UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

Miami Division 

Case No. 20-cv-23159-AMC

IKSA EXIM, INC., a Florida corporation

and IZHAK KASHANI, an individual

Plaintiff 

vs. 

LAWRENCE ALLOUCHE a/k/a LARRY 

ALLOUCHE a/k/a LARRY ALUSH and 

ARIEL LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability

company,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, OR IN THE 

ALTERNATIVE, FOR MORE DEFINTIE STATEMENT, AND AS TO ARIEL LLC, 

MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ITS ENTIRETY 

Plaintiffs, IKSA EXIM, INC. and IZHAK KASHANI (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), through 

undersigned counsel, hereby move to strike the affirmative defenses of Defendants, or in the 

alternative, for a more definite statement, and as to Ariel LLC specifically, move to strike the 

answer and affirmative defenses in its entirety, and as grounds therefore state:

I. Preliminary Statement

On July 30, 2020, Plaintiffs filed this action. See D.E. 1. After a number of issues obtaining 

service, on December 1, 2020, Defendants – one of which is an entity – filed their pro se answer 

and affirmative defenses (the “Answer”).

1 See D.E. 13. As set forth herein, certain of Defendants’ 

affirmative defenses should be stricken. Moreover, the pro se answer and affirmative defenses 

1

It is abundantly clear from a review of the defenses that the pro se Defendants found pleadings 

online and copy-pasted as many boilerplate defenses as they could find from other pleadings, some 

of which do not relate, even arguably, to the instant action.

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 1 of 10
Page 2 of 10

should be stricken in their entirety as to Ariel LLC because it is well-established that entities must 

be represented by an attorney.

While pro se litigants are given some leeway and their pleadings are liberally construed, 

those pleadings must still conform to the procedural rules and give fair notice to the opposing 

parties. See Tran v. City of Holmes Beach, 817 Fed. Appx. 911, 915-16 (11th Cir. 2020).

II. Argument

A. The Court Should Strike the Answer and Affirmative Defenses as to Ariel LLC 

in Its Entirety

As a preliminary matter, the answer and affirmative defenses should be stricken in their 

entirety as to Ariel LLC and a default should be entered against it because it is well-established 

that entities must be represented by an attorney. See Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764 F. 2d 1381, 

1384 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The rule is well established that a corporation is an artificial entity that 

can act only through agents, cannot appear pro se, and must be represented by counsel.).

B. Combined Defenses

Combining multiple defenses into one defense is improper and supports a striking of such 

defenses. See Dionisio v. Ultimate Images & Designs, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1187, 1195 (S.D. Fla. 

2019) (“discrete defenses that have been improperly combined should be pled separately”). The 

following are combined defenses that should be stricken: (a) those set forth in paragraph 140 of 

the Answer (see D.E. 13, p. 13); and (b) those set forth in paragraph 142 of the Answer (see D.E. 

13, p. 13).

C. Duplicative Defenses

A number of the defenses raised by Defendants are duplicative of each other,

2

and should 

therefore be stricken. See Ramnarine v. RG Group, Inc., No. 12-80264-CIV2 This includes ten (10) paragraphs at the end of the answer (but before the section labeled 

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 2 of 10
Page 3 of 10

MARRA/BRANNON, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94153, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 9, 2012) (striking 

duplicative defense); Advance Concrete Materials, LLC v. Con-Way Freight, Inc., No. 09-80460-

CIV-MARRA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83197, *10 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 11, 2009) (striking affirmative 

defenses that “merely re-phrase” other affirmative defeses).

The below-identified defenses are duplicative as follows: 

1) The defense identified in paragraph 135 of the Answer (see D.E. 13, p. 13) is 

duplicative of the affirmative defenses labeled “fourth affirmative defense,” “sixth 

affirmative defense,” and “seventh affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, pp. 14-15) 

and paragraph 135 should therefore be stricken;

2) The portion of the defense – asserting that Plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages –

identified in paragraph 140 of the Answer (see D.E. 13, p. 13) is duplicative of the 

affirmative defense labeled “fifth affirmative defense,” (see D.E. 13, p. 14) and 

paragraph 140 should therefore be stricken;

3) The defense identified in paragraph 141 of the Answer (see D.E. 13, p. 13) is 

duplicative of the affirmative defenses labeled “sixth affirmative defense” and 

“seventh affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, pp. 14-15) and paragraph 141 should 

therefore be stricken;

4) The portion of the defense – asserting that Plaintiffs are barred by equitable estoppel 

– identified in paragraph 142 of the Answer (see D.E. 13, p. 13) is duplicative of 

the affirmative defense labeled “tenth affirmative defense,” (see D.E. 13, p. 15) and 

paragraph 142 should therefore be stricken;

5) The defense labeled “seventh affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, pp. 14-15) is 

duplicative of the defense labeled “sixth affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, p. 14)

and should therefore be stricken;

6) The defense labeled “ninth affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, p. 15) is duplicative 

of the defense labeled “sixth affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, p. 14) and should 

therefore be stricken;

7) The defense labeled “fifteenth affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, p. 16) is 

duplicative of the defense labeled “fourth affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, p. 14)

and should therefore be stricken.

affirmative defenses) entitled “New Matter.” See D.E. 13, ¶¶ 133-42. These appear to be what are 

traditionally affirmative defenses and therefore Plaintiffs will treat them as such for the purpose of 

this Motion.

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 3 of 10
Page 4 of 10

D. A Number of the Defenses are Mere Denials

When a defense is asserted that is actually a denial, the Court should not strike the defense 

but should treat it instead like the denial that it is. See Longhini v. Equity One (Sheridan Plaza) 

LLC, No. 19-cv-60493-BLOOM/VALLE, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231156, *2 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 

2019). The defenses set forth in paragraphs 137 and 138 of the Answer (see D.E. 13, p. 13), and 

the defense labeled “first affirmative defense” (see D.E. 13, p. 14) are mere denials. The Plaintiffs 

respectfully request that the Court rule that such “defenses” are actually denials and are to be 

treated as such.

E. Specific Affirmative Defenses

As a preliminary matter, each and every defense asserted by Defendant, whether in the 

“New Matter” section (see D.E. 13, p. 13) or under the actual affirmative defenses section (see

D.E. 13, pp. 14-16) should be stricken as barebones, conclusory defenses. See Talisman Capital 

Alternative Invs. Fund v. Mouttet, No. 10-24577-CIV-GRAHAM/GOODMAN, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 163299, *12 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2011) (holding that defenses comprised solely of 

barebones conclusory allegations fall short of Rule 8(b)’s pleading requirements); See Dionisio, 

391 F. Supp. at 1195 (striking defenses that were “nothing more than bare recitations of boilerplate affirmative defenses.”). While the complete lack of allegations for many of the defenses 

speak for themselves, below are defenses that merited further argument or should also be stricken 

for other, more specific reasons.

i. Paragraph 134 of the Answer (Statute of Limitations)

In paragraph 134 of the Answer Defendants assert that the claims are barred by the statute 

of limitations (see D.E. 13, p. 13), however, fail to explain how this is so and it should therefore 

be stricken. See Bowes v. Haymore, No. 13-14304-CIV-GRAHAM/LYNCH, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 4 of 10
Page 5 of 10

LEXIS 202692, *7 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 8 2014) (striking defense that did not identify any specific statute 

of limitation or specific claim it barred).

ii. The Defense Labeled “First Affirmative Defense”

For the defense labeled “First Affirmative Defense” Defendants assert failure to state a 

cause of action because Plaintiffs: (a) failed to sufficiently plead a basis for relief, (b) fails to allege 

with specificity any facts to establish the requisite elements, and (c) fails to set forth ultimate facts.

See D.E. 13, p. 14. Other than these conclusory statements, Defendants do not actually point to a 

single cause of actions whereunder Plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. This defense should 

be stricken. See Nash v. O.R. Colan Group, LLC, No. 12-60759-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134727, *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2012) (striking affirmative defense generally 

stating that “Plaintiff’s claims are barred by his failure to state a cause of action . . .”); see also

Bowes, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202692 at *5 (holding that defense alleging defect in prima facie 

case is a denial rather than a defense).

iii. The Defense Labeled “Second Affirmative Defense”

For the defense labeled “Second Affirmative Defense” Defendants assert unclean hands 

and generally state: “the actions of Plaintiff should bar recovery” and “Plaintiffs wrongful conduct 

precludes it from seeking relief.” See D.E. 13, p. 14.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has stated that to assert 

an unclean hands defense, a defendant must satisfy two requirements. First, the

defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff's wrongdoing is directly related to the

claim against which it is asserted. Second, even if directly related, the plaintiff's

wrongdoing does not bar relief unless the defendant can show that it was personally

injured by her conduct.

Royal Palms Props., LLC v. Premier Estate Props., Inc., No. 10-80232-CV-COHN, 2010 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 110443, *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 5 of 10
Page 6 of 10

Here, Defendants have generally stated that the “actions” and “wrongful conduct” bar

recovery, however, have failed to state what actions or conduct by Plaintiffs directly related to the

claim.

iv. The Defense Labeled “Selective Enforcement” Should be Stricken

For the defense labeled “Selective Enforcement” Defendants assert that “Plaintiff’s 

selective enforcement of the Covenants and Documents within the community is a complete bar 

to enforcement.” See D.E. 13, p. 14. This defense clearly relates to condominium or homeowners’ 

associations, which has nothing to do with this action, and therefore it should be stricken.

v. The Defense Labeled “Fifth Affirmative Defense”

For the defense labeled “Fifth Affirmative Defense” Defendants assert that “Plaintiff failed 

to mitigate any damages . . .” See D.E. 13, p. 14. Because Defendants do not provide any facts in 

support of this defense it should be stricken. See Bowes, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202692 at *7 

(striking defense of failure to mitigate where defendant failed to allege how plaintiff failed to 

mitigate and that there was any duty to do so).

vi. The Defense Labeled “Eleventh Affirmative Defense”

For the defense labeled “Eleventh Affirmative Defense” Defendants assert that 

“Plaintiffs[’] claims are fraudulent in that Plaintiff . . . failed to fully and faithfully perform its 

duties . . .” See D.E. 13, p. 15. Assuming arguendo that this is a legitimate defense, it is ambiguous 

and confusing. Moreover, if Defendants are attempting to allege some fraudulent matter, this 

defense is subject to a heightened pleading standard and requires specific allegations in support 

thereof.

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 6 of 10
Page 7 of 10

vii. The Defense Labeled “Twelfth Affirmative Defense”

For the defense labeled “Twelfth Affirmative Defense” Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ 

claims are barred by illegality “as set forth in the Defendant’s counterclaims” and failure to comply 

with rules and regulations of the State of Florida. See D.E. 13, p. 15. In addition to the fact that no 

counterclaims have been filed, Defendants also fail to identify any rule or regulation that was 

violated.

viii. The Defense Labeled “Thirteenth Affirmative Defense”

For the defense labeled “Thirteenth Affirmative Defense” Defendants assert that 

“Defendants discharged plaintiffs claim . . . by payment of the monthly assessments.” See D.E. 

13, p. 15. Similar to the defense labeled “Selective Enforcement,” this defense clearly relates to 

condominium or homeowners’ associations, which has nothing to do with this action, and therefore 

it should be stricken.

ix. The Defense Labeled “Fourteenth Affirmative Defense”

For the defense labeled “Fourteenth Affirmative Defense” Defendants assert that “Plaintiff 

failed to comply with Rule 1.130(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure . . .” See D.E. 13, p. 

15. This Florida Rule of Civil Procedure is not applicable in this Federal court action, and therefore 

should be stricken.

F. The Court Should Strike Defendants’ “Reservation of Rights and 

Supplemental Defenses”

Traditionally, a reservation of rights is meaningless, does not prejudice a party or confer a 

right to amend, and therefore is not necessary to strike. See Longhini v. Equity One (Sheridan 

Plaza) LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231156 at *4-5. 

In the Answer in this action, however, Defendants state “The facts having not been fully 

developed, Defendant affirmatively plead [sic] any of the following defenses that may become 

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 7 of 10
Page 8 of 10

applicable to this action” and thereafter lists in shotgun form a slew of affirmative defenses. See

D.E. 13, p. 16. The difference between the standard reservation of rights and the one at issue here 

is that Defendants purport to “affirmatively plead any of the following defenses that may become 

applicable . . .” And so, this is more than a reservation, it is an affirmative pleading of defenses, 

albeit improperly. Therefore, the affirmatively pled defenses in the reservation should be stricken. 

Of course, if those defenses become apparent in this matter, Defendants can move for leave to 

amend at the appropriate time.

G. Defendants Fail to Provide Fair Notice of Certain Defenses

Although Rule 8 does not obligate a defendant to set forth detailed factual

allegations, a defendant must give the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the

defense and the grounds upon which it rests. Under Rule 12(e), a party may move

for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is

allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably

prepare a response.

Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., No. 09-61436-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2009 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 121709, *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2009).

Because the defenses are clearly pulled from other pleadings located online or otherwise

by pro se defendants,3they are ambiguous and confusing, and to the extent not stricken,

Defendants should be required to provide a more definite statement so that Plaintiffs have fair

notice of the defenses. At present, all Plaintiffs have to consider are approximately twenty-five

(25) disorganized, duplicative, and haphazardly pled defenses, none of which have any factual

support that ca be applied to this action. Therefore, Defendants should be required to provide a

more definite statement and plead the bare minimum facts supporting each of the defenses.

3 As additional examples, many of the defenses refer to crossclaims or counterclaims that do not 

exist.

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 8 of 10
Page 9 of 10

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, IKSA EXIM, INC. and IZHAK KASHANI, respectfully 

request that this Court enter an order striking Defendants, LAWRENCE ALLOUCHE a/k/a 

LARRY ALLOUCHE a/k/a LARRY ALUSH and ARIEL LLC’s affirmative defenses, or int the 

alternative, ordering Defendants to provide a more definite statement, and further as to Ariel LLC, 

striking the answer and affirmative defenses in its entirety, together with such other and further 

relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: December 22, 2020

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH CONFERENCE

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), I hereby certify that I emailed Larry Allouche, who is 

representing himself and Ariel LLC pro se, a copy of this motion in an attempt. Mr. Allouche did 

not respond to the conference attempt.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 22, 2020, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing was filed via the CM/ECF system. A copy was also sent via U.S. Mail and email to the 

parties on the attached Service List.

Respectfully Submitted,

THE BERNSTEIN LAW FIRM

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

3050 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 403

Miami, Florida 33137

Tel. (305) 672-9544 

Fax (305) 672-4572

michael@blfmiami.com

jordan@blfmiami.com

paralegal@blfmiami.com

 

s/Michael I. Bernstein 

Michael I. Bernstein 

Florida Bar No. 546208

Jordan C. Kaplan

Florida Bar No. 98618

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 9 of 10
Page 10 of 10

SERVICE LIST

CASE NO. 20-cv-23159-CANNON

LARRY ALLOUCHE

ARIEL LLC

Pro Se

32 Hirst Avenue

Lansdowne, PA 19050

allouchelarry@yahoo.com

Case 1:20-cv-23159-AMC Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/22/2020 Page 10 of 10