United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National 

Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

COMBATING TERRORISM

Guidance for State 

Department's Antiterrorism 

Assistance Program Is 

Limited and State Does Not 

Systematically Assess 

Outcomes 

Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, June 4, 2008 

 

GAO-08-875T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 4, 2008

COMBATING TERRORISM

Guidance for State Department's Antiterrorism 

Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not 

Highlights of GAO-08-875T, a testimony Systematically Assess Outcomes

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives

The Department of State’s (State)

Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 

program’s objectives are to provide 

partner nations with 

counterterrorism training and 

equipment, improve bilateral ties, 

and increase respect for human 

rights. State’s Office of the 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism 

(S/CT) provides policy guidance

and its Bureau of Diplomatic

Security, Office of Antiterrorism, 

Assistance (DS/T/ATA), manages 

program operations. GAO assessed 

(1) State’s guidance for 

determining ATA priorities, (2) 

how State coordinates ATA with 

other counterterrorism programs, 

(3) the extent State established

ATA program goals and measures,

and (4) State’s reporting on U.S. 

counterterrorism assistance. This 

statement is based on a February

2008, GAO report titled Combating

Terrorism: State Department’s 

Antiterrorism Program Needs 

Improved Guidance and More 

Systematic Assessments of 

Outcomes, GAO-08-336

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008). 

What GAO Recommends

In its report, GAO suggested that

Congress reconsider the 

requirement that State prepare an

annual report on U.S. 

counterterrorism assistance. GAO 

also recommended that State 

review its use of needs 

assessments, and measures for 

assessing the ATA program. State 

generally agreed with the 

recommendations regarding the 

ATA program, and supported the 

matter GAO suggested for

congressional consideration. 

S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize ATA program recipients, 

and S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically align ATA assistance with U.S. 

assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism needs. S/CT provided policy 

guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings and a tiered list of priority

countries, but the list did not provide guidance on country counterterrorismrelated program goals, objectives, or training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA 

also did not consistently use country-specific needs assessments and program 

reviews to plan assistance. 

S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other 

U.S. international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held interagency 

meetings with officials from the Department of State, Defense, Justice, and 

Treasury and other agencies as well as ambassador-level regional strategic 

coordinating meetings. GAO did not find any significant duplication or 

overlap among the various U.S. international counterterrorism efforts. 

State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for the 

ATA program, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess the 

outcomes and, as a result, could not determine the effectiveness of program 

assistance. For example, although sustainability is a principal focus, S/CT and 

DS/T/ATA had not set clear measures of sustainability or integrated 

sustainability into program planning. 

State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad was incomplete 

and inaccurate. S/CT had not provided a congressionally mandated annual 

report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating 

international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, S/CT has only submitted to 

Congress annual reports on the ATA program, such as the number of students 

trained and courses offered. Moreover, these reports contained inaccurate

program information. Additionally, the reports lacked comprehensive 

information of the results on program assistance that would be useful to 

Congress. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-875T. 

For more information, contact Charles 

Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or

johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Combating Terrorism

June 4, 2008

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the results of GAO’s examination of the 

Department of State’s (State) antiterrorism assistance (ATA) program.1

Our work focused primarily on the time period from fiscal year 2001 to 

fiscal year 2007, although we included more recent data where available. 

State’s ATA program has assumed an increasingly important role in U.S. 

counterterrorism efforts, and is a key mechanism in State’s efforts to help 

foreign nations improve their ability to combat terrorism. ATA’s 

legislatively mandated2

 objectives are to (1) enhance the antiterrorism 

skills of friendly countries by providing counterterrorism training and 

equipment; (2) improve bilateral ties with partner nations by offering 

assistance; and (3) increase respect for human rights by sharing modern, 

humane and effective antiterrorism techniques with foreign civil 

authorities. Funding for ATA has increased over fourfold in recent years—

from $38 million in fiscal year 2001 to almost $171 million in fiscal year 

2007. Over the period, State provided counterterrorism assistance to 

nearly 100 countries. Much of this assistance is equipment and 

counterterrorism training provided in the country by trainers on 

temporary duty, as well as six programs, which use permanent, in-country 

training facilities. 

Within State, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is charged with 

the overall supervision (including policy oversight of resources) and 

coordination of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism activities.3

 The 

broadly mandated4

 role of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of 

Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA),

5

 includes implementing security 

 1

GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Department’s Antiterrorism Program Needs 

Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, GAO-08-336 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008). 

2

22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa, 2349aa-1. 

3

22 U.S.C. § 2651a. 

4

State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its current form is an outgrowth of the Omnibus 

Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 104-105). 

5

ATA is part of a training directorate within Diplomatic Security comprised of the Office of

Antiterrorism Assistance, the Office of Training and Performance Support, and the Office 

of Mobile Security Training. 

Page 1 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

programs to protect diplomatic personnel and advise chiefs of mission on

security matters. 

Today, I will discuss (1) State’s guidance for determining country 

recipients and types of counterterrorism assistance to provide; (2) how 

State coordinates ATA with other U.S. government counterterrorism 

programs; (3) the extent to which State establishes clear ATA goals, and 

measures sustainability of program outcomes; and (4) State’s reporting on 

U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. Over the course of our 

work, we reviewed and analyzed State planning, funding, and reporting 

documents concerning ATA. We interviewed officials from State’s offices

in Washington, D.C., including ATA program managers responsible for 

each of the six in-country programs—Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia,

Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines—and visited four of the six incountry programs.6

 In these countries, we reviewed country-specific 

program documents, and interviewed ATA in-country program managers, 

course instructors, and other contractors; U.S. embassy officials 

responsible for managing counterterrorism assistance and activities; and 

partner nation government officials. We also observed various types of 

ATA training and equipment that were provided to partner nation security

units. 

We conducted our work for the ATA report from November 2006 through

January 2008 and, for purposes of this statement, we updated certain data

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

At the time of our review, S/CT provided minimal guidance to help 

determine ATA priorities and ensure that assistance provided supports 

broader U.S. policy goals. In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not 

systematically use country-specific needs assessments and program 

Summary 

 6

We visited Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, and the Philippines. These four countries

comprised about 55 percent of total ATA funding for training and training-related activities

in fiscal year 2006, and about 43 percent of funding in fiscal year 2007. 

Page 2 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

reviews to plan what types of assistance to provide partner nations in 

accordance with State policy guidance. 

• S/CT provided a tiered list of priority countries for policy guidance to 

DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings. However, this list did not provide 

guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals, objectives, 

or training priorities that DS/T/ATA could use to implement a countryspecific counterterrorism program and ensure that assistance provided is 

consistent with U.S. policy objectives. As a result, neither S/CT nor 

DS/T/ATA could ensure that program assistance provided to specific 

countries supports broader U.S. antiterrorism policy goals. In addition, 

some countries not on the tiered list received assistance because of 

unanticipated circumstances, such as an increase in the U.S. government’s 

diplomatic or political interest in a country. 

• S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not consistently use country-specific needs 

assessments and program reviews to plan what types of assistance to 

provide to partner nations. In the five countries receiving the largest 

amounts of program assistance since fiscal year 2002, we found that 

program managers did not use the assessments as the basis for developing

ATA country-specific plans. According to State policy documents, the 

assessments are to guide ATA resource decisions and form the basis of 

country-specific assistance plans. However, the assessments included 

broad-ranging recommendations for counterterrorism assistance, but they 

generally did not prioritize assistance to be provided. Consequently, the 

assessments did not consistently provide a basis for targeting program 

assistance to the areas of a partner nation’s greatest counterterrorism 

need. 

S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate ATA with other U.S. 

international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held biweekly interagency

meetings with officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, 

Treasury, and other agencies as well as ambassador-level regional 

strategic coordinating meetings in order to help coordinate all U.S. 

government international counterterrorism training assistance and avoid 

duplication of efforts. Based on our review of program documents and 

interviews and meetings with counterterrorism officials in the four 

countries we visited, we did not find any significant duplication or overlap 

among the various U.S. international counterterrorism efforts. 

State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for 

ATA, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess the outcomes 

of program assistance. Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents 

listed sustainability—that is, enabling partner nations to achieve advanced 

Page 3 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

counterterrorism capabilities and maintain them—as a key intended 

program outcome. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not set clear 

measures of sustainability, and had not integrated sustainability into 

program planning. As a result, State could not determine the effectiveness 

of program assistance or assess the extent to which ATA was meeting its 

longer-term, congressionally mandated objectives. 

S/CT had not provided a congressionally mandated report to Congress on 

U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating international 

terrorism since 1996.7

 After 1996, S/CT has only submitted to Congress 

annual reports prepared by DS/T/ATA on just the ATA program. Moreover, 

we found that the ATA annual reports contained inaccuracies, such as the 

number of students trained and courses offered. Additionally, the ATA 

annual reports lacked comprehensive information on the results of 

program assistance that would be useful to Congress in evaluating the 

effectiveness of the program. 

Given changes in the overall scope and nature of U.S. international 

counterterrorism assistance and the fact that State had not submitted the 

mandated report on such matters since 1996, we included a matter for 

congressional consideration regarding the legislative requirement for 

State’s reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. Additionally, to 

ensure that ATA, as a key element of State’s broader international 

counterterrorism efforts, is focused on improving partner nations’ 

counterterrorism capabilities and aligned with overall U.S. 

counterterrorism policy goals, we recommended that the Secretary of 

State improve internal program guidance. We made other 

recommendations to help S/CT and DS/T/ATA more effectively link 

assistance needs to resource allocations and better assess program 

outcomes 

Congress authorized State’s ATA program in 1983 through the Foreign 

Assistance Act.8

 According to the legislation the purpose of ATA is “(1) to 

enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training 

and equipment to deter and counter terrorism; (2) to strengthen the 

Background 

 7

22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7 (requiring the Secretary of State to report annually on the amount and

nature of all assistance provided by the U.S. government related to international terrorism).

8

Pub. L. No. 87-195, Pt. II, §571, as added by Pub. L. No. 98-151, §101(b)(2), 97 Stat. 972 

(1983) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2349a). 

Page 4 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

bilateral ties of the United States with friendly governments by offering 

concrete assistance in this area of great mutual concern; and (3) to 

increase respect for human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities 

modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques.” 

ATA offers a wide range of counterterrorism assistance to partner nations, 

but most assistance consists of (1) training courses on tactical and 

strategic counterterrorism issues and (2) grants of counterterrorism 

equipment, such as small arms, bomb detection equipment, vehicles, and 

computers. ATA curricula and training focus on enhancing critical 

counterterrorism capabilities, which cover issues such as crisis 

management and response, cyberterrorism, dignitary protection, and 

related areas. According to DS/T/ATA, all its courses emphasize law 

enforcement under the rule of law and sound human rights practices. 

ATA is State’s largest counterterrorism program, and receives 

appropriations under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and 

Related Programs account. Fiscal year 2002 appropriations for ATA 

increased to about $158 million—over six times the level of funding 

appropriated in fiscal year 2000. Appropriations have fluctuated since 

fiscal year 2002, but increased to almost $171 million in fiscal year 2007.

From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, program assistance for the top 10 

recipients of ATA allocations ranged from about $11 million to about 

$78 million. The top 10 recipients represented about 57 percent of ATA 

funding allocated for training and training-related activities over the 6-year

period. ATA funding for the other 89 partner nations that received 

assistance during this period ranged from $9,000 to about $10.7 million. 

The Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the head of S/CT, is statutorily9

charged with the overall supervision (including policy oversight of 

resources) and coordination of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism 

activities. The broadly mandated10 role of the Assistant Secretary for 

Diplomatic Security, the head of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

includes implementing security programs to protect diplomatic personnel 

ATA Program Assistance 

ATA Program Funding 

ATA Program Management 

 9

22 U.S.C. § 2651a. 

10State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its current form is an outgrowth of the Omnibus 

Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 104-105). 

Page 5 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

and advise chiefs of mission on security matters. Specific roles and 

responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA regarding ATA are described in a 

1991 internal policy guidance memorandum, the Omnibus Diplomatic 

Security Act of 1986,11 and incorporated into State’s Foreign Affairs 

Manual.12

S/CT is responsible for leading the initial assessment of a partner nation’s 

counterterrorism needs, and DS/T/ATA is responsible for developing 

annual, country-specific plans. Under current program operations, 

DS/T/ATA conducts an initial assessment of a new participant nation’s 

counterterrorism capabilities, and conducts subsequent assessments—

referred to as program reviews—every 2 to 3 years thereafter. In general, 

the needs assessments include input from the embassy teams, but the 

assessments themselves are conducted by technical experts contracted by 

DS/T/ATA. According to DS/T/ATA, the purpose of the needs assessment 

and program review process is to determine the forms of assistance for a

partner nation to detect, deter, deny, and defeat terrorism; and to evaluate

program effectiveness. 

S/CT provides minimal policy guidance to DS/T/ATA to help determine 

assistance priorities and ensure that it supports broader U.S. policy goals.

In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use countryspecific needs assessments and program reviews to plan what types of 

assistance to provide partner nations in accordance with State policy

guidance. The assessments we reviewed had weaknesses and 

inconsistencies. 

According to State officials, S/CT places countries on a tiered list in one of

four priority categories based on criteria that address several factors, 

including country-specific threats and the level and depth of diplomatic 

and political engagement in a country. State officials indicated that other 

factors also may be considered in determining whether and where a 

country is placed on the list, such as the presence of a U.S. military base or 

a planned international sporting or cultural event with U.S. participation. 

State’s 

Implementation of 

ATA Lacks Guidance 

and Use of Country 

Needs Assessments 

S/CT Provides a Tiered 

Country List, but Little 

Additional Policy 

Guidance 

 11Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 104-105.

12The general responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA regarding the ATA program are

described in the 2007 U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 1–

Organization and Functions, 1 FAM 022.5 and 1 FAM 262.3-1. 

Page 6 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

Since 2006, S/CT has reviewed and discussed the tiered list—including 

changes, additions, or deletions—with DS/T/ATA during quarterly 

meetings. In addition to the quarterly meetings, an S/CT official told us 

that they had established a series of regional roundtable discussions in 

2006 between S/CT regional subject experts and DS/T/ATA counterparts. 

According to the S/CT official, the roundtables were intended as a means 

of identifying priority countries and their counterterrorism needs for 

purposes of developing budget requests. 

S/CT provides little guidance to DS/T/ATA beyond the tiered list, although 

the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum states that S/CT’s written 

policy guidance for the program should include suggested country training

priorities. While S/CT provides some additional guidance to DS/T/ATA 

during quarterly meetings and on other occasions, DS/T/ATA officials in 

headquarters and the field stated they received little or no guidance from 

S/CT beyond the tiered list. As a result, neither S/CT nor DS/T/ATA could 

ensure that program assistance provided to specific countries supports 

broader U.S. antiterrorism policy goals. 

Other factors beyond S/CT’s tiered list of countries, such as unforeseen 

events or new governmental initiatives, also influence which countries 

receive program assistance. We found that 10 countries on the tiered list 

did not receive ATA assistance in fiscal year 2007, while 13 countries not 

on the tiered list received approximately $3.2 million. S/CT and DS/T/ATA 

officials stated that assistance does not always align with the tiered list 

because U.S. foreign policy objectives sometimes cause State, in 

consultation with the President’s National Security Council, to provide 

assistance to a non-tiered-list country. 

According to the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum and DS/T/ATA 

standard operations procedures, ATA country-specific needs assessments 

and program reviews are intended to guide program management and 

planning. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use the 

assessments to determine what types of assistance to provide to partner 

nations or develop ATA country-specific plans. Although the 1991 State 

policy memorandum states that S/CT should lead the assessment efforts, a 

senior S/CT official stated that S/CT lacks the capacity to do so. As a 

result, DS/T/ATA has led interagency assessment teams in recent years, 

but the assessments and recommendations for types of assistance to be 

provided may not fully reflect S/CT policy guidance concerning overall

U.S. counterterrorism priorities. 

S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did 

Not Systematically Align 

Program Assistance with 

Counterterrorism Needs 

Page 7 GAO-08-875T
DS/T/ATA officials responsible for five of the top six recipients of ATA 

support—Colombia, Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines13—did 

not consistently use ATA country needs assessments and program reviews 

in making program decisions or to create annual country assistance plans.

In some instances, DS/T/ATA officials responsible for in-country programs 

had not seen the latest assessments for their respective countries, and 

some said that the assessments they had reviewed were either not useful 

or that they were used for informational purposes only. 

DS/T/ATA Did Not 

Consistently Use Country 

Needs Assessments 

• The Regional Security Officer, Deputy Regional Security Officer, and 

DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Kenya had not seen any of the 

assessments that had been conducted for the country since 2000. Although 

the in-country program manager for Kenya was familiar with the 

assessments from her work in a previous position with DS/T/ATA, she 

stated that in general, the assessments were not very useful for 

determining what type of assistance to provide. She said that the initial 

needs assessment for Kenya failed to adequately consider local needs and

capacity. 

• The Regional Security Officer and Assistant Regional Security Officer for 

Indonesia stated they had not seen the latest assessment for the country. 

The DS/T/ATA program manager for Indonesia said that he recalled using 

one of the assessments as a “frame of reference” in making program and 

resource decisions. The in-country program manager also recalled seeing

one of the assessments, but stated that he did not find the assessment 

useful given the changing terrorist landscape; therefore, he did not share it

with his staff. 

• The DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Pakistan stated that decisions on the 

types of assistance to provide in Pakistan were based primarily on the 

knowledge and experience of in-country staff regarding partner nation 

needs, rather than the needs assessments or program reviews. He added

that he did not find the assessments useful, as the issues identified in the 

latest (2004) assessment for the country were outdated. 

 13Each of these countries received a range of ATA training and other assistance through an

in-country presence. The sixth in-country program, Afghanistan, also received significant 

program assistance during this period. But, according to DS/T/ATA officials, the

Afghanistan in-country program focuses principally on training and monitoring a 

Presidential Protective Service. 

Page 8 GAO-08-875T Combating Terrorism
We reviewed 12 of the 21 ATA country-specific needs assessments and 

program reviews14 that, according to ATA annual reports, DS/T/ATA 

conducted between 2000 and 2007 for five of the six in-country programs.15

The assessments and reviews generally included a range of 

recommendations for counterterrorism assistance, but did not prioritize 

assistance to be provided or include specific timeframes for 

implementation. Consequently, the assessments did not consistently 

provide a basis for targeting program assistance to the areas of a partner 

nation’s greatest counterterrorism assistance need. Only two of the 

assessments—a 2000 needs assessment for Indonesia and a 2003 

assessment for Kenya—prioritized the recommendations, although a 2004 

assessment for Pakistan and a 2005 assessment for the Philippines listed 

one or two recommendations as priority ATA efforts. In addition, the 

information included in the assessments was not consistent and varied in

linking recommendations to capabilities. Of the 12 assessments we 

reviewed: 

Needs Assessments 

Generally Lacked 

Prioritized 

Recommendations and 

Were Inconsistent 

• Nine included narrative on a range of counterterrorism capabilities, such 

as border security and explosives detection, but the number of capabilities 

assessed ranged from 5 to 25. 

• Only four of the assessments that assessed more than one capability 

linked recommendations provided to the relevant capabilities. 

• Six included capability ratings, but the types of ratings used varied. For 

example, a 2003 assessment for Colombia rated eight capabilities from 1 

through 5, but the 2004 assessment rated 24 capabilities, using poor, low, 

fair, or good. 

• Two used a format that DS/T/ATA began implementing in 2001. The 

assessments following the new format generally included consistent types 

of information and clearly linked recommendations provided to an 

assessment of 25 counterterrorism capabilities. However, they did not 

prioritize recommendations or include specific timeframes for 

implementing the recommendations. 

 14DS/T/ATA was unable to provide nine assessments that were reportedly conducted for 

four of these countries between 2002 and 2007. According to DS/T/ATA officials, they were

either unable to locate these assessments, written reports on the assessment visits were 

not completed, or the annual reports stating that they had been completed were inaccurate. 

15We did not include the ATA in-country program in Afghanistan in this analysis because 

the scope of the program is narrowly focused on presidential protection training. 

Page 9 GAO-08-875T Combating Terrorism
Although the 1991 State policy memorandum states that DS/T/ATA should 

create annual country assistance plans that specify training objectives and 

assistance to be provided based upon the needs assessments and program 

reviews, we found that S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use the 

assessments to create annual plans for the five in-country programs. 

DS/T/ATA officials we interviewed regarding the five in-country programs 

stated that in lieu of relying on the assessments or country assistance 

plans, program and resource decisions were primarily made by DS/T/ATA 

officials in the field based on their knowledge and experience regarding

partner nation needs. Some DS/T/ATA officials said they did not find the 

country assistance plans useful. The program manager for Pakistan stated

that he used the country assistance plan as a guide, but found that it did 

not respond to changing needs in the country. The ATA program manager 

for Kenya said that he had not seen a country assistance plan for that 

country. 

We requested ATA country assistance plans conducted during fiscal years 

2000-2006 for the five in-country programs included in our review, but 

S/CT and DS/T/ATA only provided three plans completed for three of the 

five countries. Of these, we found that the plans did not link planned 

activities to recommendations provided in the needs assessments and 

program reviews. For example, the plan for the Philippines included a

brief reference to a 2005 needs assessment, but the plan did not identify 

which recommendations from the 2005 assessment were intended to be

addressed by current or planned efforts. 

S/CT has mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. 

government international counterterrorism training assistance and to help

avoid duplication of efforts. S/CT chairs biweekly interagency working 

group meetings of the Counterterrorism Security Group’s Training 

Assistance Subgroup16 to provide a forum for high-level information 

sharing and discussion among U.S. agencies implementing international 

counterterrorism efforts.17 S/CT also established the Regional Strategic 

Initiative in 2006 to coordinate regional counterterrorism efforts and 

Country Assistance Plans 

Were Not Used or Were 

Not Linked to Needs 

Assessments 

S/CT Has Established 

Various Mechanisms 

to Coordinate 

Program Assistance 

 16The Training Assistance Subgroup includes representatives from the Departments of 

State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, and other agencies. 

17The Counterterrorism Security Group is chaired by the National Security Council and is

intended to serve as a means for U.S. agencies to share information and coordinate the 

response to terrorist threats against U.S. interests domestically and abroad.

Page 10 GAO-08-875T Combating Terrorism
Combating Terrorism

strategy. S/CT described the Regional Strategic Initiative as a series of 

regionally based, interagency meetings hosted by U.S. embassies to 

identify key regional counterterrorism issues and develop a strategic 

approach to addressing them, among other goals.

In the four countries we visited, we did not find any significant duplication

or overlap among U.S. agencies’ country-specific training programs aimed 

at combating terrorism. Officials we met with in each of these countries 

noted that they participated in various embassy working group meetings, 

such as Counterterrorism Working Group and Law Enforcement Working 

Group meetings, during which relevant agencies shared information 

regarding operations and activities at post. DS/T/ATA officials also 

coordinated ATA with other counterterrorism efforts through daily 

informal communication among cognizant officials in the countries we 

visited. 

In response to concerns that ATA lacked elements of adequate strategic 

planning and performance measurement, State took action to define goals 

and measures related to the program’s mandated objectives. S/CT and 

DS/T/ATA, however, did not systematically assess sustainability—that is, 

the extent to which assistance has enabled partner nations to achieve and

maintain advanced counterterrorism capabilities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA 

lacked clear measures and processes for assessing sustainability, and 

program managers did not consistently include sustainability in ATA 

planning. 

State did not have measurable performance goals and outcomes related to

the mandated objectives for ATA prior to fiscal year 2003, but has recently 

made some progress to address the deficiency, which had been noted in

reports by State’s Office of Inspector General. Similarly, State developed 

specific goals and measures for each of the program’s mandated objectives

in response to a 2003 Office of Management and Budget assessment. 

Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents, including department 

and bureau-level performance plans, have stated that enabling partner 

nations to achieve advanced and sustainable counterterrorism capabilities 

is a key outcome. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials further confirmed that 

sustainability is the principal intended outcome and focus of program 

assistance. In support of these efforts, DS/T/ATA appointed a Sustainment 

Manager in November 2006 to, among other things, coordinate with other 

State Had Made 

Progress in 

Establishing ATA 

Goals, but S/CT and 

DS/T/ATA Did Not 

Assess Sustainability 

State Recently Established 

ATA Goals and Measures, 

and Emphasizes Sustaining 

Partner Nations’ 

Counterterrorism 

Capabilities 

Page 11 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

DS/T/ATA divisions to develop recommendations and plans to assist 

partner nations in developing sustainable counterterrorism capabilities. 

Despite progress towards establishing goals and intended outcomes, State 

had not developed clear measures and a process for assessing

sustainability and had not integrated the concept into program planning. 

The Government Performance and Results Act of 199318 requires agencies

in charge of U.S. government programs and activities to identify goals and

report on the degree to which goals are met. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials 

noted the difficulty in developing direct quantitative measures of ATA 

outcomes related to partner nations’ counterterrorism capabilities. Our 

past work also has stressed the importance of establishing program goals, 

objectives, priorities, milestones, and measures to use in monitoring 

performance and assessing outcomes as critical elements of program 

management and effective resource allocation.19

We found that the measure for ATA’s principal intended program outcome 

of sustainability is not clear. In its fiscal year 2007 Joint Performance 

Summary, State reported results and future year targets for the number of 

countries that had achieved an advanced, sustainable level of

counterterrorism capability. According to the document, partner nations 

that achieve a sustainable level of counterterrorism would graduate from 

the program and no longer receive program assistance. However, program 

officials in S/CT and DS/T/ATA directly responsible for overseeing ATA 

were not aware that the Joint Performance Summary listed numerical 

targets and past results for the number of partner nations that had 

achieved sustainability, and could not provide an explanation of how State 

assessed the results. DS/T/ATA’s Sustainment Manager also could not 

explain how State established and assessed the numerical targets in the 

reports. The Sustainment Manager further noted that, to his knowledge, 

S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not yet developed systematic measures of 

sustainability. 

DS/T/ATA’s mechanism for evaluating partner nation capabilities did not 

include guidance or specific measures to assess sustainability. According 

S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did 

Not Assess Sustainability 

of Capabilities 

 18Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, 287-88 (1993). 

19GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist

Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists, GAO-07-697 (Washington,

D.C.: June 25, 2007). 

Page 12 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

to program guidance and DS/T/ATA officials, needs assessments and 

program reviews are intended to establish a baseline of a partner nation’s 

counterterrorism capabilities and quantify progress through subsequent 

reviews. DS/T/ATA officials also asserted that the process is intended to 

measure the results of program assistance. However, the process did not 

explicitly address sustainability, and provided no specific information or 

instruction regarding how reviewers are to assess sustainability. Moreover, 

the process focused on assessing a partner nation’s overall 

counterterrorism capabilities, but did not specifically measure the results 

of program assistance. 

DS/T/ATA had not systematically integrated sustainability into countryspecific assistance plans, and we found a lack of consensus among 

program officials about how to address the issue. In-country program 

managers, embassy officials, instructors, and partner nation officials we 

interviewed held disparate views on how to define sustainability across all

ATA participant countries, and many were not aware that sustainability 

was the intended outcome. Several program officials stated that 

graduating a country and withdrawing or significantly reducing program 

assistance could result in a rapid decline in the partner nation’s 

counterterrorism capabilities, and could undermine other program 

objectives, such as improving bilateral relations. Further, although State 

has listed sustainability in State-level planning documents since 2006, S/CT 

and DS/T/ATA had not issued guidance on incorporating sustainability into 

country-specific planning, and none of the country assistance plans we 

reviewed consistently addressed the outcome. As a result, the plans did 

not include measurable annual objectives targeted at enabling the partner 

nation to achieve sustainability. For example, Colombia’s assistance plan 

listed transferring responsibility for the antikidnapping training to the 

Colombian government and described planned activities to achieve that 

goal. However, the plan did not include measurable objectives to 

determine whether activities achieved intended results. 

Page 13 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

Since 1996, State has not complied with a congressional mandate20 to 

report to Congress on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. 

Additionally, State’s annual reports on ATA contained inaccurate data 

regarding basic program information, did not provide systematic 

assessments of program results, and lacked other information necessary to

evaluate program effectiveness. 

In 1985, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act requiring the 

Secretary of State to report on all assistance related to international 

terrorism provided by the U.S. government during the preceding fiscal 

year.21 Since 1996, State has submitted ATA annual reports rather than the 

broader report required by the statute. 

A S/CT official noted confusion within State over what the statute required

and he asserted that the ATA annual report, which is prepared by 

DS/T/ATA, and State’s annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report22 were 

sufficiently responsive to congressional needs. He further noted that, in his

view, it would be extremely difficult for State to compile and report on all 

U.S. government terrorism assistance activities, especially given the 

significant growth of agencies’ programs since 2001. Officials in State’s 

Bureau of Legislative Affairs indicated that, to their knowledge, they had

never received an inquiry from congressional staff about the missing 

reports. 

Recent ATA annual reports have contained inaccurate data relating to 

basic program information on numbers of students trained and courses 

offered. For example, 

State Reporting on 

U.S. Counterterrorism 

Assistance Abroad 

Has Been Incomplete 

and Inaccurate 

S/CT Has Not Prepared a 

Mandated Report 

ATA Annual Reports 

Contain Inaccuracies 

• Afghanistan. According to annual reports for fiscal years 2002 to 2005, 15 

Afghan students were trained as part of a single training event over the 

4-year period. DS/T/ATA subsequently provided us data for fiscal year 

 2022 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7. 

21Pub. L. No. 99-83, Title V, § 502, 99 Stat. 220 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7). 

22S/CT prepares this annual report, which is required by a separate statute (22 U.S.C. §

2656f(a)). The report primarily describes international terrorist activity. 

Page 14 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

2005, which corrected the participation total in that year from 15 

participants in 1 training event to 1,516 participants in 12 training events. 

• Pakistan. According to the fiscal year 2005 ATA annual report, ATA 

delivered 17 courses to 335 participants in Pakistan. Supporting tables in 

the same report listed 13 courses provided to 283 participants, and a 

summary report provided to us by DS/T/ATA reported 13 courses provided 

to 250 course participants. 

DS/T/ATA officials acknowledged the discrepancies and noted that similar 

inaccuracies could be presumed for prior years and for other partner 

nations. The officials indicated that inaccuracies and omissions in reports 

of the training participants and events were due to a lack of internal 

policies and procedures for recording and reporting program data. In the 

absence of documented policies and procedures, staff developed various 

individual processes for collecting the information that resulted in flawed

data reporting. Additionally, DS/T/ATA officials told us that its inadequate 

information management system and a lack of consistent data collection

procedures also contributed to inaccurate reporting. 

We reviewed ATA annual reports for fiscal years 1997 through 2005, and

found that the reports varied widely in terms of content, scope, and 

format. Moreover, the annual reports did not contain systematic 

assessments of program performance or consistent information on 

program activity, such as number and type of courses delivered, types of

equipment provided, and budget activity associated with program 

operations. In general, the reports contained varying levels of detail on 

program activity, and provided only anecdotal examples of program 

successes, from a variety of sources, including U.S. embassy officials, ATA 

instructors, and partner nation officials. DS/T/ATA program officials 

charged with compiling the annual reports for the past 3 fiscal years noted 

that DS/T/ATA did not have guidance on the scope, content, or format for 

the reports. 

Although ATA plays a central role in State’s broader effort to fight 

international terrorism, deficiencies in how the program is guided, 

managed, implemented, and assessed could limit the program’s 

effectiveness. Specifically, minimal guidance from S/CT makes it difficult

to determine the extent to which program assistance directly supports 

broader U.S. counterterrorism policy goals. Additionally, deficiencies with

DS/T/ATA’s needs assessments and program reviews may limit their utility 

ATA Annual Reports Lack 

Performance and Other 

Useful Program 

Information 

Conclusions 

Page 15 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

as a tool for planning assistance and prioritizing among several partner 

nations’ counterterrorism needs. As a result, the assessments and reviews 

are not systematically linked to resource allocation decisions, which may 

limit the program’s ability to improve partner nation’s counterterrorism 

capabilities. 

Although State has made some progress in attempting to evaluate and 

quantitatively measure program performance, ATA still lacks a clearly 

defined, systematic assessment and reporting of outcomes, which makes it

difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of the program. This 

deficiency, along with State’s noncompliance with mandated reporting 

requirements, has resulted in Congress having limited and incomplete 

information on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance and ATA 

efforts. Such information is necessary to determine the most effective 

types of assistance the U.S. government can provide to partner nations in 

support of the U.S. national security goal of countering terrorism abroad. 

In our February 2008 report, we suggested that Congress should 

reconsider the requirement that the Secretary of State provide an annual 

report on the nature and amount of U.S. government counterterrorism 

assistance provided abroad, given the broad changes in the scope and 

nature of U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad in conjunction with the 

fact that the report has not been submitted since 1996. 

We also recommended that the Secretary of State take the following four 

actions: 

1. Revisit and revise internal guidance (the 1991 State policy 

memorandum and Foreign Affairs Manual, in particular) to ensure that 

the roles and responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA are still relevant 

and better enable State to determine which countries should receive 

assistance and what type, and allocate limited ATA resources. 

2. Ensure that needs assessments and program reviews are both useful 

and linked to ATA resource decisions and development of countryspecific assistance plans.

3. Establish clearer measures of sustainability, and refocus the process 

for assessing the sustainability of partner nations’ counterterrorism 

capabilities. The revised evaluation process should include not only an 

overall assessment of partner nation counterterrorism capabilities, but 

also provide guidance for assessing the specific outcomes of ATA. 

Page 16 GAO-08-875T
Combating Terrorism

4. Comply with the congressional mandate to report to Congress on U.S. 

international counterterrorism assistance. 

In commenting on our report, State agreed overall with our principal 

findings and recommendations to improve its ATA program guidance, the 

needs assessment and program review process, and its assessments of 

ATA program outcomes. State noted that the report highlighted the 

difficulties in assessing the benefits of developing and improving long-term 

antiterrorism and law enforcement relationships with foreign 

governments. State also outlined a number of ongoing and planned 

initiatives to address our recommendations. As noted in our report, we 

will follow up with State to ensure that these initiatives have been 

completed, as planned. 

Although State supported the matter we suggested for congressional 

consideration, it did not specifically address our recommendation that it 

comply with the congressional mandate to report on U.S. counterterrorism

assistance. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael 

Johnson, Jr. (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Albert H. Huntington, 

III, Assistant Director; Matthew E. Helm; Elisabeth R. Helmer; and Emily 

Rachman made key contributions in preparing this statement. 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgements 

Page 17 GAO-08-875T (320606) 
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