NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES T. CLAGETT, III, AKA Charles Thomas Clagett, III, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. J. WOODRING, Terminal Island FCI; et al., Defendants

- Appellees. No. 14

- 55051 D.C. No. 2:08

- cv - 06251

- JFW

- MAN

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 8, 2016 Pasadena, California Before: BERZON, CHRISTEN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Charles T. Clagett III appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to several prison employees , who he claims violated his constitutional rights and were
therefore liable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Ag ents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971)

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

DEC 28 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 Reviewing de novo, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Parker , 436 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006), we affirm in part and reverse in part.
1. We reverse the distr ict court’s grant of summary judgment to Joseph Woodring, a former warden, and Robert Young, a former associate warden, on Clagett’s First Amendment claim for retaliation. In the prison context, Clagett must establish the following elements regarding this claim : “ (1) [ a ] n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) th at prisoner’ s protected conduct , and that suc h action (4) chilled the inmate’ s exercis e of his First Amendment rights , and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. ” Rhodes v. Robinson , 408 F.3d 559, 567

– 68 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court found that Clagett raised a genuine dispute regarding the
first four elements but that he failed to show the lack of a legit imate penological goal for his reassignment. We disagree. Defendants claim that Clagett was reassigned from the educa tion department
to food service due to the suspicions of prison staff that he was improperly performing legal work in the prison law libra ry . While this would be a legitimate penological interest if found to be true, s ee Pratt v. Rowland , 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) , Clagett’s evidence raises a genuine dispute as to whether Defendants’3 true motivation for the transfer was retaliation for filing grievances and an earlier
iteratio n of this lawsuit. Clagett’s transfer occurred shortly after his administrative complaint was denied and shortly after he filed his complaint in this action. Clagett also declares that Woodring threatened him for filing grievances on the morning of the day he was transferred; that the head of the education department told him his performance was excellent and that the transfer decision had been

m ade by higher

- level staff; and that medical staff told him that th ey were pressured
to clear him for the new position in food service.
Defendants countered with several declarations that hint at misconduct by Clagett, but the se declarations are t oo vague to support a grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. For example, Young said that he learned of Clagett’s misconduct through Woodring

— who in turn had learned of it from
education d epartment staff

— but Woodring had no recollection of Clagett’s
transfer. No declarant from the education d epartment claims to have e ver told Woodring about Clagett’s misconduct. No staff member claims to know who actually initiated Clagett’s transfer. Lastly, no staff member suggests why , after a
stint in food service, Clagett was transferred back to the e ducation d epartment even tho ugh he had supposedly engaged in miscon duct in his previous stint there.4 Defendants’ evidence does not dispel a genuine dispute about whether there was a legitimate penological goal for Clagett’s reassignment.
2. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Dr. Evelyn Castro on Clagett’s Eighth Amendment claim. To prove an Eighth Amendment violation for inadequate health care, Clagett must show that Dr. Castro was deliberately indifferen t to his ser ious medical need s , see Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) , when she cleared him fo r food service work

. While Clagett

was previously ineligible for food service due to his h epatitis diagnoses, that ineligibility was no longer th e case due to a pol icy change. Further, o ther inmates with serious physical limitations w orked in food service, including those with
walkers and in wheelchairs. Clagett allege s that he suffered distress from the specific assignment he received, which forced him to stand an d bend. Dr. Castro , however, had no authority over specific assignment s within food service. Her
action was limited to medically clear ing Clagett for assignment to food service and
therefore did not constitute deliberate indifference. 1

1 We note that Clagett’s replacement brief did not challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims against Pratap Misra, as well as several of Clagett’s other claims: a First Amendment claim against Castro; an Eighth Amendment claim against Woodrin g and Young; and Fifth Amendment claims5 AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART .

related to the inadequate provision of bedding materials. We therefore need not address them here.