PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4639

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DONALD T. HILL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:15−cr−00013−REP−1)

Argued: January 25, 2017 Decided: March 30, 2017 

Before DUNCAN and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the majority opinion, in which 

Judge Duncan joined. Senior Judge Davis wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Caroline Swift Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen Eugene Anthony, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
2

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

Donald Hill pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence of statements he made during a traffic stop and of a firearm that was 

seized during the stop. Hill argues that the police officers’ actions exceeded the lawful 

scope of the stop, and that the stop was prolonged unjustifiably beyond the time needed 

to execute the relevant tasks, violating his Fourth Amendment rights described in 

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). 

Upon our review, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the 

suppression motion, because the traffic stop did not exceed the time reasonably required 

to complete the tasks incident to the mission of the stop. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s judgment.

I.

On October 20, 2014, Richmond City police officers Ryan Taylor and Jason 

McClendon were patrolling a neighborhood in Richmond in their police cruiser.1

 The 

officers saw a vehicle (the car) travelling at an estimated speed slightly exceeding the 

posted speed limit, and observed the car cross a yellow, double-solid line marker in the 

 1 Because we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, we recount the facts in accordance with the officers’ testimony at the 

suppression hearing. See United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2015). 

Hill does not challenge the district court’s determination that both officers testified 

credibly.
3

center of the roadway. After Officer Taylor activated the cruiser’s emergency lights and 

siren, the car turned into a driveway of a residence. The officers parked their cruiser at 

the end of the driveway behind the car, and initiated a traffic stop about 6:01 p.m. 

The driver of the car, Jeremy Taylor (the driver), immediately stepped out of the 

car. The officers thought that the driver might be attempting to abscond from the scene,2

but the driver complied when ordered by Officer McClendon to return to the car. 

As the officers approached the car, Officer Taylor recognized both occupants of 

the vehicle. Officer Taylor testified that he knew the driver as someone who had been 

“hanging with” individuals “connected with” robberies. Officer Taylor also recognized 

Hill, the passenger in the vehicle, from a prior traffic stop, and was aware that Hill had 

been a victim in a prior stabbing incident. 

At Officer Taylor’s request, the driver produced identification but Hill was unable 

to do so. Officer Taylor returned to the police cruiser, and entered the names of both the 

driver and Hill into computer databases operated by the Department of Motor Vehicles 

(DMV) and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Officer Taylor took this 

action to confirm the men’s identities, to ascertain whether there were any warrants 

outstanding for their arrest, and to determine whether the driver had a valid operator’s 

license. 

After about three minutes had passed, the NCIC database returned an “alert” 

notifying Officer Taylor that both men had been associated with drug trafficking and 

 2 The driver testified at the suppression hearing that he was not attempting to run 

from the car, but the district court discredited the driver’s testimony. 
4

were “likely armed.” Officer Taylor also learned that the driver had a suspended 

operator’s license. Accordingly, about 6:04 p.m., Officer Taylor began writing two 

summonses for the driver, one for reckless driving and one for driving with a suspended 

operator’s license. Officer Taylor also requested that a K-9 unit be sent to the scene. 

Officer Taylor interrupted writing the summonses in order to enter the men’s 

names into an additional computer database known as PISTOL, which tracks every

person who has had prior contacts with the police in Richmond.3

 Officer Taylor testified 

that using PISTOL can be a lengthy process because after an officer enters an 

individual’s name into the system, PISTOL produces a list of all individuals with the 

same name. In this case, after PISTOL produced a list of eight or nine individuals with 

the same name as the driver, Officer Taylor spent between three and five minutes 

reviewing that information. Once Officer Taylor had located both the driver and Hill in 

the PISTOL system, Officer Taylor resumed writing the two summonses. Both officers 

testified that it typically takes about four or five minutes to write a single summons. 

While Officer Taylor searched the databases and continued to write the 

summonses in the police cruiser, Officer McClendon remained standing next to the 

passenger side of the car “[m]aking small talk” with the driver and Hill. During their 

conversation, Officer McClendon asked the men a total of three times whether there were 

 3 PISTOL stands for “Police Information System Totally On Line,” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 709 S.E.2d 139, 140 (Va. 2011), and “is a database that advises 

officers of the ‘nature of the contact’ a suspect has had with the Richmond Police 

Department, any prior arrests, and whether the suspect might be armed,” Marshall v. 

Commonwealth, No. 2053-15-2, 2016 WL 7094219, at *1 n.1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 

2016) (unpublished).
5

any drugs or firearms in the car. Following the third inquiry, Hill responded that he had a 

firearm on his person. Officer McClendon immediately shouted “gun,” prompting 

Officer Taylor to return to the car to assist in securing Hill and recovering the firearm. 

Meanwhile, the K-9 unit had arrived at the scene. However, at the time Officer 

McClendon yelled “gun,” the K-9 unit dog was still in the unit’s vehicle and had not 

begun its anticipated “sniff” of the area around the car. The district court found that a 

total of about 20 minutes had elapsed from the time the officers initiated the stop to the 

moment that Officer McClendon shouted “gun.” 

Hill was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress both the firearm and the statements he 

made during the traffic stop. After a suppression hearing, the district court found that the 

officers had testified credibly, and accepted as true the officers’ description of the events. 

The court also found that the stop was not extended for any reason, including Officer 

Taylor’s request for a K-9 unit. The court accordingly concluded that the officers had 

acted lawfully, and denied Hill’s motion to suppress. 

Hill later entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge on 

appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Hill now appeals from the district court’s 

denial of that motion.

II.

Hill argues that Officers Taylor and McClendon unlawfully extended the duration 

and scope of the traffic stop, in violation of Hill’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
6

In particular, Hill challenges Officer McClendon’s decision to talk with him and the 

driver, rather than to assist Officer Taylor with searching the databases and writing the 

summonses. Hill also challenges Officer Taylor’s decisions to request a K-9 unit and to 

search the PISTOL database. Hill asserts that as a cumulative effect of these decisions, 

the officers improperly extended the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the 

purpose of the stop in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 

1609. We disagree with Hill’s arguments.

A.

When a district court has denied a motion to suppress, we review the court’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. White, 836 

F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2016). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, the prevailing party in the district court. United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 

238, 245 (4th Cir. 2015).

A traffic stop constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment and is subject 

to review for reasonableness. Id. To satisfy the reasonableness requirements for an 

investigative detention, a traffic stop must be legitimate at its inception, and the officers’ 

actions during the stop must be “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the stop. Id.

(citation omitted); see generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Because Hill does not 

argue that the traffic stop was unjustified at its inception, our analysis is limited to the 

second question, namely, whether the “manner of execution [of the stop] unreasonably 

infringe[d]” on Hill’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 

405, 407 (2005). 
7

If a traffic stop is extended in time beyond the period that the officers are 

completing tasks related to the traffic infractions, the officers must either obtain consent 

from the individuals detained or identify reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 

support the extension of the stop. Williams, 808 F.3d at 245-46. The “[a]uthority for the 

seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have 

been—completed.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. The Supreme Court recently has 

clarified that extending a stop by even a de minimis length of time violates the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. at 1615-16; see also Williams, 808 F.3d at 246-47. 

The “acceptable length of a routine traffic stop,” however, “cannot be stated with 

mathematical precision.” United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(citation omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1609. In 

evaluating the reasonableness of a stop, we consider “what the police in fact do,” and 

whether the officers acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances presented to 

them. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616; Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 509. Thus, an officer need 

not employ “the least intrusive means conceivable” in executing a stop, but he still must 

be reasonably diligent and must use “the least intrusive means reasonably available.” 

United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 

at 507); see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.

An officer may engage in certain safety measures during a traffic stop, but 

generally must focus his attention on the initial basis for the stop. Palmer, 820 F.3d at 

649. An officer may engage in “ordinary inquiries incident to” the traffic stop, such as 

inspecting a driver’s identification and license to operate a vehicle, verifying the 
8

registration of a vehicle and existing insurance coverage, and determining whether the 

driver is subject to outstanding warrants. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. 

While diligently pursuing the purpose of a traffic stop, officers also may engage in 

other investigative techniques unrelated to the underlying traffic infraction or the safety 

of the officers. Id. at 1614-15 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) and 

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405). Such unrelated activity is permitted under the Fourth 

Amendment only as long as that activity does not prolong the roadside detention for the 

traffic infraction. Id. For example, an officer may question the occupants of a car on 

unrelated topics without impermissibly expanding the scope of a traffic stop. See

Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333; Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507. An officer also may engage a K9 unit to conduct a “dog sniff” around a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop in an attempt 

to identify potential narcotics. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-09. However, because such a 

“sniff” or investigative questioning is intended to detect “ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” 

these actions may not prolong the duration of the traffic stop absent consent of those 

detained or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615-

16 (citation omitted); see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-09; Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 

B.

With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the conduct of Officers Taylor 

and McClendon in the present case. Initially, we observe that the record does not contain 

evidence showing that either officer acted in a manner that delayed the completion of the 

traffic stop. The district court accepted as credible Officer McClendon’s testimony that 

the traffic stop did not take longer than a typical stop would take in these circumstances, 
9

as well as Officer Taylor’s statement that he did not engage in any action that caused the 

stop to be extended in duration. Both officers also testified that it typically takes about 

10 minutes to write two summonses, and Officer Taylor estimated that in this case it took 

about eight additional minutes to search the DMV, NCIC, and PISTOL databases. Thus, 

the officers directly accounted for their activity during about 18 minutes of the stop. 

And, as noted above, the district court found that the entire stop took about 20 minutes. 

Based on the present record, this two-minute time difference, between the 

estimated time required to complete the officers’ described activities and the total length 

of the stop, does not support an inference that the stop was extended unlawfully for a de 

minimis amount of time in violation of Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615-16. The district 

court found that the duration of the traffic stop was not extended for any purpose beyond 

the time reasonably required to complete the stop, and Hill has not pointed to any 

evidence showing that this finding was clearly erroneous. Additionally, the record 

plainly shows that Officer Taylor had not finished writing the summonses when Officer 

McClendon yelled “gun.” Officers are not required to estimate with “mathematical 

precision” the duration of each discrete task undertaken during a traffic stop. See

Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 511. Moreover, the holding in Rodriguez does not render 

unlawful a traffic stop in which there are brief periods unaccounted for, as long as the 

stop was not prolonged for purposes beyond the mission of the stop, and the officers 

executed their tasks with reasonable diligence. 

Although defense counsel introduced evidence that Officers Taylor and 

McClendon had completed other traffic stops that day in a shorter period of time, such a 
10

comparison is irrelevant to our analysis. This evidence regarding other stops did not

show whether the circumstances were comparable to those presented here, including 

whether any occupants of other vehicles were deemed “likely armed,” whether the 

officers wrote multiple summonses, or whether they took other action. We therefore 

conclude that the 20-minute length of the traffic stop did not itself render the stop 

unreasonable in duration. 

We further conclude that none of the officers’ individual actions suggested a lack 

of diligence in pursuing the stop or were otherwise unreasonable. Although Officer 

Taylor could have executed the stop without using PISTOL, and instead have relied 

exclusively on the DMV and NCIC databases, his decision to search this additional 

database did not violate Hill’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. As noted above, the 

Fourth Amendment “does not require that the officer employ the least intrusive means 

conceivable” in effectuating a traffic stop. Palmer, 820 F.3d at 649 (emphasis added). In 

our view, an officer reasonably may search a computer database during a traffic stop to 

determine an individual’s prior contact with local law enforcement, just as an officer may 

engage in the indisputably proper action of searching computer databases for an 

individual’s outstanding warrants. See id. at 651 (explaining that, in the interest of 

officer safety, officers are “entitled to inquire into a motorist’s criminal record after 

initiating a traffic stop”); Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615-16; see also Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that PISTOL 

includes information helpful for officers to assess their safety in the field), overruled on 

other grounds by Commonwealth v. Smith, 709 S.E.2d 139 (Va. 2011). An officer may
11

take such measures with respect to both the driver and passengers of a stopped vehicle to 

ensure officer safety. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997) (holding 

that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a traffic stop for officer 

safety reasons); see also United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 2017) (en 

banc) (“[W]hen the stop involves one or more passengers, that fact ‘increases the possible 

sources of harm to the officer,’ as ‘the motivation of a passenger to employ violence is 

every bit as great as that of the driver.’”) (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14) (internal 

alterations omitted).

We also decline Hill’s invitation that we find unreasonable as a matter of law 

Officer McClendon’s decision to stand next to the car during most of the stop, rather than 

to assist Officer Taylor in completing the database searches in the police cruiser. As 

noted above, the NCIC database returned an alert that the two men were “likely armed.” 

This situation illustrates the concerns that the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly 

have emphasized, namely, that because “[t]raffic stops are especially fraught with danger 

to police officers,” those officers may “take certain negligibly burdensome precautions” 

to ensure the safe completion of the stop. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); Palmer, 820 F.3d at 651 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, given the inherent risks involved in such traffic 

stops, we conclude that the decision here by the two officers to allocate duties at the 

scene of the traffic stop, so that one remained in the immediate proximity of the vehicle’s 

occupants at all times, was not unreasonable. 
12

Officer McClendon’s conversation with the driver and Hill similarly did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment. As set forth above, officers may engage in questioning 

unrelated to the traffic violations as long as the conversation does not extend the length of 

the stop. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citing Johnson, 555 U.S. 323). Given the 

absence of any contrary evidence, the record before us uniformly shows that Officer 

McClendon’s actions did not cause the stop to be prolonged. 

And finally, we conclude that Officer Taylor’s decision to request a K-9 unit did 

not violate the Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615-16. The district 

court made a factual finding that Officer Taylor’s decision to place a call requesting the 

K-9 unit did not extend the time period of the stop, and Hill has not identified any 

evidence demonstrating that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous. To the contrary, 

the record shows that at the time Officer McClendon shouted “gun,” the narcoticsdetection dog was still in the K-9 unit’s car. Thus, the record before us shows only that 

the presence of the K-9 unit on the scene was contemporaneous with the officers’ diligent 

pursuit of the mission of the stop.4

 Compare Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612-13 (traffic 

stop unlawfully extended when officers conducted “dog sniff” after traffic warning was 

issued, and dog did not “alert” to narcotics until seven or eight minutes after the purpose 

of the traffic stop was complete). 

 4 Additionally, we observe that Officer Taylor requested the K-9 unit only after 

being notified by NCIC that the driver and Hill were “likely armed” and had been 

involved in drug trafficking activity. 
13

In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez does not require courts to 

second-guess the logistical choices and actions of a police officer that, individually and 

collectively, were completed diligently within the confines of a lawful traffic stop. We 

emphasize, however, that we are not confronted here with an officer’s decision to execute 

a traffic stop in a deliberately slow or inefficient manner, in order to expand a criminal 

investigation within the temporal confines of the stop without reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity or consent of those detained. In such a case, an officer’s actions 

delaying the completion of a stop may compel a different conclusion than the one we 

reach here. In the present case, however, we hold that because the evidence shows that 

the officers acted with reasonable diligence in executing the tasks incident to the traffic 

stop, and the stop was not impermissibly expanded in scope or time beyond the pursuit of 

the stop’s mission, the district court did not err in denying Hill’s motion to suppress.

 

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED
14

DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Respectfully, I dissent. I would reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.

Appellant Donald Hill was not a motorist. He was a passenger in a vehicle the 

operation of which violated the rules of the road because: (1) the operator’s driver’s 

license had been suspended and (2) the operator appeared to exceed slightly the posted 

speed limit and was observed to cross the double yellow line dividing the travel lanes of 

the roadway. Hill had nothing whatsoever to do with these violations. As a passenger in 

the vehicle who had not committed any violation of Virginia law, Hill had no obligation 

to identify himself to Officer Taylor (who apparently recognized him in any event) and 

failed (or declined, as was his right) to identify himself to the officer upon request. Thus, 

the proper timeline for the sole “mission” of the traffic stop in this case was to identify 

Jeremy Taylor (the driver) and issue whatever warnings or violation notices that Officer 

Taylor, in his discretion, chose to issue.

What, then, could possibly justify Hill’s prolonged detention? The clear answer to 

this question is well known to all of us. This was no mere traffic stop. Rather, it was a 

narcotics and firearms investigation, undertaken in the absence of reasonable suspicion 

(to say nothing of probable cause) that a narcotics or firearms violation was taking place. 

Violent drug dealers have the sympathy of none of us; we rightly applaud, respect, and 

deeply appreciate the brave law enforcement officers who put their lives on the line every 

day to keep us safe from such violence. But the ill-fated “War on Drugs” has a 

sometimes overlooked and unmentioned casualty: the Fourth Amendment. Here, the 

district court’s flawed findings easily satisfy the “clearly erroneous” standard because 
15

every minute Officer Taylor spent seeking to confirm Hill’s identity unreasonably 

prolonged the traffic stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).