AFDD Template Guide 

20 September 2002

.

Command 

and Control

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8 

1 June 2007

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 0-2, 

Unified Action Armed Forces, Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for 

Joint Air Operations, and Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-8 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 1 JUNE 2007 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It 

represents a doctrinal evolution in command and control (C2) operations. This revision 

updates key C2 doctrine concepts to include a discussion of net-centric operations, 

distributed and reachback operations, and threats to effective C2 of forces. It presents 

C2 of forces through both an administrative and an operational structure. It adds a 

discussion of the Air Force’s current cyberspace force C2 structure. It adds a discussion 

of C2 operations at home station and at deployed locations, with the introduction of the 

Installation Control Center, in support of national and multinational objectives across the 

full range of military operations. It expands the discussion of the commander, Air Force 

forces (COMAFFOR), including a discussion of the COMAFFOR’s staff (the AFFOR 

staff), in Chapter 2. It updates the discussion of Air Force C2 nodes, and adds a 

discussion of the Air Force component headquarters in Chapter 3. It expands the 

discussion of C2 processes in Chapter 4. It updates and expands the discussion of 

developing C2 professionals in Chapter 5. It adds an appendix that discusses transfer of 

forces and command authority (Appendix A). It also updates definitions, terminology, 

historical references, and readings throughout. 

Supersedes: AFDD 2-8, 16 February 2001 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DD 

Certified by: AFDC/CC (Maj Gen Allen G. Peck) 

Pages: 120 

Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading 

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication 

Approved by: T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, General, USAF 

 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force 
FOREWORD 

 The Air Force mission is global. Airmen are trained to employ air, space, and 

cyberspace forces anywhere, at any time, across the full range of military operations. In 

order to adequately support the Secretary of Defense and the geographic combatant 

commanders in executing operations, we must have a global command and control 

system. Military operations in the 21st century are highly complex and require close 

coordination to be effective. An effective command and control system allows efficient 

and effective coordination of all the means that Airmen can bring to bear on a conflict 

and speed the outcome in our favor. 

 “Command and control” is one of the key operational functions as described in 

Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. It is the key operational 

function that ties all the others together to achieve our military objectives. Our doctrine 

for command and control rests on the Air Force tenets of centralized control and 

decentralized execution. A commander of Air Force forces will be designated whenever 

Air Force forces are presented to a joint force commander. This designation provides 

unity of command. An Airman is normally designated as the joint force air and space 

component commander, resulting in clear lines of authority for both joint and Air Force 

component operations. We organize, train, and equip Airmen to execute the myriad 

tasks of command and control of air, space, and cyberspace forces through Air Force 

global and theater command and control systems. 

 

 Command and control of air and space power is an Air Force-provided 

asymmetric capability that no other Service or nation provides. We use a variety of 

means to leverage this capability. While we employ our command and control through 

various systems, our focus is on our most important asset, our people. All Airmen must 

be trained and educated to be command and control professionals. While we have a 

cadre of command and control operators, most Airmen will use the principles and tenets 

of command and control in employing forces at some point in their service to our nation. 

We must be prepared through effective training and education to perform these critical 

tasks. 

 Our doctrine is broadly stated to fit varying levels of contingencies and diverse 

geographical areas, while encompassing joint and multinational operations. Our 

doctrine will support effective employment of the various Air Force capabilities 

necessary to achieve an effects-based approach to operations. Airmen conduct 

operations and learn from those experiences every day. They are finding innovative 

ways to improve our command and control processes and technical capabilities. We 

must use these experiences to improve our doctrine to continue to support our national 

military objectives worldwide. 

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY 

 General, USAF 

 Chief of Staff 
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... v 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ..................................................................... vii 

CHAPTER ONE—Foundations of Command and Control (C2)........................................... 1 

The Operational Environment ................................................................................................ 1 

Command Defined ................................................................................................................... 4 

Control Defined......................................................................................................................... 5 

Command and Control ............................................................................................................ 6 

Key Considerations of C2 ..................................................................................................... 10 

Considerations for Command and Control Operations.................................................... 25 

Multinational and Interagency Considerations ................................................................. 26 

Operational Risk Management ............................................................................................ 27 

CHAPTER TWO—Air Force C2 in the Administrative Chain of Command...................... 29 

Administrative Versus Operational C2 Environment ........................................................ 29 

Command Relationships and Levels of Authority ............................................................. 31 

The Administrative Branch.................................................................................................... 35 

C2 of Air Force Forces .......................................................................................................... 39 

Command and Control Architectures.................................................................................. 44 

CHAPTER THREE—Air Force C2 in the Operational Chain of Command ...................... 51 

Operational versus Administrative C2 Environment......................................................... 51 

The Operational Branch........................................................................................................ 51 

The Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force................................................................... 52 

Functional Air and Space Operations Architectures......................................................... 54 

CHAPTER FOUR—Command and Control Processes ....................................................... 69 

C2 of Air Force Functions ..................................................................................................... 69 

Planning................................................................................................................................... 69 

The Air Force Component Planning Process .................................................................... 72 

Directing................................................................................................................................... 75 

Coordinating............................................................................................................................ 75 

Controlling ............................................................................................................................... 76 

Assessing ................................................................................................................................ 76 

CHAPTER FIVE—Technology Attributes and Developing C2 Professionals................... 77 

Interoperability ........................................................................................................................ 78 

Reliability and Redundancy .................................................................................................. 79 

Communications Capabilities............................................................................................... 80 

Useable Data for Decision Making...................................................................................... 80 

Key Networks.......................................................................................................................... 80 

Testing, Certification, and Security Requirements for C2 Systems ............................... 83 

C2 Systems Characteristics ................................................................................................. 84 

Developing Air Force C2 Professionals.............................................................................. 89 

Training Air Force C2 Professionals ................................................................................... 90 
iv

SUGGESTED READINGS ....................................................................................................... 93 

APPENDIX A Transfer of Forces and Command Authority ................................................ 97 

GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................. 99 
v

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) establishes doctrinal guidance for 

command and control operations to support national military objectives and 

commanders in employing air and space forces across the full range of military 

operations. 

APPLICATION 

 This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, 

including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. 

Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

military operations. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation 

when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

 This command and control doctrine is broad in nature and is adaptable to diverse 

global and theater-specific force deployment situations and differing levels of conflict. 

AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, is the keystone document addressing the spectrum 

of command and control functions that operate across the full range of military 

operations. It stresses the need for fixed and mobile, interoperable command and 

control centers, with efficient processes, state-of-the-art equipment, and properly trained 

Airmen to support US and multinational requirements worldwide. 
vi

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology 

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force 

prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air 

Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and 

space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component 

commander while the term ”JFACC” refers to a joint component-level operational 

commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will 

normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are 

different, and should be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control/ 

administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through a 

Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air and 

space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a 

combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the 

air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in 

joint or combined operations is correctly known as a JAOC or CAOC. Since 

nearly every operation the US conducts will involve international partners, this 

publication uses the terms CFACC and CAOC throughout to emphasize the 

doctrine’s applicability to multi-national operations. 
vii

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDD expands on or supports these 

statements. 

 Effective command and control (C2) of forces is woven throughout each level of 

conflict and is accepted as a necessity for successful military operations. (Page 4) 

 Centralized C2 of air and space forces under a single Airman is a fundamental 

principle of air and space doctrine. (Page 7) 

 Unity of command is a principle of C2 operations. (Page 10) 

 Centralized control and decentralized execution are tenets of C2 and provide 

commanders the ability to exploit the speed, flexibility, and versatility of global air 

and space power. (Page 12) 

 Command may be delegated to another commander, but never to a staff. (Page 24) 

 Air Force forces are presented to joint force commanders in a single, capabilitiesbased entity—the air and space expeditionary task force. (Page 33) 

 A commander of Air Force forces is designated whenever Air Force forces are 

presented to a joint force commander. (Page 52) 

 Planning is one process essential to effectively commanding and controlling military 

operations. (Page 70) 

 Commanders must be provided with tools for decision-making through effective 

control, exploitation, and protection of information regardless of form or function. 

(Page 80) 

 Specialized training and education of C2 professionals improves combat 

effectiveness; makes C2 capabilities universally understood, accepted, and 

exploitable by joint forces; and creates military and civilian C2 experts and leaders 

with a stronger foundation in force employment and capabilities. (Page 89) 
1

CHAPTER ONE 

 FOUNDATIONS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) 

The Operational Environment 

Command and control are essential and integral parts of warfighting that require 

careful planning and execution to be effective. Early twentieth century air and space 

pioneers were quick to recognize that air warfare requires an intuitive and fast decision 

cycle. Commanders need to make timely decisions, based upon the best information 

available to them. Once decisions have been made, they need to be able to 

disseminate guidance and commander’s intent to subordinate commanders and 

supporting commanders. This information enables collaboration (for supporting 

commanders), decision-making, and synchronization of operations. Commanders also 

need information to be fed back to them to enable the next decision. 

 Air and space capabilities can be most fully exploited when considered as an 

indivisible whole. Air Force operations and C2 are intimately related. With the advent of 

the airplane, a commander’s area of focus grew a hundredfold larger. Today the United 

States conducts operations in an operational environment that is ever expanding. 

The art of commanding Air Force forces lies in the ability to effectively integrate 

people, systems, and processes to enable sound decisions and produce the desired 

effects that support achievement of national objectives. Effective C2 capabilities support 

operations across the domains of air and space from the strategic to the tactical level of 

operations. Airmen should think in terms of controlling and exploiting the full air and 

space continuum on a regional and global scale to achieve desired effects. Air and 

space operations centers (AOCs) are becoming more capable of gathering and fusing 

the full range of information, from national to tactical, in real time, and rapidly converting 

that information to knowledge and understanding—to assure decision superiority over 

adversaries. This brings into focus the driving issues that affect Air Force C2. Effective 

C2 is essential to the Air Force in producing the right effects at the right place and time 

to support theater and global force commanders. The immense expanse of the global 

operational environment demands highly trained people, state-of-the-art technology, 

and efficient processes for successful C2. Modern conflicts demand fast and efficient 

C2 operations that are sufficiently flexible and adaptable to minimize the inevitable fog 

and friction of warfare.

 To command effectively, commanders need a mechanism to exercise C2. 

Commanders give direction and guidance face to face at the unit level. In this construct, 

the C2 process is very simple. At higher levels the C2 process becomes more complex 

and commanders need a C2 system that ties together geographically separated units or 

those with diverse missions. The command mechanism at higher levels should consist 

primarily of C2 centers that are tailored to their unique requirements, based on their 

respective missions, geographic location, multinational situation, or makeup of the 

coalition. These C2 centers should be standardized to a certain extent, providing 
2

common technological and procedural requirements. They may be fixed, transportable, 

or mobile. They should provide commanders the capability to communicate up and 

down the chain of command, as well as laterally with commanders of other components 

or a coalition. 

 C2 is an Air Force function that affects Airmen at each level of command, in 

every theater, and across the range of military operations when air and space 

operations are conducted. Whether disseminating guidance to subordinate units, or 

receiving guidance from above, C2 enables successful operations. Throughout history, 

military forces sought ways to improve C2 operations. Runners were used to 

communicate between fielded forces. Semaphores and other visual signals were used 

between ships. The telegraph was used between fielded forces and their command 

elements. Each of these technological improvements in C2 granted an edge to the force 

adapting the technology for its use. These technological advances have usually been 

short-lived. Military forces of the United States have had and expect to continue to have 

a technological advantage over our adversaries, both in weapons capabilities and in the 

C2 systems that facilitate their employment. There is a continuing requirement to 

develop and enhance our fundamental concepts for effective C2, commensurate with 

our technical advantages. Effective preparation of C2 systems and the C2 professionals 

who employ them are both required to support military operations in today’s highly 

volatile world situation. This preparation is a necessity to support tomorrow’s fully 

integrated electronic battlefield. 

C2 Defined 

 To frame the discussion of C2, the concept must be defined. Understanding C2 

requires examining the definition found in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of 

Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: 

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 

commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 

the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of 

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures 

employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 

 This definition acknowledges three central themes. The first theme, personnel, 

covers the human aspects of C2. In the context of this document, we refer to personnel 

as Airmen; the total force of regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard of 

the US, and DOD civilians who serve the Air Force. The second, the technology

element; covers the equipment, communications, and facilities needed to overcome the 

warfighting problems of integrating actions and effects across space and time. 

Technology elements tend to dominate C2 doctrine, because advanced technology 

characterizes American warfare. Technology can include equipment, facilities, 

hardware, software, infrastructure, materiel, systems, and a whole host of other 

elements. The third theme, labeled in this document as “processes,” encompasses 
3

Airmen Feedback, 

Analysis, 

& Integration

Information

The 

Commander

C2 

Processes

C2 Systems 

& 

Technology 

“procedures.” This document extracts doctrinal concepts from generalized C2 

processes. The details of C2 processes and associated procedures are found in tactics, 

techniques, and procedures documents and other instructional publications. Personnel,

technology, and processes must all come together to efficiently execute C2 functions. 

Figure 1.1 portrays the Air Force C2 construct, which expands on the joint definition of 

C2. The construct reflects the processes, technology, and Airmen (personnel) 

mentioned in the joint definition of C2, and adds information as an element. These 

elements work together to enable effective decision-making by the organization’s 

commander, who is at the center of the construct. The construct portrays C2 as the 

lens through which Air Force forces are transformed into air and space power, and it 

enables accomplishment of the mission.

 

 Figure 1.1. The Air Force C2 Construct. 

 C2 is not unique from other military functions. It enables mission accomplishment 

by collaborative planning and synchronizing forces and operations in time and purpose. 

Effective C2 enables a commander to use available forces at the right place and time to 

optimize the attributes of global vigilance, reach, and power, thereby allowing decision 

superiority over adversaries. Good horizontal and vertical information flow enables 

effective C2 throughout the chain of command. This information flow, and its timely 

fusion, enable optimum decision-making. This allows the centralized control and 

decentralized execution so essential to effective command of forces. A robust and 

redundant C2 system provides commanders the ability to effectively employ their forces 

despite the “fog and friction of war,” while simultaneously minimizing the enemy’s 

capability to interfere with the same. 

Facilitating timely and informed decisions is at the heart of C2. Technological 

advances in the transfer and handling of information have created the information age. 

Advancements such as the global information grid (GIG) have accelerated the process 
4

of information sharing immensely. This capability foreshadows new opportunities for 

informed decision-making. It can, at the same time, threaten commanders with 

“information overload,” challenging their ability to synthesize data and make timely 

decisions. Therefore, the identification of mission-essential information is paramount to 

successful information flow. Commanders and their staffs have a process for 

information flow, both within the headquarters or C2 center, or up and down the chain of 

command. This process should be formally documented in an information management 

plan (IMP). A portion of this information is provided by tools available to the 

commander, such as the commander’s estimate of the situation, course of action (COA) 

selection, and detailed plans. By analyzing these and other products, commanders can 

determine the information they need to conduct operations and filter out the 

unnecessary. 

C2 is one of the Air Force’s key operational functions as described in Air Force 

Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. C2 as a construct fits in with 

the principles of war that are universally held by the joint community. The tenets of air 

and space power refine these further by adding context, from the Airman’s perspective, 

about how air and space power should best be applied. The functions of air and space 

power take this discussion to the next level of granularity, by describing the actual 

operational constructs Airmen use to apply air and space power to achieve objectives. 

The Air Force’s operational functions (see AFDD 1) are the broad, fundamental, and 

continuing activities of air and space power. 

These functions are not necessarily unique to the Air Force. Some, including C2, 

predate air and space power as a separate military discipline. They have evolved 

steadily since air and space power’s inception. Air Force forces employ air and space 

power globally through these basic functions to achieve strategic, operational, and 

tactical level objectives. These battle-proven functions can be conducted at any level of 

war and enable the Air Force to shape and control the operational environment. As one 

of these functions, effective C2 of forces is woven throughout each level of conflict 

and is accepted as a necessity for successful military operations. 

 C2, as one of the basic constructs Airmen use to employ air and space power, is 

one of the functions that cuts across all other functions in the Air Force. C2 cannot 

occur without the other functions. Likewise, if C2 of forces is not present other Air Force 

functions are somewhat difficult, if not impossible, to conduct. 

 C2 is a commonly accepted term in military operations, even though its meaning 

can be interpreted in different ways. To frame a discussion of C2, we must break down 

its components for definition and analysis. By defining the terms separately and 

analyzing them, we can re-form the construct of C2 with a clearer concept of what C2 

really entails. 

COMMAND DEFINED 

The concept and the principles underlying command have been in existence 

since militaries were formed, thousands of years ago. The concept of command 

encompasses certain powers, duties, and unique responsibilities not normally given to 
5

leaders in the public or private sector. The art of command must be exercised with care 

and should be awarded only to those who have demonstrated potential to selflessly lead 

others. JP 1-02 defines command as: 

The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises 

over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the 

authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for 

planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It 

also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of 

assigned personnel. 

 Today’s full spectrum employment of air and space forces requires command 

responsibility to also include force protection.

 Commanders are given authority and responsibility to accomplish the mission 

assigned. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish the mission, 

they cannot delegate the responsibility for the attainment of mission objectives. A 

Service component commander, such as the commander, Air Force forces 

(COMAFFOR), normally has operational and administrative responsibilities and should 

have the proper levels of authority to accomplish the mission. Commanders must be 

aware of the authorities they are given and their relationship under that authority with 

superior, subordinate, and lateral force commanders. Command relationships should be 

clearly defined to obviate confusion in executing operations. The command of air and 

space power requires intricate knowledge of the capabilities of the forces to be 

employed, and a keen understanding of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) (in 

multinational forces a combined forces commander’s) intent, and the authorities of other 

component commanders. 

CONTROL DEFINED 

 Control is the process and system by which commanders plan and guide 

operations. Commanders should rely on delegation of authorities and commander’s 

intent as methods to control forces. However, just as in the discussion of command, 

although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish the mission, they cannot 

delegate the responsibility for the attainment of mission objectives. JP 1-02 defines 

control as: 

Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander 

over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. 

 This is the process by which commanders plan, guide, and conduct operations. 

The control process occurs before and during the operation. Control involves dynamic 

balances between commanders directing operations and allowing subordinates freedom 

of action. These processes require strong leaders who conduct assessment and 

evaluation of follow-up actions. Often time and distance factors limit the direct control of 

subordinates. Commanders should rely on delegation of authorities and ‘commander’s 
6

intent’ as methods to control forces. The commander’s intent should specify the goals, 

priorities, acceptable risks, and limits of the operation. Commanders influence 

operations and ensure mission success through other means, such as memoranda of 

agreement (MOAs), memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and designation of an 

executive agent for specific functions. These and other types of agreements are usually 

negotiated before operations commence. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

A discussion of C2 will bring a variety of viewpoints and perspectives, depending 

upon an Airman’s unique experiences, or his/her respective role in a military operation. 

To a JFC, a discussion of C2 might revolve around orders received directly from the 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to execute a major combat operation. A discussion of C2 

with a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) might entail guidance received to control an 

aircraft delivering ordnance on an enemy position. Both discussions concern C2 of 

forces within a theater. To the JFC, the discussion is on the strategic or operational 

level of war. The JFC will work through his/her staff and subordinate commanders to 

translate and execute the guidance given to employ theater forces. The JTAC will 

execute that guidance after it has been disseminated through the component and joint 

C2 apparatus and translate it into a tactical application. The results of that tactical 

application of firepower by the JTAC and the flight of aircraft that he controlled are 

exchanged throughout the C2 system. Those results will be combined with other data 

and assessed. If needed, the tactical engagement, or one similar to it, will be repeated 

to attain the JFC’s objectives. 

A discussion of C2 with a supporting commander (one involving global strike or 

global mobility forces) might entail receiving JFC intent, rules of engagement (ROE), 

and agreement as to when or if control of strategic global assets will be handed off to a 

theater commander for tactical employment. The discussions will also involve when the 

control of the global assets are returned to the supporting commander so they can be 

planned to support other global operations. Discussions should concern C2 of global 

forces operating into a theater and C2 of forces within a theater. To the JFC, in this 

case, the discussion is at the strategic and operational levels of war. The JFC will work 

through his/her staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders to 

translate and execute the intent and guidance given to tactically employ strategic forces 

and the allocated theater forces. 

Supporting commanders have unique requirements for C2 of forces. These 

forces may be tasked with global support, such as space or airlift forces. They require 

the ability to quickly establish or adapt C2 structures across the force and within the 

staff tailored to the mission, and to create the processes that will enable horizontal and 

vertical collaboration. They must have alternatives for organizing the components and 

defining command relations, depending upon conditions within the command and area 

of responsibility (AOR) to be supported, with associated guidance on when and how to 

apply them. 
7

Operation DESERT STORM 

One of the most serious joint issues to arise in Operation DESERT 

SHIELD was the control of air power. Lieutenant General Horner, Commander of 

[US Air Forces, Central Command] USCENTAF, proposed that all aviation come 

under a single commander, and he requested that the JFACC control the air 

effort. Given the large number of US and allied aircraft, it was clear that some 

control was necessary. None of the components wanted to give up control of 

their aircraft, yet innovative solutions were worked out on the scene. For 

example, the Marine Corps did not want their unique air/ground task forces to be 

broken up. [US Marine forces, Central Command] USMARFORCENT worked 

out an agreement prior to execution of the air operation plan. USMARFORCENT 

would support its organic forces and provide an agreed-upon number of fixedwing sorties to USCENTCOM for its use. 

—Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, 1997

Although every Airman might have an unofficial definition of C2, there are formal 

definitions at the joint and component level. In general terms, C2 includes the process 

of planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations. C2 involves 

the integrated processes, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, 

information, and communications designed to enable a commander to exercise 

authority and direction across the range of military operations. 

The concept of a C2 system is purposefully broad in scope. A discussion of C2 

as a function should be differentiated from the discussion of a C2 system. Often the 

term C2 is narrowly construed as the highly visible technology elements of a C2 

operation. A C2 system encompasses both equipment items such as satellite 

communication systems or computer systems, as well as the capabilities that support 

C2 of military forces. Airmen should strive to become knowledgeable of all facets of the 

C2 process, including concepts, functions, and hardware and software requirements. 

Command and Control of Air and Space Forces 

Air and space forces conduct the C2 function to achieve strategic, operational, 

and tactical objectives. Air Force forces are employed in a joint force context by a JFC. 

C2 of those forces can be through a Service component commander or a functional 

component commander if more than one Service’s air and space assets are involved. 

This officer, the combined/joint force air and space component commander (C/JFACC), 

should normally be the Service commander with the preponderance of air and space 

assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air and space operations. 

Centralized C2 of air and space forces under a single Airman is a fundamental 

tenet of Air Force doctrine.
8

Concepts for the Control of Forces 

 There are other concepts and tools that can aid a commander in control of 

forces. These concepts facilitate communications between commanders and 

subordinates. If used effectively, they can provide information to subordinates even 

when traditional means of communications are nonexistent, because they have been 

rehearsed before a conflict begins. Some of these concepts are discussed below. 

 One of the commander’s tools is employing information management. Control of 

information is a prerequisite to maintaining C2 of an operation. Identifying, requesting, 

receiving, tracking, and disseminating the needed information allow decision-makers to 

make informed and timely decisions. Commanders and staffs develop procedures that 

manage the available information to ensure it is used effectively. 

 Implicit communication can also be used. Commanders seek to minimize 

restrictive control measures and detailed instructions; therefore, they must find efficient 

and effective ways to create cooperation and compliance. Commanders and their 

subordinates at all levels do this by fostering implicit communication and understanding 

with everyone in the chain of command. 

Two joint C2 concepts that nurture implicit communications are commander’s 

intent and mission-type orders. By expressing intent and direction through mission-type 

orders, the commander attempts to provide clear objectives and goals to enable his/her 

subordinates to execute the mission. 

Also available is the concept of decision superiority. AFDD 2-5, Information 

Operations, defines decision superiority as “a competitive advantage, enabled by an 

ongoing situational awareness that allows commanders and their forces to make betterinformed decisions and implement them faster than their adversaries can react. 

Decision superiority is about improving our ability to observe, orient, decide, and act 

(the OODA loop) faster and more effectively than the adversary. Decision superiority is 

a relationship between adversary and friendly OODA loop processes.” The commander 

can get inside the adversary’s decision and execution cycle by making more timely and 

informed decisions. Doing so generates adversary confusion and disorder and slows 

opponents. The commander who can gather information and make decisions faster and 

better will generate a quicker tempo of operations and gain a decided military 

advantage. This can be an asymmetric capability for US forces.

Interoperable support systems are a requirement for effective control. 

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and command, control, 

communications, and computer support systems must be responsive in real time to 

provide the JFC (both in a functional or a geographic combatant commander’s role) with 

accurate, timely, relevant, and adequate information. Interoperable systems, designed 

to be employed in a layered and redundant construct, result in a robust C2 capability to 

support the JFC. This robust integration of C2 and ISR assets facilitates timely 

guidance and efficient information flow. 
9

Integration of C2 and ISR assets of Service or functional components and those 

of coalition members enhances the flow of information to commanders and among 

users. By integrating systems and leveraging their individual capabilities, planners can 

maximize available coverage of C2 and ISR assets for the commander. Synchronization 

of these assets allows their use at the time or in the situations that are most beneficial to 

the JFC to support a battle plan. Assets can be coordinated to achieve specific 

objectives or to provide redundant coverage or communications connectivity. Attacks 

are coordinated among Service or functional components to bring varied weapons and 

capabilities of the joint/combined force to bear on the opposing force at the time of the 

commander’s choosing and when the most favorable conditions exist to execute 

operations. 

Battle rhythm discipline as a concept also enhances control of forces. Effective 

operations in a theater requires the synchronization of strategic, operational, and 

tactical processes, to ensure mission planning, preparation, and execution are 

coordinated. This process is called battle rhythm or operational rhythm. It is essentially 

a schedule of important events which should be synchronized with the other Service or 

functional components and combined forces within a theater. 

Battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities 

intended to synchronize current and future operations. Activities at each echelon must 

incorporate higher headquarters guidance and commander’s intent, and subordinate 

units’ requirements for mission planning, preparation, and execution. If one element of 

the task force is not following the battle rhythm, it can produce problems in planning and 

executing operations with other elements of the task force. Every command 

headquarters has a rhythm regulated by the flow of information and the decision cycle. 

The keys to capturing and maintaining control over the battle rhythm are simplicity and 

sensitivity to the Service components’ and superior commander’s battle rhythms.

Efficient use of the staff facilitates effective control. The primary objective the 

staff seeks to attain for the commander, and for subordinate commanders, is 

understanding or situational awareness. This is a prerequisite for commanders to 

anticipate opportunities and challenges. 

 Trust among the commanders and staffs in a joint force expand the senior 

commander’s options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the 

initiative when conditions warrant. Mutual trust results from honest efforts to learn about 

and understand the capabilities that each member brings to the joint force: 

demonstrated competence and planning and training together. 

 The JFC has a functional system and structure for disseminating guidance to 

his/her staff and to deployed forces. The functional components also play a role in this 

process through their functional operational centers that disseminate guidance to fielded 

forces. The operations center that disseminates the JFC’s guidance for the Air Force 

component is the AOC. 
10

 Commanders need the ability to review and possibly alter mission objectives 

during the execution phase of operations in order to achieve the desired effects given a 

change in the situation. Commanders can use the effects-based approach to operations 

(EBAO), which are operations that are planned, executed, assessed and adapted to 

influence or change system behavior or capabilities in order to achieve desired 

outcomes. EBAO is sometimes colloquially but incorrectly referred to as “effects-based 

operations,” or EBO. EBAO encompasses planning, execution, and assessment, all of 

which support the commander. The key insights associated with EBAO are: effective 

operations must be part of a coherent plan that logically supports and ties all objectives 

and the end state together; the plan to achieve the objectives must guide employment; 

and means of measuring success and gaining feedback must be planned for and 

evaluated throughout execution. For more on EBAO, see AFDD 2, Operations and 

Organization. 

KEY CONSIDERATIONS OF C2 

 There are key considerations that guide C2 operations just as in other air and 

space operations. These key considerations are used by commanders to enable 

effective decision-making and to aid in the successful conduct of military operations. 

These considerations use principles and tenets that are woven throughout the C2 

process. Unity of command ensures concentration of effort for every objective under 

one responsible commander. Unity of command is a principle of C2 operations,

which, in turn, assures unity of effort and is supported by the tenets of centralized 

control and decentralized execution. Another enduring tenet of C2 operations is

informed decision-making. Informed and timely decision-making is the essence of 

decision superiority. When the right information is flowing horizontally and vertically in a 

timely manner, the commander is able to fuse together the needed information to make 

the best possible decision—thus gaining and maintaining decision superiority to 

dominate the operational environment. The commander will never have all the 

information desired. Accepting and taking reasonable risks to achieve mission success 

is the norm in warfare—efficient and effective C2 minimizes that risk. 

Unity of Command 

 Unity of command is one of the principles of war. According to AFDD 1, Air Force 

Basic Doctrine, “Unity of command ensures the concentration of effort for every 

objective under one responsible commander. This principle emphasizes that all efforts 

should be directed and coordinated toward a common objective.” 
11

 Nothing is more important than unity of 

command.

 —Napoleon 

Unity of command is not intended to promote centralized control without 

delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. Some commanders may 

fulfill their responsibilities by personally directing units to engage in missions or tasks. 

However, as the breadth of command expands to include the full spectrum of 

operations, commanders are normally precluded from doing so. Thus, C2 operations 

normally include the assignment of responsibilities and the delegation of authorities 

between superior and subordinate commanders. A reluctance to delegate decisions to 

subordinate commanders slows down C2 operations and takes away the subordinates’ 

initiative. Senior commanders should provide the desired end-state, desired effects, 

ROE, and required feedback on the progress of the operation and not actually direct 

tactical operations. 

 As an example, some functions, such as counterair operations, must decentralize 

authority when the situation dictates. The area air defense commander (AADC) must 

decentralize engagement authority to sector air defense commanders if the integrated 

air defense system is overwhelmed by the sheer number of hostile tracks, or loss of 

communications with the air defense sectors occurs. In this case, the AADC cannot 

direct which targets should be engaged, and must rely on subordinate commanders to 

do so. Once effective communications are regained, or the tactical situation allows, the 

AADC can reassume engagement authority. Engagement authority is always spelled 

out in the ROE for an operation, as well as in governing documents such as the air 

defense plan. Responsibilities of commanders at each level must be clearly understood 

before decentralization of authority occurs. 

 

 Unity of command ensures concentration of effort for every objective under one 

responsible commander. This principle emphasizes that all efforts should be directed 

and coordinated toward a common objective. Air and space power’s operational-level 

perspective calls for unity of command to gain the most effective and efficient 

application. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved

by vesting a single commander with the authority to direct all force employment in 

pursuit of a common objective. The essence of successful operations is a coordinated 

and cooperative effort toward a commonly understood objective. In many operations, 

the wide-ranging interagency and non-governmental organization operations involved 

may dilute unity of command; nevertheless, a unity of effort must be preserved to 

ensure common focus and mutually supporting actions. 
12

 Unity of command is vital in employing forces. Air and space power is the product 

of multiple capabilities, and centralized C2 is essential to effectively fuse these 

capabilities. Airmen best understand the entire range of air and space power. An 

Airman may be designated as the supported commander for an operation or as the 

supporting commander. Whether in the role of supported or supporting commander, Air 

Forces are presented as a separate force to the JFC, under a single Airman, a 

COMAFFOR, to preserve unity of command. Air Force forces are not broken apart 

piecemeal under the component commanders being supported. Breaking Air Force 

forces apart dilutes their effectiveness. The ability of air and space power to range on a 

theater and global scale imposes responsibilities that can be discharged only through 

the integrating function of centralized control under an Airman. That is the essence of 

unity of command and air and space power. 

 There are exceptions to the tenets governing delegation of authorities to 

subordinate commanders. Some capabilities, such as nuclear forces, national missile 

defense systems and national-level ISR assets require centralized control. For example, 

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), states, “National policy requires 

centralized execution authority of nuclear weapons. The President is the sole authority 

for release of US nuclear weapons. The President's decision to authorize release of 

these weapons is based on recommendations of the SecDef, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), geographic combatant commanders, and allies. The President 

will monitor all aspects of the authorization and employment of nuclear weapons.” 

Delegation of authority for execution is not appropriate in employing these assets. 

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution 

Centralized control and decentralized execution are key tenets of C2; they 

provide commanders the ability to exploit the speed, flexibility, and versatility of 

global air and space power. Centralized control is defined in JP 1-02 as, “In joint air 

operations, placing within one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, 

directing, and coordinating a military operation or group/category of operations.” Air and 

space power’s unique speed, range, and ability to maneuver in three dimensions 

depends on centralized control by an Airman to achieve effects when and where 

desired. 

 Centralized control and decentralized execution are critical to the effective 

employment of air and space power. Indeed, they are the fundamental organizing 

principles Airmen use for effective C2, having been proven over decades of experience 

as the most effective and efficient means of employing air and space power. Because of 

air and space power’s unique potential to directly affect the strategic and operational 

levels of war, it must be controlled by a single Airman at the air component commander 

level. This Airman must maintain the broad strategic perspective necessary to balance 

and prioritize the use of the air and space resources that have been allocated to the 

theater. A single commander, focused on the broader aspects of an operation, can best 

mediate the competing demands for tactical support against the strategic and 

operational requirements of the conflict.
13

JP 0-2 embodies the Air Force’s commitment to the tenet of centralized control of 

air and space power in its description of the fundamental concept of a functional 

component commander. The UNAAF outlines the requirement to place the responsibility 

for air operations under a single commander. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 

describes the joint air and space operations center (JAOC) where centralized planning, 

directing, controlling, coordinating, and assessing take place. A balance exists between 

too much and too little centralized control. Overcontrolling air and space power robs it of 

flexibility, taking away initiative from operators. Undercontrolling air and space power 

fails to capitalize on joint force integration and orchestration, thus reducing its 

effectiveness. 

Centralized control of air and space forces levies a major requirement on Air 

Force C2 operations. This requirement is to establish and maintain two-way information 

flow among commanders, operators, and combat support elements that must be 

effectively integrated to achieve the desired combat effects. Using timely and available 

information, commanders make and communicate decisions. A good example is the air 

tasking order (ATO); it embodies command decisions that must be communicated to the 

operators. It enables the CFACC to control theater-wide air and space forces in support 

of the JFC’s objectives. The ATO allows the JFC to integrate air and space operations 

across the theater, to bring forces to bear at the time and location of his/her choosing. It 

also allows air and space forces to be fully integrated to support the JFC’s intent. The 

ATO is centrally planned and developed at the operational level, but its execution is 

decentralized to subordinate C2 nodes and tactical level units. 

 Senior commanders making operational decisions, combined with subordinates 

free to exercise initiative in executing those decisions, make up the heart of C2—

centralized control and decentralized execution. There may be times when the political 

leadership becomes directly involved in the execution of military operations. This highlevel political involvement tends to drive a higher level of centralized command. 

Decentralized execution in these instances may vary with the latitude granted by the 

senior national leadership. Coalition unity and collateral damage are two common 

concerns that may challenge the optimal balance in centralized control and 

decentralized execution. 

Centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power provide 

theater-wide focus while allowing operational flexibility to meet theater objectives. They 

assure concentration of effort while maintaining economy of force. They exploit air and 

space power’s versatility and flexibility to ensure that air and space forces remain 

responsive, survivable, and sustainable. 
14

Case Study: 

Failure to Decentralize and the Role of the Staff,

Major General George C. Kenney in the South Pacific, 1942 

On 4 August 1942, the day Kenney officially took command, he received 

orders for upcoming air operations. Rather than broad mission guidance, [Maj. 

Gen. Richard K.] Sutherland [Gen. MacArthur’s Chief of Staff] sent detailed 

instructions, directing takeoff times, weapons, and even tactics. Kenney was 

furious. He immediately marched into Sutherland’s office, arguing, in typical 

Kenney fashion, that he was the “most competent airman in the Pacific” and 

that he had the responsibility to decide how the air units should operate—not 

Sutherland. Kenney shot down Sutherland’s rebuttal by suggesting that they “go 

into the next room, see General MacArthur, and get this thing straight. I want to 

find out who is supposed to run this Air Force.” According to Kenney, Sutherland 

backed down, rescinded the orders, and then apologized, claiming that he had 

been forced to write the detailed instructions prior to Kenney’s arrival. 

Although this was not the final disagreement between the two, it was the 

last time Sutherland directly interfered with Kenney’s combat operations. 

Perhaps the showdown vindicated [Lt Gen] Brett’s [Kenney’s predecessor’s] 

analysis of Sutherland as a bully who backed down when someone stood up to 

him. More likely, both Sutherland and Kenney knew that the chief of staff should 

not have issued detailed orders to the air component commander and realized 

that MacArthur would back Kenney in this situation. 

—Col Thomas E. Griffith, 

Command Relations at the Operational Level of War: Kenney, 

MacArthur, and Arnold 

This example from World War II illustrates a violation of two tenets 

of command and control. The first was the principle of unity of command. 

Airpower was not unified under one commander if both the Chief of Staff 

and the air forces commander were issuing guidance on how it should be 

employed. The second tenet violated was the one that ensures unity of 

command in commanders, not staffs. The staff is an extension of the 

commander. Its sole function is command support, and its only authority 

is that which is delegated to it by the commander. The “staff” cannot 

issue orders to subordinate elements. The staff assists the commander. 

The tenets of centralized control and decentralized execution also apply to global 

strategic forces, such as global strike or air mobility forces. Supporting and supported 

commanders must also consider the planning, direction, prioritization, synchronization, 

integration, and deconfliction of global forces supporting and integrating with theater 

operations. In this case, control of strategic forces may remain with the supporting 

commander until it is appropriate to transition control to the JFC for centralized control 
15

and tactical employment. Commanders need to consider and agree on who is best 

suited to control, plan, direct, and synchronize strategic, operational, and tactical 

operations. When global strategic forces are called on to support theater objectives, the 

CFACC and the combined air operations center (CAOC) should coordinate through their 

theater JFC with the supporting commanders and their AOCs to discuss control and 

execution of strategic missions as they are integrated with theater forces. 

Centralized control of air and space power is the planning, direction, 

prioritization, synchronization, integration, and deconfliction of air and space capabilities 

to achieve the objectives of the JFC. It can be provided for any contingency across the 

range of military operations. Centralized control maximizes the flexibility and 

effectiveness of air and space power; however, it must not become a recipe for 

micromanagement, stifling the initiative subordinates need to deal with combat’s 

inevitable uncertainties. 

 

Decentralized execution is defined in JP 1-02 as, “Delegation of execution 

authority to subordinate commanders.” Decentralized execution of air and space power 

is the delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable lower level 

commanders to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, 

situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility. In other words, decentralized 

execution means that tactical commanders, whether in a theater or sector C2 center, in 

the cockpit, or in the field, retain the authority to make their own tactical decisions. It 

allows subordinates to exploit opportunities in rapidly changing, fluid situations. The 

benefits inherent in decentralized execution, however, are maximized only when a 

commander clearly communicates his/her intent to subordinates. 

A key element in the concept of decentralized execution is the principle of 

delegation of execution authority. Even commanders at the lowest levels of 

responsibility cannot execute or directly oversee every task that is performed within their 

units or organizations. This situation is made much more complex for a theater or 

Service component commander. By delegating authority for certain key tasks, 

commanders can ensure their subordinates can execute decisions for them, while 

following their guidance disseminated via commander’s intent. 

Decentralized execution does not imply that subordinate commanders or those 

holding certain duty positions have free reign in accomplishing their directed tasks. In 

some cases free rein may be given. Usually commanders are given authority to act in 

certain situations and circumstances, within parameters established by the JFC or the 

Service component commander, such as commander’s intent and ROE. 

For example, the CFACC’s responsibilities are assigned by the JFC, which will 

normally include delegation of authority to execute air and space operations. The 

CFACC’s responsibilities will normally include developing a joint air and space 

operations plan (JAOP), assigning missions, tasking forces, and ensuring unity of effort 

in accomplishing the overall theater mission. The CFACC also delegates authority to 

enable mission accomplishment in a rapidly changing operational environment. In 
16

Modern communications technology provides a temptation towards 

increasingly centralized execution of air and space power. Although several 

recent operations have employed some degrees of centralized execution, 

such command arrangements will not stand up in a fully stressed, dynamic 

combat environment, and as such should not become the norm for all air 

operations... A high level of centralized execution results in a rigid campaign 

unresponsive to local conditions and lacking in tactical flexibility. For this 

reason, execution should be decentralized within a C2 architecture... 

Nevertheless, in some situations, there may be valid reasons for execution of 

specific operations at higher levels, most notably when the JFC (or perhaps 

even higher authorities) may wish to control strategic effects, even at the 

sacrifice of tactical efficiency. These instances should be the exception, rather 

than the norm. 

—AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

his/her role as AADC, the CFACC may delegate execution authority to engage hostile 

aircraft and missiles to regional or sector air defense commanders, or to elements of the 

theater air control system (TACS), when the situation requires it. This engagement 

authority is tightly prescribed to defensive counterair (DCA) operations, and is spelled 

out in the air defense plan and the theater ROE. The engagement authority given to 

regional air defense commanders enables them to influence DCA operations, but it 

does not necessarily allow them to influence other air operations. 

Continuing with the example, the authority to execute surface attack operations 

may be delegated from the CFACC to subordinate commanders or individuals qualified 

for certain duty positions, such as a senior offensive duty officer (SODO) in the AOC or 

an air liaison officer (ALO) in the tactical air control party (TACP). This delegated 

authority is used by the SODO in the AOC for planning surface attack operations. It is 

used by the ALO in the TACP for mission execution. The ALO has prescribed delegated 

authority from the CFACC to divert the supported ground commander’s allocated 

surface attack missions to a higher priority tasking if the need arises. 

Guidance for planning and conducting air and space operations is reflected in the 

commander’s intent. Those granted delegated authority must understand the 

commander’s intent, which is disseminated through the campaign plan and other plans 

and annexes that provide specific guidance for specialized functions. Unity of effort over 

complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, 

overarching plans. Roles and responsibilities must be clearly spelled out and 

understood. Communication between commanders and those who are granted 

delegated authority is essential throughout all phases of the military operation. 

ROE for the operation and host nation sensitivities must be considered. Each 

situation will vary due to the personalities of the commanders involved. The political and 

diplomatic situation will influence military operations. Guidance given to a JFC at the 
17

beginning of a conflict may change during the conflict. General MacArthur received a 

set of military objectives from the national leadership at the beginning of the Korean 

conflict. He was issued a set of objectives that were quite different after the Chinese 

crossed the Yalu River and attacked United Nations forces. The campaign plan was 

revised to accommodate the realities of the political and diplomatic situation at that time. 

Centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space forces requires 

a two-way information flow between commanders. Subordinate commanders do not 

always have the situational awareness for theater and multinational concerns, as well 

as the intelligence information that senior commanders may have. The subordinate 

commanders may feel so restricted that they cannot exercise what they feel is their full 

range of military options to accomplish a task. Subordinate commanders must develop 

a sense of how far they can go while executing decentralized control. Authorities must 

be spelled out before operations commence.

Advances in information management and communications greatly enhance the 

situational awareness of tactical commanders, combatant commanders, and even the 

senior national leadership. These advances enhance the flow of shared knowledge, and 

more freely enable the communication of intent, ROE, desired effects, collaborative 

planning, and synchronized operations across the globe among commanders. These 

technological advances increase the potential for superiors, once focused solely on 

strategic and operational decision-making, to assert themselves at the tactical level. 

While this is their prerogative, it is done so with risk. Decentralized execution remains a 

basic C2 tenet of joint operations. The level of control used will depend on the nature of 

the operation or task, the risk or priority of its success, and the associated comfort level 

of the commander. 

Informed Decision-Making 

The C2 process should support informed and timely decisions at all levels of 

command. The process should be adapted to the circumstances presented by the 

mission and operational environment. The process should not be used blindly in a 

checklist fashion. A key attribute of informed decision-making is using available, 

processed, and sorted information to choose among competing COAs. Time-sensitive 

targeting decisions and sensor-to-shooter reactions are prime examples of competing 

COAs that must be reconciled by the air and space commander. Commanders preserve 

the flexibility of Air Force capabilities by making informed and timely decisions. 

Deferring decisions by moving them up or down the chain of command sacrifices the 

initiative and limits the flexibility of alternatives.

 

Commanders must have actionable information that has been sorted and 

processed. Today’s information systems can process huge amounts of data and 

forward that data in near-real time. During a contingency, a commander usually cannot 

sort through a vast amount of data. There is simply too much data available and not 

enough time. The commander’s staff must organize, filter, analyze, and sort through the 

data to forward what the commander actually needs to enable a decision. Commander 

and staff “information overload” could lead to missing a truly important piece of 
18

Centralized control of airpower was the only feasible means by which each 

of the ground forces [U.S., Republic of Vietnam, Korean, Australian corps] could 

get air support when it needed it. By early 1967, there were hundreds of thousands 

of troops in country. The 7th Air Force was well established by this time to support 

the U.S., ARVN, Korean, and Australian ground forces in all of the four corps 

areas. If the air had been divided-up among these various forces, COMUSMACV 

would have been unable to concentrate the airpower of 7th AF where he wanted 

and needed it. With the control centralized, he was able to move around anywhere 

within his area of responsibility concentrating firepower as needed. 

—General William W. Momyer, USAF (Retired), 

Airpower in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam) 

information while sorting through a mountain of data. An effective IMP is essential to 

mitigate the risk of information overload by defining who needs what information and 

how it will be presented. 

 Commanders are aided in the decision-making process by the concept of 

information superiority. Information superiority is an integral part of full spectrum 

decision superiority. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, defines information superiority 

as “the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective 

opposition.” It includes both the ability to employ actionable intelligence/information to 

our advantage and to the disadvantage of our adversaries, as well as the freedom of 

action in the information environment.

Improvements in technology have aided in the efficient transmission of 

information. Technological improvements have eased, but not eliminated, the need for 

trained people to make assessments on the value of information. Airmen must continue 

to broker information for it to be useful to a commander. These trained professionals 

use formalized procedures in brokering the information. They are constantly seeking to 

improve their procedures for sifting information to provide the best possible situational 

awareness to the commander.

 The GIG is a “system of systems” that enables faster decision-making. It is a 

combination of information systems constantly being improved and upgraded. The GIG 

will aid operators at all levels by making information more readily available and more 

easily shared among users. According to JP 1-02: 

The GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information 

capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, 

processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand 

to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The GIG includes all 

owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, 

software (including applications), data, security services, and other 
19

associated services necessary to achieve information superiority. The GIG 

supports all DOD, national security, and related intelligence community 

missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical, and business), 

across the full range of military operations. The GIG provides capabilities 

from all operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, 

mobile platforms, and deployed sites). The GIG provides interfaces to 

coalition, allied, and non-DOD users and systems. 

 A portion of the GIG, the defense information systems network (DISN) is an 

integrated network, centrally managed and configured, to provide telecommunications 

services for all DOD activities. The CJCS exercises operational oversight over the DISN 

through the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Defense Information 

Systems Agency (DISA) network operations and security center hierarchy. The overall 

C2 of the GIG is accomplished through a comprehensive system that distributes 

management and technical control functions to DOD components responsible for 

equipping the GIG, while integrating combatant commander operational oversight. 

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) has overall responsibility for GIG 

operations and defense in coordination with the CJCS and combatant commands. 

 Overall C2 of the Air Force portion of the GIG is provided by the concept of Air 

Force network operations, or AFNETOPS. The Eighth Air Force commander (8 AF/CC) 

is the COMAFFOR for Air Force forces conducting AFNETOPS in support of Joint Task 

Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO). In the role of AFNETOPS commander 

(AFNETOPS/CC), 8 AF/CC is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Air Force 

portion of the GIG. Currently, this is the Air Force’s most visible manifestation of a 

distinctly separate cyberspace organization. AFNETOPS ensures reliable, redundant, 

and robust Air Force systems and networks are available to support commanders to 

establish and maintain the vertical and horizontal information flow essential to promote 

information and decision superiority. Disciplined operations aid in ensuring the 

availability of the global infrastructure vital to connecting these information resources. 

 The AFNETOPS/CC has the overall responsibility for ensuring the effective 

operation and the defense of the Air Force-provisioned portion of the GIG, throughout 

all levels of military operations. AFNETOPS C2 is accomplished through a structured 

framework to monitor, assess, plan, decide, and execute operations across fixed, 

mobile, terrestrial, airborne, and space facilities, assets, and equipment. It is conducted 

by trained personnel providing near real-time situational awareness, assessments, and 

courses of action for end-to-end control, operation, and defense of the network. 

Information Integration 

 Integration of information among users is essential to effective C2. There is twoway information flow between commanders and operators, often depicted as a vertical 

or “up-and-down” flow. Commanders rely on vertical information flow to produce a 

common tactical picture of the battle. Senior commanders, like the JFC, may 

subsequently use several common tactical pictures to produce a tailorable, common 

operational picture (COP) of the tactical, operational, or strategic environment. Vertical 
20

information flow is fundamental to centralized control and important for direction and 

feedback. Without this flow, commanders cannot give meaningful feedback when 

controlling operations. 

 Another type of information flow is horizontal or “peer-to-peer” communication, 

which normally occurs between operators and other like elements. Horizontal 

information flow is essential for common situational awareness. Both vertical and 

horizontal information flow exchange data that, when fused in a timely manner, 

becomes integrated information to provide the framework for the commander to make 

the best possible decision enabling decision superiority. Decision superiority is a 

competitive advantage. 

 The dynamic fusion of vertical and horizontal information allows timely 

assessments and decisions by the air and space commander—centralized control. At 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, proper information fusion allows better 

situational awareness enabling decentralized execution. Figure 1.2 depicts the 

interrelationship of vertical and horizontal information flow for both theater and global 

operations. It represents a notional informational flow among C2 centers. It is not a 

wiring diagram showing command relationships. 

 Decentralized execution by air and space forces levies another major 

requirement on Air Force C2 operations. This requirement is to ensure the two-way 

horizontal information flow that reduces the uncertainty of war by enabling information to 

flow freely among operators. Horizontal flow of information enhances operator initiative. 

As the operational environment changes, operators are free to act within the guidelines 

of the commander’s intent and rules of engagement. The balance between vertical and 

horizontal information flows should be described in the C2 section of the operation plan 

(OPLAN). Both the technology required and the procedures used to affect these 

vertical and horizontal information flows must be spelled out prior to a conflict, in the 

OPLAN or its C2 annex. Maintaining this balance of information flow across the full 

spectrum of air and space employment is a job for all Airmen. 

 

Work still needs to be done to integrate horizontal and vertical information flows. 

When the vertical flow dominates, subordinate commanders and operators may suffer 

as the initiative is passed to senior commanders. When the horizontal flow dominates, 

commanders may suffer because they do not have the information necessary to 

exercise focused control of present operations and to plan future operations. 

 C2 processes are the structured basis of informed decision-making. Technology 

either automates or accelerates these processes via advances in information 

technology like digital electronic communications, computers, and expert systems. 

There is no substitute for trained personnel using intuition and common sense in making 

the final decision, however. Airmen, schooled in the art of war, need good information 

as well as an efficient and effective process to make the best-informed decisions. 
21

Global 

Reach 

Forces 

AOCs 

Subordinate 

C2 Nodes 

and 

Operating 

Forces 

Other 

Component

C2 Centers 

JFC or 

JTF/HQ 

CAOC 

Horizontal 

Integration 

Vertical 

Integration 

Figure 1.2. Information Integration. 

Network-Centric Warfare 

Improvements in technology and the flow of information have resulted in 

additional concepts affecting military operations such as network-centric warfare 

(NCW). NCW networks enable sensors, decision makers, and combat forces to achieve 

shared awareness, increased speed of command, a higher tempo of operations, greater 

lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of operational synergy. In essence, it 

translates information advantage into combat power. It effectively links friendly forces 

within the operational environment and provides a much improved shared awareness of 

the situation. Net-centricity enables the collection of data and information for fusion 

flowing from surface forces; multi-mission air and space platforms; and computer 

networks, together with analytically derived knowledge. It enables more rapid and 

effective decision-making at all levels of military operations. NCW allows for increased 

speed of execution. The NCW construct is underpinned by information technology 
22

systems, but it requires trained and knowledgeable Airmen to enable its inherent 

advantages to support military operations. 

During the 1990s, the Air Force made significant progress in improving its 

information superiority capabilities. It greatly increased the number of quality sensors, 

multisensor platforms, and the capability to process, analyze, and distribute data quickly 

over vast distances. This led to an order of magnitude increase in situational awareness 

and the capability to conduct operations more flexibly and rapidly. The Air Force has 

actively pursued interoperability for its C2 and ISR systems, leading the DOD’s networkcentric initiatives. 

The Air Force views NCW as the natural progression of technology and 

employment that aids in the efficient transfer of data to warfighters at all levels. The 

attributes of shared awareness, decision superiority, and increased speed of execution; 

touted as central to NCW, have developed and steadily improved over the history of 

warfare. The earliest commanders of fielded forces communicated directly with their 

subordinate commanders or they used messengers to convey orders. C2 systems 

evolved using means such as signal fires, flags, and mounted riders to convey 

guidance. This level of C2 supported warfare in ancient times and the Middle Ages, 

consisting primarily of conflict between forces on a relatively localized battlefield. As 

warfare expanded to conflicts on dispersed battlefields, there were coincidental 

developments in C2 capabilities, such as the telegraph, telephone, and radio, which 

greatly accelerated the rate of transfer of data. The advent of satellite communications 

and the technology of the information age enabled even faster communications 

between commanders and subordinates. NCW can accelerate and improve upon that 

technological trend, but it cannot replace either those who are trained to evaluate and 

process the data as it moves from node to node, or the decision-maker where the 

process culminates—the commander. 

NCW captures the latest improvements to this incremental development process 

of technology supporting C2. The technology does speed the information flow and 

makes it readily available to more users at each level of command. NCW is an enabler 

of sound leadership, strategy, and application of time-tested doctrinal principles. The Air 

Force views NCW as a construct that affects an environment, or a broad and enduring 

concept that has supported effective C2 of military forces throughout their history. 

Network-centric operations (NCO) involve the application of elements of NCW to 

military operations across the full range of military operations. By using a networked 

system, US forces gain a significant advantage over non-networked forces. This 

competitive advantage is readily apparent when comparing forces conducting NCO and 

those operating under the old paradigm of platform-centric operations. Platform-centric 

forces lack the ability to leverage the synergies created through a networked force. A 

networked force is more adaptive and ready to respond to future uncertainty at all levels 

of warfare and across the range of military operations. When considering the most 

recent combat experience of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is apparent that 

platforms retained a central focus, but the networking of those platforms and 
23

organizations greatly enhanced their lethality and survivability. Networking enables 

quicker information transfer and processing, but it also improves the redundancy of 

information systems by sharing data among all users. If one critical node is disabled, 

others will have the ability to forward and process that same data, enabling 

uninterrupted decision-making. Though a networked force has many advantages, it also 

creates vulnerabilities. 

Network warfare operations (NW Ops), are the integrated planning and 

employment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the interconnected 

analog and digital portion of the operational environment. Network warfare operations 

are conducted in the information domain through the dynamic combination of hardware, 

software, data, and human interaction. The operational activities of network warfare 

operations are network attack (NetA), network defense (NetD) and network warfare 

support. 

Networks include telecommunication devices and data services networks. NetA, 

a sub-class capability of NW Ops, is conducted to deny, delay, or degrade information 

resident in networks or processes dependent on those networks,. A primary effect is to 

reduce an adversary commander’s decision-making capability. NetA can contribute 

effects in support of all air and space power functions and across the range of military 

operations. One example of NetA employment includes actions taken to reduce 

adversary’s’ effectiveness by denying them the use of their networks by affecting the 

ability of the network to perform its designated function. NetA may support deception 

operations against an adversary by deleting or distorting information stored on, 

processed by, or transmitted by network devices. Psychological operations can be 

performed using NetA to target and disseminate selected information to target 

audiences. NetA can also offer the commander the ability to incapacitate an adversary 

while reducing exposure of friendly forces, reducing collateral damage, and saving 

conventional sorties for other targets. 

Network attack, like all other information operations, is most effective and 

efficient when combined with other air and space operations. Certain aspects of 

electronic warfare operations overlap NetA and should be coordinated. An example of 

this is where concurrent physical attack is integrated with NetA and can protect our 

operations and technology, while exploiting adversarial vulnerabilities. For more on 

NetA operations and NW Ops see AFDD 2-5, Information Operations. 

As the network-centric transformation becomes more widespread, we must 

ensure that our networks are properly designed to ensure protection of information and 

information systems through information assurance (IA) measures and proper filtering of 

information at the user’s end. Network and information compatibility must be developed 

and employed if we expect successful joint and coalition operations to achieve a 

cohesive effort among partners. Finally, as long as current doctrinal tenets such as 

decentralized execution remain valid, they should guide network development. 
24

 Air control can be established by superiority in 

numbers, by better employment, by better equipment, or

by a combination of these factors. 

 —General Carl Spaatz 

Air-to-Air Operations and Network-Centric Warfare 

...Some of the most thoroughly documented and convincing examples of 

the power of NCW have been drawn from the air-to-air mission area. Increased 

situational awareness and enhanced situational understanding are major 

contributors to enhanced survivability and lethality in this mission area. With 

audio-only communications, pilots and controllers must share information on 

adversary forces generated by onboard sensors, as well as their own position 

and status, via voice. Communicating the minimum essential information by 

voice takes time and the resulting situational awareness often differs significantly 

from reality. In contrast, when datalinks are employed on fighter aircraft, digital 

information on blue and red forces is shared instantaneously, enabling all 

participants to share a common tactical picture. This improved information 

position constitutes a significant “information advantage” as compared to an 

adversary fighting with only voice communications. This information advantage, 

in turn, enables a cognitive advantage, in the form of dramatically increased 

shared situational awareness and enhanced situational understanding. The 

result is that pilots flying data link equipped aircraft can translate these 

advantages into increased survivability and lethality.

. 

 —The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare,

Department of Defense, Office of Transformation, 2005 

 

Commanders and Staffs 

JFCs and Service component commanders at various levels are provided staffs 

to assist them in the decision-making and execution process. The staff is an extension 

of the commander. Its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that 

which is delegated to it by the commander. The staff cannot issue orders to subordinate 

elements. Orders must be vetted through and issued by the commander, to other 

commanders, whether in a joint or a Service component chain of command. Staffs may 

advise and assist in executing operations. Command may be delegated to another 

commander, but never to a staff. A properly trained and directed staff will free the 

commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and 

maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole. The staff should be composed of the 

smallest number of qualified personnel who can do the job. 

The term used to describe the chain of command through which command is 

exercised is the command channel. It is reserved for use by designated commanders. 

Commanders interact with staffs through the staff channel. This is the channel by which 

staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate 

headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. 

Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate 

headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information. 
25

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OPERATIONS 

Air Force C2 enables commanders to lead missions within the contextual 

constraints of policies, resources, and environment. Effective C2 of forces at all levels of 

conflict and at each level of command, whether strategic, operational, or tactical, 

requires extensive planning and preparation before operations commence. 

Requirements for C2 of a force must be intertwined with operations and logistics 

planning for operations to be effective. Air Force operations are global in nature and 

require information from around the world to effectively plan and execute missions. 

Theater systems must be linked to global systems for sharing of information. Some 

considerations for well-planned C2 support are: 

 Coverage: The Air Force’s C2 system must have adequate coverage with sensors 

and nodes for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; weather data; air traffic 

control; and other capabilities. This system must support contingencies and 

peacetime operations and the theater commander’s as well as supported and 

supporting commanders’ plans and objectives. 

 Connectivity: Effective C2 of forces relies on global communications to collaborate 

across domains, to synchronize simultaneous operations in multiple theaters, and to 

provide global reachback capabilities. The theater C2 system must also provide 

connectivity to users throughout the theater and sometimes provide reachback 

capability to supporting C2 and ISR nodes in the continental US and other locations. 

 Functionality: There should be sufficient redundant decentralized execution nodes 

for the specific areas of strategic attack, counterair, counterland, air refueling, 

airspace control, as well as other air and space function mission requirements. 

These redundant nodes will enable continuity of operations if a senior level 

command C2 node has been disabled or becomes unable to function in its role. 

 Placement: Political and geographic constraints may affect C2 system node 

placement and thus affect the flexibility of its employment. Host nation sensitivities 

and cultural considerations may not always allow the optimum placement of C2 

nodes to enable their maximum capabilities. Planners must take these 

considerations into account. 

Since the details of most C2 operations are not specified by superior 

commanders, the responsibilities for the details of implied tasks normally fall upon 

operational and tactical commanders. Commanders should describe their C2 objectives, 

intent, resources, acceptable risks, and strategies to subordinates. A centralized plan 

for C2 operations is developed through the iterative campaign planning process as 

detailed in Air Force and joint publications. The uncertainty of conflict throughout the 

spectrum of engagement makes the C2 planning process just as important as the C2 

section of the contingency plan itself. 

US forces may participate in relief operations or homeland operations which 

require connectivity with civil agencies, host nation forces, or international 

organizations. When US forces fight as part of a joint or multinational force, 
26

A prince or general can best demonstrate his 

genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit 

his objectives and his resources, doing neither too 

much nor too little. 

 —Carl von Clausewitz 

responsibilities for C2 operations are by necessity shared among national, functional, 

and Service component commanders. It is up to the JFC or multinational force 

commander and staff to determine a workable theater C2 plan. A primary consideration 

is choosing among parallel, lead nation, or multinational C2 structures. See JP 3-0,

Joint Operations, for details on these C2 structures. In complex multinational 

operations, C2 often proves to be the essential mission-enabler, without which effective 

coalition operations would be impossible.

MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY CONSIDERATIONS 

Multinational Considerations 

 US military operations often are conducted with the armed forces of other 

nations in pursuit of common objectives. Multinational operations, both those that 

include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance 

or coalition. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations 

for broad, long-term objectives (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]). 

These alliance operations are combined operations, though in common usage 

combined often is used inappropriately as a synonym for all multinational operations. A 

coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for 

instance the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in Operation 

DESERT STORM. Joint operations as part of an alliance or coalition require close 

cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, 

and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations 

should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without 

diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support. 

Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in 

planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation 

and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members. Whereas alliance 

members typically have common national political and economic systems, coalitions 

often bring together nations of diverse cultures for a limited period of time. As long as 

the coalition members perceive their membership and participation as advancing their 

individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point that national 

objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition strains to function or breaks down.
27

The armed forces of the United States should be prepared to operate within the 

framework of an alliance or coalition under other-than-US leadership. Following, 

contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations—often as 

important as leading. However, US forces often will be the predominant and most

capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central

leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the 

military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual 

support and respect. For additional guidance on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-

0, and JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

Interagency Considerations 

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the 

economic, diplomatic, and informational entities of the US government as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs). Successful 

interagency coordination and planning enable these agencies, departments, and 

organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation to achieve unity of 

effort. 

Across the range of military operations, a broad variety of agencies, many with 

indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities, interact with the 

armed forces of the United States. Obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an 

interagency operation should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. Various 

agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decisionmaking techniques make unity of effort a challenge. 

OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 

 Risk management is part of the commander’s responsibility and should be 

involved in his/her decision-making process. Commanders should assess and accept 

risks necessary to accomplish the mission. Accepting risks also acknowledges the 

possibility of failure. Assessing risks may be a time-consuming process; however, not 

assessing risks turns the decision-making process into a dangerous gamble. 

Commanders should take advantage of vertical and horizontal information fusion efforts 

to optimize timely and informed decision making. Effective operational risk management 

principles must be employed before, during, and after military operations to prevent 

mishaps. Commanders must advocate and employ proactive mishap prevention 

principles to prosecute military operations safely and effectively. For information on 

operational risk management, see AFI 90-901, Operational Risk Management, and Air 

Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Inter-Service) (AFTTP[I]) 3–2.34, 

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Risk Management. 
28

Case Study: The Challenges of Network-Centric C2

Operation ANACONDA: Afghanistan, April 2002 

... [There] was frustration over failing to hit a truck observed on Predator video. 

Watching a live Predator feed, the JOC at Bagram spotted a truck behind the 

battle lines that appeared to be resupplying enemy forces and ordered it killed. 

CJTF Mountain told the ASOC cell to blow up the truck. The ASOC told him they 

had troops-in-contact requests but he reiterated the order. “We tried to send 

several sets of fighters at it,” the Assistant Division ALO attested. As he told the 

story two months later: ...this truck was a flatbed, stake-bed truck driving 

through a ravine up in the hills, in the vicinity of but not in the heat of battle...the 

first aircraft they sent over there were F-16s and ... they couldn’t find them so 

they ran out of gas. Everybody is tensely awaiting to see this thing blow up on 

TV. ...We had another set of F-18s, sent them in, bottom line, never hit it.... This 

story, recalled from the heat of battle, vividly conveyed the sense of frustration 

with the air control system and uncertainty over the rules of engagement. The 

truck was difficult to find without a FAC in place to pass along the coordinates 

and help talk the aircraft onto the target. Frustration aside, the fundamental 

issue remained about the propriety of diverting strike assets from troops-incontact to chase a truck. He summarized that the Predator’s live feed “stared at 

that truck for hours ...It was a waste of an asset that could have helped defend 

guys, could have helped with other targeting.”The dramatic failure to hit the truck 

was carried out in clear view, because of the live Predator feed to the JOC. 

—Operation ANACONDA, An Airpower Perspective; 

 The Office of Air Force Lessons Learned 

 Task Force Enduring Look 

 

This example illustrates the challenges presented by the advanced 

information capabilities offered up to commanders by technology. While 

the flatbed truck was a target that was readily available, had it not been 

presented to the entire staff by the Predator feed, it would not have 

generated the interest that it did. In fact, it diverted the commander’s 

attention from the targets that were more important—troops in contact. 

Today’s technology allows commanders to view some, but not all, 

aspects of a conflict. It is important for commanders at all levels, but 

especially at the operational and strategic level, not to become fixated on 

one target or incident they can view through advances in technology. The 

concepts of centralized control and decentralized execution must still be 

observed, to allow subordinates to execute and to avoid “target fixation” 

at senior levels. 
29

Effective C2... allows our forces to control what moves 

through air and space; engage adversary targets anywhere, 

anytime; control and exploit information to our nation’s 

advantage; deliver desirable effects with acceptable risk and

minimal collateral damage; rapidly position forces anywhere in 

the world; and sustain flexible and effective combat

operations. 

—General Michael E. Ryan, 

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF), 1997-2001 

CHAPTER TWO 

AIR FORCE C2 IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND 

ADMINISTRATIVE VERSUS OPERATIONAL C2 ENVIRONMENT 

The US Constitution provides for civilian control of the military. This civilian 

control is provided by the President and the SecDef. The UNAAF presents the chain of 

command for both administrative and operational control of the armed forces. The 

President and the SecDef exercise authority and control of the armed forces through 

two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, 

through the SecDef, directly to the commanders of combatant commands for missions 

and forces assigned to their commands. This is commonly referred to as the 

“operational” chain of command. The other branch, (commonly referred to as the 

“administrative” chain of command) is used for purposes other than operational direction 

of forces assigned to combatant commands. It runs from the President, through the 

SecDef, to the Secretaries of the military departments. The military departments, 

organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef. 

The Secretaries of the military departments exercise authority through their respective 

Service chiefs over their forces not assigned to the combatant commanders. See Figure 

2.1 for a representation of the operational and administrative chains of command and 

control as they apply to US forces, including Air Force forces. For more on the chain of 

command and control of US forces see JP 0-2. 

One way to differentiate between functions and missions, and to understand the 

two distinct branches of the chain of command is to distinguish between the functions a 

Service performs under the auspices of the administrative branch of the chain of 

command and those functions provided to a joint force commander via the operational 

branch of the chain of command. Along these lines, it is useful to make a distinction 

between “administrative and organizational functions” (those activities required to 

develop and sustain the Air Force as a corporate entity) and “operational functions” 

(those warfighting activities involving the application of air and space power to achieve 

specific military effects). The way that forces are employed, and thus commanded, is 

guided by whether those forces fall under the operational or the administrative functions 
30

of the DOD. This also guides the command arrangements and relationships and 

dictates the C2 structure for these forces. 

Figure 2.1. The Chain of Command and Control for US Forces. 
31

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND LEVELS OF AUTHORITY 

There are varying levels of authority and different command relationships 

governing forces that fall under the operational chain of command or the administrative 

chain. Forces fall under the administrative control of the Secretaries of the military 

departments until they are presented to combatant commanders for employment. Once 

they are presented to the combatant commander, they fall under the operational chain 

of command. 

Combatant commanders employ forces, in contrast to the Service chiefs, who 

are tasked by law to organize, train, and equip US military forces. These differing 

responsibilities require different command relationships and levels of authority to 

accomplish designated roles and missions. 

The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the 

responsibility assigned. Levels of authority vary, depending upon the type of command 

relationship involved. Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (COCOM) 

over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the President and SecDef for the 

performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform 

assigned missions. COCOM is nontransferable and cannot be delegated. Operational

control (OPCON) is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions 

of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands 

and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction 

necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions 

assigned to the command. OPCON may be delegated within the command. Tactical 

control (TACON) is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary 

to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be 

delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of 

combatant command. 

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a 

superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should 

aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Several 

categories of support have been defined for use within a combatant command as 

appropriate to better characterize the support that should be given. Support 

relationships may be categorized as general, mutual, direct, and close.

 Modern information technology systems afford air and space commanders with 

vastly improved information resources that improve situational awareness and 

understanding and may help reduce forward-deployed footprints. These same 

information resources have an inherent capability to provide undue rear area influence 

in the engaged commander’s C2 process. In light of this development, it is critical that 
32

supported/supporting relationships are clearly understood by commanders and their 

staffs. 

 Other authorities critical to C2 operations are administrative control (ADCON), 

coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). Commanders must 

thoroughly understand command authorities and the concept of command relationships, 

as this area could well be a source of confusion. See Appendix A for a listing and 

description of command authorities. For a brief description of the levels of authority and 

command relationships, see Appendix A, and AFDD 2, Operations and Organization. 

Derivation of Command Relationships 

The relationships between combatant commanders or commanders within a JTF 

and between JTFs are prescribed by law and are based on proven doctrinal precepts. 

The SecDef is the only authority who can transfer forces between combatant 

commands. A request for transfer of forces is initiated by the requesting commander 

and forwarded to the joint staff for action, resulting in either approval or disapproval by 

the SecDef. The SecDef gives direction to the joint chiefs for the operational 

employment of US forces. 

Once direction is given from the President and the SecDef, JFCs use command

(the lawful authority of a commander) and control (the regulation of forces and 

functions) to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent (or 

President and the SecDef’s intent). This is the most important function undertaken by a 

JFC. C2 is the means by which a JFC synchronizes and integrates joint force activities 

in order to achieve unity of command and unity of effort. C2 ties together all the 

operational functions and tasks and applies to all levels of war and echelons of 

command across the range of military operations. C2 of joint operations begins by 

establishing unity of command through the designation of a JFC with the requisite 

authority to accomplish assigned tasks using an uncomplicated chain of command. It is 

essential for the JFC to ensure that subordinate commanders, staff principals, and 

leaders of C2 nodes understand their authorities, their role in decision making and 

controlling, and their relationships with others.

The JFC organizes assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission 

based on their vision and concept of operations as well as planning considerations and 

the requirements of the AOR. Unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and 

decentralized execution are also key considerations. JFCs can conduct operations 

through subordinate JTFs, Service components, functional components, or a 

combination of Service and functional components. The JFC establishes subordinate 

commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command 

relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. 

The JFC establishes the command and supported/supporting relationships and 

assignment of forces to accomplish mission objectives. The JFC will also specify the 

command relationships between the functional components and Service components. 
33

OPCON and TACON are normally employed by the JFC to control forces, with each 

AOR being situation- and scenario-dependent for the command structure. 

Presentation of Forces 

Forces (except as noted in Title 10, US Code [U.S.C.], section 162) are assigned 

to combatant commands by the SecDef’s “Forces for Unified Commands” 

memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be 

transferred from that command only as directed by the SecDef and under procedures 

prescribed by the SecDef and approved by the President. The command relationship 

the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) will be 

specified by the SecDef. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and 

JTFs may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate 

commands as appropriate. When forces are transferred between combatant 

commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise over those 

forces must be specified by the SecDef. 

Attachment of Air Force Forces to Combatant Commands 

Air Force forces are presented to joint force commanders in a single, 

capabilities-based entity—the air and space expeditionary task force (AETF). The 

AETF consists of fielded forces, a COMAFFOR, and appropriate C2 mechanisms (an 

AOC and an AFFOR Staff). The AFFOR Staff is tailored to meet specific mission 

requirements. It supports the COMAFFOR as the senior operational-level component 

warfighter with established OPCON and ADCON of assigned/attached Air Force forces. 

When aligned to support a geographic combatant commander, the AFFOR Staff 

provides a capable, ready, and theater-smart C2 element for the COMAFFOR.

Regardless of the size of the Air Force element, it will be organized along the lines of an 

AETF. 

Air Force Capabilities Not Assigned to Combatant Commands 

 There are Air Force organizations capable of being tasked to support military 

operations that are not assigned to combatant commands. These organizations exist 

primarily within the Air Force’s administrative chain of command. They are not as visible 

for tasking and deployment, although their functions may support continuous military 

operations through a variety of intelligence, support, and logistics functions, for 

example. These organizations may deploy personnel forward or support operations in 

place, using the concept of reachback. They may be made up of a combination of 

Airmen (using the total force concept) and contractor personnel. Their relationships with 

the COMAFFOR may be governed by formal command relationships such as a 

supporting/supported relationship or by memorandum of agreement/understanding or 

formal contract. Depending on how they will be integrated and employed (deployed or 

in-place support), the COMAFFOR requests Air Force forces through their combatant 

commander, the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) (for those Air Force forces not 

assigned to combatant commands), and the President/SecDef. For a representative 

sample of agencies that remain in the administrative chain of command but also provide 

support to the COMAFFOR, see Figure 2.2. 
34

Examples of Air Force Organizations not Assigned to Combatant Commands 

Organization Capability 

Air Force Agency for 

Modeling and Simulation 

Conducts modeling and simulation programs and 

initiatives. 

Air National Guard 

Readiness Center 

Provides information to forces providing contingency 

augmentation. 

Any Air Staff DCS or 

Directorate or MAJCOM 

as required 

Provides policy, guidance, and oversight for Air Force 

FOAs, DRUs, and functional area expertise of organic 

Air Force capabilities. 

Air Force Audit Agency Audits for efficiency and effectiveness. 

Air Force Civil 

Engineering Support 

Agency 

Provides the best tools, practices, and professional 

support for base-level and contingency operations. 

Air Force Communications 

Agency 

Provides communications expertise and services. 

Air Force Doctrine Center Focal point for air and space doctrine support to 

warfighters. 

Air Force Flight Standards 

Agency 

Performs worldwide flight inspections of airfields and 

flight instrumentation/navigation systems. 

Air Intelligence Agency Provides intelligence expertise in the areas of C2 

protection, security, acquisition, foreign weapons 

systems and technology, and treaty monitoring. 

Air Force Legal 

Operations Agency 

Provides commanders with specialized legal services. 

Air Force Logistics 

Management Agency 

Develops, analyzes, tests, evaluates, and recommends 

new or improved logistical procedures. 

Air Force Medical 

Operations Agency 

Develops programs to improve aerospace medicine 

and preventive and clinical healthcare services. 

Figure 2.2. Examples of Air Force Organizations not Assigned to Combatant 

Commands. 

The Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) executes missions assigned by the National 

Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Air Force. Their 

unique, by-law arrangements allow the organization to support the Service chief, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the nation’s senior defense policymakers. In contrast, 

most other C2 facilities support either the civilian or military chains of command. The 

AIA offers support to the JFCs at USSTRATCOM and US Joint Forces Command 

(USJFCOM). The AIA falls under the ADCON of Air Combat Command (ACC). 

However, its cryptologic collection management authority flows from the NSA, reflecting 

its unique command arrangement, which gives the commander OPCON over all 

cryptologic activity conducted anywhere in the Air Force. 
35

Some agencies, such as the AIA, have a unique command arrangement, 

established by laws contained in Title 10 and Title 50, U.S.C. These “dual-purpose” 

military forces are funded and controlled by organizations that derive authority under 

laws contained in both Title 10 and Title 50. The greatest benefit of these "dualpurpose" forces is their authority to operate under laws contained in Title 50, and so 

produce actionable intelligence products and information, while being employed by 

combatant commanders. These forces are primarily organized, trained, and equipped 

under Title 10. They serve both the military chain of command and the nation’s senior 

defense policymakers. 

Organization of Functional Forces 

Some operational forces are organized functionally. Some air and space forces 

employed in an operation will not be attached forward to a geographic combatant 

commander. Several aspects of air and space power are capable of serving more than 

one geographic combatant commander at a time and thus require optimization above 

the theater level. Such capabilities—air mobility, space, and special operations forces 

(SOF)—are instead organized under functional combatant commanders who normally 

retain control of such forces. Although functional forces may be transferred to a 

geographic combatant commander (with specification of OPCON or TACON), the 

preferred command relationship between geographic combatant commands and 

functional organizations not assigned or attached to the geographic combatant 

command is support. For theater air mobility, this support relationship is normally 

facilitated through a specially designated representative, attached to regional AETFs; 

the director of air mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR-AIR), who is responsible for integrating 

the total air mobility effort for the CFACC. Similarly, the director of space forces 

(DIRSPACEFOR) is the senior space operations advisor to the COMAFFOR. 

THE ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH 

Administrative Control 

 The authority vested in the Secretaries of the military departments in the 

performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs from the 

President through the SecDef to the Secretaries. This authority is reflected in Title 10, 

U.S.C. Then, to the degree established by the Secretaries or specified in law, this 

authority runs through the Service chiefs to the Service component commanders 

assigned to the combatant commands and to the commanders of forces not assigned to 

the combatant commands. This ADCON provides for the preparation of military forces 

and their administration and support, unless such responsibilities are specifically 

assigned by the SecDef to another DOD component. For more information on the 

functions of the Air Force, see DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.1, Functions of the 

Department of Defense and Its Components. 

 ADCON is defined in JP 1-02 as the direction or exercise of authority over 

subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including 
36

organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel 

management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, 

demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of 

the subordinate or other organizations. 

ADCON is the authority necessary to fulfill military department statutory 

responsibilities for administration and support. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force and 

every other Air Force commander use ADCON authority to organize, train, and equip Air 

Force forces to be ready to meet contingencies and to carry out the orders of the 

President and the SecDef. Providing for the welfare of all Airmen is one of the 

responsibilities of ADCON. The Air Force has a set of C2 nodes that support 

commanders in their functions to prepare, train, and equip Airmen for possible 

contingencies. These nodes are primarily fixed, but some also have a mobile or 

deployable capability. They are usually configured to support both the ADCON 

responsibilities of their commander, as well as any operational requirements, such as 

mobilizing to meet a commander’s tasking. 

Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR: Administrative and Operational 

The COMAFFOR commands forces through two separate chains of 

responsibilities, the administrative and the operational. The operational chain runs 

through joint channels from the JFC and is expressed in terms such as OPCON, 

TACON, and support. The administrative chain runs through Service channels only, 

from the AETF, up through the regional major command (MAJCOM) (if present), to the 

CSAF and SECAF. This authority is expressed as ADCON. 

The COMAFFOR is the Air Force officer designated as commander of the Air 

Force component command assigned or attached to a JFC at the unified, subunified, 

and JTF level, or as commander of a single Service task force. C2 of Air Force forces 

assigned or attached to the Air Force component is exercised through the COMAFFOR. 

Air Force forces should be organized as an AETF, whose commander is the 

COMAFFOR. Through the JFC’s command authority, the JFC normally will conduct 

operations through the COMAFFOR by delegating OPCON of the Air Force component 

forces to the COMAFFOR. When designated as the CFACC, the COMAFFOR normally 

maintains OPCON of assigned and attached Air Force forces and normally receives 

TACON of forces from other Service or functional components as directed by the JFC. 

If the CFACC is designated from another component of the joint force, the COMAFFOR 

will ensure Air Force forces are employed in accordance with the CFACC’s guidance 

and tasking. If the CFACC is designated from another component of the joint force, the 

COMAFFOR still retains OPCON and ADCON of Air Force forces. Only TACON is 

passed to the CFACC, whether or not the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the CFACC. 

The administrative responsibilities of the COMAFFOR are discussed below. His/her 

operational responsibilities are discussed in chapter three. 

Administrative (Service) Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR 

Commanders of Air Force components have responsibilities and authorities that 

derive from their roles in fulfilling the Service’s ADCON function under Title 10, U.S.C. 
37

ANG assets can be classified into three categories within the law and, 

with the exception of one very limited situation under 32 U.S.C. §325 requiring 

approval of the President, can only be in one status at a time. The first is 

familiar: Title 10, where forces are under the authority of the President as 

commander in chief. The second category is “state active duty” for ANG forces 

under the authority of the state governor through the respective state's adjutant 

general and funded by the state. The third category is Title 32 status. They are 

under the authority of the state governor for training purposes but funding is from 

the federal government. The ANG and Air Force have agreed that the joint 

definition of ‘coordinating authority’ allows the state governor to direct ANG 

forces to respond to the direction of a Title 10 commander. The forces are still 

under the command authority of the governor, but for unity of effort the Title 10 

commander (i.e., active duty officer) can direct their actions. However, ANG 

forces in Title 32 status can only perform training and other specified activities, 

and have different systems for discipline, union rights, and other areas, so 

employment details should be planned in advance. 

 —Information derived from Titles 10 and 32, U.S.C.

Through the JFC’s command authority, the JFC normally will conduct operations 

through the COMAFFOR by delegating OPCON of the Air Force component forces to 

the COMAFFOR. Through the Service’s ADCON authority, the COMAFFOR will have 

complete ADCON of all assigned Air Force component forces and specified ADCON of 

all attached Air Force component forces. The specified ADCON responsibilities apply to 

all attached forces, regardless of MAJCOM or Air Force component (regular, Guard, or 

Reserve). The COMAFFOR also has some ADCON responsibilities for Air Force 

elements and personnel assigned to other joint force components (such as liaisons). 

The Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) retain all other 

ADCON responsibilities, such as Reserve component activation, deactivation, partial 

mobilization, and length of tour. Additionally, intertheater forces, such as intertheater 

airlift and forces transiting another COMAFFOR’s area of interest, will be subject to the 

ADCON authority of the respective COMAFFOR while transiting that COMAFFOR’s 

area only for administrative reporting and for TACON for force protection requirements 

derived from the combatant commander. For more on this relationship see AFDD 2, 

Organization and Operations. 

G-series orders are the means used to activate, inactivate, redesignate, assign, 

and reassign units and detachments subordinate to a MAJCOM, field operating agency 

(FOA), or direct reporting unit (DRU); and to attach one unit to another. A MAJCOM, 

FOA, or DRU manpower and organization function may authenticate and publish Gseries orders. These orders are used to establish clear lines of authority for a 

COMAFFOR when units from another organization or different organizations are placed 

within an AETF. See Figure 2.3 for a sample G-series order. 
38

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

HEADQUARTERS AIR COMBAT COMMAND 

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA 23665-2778

SPECIAL ORDER 

GXXX-XX DATE 

1. ( ) Effective the date of this order, HQ 345th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), a provisional unit, 

is activated at Location, Country, and assigned to the XXth Air and Space Expeditionary Task 

Force. (XX AETF – [Operation Name]) for the purposes of specified ADCON to include: making 

recommendations to the COMAFFOR on the proper employment of subordinate units; 

accomplishing assigned tasks; organizing, training, equipping and sustaining assigned and 

attached forces; reachback to the US Air Force rear and supporting US Air Force units; force 

protection; morale, welfare and discipline; and personnel management. 

2. ( ) Effective the date of this order, the following units are activated at Location, Country, and 

assigned as indicated for the purposes of command and control and administrative support: 

UNIT ASSIGNMENT 

HQ 345th Expeditionary Operations Group (EOG) 345 AEW 

345th Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron 345 EOG 

1st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron 345 EOG 

HQ 345th Expeditionary Maintenance Group (EMG) 345 AEW 

345th Expeditionary Maintenance Operations Squadron 345 EMG 

345th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron 345 EMSG 

345th Expeditionary Medical Operations Squadron 345 AEW 

3. ( ) Upon Inactivation, the units will permanently retain any honors gained while active as 

provisional units. 

4. ( ) Authority: AFI 38-101, DAF XXXs 

FOR THE COMMANDER 

DISTRIBUTION: 

HQ USAF/DPMO 

AFHRA/RS 

All units mentioned in order 

Others as needed 

Classified by: 

Dated: 

Declassify on: 

Figure 2.3. Sample G-Series Order Establishing a Provisional Unit. 
39

G-series orders should detail which commanders are responsible for providing 

specific elements of specified ADCON to deployed units and what authority that 

commander may use to carry out these responsibilities (see AFDD 2 and AFI 38-101, 

Air Force Organization, for discussion and examples of G-series orders). The orders are 

not required to spell out all support and sustainment responsibilities. For a notional 

example, the orders might specify that lodging, dining, and force protection will be 

provided by the 36th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) from Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). 

The minimum ADCON responsibilities and authorities to go forward should be 

responsibility for Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) actions, protection of 

assigned forces and assets, lodging, dining, and force reporting. 

C2 OF AIR FORCE FORCES 

The COMAFFOR requires the ability to provide command and oversight of Air 

Force forces offered up to the joint or combined operation (i.e., an AOC and an A- staff). 

Networked, adaptive C2 facilitates integration of the COMAFFOR with warfighting 

functions to optimize the commanders’ ability to execute the military operation. Effective 

C2 of Air Force forces enables the commander to employ capabilities and resources 

effectively for mission accomplishment. The COMAFFOR’s C2 system should be 

interoperable, horizontally integrated across functions, vertically integrated across all 

echelons of command, and provide organizational connectivity between commanders 

and decision makers down to the employing units. 

AFFOR Staff Organization 

 The primary emphasis of command relationships is to keep the chain of 

command simple so all involved understand who is in charge. The COMAFFOR will 

have a dedicated staff to coordinate actions required to accomplish the mission. This is 

known as the “A” staff. The AFFOR staff assists the COMAFFOR in the decisionmaking and execution process for Service support and command matters. An extension 

of the commander, it performs primary functions to support the COMAFFOR and 

subordinate AETF units. Authorities held by members of the AFFOR staff are only those 

specifically delegated by the commander. These authorities are clearly communicated, 

universally understood, and documented for proper accountability in performance of 

duty. A properly trained and directed staff is absolutely necessary to free the 

commander to devote requisite attention to command-level matters. Functions common 

to all staff sections include providing information and advice, making estimates, making 

recommendations, preparing plans and orders, advising other staffs and subordinate 

commands of the commander’s plans and policies, and supervising the execution of 

plans and orders. The COMAFFOR and his/her staff should be considered a single 

entity. Staff officers may be authorized to act in the name of the commander in certain 

matters; however, no staff officer has any authority over any subordinate unit of the 

command. 

The AFFOR staff normally includes divisions for manpower and personnel, 

intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications and information and are 

designated A-1 through A-6 respectively. Other (A-x) designations and functions are 
40

also used but they can vary from MAJCOM to MAJCOM (e.g., engineers; analysis, and 

assessment functions). The staff also includes the personal and special staffs of the 

COMAFFOR. 

The AFFOR Staff must be able to transition from peacetime to contingency 

operations. During day-to-day operations, MAJCOM/numbered Air Force (NAF) 

functions generally fall into two broad categories: Title 10 management tasks and 

component/AFFOR staff functions. In the transition to contingency operations, the 

MAJCOM/NAF's component/AFFOR staff becomes the core of the COMAFFOR's staff, 

rolling in on top of whatever contingency staff may already exist in the theater of 

operations, as shown in figure 2.4. Augmenting that staff, in priority order, are the nonengaged NAF staffs, the engaged MAJCOM staff, and the non-engaged MAJCOMs. 

MAJCOMs must pre-identify personnel to fill the AFFOR staff positions. 

 The AFFOR staff is one vehicle through which the COMAFFOR fulfills his/her 

operational and administrative responsibilities for assigned and attached forces (the 

other is the AOC), and is responsible for the long-range planning that occurs outside the 

air tasking cycle (e.g., contingency planning). The AFFOR staff also has responsibilities 

to interface with host nation and coalition nations to support contingencies. The 

COMAFFOR (who may also be the JFACC) may issue traditional mission-type orders to 

direct subordinate units to execute actions outside the scope of the ATO. Two 

examples of such orders include setting a baseline force protection condition or 

directing the move of a unit to another operating base. The AFFOR staff should 

develop a habitual working relationship with the AOC to help fulfill the COMAFFOR’s full 

range of responsibilities. The AFFOR staff is not the AOC staff. Although some 

functions may seem to overlap between the staffs, the two organizations should not be 

“dual hatted” with the same personnel, except in extreme circumstances. Dual hatting 

will result in the staff members becoming overtasked and having conflicting taskings. 

Figure 2.4. Notional A-staff organization 

COMAFFOR 

Personal Staff Special Staff 

A-3 

Operations 

A-2 

Intelligence 

A-1 

Personnel 

A-5 

Plans

A-4 

Logistics 

A-6 

Comm 

Information 

A-7 

Installations 

and Mission 

Support

A-8 

Programs 

A-9 

Analysis 

and 

Assessment 
41

 The following discussion of AFFOR staff duties is not intended to be all-inclusive. 

The differing mission requirements of any given AETF may dictate different task 

emphasis and staff arrangements. Very large or complex operations, for example, may 

require all staff directorates. In some cases, senior component liaison elements may 

not be needed. Some of the required support may be obtained through reachback. For 

very small or limited operations, a full AFFOR staff may not be required. As a rule of 

thumb, the size and span of the AFFOR staff should normally be held to the smallest 

number of divisions necessary to handle the demands of the operation. For example, 

for a very small, forward deployed operation, the AFFOR staff may consist of only A-1 

through A-6; for support of major, theater-wide operations all nine directorates (A-1 

through A-9) may be required. For additional information see Air Force Operational 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFOTTP) 2-3.3, Air Force Forces. 

 The COMAFFOR may elect to send liaisons to other components or to a joint 

force headquarters. The Air Force liaison element (AFLE) provides an interface 

between the COMAFFOR and component commanders for coordinating and 

synchronizing Air Force units in support of joint air operations. Normally, the AFLE is 

composed of personnel and equipment for a general purpose numbered Air Force's 

staff and component organizations. AFLE manning is based on a cadre concept with 

personnel selected for their battle management expertise and knowledge of C2 

concepts and procedures. The cadres are augmented by additional personnel who are 

specialists knowledgeable in the capabilities and tactics of the aircraft, intelligence, or 

weapons systems being employed. The AFLE can be tailored to perform a variety of 

missions and management functions to match the contingency or operation. 

Combat Support C2 

Combat support C2 (CSC2) enables the commander to employ capabilities and 

resources effectively (despite competing demands). It also provides the means for 

implementing combat support plans, and the agility to modify those plans as necessary 

to meet evolving operational requirements. For more information on CSC2, see AFDD 

2-4, Combat Support. 

Networked, adaptive, and integrated CSC2 facilitates integration with warfighting 

functions. It is required to maximize C2 planning and tasking efforts and to optimize the 

commanders’ ability to control and execute the military operation. CSC2 supports the 

mission and provides input to operational risk mitigation, near-real time CSC2 

information, and cross-AOR resource planning and arbitration. The key to operational 

risk mitigation is the integration of Air Force C2 centers at all levels, sustaining base and 

agile combat support (ACS) capabilities for global and theater missions and resource 

optimization. Additionally, near-real time dynamic, continuous management of C2 and 

combat support/operational intelligence ensures adaptive operations and effective 

combat support plans. 

The COMAFFOR requires the ability to maintain awareness of the status of the 

friendly forces order of battle, recognize what support capability is needed where, and 

direct resources accordingly. Many Air Force resources are limited and designed to 

serve the needs of multiple missions in widely dispersed unified commands. Centralized 
42

control and decentralized execution of these resources are especially critical to assure 

an optimum balance between flexibility and responsiveness of Air Force combat 

support. Key to this is the concept that various echelons need visibility and authority 

over assets relevant to their respective roles and responsibilities. 

CSC2 Processes and Capabilities 

CSC2 uses the monitor, assess, plan, and execute (MAPE) process. The 

inherent capabilities of this process allow commanders to employ combat support 

capabilities and resources effectively. CSC2 systems provide the tools and technology 

to access, analyze, display, and act upon relevant information enabling them to ready, 

deploy, employ, and sustain forces for assigned missions worldwide. These capabilities 

and processes bring into focus the continuum of action required to link operational and 

combat support capabilities to achieve desired effects. 

Full range planning and execution of Air Force forces require an ACS C2 

architecture that is integrated across the functional areas of combat support and 

provides secure and nonsecure capability. Connectivity to any deployed operating 

location, including bare bases, is needed early; robust secure communications and 

information capabilities should connect all combat support functions. 

Combat Support Organization and Commanders’ Roles and 

Responsibilities 

Combatant commanders exercise COCOM and directive authority for logistics. 

For assigned Air Force forces, they exercise their authority through the COMAFFOR 

who is normally dual-hatted as the CFACC. Additionally, when United States 

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is supporting a geographic combatant 

commander with airlift and air refueling capabilities, the CFACC normally provides the 

majority of C2 interface for those assets. Air Force C2 structures for combat support 

are designed to enable a COMAFFOR’s ability to support the combatant commander’s 

exercise of his/her directive authority for logistics. 

When MAJCOMs are the combatant command’s Air Force component, they 

advise how to organize and employ these forces to accomplish assigned missions. 

MAJCOMs, in their role as the theater AFFOR, provide theater reachback support to the 

regional AFFOR. NAFs provide the senior Air Force warfighting echelon and provide 

the organizational combat support planning expertise. The NAF staff plans the C2 

architecture for operations and forms the core of the regional AFFOR staff. Air Force 

commanders should be prepared to accept single-Service responsibility for joint 

common use items. Regardless of the source of support or support C2 structure, the 

Service component is responsible for ensuring essential combat support for assigned or 

attached Air Force forces within a joint command. 
43

Joint Task Forces Katrina Lessons Learned 

One of the lessons learned from DOD support to civil operations 

supporting Hurricane Katrina involved the C2 of active duty and reserve 

forces providing relief. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons 

Learned stated: “A fragmented deployment system and lack of an integrated 

command structure for both active duty and National Guard forces 

exacerbated communications and coordination issues during the initial 

response. Deployments for Title 32 (National Guard) forces were coordinated 

State-to-State through Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

agreements and also by the National Guard Bureau. Title 10 (active duty) 

force deployments were coordinated through USNORTHCOM. Once forces 

arrived in the Joint Operations Area, they fell under separate command 

structures, rather than one single command. The separate commands 

divided the area of operations geographically and supported response efforts 

separately, with the exception of the evacuations of the Superdome and the 

Convention Center in New Orleans. Equipment interoperability problems 

further hindered an integrated response. Similar issues of bifurcated 

operations and interoperability challenges were also present between the 

military and civilian leadership...”. 

LESSON LEARNED: The Departments of Homeland Security and Defense 

should jointly plan for the Department of Defense’s support of Federal 

response activities as well as those extraordinary circumstances when it is 

appropriate for the Department of Defense to lead the Federal response. In 

addition, the Department of Defense should ensure the transformation of the 

National Guard is focused on increased integration with active duty forces for 

homeland security plans and activities. 

—The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned 
44

The Senior/Host Air Force Installation Commander 

 An Installation commander, regardless of Service, always exercises responsibility 

for forces on his/her base for protection of assigned forces and assets, and for other 

base operations support-integration (BOS-I) functions such as dining and lodging 

regardless of the command relations of those forces. These are the inherent 

responsibilities of an installation commander. 

 Ultimately, the Air Force Service component commander within a region is 

responsible for fulfilling ADCON responsibilities and common logistics support for all Air 

Force forces within his/her region, regardless of organization or assignment of those 

forces. These ADCON responsibilities are exercised through commanders at 

subordinate echelons. The ADCON chain is clear for non-deployed forces at home 

station during peacetime. However, the ADCON chain during expeditionary operations 

requires some fundamental guidance, especially during those fluid times when forces 

are initially building up in remote deployed locations. The senior Air Force commander 

on any base where Air Force forces are present has responsibilities for care and 

provisioning of the Air Force forces on that installation, regardless of organization. See 

AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, for more on the ADCON responsibilities of the 

senior/host installation commander. 

The Senior Airfield Authority 

 The ability to open and establish airbases is a key enabler facilitating both 

strategic and operational reach across the range of military operations. To alleviate C2 

issues and mitigate concerns about airfield authority, the JFC should designate the 

component responsible for airfield operations at each base shared by Service 

components. The JFC will normally select the component with the preponderance of 

airfield operations capabilities and assets to support the airbase opening mission. 

 The senior airfield authority (SAA) is an individual designated by the JFC to be 

responsible for the control, operation, and maintenance of an airfield to include 

runways, associated taxiways, parking ramps, land, and facilities whose proximity affect 

airfield operations. In addition, it is the SAA’s responsibility to define the SAA terrain 

boundary on a jointly inhabited installation so as to identify and establish the airfield 

operations activities and airfield management areas of responsibility. It is the SAA’s 

responsibility to program for this operation area and to provide that terrain boundary 

identification to the BOS-I for inclusion within the overall base camp (installation) master 

plan. Inherent in the ability to manage these responsibilities is the task to develop a 

formal security plan to address security requirements for airfield operations. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURES 

 To support taskings through both the administrative and operational chains of 

command, US forces have a series of C2 centers that form an integrated structure. 

They are capable of operations in all levels of contingencies and may represent only 

one Service component or more than one Service in a joint structure. These centers 

may have a US-only mission, or they may support multinational operations as well. 
45

These C2 centers are sometimes described as “notional,” because they can vary due to 

tasking by AOR-specific needs and due to the variances in the multinational force they 

provide. Some of these C2 centers are presented below. 

The National Military Command System 

The senior national civilian leadership requires a system to provide oversight and 

C2 of the nation’s military and to execute its strategy. The National Military Command 

System (NMCS) is the priority component of the Global Command and Control System

(GCCS) designed to support the national leadership in exercising its responsibilities. 

The NMCS provides the means by which the President and the SecDef can send and 

receive information that supports timely decisions. It also supports their communications 

with the combatant commanders or the commanders of other established commands. 

The NMCS must be capable of providing information to the senior national leadership 

so they can select and direct appropriate and timely responses and ensure their 

implementation. In addition, the NMCS supports the JCS in carrying out their 

responsibilities.

The NMCS includes four primary nodes (the National Military Command Center, 

Alternate National Military Command Center, United States Strategic Command Global 

Operations Center, and National Airborne Operations Center) and such other command 

centers as may be designated by the SecDef. Support of the NMCS is the priority 

function of all primary and alternate command centers. 

GCCS is designed to provide an enduring command structure with survivable C2 

systems. It is required and fundamental to NMCS’s continuity of operations. GCCS is a 

comprehensive, secure, worldwide network of systems that provides the national 

leadership, joint staff, combatant commands, Services, defense agencies, joint task 

forces and functional components, and others with information processing and 

dissemination capabilities necessary for C2 of forces. For further detail concerning the 

NMCS, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6721.01A, 

Global Command and Control Management Structure, and JP 6-0, Joint 

Communications System. 

Nuclear Command and Control System 

The management and C2 of nuclear weapons is a joint responsibility. There is a 

dedicated joint C2 system that manages these weapons. The purpose of nuclear forces 

is to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to 

serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat. 

Control of US nuclear weapons is established to preclude unauthorized or inadvertent 

use either by US or allied forces, foreign powers, or terrorists without degrading the 

operational readiness of these weapons. Command is managed via dedicated media 

message delivery systems standardized for joint operations. C2 must support theater 

and strategic employment of nuclear weapons through all phases of a conflict. 
46

National policy requires centralized execution authority of nuclear weapons. The 

President is the sole authority for release of US nuclear weapons. Release and related 

instructions will be transmitted via the CJCS in accordance with established emergency 

action procedures (EAP). Air Force forces assigned or attached to USSTRATCOM 

execute nuclear operations under direct control of the senior national civilian leadership. 

For further detail concerning the nuclear C2 system, refer to JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint 

Nuclear Operations and AFDD 2-1.5, Nuclear Operations.

Air Force Command and Control Centers 

Air Force C2 centers must provide oversight and control for operations 

conducted worldwide. These centers must support both the operational and 

administrative chains of command. Each C2 center is unique in its mission, due to the 

uniqueness of the command and the mission that it serves. There is no “cookie cutter” 

approach to C2 node design and capabilities. These C2 centers may provide the 

capability to command deployed forces forward, while at the same time maintain a 

command presence at home station. This concept is enabled through the process of 

“reachback,” or distributed operations. 

The Air Force C2 architecture consists of strategic, operational, and tactical C2 

nodes, which provide the tools by which Air Force leaders exercise C2 of forces at 

home station, en route, and while deployed. This doctrine document focuses mainly on 

the operational level of C2 with some discussion of tactical C2 operations and 

architecture. However, many C2 nodes span several levels of operations and cross the 

full range of military operations. 

Reachback and Distributed Operations 

Air Force C2 centers may use the concepts of reachback and distributed 

operations to support forces deployed or operating in place from multiple locations. 

Reachback is a generic term for obtaining forces, materiel, or information support from 

Air Force organizations not forward deployed. Communications and information 

systems should provide a seamless information flow of prioritized data to and from 

forward and rear locations. C2 of forces through the concept of reachback is normally 

provided from a supporting/supported relationship. This relationship gives the forwarddeployed COMAFFOR the support necessary to conduct operations while maintaining a 

smaller deployed footprint. Effective reachback enhances the operational capability and 

facilitates informed and timely decision-making by the engaged COMAFFOR. The intent 

of reachback operations is to support forces forward, not to command operations from 

the rear.

Distributed operations occur when independent or interdependent nodes or 

locations participate in the operational planning and/or operational decision-making 

process to accomplish goals/missions for engaged commanders. For instance, the Joint 

Space Operations Center (JSpOC) can task the Global Positioning System (GPS) to 

provide required data to theater planners for planning of air strikes. While the 
47

relationships may vary according to the nature of the operation, the design of a

distributed operation should enable a more survivable C2 network through distribution of 

tasks and information. In some instances, the commander may establish a formal 

supported/supporting relationship between distributed nodes. In other instances, 

distributed nodes may have a horizontal relationship. Military commanders have used

distributed C2 for many years. The method and means for controlling forces have 

changed, but military leaders have always distributed their operations among multiple 

echelons. What has changed in recent years is that technology enables more 

participants from greater distances to create and manage complex networks. 

Split operations are a type of distributed operations. The term describes those 

distributed operations conducted by a single C2 entity that is separated between two or 

more geographic locations. A single commander must have oversight of all aspects of a 

split C2 operation. For example, sections of the ATO may be developed from a rear 

area or backup operation center to reduce the deployed AOC footprint. In this case the 

AOC is geographically separated and is a split operation. During split operations, the 

COMAFFOR has the same degree of authority over geographically separated elements 

as he or she does over the deployed AFFOR and AOC. 

Although distributed operations are similar to reachback, there is one major 

difference. Reachback provides ongoing combat support to the operation from the rear 

while a distributed operation indicates actual involvement in operational planning and/or 

operational decision-making. Information technology advances may further enhance 

distributed operations. The goal of effective distributed operations is to support the 

operational commander in the field; it is not a method of command from the rear. The 

concept of “reachback” allows functions to be supported by a staff at home station, to 

keep the manning and equipment footprint smaller at a forward location. Distributed 

operations, which may rely heavily on reachback support, vary by mission, 

circumstances, and level of conflict.

Each Air Force C2 entity will have a defined function that contributes to an overall 

distributed operation, whether they provide information from a fixed location at home 

station, or whether they are forward deployed. In a distributed C2 operation, specific 

roles, functions, and capabilities at each node must be fully understood and specified. 

Capabilities of the C2 nodes (both forward and at home station), must be thoroughly 

understood to effectively execute operations. 

 Depending on the scenario, communications capabilities, joint/combined 

requirements, and the political situation, C2 nodes may have to operate in the 

distributed operations mode. To employ distributed operations most effectively, 

extensive planning is required before a contingency develops. Contingency planning 

staffs should already have plans drawn up to accommodate a variety of C2 scenarios 

for deployed forces. 
48

Air Force Component Command and Control Centers 

The Air Force’s C2 apparatus must be able to support worldwide distributed 

operations. It must integrate all aspects of air and space power; and provide for 

connectivity with joint and coalition operations, as required by the supported theater 

combatant commanders and as directed by the senior national leadership. The Air 

Force, whether through permanent facilities or expeditionary capability, must provide a 

permanent and flexible network of C2 nodes and a deployment capability that can bring 

global capabilities into theater focus. 

The network of worldwide C2 centers is the backbone of the Air Force support of 

Air Force forces conducting operations worldwide and the basis for joint and coalition 

connectivity. Many of these nodes identified are not Air Force-exclusive, but are the 

primary responsibility of the Air Force as defined in Title 10, U.S.C. Although provided 

by the Air Force, these nodes must be able to interact with sister Service, DOD, and 

allied nation C2 networks. Aligned air reserve component units will provide critical 

augmentation to regular force structure at each node. Major commands and direct 

reporting agencies have specific responsibilities for each node, but the overall 

architecture facilitates Air Force support to the warfighter. 

The C2 centers discussed below support the administrative chain of command 

and the operational chain. They enable the employment of Air Force forces from home 

station to support worldwide requirements. They also provide information to senior Air 

Force and national leadership. 

Air Force Service Watch Cell 

The Air Force Service Watch Cell (AFSWC) is the C2 organization that provides 

information to the Air Force operations group (AFOG) and other staffs and agencies 

within DOD. The mission of the AFOG is to collect, process, analyze, and communicate 

information enabling situational awareness of current Air Force operations worldwide. 

This awareness facilitates timely, responsive and effective decision-making by senior Air 

Force leaders and supported combatant commanders. The AFOG serves and supports 

the CSAF with a responsive integrated crisis action team (CAT) during national 

emergencies by providing operations briefings, monitoring current events, and 

coordinating Air Force support for joint operations. 

 The AFOG operates the AFSWC under the unified command center concept. It is 

a 24-hour operation that interfaces with the NMCC, the joint staff, sister Services, and 

other governmental agencies, and supports the Department of the Air Force. It also 

provides connectivity to the MAJCOMs and other Air Force agencies.

Major Commands, Numbered Air Forces, and Installation Control 

Centers 

MAJCOMs and/or NAFs are authorized to operate a separate MAJCOMdedicated command center to manage assets beyond the limits of their home station. 
49

The mission of a MAJCOM command center is to provide commanders the global 

support structure to exercise C2 of assigned forces through facility, staff advice, and 

communication resources. This C2 center provides the continuous C2 link necessary to 

satisfy a commander’s responsibility to control and support Air Force forces worldwide. 

Each Air Force installation maintains and operates an installation control center 

(ICC) to provide C2 for all resident units and organizations on the installation. The ICC 

provides the installation commander a single, consolidated C2 center from which to 

monitor and execute the installation’s missions, including tenant; joint; and combined 

missions for which the commander bears supporting responsibility. The USAF ICC 

provides a standardized, functional organization for all installations; facilitating the 

installation-level C2 across the full spectrum of operations. 

The ICC is scalable and tailorable at the installation commander’s direction to 

provide the exact C2 capability required for the unique location, mission, and 

operational situation of each installation. In addition to the CP function, the ICC may 

include provisions for a battle staff, mission planning function, operations planning and 

execution monitoring functions, maintenance operations, a logistics readiness center, 

and an emergency operations center (EOC). The ICC is linked to on-base support 

facilities such as the deployment control center, security forces, fire department, and 

hospital; as well as group and squadron unit control centers. The ICC is also linked to 

off-base C2 nodes including, but not limited to, the MAJCOM command center; Air 

Force component headquarters, AOC, and civilian EOCs, which are elements of the 

national incident management system. 

The ICC supports the installation commander and tenant commanders, as well 

as transient or expeditionary forces hosted on a fixed installation, either in the 

continental US (CONUS) or overseas. As the installation commander for an 

expeditionary base, an AEW commander also uses the ICC to provide the required C2 

capability. ICCs provide insight to activities required to execute the installation’s mission 

at both fixed and expeditionary locations. The ICC consists of the following functional 

areas: the operations control function, the maintenance coordination function, the aerial 

port coordination function, reports, battle management, and incident response. 

The ICC interfaces with the AOC as well as the AFFOR staff and is the key C2 

center that bridges the C2 gap between operational planning and tactical execution. The 

ICC provides functional experts to receive, schedule, plan, and direct execution of the 

ATO. As required, the ICC is capable of connecting with elements of the TACS through 

voice and data communications. The ICC is especially effective when working with host 

nation representatives, tenant organizations, joint, and coalition forces. 

Air Force Information Operations Center 

The Air Force Information Operations Center (AFIOC), located at Lackland AFB, 

Texas, provides primary support to IO requirements across the full range of Air Force 

operations. Linked to other C2 nodes via robust communications, AFIOC can support 
50

worldwide warfighters in IO. The technical skills in C2 and computer systems security 

resident in AFIOC provide a solid baseline for command and control warfare.

Other Air Force C2 Centers/Nodes 

 Units below wing level may also have command centers, CPs, operations 

centers, readiness centers, or other centers for C2 of forces. These nodes are missionspecific and too varied to discuss in this level of document. They may be governed by 

applicable MAJCOM, NAF, or wing directives. They can be fixed or mobile, depending 

upon mission needs and tasking. These C2 centers may have connectivity with lateral 

joint, or even combined C2 centers that share the same or like mission (e.g., air defense 

C2 elements or contingency response elements, which are responsible for missions 

such as setting up an airbase). 
51

Unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, 

assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander, establishing 

command relationships, assigning and/or attaching appropriate forces to the joint 

force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to 

accomplish the assigned mission. 

—JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces

CHAPTER THREE 

AIR FORCE C2 IN THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND 

OPERATIONAL VERSUS ADMINISTRATIVE C2 ENVIRONMENT 

For military forces to be employed, they must receive direction from the nation’s 

senior civilian leadership. This authority flows through the operational chain of 

command. The chain runs from the President, through the SecDef, directly to the 

commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned or attached to 

their commands. Operational forces can be employed worldwide to influence events. A 

robust C2 system to support these operational taskings is a necessity to support 

combatant commanders employing US and possibly multinational forces. This system 

must complement and be interoperable with the administrative C2 system that enables 

direction of Air Force day-to-day operations. This C2 system and the professionals who 

operate it support both the operational and the administrative chains of command of the 

military forces. 

THE OPERATIONAL BRANCH 

In the late 20th Century and into the 21st, joint and multinational operations have 

predominantly encompassed the full range of military operations; inclusive of air and 

space, land, sea, and special operations (SO) capabilities. Advances in capabilities 

among all forces and the ability to communicate over great distances have made the 

application of military power more dependent on the ability of the JFC to synchronize 

and integrate all components of the assigned forces. As a result, joint and combined 

operations require an effective and efficient C2 structure to achieve success. 

 Combatant commanders and leaders at all levels in the military are involved in 

the operational prosecution of a campaign. There are many facets of a successful 

campaign and many forces must come together for a campaign to be a success. The 

operational branch of the chain of command for the armed forces is established to 

provide a span of control necessary to execute operations across an entire AOR. There 

is a C2 system dedicated to supporting the objectives of the senior national leadership 

in executing military strategy. This system aids in effective C2 of joint and combined 
52

forces and in the execution of national strategy. It provides the operational control that 

combatant commanders require. 

THE AIR AND SPACE EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE 

 The Air Force presents forces to the combatant commander as an AETF. The 

AETF is the organizational structure for deployed Air Force forces. The AETF presents 

a JFC with a task-organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of force, 

sustainment, control, and force protection. The AETF presents a scalable, tailorable 

organization with three elements: a single commander, embodied in the COMAFFOR; 

appropriate C2 mechanisms; and tailored and fully supported forces. Regardless of the 

size of the Air Force element, it will be organized along the lines of an AETF. 

 The AETF will be tailored to the mission; this includes not only forces, but also 

the ability to provide C2 for those forces for the missions assigned. The AETF should 

draw first from in-theater resources, if available. If augmentation is needed, or if intheater forces are not available, the AETF will draw as needed from the air and space 

expeditionary force (AEF) currently on rotation. These forces, whether in-theater or 

deployed from out of theater, should be fully supported 

Within the AETF, the COMAFFOR organizes forces into expeditionary wings, 

groups, squadrons, flights, detachments, or elements, as necessary, to provide 

reasonable spans of control and command elements at appropriate levels, and to retain 

unit identity. Each of these units must have a C2 node that interfaces with other like 

elements and with higher headquarters. These C2 nodes will take advantage of the GIG 

to speed information up and down the chain of command. 

COMAFFOR Operational Responsibilities 

 When forces of any Service are presented to a JFC, those forces are organized 

along Service lines; each of those Service components requires a clearly designated 

commander. A COMAFFOR is designated whenever Air Force forces are 

presented to a JFC. Depending on the scenario, the position of COMAFFOR may 

exist at different levels within a given theater. If a combatant commander (by definition 

a JFC) has Air Force forces permanently assigned to his/her command, that combatant 

commander should have a standing Air Force component, usually in the form of a 

MAJCOM or a NAF, and the MAJCOM commander is a standing COMAFFOR to that 

combatant commander. For example, the commander, US European Command 

(CDRUSEUCOM) has Air Force forces permanently assigned through US Air Forces in 

Europe (USAFE); the USAFE commander is thus the COMAFFOR to CDRUSEUCOM. 

The commander, PACAF, is similarly the standing COMAFFOR to the commander, US 

Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM). This same principle applies to functional 

combatant commanders; for example, the COMAFFOR to the commander, US 

Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) is the commander, Air Mobility 

Command (AMC). 
53

 If air and space assets from more than one Service are present within a joint 

force, the JFC normally will designate a JFACC to exploit the full capabilities of joint air 

and space operations. The JFACC should be the Service component commander with 

the preponderance of air and space assets and the ability to plan, task, and control joint 

air and space operations. If working with allies in a coalition or alliance operation, the 

JFACC may be designated as the CFACC. The CFACC recommends the proper 

employment of air and space forces from US components and the air components of 

other nations. The CFACC also plans, coordinates, allocates, tasks, executes, and 

assesses air and space operations to accomplish assigned operational missions. 

Because of the theater wide scope of air and space operations, the CFACC will typically 

maintain the same joint operations area (JOA) /theater-wide perspective as the JFC. 

The CFACC, as with any component commander, should not also be dual-hatted as the 

JFC. For more on the responsibilities of the CFACC, see JP 3-30, Command and 

Control for Joint Air Operations.

 Functional component commanders exercise TACON of all forces made 

available for tasking. They exercise OPCON of their own forces under their Service 

component responsibilities. Thus, a COMAFFOR exercises OPCON of Air Force 

forces. When also designated as the CFACC, the COMAFFOR normally exercises 

TACON of any Navy, Army, Marine, Special Operations, and coalition aviation assets 

made available for tasking (i.e., those forces not retained for their own Service’s organic 

operations). 

 

 When the COMAFFOR is designated the CFACC, there may be a need to 

establish a joint or combined staff with some or all parallel functions reflecting those of 

the AFFOR staff. Depending on the extent of the operation, the number of joint and 

coalition partners, and the physical location of the AFFOR staff (i.e., collocated with the 

COMAFFOR, at a reachback location, or distributed between the two), the Air Force 

component staff may provide the basis for the joint or combined staff. Additionally, 

some AFFOR staff personnel may be present in the AOC to provide the CFACC with 

access to Air Force component information. Augmentation within each AOC division 

from relevant Service components ensures adequate joint representation on the 

CFACC staff. At the discretion of the CFACC, officers from other Services should fill 

key deputy and principal staff CFACC positions. Liaison officers from other Service 

components and allies will provide insight and coordination between forces. When the 

Air Force component staff assumes CFACC staff functions, the CFACC must provide a 

clear definition of responsibilities and adequate resources to ensure both the Air Force 

component and CFACC staff functions operate effectively, yet remain functionally 

separate. 
54

FUNCTIONAL AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS ARCHITECTURES 

Command and Control Arrangements for Functional Air and Space 

Forces 

Some air and space forces are organized and employed functionally and can 

thus support more than one geographic combatant commander or other government 

agency at a time. Therefore, not all air and space forces employed in an operation will 

be attached forward to a geographic combatant commander. Space, air mobility, and 

special operations forces are organized under functional combatant commanders who 

normally retain control of the forces assigned to them, unless they are transferred 

forward by the SecDef. These forces normally operate under a support relationship to 

geographic commanders 

C2 of Space Forces 

C2 of space forces is challenging due to the fragmented nature of space 

operations and the interdependence between global and theater space forces. Space 

capabilities come from a variety of organizations, sometimes outside of the DOD with 

nontraditional chains of command. Also, interagency responsibilities with authority split 

between organizations further complicate C2 of space operations. Many space assets 

support joint operations in more than one geographic area. Space assets may be used 

to fulfill individual theater, multiple theater, or global objectives. 

The C2 structure established for space forces must be robust enough to account 

for these various operating areas. In the administrative chain, the commander, Air Force 

Space Command (AFSPC/CC) exercises ADCON over Air Force space forces as the 

MAJCOM commander. In the operational chain, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) 

designates CDRUSSTRATCOM as responsible for all military space operations. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM has COCOM of all space forces as assigned by the SecDef. 

USSTRATCOM operates assigned military space forces through its joint functional 

component commands. Fourteenth Air Force, Air Force Strategic Command (Space) 

(14AF AFSTRAT-SP) is the Air Force component to USSTRATCOM’s current joint 

functional component command-space (JFCC-SP). The commander, JFCC Space 

commands and controls space forces through the JSpOC. 

Within a theater, the DIRSPACEFOR works for the COMAFFOR as the senior 

space advisor. The DIRSPACEFOR conducts coordination, and staffing activities to 

integrate space capabilities for the COMAFFOR. For more on the role of the 

DIRSPACEFOR see AFDD 2-2, Space Operations. 

Space AOC/Joint Space Operations Center 

 The Air Force provides a space AOC that forms the core of the JSpOC. The 

space AOC is located at Vandenberg AFB, California. It includes personnel, facilities 

and equipment necessary to plan, execute and assess space operations and integrates 
55

space power on behalf of the commander, JFCC Space, into all combatant commands. 

The space AOC tracks assigned and attached space forces/assets and provides 

reachback support to organic theater space personnel. The space AOC translates 

CDRUSSTRATCOM’s operation orders (OPORDs) and the commander, JFCC Space’s 

guidance into space tasking orders (STO), which are a part of the overall space tasking 

cycle. STOs task and direct assigned and attached space forces to fulfill theater and 

global mission requirements in support of national objectives. The STO production 

cycle is based on the standard 72-hour ATO cycle. The STO cycle is flexible to 

synchronize with the theater battle rhythm. The primary functions of the space AOC are 

to: 

 Serve as the JFCC Space’s point of contact for space operations issues. 

 Advise USSTRATCOM on space strategy and campaign plans. 

 Task and direct assigned and attached space forces via the STO. 

 Conduct planning, tasking, integration, command, control, and operational execution 

for global space operations. 

 Maintain a COP for space capabilities and ensure it is available to combatant 

commanders for situational awareness. 

Space AOC Organization 

 The space AOC is a functional AOC composed of four divisions: strategy, 

combat plans, combat operations and ISR. There are also specialty teams, liaisons 

from other agencies and sister Service and allied officers to enable the space AOC to 

fulfill its responsibilities as the JSpOC. Collectively, they accomplish the main processes 

of strategy development, planning, tasking, collection management, and intelligence 

analysis/production. The space AOC serves as the Air Force focal point for 

coordination and reachback support for regional space operations requirements. For 

more information, see AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, and AFOTTP 2-3.4, Space Air and 

Space Operations Center. 

C2 of Cyberspace Forces 

C2 of cyberspace forces is evolving. The Air Force views cyberspace as a 

domain that uses the electromagnetic spectrum as its maneuver space to conduct 

global operations. Comprehending cyberspace as a domain allows an understanding of 

its expansive global nature and how best to design organizations and capabilities to 

best exploit it. The CSAF designated Eighth Air Force (8 AF) as the operational 

command for cyberspace. Eighth Air Force’s mission will be to integrate the Air Force’s 

global kinetic and non-kinetic strike capability in support of the combatant commander 

through the full range of military operations. 
56

Air Force Network Operations Center 

To ensure the availability of the GIG and its continuous protection, the 

AFNETOPS/CC, via the AFNETOPS center, provides oversight of the forces 

responsible for building, operating, and defending the Air Force portion of the GIG. The 

AFNETOPS center is located at 8 AF headquarters, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. 

 The Air Force GIG C2 system enables the AFNETOPS/CC to provide support to 

the commander, JTF-Global Network Operations (GNO), and the designated 

COMAFFOR for each combatant commander. It provides these commanders the 

capability to plan and conduct global NETOPS and to ensure GIG availability and 

security in support of joint and combined operations. The AFNETOPS center provides 

Air Force staff and execution functions for the Air Force component that supports JTFGNO. The CDRUSSTRATCOM provides guidance to 8 AF/CC, who develops and 

C2 of Cyberspace Forces 

Doctrine for cyberspace operations (including its C2) is under 

development. As doctrine for cyberspace operations is developed, it will be 

incorporated into Air Force doctrine documents as they are revised. Key 

points in this ongoing process are discussed below. 

 The new Air Force mission statement, “...deliver sovereign options for the 

defense of the United States of America and its global interests – to fly 

and fight in air, space and cyberspace” explicitly recognizes cyberspace’s 

growing importance to the nation’s defense. 

 The current JCS-endorsed working definition of cyberspace identifies it as 

a new domain and makes it more than simply a subset of the information 

environment or a subset of information operations. 

 The CSAF designated 8 AF as the operational command for cyberspace. 

Eighth Air Force’s mission will be to integrate the Air Force’s global kinetic 

and non-kinetic strike capability in support of the combatant commander 

through the full range of military operations. 

 Effectively employing forces in this new domain may require changes in 

the way we present forces to the joint fight. Defining how we command 

and control these assets will be an important first step 

 CSAF issued a “Go Do” letter directing 8 AF to stand up the Air Force’s 

Cyber Command, including an AOC, to be interoperable with other Air 

Force AOCs. 

—Various Sources
57

executes the Air Force component portion of the USSTRATCOM NETOPS campaign 

plan.

C2 of Air Mobility Forces 

Air mobility forces are divided into intertheater forces and intratheater forces, 

each comprising separate yet mutually supporting C2 systems, with differing C2 

arrangements for each mission. Intertheater air mobility involves forces operating 

between the CONUS and a geographic combatant command’s AOR or between two 

geographic combatant commands’ AORs. These operations require close coordination 

between AMC and the theater air components. Intertheater air mobility operations are 

generally global in scope and serve the CONUS-to-theater air transportation and force 

projection needs of the geographic combatant commander. Intratheater operations 

cover two types of operations, those of a single geographic combatant commander 

during peacetime or when a JOA has not been established, and those operations inside 

a JOA when a joint task force has been established. In both of these situations 

operations are normally conducted using forces assigned, attached, or made available 

for tasking to the JFC. 

For air mobility forces performing primarily intertheater operations the preferred 

command relationship between global/functional and regional/geographic organizations 

is support. Within a theater, this support relationship is normally facilitated by the 

designated DIRMOBFOR-AIR attached to the AETF. When forces are attached to a 

theater, JP 0-2 states, “The combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over 

forces attached.” See AFDD 2 for a detailed discussion of recommended command 

relationships for non-assigned forces. 

CDRUSTRANSCOM exercises COCOM over CONUS-based active duty air 

mobility forces, as well as some overseas deployed expeditionary mobility task force 

(EMTF) air mobility support forces even though they are assigned to USTRANSCOM. 

CDRUSTRANSCOM normally will delegate OPCON of these forces to the Air Force 

component commander (who is the commander, AMC), who further delegates the dayto-day execution authority to the commander, 18th Air Force (18 AF). 

 

When USTRANSCOM air mobility forces are deployed for extended durations in 

supporting operations, they are normally organized as expeditionary units. Because 

these forces are located within geographic theater boundaries, an ADCON relationship 

is normally established with the Air Force host command to ensure that support 

requirements are met. Command-to-command agreements are the best method for 

detailing these arrangements. 

18 AF (AFTRANS) 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center 

 

For global operations, the 18 AF/CC executes centralized control of AMCassigned or attached forces through the 18 AF tanker airlift control center (618 TACC). 

The 18 AF/CC responds to air mobility requirements handed down from 
58

Named 'Operation Vittles,' the airlift forced AACS [Airways and Air 

Communication Service] personnel to improvise new methods of air traffic control to 

handle the volume of traffic needed to bring the minimum 4,500 tons of coal and 

food into Berlin daily... The area control operators kept in touch with the aircraft until 

they turned them over to the ground-controlled approach radar operators who talked 

them down to a safe landing. Airplanes that missed their first landing approach 

were dispatched back to their home base unless they could be later vectored back 

into the landing pattern. Flight plans, position reports, and clearance phraseology 

were streamlined to limit the length of radio transmissions and accelerate 

operations. Ground-controlled approach radar was the keystone upon which the 

airlift system was built. 

—Thomas S. Snyder, ed., History of Air Force Communications Command

USTRANSCOM. Located at Scott AFB, Illinois, the 618 TACC is AMC’s hub for 

planning, scheduling, tasking, and executing assigned air mobility forces around the 

world. The 618 TACC is designated as a functional AOC. The 18 AF/TACC is dedicated 

to providing quality service to a wide range of mobility customers. Its number one 

mission is to provide quality mobility support to the President and combatant 

commanders. Because of air mobility’s global responsibility, multiple competing 

common users, and the necessity to prioritize and apportion limited resources, 

centralized control of air mobility is crucial. The 618 TACC directs intertheater mobility 

forces through its air mobility wings and EMTFs. 

The 618 TACC plans and executes all USTRANSCOM-owned tanker, airlift, and 

support missions and monitors commercial contract airlift missions. It performs detailed 

pre-mission planning and provides that information to the air mobility units, the airlift and 

tanker crews, and operating locations for mission execution. During execution, the 18 

AF/CC exercises OPCON over USTRANSCOM-owned Air Force crews and aircraft until 

return to home station. Within a regional JTF, the DIRMOBFOR-AIR provides the links 

between the regional air component’s air mobility operations and the TACC’s 

intertheater air mobility operations. 

618 TACC Organization 

The 618 TACC consists of eight divisions led by a director of operations who 

provides immediate oversight and decision-making in the day-to-day missions of AMC, 

and serves as the command’s representative to the joint staff, AFSWC, NMCC, 

USTRANSCOM, DOD, and other agencies. The divisions are: mobility management, 

command and control, current operations, global readiness, global channel operations, 

operations management, intelligence, and the 15th Operational Weather Squadron. 

There are also Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard advisors who provide advice 

and guidance on air reserve components (ARC) matters. For a more detailed 

description, see AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations. 
59

C2 of Special Operations 

SO are conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to 

achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives. Special 

operations employ military capabilities for which there are no broad conventional force 

requirements. These operations often require covert or low-visibility capabilities. SO are 

applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted 

independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other 

government agencies and may include operations by, with, or through indigenous or 

surrogate forces. 

SOF may be assigned to either US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

or a geographic combatant command. OPCON of SOF assigned to a geographic 

combatant command is exercised by the commander of the theater special operations 

command (TSOC). OPCON of SOF attached to a geographic combatant command is 

normally exercised by the commander of the TSOC or other JFC (e.g., commander, 

joint special operations task force [JSOTF], etc.). 

SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall campaign 

plan (war or stability operations). Successful execution of SO requires clear, responsive 

C2 by an appropriate SOF C2 element. The limited window of opportunity normally 

associated with the majority of SOF missions, as well as the sensitive nature of many of 

these missions, requires a C2 structure that is, above all, responsive to the needs of the 

operational unit. SOF C2 may be tailored for a specific mission or operation. Liaison 

among all components of the joint force and SOF, wherever assigned, is vital for 

effective employment of SOF as well as the prevention of fratricide. 

A JSOTF is a JTF composed of SO units from more than one Service formed to 

carry out a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other 

operations. When the JSOTF is combined with conventional forces as part of a larger 

joint force, it will often be designated as a functional component—Joint Force Special 

Operation Component. A JSOTF may have conventional non-special operations units 

assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions, or such forces may be 

tasked to provide support. A JSOTF, like any JTF, is normally established by a JFC 

(e.g., a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander such as a TSOC 

commander, or a JTF commander). For example, a geographic combatant commander 

could establish a JTF to conduct operations in a specific region of the theater. Either the 

geographic combatant commander or the JTF commander could then establish a 

JSOTF, subordinate to that JTF, to plan and execute SO. Likewise, a TSOC 

commander could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region assigned 

by the geographic combatant commander. A JSOTF may also be established as a joint 

organization and deployed as an entity from outside the theater. 

Special Operations Forces Liaison Elements 

SOF commanders have available specific elements that facilitate C2, 

coordination, and liaison. They include the special operations C2 element (SOCCE) to 
60

provide C2 and coordinate SOF activities with conventional forces; the special 

operations liaison element (SOLE) to provide liaison to the CFACC or appropriate 

Service component air C2 facility; and SOF liaison officers (LNOs) placed in a variety of 

locations as necessary to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SO within the 

operational area. All of these and other SOF C2 elements significantly improve the flow 

of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance overall mission 

accomplishment of the joint force. 

Air Force Special Operations C2 

The Air Force special operations component (not to be confused with the Air 

Force Special Operations Command [AFSOC], the Air Force component of USSOCOM) 

is the Air Force component of a joint SO force. It is normally composed of a special 

operations wing, special operations group, or special tactics group. When subordinate 

Air Force SOF units deploy to forward operations bases (FOBs) or advanced operations 

bases (AOBs), the AFSOC commander may establish one or more provisional units. 

The Air Force special operations detachment (AFSOD) is a squadron-size Air Force 

Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) unit that could be a composite organization 

composed of different Air Force assets. The detachment normally is subordinate to a 

theater Air Force special operations component, JSOTF, joint special operations air 

component commander (JSOACC), or JTF depending upon the size and duration of the 

operation. The Air Force special operations element (AFSOE) contains selected AFSOF 

units and is normally subordinate to a theater Air Force special operations component 

or AFSOD, depending upon the size and duration of the operation. 

C2 of Regional Air Force Forces 

Air Force Component Headquarters 

 The Air Force is establishing Air Force component headquarters capable of 

providing the unified combatant commander and his designated JFCs the full spectrum 

of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. The Air Force must be able to employ forces 

anywhere in the world, in support of national security objectives. To achieve this goal, 

the designated COMAFFOR must be ready to quickly establish the C2 functions 

necessary to control air, space, and cyberspace operations. The COMAFFOR must also 

be prepared to serve as the CFACC or as the JTF commander if requested (CFACC 

and JTF/CC positions should not normally be dual-hatted). 

 

The construct establishes component organizations, some of which will be 

regionally focused and some which will be globally focused. Each will have an AFFOR 

staff and an appropriately tailored AOC. The Air Force component headquarters will 

vary in size, depending on factors such as geographic location, responsibilities, and 

missions assigned. These Air Force component headquarters are intended to be the 

Airman’s single voice to the JFC. This reorganization is designed to enhance combat 

capability, integrate combat staffs with AOCs, and provide the JFC an air and spacefocused warfighting structure supported by state-of-the-art warfighting C2. 
61

 All of these headquarters will be integrated into a robust communications 

network. This will facilitate collaborative planning and the rapid transfer of AOC 

functions between headquarters in the event an AOC is taken down. 

Air and Space Operations Center 

The AOC is the operational-level warfighting command center for air and space 

forces. As a component organization of the Air Force, the AOC is the air and space 

operations planning and execution focal point for the COMAFFOR. In most large scale 

operations the Air Force will provide the preponderance of air assets and possess the 

necessary capabilities to exercise C2 over all theater air operations. Accordingly, the Air 

Force component commander will normally be designated the CFACC. The AOC 

provides the air and space component commander the capability to plan, execute, and 

assess air and space operations. The AOC is often referred to as a CAOC in Air Force 

doctrine documents. However, this document discusses the variations in the Air 

Force AOC weapon system. To simplify discussion, the term “AOC” will be used unless 

there is need for a specific reference to a CAOC vice an AOC. Along with the CFACC’s 

senior staff, the AOC’s various divisions and teams are responsible for planning, 

executing, and assessing air and space operations. Through the AOC, the CFACC 

directs tactical actions to produce desired operational and strategic effects in support of 

the JFC's campaign. The fundamental principle of this system is centralized planning 

and control through the AOC, with decentralized execution by subordinate/tasked 

organizations and elements. For a more detailed examination of the AOC, see AFOTTP 

2-3.2, Air and Space Operations Center. 

The AOC is nominally designed and organized to conduct intense air operations 

consistent with major operations and campaigns. However, it can be configured to 

conduct operations across the range of military operations. Each AOC crew is uniquely 

trained to the local environment, resource availability, operational demands, and 

command relationships of the military and civilian hierarchy in its AOR. 

The AOC is an Air Force weapon system, known as the Falconer. There are 

three types of AOCs: the Falconer, the tailored Falconer, and the functional Falconer 

AOC. Falconer AOCs are assigned to specific geographic combatant commanders 

(GCCs), and can be fixed, deployable, or a combination of both of these options. A 

tailored Falconer is a variant adapted for specific or unique missions, such as 1 AF’s 

AOC, which supports the homeland security mission. Functional AOCs support global 

functional requirements. AMC has a functional AOC, the 618 TACC. In addition, the 

Space AOC is a functional AOC, capable of C2 over the broad range of assigned 

USSTRATCOM space missions. Functional AOCs correspond as much as possible to 

Falconer AOCs. 

AOC Organization and Employment 

The Falconer AOC is notionally organized under an AOC commander (AOC/CC), 

with five divisions (strategy; combat plans; combat operations; intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance; and air mobility), and multiple support/specialty teams. Each 
62

specialty/support team is a horizontally cross-cutting capability integrated into the five 

divisions. Figure 3.1 depicts a notional AOC organization. The AOC/CC acts as the 

JAOC Director in a JAOC/CAOC, having no command authority over augmentees from 

other Service components or allied/coalition personnel. 

The Falconer is usually employed as the senior element of the TACS and 

provides centralized planning, direction, control, and coordination of air and space 

operations. The AOC may be employed in a scenario that does not require the full 

TACS for mission execution, such as a stability operation (or in space or mobility 

operations, which use tailored or functional Falconers). Some scenarios, such as major 

operations and campaigns, usually require the AOC to employ with a full TACS. The 

AOC may be fixed or mobile, depending upon the level of contingency, theater or 

scenario requirements, and political and diplomatic situations. The AOC is configured to 

meet its functional or regional mission and AOC crews train to meet the unique 

requirements for various scenarios in the appropriate AOR or functional scenario. 

 

Figure 3.1. Basic Structure of a Notional AOC. 

Component Liaisons

AreaAirDefense

Information Operations

SpecialTechnicalOperations

Information Management

Space

Combat Support

Airspace Management

Public Affairs

SystemAdministration

CommunicationsSupport

CombatSearchandRescue

Legal

Weather

(Othersasneeded)

SSSTTT

RRRAAATTT

EEE

GGGYYY 

DDDIII

VVVIII

SSSIII

OOONNN 

Strategy 

Plans 

Team 

Strategy 

Guidance 

Team 

Operational 

Assessment 

Team

CCCOOOMMMBBBAAATTT 

PPPLLLAAA

NNNSSS 

DDDIII

VVVIII

SSSIII

OOONNN 

Targeting 

Effects 

Team 

MAAP 

Team 

ATO 

Production 

Team 

IIISSSRRR 

DDDIII

VVVIII

SSSIII

OOONNN 

Analysis 

Correlation 

and 

Fusion 

(ACF) 

Team 

Targets / 

Combat 

Assessment 

Team 

ISR 

Operations 

Team 

(Collection 

Management 

RFI 

Management 

and MEC) 

PED 

Management 

Team 

CCCOOOMMMBBBAAATTT 

OOOPPPEEE

RRRAAATTTIII

OOONNNSSS 

DDDIII

VVVIII

SSSIII

OOONNN 

Offensive 

Operations

Team 

Defensive 

Operations

Team 

SODO 

Team 

Interface 

Control 

Team 

AAAIII

RRR 

MMMOOOBBBIII LLL III

TTT

YYY 

DDDIII

VVVIII

SSSIII

OOONNN 

Airlift 

Control 

Team 

Air 

Refueling 

Control 

Team 

Air 

Mobility 

Control 

Team 

Aeromedical

Evacuation 

Control 

Team 
63

Component Liaisons, Coalition and Allied Liaisons, Coordination 

Elements, and Specialty/Support Functions 

The AOC also has component liaisons, coordination elements, and specialty 

teams that assist the COMAFFOR and/or CFACC in executing the air and space 

portions of the campaign. Component liaisons are provided by each Service or 

functional component commander involved in the operation of the AOC to articulate 

component requirements. The special operations component commander provides a 

SOLE to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize SOF operations, strategy, and plans 

with conventional air. The other Services have a liaison presence in the AOC. The 

battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) represents the Army, while the naval and 

amphibious liaison element (NALE) articulates Navy and Marine interests, unless a 

separate Marine liaison officer (MARLO) is designated. 

 For large operations, the CFACC may establish one or more air component 

coordination elements (ACCEs) with the JFC’s or a component commander’s 

headquarters to better integrate air and space operations with surface operations, and 

with the JTF headquarters to better integrate air and space operations within the overall 

joint force. When established, these elements act as the CFACC’s primary 

representatives to the respective commanders and facilitate interaction between the 

respective staffs. The ACCE also communicates the component commander’s 

decisions and interests to the CFACC. However, the ACCE should not replace, 

replicate, or circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the 

component/JTF staffs. The ACCE is a liaison function, not a C2 node. It normally has no 

authority to direct or execute operations. The make-up of the ACCE is dependent on the 

scope of the operation and the size of the staff they will liaise with. The ACCE should 

be tailored with the expertise necessary to perform effectively. Element expertise may 

include plans, operations, intelligence, airspace management, logistics, space, and air 

mobility, as needed. 

LNOs representing coalition and/or allied forces may improve AOC situational 

awareness regarding the disposition of friendly forces and their inclusion in coalition 

operations. They are also essential for unity of effort for coalition air defense operations 

and airspace deconfliction. The AOC commander should anticipate the need for LNOs 

during both the planning and execution phases of an operation. For more information 

concerning coalition and allied liaison officers see JP 3-0. 

 The regional air movement control center (RAMCC) is a specialty team that 

provides the CFACC with a centralized function to deconflict both military and civilian air 

traffic in a particular airspace control area. The goal of the RAMCC is to provide a safe 

and efficient operating environment through managing the complex interaction of 

military and civil aircraft attempting to access or transit the airspace control area. The 

RAMCC may include liaison officers from the coalition and neutral nations and will have 

interface with nongovernmental organizations and civil or commercial users of the 

airspace. For related discussion, see AFDD 2-1.7, Airspace Control in the Combat 

Zone. 
64

FAC-(A) 

AWACS 

Joint STARS 

ASOC 

TACP

CRC 

AOC 

 The Airborne Command Element (ACE) is an optional element composed of a 

single officer or team of mission experts who fly on board airborne C2 platforms and 

function as the CFACC’s representative. When required, the ACE conducts the air 

battle in accordance with the latest command guidance. 

The Theater Air Control System 

The Air Force TACS reflects the air and space power tenet of centralized control 

and decentralized execution. The TACS provides the COMAFFOR with the means to 

achieve this tenet. The AOC is the senior element of the TACS. The TACS can be 

tailored to support contingencies ranging from the smallest stability operation to fullscale combat operations. TACS elements may be employed in garrison, deployed for 

contingencies or deployed to augment theater-specific systems. The TACS is divided 

into ground and airborne elements. When the TACS is combined with other 

components’ C2 elements, such as the Army air-ground system, the Navy tactical air 

control system, and the Marine Corps air command and control system, they become 

the theater air-ground system (TAGS), to execute operations for the CFACC. For a 

more detailed examination of each element of the TACS, see AFDD 2-1.7, Airspace 

Control in the Combat Zone and AFTTP 3-1, Vol. 26, Theater Air Control System. 

Figure 3.2 presents a notional depiction of the TACS, including connectivity among 

elements. 

Figure 3.2. Notional Theater Air Control System. 
65

Problems coordinating close air

support operations over long

distances during Operation 

ANACONDA highlighted the need

for an airborne C2 and

communications relay platform in 

the role formerly occupied by the 

Airborne Command and Control

Center. In the future, portions of

this mission will be shared by

AWACS, Joint STARS, and

unmanned aircraft. 

Ground Theater Air Control System Elements 

 Ground theater air control system (GTACS) elements include the control and 

reporting centers (CRC), the ASOC, and the TACP. The CRC is subordinate to the AOC 

and may be designated as the primary theater command, control, and air surveillance 

facility within the theater, or may share that responsibility with other TACS elements 

such as AWACS. Responsibility as the region/sector air defense commander is also 

normally decentralized to the CRC, which acts as the primary integration point for air 

defense artillery (ADA) fire control. The CRC may deploy mobile radars and associated 

communications equipment to expand radar coverage and communications range within 

its assigned operating area. These remote radars are capable of providing early 

warning, surveillance, weapons control, and identification functions. The ASOC, which 

reports to the AOC, receives, coordinates, and processes requests for immediate air 

support from subordinate TACPs, which are transmitted through the joint air request net 

(JARN). ASOCs commit allocated sorties to satisfy requests for immediate air support 

and integrate those missions with the supported units' fires and maneuver. An ASOC is 

normally tasked to support an Army unit but can also support units from other 

organizations (e.g., special operations, coalition forces). It may also augment other 

missions requiring C2 of air assets (e.g., humanitarian efforts). TACPs are aligned with 

Army maneuver elements, battalion through corps level. They are primarily responsible 

for decentralized execution of CAS operations. TACPs request, coordinate, and control 

CAS and theater airlift missions as required. For more information on TACPs and 

ASOCs, see AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland. 

Airborne Elements of the Theater Air 

Control System 

Airborne elements of the theater air 

control system (AETACS) elements include the 

AWACS, the joint surveillance target attack 

radar system (JSTARS), and the forward air 

controller (airborne) (FAC [A]). AWACS is 

subordinate to the AOC and conducts air 

surveillance and supports strategic attack, 

counterair, counterland, air refueling 

operations, and other air and space power 

functions/missions as directed. JSTARS 

provides dedicated support to ground 

commanders and attack support functions to 

friendly offensive air elements. The FAC(A) is 

an airborne extension of the TACP and has the 

authority to direct aircraft delivering ordnance 

to a specific target cleared by the ground 

commander. The FAC(A) provides additional 

flexibility in the operational environment by 

enabling rapid coordination and execution of 

air operations. It also enhances the TACS’ 
66

situational awareness by disseminating information on the flow of aircraft on target.

Air Force C2 in Homeland Operations 

The DOD contributes to homeland security (HS) through homeland defense 

(HD), emergency preparedness (EP), and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security provides a federal framework for a 

concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 

America’s vulnerability to terrorism, as well as minimize the damage and recover from 

attacks that do occur. The DOD uses “homeland security” as an umbrella term to 

include homeland defense, emergency preparedness, and defense support of civil 

authorities (whether combating terrorism or supporting domestic incident management 

after an earthquake or other natural disaster). For the Air Force, homeland operations 

are the means by which its support to homeland security is accomplished. 

The commander, US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) and 

CDRUSPACOM are the supported JFCs for homeland operations. For homeland 

defense in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility, less the Alaska JOA, the 

commander, First Air Force (Air Forces Northern) (1 AF [AFNORTH]/CC) has been 

designated as the COMAFFOR, and acts as a JFACC with OPCON of air forces for 

homeland operations. For the Alaska JOA, the commander, Alaska North American 

Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Region (CDRANR) (11th Air Force) acts as a JFACC with 

OPCON of homeland defense air forces. Both JFACCs supporting USNORTHCOM 

provide assets in direct support of JTF requirements. 

If National Guard assets are involved in these operations they may be operating 

under gubernatorial authority in Title 32 or state active duty status, or under federal 

authority in Title 10 status. It is imperative the command arrangements and 

relationships for National Guard operations mesh with those set up by 

CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM to ensure deconfliction of efforts and 

effective allocation of resources to prevent duplication. 

Air National Guard assets have been the primary Air Force forces involved in 

homeland defense operations. While ANG personnel routinely operate under 

gubernatorial authority in Title 32 status, procedures have been established so that, 

upon declaration of an air sovereignty event, the ANG pilot immediately assumes Title 

10 (federal operations) status. This command arrangement/relationship for Air National 

Guard operations in homeland defense dovetails with the 

CDRUSNORTHCOM/commander in chief, NORAD (CINCNORAD) and 

CDRUSPACOM/ CINCNORAD requirements for effective allocation of air defense 

resources. 

Air Force C2 in Disaster Relief and Other Operations 

DSCA, often referred to as civil support, is DOD support provided during and in 

the aftermath of domestic emergencies—such as terrorist attacks or major disasters—

and for designated law enforcement and other activities. It includes military assistance 

for civil law enforcement operations in very limited circumstances. However, National 
67

Guard forces operating in state status (in state active duty and under Title 32, U.S.C.)

can directly assist civil law enforcement operations. DSCA missions include, but are not

limited to, supporting the Department of Justice in preventing or defeating terrorist 

attacks; response to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents; response to 

natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and fires; support to civilian law 

enforcement agencies, including counter-drug activities; and response to civil 

disturbances or insurrection. In all these missions, various federal, state, or local civilian 

agencies are primarily responsible for the management of the particular incident. Under 

the homeland operations concept, the Air Force’s involvement is supportive and 

dependent on a request to the DOD from the designated lead agency. Traditionally, 

DSCA operations were either considered crisis or consequence management. Crisis 

management activities were handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and 

consequence management by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. That 

distinction is now replaced with domestic incident management, a full-spectrum 

perspective that sees each event as a single incident requiring an integrated response.

For most homeland security scenarios, Air Force forces should be presented as 

an AETF under the OPCON of a COMAFFOR, just as in any other theater. For 

homeland operations in the NORTHCOM AOR, 1 AF at Tyndall AFB, Florida, normally 

fulfills the role of Air Force component to USNORTHCOM, the supported combatant 

command. The commander, 1AF, is also the CFACC within the NORAD chain for the 

CONUS NORAD region. The command relationships between a JFC and a 

COMAFFOR in a homeland context should be as previously described for any other 

region—although legal and interagency considerations may have a significant impact. 

The CONUS is not a special case regarding C2 or organization of air and space forces.

Single-Service task forces may also be established in homeland operations. See AFDD 

2, Organization and Employment, and AFDD 2-10, Homeland Operations, for more 

information on homeland operations. 

Additionally, Civil Air Patrol (CAP) as an auxiliary of the Air Force can be used to 

perform Air Force assigned missions. These non-combatant missions encompass 

homeland operations, search and rescue, disaster relief and support to law enforcement 

authorities. See AFI 10-2701, Organization and Function of the Civil Air Patrol, for more 

information.

Air Force C2 in Continental US Air Defense Operations 

The commander, 1AF, in his role as the CONUS NORAD region (CONR) 

commander, provides CDRNORAD/commander, US Element NORAD with surveillance 

and control of the airspace of the United States and appropriate response against air 

attack. The CONUS region commander is operationally responsible for centralized 

command of the CONUS region air defense activities. Decentralized control may be 

executed by the three air defense sectors (ADS). They are responsible for the tactical 

execution of air sovereignty and defense through detection, identification, and required 

tactical response. The ADS integrates fighters, tankers, air defense artillery assets, 

surface radars, and other US agencies’ aircraft for air defense missions. During 

homeland defense operations, ground-based and airborne radar elements of the TACS 

support air operations primarily by providing low-level gap filler coverage and relaying 
68

C2 guidance in the event fighters are below the ADS’ radar or radio coverage. For more 

on CONUS air defense operations, see AFTTP(I) 3-2.50, Air Defense of the United 

States (Classified). 
69

“ . . . [A] good plan violently executed now is 

better than a perfect plan next week.” 

. 

—Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. 

 CHAPTER FOUR 

COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESSES 

 

C2 OF AIR FORCE FUNCTIONS

The COMAFFOR’s mission is to command, control, and execute air and space 

capabilities across the full range of military operations. He must be provided a means to 

accomplish this task. JP 1-02 states, “C2 functions for the joint and Service force are 

performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 

and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.” All Air Force 

functions require C2 for effective employment. The processes and functions described 

below are required for a commander to effectively plan and execute a military operation. 

These functions, combined with a C2 system to monitor the progress of the operation 

and provide feedback, will aid in the successful prosecution of the military operation. 

The C2 functions as discussed in JP 1-02 are discussed below. 

Effective C2 decisions use a dynamic process that starts when data are received 

from various sources and are analyzed to form information. This information is then 

used as the basis for making decisions. Once the appropriate decisions are made, the 

commander formulates guidance and communicates it to subordinates for execution. 

Often, these C2 decision processes are continuous and proactive in the sense that 

many decisions are planned for in advance and are not normally done in a reactive 

manner. The Air Force uses principles of EBAO in this process to ensure there is a 

coherent plan that logically supports and ties all objectives and the end state together. 

The C2 decision process occurs at all levels of command with the key objective of 

making or delegating rational and timely decisions. 

PLANNING

 

Plans are an important way for the JFC to communicate intent to subordinates 

and unify the efforts of the joint force. Joint force operational planning links the tactical 

employment of forces to campaign and strategic objectives through the achievement of 
70

operational goals. JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, gives a full description of the joint 

planning process. The focus of JFC planning is on operational art and design. 

Operational art is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to 

efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission. 

Operational design is the practical extension of operational art. Together they 

synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical and logical 

process of design The JFC requires a C2 structure that enables effective planning, 

execution, and assessment for his/her mission to be successful. 

Planning is one process essential to effectively commanding and 

controlling military operations. Military operations must be extensively planned and 

then monitored, assessed, and adapted to shape the operational environment to create 

the desired effects that will ensure success. Planning is the process of examining the 

environment, relating objectives with resources, and deciding on a COA. Commanders 

make planning decisions through a rational analysis of costs, evaluation of benefits, and 

an acceptance of residual risks approach. The key C2 component of these planning 

activities is the commander’s estimate process. 

JP 1-02 defines the commander’s estimate of a situation as “a logical process of 

reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military 

situation and arrives at a decision as to a COA to be taken to accomplish the mission.” 

The air component assists in the development of the JFC’s estimate, specifically: 

assessing the mission, developing COAs that are responsive to the situation, analyzing 

adversary COAs (defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, escalate, and delay), comparing 

friendly COAs, and selecting a COA, or possibly multiple COAs. 

As detailed in AFDD 2, the Air Force’s estimate process integrates air and space 

power into COAs that are presented to the JFC for a decision. The estimate process is 

the primary way for Airmen to influence the JFC’s COA decision process. The time 

relationship between the JFC’s and the Air Force component’s estimate processes is 

critical. Both processes are interrelated and should be accomplished simultaneously. A 

desired goal is to have one staff, one process, and one product. 

A JFC may also need to synthesize COAs from those recommended by 

subordinates in order to satisfy the criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, variety, 

and completeness. The inputs of Airmen are critical in this synthesis process. Air and 

space power requires early consideration when integrating air and space missions into a 

campaign plan. Planning based solely upon deconfliction and synchronization, either 

geographically or temporally, denies air and space power its flexibility. Planning should 

focus on integrating air and space power into operations that will achieve specific 

objectives and effects. 

 The Air Force employs the joint air estimate process (JAEP), the air, space, and 

cyberspace component’s extension of the joint operations planning process (JOPP). It is 

a six-phase process that culminates with the production of the JAOP. For more on the 

joint air estimate process, see JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

The JAEP may be employed during contingency planning, producing joint air operations 
71

plans supporting operation plans or operation plans in concept format, or crisis action 

planning (CAP) in concert with other theater operations planning. While the phases are 

presented in sequential order, work on them can be either concurrent or sequential. 

Nevertheless, the phases are integrated and the products of each phase are checked 

and verified for coherence. The phases are mission analysis, situation and COA 

development, COA analysis, COA comparison, COA selection, COA assessment, and 

JAOP development.

Once the JFC decides on a COA, joint and Service component commanders 

develop their plans to support the JFC’s overall objectives. The CFACC produces the 

detailed plan to achieve assigned objectives for air and space forces. The JAOP is the 

output of this process and forms the basis for day-to-day tactical operations. Another 

important JFC decision is the apportionment of air and space power to accomplish the 

JAOP. In turn, the CFACC allocates JFC-apportioned air power to satisfy joint 

objectives. 

There are many notional decision-making models available for use such as the 

OODA loop; Lawson’s model (sense, process, compare, decide, and act); and the 

generic monitor, assess, plan, execute (MAPE) model, which uses the effects-based 

construct. The Air Force C2 capabilities must be able to monitor, assess, plan, and 

execute the Air Force’s air, space, and information missions to be effective. The 

following definitions of planning and execution capabilities and processes bring into 

focus the continuum of action required to link operational capabilities to achieve desired 

effects. The four sub-capabilities that make up this capability are monitoring, assessing, 

planning, and executing. 

 Monitoring involves the processes of collecting, storing, maintaining, and 

tracking data. 

 Assessing results is the ability to determine the nature and impact of conditions 

and events on force capabilities and commander’s intent. It involves the 

processes of analyzing and evaluating information collected in the monitoring 

function, aided by modeling and simulation, to describe situational awareness 

and alternative solutions. 

 Planning is how we develop courses of action based on information collected in 

the monitoring function. This information is analyzed in the assess function to

support the operational objectives; develop, evaluate, and select courses of 

action; generate force lists (capabilities) and force movement requirements; and 

detail the timing of sequential actions. Planning is essentially a description and 

prioritization of how to achieve stated mission goals. 

 Executing is the overall dissemination and action of the plan, synchronization of 

forces, and adjustment of operations in response to assessment to ensure 

successful mission accomplishment.
72

THE AIR FORCE COMPONENT PLANNING PROCESS 

Planning for Deployment, Employment, Sustainment, and 

Redeployment of Air Force Forces 

The US Armed Forces provide the military dimension of national power 

projection. Power projection is defined in the joint lexicon as the ability of a nation to 

apply all or some of its elements of national power—diplomatic, economic, 

informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and 

from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and 

to enhance regional stability. Military forces can be used as part of our national security 

strategy for force projection. The joint definition of force projection is: “The ability to 

project the military element of national power from the CONUS or another theater, in 

response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend 

from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home 

theater.” Allied with this concept is the joint concept of focused logistics, which defines 

the support and control activities to deliver warfighting capability. This capability is a 

core aspect of deployment, redeployment, and sustainment of military forces. C2 

professionals must employ force projection and focused logistics to plan for deployment, 

employment, sustainment, and redeployment of C2 forces, depending on the nature of 

the tasked mission. 

One aspect of planning for the employment of forces is preparing the operational 

environment. Each operation, each theater, and each command arrangement will bring 

differing requirements for the employment of C2 systems. Planning and preparation in 

advance of a tasking are essential to a successful operation. Planning must also be 

performed for post-hostilities scenarios, such as nation-building or redeployment of 

forces. Operations do not cease simply because combat operations have terminated. 

Preparing the operational environment is defined as assessing, developing, and 

posturing for the employment of forces in an operational area. This environment 

includes the factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply 

combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. Actions include but are not 

limited to: 

 Knowing the operational environment, factors, and conditions. 

 Performing intelligence gathering and disseminating intelligence. 

 Garnering and clarifying strategic, operational, and tactical levels of support. 

 Identifying employment requirements through contingency and crisis action planning. 

 Defining levels of strategic and theater assets (prepositioned or for deployment). 

 Accomplishing host-nation and coalition support agreements. 
73

Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility 

of command. Planning is performed at every echelon of command, and it is 

conducted across the range of military operations. 

—Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Operations Planning 

 Establishing and maintaining deployment capabilities of resources through 

intratheater and intertheater movement. 

 Preparing for conflict termination and redeployment of forces. 

To establish the sustainment of forces, planners must understand the joint 

community’s concept of focused logistics. This concept seeks to replace the historical 

logistics emphasis on mass with a new emphasis on speed and precision through joint 

deployment and theater distribution.

Types of Planning and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System (JOPES) 

The Air Force recognizes the importance of the JOPES process to the warfighter. 

The JOPES process includes threat identification, strategy determination, COA 

development, detailed planning, and implementation. Contingency and crisis action 

planning are the primary operational planning activities described in JOPES, and they 

are implemented in the JOPP. The key component of these JOPES planning activities 

is the commander's estimate decision process. 

There are two types of planning that are used to prepare for contingencies, 

briefly described below. See JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, for a full description of 

the joint operational planning process. 

Contingency planning is the first type, which occurs in non-crisis situations. A 

contingency is a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural 

and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, 

or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef. The joint planning and 

execution community uses contingency planning to develop plans for a broad range of 

contingencies. Contingency planning facilitates the transition to CAP. 

CAP is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and 

emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. Crisis 

action planners base their plan on the actual circumstances that exist at the time 

planning occurs. They follow prescribed CAP procedures that parallel contingency 

planning, but are more flexible and responsive to changing events.

The Service component commands perform joint planning functions both within 

the chain of command and under the administrative control of the military departments. 

This is the role of the COMAFFOR and his/her AFFOR staff, primarily the A-5. Within 

the chain of command, the Service component commands recommend the proper force 

composition and employment of Service forces. They provide Service forces and 
74

support information for joint planning, and prepare component-level operation plans or 

OPORDs in support of taskings assigned to the combatant commands. Under their 

ADCON responsibilities, the Service component commands prepare and execute 

administrative and logistic plans to support operating forces.

The JOPP is a coordinated joint staff procedure used by commanders to 

determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the actions 

necessary to accomplish those tasks. JOPES is used to conduct joint planning. JOPES 

facilitates the building and maintenance of OPLANs and concept plans, which are also 

referred to as OPLANS in concept format (CONPLANs) (with or without time phased 

force deployment data [TPFDD]). It aids in the development of effective options and 

OPORDs through adaptation of OPLANs or plan creation in a no-plan scenario. JOPES 

provides policies and procedures to ensure effective management of planning 

operations across the spectrum of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, 

and redeployment. As part of the application suite approved to ride on the GCCS 

architecture, JOPES supports the deployment and transportation aspects of joint 

operation planning and execution. The Air Force uses JOPES, which then feeds the 

JOPP.

Each Service has its own war planning systems and databases. The Air Force 

war and mobilization plan (WMP) is published in six volumes. It provides major

commands and Air Force staff agencies consolidated guidance concerning the support 

of combatant forces and mobilization planning. The WMP provides consolidated lists of 

OPLANs, lists of combat and support forces available to support OPLANs, planned 

positioning and use of aircraft forces in support of joint OPLANs, basic planning factors, 

and base use.

Once the contingency planning or CAP process is completed, a number of COAs 

are presented to the JFC, who then decides on one COA (or a combination of COAs). 

The selected COA is then refined and disseminated to commanders for further planning 

and execution by their respective component staffs. 

COA Selection and AOC and AFFOR Staff Interface 

 Commanders select a COA (or multiple COAs) for operations to commence. This 

is part of command responsibility, to provide guidance for subordinates. Once a COA is 

selected, the JFC then develops an OPORD that describes the COA and tasks 

supporting commanders to implement the approved COA. The primary purpose of the 

OPORD is to provide guidance and direction to subordinate units. The Service 

component of commands (in this case, the COMAFFOR) develops Service aspects of 

the COA, determines force and resource requirements, and builds TPFDDs to 

implement the deployment aspects of the COA. The COMAFFOR also works within 

Service channels to identify combat support forces, critical materiel, sustaining supplies, 

filler and replacement personnel, and reserve component asset availability. 

 As the JFC develops the OPORD prior to execution, subordinate Service and 

functional components (in this case, the COMAFFOR) are also tasked to develop 

supporting plans and/or OPORDs. These products should then be cross-walked by the 

JFC staff to ensure integration. Simultaneously and in coordination, the AFFOR Staff, 
75

usually led by the A-5, will develop an Air Force component supporting plan or OPORD 

to capture information pertinent to Air Force forces deploying to and employing within 

the particular area of operations. 

 The Service component supporting plan or OPORD should follow JOPES 

formats and be comprehensive enough to cover all combat support aspects of how the 

Air Force will fight. The Service OPORD may overlap the CFACC’s JAOP—the sole 

employment plan for air and space component forces—in some respects, but this may 

be necessary to give appropriate guidance to the AFFOR staff where their duties differ 

from those of the CFACC’s AOC staff. Although contingency planning may provide 

many rich samples of theater planning, often the OPORD or supporting plan developed 

must now reflect the reality of the situation (since many of the contingency planning 

assumptions are no longer assumed or necessarily valid). 

 This OPORD should include a basic plan plus appropriate annexes and 

appendices. Ownership of the annexes and appendices is divided among the AFFOR 

staff; and, once developed and approved, should be made available to all Air Force 

units within the AETF for execution. See AFDD 2 for an expanded discussion of the Air 

Force component planning process. 

DIRECTING 

Directing is giving specific instructions and guidance to subordinate units.

Superior commanders often give specific instructions to subordinates on mission 

objectives, situation, resources, and acceptable risks. Commanders should also give 

their guidance or “intent” to subordinates as a way to encourage initiative and reduce 

the uncertainty throughout the spectrum of conflict. Direction is guidance to or 

management of support staff functions, inherent within command but not a command 

authority in its own right. In some cases, direction can be considered an explicit 

instruction or order. It is used by commanders and their designated subordinates to 

facilitate, channel, or motivate support staff to achieve appropriate action, tempo, or 

intensity. It is used by directors of staff agencies on behalf of the commander to provide 

guidance to their staffs on how best to accomplish stated objectives in accordance with 

the commander’s intent. 

COORDINATING 

Coordinating is sharing information to gain consensus, explain tasks, and 

optimize operations. To ensure required support is available, coordination in advance of 

execution is critical. Commanders should ensure the shared information (both vertical 

and horizontal) produces trusting relationships and gains agreements necessary for 

efficient multinational and joint operations. Coordination is defined as the necessary 

action to ensure adequate exchange of information to integrate, synchronize, and 

deconflict operations between separate organizations. Its benefits include minimizing 

risk of fratricide; ensuring adequate exchange of information to integrate, synchronize, 

and deconflict operations between separate organizations; and mutual exchange of 

information. Coordination is not necessarily a process of gaining approval but is most 

often used for mutual exchange of information. It is normally used between functions of 
76

a supporting staff. DIRLAUTH is used to coordinate with an organization outside of the 

immediate staff or organization, or between component staffs. Although each 

component of a joint force develops its own plan as part of the JFC’s overall effort, 

these plans are most successful if they are coordinated among the Service 

components. Plans should be coordinated with as much time as possible before 

execution, to ensure all required support is coordinated for the operation. 

CONTROLLING 

Controlling is a composite function that uses parts of the planning, directing, and 

coordinating processes to ensure efficient execution of operations. Controlling requires 

current information to produce feedback. Feedback is essential to correct errant results 

or to issue new orders that exploit advantages. Controlling involves a means to 

disseminate guidance and to influence ongoing and future operations. Controlling 

operations or processes may span the spectrum from involvement in every aspect to 

giving generalized guidance to achieve a result. The span of control given to 

subordinates depends on the situation, the personality of the commander, and the 

confidence the commander has in the subordinate to carry out the task. 

ASSESSING 

Assessing is determining the nature and impact of conditions and events to 

include the military implications of intelligence indicators, environmental effects, and 

orders of battle. It implies ability to develop situational awareness, evaluate threats and 

opportunities and to provide early warning and attack assessment to: 

 Determine and assess the nature and impact of critical events in the operational 

environment. 

 Assess status of resources. 

 Assess the impact of environmental factors on operations. 

 Assess termination options, conditions, and proposals. 

 Assess implications of fused, all source intelligence. 

 Assess events relative to ROE, treaties, and agreements. 

 Conduct effects-based assessment in order to adapt effects and taskings to execute 

operations in the future. 
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War is a matter of vital importance to the state, the province of life or 

death, the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly 

studied. 

 —Sun Tzu, The Art of War 

CHAPTER FIVE 

TECHNOLOGY ATTRIBUTES AND DEVELOPING C2 PROFESSIONALS 

People, processes, and effective use of available technology enable successful 

C2 for military operations. Processes were discussed previously. This chapter 

discusses the other two central themes that affect C2. One theme, the technology 

element, covers the equipment, communications, and facilities needed to overcome the 

warfighting problems of integrating actions across space and time. Technology 

elements tend to dominate C2 doctrine, because advanced technology characterizes 

American warfare. Technology attributes are important and must be understood before 

C2 operations can be conducted effectively. The other theme, personnel, covers the 

human aspects of C2, including the requirement to develop C2 professionals to meet 

the complex global requirements of today’s military operations. Personnel, technology, 

and processes must all come together to efficiently execute C2 functions. 

JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, states: “The objective of the joint 

communications system is to facilitate the proper integration and employment of joint 

force operational capabilities through effective command and control.” It also must 

ensure the continuous, automated flow and processing of information. The joint C2 

system must be interoperable, reliable, mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable. 

These principles provide the foundation on which the Services build their systems and 

are applied during planning and execution of military operations. The C2 system 

provides the JFC with the ability to control the flow and processing of information. It

supports the JFC’s decision-making process and provides him/her with the capability to 

achieve the desired effects during joint operations. 

In accordance with guidelines and direction from the SecDef, each military 

department or Service, as appropriate, has the following common functions and 

responsibilities pertaining to joint operations: 

 To provide flexibility, as required, to meet changing situations and diversified 

operations with minimum disruption or delay. 

 To provide interoperable and compatible C2 systems, warfighters, and reserves of 

equipment and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and to plan for the 

expansion of peacetime communications to meet the needs of war. 
78

 To provide, organize, train, and equip its C2 systems personnel and provide 

interoperable and compatible C2 systems equipment for joint operations. 

 To install, operate, and maintain assigned facilities of the DISN, including the 

capability of meeting the provisions of applicable standards. 

 To maintain mobile, transportable C2 system assets, which are controlled by the

CJCS, in a high state of readiness. 

The Services must provide C2 systems that can support joint operations. This is 

established as part of their mission to train and equip personnel and forces to be 

employed by the JFC. When forces are deployed for a contingency, it is too late to 

discover that C2 systems do not meet the characteristics discussed below. Failure to 

achieve joint standards among C2 systems will result in system degradation, if not 

mission failure. Coalition C2 system characteristics and requirements must also be 

considered during system procurement and in contingency planning. 

INTEROPERABILITY 

Interoperability is the ability of C2 systems to exchange information, allowing 

warfighters to operate effectively together. Interoperability is best achieved by adhering 

to technology and process standards that allow information flow. Unity of command is 

difficult, if not impossible, to achieve when C2 systems do not work together. In the 

past, most C2 systems were designed strictly to meet the needs of a particular Service 

or functional commander. This is changing. However, the focus on multinational 

operations will continue to challenge us, particularly in security issues and technology 

gaps. Every effort should be made to share the needed information efficiently among 

the multinational forces participating in an operation. 

 Numerous directives require the 

Services to migrate existing Service- or 

function-specific C2 systems and 

applications to a standard defense 

information infrastructure (DII). This 

infrastructure is not a C2 system, but 

provides a common operating environment 

(COE) or a foundation for building where 

functionality is added or removed in small, 

manageable segments. To achieve 

interoperability, the DOD established the 

joint technical architecture (JTA) and the 

communications systems support (CSS) 

architectural framework. The framework 

implements a standard DOD architecture 

that provides the needed structure while systems are in the developmental and system 

engineering phases of acquisition. The JTA identifies a common set of mandatory 

USAF C2 systems must be 

interoperable with joint and 

combined systems. 
79

The Three Segments of Communications Connectivity 

 The “first 400 feet” is what the customer actually sees. It consists of 

those applications, the environment, services, and functionality used to train, 

organize and equip the user on a daily basis. This includes elements deployed 

as part of a C2 element, such as the AOC or possibly a flying squadron. The first 

400 feet involve software and hardware applications that the customers see 

every day, including the desktop computers, FAX machines, telephones, and 

radios at the users’ fingertips. The first 400 feet also include behind-the-scenes 

services such as processing imagery devices that tie the customers' instruments 

together forming a network. This network interfaces with realms beyond the first 

400 feet. 

 There is also the segment known as “inside the gate,” or the base 

information infrastructure (BII). This provides an information utility between 

users and from users to the GIG. Services include on-site voice and data 

networks, protection of the networks from intrusion, official and unofficial 

electronic messaging, spectrum management, and interface to the global grid. 

Inside the gate systems may tie the ICC and individual squadrons together, as 

an example. 

 The last segment, “outside the gate,” connects to the GIG. Depending 

on its scope, this realm may be considered the global, defense, or theater 

information infrastructure. Regardless of its name, the outside the gate realm, in 

conjunction with the first 400 feet and inside the gate realms, tie together a 

system of systems to create the global grid. This element ties together the AOCforward with the AOC-rear or lateral or subordinate C2 nodes, to enable 

reachback, as well as support for the COMAFFOR and JFC from all aspects of 

the GIG. 

 —Multiple Sources

information technology standards and guidelines to be used for sending, receiving, 

understanding, and processing information. 

RELIABILITY AND REDUNDANCY 

Redundant C2 systems provide the ability for alternative C2 systems to continue 

operations in the event of failure or damage to the primary system. C2 system 

redundancy begins with planning. Redundancy requirements should balance the goal of 

mission success against natural failures. High value C2 systems that are difficult to back 

up, such as the AOC, are good candidates for redundancy planning. A COMAFFOR 

should plan for redundancy by using distributed C2 operations. For example, the 

commander could designate the alternate AOC or another NAF’s AOC as backup. This 

backup plan must be formalized by a set of agreements and specified in the OPLAN. It 

should also be exercised before military operations commence.
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COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES 

 Commanders must have access to information. This information is required for 

them to exercise Air Force distinctive capabilities. Commanders must be provided 

with tools for decision-making through effective control, exploitation, and 

protection of information regardless of form or function. The objective of 

communications and information services is to create a global and transparent interface 

to C2 centers and to provide users with the information necessary to carry out the 

mission. Commanders are provided a connection to the C2 centers through a common 

operating environment, collectively referred to as the GIG. A useful construct is to 

consider the C2 centers and their users as being divided into three segments or realms 

for communications connectivity: the “Last 400 Feet,” “Inside the Gate,” “and Outside 

the Gate,” as described above. 

USEABLE DATA FOR DECISION-MAKING 

Commanders must have actionable information that has been sorted and 

processed. Today’s information systems can process huge amounts of data and 

forward that data in near-real time. During a contingency, a commander usually cannot 

sort through a vast amount of data. There is simply too much data available and not 

enough time. The commander’s staff must analyze and sift through the data to forward 

information the commander actually needs to enable a decision. There is a concern that 

commanders and staffs will suffer from “information overload.” They could miss the truly 

important nugget of information while sorting through a mountain of data. The human 

element will always be required in the decision-making process. 

KEY NETWORKS 

C2 throughout the DOD relies on a series of networks to provide conduits for the 

rapid exchange of information among nodes. The networks are provided under the 

aegis of DISA or DIA, but individual network facilities are furnished, installed, operated, 

and maintained by one or another of the Service or functional components. For network 

facilities to be interoperable, they must adhere to protocol and performance standards 

established by DISA or DIA. The result is consistent, seamless, robust, and redundant 

data exchange service available to warfighters worldwide. Figure 5.1 presents a 

representative sample of key networks supporting the warfighter. 

Communications Planning 

Communications planning is an essential element of effective C2. The need to 

communicate effectively demands that planners analyze the commander’s requirements 

and translate those needs into workable solutions. These needs are normally met by 

installing a combination of organic and commercial communications systems prioritized 

to effectively support the commander’s tasking. The goal is to maximize the use of 

organic military capabilities and expand with commercial systems to increase capacity 

and reliability and to generate greater freedom of action. 
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Network Long Title Purpose Applications Supported 

NIPRNET Non-secure Internet 

Protocol Router 

Network 

Unclassified data 

exchange. Internet 

access. 

E-mail, browser-based data 

mining, GCSS, AFMSS, 

dissemination of public 

information, collaborative tools, 

office applications, DMS 

SIPRNET Secret Internet 

Protocol Router 

Network 

Classified data 

exchange. 

Command and 

control. 

GCCS, GCSS, AFMSS, TBMCS, 

JDISS, Intelink-S, collaborative 

tools, office applications, desktop 

VTC, E-mail, DMS 

JWICS Joint Worldwide 

Intelligence 

Communications 

System (also an 

Internet Protocol 

Router Network) 

SCI Exchange JDISS, Intelink, Intel applications, 

VTC, E-mail, collaborative tools, 

office applications, DMS 

DSN Defense Switched 

Network 

Telephone Service Unclassified voice, facsimile, dialin computer data transfer. Secure 

services via STU-III or STE. 

DRSN Defense Red Switched 

Network 

Secure Telephone 

Service 

Classified voice, video, fax and 

data. 

Figure 5.1. Key Networks Supporting the Warfighter. 

Modes of Communications Between C2 Systems 

The primary means of communications between C2 nodes are voice and data. 

Principal transmission should be through secure and anti-jam communications 

equipment. Air Force C2 nets use fixed communications, leased communications and 

space-based communications capabilities for mission accomplishment. Theater 

communications capabilities include line of sight and satellite systems, but planners 

should also ensure that radio relays are considered to enhance over-the-horizon radio 

communications. 

Joint Data Network 

The Joint Data Network (JDN) allows connectivity between joint commanders, 

staffs, and components. It is a network comprised of four subnetworks, each of which is 

optimized to enable certain joint warfighting capabilities. The complexity of the JDN is 

significant, and an effective JDN plan is a key consideration in the overall planning 

process. Planners include combatant commands, JTF, and component command 

staffs, in coordination with the supporting services. Responsibility for implementation 

and management of each of the JDN subnetworks is normally assigned as depicted in 

Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Organization for JDN Operations. 

Tactical Digital Information Links and Gateways 

 Tactical Digital Information Links (TADLs) (also referred to as TADILs) are 

standardized communication links, approved by the JCS, suitable for transmission of 

digital information. All Services, including the Air Force, use these links to support their 

doctrinal requirements to exchange data and information quickly and in a readily 

recognizable format. These links support many missions, including air defense, 

airspace control, and the exchange of ISR data. Link 16 has been designated as the 

primary data link for use in the combat air forces. Some examples of data links are: 

 Army Tactical Data Link 1. 

 Link-11/11B (TADIL A/TADIL B). 

 Link 14 (Maritime, UHF or HF). 

 Link 16 (TADIL J). 

CJCSM 6120.01C, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link Operating Procedures, provides a 

detailed description of each link shown above. 

 Other tools exist for extending the TADL network. The situation awareness data 

link (SADL) integrates Air Force close air support aircraft with the digitized battlefield via 

the Army’s enhanced position location reporting system. It provides fighter-to-fighter 

and air-to-ground/ground-to-air secure communications. The data link gateway is a 
83

Navy system that provides TADL connectivity to a wide variety of users. Ships, aircraft, 

ADA units and fixed C2 sites use either a host emulator or a terminal emulator to pass 

data via TADIL J links, if not TADIL J-equipped. Some AETACS and GTACS elements 

have this capability. The data link gateway can also be used for exercises and for 

operational training. 

Installation Mapping and Visualization for C2 Operations 

 Commanders and planners use a common installation picture for mission 

success. Installations represent the underlying platform for AF missions. Installation 

operations also require disciplined creation, management, and sharing of critical 

georeferenced information through modern mapping processes. The AFSPC GeoBase 

program satisfies this critical need across the installation mission spectrum. 

 The GeoBase program provides a data service, referred to as the “GeoBase 

Service,” that can be simultaneously accessed and exploited on Air Force networks by 

any number of base and higher headquarters organizations. Installation maps 

(geospatial data) are made available via the service to provide a single point of access 

for visualizing installation situations, conditions, assets, and facilities. The GeoBase 

service may be fused with functional automated information systems and other 

information and technology solutions providing the ability to view functional information 

assets via the base map. 

TESTING, CERTIFICATION, AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR C2 

SYSTEMS 

 C2 systems have certain requirements that must be met before they can be 

placed into service. These requirements are spelled out in DOD directives that govern 

the acquisition process. The DOD information technology security certification and 

accreditation process (DITSCAP) is composed of four phases: definition, verification, 

validation, and post accreditation. Phase 1, definition, is focused on understanding the 

mission, environment, and architecture to determine the security requirements and level 

of effort necessary to achieve accreditation. Phase 2, verification, verifies the evolving 

or modified system's compliance with the information agreed on in the systems security 

authorization agreements (SSAA) that govern the requirements process. Phase 3, 

validation, validates compliance of the fully integrated system with the information 

stated in the SSAA. Phases 1, 2, and 3 are repeated as often as necessary to produce 

an accredited system. Phase 4, post accreditation, includes those activities necessary 

for the continuing operation of the accredited information technology system in its 

computing environment and to address the changing threats a system faces through its 

life cycle. Phase 4 starts after the system has been certified and accredited for 

operations. The objectives of phase 4 are to ensure secure system management, 

operation, and maintenance to preserve an acceptable level of residual risk. Once 

certified, the C2 system is ready for employment. 
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C2 SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS 

 The fundamental purpose of C2 systems is to ensure commanders receive 

mission-essential information, make informed and timely decisions, and communicate 

appropriate commands to subordinates throughout the operation. To achieve this 

purpose, C2 systems must meet the cost, schedule, and performance criteria set during 

the requirements phase of the acquisition process. In establishing these requirements, 

users and developers must also ensure C2 systems are interoperable, sustainable, and 

survivable. For C2 systems to be effective they must be: 

 Flexible. Required to meet changing situations and diversified operations with 

minimum disruption or delay. 

 Responsive. Able to respond instantaneously to demands for information; must be 

reliable, redundant, and timely. 

 Mobile. Must be as mobile as the forces, elements, or organizations they support 

without degraded information quality or flow. 

 Disciplined. The C2 infrastructure must be focused, balanced, and based on 

predetermined needs for critical information. 

 Survivable. National policy dictates the survivability of national command centers 

and the communications systems through which decisions are transmitted to forces. 

 Sustainable. Must provide continuous support during any type and length of 

operations; requires economical design and employment. 

 Interoperable. Should be able to operate with key joint and coalition C2 systems. 

Threats to C2 Systems 

A distributed network, such as the GIG, feeds on shared information, over a robust 

communications network. The GIG relies on a global grid of linked US and allied military 

and multinational commercial networks and communications systems for its inputs. This 

grid, along with advanced sensors and automation, enables information sharing and 

thus information superiority. 

The threat to a network, such as the GIG, is two-fold. First, since the system feeds 

on information, an enemy can target the distributed network with robust IO. Because of 

the inexpensive nature of this threat, even the weakest adversary is capable of 

conducting an aggressive campaign to infiltrate, corrupt, disrupt, and neutralize 

information flow. This capability produces an asymmetric relationship in any future 

conflict. No matter how strong our military forces may be, a capable IO adversary could 

adversely affect our C2 capability if we are not fully protected. 
85

The second threat is to our communications links. The GIG provides robust, 

redundant communications. We must always be vigilant for a potential adversary 

attempting to disrupt our communications links, whether they are provided through 

purely military means or through increased use of the civilian communications sector. 

Further, future space capabilities of foreign powers may require increased attention to 

air and space superiority, as our space-based platforms are critical to successful 

distributed operations. The design of the GIG must also contain enough redundancy so 

that single points of failure do not present themselves as lucrative targets to an 

adversary. 

There is also the threat of physical violence, either through conventional attack or 

terrorist activity. One aspect of distributed operations is to present a smaller forward C2 

presence in order to minimize risk. However, there is always a risk, even to forces in 

the US, and therefore force protection will continue to be a major concern for the 

commander. The operational and communications architecture should be designed with 

sufficient reliability, redundancy, and protections to ensure robust operation and minimal 

degradation. This facet should be exercised regularly in training events for the C2 

system. 

Threats to C2 systems, including information systems, can come from a variety 

of sources. Adversaries include hostile nations, groups, or individuals, and may include 

domestic threats. Specific threats to C2 systems may consist of the operations/activities 

shown below: 

 Masquerading. Also known as attempting to gain access by posing as an authorized 

user. Information assurance programs, password selection, use, and protection are 

vital to counter these intrusions. 

 Network attack. The employment of network-based capabilities to destroy, disrupt, 

corrupt, or usurp information resident in or transiting through networks. Networks 

include telephony and data service networks. 

 Spoofing. The insertion of data causing a system to inadvertently disclose 

information or data. 

 Electronic warfare (EW). EW can cause denial of service and corruption of data by 

employing electromagnetic energy. Electromagnetic pulses can corrupt and destroy 

data stored on magnetic media and damage software and hardware. 

 Other operations/activities revealed by foreign intelligence. Foreign intelligence can 

provide information in support of other threats. It can provide insight into 

communications infrastructure and information transfer techniques. Foreign 

intelligence is an all-source threat that includes signals intelligence, human 

intelligence, and possibly other sources. 

 Substitution and modification. This disrupts planning and operations by modifying or 

substituting false data or information in a system. The objective can be to influence 
86

a specific plan or operation, and shake the user’s faith in the integrity of his/her 

information. 

 Physical attacks. Physical attacks or destruction because of natural disaster can be 

a threat to information systems. Facilities and physical resources may be lost, and 

the loss of connectivity can be devastating. 

 Unauthorized access. Access to any computer, network, storage medium, system, 

program, file, data, user area, or other private repository, without the express 

permission of the owner. 

Network Defense and Network Operations Organizations 

NetD and Network Operations (NETOPS) organizations provide US forces with 

critical capabilities to realize the effects of information and decision superiority. 

Collectively, these organizations provide varying degrees of NetD and NETOPS 

support. They provide commanders with real-time intrusion detection and perimeter 

defense capabilities, network management and fault resolution activities, data fusion, 

assessment, and decision support. During employment, organizations are arranged 

into a three-tiered operational hierarchy which facilitates synchronized application of 

their collective capabilities in support of DOD's defense-in-depth security strategy. This 

defense-in-depth approach employs and integrates the abilities of people, operations, 

and technology to establish multilayer, multidimensional protection. Security and 

protection include policies and programs to help counter internal and external threats—

whether foreign or domestic—to include protection against trusted insider misconduct or 

error. For more information on NetD and NETOPS organizations, see AFDD 2-5, 

Information Operations.

Information Assurance (IA) 

 IA is a key enabler of C2 capabilities. IA comprises those measures taken to 

protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, 

integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation (ability to prove sender’s 

identity and prove delivery to recipient). IA depends on the continuous integration of 

trained personnel, operational and technical capabilities, and necessary policies and 

procedures to guarantee continuous and dependable information, while providing the 

means to efficiently reconstitute these vital services following disruptions of any kind, 

whether from an attack, natural disaster, equipment failure, or operator error. In an 

assured information environment, C2 professionals and other warfighters can leverage 

the power of the information age. 

 Developing and implementing security and protection in the 21st Century 

requires recognition of the globalization of information and information systems. 

Security, like interoperability, must be incorporated into information systems designs 

from the beginning to be effective and affordable. Levels of protection must be 

commensurate to the importance and vulnerability of the specific information and 

information systems. An IMP is effective in developing IA capabilities, but will also 
87

speed the transfer of critical information. It will route information in the most expeditious 

manner throughout the C2 system. Internal and external attack threats must be 

anticipated as a part of the IMP. The various types of threats include:

 Hacker. An unauthorized user who attempts to or gains access to an information 

system with intent to cause malicious destruction of data. 

 Disgruntled system users. Authorized users with malicious intent who abuse the 

system. 

 Poor communications security (COMSEC), computer security, and operations 

security practices. 

 Viruses (malicious code). 

 Unauthorized/unintentional disclosure of data. This threat increases proportionally to 

the Air Force’s use of automation. 

 Corruption of data. This is an insidious method of deception, which, if undetected, 

leads to faulty guidance, coordination, decision-making, and execution. 

 Physical disruption or denial of communications. This threat can be internally or 

externally generated. 

 Terrorist groups. 

 State sponsored information attacks. 

Protection and defense of information and information systems is accomplished 

through aggressive application of IA measures. The predominant means to apply IA is 

through information security, which could include intrusion detection, effective isolation, 

and incident response to restore information and system security. Vigilance must be 

maintained when securing any form of information medium or communication system. 

The dynamic nature of the developing information environment requires well-developed 

IA programs to ensure effective information management (IM). 

 Education programs for information security are essential for Airmen, enabling 

them to conduct their duties in today’s complex technological environment. Traditional 

programs such as COMSEC, physical security, emissions security, and NetD are 

methods to protect our information and information systems. In addition, other IA 

programs help assess the interoperability, compatibility, and supportability of our 

information systems and aim specifically to reduce vulnerabilities and to improve the 

overall security of shared networks and systems. Due to the US dependency on and the 

general vulnerability of information and its supporting systems, IA is essential to 

effective C2 operations.

A well crafted and coordinated set of integrated, interoperable procedures are of 

great importance, considering the increasing joint and multinational context of current 
88

and future operations. The value of technology, organization, and strategy is diminished 

in the absence of a professional force to leverage their value. To meet uncertain 

challenges on the horizon, that force must be fully indoctrinated in employment of joint 

and multinational warfighting capabilities. They must also be trained to embody the 

inherent adaptability required to react to and counter the dynamics of an asymmetric 

operational environment. A comprehensive and thoroughly rehearsed library of 

operational procedures is crucial to developing that required degree of proficiency. 

Information systems and networks must be of sufficient scale, capacity, reach, and 

reliability to support evolving operational and training missions. 

Information Management 

An effective plan and operating procedures for handling information are an asset 

to commanders and all members of the task force. C2 is essentially about information: 

getting it, judging its value, processing it into useful form, acting on it, and sharing it with 

others. There are two basic uses for information. The first is to help create situational 

awareness as the basis for a decision. The second is to direct and coordinate actions in 

the execution of the decision. The C2 system must present information in a form that is 

both quickly understood and useful to the recipient. Many sources of information are 

imperfect and susceptible to distortion and deception. 

 Combining pieces of information with context produces ideas or provides 

knowledge. C2 is as much a problem of IM as it is of carrying out other warfighting 

tasks. Good IM makes accomplishment of other tasks less complex. Automation and 

standardization of communications system processes and procedures improve IM and 

assist the commander’s effectiveness and speed of C2. Today, improved technology in 

mobility, weapons, sensors, and communications continues to reduce reaction time, 

increase the tempo of operations, and generate large amounts of information. If 

information is not well managed the reactions of commanders and decision makers and 

ultimately the joint force may be degraded. It is essential the communications system 

complement human capabilities and reduce or eliminate known limitations. Effective IM 

procedures need to be promulgated through the IMP and lessons learned need to be 

retained for future reference. 

Effective IM is everyone’s responsibility. All personnel are information managers. 

IM includes all processes involved in the creation, receipt, collection, control, 

dissemination, storage, retrieval, protection, and disposition of information. As an 

information user, each Airman has inherent responsibilities to acquire, assess, reason, 

question, correlate, fuse, place in context, and disseminate quality information to others. 

 IM procedures must be established by the operational community to enhance, 

exploit, and use the concept of distributed operations. Also, more effective use of 

existing bandwidth will result in better communications capability. Protocols for the 

timing and detail of information will eliminate a constant influx of information that tends 

to overwhelm the warfighter. Operators must decide early on exactly what information 

they require, and publish the rules for information exchange, then enforce the rules with 

information discipline. 
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Information Quality Criteria 

 The criteria shown below help characterize information quality. By applying these 

criteria, the danger of the commander and staff receiving too much information, or 

undigested or inaccurate information, can be mitigated. For information to be useful to 

the commander it must be: 

 Accurate. It must convey the true situation. 

 Relevant. It must apply to the mission, task, or situation ahead. 

 Timely. It must be available in time to make decisions. 

 Usable. It must be in a common, easily understood format and display. 

 Complete. It must reflect all necessary information required by the decision maker. 

 Brief. It must contain only the level of detail that is required. 

 Secure. It must be afforded adequate protection where required. 

The Importance of Information Systems Protection 

 Mission accomplishment depends on protecting and defending information and 

information systems from destruction, disruption, corruption, and safeguarding from 

intrusion and exploitation. Everyone should assume his or her information and 

information system is a target. Therefore, all users share responsibility for adequately 

protecting and defending friendly information and information systems. 

The success or failure of the JFC’s mission depends on his/her ability to have 

accurate and timely information available to the decision makers. The objective of this 

IM plan is to map all processes involved to synergistically function to deliver decisionready information to the AOC or other C2 node. As such, the right information needs to 

be given to the right person at the right time in the right format and level of detail 

needed for commanders to make the right decision positively affecting planning and 

execution of air and space operations. 

DEVELOPING AIR FORCE C2 PROFESSIONALS 

 A global C2 system requires a trained cadre of professionals to operate and to 

support the full range of military operations. Specialized training and education of C2 

professionals improves combat effectiveness; makes C2 capabilities universally 

understood, accepted, and exploitable by joint forces; and creates military and 

civilian C2 experts and leaders with a stronger foundation in force employment 

and capabilities. Some C2 nodes, such as a combat control team, have personnel 

assigned as crew members from a small and specialized career field. These individuals 
90

bring unique training and experience to their C2 nodes. They will probably spend an 

entire career applying their knowledge supporting C2 operations worldwide. Other C2 

nodes, such as an AOC, have a broad cross-section of Air Force specialties in their 

crew composition. Many positions in the AOC and other C2 nodes are filled by 

personnel who do not necessarily have a “C2” core Air Force specialty code. They may 

be trained as navigators or intelligence specialists, for example. These personnel may 

only be assigned to the AOC or other C2 node for one tour. They must become fully 

proficient in C2 operations while in that crew position to effectively and safely execute 

today’s complex military operations. 

 C2 operators function in war within an environment that cannot be precisely 

duplicated in peacetime. Therefore, realistic training on actual C2 operational equipment 

is critical to developing personnel with the judgment, experience, and instincts 

necessary to effectively perform C2 tasks. People, technology elements, and processes 

make C2 a force enhancer. Commanders must ensure their people are fully proficient at 

using designated C2 systems when performing wartime duties. Consequently, C2 

professionals should be trained and educated in the manner they intend to fight. This 

should include training, education, and exercise scenarios that simulate potential real 

world situations, as well as experiments and wargames that consider the broader 

implications of future conflict. 

TRAINING AIR FORCE C2 PROFESSIONALS 

C2 professionals should be trained throughout their careers to provide effective 

C2 of forces across the range of military operations and during all phases of an 

operation. Continual training is crucial to maintain proficiency because C2 forces, along 

with the forces they control and their tactics, techniques, and procedures are constantly 

evolving. In concert with training, evaluation is essential to identifying shortfalls and is a 

critical measure of training program effectiveness. Most C2 professionals function as 

part of a team. Experience gained in a variety of real world operations is always a plus 

in forming a crew or team of C2 professionals. It is not possible to outline the career 

track of each C2 career field in this or any other single document. There are, however, 

certain stages of training and career progression common to all C2 professionals. 

Accession, Initial Qualification, and Mission Qualification Training 

 Accession training establishes the basis for all future learning. Training C2 

professionals should begin in accession programs. Here the trainee gains knowledge 

and an appreciation for air and space operations in the context of overall Air Force and 

joint operations. C2 professionals learn their operating skills through initial qualification 

training (IQT). Formal C2 systems training and education begin with basic instruction on 

fundamental C2 competencies. C2 professionals receive IQT in their specific mission 

system. Mission qualification training (MQT) prepares C2 professionals for mission 

ready certification. MQT should include training by unit instructors on both operational 

systems and in exercises, if possible. The ultimate purpose of MQT is to prepare the C2 

professionals to accomplish all tasks associated with their particular mission and to 
91

ready them for their mission ready evaluation and certification. MQT is supplemented by 

the owning command for theater-specific and local area procedures to ensure that C2 

professionals are prepared to execute operations in their assigned area of 

responsibility. 

Continuation Training 

 Continuation training is proficiency or recurring training that ensures C2 

professionals remain adept in their skills and current in their knowledge. To maintain 

proficiency, they receive recurring training on all tasks required to perform their jobs, 

even those that may only be required on a periodic basis. If operators fail to 

demonstrate a required level of proficiency, they should receive individual training to 

correct any deficient areas. Additionally, supplemental training may be required when 

warranted by new procedures, hardware, or software affecting operational equipment. 

All categories of proficiency training (recurring, individual, and supplemental) may 

include classroom instruction, simulations, or hands-on training with an operational C2 

system. 

Operational Level Training 

 Advanced training covers any specific training in unique aspects of the 

operational mission. Once C2 professionals are declared mission ready they may 

receive advanced training to assure their proficiency in activities involving instruction, 

evaluation, or special mission requirements. For example, the Air Force weapons 

school provides advanced tactical-level training to select C2 personnel on the conduct 

and integration of C2 capabilities with theater operations. Those weapons school 

graduates then become subject matter experts in employing their respective weapon 

system and teach others in the operational art and provide updates on tactics. 

Training for Air Force C2 professionals extends from application of tactical 

procedures in a specific environment to understanding the principles involved in 

commanding forces across a theater of operations. C2 professionals should progress 

through levels of training commensurate with their levels of command or positions as a 

staff member or a key adviser to a functional commander. An appreciation of C2 

capabilities and requirements for operations across the full range of military operations 

is the goal for the training and education process for the C2 professional. 

Senior personnel such as the COMAFFOR, the CFACC, their staffs, and other 

personnel may require training to accomplish specific missions. These senior officers 

and their staffs must be able to execute critical C2 functions both in peacetime and 

during contingencies. Peacetime training opportunities afford the greatest environment 

to learn the art of effective C2, with the least impact on real world operations and in a 

permissive and forgiving learning environment. 

C2 warrior training is one form of operational training offered at the 505th 

Command and Control Wing located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and other locations. This 
92

In my travels around the world, foreign political and military leaders 

continually ask how we field such a talented, dedicated, and capable enlisted 

corps. Our enlisted corps is the envy of the world, and is a major reason we 

have emerged as the most respected air and space force on the planet. This 

is no accident. Over the years, we’ve invested heavily in our Airmen—in 

training, education, and benefits. We’ve reaped the rewards of these 

investments many times over, in war and peace. As we face new challenges, 

it’s imperative we continue to evolve the processes we use to develop 

Airmen. We must ensure our development opportunities produce the skills 

needed to remain the world’s premier enlisted air and space force. 

—General John P. Jumper, 

CSAF, 2001-2005 

training, while initially focused at the AOC staff, is rapidly evolving into a standard 

training curriculum for the C2 personnel who must staff and employ C2 centers.

The C2 warrior training will be relevant in the near term to operational-level C2, 

but is useful to those C2 personnel who man tactical-level nodes as well. The joint air 

ground operations group at Nellis AFB, Nevada, also conducts training in tactical C2 

processes, notably for TACP and ASOC personnel. 

Commanders and Development of C2 Professionals 

 Stringent standards of performance should be established to ensure C2 

professionals attain and maintain the high degree of proficiency required for mission 

success. Commanders at all levels should be involved with the training and evaluation 

of their personnel and should ensure they meet minimum standards before being 

certified mission ready. 

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine.... 
93

Suggested Readings 

Air Force Publications (Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the 

Air Force Doctrine Center web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil) 

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine 

AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development 

AFDD 2, Operations and Organization 

AFDD 2-1.5, Nuclear Operations 

AFDD 2-1.7, Airspace Control in the Combat Zone 

AFDD 2-2, Space Operations 

AFDD 2-4, Combat Support 

AFDD 2-5, Information Operations 

AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations 

AFDD 2-7, Special Operations 

AFDD 2-10, Homeland Security Operations 

AFI 10-207, Command Posts 

AFI 10-2701, Organization and Function of the Civil Air Patrol 

AFI 13-1AOC, Vol. 3, Operational Procedures-Air and Space Operations Center 

AFI 38-101, Air Force Organizations

AFI 51-604, Appointment to and Assumption of Command

AFOTTP 2-3.2, Air and Space Operations Center 

AFTTP 3-1, Vol. 26, Theater Air Control System 

The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and 

Programs; Future Concepts and Transformation Division, U.S. Air Force, November, 

2003. 
94

Joint Publications 

 

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) 

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States 

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations

JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats

JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations

JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations 

JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning 

JP 6-0, Joint Communications System 

Department of Defense Publications 

DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components 

DODI 5200.40, DOD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation 

Process (DITSCAP) 

The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, Director, Force Transformation, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 2005. 

Other Publications 

Articles 

Griffith, Thomas E, Colonel, USAF. Command Relations at the Operational Level of War 

Kenney, MacArthur, and Arnold. Airpower Journal, Summer 1999.

Books 

Alberts, David E., and Richard E. Hayes. Power to the Edge, Command and Control in 

the Information Age. Command and Control Research Program, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (NII). 2003.

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, trans. and ed., Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 

Princeton University Press. 1984. 
95

Clodfelter, Richard, The Limits of Airpower (Free Press). 1989. 

Coakley, Thomas P., Command and Control for War and Peace, (NDU Press). 1992. 

Cole, Ronald H., Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada, The Planning and Execution of 

Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October - 2 November 1983. Joint History Office, Office 

of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, DC. 1997.

Davis, Richard G., Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe. (DC). 1992. 

Gordon, Michael R., and Trainor, Bernard E., Lieutenant General USMC (Retired). The 

General's War. (Little Brown and Company). 1995. 

Grant, Rebecca., The First 600 Days of Combat: The US Air Force in the Global War on 

Terrorism. (IRIS Press). 2004. 

Hallion, Richard P., Storm Over Iraq, Air Power and the Gulf War. (Smithsonian 

Institution Press). 1992. 

Kenney, George C., General. General Kenney Reports. (DC). 1987. 

Owen, Robert C., Colonel, USAF. Deliberate Force, A Case Study in Effective Air 

Campaigning. (Air University Press). 2000. 

Patton, George S., Jr. General, War as I Knew It. (Houghton Mifflin Company). 1947. 

Snyder, Thomas S., and Betty A. Boyce, Air Force Communications Command: 1938-

1991, an Illustrated History. (Air Force Communications Command Office of History). 

1991. 

Westenhoff, Charles M., Lt Col, USAF. Military Air Power, the CADRE Digest of Air 

Power, Opinions and Thoughts. (Air University Press). 1990. 

Research Reports 

Djuric, Teresa A. H., Lt Col, USAF. Future Command and Control of Aerospace 

Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001. (US Army War College). US Army War 

College Strategy Research Project. 

Hallion, Richard P., Ph.D., SES, USAF. Control of the Air: The Enduring Requirement. 

Bolling AFB, Washington DC. Air Force History and Museums Program. September, 

1999. 

Headquarters United States Air Force, Office of Air Force Lessons Learned, AF/XOL. 

Operation ANACONDA: An Air Power Perspective. February 7, 2005. 
96

Headquarters United States Air Force, Office of Air Force Lessons Learned, AF/A9L. 

Air Force Support to Hurricane Katrina/Rita Relief Operations. Undated. 

Office of the President of the United States, The Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina, Lessons Learned. February, 2006. 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Reading List 

CSAF’s professional reading list, with links to book reviews, is available on the Air Force 

web site at: http://www.af.mil/library/csafreading/index.asp. The list is subject to 

revision. Readers are encouraged to check the website for the most current 

information.
97

APPENDIX A 

TRANSFER OF FORCES AND COMMAND AUTHORITY 

Transfer of Forces 

Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. 

Combatant command (COCOM—command authority) is vested only in commanders of 

combatant commands or as directed by the President and is nontransferable.

Operational control (OPCON) is command authority that may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be 

delegated within the command. Tactical control (TACON) is the detailed direction and 

control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to 

accomplish assigned missions or tasks. 

When the transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown 

but long period of time) forces should be reassigned. When transfer of forces to a joint 

force is temporary, the forces are attached to the gaining command and JFCs will 

exercise OPCON or TACON, as appropriate, over the attached forces. 

Command Authority 

COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the 

commanders of combatant commands by title 10, U.S.C., section 164, or as directed by 

the President in the Unified Command Plan, and cannot be delegated or transferred. 

COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of 

command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and 

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations, joint training (or, in the case of USSOCOM, training of 

assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the 

command. 

OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of 

command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and 

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction 

necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions 

assigned to the command. 

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary 

to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be 

delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of 

combatant command. 
98

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a 

superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should 

aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Several 

categories of support have been defined for use within a combatant command as 

appropriate to better characterize the support that should be given. Support 

relationships may be categorized as general, mutual, direct, and close. 

Administrative control (ADCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over 

subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support including 

organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel 

management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, 

demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of 

the subordinate or other organizations. This is the authority necessary to fulfill military 

department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. 

Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for 

coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more military 

departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same 

Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between 

the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. 

Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) is that authority granted by a commander 

(at any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a 

command or agency within or outside of the granting command. 

Training and readiness oversight is the authority that combatant commanders 

may exercise over Reserve forces. 
99

GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

1AF(AFNORTH) First Air Force (Air Forces Northern) 

14AF AFSTRAT-SP Fourteenth Air Force, Air Force Strategic Command 

(Space) 

8AF/CC Eighth Air Force Commander 

AADC area air defense commander 

ACC Air Combat Command 

ACE airborne command element 

ACCE air component coordination element 

ACS agile combat support 

ADA air defense artillery 

ADCON administrative control 

ADS air defense sector 

AEF air and space expeditionary force 

AETACS airborne elements of the theater air control system 

AETF air and space expeditionary task force 

AEW air expeditionary wing 

AFB Air Force base 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFFOR Air Force forces 

AFIOC Air Force Information Operations Center 

AFLE Air Force liaison element 

AFNETOPS Air Force network operations 

AFNORTH Air Force Forces, United States Northern Command 

AFOG Air Force operations group 

AFOTTP Air Force operational tactics, techniques, and procedures

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command 

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 

AFSOD Air Force special operations detachment 

AFSOE Air Force special operations element 
100

AFSOF Air Forces special operations forces 

AFSPC Air Force Space Command 

AFSWC Air Force Service Watch Cell 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(interservice) 

AIA Air Intelligence Agency 

ALO air liasion officer 

AMC Air Mobility Command 

ANG Air National Guard 

AOB advanced operating base 

AOC air and space operations center 

AOR area of responsibility 

ARC air Reserve Components 

ASOC air support operations center 

ATO air tasking order 

AWACS airborne warning and control system 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BII base information infrastructure 

BOS-I base operations support-integration 

C2 command and control 

CAOC combined air and space operations center 

CAP Civil Air Patrol, crisis action planning 

CAT crisis action team 

CC commander 

CDRAFNORTH Commander, Air Force Forces United States Northern 

Command 

CDRUSEUCOM Commander, United States European Command 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command 
101

CFACC combined force air and space component commander 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

COA course of action 

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COE common operating environment 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

COMSEC communications security 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN concept plan, or operation plan in concept format 

CONR continental United States North American Aerospace 

Defense Command Region 

CONUS continental United States 

COP common operational picture 

CP command post 

CRC control and reporting center 

CSAF Chief of Staff, United States Air Force 

CSC2 combat support command and control 

CSS communications systems support 

DCA defensive counterair 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DII defense information infrastructure 

DIRMOBFOR-AIR director of mobility forces-Air 

DIRLAUTH direct liasion authorized 

DIRSPACEFOR director of space forces 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DISN Defense Information Systems Network 

DITSCAP Department of Defense information technology security 

certification and accreditation process 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 
102

DRU direct reporting unit 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

EAP emergency actions procedures 

EBAO effects-based approach to operations 

EMTF expeditionary mobility task force 

EOC emergency operations center 

EP emergency preparedness 

EW electronic warfare 

FAC (A) forward air controller (airborne) 

FOA field operating agency 

FOB forward operating base 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GCCS global command and control system 

GIG global information grid 

GNO global network operations 

GPS global positioning system 

GTACS ground theater air control system 

HD homeland defense 

HS homeland security 

IA information assurance 

ICC installation control center 

IM information management 

IMP information management plan 

IO information operations; international organization 

IQT initial qualification training 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IT information technology 
103

JAEP joint air and space estimate process 

JAOC joint air and space operations center 

JAOP joint air and space operations plan 

JARN joint air request net 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JDN joint data network 

JFACC joint force air and space component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFCC Space Joint Functional Component Command Space 

JOA joint operations area 

JOC joint operations center 

JOPES joint operation planning and execution system 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JSOACC joint special operations air component commander 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JSpOC Joint Space Operations Center 

JSTARS joint surveillance target attack radar system 

JTA joint technical architecture 

JTAC joint terminal attack controller 

JTF joint task force 

LNO liaison officer 

MAJCOM major command 

MAPE monitor, assess, plan, and execute (model) 

MARLO Marine liaison officer 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

MQT mission qualification training 
104

NAF numbered Air Force 

NALE naval and amphibious liaison element 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCO network-centric operations 

NCW network-centric warfare 

NetA network attack 

NetD network defense 

NETOPS network operations 

NGO non-governmental organization 

NIPRNET non-secure internet protocol router network 

NMCC National Military Command Center 

NMCS National Military Command System 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NSA National Security Agency 

NW Ops network warfare operations 

OODA Loop observe, orient, decide and act (loop) 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operations order 

PACAF Pacific Air Forces 

RAMCC regional air movement control center 

ROE rules of engagement 

SAA senior airfield authority 

SADL situation awareness data link 

SECAF Secretary of the Air Force 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SIPRNET secret internet protocol router network 

SO special operations 
105

SOCCE special operations command and control element 

SODO senior offensive duty officer 

SOF special operations forces 

SOLE special operations liaison element 

SSAA systems security authorization agreements 

STO space tasking order 

TACC tanker airlift control center 

TACON tactical control 

TACP tactical air control party 

TACS theater air control system 

TADL tactical digital information link 

TADIL tactical digital information link 

TAGS theater air-ground system 

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data 

TSOC theater special operations command 

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAFE United States Air Forces Europe 

U.S.C. United States Code 

USEUCOM United States European Command 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

WMP war and mobilization plan 
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Definitions 

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or 

other organizations in respect to administration and support, including 

organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel 

management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, 

demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational 

missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-

02)

air force network operations. The operation and defense of the 

communications system supporting the Air Force’s provisioned portion of the 

Global Information Grid. Also called AFNETOPS. (AFDD 2-8)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited 

resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air 

sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and 

forces for planning, etc. (JP 1-02)

apportionment (air). The determination and assignment of the total expected 

effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air 

operations for a given period of time. Also called air apportionment. See also 

apportionment. (JP 1-02) 

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement 

is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers 

the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, 

of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions 

where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. See also 

attach. (JP 1-02)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such 

placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific 

functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., 

attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. See also assign. (JP 

1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command 

authority established by title 10, (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 

164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands 

unless otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef. Combatant command 

(command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant 

commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces 

involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, 

designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the 
107

missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) 

should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. 

Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders 

and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command 

(command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands 

and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish 

assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command 

(command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

command. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully 

exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes 

the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for 

planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling 

military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes 

responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 

(JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed 

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 

procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also 

called C2. (JP 1-02) 

defense information infrastructure. The shared or interconnected system of 

computers, communications, data applications, security, people, training, and 

other support structures serving DOD local, national, and worldwide information 

needs. The defense information infrastructure connects DOD mission support, 

command and control, and intelligence computers through voice, 

telecommunications, imagery, video, and multimedia services. It provides 

information processing and services to subscribers over the defense information 

systems network and includes command and control, tactical, intelligence, and 

commercial communications systems used to transmit DOD information. Also 

called DII. (JP 1-02)

distributed operations. The process of conducting operations from 

independent or interdependent nodes in a teaming manner. Some operational 

planning or decision-making may occur from outside the joint area of operations. 

The goal of a distributed operation is to support the operational commander in 

the field; it is not a method of command from the rear. See also split operations. 

(AFDD 2-8)

effects-based approach to operations. Operations that are planned, 

executed, assessed and adapted to influence or change system behavior or 

capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes. Also called EBAO. (Note: 
108

Sometimes colloquially but incorrectly referred to as “effects-based operations,” 

or EBO) (AFDD 2)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, 

facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting 

potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the 

coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the 

effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the 

enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02) [An integrated 

application of offensive and defensive actions that deter, detect, preempt, 

mitigate, or negate threats against or hazards to Air Force air and space 

operations and assets, based on an acceptable level of risk.] (AFDD 2-4.1) 

{Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for 

clarity.} 

information. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The 

meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used 

in their representation. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and 

information systems while defending one's own information and information 

systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02) [Information operations are the integrated 

employment of the core capabilities of influence operations, electronic warfare 

operations, network warfare operations, in concert with specified integrated 

control enablers, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and 

automated decision making while protecting our own.] (AFDD 2-5) {Italicized 

definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, 

integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information 

concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an 

adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or 

understanding. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, 

assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a 

single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and 

coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may 

be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority 
109

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing 

commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02) [The joint force air and space 

component commander (JFACC) uses the joint air and space operations center 

to command and control the integrated air and space effort to meet the joint force 

commander’s objectives. This title emphasizes the Air Force position that air 

power and space power together create effects that cannot be achieved through 

air or space power alone.] [AFDD 2] {Italicized words in brackets apply only to 

the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise 

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint 

force. Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the 

Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an 

existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

military strategy. The art and science of employing the armed forces of a 

nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the 

threat of force. (JP 1-02)

national strategy. The art and science of developing and using the political, 

economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, 

during peace and war, to secure national objectives. (JP 1-02)

network attack. The employment of network-based capabilities to destroy, 

disrupt, corrupt, or usurp information resident in or transiting through networks. 

Networks include telephony and data services networks. Also called NetA. 

(AFDD 2-5)

network operations. The integrated planning and employment of military 

capabilities to provide the friendly net environment needed to plan, control and 

execute military operations and conduct Service functions. NETOPS provides 

operational planning and control. It involves time-critical, operational-level 

decisions that direct configuration changes and information routing. NETOPS risk 

management and command and control decisions are based on a fused 

assessment of intelligence, ongoing operations, commander’s intent, blue and 

gray situation, net health, and net security. NETOPS provides the three 

operational elements of information assurance, network/system management, 

and information dissemination management. Also called NETOPS. (AFDD 2-5)

network warfare operations. Network warfare operations are the integrated 

planning and employment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects 

across the interconnected analog and digital portion of the battlespace. Network 

warfare operations are conducted in the information domain through the dynamic 
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combination of hardware, software, data, and human interaction. Also called NW 

Ops. (AFDD 2-5)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. 

Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). 

Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and 

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational 

control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and 

joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. 

Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint 

force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and 

forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control 

considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does 

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of 

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called 

OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and 

influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions 

of the unit commander. (JP 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major 

operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic 

objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link 

tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish 

the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, 

initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these 

events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do 

tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and 

provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic 

objectives. (JP 1-02)

operational risk management. The systematic process of identifying hazards, 

assessing risks, analyzing risk control measures, making control decisions, 

implementing risk controls, and supervising and reviewing the process. 

Commanders accept the residual risks. (AFI 91-213)

reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or 

forces, equipment, or materiel from Air Force organizations that are not forward 

deployed. (AFDD 2)
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reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other 

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or 

potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, 

or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02)

senior airfield authority. The senior airfield authority is an individual designated 

by the joint force commander to be responsible for the control, operation, and 

maintenance of an airfield to include runways, associated taxiways, parking 

ramps, land, and facilities whose proximity affect airfield operations. Also called 

SAA. (JP 3-17)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and 

equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, 

or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or 

politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range 

of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of 

conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations 

frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility 

techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from 

conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational 

techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and 

dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also 

called SO. (JP 1-02)

spectrum management. Planning, coordinating, and managing joint use of the 

electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative 

procedures, with the objective of enabling electronics systems to perform their 

functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering unacceptable 

interference. (AFI 33-118)

split operations. One type of distributed operations. It describes those 

distributed operations conducted by a single command and control (C2) entity 

that is separated between two or more geographic locations. A single 

commander must have oversight of all aspects of a split C2 operation. (AFDD 2-

8)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of 

a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) 

security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to 

accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish national and 

multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess 

risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop 

global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military 

forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic, 
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psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford 

the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and 

favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. (JP 1-

02)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface 

areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or 

other means. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is 

limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or 

maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control 

is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and 

exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called 

TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are 

planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units 

or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 

maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to 

achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02)

tactics. 1. The employment of units in combat. 2. The ordered arrangement 

and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to 

use their full potentialities. (JP 1-02)

theater. The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a 

commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-

02)

war. Open and often prolonged conflict between nations (or organized groups 

within nations) to achieve national objectives. (AFDD 1)