a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2005 SECURING U.S. 

NUCLEAR 

MATERIALS

DOE Needs to Take 

Action to Safely 

Consolidate 

Plutonium

GAO-05-665
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-665.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-665, a report to 

congressional committees 

July 2005

SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS

DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely 

Consolidate Plutonium 

DOE cannot yet consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons. 

First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form for

permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional 

plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot receive all of the plutonium from 

DOE’s Hanford Site because it is not in a form SRS planned to store. 

Specifically, about one-fifth of Hanford’s plutonium is in the form of 12-footlong nuclear fuel rods, which Hanford had planned to ship intact to SRS as 

part of its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed 

nuclear facilities. However, SRS’s storage plan called for storing DOE’s 

standard storage containers and not intact fuel rods. Recent changes in 

DOE’s security requirements have complicated SRS’s storage plans by 

eliminating one facility that DOE planned to use to store plutonium. Until 

DOE develops a permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be 

shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security 

improvements that consolidation could offer. Continued storage at Hanford 

will cost an additional approximately $85 million annually and will threaten 

that site’s achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan. 

In addition, DOE lacks the capability to fully monitor the condition of the 

plutonium necessary to ensure continued safe storage. The facility at SRS 

that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety systems to 

conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a monitoring capability, 

DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release that could 

harm workers, the public, and/or the environment. DOE had planned to 

construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS that already had 

the safety systems needed to work with plutonium. However, this building 

would not have had sufficient security to conduct all of the required 

monitoring activities. In addition, this building also has other serious safety 

problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that it 

would have SRS’s storage facility upgraded to conduct plutonium 

monitoring. 

Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE’s Unneeded Plutonium 

Hanford

Rocky

Flats

Los

Alamos

Consolidation

Permanent disposition

Sources: GAO (data); MapArt (images).

Savannah

River

Site

Yucca

Mountain

Lawrence

Livermore

Plutonium is very hazardous to 

human health and the environment 

and requires extensive security 

because of its potential use in a 

nuclear weapon. The Department 

of Energy (DOE) stores about 50 

metric tons of plutonium that is no 

longer needed by the United States 

for nuclear weapons. Some of this 

plutonium is contaminated metal, 

oxides, solutions, and residues 

remaining from the nuclear 

weapons production process. To 

improve security and reduce 

plutonium storage costs, DOE 

plans to establish enough storage 

capacity at its Savannah River Site 

(SRS) in the event it decides to 

consolidate its plutonium at SRS 

until it can be permanently 

disposed of in a geologic repository 

at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. GAO 

was asked to examine (1) the 

extent to which DOE can 

consolidate this plutonium at SRS 

and (2) SRS’s capacity to monitor 

plutonium storage containers. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE (1) 

develop a comprehensive strategy 

to consolidate, store, and 

eventually dispose of its plutonium 

and (2) ensure that its facilities’ 

cleanup plans are consistent with 

its plutonium consolidation plans. 

In commenting on the report, DOE 

generally agreed with our 

recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5

Background 7

DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the 

Savannah River Site 10

DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored 

Plutonium at SRS 13

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 19

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy 26

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 28

Tables Table 1: DOE’s Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by 

Site after Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have 

Been Completed 9

Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories 14

Table 3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category, 

Fiscal Years 2005-2016 15

Figures Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of 

DOE’s Unneeded Plutonium 2

Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage Container 8

Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers 16
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Abbreviations

DBT design basis threat

DE destructive examination

DOE Department of Energy

HEPA High-Efficiency Particulate Air

NDE nondestructive examination

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

Safety Board Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

SRS Savannah River Site

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Page 1 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 20, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Joe Barton 

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ed Whitfield

Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

Plutonium—a man-made element produced by irradiating uranium in 

nuclear reactors and used in nuclear weapons—is very hazardous to 

human health and the environment and presents an attractive target for 

theft by a terrorist. When the United States stopped producing nuclear 

weapons in 1989, it had plutonium inventories located in numerous 

Department of Energy (DOE) facilities throughout the United States. These 

facilities included the Hanford Site in Washington, the Rocky Flats 

Environmental Technology Site in Colorado, the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory in New Mexico, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 

California, and the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina.

DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by 

the United States for nuclear weapons. The majority is in the form of pits 

(the spherical core of a nuclear weapon), clean metal, and oxides while the 

remainder is in nonpit forms such as contaminated metal, oxides, 

solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production 

process.1

 To improve security and reduce costs, DOE plans to establish 

enough storage capacity at SRS in the event it decides to consolidate its 

nonpit plutonium for interim storage until it can be permanently disposed 

of in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. (See fig. 1.)

1

The exact amounts of plutonium that are in pit and nonpit forms is considered classified 

information.
Page 2 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE’s Unneeded Plutonium

Nonpit plutonium has particularly dangerous characteristics that demand 

special storage conditions. Unlike pits, nonpit plutonium is in forms that 

can be easily dispersed. If not safely contained, plutonium can be 

dangerous to human health, even in extremely small quantities. Because it 

can be highly radioactive, inhaling a few micrograms of plutonium creates 

a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone cancer. Inhaling larger doses can 

cause immediate lung injuries and death. In certain forms, plutonium can 

spontaneously combust in the presence of oxygen at temperatures above 

Hanford

Rocky

Flats

Los

Alamos

Consolidation

Permanent disposition

Sources: GAO (data); MapArt (images).

Savannah

River

Site

Lawrence

Livermore

Yucca

Mountain
Page 3 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

room temperature. Because of these hazards, nonpit plutonium must be 

stabilized and packaged appropriately to minimize the risk of accidental 

release. In addition, facilities storing plutonium must be properly equipped 

with safety systems that prevent it from escaping into the surrounding air, 

land, or water in the event a container is breached. This report addresses 

the storage and monitoring of nonpit plutonium (hereafter referred to as 

plutonium) at SRS.

In 2003, DOE issued a technical standard for plutonium stabilization and 

storage that it believes will allow it to safely store plutonium for a minimum 

of 50 years. DOE is nearing completion of a multiyear effort to stabilize and 

package plutonium at its sites across the United States into 5-inch-wide, 

10-inch-long storage containers. Under DOE’s standard, once the plutonium 

is safely packaged, DOE must periodically monitor the storage containers 

for changes in the plutonium’s condition, particularly any pressurization or 

corrosion of the containers. Such monitoring includes annually x-raying a 

sample of storage containers to evaluate potential pressurization. Storage 

containers may also be cut open to evaluate the plutonium inside and the 

container itself for potential corrosion. An effective monitoring program is 

intended to detect damaged storage containers or inadequately stabilized 

plutonium and will help DOE ensure the continued safe storage of the 

material.

DOE must also provide security against potential terrorists interested in 

the plutonium’s value for constructing a nuclear weapon, an improvised 

nuclear device, or even a “dirty bomb.”2

 For many years, a key component 

of DOE security has been the development of the design basis threat 

(DBT), a classified document that identifies the potential size and 

capabilities of terrorist forces. Since September 11, 2001, the size of the 

potential threat has increased significantly.3

DOE has cancelled two proposed construction projects at SRS that would 

have provided plutonium storage and monitoring and would have 

2

A dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersion device, uses conventional explosives 

to disperse radioactive material. While a dirty bomb would have few short-term health 

effects on exposed individuals, it could potentially increase the long-term risks of cancer for 

those contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated areas after 

such an explosion could lead to panic and serious economic costs.

3

See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully 

Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004).
Page 4 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

processed the plutonium for permanent disposition. In 2001, DOE 

cancelled a project initiated in 1995 to build a new facility at SRS, called the 

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, that would have provided 

long-term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium containers in a 

secure environment. DOE cancelled the project because it expected to 

store the plutonium for only a few years until a facility to process the 

plutonium for permanent disposition was available. Instead, DOE decided 

to use existing buildings at SRS to package and store the plutonium until 

construction of the processing facility was completed. In addition, in 2002, 

citing budgetary constraints, DOE cancelled its plans to construct the 

facility that would have processed its most heavily contaminated 

plutonium into a form for permanent disposition by a method known as 

immobilization. Immobilization involves mixing the plutonium with 

ceramics, placing the mixture in large canisters, and then filling the 

canisters with high-level radioactive waste that has been turned into 

molten glass that then hardens. These canisters would have then been 

shipped to a geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste that DOE 

plans to construct at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. As a result of the 

cancellation of the immobilization facility, DOE has no means for 

processing its most heavily contaminated plutonium into a form suitable 

for permanent disposition.

In December 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety 

Board), an independent federal agency established by the Congress in 1988 

to oversee the safety of DOE’s nuclear weapons complex, reported that 

although the facilities DOE plans to use for plutonium storage can do so 

safely for a limited time, the facilities do not meet modern safety standards 

for long-term plutonium storage. The Safety Board concluded that DOE’s 

lack of planning for plutonium storage forced SRS to focus on what can be 

done with existing facilities, foreclosing options that may have been both 

cost-effective and safe. The Safety Board proposed that DOE conduct a 

new study of the options for storing plutonium at SRS. In addition, it 

advocated the development of a complete, well-considered plan for 

permanently disposing of all of DOE’s excess plutonium.

In this context and as agreed with your offices, we examined (1) the extent 

to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS’s capacity 

to monitor plutonium storage containers. A forthcoming classified report 

will discuss SRS’s plans for upgrading security to meet the 2004 DBT.

To evaluate DOE’s plans for consolidating plutonium, monitoring stored 

plutonium, and providing security, we reviewed plutonium storage, 
Page 5 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

monitoring, and security plans and reports prepared by DOE’s Office of 

Environmental Management, DOE’s Office of Security and Safety 

Performance Assurance, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA), DOE’s operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah 

River Company), and DOE’s security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut 

Services, Inc.). In addition, we reviewed studies on plutonium storage at 

SRS produced by the Safety Board. Over the course of our work, we toured 

plutonium storage facilities at SRS. During these visits, we interviewed and 

received briefings from DOE Savannah River Operations, Westinghouse, 

and Wackenhut officials. We also visited plutonium storage facilities at 

DOE’s Hanford Site, specifically Hanford’s Plutonium Finishing Plant. 

Hanford currently stores the majority of the plutonium that could 

eventually be shipped to SRS. During this visit, we interviewed and 

received briefings from DOE Richland Operations officials. We also spoke 

with officials from DOE’s operating contractor for Hanford (Fluor Hanford) 

and Fluor’s security subcontractor for the Hanford Site (Protection 

Technology Hanford). In addition, we interviewed officials from the Safety 

Board, DOE’s Office of Environmental Management, and DOE’s Office of 

Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. Additional 

information on our objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in 

appendix I. We conducted our work from June 2004 through June 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief DOE cannot consolidate all of its plutonium at the Savannah River Site for 

several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the 

plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a 

plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, even if this 

plan was in place, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford’s plutonium 

because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing. Specifically, 

Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to 

accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. About 

one-fifth of Hanford’s plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel 

rods. Because disassembling the fuel rods would delay cleanup activities, 

Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan calls for shipping these rods intact to 

SRS inside special shipping containers. However, SRS’s storage plans called 

for storing Hanford’s plutonium in DOE’s standard 5-inch-wide, 

10-inch-long storage containers. SRS’s storage plan assumed Hanford 

would disassemble the fuel rods and package the plutonium in storage 

containers. Despite these inconsistencies, DOE approved both Hanford’s 

accelerated cleanup plan and SRS’s plutonium storage plans. Instead of 
Page 6 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

developing an integrated plan for plutonium consolidation, DOE relied 

upon its individual sites to independently develop plans to achieve their 

own goals. Although SRS’s storage facility has sufficient space to store the 

fuel rods, several steps are necessary before DOE would be able to ship the 

fuel rods to SRS. These include obtaining Department of Transportationcertified shipping containers for the fuel rods and completing the 

appropriate safety analyses and documentation for SRS’s storage facility. 

Changes to DOE’s security requirements have complicated SRS’s storage 

plans by eliminating one facility that DOE planned to use to store 

plutonium. Originally, DOE had planned to use two SRS facilities to store 

its excess plutonium. However, both facilities would need extensive and 

expensive upgrades to comply with the new 2004 DBT requirements. In 

order to save money, DOE has, therefore, decided to use only one facility to 

store plutonium. Until DOE develops a plan to process the plutonium for 

permanent disposition, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and 

DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that 

plutonium consolidation could offer. In particular, continued plutonium 

storage at Hanford will cost approximately an additional $85 million 

annually and will threaten that site’s achievement of the milestones in its 

accelerated cleanup plan. 

In addition, DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the condition 

of the plutonium that is in storage containers as required by DOE’s storage 

standard. According to the Safety Board, the facility at SRS that DOE plans 

to use to store the plutonium is not equipped to conduct the needed 

monitoring of storage containers. In fact, because this storage facility lacks 

adequate fire protection, ventilation, and filtration, DOE’s standard storage 

containers cannot be removed from their outer packaging—35-gallon steel 

drums used to ship the containers to SRS. The only facility at SRS that can 

be used to safely remove the storage containers from their outer packaging, 

monitor them, and, if necessary, restabilize and repackage the plutonium, 

has closed in preparation for decommissioning. Without a monitoring 

capability that would detect whether the stored plutonium is becoming 

unstable and damaging the storage containers, DOE faces increased risks 

of an accidental plutonium release at SRS that could harm workers, the 

public, and/or the environment. Because SRS’s storage facility lacks the 

capability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE had planned to construct a 

monitoring capability in another building at SRS that already had the 

ventilation and filtration systems needed to work with plutonium. 

However, this building would not have had sufficient security to conduct all 

of the monitoring activities required by DOE’s storage standard. In 

addition, the Safety Board has reported that, like the storage facility, this 
Page 7 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

building lacks adequate fire protection as well as having other serious 

safety concerns. Given these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that 

it would have SRS’s storage facility upgraded to allow storage and 

monitoring activities to be centralized in one facility.

We are making recommendations to ensure that DOE develops a 

comprehensive strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, and 

disposition and that its facilities’ cleanup plans are consistent with this 

strategy.

We presented a draft of this report to DOE for comment. In its comments, 

DOE generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that its 

recently created Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation 

Coordination Committee will develop a strategic plan for the consolidation 

and disposition of special nuclear material. Upon completion of this plan, 

DOE stated that it will ensure that its sites’ cleanup plans are revised 

accordingly. DOE also provided technical comments that we incorporated 

into the report as appropriate.

Background SRS was constructed in the early 1950s by the DuPont Company under 

contract to the Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor agency to DOE) 

to produce tritium and plutonium-239 for use in nuclear weapons. Covering 

310 square miles along the Savannah River and encompassing land across 

several counties in South Carolina, the site historically has supported five 

nuclear reactors, two chemical separation plants, a heavy water extraction 

plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium extraction 

facility, and waste management facilities. During the cold war, SRS was the 

only source of tritium in the United States and supplemented the 

production of weapons-grade plutonium at DOE’s Hanford Site. Although 

SRS no longer produces plutonium, some of its missions continue, such as 

the extraction of tritium for nuclear warheads. SRS is currently managed 

under contract to DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River Company.

To address the problems associated with unstable forms of plutonium and 

inadequate packaging for long-term storage, DOE established a standard 

for the safe storage of plutonium for a minimum of 50 years.4

 This standard 

establishes the stabilization and packaging requirements for plutonium. 

4

U.S. Department of Energy, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing 

Materials, DOE-STD-3013-2003 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003).
Page 8 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Stabilization occurs by heating the material to remove moisture that could 

lead to a buildup of pressure. This buildup of pressure increases the risk of 

rupturing a container. Plutonium containers designed to meet this standard 

consist of an inner and outer container, each welded shut. (See fig. 2.)

Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage Container

The inner container is designed so that it can be monitored for a buildup of 

pressure using analytical techniques, such as radiography, that do not 

damage the container. Containers must also be resistant to fire, leakage, 

and corrosion. Each storage container can hold a total of 5 kilograms of 

material, but a maximum of 4.4 kilograms of the 5 kilograms can be pure 

plutonium. The remaining material is chemical impurities such as chlorides 

and fluorides that are mixed with the plutonium.

Plutonium stabilization and packaging is completed at Rocky Flats, 

Hanford, and SRS, and SRS has already received nearly 1,900 containers 

from Rocky Flats. Stabilization and packaging is still ongoing at Lawrence 

Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Once completed, DOE 

estimates that it will have nearly 5,700 plutonium storage containers being 

stored at locations across the United States that could eventually be 

shipped to SRS. (See table 1.)

Plutonium Inner container

Inner container 

placed inside 

outer container

Outer container

Source: SRS.
Page 9 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Table 1: DOE’s Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by Site after 

Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have Been Completed

Source: SRS.

Notes: 1,895 of the storage containers now stored at SRS were originally packaged and shipped from 

the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in Colorado.

In addition to 2,275 storage containers, Hanford has additional plutonium in the form of fuel rods that 

were to be used in the now-closed Fast Flux Test Facility nuclear reactor. These fuel rods contain 

enough plutonium that, if they were cut apart and the material packaged, would require approximately 

1,000 additional storage containers. See pages 11 and 12 for additional discussion of Hanford’s fuel 

rods.

Until April 2005, SRS’s plutonium storage plans called for using two 

buildings at the site for plutonium storage and monitoring operations: 

Building 105-K and Building 235-F. Building 105-K was originally a nuclear 

reactor built in the early 1950s and produced plutonium and tritium until 

1988. The reactor was then placed in a cold standby condition until its 

complete shutdown in 1996. The major reactor components were removed 

and the facility is now primarily used to store plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium.

Building 235-F was also constructed in the 1950s and was used until the 

mid-1980s to produce plutonium heat sources that were used to power 

space probes for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 

the Department of Defense. The building is currently used to store 

plutonium.

DOE must provide extensive security for plutonium storage facilities at 

SRS because they contain Category I quantities of plutonium. Category I 

material includes specified quantities of plutonium or highly enriched 

uranium in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and test 

devices; (2) pure products containing higher concentrations of plutonium 

or highly enriched uranium, such as major nuclear components and 

recastable metal; and (3) high-grade materials, such as carbides, oxides, 

solutions, and nitrates. The risks associated with Category I special nuclear 

materials vary but include the nuclear detonation of a weapon or test 

Site Number of storage containers

SRS 2,935

Hanford 2,275

Los Alamos National Laboratory 342

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 135

Total 5,687
Page 10 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

device at or near design yield, the creation of improvised nuclear devices 

capable of producing a nuclear yield, theft for use in a nuclear weapon, and 

the potential for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal.

To manage potential security risks, DOE has developed the DBT, a 

classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities of 

terrorist forces. DOE requires the contractors operating its sites to develop 

security measures designed to defend against the threat contained in the 

DBT. While specific measures vary from site to site, SRS’s security 

measures include

• a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting 

intruders;

• physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;

• numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers, 

vehicle inspection stations, special nuclear material detectors, and 

metal detectors;

• operational security procedures, such as a “two person” rule that 

prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear 

material;

• hardened facilities and vaults; and

• a heavily armed paramilitary protective force equipped with such items 

as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and 

chemical protective gear.

DOE Cannot 

Consolidate Its 

Plutonium from Other 

DOE Sites at the 

Savannah River Site

DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons. 

First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form 

for permanent disposition, as required by the FY 2002 defense 

authorization act. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional 

plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford’s 

plutonium because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing. 

Changes to the DBT have complicated SRS’s storage plans by eliminating 

one facility that DOE had planned to use for plutonium storage. DOE is 

facing these storage challenges because of its failure to adequately plan for 

plutonium consolidation and disposition. Until DOE develops a permanent 

disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE 
Page 11 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium 

consolidation could offer. For example, continued plutonium storage at 

Hanford will cost approximately an additional $85 million annually and will 

threaten that site’s achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup 

plan.

SRS Cannot Receive 

Additional Plutonium Until 

a Plan to Process the 

Plutonium for Permanent 

Disposition Is Developed

Section 3155 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

20025 provides that if DOE decides not to construct either of two proposed 

plutonium disposition facilities at SRS,6

 DOE is prohibited from shipping 

plutonium to SRS until a plan to process the material for permanent 

disposition is developed and submitted to the Congress. In 2002, DOE 

cancelled the plutonium immobilization plant and, to date, DOE has not 

developed a plan for the plutonium that would have been processed in that 

plant for permanent disposition. In its fiscal year 2006 budget, DOE has 

requested $10 million to initiate conceptual design of a facility that would 

process this plutonium. However, it is uncertain when this design work 

would be completed and a plan prepared.

SRS Cannot Currently 

Receive Some of Hanford’s 

Plutonium Because 

Hanford’s Accelerated 

Cleanup Plans and SRS’s 

Storage Plans Are 

Inconsistent with One 

Another

Even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition had 

been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS cannot 

currently accommodate some of Hanford’s plutonium because Hanford’s 

accelerated cleanup plans and SRS’s storage plans are inconsistent with 

one another. DOE approved both plans even though Hanford’s accelerated 

cleanup plan called for shipping some of its plutonium to SRS in a form that 

SRS had not planned on storing.

Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of 12-foot-long 

nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE standard 

5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. The fuel rods were to be used 

in Hanford’s Fast Flux Test Facility reactor. The reactor has been closed, 

and the fuel rods were never used. Hanford’s plutonium is currently being 

stored at the site’s Plutonium Finishing Plant—the storage containers in 

vaults and the nuclear fuel rods in large casks inside a fenced area. Hanford 

was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate 

5

Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 3155, 115 Stat. 1378 (2001).

6

The two proposed plutonium disposition facilities are the plutonium immobilization plant 

and a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility for surplus plutonium pits and nonpit plutonium.
Page 12 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. Although 

Hanford’s original cleanup plan called for demolishing the Plutonium 

Finishing Plant by 2038, the plan was modified in 2002 to accelerate the 

site’s cleanup. Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan that was approved by 

DOE’s Office of Environmental Management now calls for shipping the 

storage containers and nuclear fuel rods to SRS by the end of fiscal year 

2006 so that Hanford can demolish the Plutonium Finishing Plant by the 

end of fiscal year 2008. To meet the new deadline, Hanford planned to ship 

the fuel rods intact to SRS.

Nevertheless, SRS’s July 2004 plutonium storage plan stated that Hanford 

would cut the fuel rods and package the plutonium in approximately 1,000 

DOE standard storage containers before shipping the material to SRS. At 

the time the plan was issued, SRS planned to use Building 105-K and 

Building 235-F to store plutonium in standard storage containers and not 

intact fuel rods. Although Building 105-K is capable of storing the fuel rods 

intact, several steps are necessary before DOE would be able to ship the 

fuel rods from Hanford to SRS. First, there is currently no Department of 

Transportation-certified shipping container that could be used to package 

and ship the fuel rods. In addition, SRS would be required, among other 

things, to prepare the appropriate analyses and documentation under the 

National Environmental Policy Act and update Building 105-K’s safety 

documentation to include storage of the fuel rods. Wherever the fuel rods 

are stored, they would have to be disassembled prior to processing the 

plutonium for permanent disposition. Hanford and SRS currently lack the 

capability to disassemble the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study establishing 

that capability at SRS as part of its conceptual design of a facility to process 

the plutonium for disposition.

Changes in Security 

Requirements Have 

Eliminated One Facility at 

SRS That DOE Planned to 

Use for Plutonium Storage

SRS originally planned to use both Building 105-K and Building 235-F to 

store plutonium storage containers. After the DBT was changed in October 

2004, SRS was forced to reevaluate its storage plans. Because the DBT 

substantially increases the potential threat that SRS must defend against, 

significant additional security will be required for SRS facilities storing 

plutonium. SRS projected the total cost of this additional security at over 

$300 million. SRS estimated that it could save more than $120 million by 

consolidating plutonium in Building 105-K and not using Building 235-F for 

storage. Building 235-F was originally planned to store approximately 1,900 

storage containers. Although SRS officials believe that Building 105-K has 

sufficient space to store all of DOE’s plutonium storage containers from 

other DOE sites in the event that DOE decides to ship additional plutonium 
Page 13 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

to SRS, DOE’s estimates of the total number of containers have varied over 

time and may continue to change as Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos 

conduct plutonium stabilization and packaging operations.

DOE’s Failure to Adequately 

Plan for Plutonium 

Consolidation Will Lead to 

Additional Storage Costs 

and Threatens Hanford’s 

Cleanup Plans

The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the 

department’s failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. DOE 

has not developed a complexwide, comprehensive strategy for plutonium 

consolidation and disposition that accounts for each of its facilities’ 

requirements and capabilities. Until DOE is able to develop a permanent 

disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS, and DOE 

will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium 

consolidation could offer. According to DOE officials, the impact of 

continued storage at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will be relatively 

minor because both laboratories had already planned to maintain 

plutonium storage facilities for other laboratory missions. However, 

according to Hanford officials, continued storage at the site could cost 

approximately an additional $85 million annually and will threaten the 

achievement of the goals in the site’s accelerated cleanup plan. Specifically, 

maintaining storage vaults at Hanford’s Plutonium Finishing Plant will 

prevent the site from demolishing the plant as scheduled by September 

2008.

DOE Lacks the 

Capability to Fully 

Monitor the Condition 

of Stored Plutonium at 

SRS

DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the condition of the 

plutonium that is in storage containers as required by DOE’s storage 

standard. According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K does not have 

adequate safety measures to monitor the containers. Therefore, DOE had 

planned to construct a monitoring capability in Building 235-F at SRS, 

which already had the safety systems needed to work with plutonium. 

However, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to conduct 

all of the required monitoring. In addition, the Safety Board identified 

serious safety concerns with Building 235-F. Because of these concerns, 

DOE changed its plans again in April 2005 and announced that it would 

install monitoring equipment and the necessary safety systems in Building 

105-K.
Page 14 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

SRS’s Designated Storage 

Facility Lacks Sufficient 

Safety Measures to Conduct 

Plutonium Monitoring

Under DOE’s plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be 

periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a 

monitoring capability that would detect whether storage containers are at 

risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental plutonium 

release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment. The 

following two types of monitoring activities are to be performed:

• Nondestructive examination (NDE): Between 13 and 41 storage 

containers are to be tested annually for leaks or contamination and 

x-rayed to detect any increase in internal pressure that could rupture a 

container.

• Destructive examination (DE): Between 13 and 15 storage containers 

are to be punctured and cut open annually. Samples of the gases inside 

the container are to be taken and analyzed and the containers 

themselves examined for indications of corrosion. In addition, the 

material inside is to be analyzed to detect any changes in the 

plutonium’s condition.

DOE has categorized the plutonium storage containers into three groups 

based on their risk of rupturing because of pressurization or corrosion. 

(See table 2.)

Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories

Source: SRS.

Category Type of monitoring Characteristics

Number of storage

containers

Pressure and corrosion NDE and DE Containers with impure plutonium oxides 

contaminated with chlorides. The chlorides 

make the containers at risk for rupture due to 

both pressure and corrosion. Plutonium in 

these containers may also contain other 

impurities such as calcium, iron, magnesium, 

silicon, sodium, and potassium, among others.

1,597

Pressure NDE and DE Containers with impure plutonium oxides 

without chlorides, but still at risk of rupture due 

to pressurization.

1,386

Innocuous NDE Containers with relatively pure plutonium metal 

and oxides with little risk for rupture due to 

pressure or corrosion.

2,704

Total 5,687
Page 15 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

A storage container’s placement in one of the three groups—pressure and 

corrosion, pressure, or innocuous—determines the type of monitoring a 

container will be subjected to and how many containers will be monitored 

annually. Table 3 shows the number of examinations DOE plans to conduct 

beginning in fiscal year 2005.

Table 3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category, Fiscal Years 2005-2016

Source: SRS.

Note: According to SRS’s plutonium surveillance and monitoring plan, gas pressurization and 

corrosion have been identified as the only mechanisms that could cause the failure of a storage 

container. Gas pressurization would likely be discovered early because gas generation decreases over 

time. Therefore, monitoring of the pressure category will stop after 5 years. Since corrosion is a slower 

phenomenon and is considered to have a longer term potential to cause failure, monitoring on the 

pressure and corrosion category will continue for 10 years. The innocuous category has little potential 

for pressurization or corrosion, therefore monitoring will stop after 5 years.

Since an accidental release of plutonium would present an extreme hazard 

to workers, the public, and the environment, monitoring activities must 

occur in a facility that, among other things, is equipped to confine 

accidentally released plutonium through effective ventilation and 

appropriate filters. In addition, the facility must have a fire protection 

system to protect storage containers and prevent their contents from being 

released in a major fire. According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K is 

not currently equipped with adequate ventilation or fire protection. 

Specifically, SRS removed the High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) 

filters that were used when the building was a nuclear reactor. Such filters 

could prevent plutonium from escaping the building in the event of a 

release from the storage containers. In addition, Building 105-K lacks 

automatic fire detection or suppression systems. As a result, plutonium 

storage containers cannot be removed from inside the outer packaging 

used to ship the containers to SRS. The outer package—a 35-gallon steel 

drum—is used to ship a single storage container and is designed to resist 

Fiscal year

Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Pressure 

and 

corrosion

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

14 NDE

14 DE

Pressure 25 NDE 25 NDE 25 NDE

2 DE

26 NDE

2 DE

26 NDE

2 DE

Innocuous 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE

Total 27 NDE 27 NDE 40 NDE

15 DE

41 NDE

15 DE

41 NDE

15 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

13 NDE

13 DE

14 NDE

14 DE
Page 16 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

damage during transportation and handling. The outer package confines 

the plutonium in the event the storage container inside is breached. In 

addition, the outer package provides an additional layer of protection from 

fire for the storage container inside. (See fig. 3.)

Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers

Because monitoring requires x-raying individual storage containers and, in 

some cases, puncturing and cutting storage containers to analyze the 

condition of the container and the plutonium within, the storage containers 

must be removed from their outer packaging. In addition, SRS plans to 

establish a capability to restabilize the plutonium by heating it in a 

specialized furnace in the event monitoring determines that the stored 

plutonium is becoming unstable (i.e., increasing the risk of rupturing a 

storage container). The restablized plutonium would then be packaged into 

new storage containers. The only facility at SRS currently capable of

Source: SRS.
Page 17 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

restabilizing and repackaging the plutonium has closed in preparation for 

decommissioning.7

Plutonium Monitoring in 

Another SRS Building Also 

Presented Safety and 

Security Concerns

Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage 

containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building 

235-F at SRS. Building 235-F was chosen primarily because it was already 

equipped with filtered ventilation systems appropriate to handling 

plutonium—multiple and redundant air supply and exhaust fan systems 

that use HEPA filters. Exhaust from the ventilation system is further 

filtered through a sand filter before entering the outside atmosphere.8

Currently, Building 235-F is limited to removing storage containers from 

their outer packaging and performing nondestructive examinations. If 

nondestructive examination indicates pressurization in a storage container, 

DOE has installed equipment in Building 235-F that could puncture the 

storage container to relieve pressure.

Although Building 235-F has the appropriate ventilation and filtration, it 

faced several challenges that would have affected its ability to monitor 

plutonium. Building 235-F is not currently equipped to conduct destructive 

examinations or to restabilize and package the plutonium in new storage 

containers if necessary. In addition, because of changes in the DBT, 

Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to store Category I 

quantities of plutonium. According to SRS officials, 972 storage containers 

contain Category I quantities of plutonium. These storage containers are in 

the innocuous monitoring category and are at low enough risk for rupture 

that only two randomly sampled containers are subject annually to 

nondestructive examination. However, SRS would have been unable to 

remove those containers from Building 105-K to monitor their condition, 

leaving these 972 storage containers unmonitored. According to SRS 

7

This facility—FB Line—was constructed in the early 1960s at SRS to convert plutonium 

solutions into solid forms to be used in nuclear weapons components. In recent years, its 

primary mission has been the stabilization of scrap plutonium from cleanup operations at 

SRS and packaging the stabilized plutonium into storage containers. It ceased operations 

and transferred its remaining plutonium to Building 105-K in March 2005.

8

Sand filters are large, deep beds installed in underground concrete enclosures and filled 

with up to 10 feet of rock, gravel, and sand. As air flows upward through the bed, the rock, 

gravel, and sand filter out plutonium and other chemicals. The decontaminated air can then 

flow into the outside atmosphere. Sand filters have been used in U.S. nuclear facilities since 

1948. Although initially expensive, sand filters can remove a large amount of radioactive 

material, are relatively low maintenance, and are fire resistant.
Page 18 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

officials, security measures could have been established in Building 235-F 

should a safety issue have arisen that required opening a Category I 

container.

Furthermore, the Safety Board identified a number of serious safety 

concerns with Building 235-F. Specifically, the Safety Board reported the 

following:

• The building lacks fire suppression systems, and many areas of the 

building lack fire detection and alarm systems.

• The building’s nuclear criticality accident alarm system has been 

removed. A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile 

material, such as plutonium, is brought together to cause a sustained 

nuclear chain reaction. The immediate result of a nuclear criticality 

accident is the production of an uncontrolled and unpredictable 

radiation source that can be lethal to people who are nearby.

• A number of the building’s safety systems depend upon electrical cables 

that are approximately 50 years old and have exceeded their estimated 

life. When electrical cables age, they become brittle and may crack, 

increasing the potential for failure.

• SRS has discovered two areas in the soil near the building that could 

present a hazard in the event of an earthquake.

• The building’s ventilation system still contains plutonium from its 

previous mission of producing plutonium heat sources to power space 

probes. This highly radioactive plutonium could be released, for 

example, during a fire or earthquake and could pose a hazard to workers 

in the building.

Because of its concerns about Building 235-F’s safety, the Safety Board 

reported in December 2003 that DOE should not plan extended storage of 

plutonium in this building and that it may be preferable from safety and 

cost perspectives to pursue plutonium storage elsewhere at SRS. The 

Safety Board suggested that DOE consider several options for plutonium 

storage, including constructing a new facility or installing safety systems 

such as fire protection and filtered ventilation in Building 105-K.

Similar to the problems that DOE faces with plutonium storage, the 

department’s monitoring challenges are illustrative of its failure to 
Page 19 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Instead of a comprehensive 

strategy that assessed the monitoring capabilities needed to meet its 

storage standard, DOE’s plans went from constructing a state-of-the-art 

storage and monitoring facility to using a building that the Safety Board had 

significant concerns with. Moreover, DOE’s plans have subsequently 

changed again. In April 2005, after spending over $15 million to begin 

modifications to Building 235-F, DOE announced that it would only use the 

building to monitor plutonium temporarily. Now, DOE plans to install the 

necessary safety systems and monitoring equipment in Building 105-K.

Conclusions DOE has not yet developed a comprehensive plan that is necessary to 

consolidate and eventually dispose of its excess plutonium. Instead, it has 

changed its consolidation, storage, and disposition plans numerous times. 

Furthermore, DOE has relied on its individual offices, sites, and facilities to 

independently develop plans to achieve their own goals rather than 

developing an integrated plan for the consolidation and permanent 

disposition of all of its excess plutonium. Specifically, DOE headquarters 

approved both Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan and SRS’s plutonium 

storage plans without resolving conflicts between them. Moreover, we 

agree with the Safety Board that DOE’s lack of careful planning has forced 

SRS to focus on what can be done with existing facilities, eliminating 

options that may have been both more cost-effective and safer than current 

plans. DOE has instead pushed forward with plans to use a 50-year-old 

building at SRS to perform functions it was not designed for. As a result, 

DOE is currently not able to consolidate all of its plutonium at SRS. 

Because it is unable to consolidate its plutonium, DOE faces additional 

costs in excess of $85 million annually to securely store plutonium at its 

current locations, and its cleanup goals for Hanford are in jeopardy.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To ensure the continued safe and secure storage of DOE’s excess 

plutonium inventories, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take 

the following two actions:

• Develop a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and 

disposition of DOE’s excess plutonium. In particular, this strategy 

should assess the storage, monitoring, and security capabilities of all of 

DOE’s sites currently storing plutonium. Furthermore, the strategy 

should analyze the environmental impact, national security 

implications, costs, and schedules to safely consolidate, store, and 
Page 20 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

eventually dispose of DOE’s plutonium at existing facilities and/or at a 

new storage facility constructed at one of its sites.

• When this comprehensive strategy is completed, we further recommend 

that the Secretary of Energy ensure that each of DOE’s facilities’ 

cleanup plans are reviewed to ensure that each site’s cleanup goals and 

time frames are consistent with the department’s comprehensive 

strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment. 

DOE’s letter is presented as appendix II. DOE generally agreed with our 

recommendations and stated that a Nuclear Materials Disposition and 

Consolidation Coordination Committee was formed earlier this year to 

provide a forum to perform nuclear materials disposition and consolidation 

planning. The objectives of this committee are to develop a plan that would 

provide the necessary security for DOE’s nuclear material, identify paths 

for disposition, and reduce security and program costs. DOE stated that 

this committee would produce a strategic plan that would encompass the 

comprehensive strategy called for in our first recommendation. DOE also 

stated that the cleanup plans for its sites would be revised accordingly 

following completion of the committee’s strategic plan.

DOE also provided detailed technical comments that we incorporated into 

the report as appropriate. These technical comments focused primarily on 

DOE’s plans for consolidating plutonium at SRS, the availability of 

sufficient storage space at SRS, and DOE’s ability to monitor stored 

plutonium. Specifically, DOE emphasized in its technical comments that it 

has no plans at this time to further consolidate any plutonium at SRS. We 

recognize that a final decision to consolidate plutonium has not been made. 

However, it is important to note, as was stated in our draft report, that both 

Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plan and SRS’s storage plan assumed that 

DOE’s surplus plutonium would be consolidated at SRS and that both plans 

were approved by DOE headquarters without resolving conflicts between 

them. We believe DOE’s comments that it has no plans to further 

consolidate any plutonium at SRS reinforce our recommendation for a 

comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and disposition of 

DOE’s excess plutonium.

Regarding the availability of sufficient storage space at SRS, DOE stated in 

its technical comments that, even without Building 235-F, Building 105-K 

has adequate storage capacity for all of its excess plutonium, including the 
Page 21 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Hanford fuel rods. However, it is important to note that DOE was 

proceeding with its plans to store plutonium in Building 235-F until changes 

to the DBT forced DOE to reevaluate its plans. Our draft report recognized 

that SRS officials believe Building 105-K has sufficient space to store all of 

DOE’s plutonium storage containers from its sites across the United States. 

Nevertheless, DOE’s estimates of the total number of containers have 

varied over time and may continue to change because plutonium 

stabilization and packaging is still ongoing at Lawrence Livermore and Los 

Alamos National Laboratories. Furthermore, as our draft report noted, 

additional safety analyses and documentation are necessary before 

Building 105-K would be able to store the Hanford fuel rods.

Regarding DOE’s ability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE stated in its 

technical comments that it has the capability in Building 235-F to monitor 

the condition of stored plutonium and that the building will not be shut 

down until a monitoring capability is established in Building 105-K. 

However, as our draft report noted, monitoring at Building 235-F is 

currently limited to removing storage containers from their outer 

packaging and performing nondestructive examinations of the containers. 

Building 235-F also has equipment that can puncture storage containers to 

relieve pressure if needed. However, Building 235-F does not have the 

capability to perform destructive examinations of the storage containers, 

which, according to SRS’s plutonium surveillance and monitoring plan, 

must be conducted beginning in fiscal year 2007. In addition, SRS lacks the 

capability to restabilize and repackage plutonium if necessary. Until 

nondestructive examination, destructive examination, stabilization, and 

repackaging equipment is installed in Building 105-K, we believe that DOE’s 

capability to monitor the condition of stored plutonium at SRS is 

incomplete. We modified our draft report to further clarify DOE’s current 

monitoring capabilities.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of Energy; the Administrator, NNSA; the Chairman of the Safety Board; the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; appropriate congressional 

committees; and other interested parties. We also will make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 22 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III.

Gene Aloise

Director, Natural Resources

 and Environment
Page 23 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

At the request of the Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 

House of Representatives, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 

Representatives, we examined (1) the extent to which the Department of 

Energy (DOE) can consolidate its nonpit plutonium at the Savannah River 

Site (SRS) and (2) SRS’s capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers. 

A forthcoming classified report discusses SRS’s plans for upgrading 

security to meet the 2004 design basis threat (DBT).

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed independent studies of storage 

conditions at SRS performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (Safety Board), an independent federal agency established by the 

Congress in 1988 to oversee the safety of DOE’s nuclear weapons complex. 

Specifically, we reviewed the Safety Board’s December 2003 report entitled 

Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site: 

Report to Congress and its June 2004 report entitled Plutonium Storage at 

the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site: First Annual Report to 

Congress. In addition, we interviewed subject matter experts with the 

Safety Board. We also obtained and reviewed several SRS studies of 

plutonium storage options: 1999 Savannah River Plutonium Storage 

Study, 2000 Evaluation of Savannah River Plutonium Storage and 

Stabilization Options, and 2004 Savannah River Site Storage of Surplus 

Plutonium Study: 2004 Update. A GAO analyst with subject matter 

expertise and a GAO senior methodologist with training and experience in 

evaluation research and methodology reviewed all of these studies to 

evaluate their methodological soundness and determine the reliability of 

their conclusions. These reviews entailed an evaluation of each study’s 

research methodology, including its data quality, research design, and key 

assumptions, as well as a summary of its major findings and conclusions. 

We also assessed the extent to which each study’s data and methods 

support its findings and conclusions. We determined that these studies 

were methodologically sound enough for the purposes of this report.

In cooperation with a GAO economist, we attempted to determine the cost 

of plutonium storage at SRS by developing a model that evaluated costs 

under various storage scenarios, such as constructing a new consolidated 

storage facility or upgrading an existing facility to store plutonium. This 

model also attempted to determine the cost of continued storage of 

plutonium at Hanford for comparative purposes. However, we were unable 

to complete our model because we were unable to obtain complete cost 

data from DOE. Security costs are a major component of the total cost of 

storing plutonium, but security cost data were not available at the time of 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 24 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

our review because neither SRS nor Hanford had yet determined how they 

will enhance security to meet the 2004 DBT.

To determine the extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at 

SRS, we reviewed DOE’s Records of Decision published in the Federal 

Register for plutonium storage and disposition activities at SRS, such as 

plans to construct an Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and 

subsequent postponement and then cancellation of those plans, and 

relevant DOE orders, policies, and standards, such as DOE-STD-3013-2003, 

Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials. 

We visited SRS and inspected plutonium storage areas in Building 105-K 

and facilities in Building 235-F originally intended for plutonium storage 

and monitoring. We interviewed and received briefings from DOE’s 

operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River Company); 

DOE’s security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services, Inc.); SRS’s Office 

of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Services; and SRS’s Nuclear 

Materials Programs Division. We also spoke with officials responsible for 

the management of Building 105-K and Building 235-F.

We also visited the Hanford Site and toured the Plutonium Finishing Plant, 

where we observed plutonium storage containers that are currently stored 

inside the plant and nuclear fuel rods that are stored inside and outside the 

facility. We spoke with officials from DOE’s Richland Operations Office, 

DOE’s operating contractor for Hanford (Fluor Hanford), and Fluor’s 

security subcontractor for the Hanford Site (Protection Technology 

Hanford). From these officials, we received briefings on Hanford’s plans for 

plutonium storage and shipment. We also discussed the deactivation of the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant.

In Washington, D.C., we met with DOE’s acting Assistant Secretary for 

Environmental Management to discuss DOE’s planned consolidation of 

plutonium at SRS and how SRS will store the material. We also discussed 

issues related to storage, monitoring, and security with officials from 

DOE’s Office of Environmental Management, DOE’s Office of Independent 

Oversight and Performance Assurance, and DOE’s National Nuclear 

Security Administration.

To evaluate DOE’s ability to monitor plutonium storage containers, we first 

examined the reliability of SRS’s database for tracking inventory and for 

SRS’s plutonium surveillance and monitoring project. We obtained 

responses to a series of data reliability questions covering issues such as 

data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

completeness of the data. We asked follow-up questions whenever 

necessary. We also obtained and reviewed related documents, including 

Users Manual for the DOE Complex Integrated Surveillance Program 

Working Database and other manuals and data dictionaries. We 

determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

this report.

To evaluate the safety of conducting monitoring activities in Building 105-K 

and Building 235-F, we reviewed the Safety Board’s 2003 and 2004 reports 

described earlier, and discussed the safety conditions of the facilities with 

subject matter experts on the Safety Board. We observed the facilities 

where SRS plans to conduct monitoring activities and reviewed documents 

pertaining to SRS’s monitoring plans. We received briefings from 

Westinghouse Savannah River Company personnel responsible for 

plutonium monitoring and discussed the planned monitoring activities with 

officials responsible for managing Building 105-K and Building 235-F. We 

also discussed monitoring with officials from the Safety Board; 

Westinghouse Savannah River Company; Wackenhut Services, Inc.; SRS’s 

Office of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Services; and SRS’s Nuclear 

Materials Programs Division. At the Hanford Site, we observed facilities 

and equipment for surveillance and monitoring of its plutonium and 

received a briefing on Hanford’s use of that facility.

We conducted our work from June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 26 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Energy ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 27 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage
Page 28 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Robin Eddington, 

Doreen S. Feldman, Jonathan M. Gill, Sherry L. McDonald, Mehrzad Nadji, 

James D. Noel, Judy K. Pagano, Keith A. Rhodes, Paul Rhodes, and 

Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to this report.

(360467)
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