clearly aware of the challenges movant wished to 

make, even if it determined her challenges did not warrant reversal of her conviction. Thus, the 

opinion on appeal addresses movant’s claims, noting:

Through counsel, she suggested that someone had forged her signature, established 

bank accounts in her name, and used her PTIN without her knowledge.

783 Fed. Appx. At 855. The court of appeals was clearly cognizant of movant’s claims; thus, she 

fails to show deficient performance or any resulting prejudice.

Movant faults her lawyer because he did not include arguments in her appellate brief that 

trial evidence was insufficient to convict because of evidence that movant did not engage in online 

banking. DE 1:17. Counsel could not make such an argument, however, because that evidence 

was not introduced during and was not part of the record for movant’s trial, as a result of movant’s 

own decision not to testify. Thus, this objection also fails to show deficient performance.

Movant also claims that the prosecution withheld evidence consisting of records for her 

personal bank accounts that would purportedly show no proceeds from the fraud went into 

movant’s accounts. The United States rejects any claim that it withheld exculpatory evidence. 

Indeed, the accounts movant references were her own accounts, which she would have had access 

to (and would have known of) more readily than anyone.10 See, e.g., Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 

907, 910 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]there is no suppression, and thus no Brady violation if either the 

defendant or his attorney knows before trial of the allegedly exculpatory information.”). Movant 

 

10 Inexplicably, movant claims the prosecution withheld records from 2002-2012, DE 1:17, 

although the fraud offenses charged occurred from September, 2010 until July, 2011. CRDE 3:3, 

5, 8-11.

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apparently had knowledge by the time of her sentencing that her own accounts received no 

deposits of fraud proceeds, because she testified accordingly. CRDE 168:104. At her 

sentencing, movant testified inconsistently that the government did not produce records for her 

personal account, CRDE 168:69, and that she saw records for her personal account in discovery

from the United States. CRDE 168:106. 

If movant’s argument is that her attorney should have included a description of her 

personal accounts in her appeal, her claim must still fail. Under movant’s current theory, she fails 

to explain how her attorney would be responsible for addressing evidence that was supposedly 

“withheld.” Otherwise, evidence from trial reflected that movant received cash withdrawals from 

an account receiving fraud proceeds. E.g., GX 54 (withdrawal slip for BFS account with movant’s 

handwriting); GX 55 (containing checks payable to movant).11 There is no reason to assume that 

cash would have been placed in a personal account or that cash could even be traced. Moreover, 

the absence of proceeds (whether cash or check) in any particular account is not inconsistent with

movant’s receipt of fraud proceeds, which did not have to be deposited in a personal account as 

opposed to some other account. Movant fails to explain the significance of any argument her 

attorney may have failed to make, or how the absence of any such argument resulted in prejudice 

on appeal. Her undeveloped contentions about counsel’s choice of argument and performance on 

appeal fail to warrant relief.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny movant’s petition to vacate, set 

aside or correct her sentence. The record refutes the majority of movant’s factual assertions. 

 

11 These exhibits and others like them are described in the transcript of movant’s sentencing 

hearing. CRDE 168:10-13, 15-33.

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Movant also fails to allege a sufficient basis for relief, and does not present claims that indicate 

how she would have been prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Her claims do not warrant a 

hearing or any other relief.

Respectfully submitted,

ARIANA FAJARDO ORSHAN

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

By: s/ Karen E. Rochlin 

KAREN E. ROCHLIN

ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

99 N.E. 4th Street

Miami, Florida 33132

(305) 961-9234

Court I.D. No. A5500050

karen.rochlin@usdoj.gov

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by CM/ECF and by 

mail on Carline Maurice, 12700-104, FCC Coleman, P.O. Box 1027, Coleman, Florida 33521.

s/ Karen E. Rochlin 

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