UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 1:20-cv-23278-COOKE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 7505 AND 7171

FOREST LANE, DALLAS, TEXAS 75230, WITH ALL

APPURTENANCES, IMPROVEMENTS, AND

ATTACHMENTS THEREON, AND ANY RIGHT TO

COLLECT AND RECEIVE ANY PROFIT, RENT,

INCOME, AND PROCEEDS THEREFROM, etc., 

Defendant,

____________________________________________/

CLAIMANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

(Consolidated Case No. 1-20-cv-23279) 

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Claimants1 demonstrated in their Brief that principles of international comity apply to the 

United States’ claims and require this Court to abstain from considering this matter in light of 

Ukraine-based parallel proceedings and judgments addressing the same fundamental issues in 

dispute. In its Opposition, the United States contends, without any basis in law or fact, that these 

Ukrainian proceedings and judgments do not matter and should be given no weight by this Court. 

The United States is wrong, and this Court should abstain.

First, in arguing that the Ukrainian litigations are not parallel proceedings because they 

allegedly do not involve substantially the same facts and parties, the United States ignores that the 

Ukrainian litigations focus on the core issue here: whether the Ukrainian loans at the heart of the 

United States’ claims were valid and legitimate or the product of fraud. All of the United States’ 

claims are premised on the allegation that the proceeds used to acquire PNC Plaza ultimately came 

from the NZF and ZFZ Loans, which the United States asserts were fraudulently obtained in 

violation of Ukrainian law. The rulings in the NZF and ZFZ Judgments2—which confirmed that 

the NZF and ZFZ Loans were entirely valid and lawful, bear directly on, and indeed disprove, the 

United States’ claims.3 The Ukrainian court that issued the NZF Judgment addressed and rejected 

the United States’ allegations that the NZF Loan was fraudulently obtained. 

Second, the United States has it backwards in arguing it would be unprecedented for this 

Court to abstain from this case. What is unprecedented here is not Claimants’ motion to dismiss 

but rather the United States’ determination to pursue civil forfeiture claims based on allegations 

that have been adjudicated and rejected by a competent foreign tribunal. The United States does 

1 Capitalized terms not otherwise defined shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss, 

ECF No. 78 (“Brief” or “Br.”). The United States’ Opposition to Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss is referred to herein 

as “Opposition” or “Opp.” 

2

 Claimants submitted the long-form version of the Ukrainian judgment concerning the NZF Loan on April 5. 2022. 

See ECF No. 118, 118-1 (“NZF Judgment” or “NZF Judg.”). In that same filing, Claimants explained that, upon 

information and belief, on February 15, 2022, the Ukrainian court considering the ZFZ Loan issued a judgment at a 

hearing in favor of ZFZ (“ZFZ Judgment”), but has so far been unable to issue a written judgment because of Russia’s 

ongoing invasion. Id. The United States’ bizarre attempt to question the veracity of Claimants’ representation that 

the ZFZ Judgment was issued (see Opp. at 4, 7, 13) should be rejected (putting aside that the United States’ attempt 

to salvage its failed claims by taking advantage of Ukraine’s present struggles and dislocations is unbecoming and 

inappropriate). Regardless, if this Court determines that the issuance and receipt of a written ZFZ Judgment is required 

to decide this motion, this Court (like the Delaware court) should hold its decision in abeyance pending receipt of the 

final written ZFZ Judgment. See, e.g., Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Durbin, 2022 WL 874092, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 

24, 2022).

3 See, e.g., United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 579–80 (11th Cir. 1997) (it is only after a “predicate crime becomes 

‘a completed offense’” that “money laundering can occur.”)

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not and cannot point to a single instance in which a court allowed the United States to ignore 

directly applicable foreign judgments in pursuit of a civil forfeiture claim. This Court should not 

be the first to permit the United States to engage in such overreach, and the Verified Complaint 

should be dismissed on grounds of abstention based on international comity.

Third, this Court should reject the United States’ innuendo and insinuation suggesting 

Ukrainian courts are somehow flawed such that their judgments and/or proceedings are not worthy 

of deference. The United States offers absolutely no evidence to support this insulting 

characterization, and its apparent reliance on “questions” supposedly raised by PrivatBank in a 

Delaware case does not provide any basis to ignore the NZF (or any other Ukrainian) Judgment. 

In fact, the Delaware court stayed PrivatBank’s lawsuit in favor of the parallel Ukrainian 

proceedings, and found that in issuing judgments the Ukrainian courts considered the “evidence, 

including ‘detailed accounting source documents regarding the exact purpose for which the loan 

proceeds were used’ and ‘bank statements and other official documents’ confirming repayment.” 

Ex. 1 at 15. The United States’ cheap-shot characterization of a Ukrainian decision it does not like 

as an instance of a Ukrainian judge “obliging” one of the litigants—as opposed to a judgment 

issued after the court conducted a proper analysis of the law and facts—is gratuitious vilification 

of Ukraine’s courts that is no substitute for proper legal argument and analysis. 

Finally, the United States fails to rebut Claimants’ arguments that (i) prospective comity 

applies because of Ukraine’s predominant interest in governing conduct in its territory, by its 

nationals, against its most important bank; (ii) prescriptive comity requires this Court to interpret 

the statutes under which the United States intends to proceed to avoid interfering with Ukraine’s 

sovereign right to police itself and its people; and (iii) the Verified Complaint should be dismissed 

because the United States does not adequately trace the purportedly illicit funds through to the 

acquisition of PNC Plaza.

For the reasons set forth in Claimants’ Brief, and as set forth below, this Court should 

abstain from hearing this matter and dismiss the Verified Complaint in its entirety.

ARGUMENT

I. INTERNATIONAL COMITY REQUIRES ABSTENTION

Claimants previously showed that abstention is warranted because the doctrine of 

international comity applies and each of the requisite factors are satisfied. See Br. at 7-14. In 

Opposition, the United States does not and cannot rebut Claimants’ arguments. In fact, the United 

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States only addresses a single abstention factor—whether the doctrine of international comity 

applies, see Opp. at 8-16—and effectively concedes that the other two abstention factors, fairness 

to litigants and the efficient use of scarce judicial resources, see Br. at 7, weigh in favor of 

abstention. The United States’ contention that international comity does not apply in this case is 

wrong. 

A. International Comity Applies

In their opening brief, Claimants demonstrated that under the doctrine of international 

comity, this Court should abstain from adjudicating this case and defer to the Ukrainian judgments 

issued in the parallel Ukraine-based proceedings brought by the borrowers at the heart of the 

purported predicate scheme alleged in the Verified Complaint. See Br. at 7-14. The United States 

fails to rebut that showing; in fact, it fails to cite a single case in which the United States pursued 

civil forfeiture claims where, as here, the underlying allegations had been adjudicated and rejected 

by a foreign court. The United States’ response fails to change the fact that international comity 

applies here.

i. The Ukrainian Litigations Are Parallel Proceedings 

That Address the Heart of the United States’ Claims

To avoid the devastating consequences of the NZF and ZFZ Judgments4—which would 

undercut the entire basis for this civil forfeiture action—the United States argues that international 

comity does not apply because the Ukraine-based litigations do not involve substantially similar 

parties and issues and are therefore not parallel proceedings. Opp. at 12. That is wrong. The 

Ukrainian litigations, including and especially those concerning the NZF and ZFZ Loans, are 

obviously parallel proceedings, triggering the application of international comity principles. 

The United States falsely asserts that the subject matter of this action and the NZF and ZFZ 

litigations are somehow “entirely different” because the Ukrainian litigations, which concern 

4

 The United States wrongly seeks to avoid the NZF Judgment entirely by asking the Court to pretend it does not exist. 

See Opp. at 5-7. On this motion to dismiss, in addition to the pleadings, this Court may consider matters of which it 

may take judicial notice, including foreign court orders like the NZF Judgment. See Br. at 5, n.3; La Grasta v. First 

Union Sec’s., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (court may consider “well-pleaded factual allegations, 

documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed”) (emphasis added). Further, this 

Court’s consideration of additional materials does not convert this motion to one for summary judgment because a 

decision regarding foreign law is a “ruling on a question of law,” and “the court may consider any relevant material 

or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of 

Evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (emphasis added); see In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder 

Derivative Litig., 2020 WL 7388944, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2020) (“the Court may determine [foreign law] based 

on foreign law materials outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss.”).

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specific loans (like the NZF and ZFZ Loans), “are governed by Ukrainian commercial law between 

borrower and lender,” Opp. at 12, while the United States’ allegations go beyond the specific loans 

and Defendant Asset at issue here, id. at 13-14. This argument ignores that the broader allegations 

the United States references, which were not addressed in the NZF Judgment (e.g., whether 

misappropriated funds were laundered into the United States to purchase the Defendant Asset), are 

rendered irrelevant by the NZF Judgment.

The United States concedes that the NZF and ZFZ Loans “are the basis for forfeiture here,” 

Opp. at 4, and that its claims are premised on allegations that the funds “used to complete the 

purchase of PNC Plaza [were] misappropriated from PrivatBank via two fraudulent loans,” the 

NZF Loan and the ZFZ Loan. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶107-24. However the United States 

chooses to characterize (or mischaracterize) its allegations, the United States cannot deny that the 

sine qua non of the alleged scheme concerning PNC Plaza was the fraudulent procurement of the 

NZF and ZFZ loans from PrivatBank in Ukraine by Ukrainian entities NZF and ZFZ. Only “dirty” 

money (i.e., funds that were illicitly or unlawfully obtained) can be laundered; if there is not “dirty” 

money there is no laundering; and if there is no laundering, there is no ground for forfeiture. See 

United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 579–80 (11th Cir. 1997) (it is only after a “predicate crime 

becomes ‘a completed offense’” that “money laundering can occur”). 

The predicate crimes the United States identifies are fraud on a foreign bank, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(c)(7)(B)(iii), and receipt and transportation of stolen or fraudulently obtained property, 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2314-15. The “offense against a foreign nation” of “fraud . . . against a foreign bank” 

required by 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iii) mandates that the Government “be able to prove 

violations of foreign [Ukrainian] law,” United States v. Prevezon Holdings LTD., 122 F. Supp. 3d 

57, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (emphasis added), and the transfer of stolen goods pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2314-15 requires “under Ukrainian law that the property in question was not [lawfully] owned 

by [defendant],” United States v. Lazarenko, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25940, *11, 32-33 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 10, 2003) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, to succeed on its claims, the United States must show that the procurement 

of the NZF and ZFZ Loans was fraudulent and that the loan proceeds were obtained in violation 

of Ukrainian law. The Delaware Court considering PrivatBank’s civil lawsuit involving 

allegations nearly identical to those here recognized that the case turned on the validity of the 

Ukrainian loans (including the NZF and ZFZ Loans), noting that “there is no way to excise the 

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question of whether these loans were proper . . . without gutting [PrivatBank’s fraud] claims,” and 

noting “the propriety of the majority of the Optima Scheme Loans are directly at issue in the 

[Ukrainian] Borrower Actions” where Ukrainian courts will address allegations “that the Optima 

Scheme Loans were inappropriately sourced.” Ex. 1 at 22, 24 n.95. 

The Delaware Court’s ruling applies with special force here. If the NZF and ZFZ Loans 

were validly and lawfully procured in Ukraine, under Ukrainian law, the United States’ claims 

necessarily collapse. If the proceeds of the Loans were validly obtained, as the Ukrainian courts 

ruled after careful consideration of the evidence, they could not have been the subject of unlawful 

money laundering. See Christo, 129 F.3d at 579-80. Given the dispositive impact of the Ukrainian 

court’s findings in the NZF Judgment, the United States misrepresents the substance of the 

Judgment and the extent to which it eviscerates the United States’ allegations. See Opp. at 12-13. 

First, the United States fails in suggesting that the NZF Judgment merely found the NZF 

Loan had been “terminated due to proper performance.” Id. In fact, the NZF Judgment specifically 

and expressly rejected the United States’ allegations in this matter (which the United States 

acknowledges).5

Second, contrary to the United States’ assertion that the NZF loan was fraudulent because 

in applying for it NZF allegedly misrepresented the Loan’s primary purpose as “[f]unding ongoing 

operations,” Compl. ¶119, the Ukrainian Court found that, “[b]ased on the examination of all 

evidence provided by the litigants,” NZF used the proceeds from the NZF Loan consistent with 

“the [] loan agreements and for the purpose provided for in the [] loan agreements, which is the 

financing of the current activities of [NZF].’” ECF No. 118-1 (NZF Judgment) at 41.

Third, contrary to the United States’ assertion that NZF misrepresented the “[s]ources for 

repaying” the Loan as “[r]evenue from the principal line of business,” Compl. ¶117, the Ukrainian 

Court found the opposite: that NZF repaid the NZF Loan with “funds obtained from business 

activities and at the expense of the Guarantor,” ECF No. 118-1 (NZF Judgment) at 41.6

5

 Even as it contends that the subject of the NZF litigation is “entirely different” than here, the United States notes that 

the Ukrainian Court in the NZF Judgment specifically identified the United States’ allegations in this action. See Opp. 

at 11-12.

6

 These findings are similar to those made by the Delaware court, which found that “the [Ukrainian] courts held 

hearings and issued rulings against PrivatBank in all six actions rejecting its allegations that [NZF] misused loan 

proceeds and failed properly to repay loans.” Ex. 1 at 15. Given the similarity in the claims at issue in the ZFZ 

Judgment, see Br. at 6, Claimants expect that the ZFZ Judgment will include similar findings to the NZF Judgment. 

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Thus, whereas the United States’ claims are premised on allegations that NZF’s 

“application for, receipt of, and use of” the NZF Loan constituted “embezzlement and conversion 

of PrivatBank’s money,” Compl. ¶133, the Ukrainian court held precisely the opposite. The NZF 

Judgment vitiates the United States’ allegations that the NZF Loan was “fraudulent,” was “the 

proceeds of embezzlement, misappropriation, and fraud,” and was obtained through conduct that 

“violated [specified] provisions” of Ukrainian law. Id. ¶¶22, 67-76, 107-24.

The United States also contends that the NZF litigation is not a parallel proceeding because 

there is no common identity of parties. See Opp. at 12. But the Ukrainian litigations, including 

the NZF litigation, were brought by, among others, NZF and ZFZ, the Ukrainian borrowers 

identified in the Verified Complaint. And the Ukrainian litigations were brought against 

PrivatBank—the same bank the United States identified as the lender, and that has made essentially 

identical allegations as the United States against the Ukrainian borrowers (including NZF and 

ZFZ). 

The NZF and ZFZ litigations are parallel proceedings to this one, and international comity 

therefore applies.

ii. The United States’ Unprecedented Theory of Forfeiture 

Does Not Bar Application of International Comity 

Without any legal basis, the United States argues that international comity does not apply 

when the United States is a plaintiff in a civil forfeiture purportedly acting to vindicate its interests. 

See Opp. at 9-11. In fact, the United States’ actions in pursuing a civil forfeiture claim where, as 

here, valid foreign judgments eviscerate the United States’ allegations is unprecedented.

The United States misstates the case law in wrongly contending that American courts have 

uniformly rejected abstention based on international comity “where the United States sought to 

forfeit assets involved in violations of U.S. anti-money laundering laws predicated on violations 

of foreign law.” Opp. at 9. The cases the United States cites, Opp. at 9-11, are inapposite and 

provide no support for the United States’ assertion. Indeed, the United States does not cite a single 

case where, as here, a court declined to apply international comity and abstention where the United 

States was pursuing claims based on allegations of foreign conduct that had been adjudicated in 

the appropriate foreign court in a manner contrary to the United States’ allegations. See id. In 

fact, in some of the United States’ cases, the relevant and purportedly unlawful foreign conduct 

was the subject of investigations, settlement agreements, indictments, or convictions in appropriate 

foreign jurisdictions. See United States v. All Assets Held In Acct. No. XXXXXXXX, 83 F. Supp. 

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3d 360, 363-64, 371 (D.D.C. 2015) (Nigerian government entered into settlement with former 

official at center of alleged scheme); United States v. Approximately $3,275.20 seized from Bank 

of Am. Acct. No. XXXXXXXXXXX, 2021 WL 5300512, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2021) (Venezuelan 

government had initiated investigation and prosecutions); United States v. All Assets Held at Bank 

Julius Baer & Co., Ltd., 2005 WL 6718216 (D.D.C.) (¶¶15-17) (complaint alleging that individual 

at center of scheme had been charged with crimes in Ukraine, convicted of crimes in Switzerland, 

and indicted for crimes in the United States).

International comity necessarily applies to civil forfeiture actions in which the United 

States is a plaintiff, and there is absolutely no reason why the United States can or should refuse 

to recognize a validly-issued foreign judgment.

B. Retrospective Comity Applies

Unable to show that the NZF and ZFZ litigations are not parallel proceedings, the United 

States offers no meaningful legal or factual theory to preclude the application of retrospective 

comity. The United States does not and cannot assert that (i) the Ukrainian courts issuing the NZF 

and ZFZ Judgments used proceedings inconsistent with civilized jurisprudence, (ii) the Judgments 

were rendered by fraud, or (iii) the Judgments are repugnant to fundamental principles of decency 

and justice. See Br. at 8. 

In place of reasoned legal argument supported by case law and legal principles, the United 

States resorts to gross inuendo and insinuation, baselessly smearing the Ukrainian court system 

and Ukrainian judges. For example, the United States notes that in the Delaware action, 

PrivatBank “has thrown into serious question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian decisions,” Opp. at 

6 n.3—but then does not explain what those “questions” are or how they purportedly render the 

NZF Judgment short of the comity standard.7 

Federal courts have repeatedly rejected assertions that Ukrainian courts are insufficient, 

see Br. at 8, and the United States provides no substantive reason to suggest why the Ukrainian 

judgments do not meet the comity standard. Engaging in petty mudslinging against foreign courts, 

the United States does not come close to meeting its burden of showing why the NZF and ZFZ 

Judgments are not valid. See In re Arb. between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak 

7

 It bears emphasis that the Delaware court not only stayed PrivatBank’s Delaware action in favor of the Ukrainian 

litigations, but made a point of describing the Ukrainian litigations as the product of careful consideration of the 

“evidence, including ‘detailed accounting source documents regarding the exact purpose for which the loan proceeds 

were used’ and ‘bank statements and other official documents’ confirming repayment.” Ex. 1 at 15.

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Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d Cir. 2002) (“meager and conclusory submissions” do 

not permit a court to “to pass value judgments on the adequacy of justice and the integrity of 

[Ukraine's] judicial system on the basis of no more than [those] bare denunciations and sweeping 

generalizations.”) (alterations in the original); Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Kiritchenko, 2007 

WL 2669841, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (finding that plaintiff “has not demonstrated that 

the Ukrainian courts are so lacking in impartiality, due process, or procedural fairness that the 

United States courts should disregard all Ukrainian court decisions as a matter of course, or the 

particular decisions at issue herein”).

Because the NZF and ZFZ litigations and Judgments are parallel foreign proceedings that 

meet the retrospective comity standards, this Court should abstain and dismiss the United States’ 

claims on the basis of international comity.

C. Prospective Comity Applies

Claimants showed in their Brief that this Court should abstain on the basis of prospective 

comity because Ukraine has a greater interest in adjudicating these issues and provides an adequate 

forum. See Br. at 9-11. In Opposition, the United States puts the cart before the horse in arguing 

that it has an interest in determining whether the Defendant Asset is subject to forfeiture, and that 

it cannot litigate that issue in an alternate forum like Ukraine. See Opp. at 15-16. Whether the 

Defendant Asset is subject to forfeiture depends, first and foremost, on whether it was acquired 

with tainted funds. See supra, Section I.A.i. Whether the funds received in connection with the 

NZF and ZFZ Loans were obtained unlawfully is a question of Ukrainian law that has been 

considered, and continues to be considered, by Ukrainian courts, which clearly have a predominant 

interest in deciding such issues by applying Ukrainian law to Ukrainian businesses and individuals. 

The United States has no right to assume the role of Ukraininan prosecutor and usurp for itself a 

legal analysis under Ukrainian law concerning Ukrainian loan transactions carried out by 

Ukrainian citizens.

D. Prescriptive Comity Applies 

The United States further ignores that, as Claimants showed, the doctrine of prescriptive 

comity also calls for abstention. See Br. at 14 n.5; ECF No. 118. Prescriptive comity is a canon of 

statutory construction and requires that statutes be construed “to avoid unreasonable interference 

with other nations’ sovereign authority where possible.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 

579 U.S. 325, 347 n.9 (2016); see F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 

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164-69 (2004); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-21 (1993). Under the 

doctrine of prescriptive comity, the predicate crime statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iii) and 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315, should be interpreted as not applying to foreign conduct that the foreign 

courts have determined to be entirely lawful and proper under the foreign nation’s own laws. In 

other words, this Court should interpret the term “fraud . . . against a foreign bank” described in 

18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iii), and the definition of stolen property described in 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2314, 2315, as not encompassing foreign conduct that the foreign government has not charged 

as a crime (for which the alleged perpetrators are innocent as a matter of Ukrainian law), and 

especially not encompassing foreign conduct (and loans) that foreign courts have held to be lawful. 

II. THE CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Claimants showed in their brief that the Verified Complaint should be dismissed because 

the United States fails to adequately plead the tracing of the purportedly illicit funds to the 

acquisition of PNC Plaza. See Br. at 16-17. The United States’ arguments in Opposition are 

unavailing.

PNC Plaza was purchased in 2011 for $77 million (Compl. ¶ 103), and at least $65 million 

(or 84%) of that purchase price came from routine acquisition financing. The minority “portion” 

traceable to supposedly improper Ukrainian loans traveled through multiple entities, bank 

accounts, and countries. See id. ¶¶ 125-26, 128-30. Then, in 2018, the Complaint alleges that 

PNC Plaza went into foreclosure proceedings which ended in “Firm A,” an “unrelated 

[indisputably untainted] third-party investor,” buying out the existing promissory note for 

approximately $27 million. Id. ¶¶ 139 n.10, 146. The “approximately $10 million” contributed 

by “Korf and Laber’s CBD 500” in 2018 came from Felman Trading Americas, Inc. and was not 

tainted. Id. ¶¶ 150-51. The original financing was thus admittedly “extinguished” in 2018 and is 

not actionable. Id. ¶¶ 138, 149; see Supplemental Rule G(2); 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3); United States 

v. Real Property at 2659 Roundhill Dr., Alamo, Cal., 194 F.3d 1020, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Indeed, the purchase of PNC Plaza out of foreclosure in 2018 was made by new entities 

that did not exist in 2011. “Korf and Laber’s CBD 500 [LLC],” was formed in 2018, and Optima 

CBD Investments, LLC, (CBD 500’s wholly owning parent company), was formed in 2017. 

Compl. ¶¶ 140-41, 144. Along with “Firm A,” CBD 500 and Optima CBD Investments jointly 

“formed PNC Corporate Plaza Holdings LLC, a Delaware company, on September 5, 2018” to 

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buy PNC Plaza out of foreclosure.8 Id. ¶¶ 139-44. As set forth in the prior paragraph, the $10 

million contributed by “Korf and Laber’s CBD 500” to the joint venture came from Felman 

Trading Americas, Inc. and is not alleged to have been tainted. 

The United States defined the Defendant Asset as “all right to and interest in PNC 

Corporate Plaza Holdings LLC held, controlled, or acquired, directly or indirectly, by Optima CBD 

Investments LLC and/or CBD 500 LLC . . . .” Id. ¶ 10. Aside from being impermissibly vague, 

those rights and interests were obtained with clean money. And in fact PNC Corporate Plaza 

Holdings LLC did not even exist until 2018—seven years after the original purchase of PNC Plaza 

by separate entities in 2011, with separate money. 18 U.S.C. § 981 requires the “involve[ment]” 

of the “property” in a criminal act, and 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3) likewise requires “a substantial 

connection between the property and the offense.” Here, the United States has completely failed 

to demonstrate any connection whatsoever between the Defendant Asset, i.e., the “right to and 

interest in PNC Corporate Plaza Holdings LLC” held by “Optima CBD Investments LLC and/or 

CBD 500 LLC,” and the offense, i.e., any alleged bank fraud or theft at PrivatBank in 2011. 

Because the rights to and interests in PNC Corporate Plaza Holdings LLC have no “substantial 

connection” to or “involvement in” the alleged bank fraud and alleged theft at PrivatBank in 2011, 

the Complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in Claimants’ Brief, the Verified Complaint 

should be dismissed in its entirety and with prejudice.

8 This corporate chain is alleged in the Complaint, but is also demonstrated visually by the organizational chart 

previously attached as ECF No. 81-2.

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Respectfully submitted,

BLACK SREBNICK, P.A.

201 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 1300

Miami, FL 33131

Tel: (305) 371-6421

Fax: (305) 371-6322

By: /s/ Howard M. Srebnick

Howard M. Srebnick

Florida Bar No. 919063

Robert T. Dunlap

Florida Bar No. 119509

HSrebnick@RoyBlack.com

RDunlap@RoyBlack.com 

Attorneys for Claimants Korf, Laber, and the 

Corporate Entities 

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP

1633 Broadway

New York, New York 10019

(212) 506-1700 

By: 

Marc E. Kasowitz 

Mark P. Ressler

Joshua N. Paul

Pro Hac Vice Anticipated

MKasowitz@kasowitz.com

MRessler@kasowitz.com 

JPaul@kasowitz.com 

Attorneys for Claimants Korf, Laber and the 

Corporate Entities

Devin “Vel” Freedman, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 99762

Colleen Smeryage, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 100023

ROCHE FREEDMAN LLP

1 SE 3rd Ave.

Suite 1240

Miami, FL 33131

vel@rcfllp.com

csmeryage@rcfllp.com

Attorneys for Claimants Korf, Laber and

CBD 500 LLC

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