SUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, 0. C. 20555 

April 23, 1980 

Regulatory Guide 5.60 

REGULATORY GUIDE DISTRIBUTION LIST (DIVISION 5) 

SUBJECT: Regulatory Guide 5.60, "Standard Fomat and Content 

of a Licensee Physical Protection Plan for Strategic 

Special Nuclear Material in Transit" 

Regulatory Guide .5.60 was distributed for comment to all affected licensees 

and to other interested parties who attended the NRC Upgrade Rule Guidance 

Seminar held on March 27-28, 1979, in Richmond, Virginia. No comments were 

received as a result of this distribution, and the guide is now being issued 

as an active guide so that affected licensees may use it for preparation of 

their physical protection plans in response to the new requirements of 10 CFR 

Part 73 published in the Federal Register on November 28, 1979 (44 FR 68184). 

Because Regulatory Guide 5.60 was not issued as a draft guide for comment, it 

is being provided as an active guide to all addressees on the Division 5 

distribution list. Although comments are always encouraged on all regulatory guides,.comnents on this guide are particularly encouraged at this time. 

Robert B. Minoguer Director 

Office of Standards Development
April 1980 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

REGULATORY GUIDE 

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.60 

STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF A LICENSEE 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN FOR STRATEGIC SPECIAL NUCLEAR 

MATERIAL IN TRANSIT

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES 

Regulatory Guides are Issued to describe and make aviallpable to the 

public methods acceptable to the NRC staff of Impl•en•.ing 

specific parts of the Commission's reguations, to delineate tech

niques used by the staf in evaatng specific rroblems or Postu

lated accidents or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory 

Guides are nof substitutes for regulations, and compliaceD With 

them Is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set 

out In the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the 

findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or 

license by the Commission. 

Comments and suIgestons for Improvements in these guides are 

encouraged at ail tmes, and guides will be revised, as approprlate, 

to accommodate comments and to reflect new inforaton or 

experience. This guide was revised as a result of substantive com

ments received from the public and additional staff review.

Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. D.C. 20555. 

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. 

The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions: 

1. Power Reactors 6. Products 

2. Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation 

3. Fuels and Materials Facilities L. Occupational Health 

4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 

5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General 

Copies of issued guides may be purchased at the current Government 

Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spe

clfic divislons Is available through the Government inting Office. 

Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may 

be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Washington, D.C. 20555, Attentions Publications Sales Manager.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION........ ... ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 

PART I - PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN 

Chapter 1 GENERAL ISSUES . . . . .......... . . . . . . . ...

1.1 Purpose and Scope . . . . ........ . . . . . . . ... 

1.2 Safeguards Contingency Plan ...... .......... . ...... 1.3 Security Organization Training, Equipment, and Qualifications 

1.4 Security Management . . . . ............... .. 

1.5 Testing and Maintenance Program . . . ... . . . .. . . 1.6 Security Records ............. . ........... 1.7 Reports to NRC ..... ........ .............. . .. 1.8 Redundancy and Diversity ......... . ......... 

Ler 2 SHIPMENT PLANNINGAND CONTROL. . . . . . . ......... 

2.1 Preplanning of Shipment Itineraries ........ . . . 2.2 Maintaining Knowledge of Route Conditions and Shipment Status 

2.3 Determination of Alternative Itineraries ............... 

ter 3 DETECTION AND DELAY OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS OR MATERIALS 

INTRODUCTION BY STEALTH OR FORCE . . . . . . ....... 

3.1 Establishment of Controlled Access Areas. . . . . . . .... 

3.2 Transport Features to Delay Access ..... ............ 3.3 Access Detection for Transports . . . . . . . ........ 

ter 4 DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS OR MATERIALS INTRODUCTION 

BY DECEIT ........ ....................... ..

4.1 Access Authorizations . ...... ..... ... ............ 4.2 Access Control at Entry Control Points. ................. 

ter. 5 PREVENTION OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF SSNM FROM TRANSPORTS 

BY DECEIT ......... ............................ 

5.1 Authorization for Removal of SSNM from Transports ......... 5.2 SSNM Removal Controls ...... ...................... 

ter 6 DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF SSNM FROM TRANSPORTS 

BY STEALTH OR FORCE ............................... 

6.1 Transport Features to Delay Removal .............. 6.2 Detection of SSNM Removal Attempts ....................

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued K

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Chapter 7 TRANSMISSION OF DETECTION, ASSESSMENT, AND OTHER SECURITY

RELATED INFORMATION ......... ...................... 31 

7.1 Communications Among Escort Force Personnel ....... ...... 31 

7.2 Communications Between the Escort Commander and the 

Movement Control Center ......... .................... 32 

7.3 Notification of LLEAs ..... ..................... .... 32 

PART II - PHYSICAL PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIFIC SHIPMENTS 

1. GENERAL INFORMATION ....... ......................... 37 

2. ITINERARY INFORMATION...... ......................... .. .38 

3. TRANSFERS OF SHIPMENT SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY ..... ............ 38 

4. DIFFERENCES FROM THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN ................ 38 

5. RELATIONSHIP TO THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN ................ 38 

K

iv
INTRODUCTION 

This regulatory guide describes the standard format and content suggested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for use in preparing Physical Protec tion Plans for strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in transit. By using this guide for preparing a Physical Protection Plan and Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments, the licensee will minimize administrative problems associated with the submittal, review, and approval of the plan. Con formance with this guide is not required by the NRC. A licensee who uses a format that will provide an equal level of completeness and detail and that will satisfy the requirements of the applicable NRC regulations may use his own format. However, the format and content herein presented are acceptable to the NRC staff. 

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, directed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to regulate the receipt, manufacture, production, transfer, possession, use, import, and export of special nuclear material (SNM) in order to protect the public health and safety and to provide for the common defense and security. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred all the licensing and related regulatory functions of the AEC to the NRC. 

The principal requirements for physical protection of licensed activities against theft and radiological sabotage of SSNM in transit are contained in 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." 

Paragraph 50.34(c) of 10 CFR Part 50 and paragraphs 70.22(g) and 70.22(h) of 10 CFR Part 70 identify the physical protection information that must be provided in a Physical Protection Plan as part of a license application. This plan is required in order for the licensee to comply with specific physical protection requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 and must be submitted with each appli cation for a licensee to possess or process SSNM or for a license authorizing the transport or delivery of SSNM. 

The information in this guide applies to any NRC licensee or applicant for an NRC license who anticipates transporting or delivering uranium-235 (con tained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more, computed by the formula: grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). 

As developments and changes in the nuclear industry occur, the Commission's requirements for information may need modification. Revisions to this Standard Format will be made, as necessary, to accommodate these changes. 

Purpose and Applicability 

pleteness 

This regulatory guide has been prepared as an aid to uniformity and com in preparing and reviewing the Physical Protection Plan, which is a prerequisite for a license for transporting or delivering SSNM. Amplification and clarification of the protection arrangements to be made for each individual I shipment of SSNM are also provided. 

V
The information requested in this Standard Format is the minimum neces

sary for an acceptable Physical Protection Plan. Additional information may be 

required during the staff review of a particular plan. It is also the licensee's 

responsibility to be aware of applicable new and revised NRC regulations. The 

information provided should be up to date with respect to the state of technology 

for the physical protection techniques and systems that the licensee proposes to 

use. 

Information and procedures that are delineated in the regulatory guides 

in Division 5, "Materials and Plant Protection," and that are appropriately 

contained in certain sections of the licensee's Physical Protection Plan for 

fixed sites may be incorporated by reference. 

Upon receipt of a Physical Protection Plan for review and approval, the 

NRC staff will perform a preliminary review to determine whether the plan is 

reasonably complete. The staff will use the Standard Format as a guideline 

to identify the necessary information. If a licensee does not provide a 

reasonably complete presentation of the necessary information, further review 

of the plan may be suspended until the needed information is provided. 

Organization of This Document 

This document is divided into two parts. Part I provides the standard 

format and content to be used for submittals of the Physical Protection Plans 

for SSNM in transit. Each section in Part I is referenced to the portions of 

the regulations that apply to that section, the reference provided in brackets 

following the section heading. Also, the sections in this part are divided 

into two subsections entitled "Intent" and "Content." The "Intent" subsections 

are exclusively explanatory in nature and are provided to give the licensee 

additional information regarding the purpose for including such provisions in 

the regulations and the relationships between the different provisions. Examples 

of subsystems and procedures that may be used in different situations to achieve 

the capabilities required in the regulations are also provided, including refer

ences to pertinent sections of the reference safeguards system described in 

§73.26. This type of information should aid the licensee in designing a well

balanced, integrated physical protection system that can meet all the performance 

capability requirements. The "Content" subsections provide detailed guidance 

on the information to be included in the Physical Protection Plan submittals 

and the standard format to be used to ensure that the plans submitted are com

plete and in a form that can be easily reviewed by the NRC staff. 

Part II contains standard format and content information relating to sub

mittals of Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments. These sub

mittals are intended to supplement the Physical Protection Plan submittal with 

changes in physical protection subsystems and procedures that will be effective 

for a given shipment plus specific scheduling information and other arrangements 

that cannot be determined very far in advance of the date for a specific shipment. 

In addition to the Physical Protection Plan and the arrangements for 

specific shipments, licensees are also required to submit plans for guard 

qualification and training programs and Safeguards Contingency Plans. All 

these plans together comprise the physical protection system required to be 

provided by licensees who are involved in the transportation of strategic 

special nuclear material;. therefore, they all should be consistent with one 

another.

vi
Use of the Standard Format

The licensee should follow, as nearly as possible, the numbering system of the Standard Format in Parts I and II of this guide. If certain subsections 

are not applicable, this should be clearly stated and sufficient information should be provided to support that conclusion. The licensee may expand on the information provided, as necessary, to adequately cover any safeguards measures 

unique to the licensee's operation. 

Upon completing the plan, the licensee should use the table of contents 

of the Standard Format as a checklist to ensure that each subject has been 

addressed. 

Style and Composition 

A table of contents should be included in each submittal. 

The licensee should clearly and concisely present all information. Con fusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be avoided. Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent throughout the 

submittal and in keeping with generally accepted usage. 

Wherever possible, duplication of information should be avoided. Thus, information already included in other NRC-required physical protection plans, e.g., the licensee's Site Physical Protection Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan, may be covered by specific reference to the appropriate sections of those 

documents. 

Drawings, diagrams, maps, and tables should be used when information may be presented more adequately or conveniently by such means. These illustrations 

should be located in the section where they are first referenced or in appro priately referenced appendices. All information presented in drawings should be legible, symbols should be defined, and drawings should be large enough (not unduly reduced) to be read by an individual having normal vision. 

Physical Specifications of Submittals 

All material submitted in an application should conform to the following physical dimensions of page size, quality of paper and inks, numbering of pages, 

etc.: 

a. Paper Size 

Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches. 

Drawings and graphics: 8-1/2 x 11 inches is preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable if the finished copy when folded does not exceed 8-1/2 x 

11 inches. 

b. Paper Stock and Ink 

There should be suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density for handling and for reproduction by microfilming.

vii
c. Page Margins 

A margin of no less than 1 Inch should be maintained on the top, bottom, 

and binding side of all pages submitted. 

d. Printing 

Composition: text pages should be single spaced. 

Type face and style: must be suitable for microfilming. 

Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically reproduced. All 

pages of the text may be printed on both sides. Images should be printed 

head to head. 

e. Binding 

Pages should be punched for looseleaf ring binding. 

f. Page Numbering 

Pages should be numbered sequentially within each section. Do not number 

the entire report sequentially. 

g. Format References 

References to this Standard Format should be made by part, chapter, and 

section number. 

Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages 

The updating or revising of data and text should be on a replacement-page 

basis. 

The changed or revised portions of each page should be highlighted by a 

vertical line. The line should be in the margin opposite the binding margin 

for each line changed or added. All pages submitted to update, revise, or add 

pages to the report should Indicate the date of the change. The transmittal 

letter should include an index page listing the pages to be inserted and the 

pages to be removed. When major changes or additions are made, pages for a 

revised table of contents should be provided. 

Number of Copies, Address, and Schedule for Submittal 

The licensee should submit six copies of his Physical Protection Plan to 

the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, in accordance with the provi

sions of paragraph 73.20(c) of 10 CFR Part 73. 

Public Disclosure and Classification 

The NRC has determined that the public disclosure of the details of 

physical protection plans and programs is not in the public Interest. Such 

details are withheld in accordance with paragraph 2.790(d) of 10 CFR Part 2.

viii
Thus the Physical Protection Plan for transport of SSNM and individual sub

mittals of Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments should be 

appropriately marked and handled accordingly. Other related proprietary or 

classified information should be clearly identified and submitted in accordance 

with applicable directives. Each such submittal of proprietary or classified 

information should be accompanied by the licensee's detailed reasons and 

justifications for requesting exemption from public disclosure, as required in 

paragraph 2.790(b) of 10 CFR Part 2. 

Compatibility 

The licensee should ensure that the Physical Protection Plan for transport 

of SSNM is compatible with applicable parts of all other physical protection 

plans, including the Site Physical Protection Plan, separate submittals of 

Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments, the Safeguards Con

tingency Plan, and plans for guard qualification and training programs.

ix
PART I 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN
Chapter 1 GENERAL ISSUES

1.1 Purpose and Scope 

Intent 

The -primary purpose of a licensee's plan for the physical protection of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in transit is to assist in the NRC review of the adequacy of the licensee's physical protection system relative to the particular routes or itineraries proposed in the'plan. However, after the plan has been approved by the NRC, it could become a guide for the licensee's security personnel in the implementation of the licensee's physical protection system for SSNM in transit. 

Content 

Describe the purpose of the Physical Protection Plan and characterize its contents. Indicate the additional types of information to be found in the Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments (prepared for each shipment in accordance with Part II of this guide) that would complete the description of the physical protection system for a given *shipment and that would describe in detail the actual shipment itinerary and schedule. 

1.2 Safeguards Contingenc- Plan [§73 . 2 5(d)(1)(iiT, (d)(1)(tii, Appendix C to Part 73) 

Intent 

A predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events is required to be prepared, based on personnel and. other physical protection resources described in the Physical Protection Plan for SSNM in transit. Specific requirements for the contingency plan are provided in Appendix C, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans," to 10 CFR Part 73. Regulatory Guide 5.56, "Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans for Transportation," provides guidance for the preparation of transportation con tingency plans. The licensee is reminded that all three submissions--the Physical Protection Plan, the Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments, and the Safeguards Contingency Plan--together describe the system for physical protection of each particular shipment. They should be developed and maintained to be completely consistent with each other for each shipment. 

Content 

Describe briefly the Safeguards Contingency Plan prepared in accordance with Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73. Relate it to the Physical Protection Plan and Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments.

5.60-3
1.3 Security Organization Training, Equipment, and Qualifications 

72 d)(1)(i), (d)(l(iv), (d)(1)(v), Appendix 8 to Part 

Intent 

The purpose of these requirements for the qualification and training of 

security organization personnel is to ensure that security organization members 

will be fully qualified, equipped, and trained and thoroughly familiar with 

the procedures and equipment they will use during the progress of a shipment. 

These requirements are detailed in Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Personnel," to 10 CFR Part 73 and are cited also in the reference system 

[§73.26(d)(4) and (d)(5)]. The requirements generally are that each security organization member be able to perform at least those duties described in the 

Physical Protection Plan that he might reasonably be assigned. 

The specific description of qualification and training of security organ

ization members will be provided as part of a separately prepared and submitted 

document entitled "Transportation Security Organization Training, Equipment, 

and Qualifications Plan." That plan should be consistent with the Physical Protection Plan with regard to the numbers of personnel, the equipment described, 

and the tasks to be performed by security organization personnel. In particular, the physical and performance characteristics of firearms carried by or immediately 

available to armed escorts and armed response personnel are described in Appen dix B to 10 CFR Part 73. Although all three types of weapons describedsemiautomatic rifles, shotguns, and sidearms--would normally be expected to be 

carried by, or immediately available to, these personnel for the physical pro tection of road and rail shipments and at transfer points, sidearms alone would 

normally be considered sufficient armament for armed escorts on aircraft and 

ships. 

Content 

Affirm that -a Transportation Security Organization Training, Equipment, 

and Qualifications Plan has been submitted to the NRC according to the require

ments set forth in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73. Affirm also that such plan is consistent with this plan as to equipment and the number of security personnel 

required to implement the physical protection system described herein. Briefly relate the two plans to ensure that all members of the security organization will be adequately qualified and trained to perform the duties normally assigned 

them. Refer to the Transportation Security Organization Training, Equipment, 

and Qualifications Plan to describe the equipment (e.g., armored escort vehicles, 

firearms, night vision equipment) that will be used by the escorts to protect themselves as well as to perform the tasks assigned to them. 

1,4 Security Management [§73.25(d)(1)(i)] 

Intent 

Security organization management is a crucial component of the physical 

protection system. Some. specific security management considerations are pro

vided in paragraphs 73.26(d)(2) and (d)(3) of the reference system. The manage

ment of the security organization is the vital link between the licensee and 

those responsible for direct implementation of the overall plan for physical

5.60-4
protection of of a shipment. Thus, it is necessary to have a detailed description the licensee's plan for management of the security organization to understand fully how the Physical Protection Plan will be implemented. 

Content 

Organization 

Refer to the Security Management section of the Transportation Security Training, Equipment, and Qualifications Plan to briefly describe the 

will 

security organization management structure. Affirm that this structure ensure that the physical protection system will not fail to function for 

rity 

lack of 

to 

the presence of a member of the security organization with proper autho conduct security-related functions performed at the movement control center. 

1.5 Testina and Maintenance Program S [§73.20("b(3)] 

Intent 

This provision requires a testing and maintenance program. This program is to ensure that all activities and devices on which the physical protection 

physical 

system depends 

protection 

to maintain shipment security continue to be available to the 

intended system in a reliable and effective manner. It also is 

Protection 

to ensure that the level of protection represented in the Physical Plan submitted does not deteriorate through neglect, disuse, or inappropriate substitution of system components. 

> Content 

Describe the program to regularly test and inspect all components (design features, equipment, vehicles, and procedures) of the physical protection system to ensure that the design, construction, and operation of all security-related components 

approved 

will continue to be substantially as described in the currently 

will 

Physical Protection Plans. Include a description of how these programs be managed, the lines of authority for such management, and the schedule for 4icensee management review of the adequacy of the physical protection system. 

security-related 

Describe the program to provide routine preventive maintenance for all 

tection system; 

equipment, vehicles, and design features in the physical pro

tions 

Include the components covered. by the program and the opera and supervisory personnel who will implement the program. Also describe the capability of the escort force to make emergency repairs en route. Describe the circumstances under which such emergency repairs might be required. 

1.6 Security Records E§73.0 

Intent 

§73.70). 

Certain 

These 

types of records regarding shipments of SSNM must be kept (see 

show requirements are intended to produce a verifiable record to that appropriate detailed planning functions were carried out for each 2j shipment and to expedite timely and efficient tracing of any missing shipment.

5.60-5
Content 

Describe the recordkeeping program designed to keep track of all licensee 

personnel who were authorized access to SSNM in transit, other persons who were 

authorized access, other persons who may have had access to SSN1 in transit, 

and other security-related matters. Include documentation of security assign ments, tests, inspections, and audits performed on the physical protection 

system. Also include logs of previous shipments and other information relating to specific routes and modes of transport such as carriers, major roads used, 

or flight numbers, as specifically required by §73.70. 

.1.7 Reports to NRC [173.711 

Intent 

This provision is designed to ensure that the NRC will be apprised of all 

security-related incidents that occur during shipments of SSNM. Thus the NRC 

will be able to continually update its knowledge, both of threats posed to such 

shipments and of the ability of existing physical protection systems to deal 

with these threats. 

Content 

Describe the procedures to ensure that NRC is provided with a full account

ing of all contingency Incidents necessitating reports to the NRC, as detailed 

in §73.71. Include a description of the management structure and procedures 

to ensure compliance. 

1.8 Redundancy and Diversity [§73_.20(b)(2)r,73.25(d)(4)]' 

Intent 

It *is required that the physical protection system be designed wOth 

redundant and diverse measures. This is to ensure that the system will remain 

capable of providing the necessary level of protection under adverse conditions 

that could cause the failure of some system elements. Redundancy means providing several measures (which may be the same measure duplicated) to perform the same 

function or subfunction. This would prevent failure of the entire system if 

there'were failure of one or more system elements. 

Diversity means providing several different kinds or types of measures 

that contribute to the performance of a particular security function or subfunc

tion'. Providing different measures with differing characteristics (e.g., sensi

tivities, failure modes, strengths, weaknesses) ensures continued performance of a given capability despite adverse operational conditions, attempts at system sabotage, or exploitation of a given measure. 

The reference system provides. redundancy in communications between the 

escort force and the movement control center (paragraph 73.26(1)(6) for road 

shipments and paragraph 73.26(k)(4) for rail shipments). The reference system also suggests "corrective action procedures and compensatory measures" to ensure 

that "the effectiveness of the physical protection system is not reduced by

5.60-6

I*.
any single failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the physical protection related equipment or structures" [paragraph 73.26(h)(5)]. 

The licensee also must be able to communicate with local law enforcement 

authorities if the escorts are attacked. Routine operating procedures must be 

designed to ensure that a single adversary attack cannot destroy the armed 

escorts' capability to notify the local law enforcement authorities of the need 

for assistance [paragraph 73.25(d)(4)]. (This would be accomplished in -the 

case of road shipments, for example, by proper spacing and randomly varying the distances between the transport and the escort vehicles.) The assurance 

of the survivability of a communications capability would normally be included 

under the general redundancy and diversity requirements of paragraph 73.20(b)(2). 

However, the integrity of this particular communications capability is considered 

so crucial to the primary mission of the physical protection system that it has 

been stated as a separate capability in paragraph 73.25(d)(4). This capability is also referred to in the reference system [paragraph 73.26(f)(2)]. in the 

context of transfer operations procedures. Generally, the licensee has the 

responsibility for determining where measures for redundancy and diversity may need to be designed into the physical protection system and for designing the 

system accordingly. 

Content

Describe the portions of the physical protection system that have been 

reinforced with redundant or diverse measures to provide assurance of continued 

capability to protect a shipment during adverse conditions or attacks. Include, 

in particular, a description of physical protection subsystems and procedures that ensure that a single adversary attack cannot keep the armed escorts from 

notifying local law enforcement authorities of the need for assistance.-

5.60-7
Chapter 2 SHIPMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL

2.1 Preplann no of Shipment Itineraries 

[§§73.25(b)(1)(l) and (d)(3)] 

Intent 

The intent of this requirement for prepianning of shipment itineraries is 

to decrease the vulnerability of SSNM shipments and to increase the ability of 

response forces to assist the escorts if a problem arises. Route preplanning 

can help accomplish this objective. It can determine areas where a shipment would be vulnerable to attack (e.g., scenes of recent natural disasters, labor 

dispute areas) and avoid these areas. It can minimize the stops required. It 

can minimize layover (storage) time. It can select routes allowing minimum 

interruption in communications with the movement control center. The route 

itinerary and scheduling information resulting from preplanning can familiarize 

escort and movement control center personnel with the route for a particular shipment. This familiarity will help ensure quick.response to any emergencies 

that may arise. 

Establishing liaison with local law enforcement authorities (LLEAs.) to 

arrange for assistance along routes will ensure that the LLEAs are familiarized 

beforehand with the types of assistance they could be asked to provide SSNM 

carriers. 

* The preplanning function will usually involve the determination and detailed 

consideration of several alternative routes and rest stops along each route that 

generally would be acceptable for SSNM shipments. However, the final selection 

of one of these alternative routes or of particular rest stops for a specific shipment will depend on the most current information available about conditions 

along each route. Such information will be obtained and maintained according 

to the procedures described in Section 2.2 of the Physical Protection Plan (see Section 2.2 of Part I of this guide). Sufficient flexibility should be incor

porated in the planning of shipments to avoid regular patterns as suggested in 

the reference system [paragraph 73.26(b)(1)]. 

Other specific considerations related to the preplanning capability are 

in the fdllowing sections of the reference system: paragraphs 73.26(b)(2) and 

(3) and 73.26(c) for general information; paragraph 73.26(i)(1) for road ship

ments; paragraphs 73.26(j)(1), (2), (4), and (8) for air shipments; para graphs 73.26(k)(1) and (3) for rail shipments; and paragraphs 73.26(l)(1), (2), 

(3), (5), (6), and (8) for shipments by sea. 

Content 

1. Planning and Schedulinp Considerations. Discuss provisions to ensure 

that the transit times of SSNM shipments will be minimized and that routes will 

be selected to avoid areas of natural disaster, civil disorder, or other similar 

threats to the security of the shipment. Also discuss provisions to ensure 

that shipments will encounter minimal, if any, storage times and that delivery will be made to the receiver as soon as possible after arrival at the final 

destination.

5.60-9
2. Itinerary Information. The itineraries (or routes) described in this 

section of the plan should show the following detail: (a) that the licensee 

has a comprehensive understanding of conditions and situations that may occur 

on the route, (b) that the licensee will use this knowledge to avoid areas 

imposing excessive and unnecessary demands on the escort force or unnecessarily 

increasing the vulnerability of the shipment, and (c) that the licensee will 

be prepared to take any necessary action when the shipment must pass through 

areas of high vulnerability. 

Information on planned itineraries routinely used in the transport 

of the SSNM covered by this Physical Protection Plan should be presented in 

this section, either directly or by referring to the pertinent appendices of 

the plan. For brevity and clarity of presentation in the body of the plan, 

this information is best presented in appendices. Information contained in 

the licensee's Safeguards Contingency Plan may be referenced to the extent it 

is applicable. Separate appendices or sections should be used for each 

itinerary. These may be referred to in preparing submittals of Physical Pro

tection Arrangements for Specific Shipments while noting any changes or updating 

route information, as necessary. (See Regulatory Guide 5.57, "Shipping and 

Receiving Control of Special Nuclear Material." See also Regulatory Guide 5.56 

for examples of charts and tables describing itineraries.) 

For each route, the itinerary information should include route segment 

identifications; pertinent time and distance factors; and locations of LLEA 

facilities, possible rest stops, transfer points, and points where there are 

changes in transportation mode. If some of the information requested is not 

available at the time the plan is submitted, it may be deferred and included 

instead in the Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments. Tables 

and charts needed for presentation of the itinerary information are described 

below: 

a. Route Overview--a graphic display of the overall route, including 

road, rail, air, and sea transportation segments. It may be presented on one 

or more sheets. It may be a line diagram or it may be depicted on a road or 

topographical map. The map or diagram should be large enough in scale to 

indicate clearly the pertinent information just described. The planned route 

segments should be indicated clearly on the display. They should be easily 

correlated with the pertinent LLEAs and recognized geographic features (e.g., 

roads, terminals, waterways) forming the boundaries of the segments or other

wise referred to in the plan. The segments may be defined according to the 

boundaries of the jurisdictions of the pertinent LLEAs. The origin and destina

tion of the itinerary should be clearly indicated. Alternative route segments 

may be appropriately indicated as alternative route segments of the original 

route or may be described separately. Route segments should be numbered, or 

otherwise identified, by an appropriate code. 

b. Route Segment Descriptions--a table showing the following informa

tion for each route segment: 

(1) Number or identification code of the route segment. 

(2) Segment boundaries (start and end points).

5.60-10
(3) Number of persons included in escort force. Describe also the source and number of armed response personnel other than escort force members expected to be available at transfer or other points included in the segment. Refer, if necessary, to the Transportation Security Organization Training, Equipment, and Qualifications Plan. 

(4) Average estimated time to complete the segment. 

(5) Provisions for escort force personnel to sleep or rest during traversal of the segment. Locations of possible refueling and rest stops on the route. 

(6) Departure points for leaving planned route and embarking upon alternative route segments. 

each route 

c. Liaisons with LLEAs--a table listing the LLEA information for segment. Include the LLEA organization name and the person contacted (plus his title and phone number within the organization). Briefly describe the 

calls 

arrangement that exists between the LLEA and the licensee concerning possible for assistance. Index this information to the numbering or other code used for identifying route segments above. 

zations 

The licensee should describe the information given LLEA organi

may 

to familiarize their personnel with the unique types of challenges they face if called to aid a shipment carrier within their jurisdiction. 

2.2 Maintaining Knowledge of Route Conditions and Shipment Status 

[§ 7 3 .25(b)(I)(ii) and (iii)J 

Intent 

The provision for updating route information is to ensure that the route selection process uses the most up-to-date information available to avoid placing the 

shipment 

shipment on a course with unusual hazards to shipment security. After the 

development 

has begun to move, further updating of route information ensures that 

discovered 

of hazardous conditions that could affect shipment security is soon enough that itinerary changes may be considered to allow the security 

The organization to avoid, or prepare for coping with, such conditions. provision for updating knowledge of shipment status is intended to ensure that the movement control center becomes aware of any unusual conditions encountered 

designed by the escort force during the shipment. This provision is also 

nications 

to allow a full understanding of reasons for any disruption in commu

gency or 

capability with the transport and its escort force because of emer

begin 

equipment failure. Detailed guidance to response forces on where to looking for a missing SSNM shipment is also to-be provided. 

Subsystems and procedures for maintaining knowledge of route conditions as the shipment progresses may include elements independent of the escort force itself to ensure that collection of such information is obtained in a timely fashion, 

Such procedures 

despite other duties escorts will have to perform during the shipment. may include contacts with LLEAs, local news media, wire services, or 

dispatched 

weather services., Also, in the case of road shipments, escorts may be ahead of the transport to ascertain that upcoming rest or fuel

5.60-11
stations., transfer points, or other critical locations are free of suspicious 

activity, civil disorders, or other threatening conditions for which special 

precautions must be taken or preparations made. 

The physical protection system may include procedures for the movement 

control center to obtain shipment position and status information from the escort 

force on a prescheduled basis that has been mutually agreed on. This will allow 

determining as soon as possible' when difficulties that prevent direct communica

tions. arise. Such procedures may involve, for example, check-in reports by 

the escort force at periodic time intervals or at predetermined milestones such 

as at all transport stops, at transfer points, or on crossing over from one 

route segment to another. These procedures may also incorporate a method for 

the movement control center to determine whether updating information they 

receive on the status of the shipment is authentic or is provided under duress. 

Also, various means may be employed to ensure that the movement control center 

becomes aware of when the updating information on the shipment status becomes 

critically overdue. 

The following sections in the reference system apply to the suggested 

capability for updating the information on the status of the shipment: para

graph 73.26(1)(6) for road shipments, paragraph 73.26(k)(4) for rail shipments, 

and paragraph 73.26(l)(7) for sea shipments. Note that although there is no 

suggestion for periodic check-in reports during the air segments of a shipment, 

the movement control center must still possess the capability for maintaining 

knowledge of the status of air shipments. This function, however, may be 

performed by periodic check-ins or, independently of the shipment, by the 

movement control center's monitoring flight status through airport authorities 

to determine if the flight is overdue or still on course. Also, check-in 

reports by the escort force immediately before takeoff and just after landing 

could narrowly circumscribe when the aircraft is in actual flight. 

Content 

Describe subsystems and procedures employed by the movement control center 

to maintain knowledge of route conditions from the time shortly before the 

shipment begins movement through the duration of the shipment and to determine 

the significance of such information for the continued safety and security of 

the shipment. This description should include the means employed to obtain 

information from diverse sources and to filter it to determine its significance, 

as well as the means to store and retrieve previously obtained information, if 

applicable. Describe procedures employed by members of the escort force to 

obtain, while en route, information regarding upcoming route conditions. 

Describe any means used to determine information source authenticity and 

whether information obtained directly from the escort force is being provided 

under duress. Also describe the process for ensuring that appropriate action 

will be taken if the required information is not obtained in a timely manner 

(i.e., according to preplanned schedule). Refer, if necessary, to the Respon

sibility Matrix and other parts of the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

5.60-12
2.3 Determination of Alternative Itineraries 

[§73.25(b)(1)(iv)] 

Intent 

During a shipment, events that would affect the shipment's security may 

occur, were the shipment to continue upon its predetermined itinerary. In such 

cases, prudence may dictate certain changes in the schedule or itinerary that 

would decrease the vulnerability of the shipment. This provision is designed 

to ensure that a capability to rapidly and intelligently determine and communicate 

such changes is established in advance. It would probably be most desirable 

if such changes were made within the context of alternative route plans already prepared for use in such contingencies and already familiar to the escort force 

and the movement control center. To ensure the continuity of the high level 

of protection provided the shipment, these procedures also will usually include 

contacting LLEAs to inform them of any changes in shipment schedule or itinerary that would affect them. 

Content 

Describe procedures to determine and implement alternative itineraries 

when such changes become necessary. Describe the process by which the decision 

to change an itinerary or schedule is made. Specify who has final authority 

to make such decisions. Refer, if desired, to the appropriate sections of the 

Safeguards Contingency Plan.

5.60-13
Chapter 3 DETECTION AND DELAY OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS OR MATERIALS 

INTRODUCTION BY STEALTH OR FORCE 

These sections cover detection and delay of unauthorized access or intro

duction of materials into the vicinity of SSNM or SSNM transports by stealth 

or force when the transport is either moving or stationary. 

3.1 Establishment of Controlled Access Areas 

[§73.25(b)(2)] 

Intent 

These provisions are designed to set up a restricted area surrounding the 

transport or the SSNM (when located outside the transport or aboard moving trans

ports) in order to isolate the transport or SSNM and decrease the number of 

personnel, materials, equipment, and vehicles allowed to come in contact with 

the transport or the SSNM. This controlled access area simplifies preventing 

unauthorized access of persons or materials into the transport or into the 

immediate vicinity of the SSNM. It ensures that only persons or materials 

required to have such access to perform essential functions are in the area at 

any given time. Unauthorized persons would be discouraged from attempts at 

penetrating the controlled access area and normally would be detained at its 

perimeter. Establishing controlled access areas-would have the following 

effects: (1) it would limit opportunities for attempted unauthorized access 

to the transport or SSNM by stealth, (2) it would increase the probability of 

detection of persons possessing significant amounts of tools, explosives, or 

other unauthorized materials useful for purposes of committing radiological 

sabotage or of gaining unauthorized access to the SSNM, and (3) it would ensure 

that attempts to penetrate the transport or to misappropriate SSNM by force 

will be resisted sooner with more chance of preventing theft or 'sabotage. 

Controlled access areas are defined in paragraph 73.2(z) in terms of two 

basic attributes: (1) there must be a means of demarcating the area's bound

aries that is clear to both authorized and unauthorized personnel and (2) there 

must be some way of controlling access to the area at all times to ensure that 

unauthorized personnel are not admitted. 

The plan should address the establishment of. controlled access areas, where 

applicable, in two somewhat different types of situations, i.e., both at trans

port stops and aboard moving transports. Some types of transports such as 

certain aircraft, rail cars, and road transports may not need to be protected 

by the establishment of a controlled access area while they are in motion. 

This is because the cargo compartments of such transports are not normally 

accessible to persons on board the moving transport and, further, would be 

inaccessible to persons on the ground by virtue of the transport's motion. 

Special provisions for protection may still be required in instances where the 

transport slows sufficiently to allow access (e.g., slow-moving trains, road 

transports at toll booths or traffic signals). Aboard trains or large ocean

going vessels where unauthorized persons may possibly gain access to the SSNM, 

controlled access areas may need to be established. A secured cargo compartment 

may serve as a controlled access area on board such moving transports.

5.60-15
In considering the space to be included in a controlled access area aboard 

a moving transport, the precise object to be considered the "transport" may 

vary according to the mode of transportation Involved. "Transport," as defined K 

in paragraph 73.2(cc), includes any vehicle for "land, sea, or air conveyance 

or modules for these conveyances such as rail cars or standardized cargo con

tainers." In the case of dedicated truck or aircraft, the entire vehicle can 

be considered the transport. Sometimes, a controlled access area must be 

established on board a nondedicated transport in order to isolate the SSNM from 

unauthorized persons occupying the remainder of the space on the transport (if 

it is physically possible for such persons to gain access to the SSNM while 

the transport is in motion). 

In the cases of large oceangoing vessels or a long train of rail cars, 

isolation of the entire conveyance may be impractical. Instead, aboard a 

specially designed ship (container ship), thb standard multimode shipping con

tainer (which alternately serves as both a truck trailer or rail car mountable 

container) may be considered the transport. For rail transportation- the partic ular rail car containing the SSNM may be considered the transport. In these 

cases, the function of the controlled access area is to isolate the transport 

module (i.e., the rail car or standard shipping container) from the remainder 

of the conveyance of which it is a part. Alternatively, a secured cargo com

partment may serve as a controlled access area aboard a moving transport. 

Access detection subsystems and procedures are required to detect penetra

tions of controlled access areas by unauthorized persons or materials. Detec

tion is normally expected to occur at the time of penetration, which woId permit 

a response sufficiently timely and effective to prevent the penetration (or attempted penetration) from resulting in the theft of SSNM and limit the 

opportunity for a potential adversary to complete actions of radiological 

sabotage. Of course, the considerations that persons or materials may already 

have been introduced aboard a moving transport for the purposes of sabotaging 

the transport, and that it may not be practical for the escorts to maintain 

effective control over the entire transport, limit the chances for protecting against sabotage to the entire transport. However, the physical protection 

system may effectively protect against actions of force and stealth aimed 

specifically at the SSNM or the transport module in which the SSNM is contained. 

This protection would be designed to limit the opportunities for a potential 

adversary to cause significant dispersals of SSNM by direct attack on the 

transport or on the SSNM through actions of stealth or force. 

Detection of-unauthorized penetrations of controlled access areas at trans

port stops will normally be accomplished by escorts who will maintain constant 

surveillance over the SSNM or transport. For longer periods such as overnight 

storage, intrusion alarms may be useful. Storage of the shipment within a pro

tected area maintained at a fixed site by an NRC licensee would satisfy the 

requirements for a controlled access area. The reference system delineates 

several safeguards measures that usually will be included in the physical pro tection system to satisfy the performance capability requirements for the detec

tion of unauthorized penetrations of controlled access areas at transport stops 

and transfer points [paragraphs 73.26(f)(2), (i)(7), (j)(3), (k)(1), and (1)(4)]. 

Aboard moving transports, either guard surveillance (either direct or by using closed circuit television (CCTV)) or intrusion alarms maybe used to detect 

unauthorized penetrations-of the controlled access area. If a secured cargo 

5.60-16
compartment or a standard cargo container is used and is determined to be 

generally not accessible to unauthorized personnel (e.g., due to other con

tainers stacked around and above it), a procedure for the use of tamper

indicating seals and inspections may be a suitable means of access detection 

provided the SSNM is placed under constant surveillance whenever access by 

unauthorized persons becomes possible, Locks and seals on the containers would 

normally be examined at these times. (Locks and seals on individual packages 

or containers of SSNM could also be used to establish continued shipment 

integrity, should the shipping container seals be damaged in transit.) 

Communication and assessment functions associated with the access detec

tion subsystems and procedures for controlled access areas should be capable 

of facilitating an appropriate response to detect penetration or attempted 

penetration of a controlled access area. This response is to be capable of 

meeting the threat described in paragraph 73.1(a). The details of the perfor

mance of these communications and assessment functions are to be discussed in 

the Safeguards Contingency Plan in the context of the overall response. 

Content 

1. Controlled Access Areas at Transport Stops. Describe the different 

types of controlled access areas that will need to be established at transport 

stops, and describe the criteria to be used for selection of oppropriate loca

tions for such stops. Include those for rest stops and emergency stops for 

road transportation, intermediate ports of call for sea shipments, transfer 

points, etc. (Refer to the Safeguards Contingency Plan as necessary.) For 

each type of controlled access area described, include the transportation modes 

involved and the occasion for the transport stop being made. Briefly describe 

significant adverse conditions under which the controlled access area will be 

expected to function (e.g., crowds, traffic, availability of nearby cover). 

Provide for each of the different types of controlled access areas 

described, in combination or separately as appropriate, the following information: 

a. Demarcation of Controlled Access Areas. Describe how each con

trolled access area is to be demarcated in order to indicate to escort personnel 

and to other authorized and unauthorized persons that a particular area has 

been defined and that such area is restricted to authorized personnel only. 

Some examples include cordoning off the area with posted guards or erecting 

temporary barricades. 

b. Implementation Procedures. Describe. procedures and criteria 

for escort personnel to select appropriate locations and arrangements (to the 

extent possible) for establishing controlled access areas. Describe procedures 

to be followed in establishing such areas with minimum delay when the specified 

occasion arises. The configuration and approximate dimensions of the controlled 

access area to be established in relationship to the transport or the SSNM should 

be included in this description. 

c. Access Control. Describe the barrier subsystems, procedures, or 

other devices employed to ensure that only authorized personnel will be allowed 

access to the controlled access area. These may include posted guards (escort 

personnel) responsible for detaining unauthorized persons or materials at the 

5.60-17

-J
boundary 

means 

of the controlled access area, appropriate physical barriers, or other for delaying access to the controlled access area. 

d. Access Detection. Describe subsystems and procedures employed to detect and communicate any unauthorized penetration (or such attempts) of the controlled access area by persons, vehicles, or materials and to whom such detections would be communicated. Refer to the Responsibility Matrix of the Safeguards Contingency Plan as necessary. 

Discuss the interrelationship among the access control and detec tion subsystems and the procedures described above and the armed response capa bilities in order to demonstrate that the combined systems can satisfy the general performance requirements of paragraph 73.20(a). 

2. Controlled Access Areas Aboard Moving Transports. Provide descrip tions of the types of controlled access areas to be established aboard moving transports. Include transportation mode involved, location of SSNM aboard the transport, and access points where unauthorized persons could gain access or unauthorized materials could be introduced into the vicinity of the SSNM *in the absence of appropriate controls. 

Provide for each of the types of controlled access areas to be estab lished aboard moving transports, in combination or separately as appropriate, the following information, similar to that included in descriptions of controlled access areas at transport stops: (a) demarcation of controlled access ireas, (b) implementation procedures, (c) access control, and (d) access detcttion. 

subsystems 

Discuss 

and procedures 

the interrelationships among the access control and detection K described above and the escort force (or other armed response personnel) response capabilities in order to demonstrate that the combined systems can satisfy the general performance requirements of paragraph 73.20(a). Refer to the Safeguards Contingency Plan as necessary. 

3.2 Transport Features to Delay Access 

[§73.25(c)(2)(i)] 

Intent 

This provision is intended to ensure that the physical protection system takes into account in its overall scheme the degree of protection afforded by transport design features. Where possible, it is also intended to suggest the inclusion of design features in special-purpose transport vehicles that maximize the delay an adversary might encounter in attempting unauthorized penetration of the transport. 

Generally, only road transport vehicles will be specifically designed to include features that delay access to the cargo compartment in the event of attempted penetration through stealth or force. Such features in road transport vehicles are provided for in the reference system [paragraph 73.26(i)(3)]. However, licensees may also rely on the design features of other types of trans ports in the design of the overall physical protection system. Some examples are the structural strength of a particular type of rail car or affixing cer tain equipment to or temporarily altering the transport to improve its resis tance to penetration. Additional locks may be installed. All such delay

5.60-18
features may be considered as transport features relevant to this provision to 

the extent that they are specifically intended or relied on to delay the 

adversary's attempt at transport penetration. 

Content 

Describe transport(s) used to carry the SSNM. Describe design features 

affecting transport penetration resistance. State whether transportation 

vehicles or modules will be under the control .of the licensee (owned, leased, 

or rented) or under the control of a contract or common carrier. Include 

drawings and specifications that describe the penetration-resistant features 

of the portion of the transport used -to carry the SSNM (e.g., the means of 

securing access points and the construction of the transport's body shell). 

Penetration from all accessible points of attack, including the top and under

sides of transports, should be considered. (See Regulatory Guide 5.31, 

"Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special 

Nuclear Material.") 

3.3 Access Detection for Transports 

[§73.25(c)(2)(ii) and (c)(2)(iiM 

Intent 

These provisions were designed to ensure that a detection capability that 

applies strictly to the transport, in addition to the detection capability asso

ciated with the controlled access area that may surround the transport, is pro

vided in the physical protection system. This is to take into account that 2 certain persons who may be authorized to enter the controlled access area may 

not be authorized to enter the transport itself. Some examples include.transport 

operating crew members on ships, airplanes, and trains or transport service or 

maintenance personnel at stops. 

The smaller perimeter of the transport, in comparison with the controlled 

access area surrounding it, and the usually better-defined boundaries of the 

transport make practical a wider variety of access detection subsystems and 

procedures than might ordinarily be effectively employed in the case of a con

trolled access area. 

Access detection subsystems and procedures are needed under these provi

sions for many reasons. Unauthorized tampering with transports and cargo 

containers can be detected. Any unauthorized presence of persons or materials 

and any unauthorized attempt to penetrate the transport can be detected, 

assessed, and communicated so that the response can prevent SSNM theft. Tamper seals and inspections aid detection of tampering. Intrusion alam systems and 

direct or remote (e.g., CCTV) surveillance aid detection of the actual presence of unauthorized persons within or adjacent to the transport or of attempts at 

unauthorized penetration. Seals do not detect SSNM theft during the act but 

do provide evidence that penetration has or has not occurred in the interims 

between inspections and can provide a useful record for tracing lost shipments 

should some SSNM be found missing. This nonpenetration assurance is also useful 

for eliminating the need to undertake more detailed inspection of transports in order to establish that there are no unauthorized persons or materials aboard 

a transport before 1,ading if the transport has been previously inspected and 

sealed.

5.60-19
Detection of unauthorized access to controlled access areas is generally 

limited to surveillance by escorts; however, remotely or locally annunciated 

Intrusion alarm systems become practical and feasible for transports. The same 

individuals (escorts) may be made responsible for detecting unauthorized access 

to both the controlled access area and the transport contained within it. How

ever, this provision makes the licensee responsible for demonstrating that these 

two functions can be adequately performed by the same personnel simultaneously. 

The licensee, for example, would have to demonstrate that personnel within the 

controlled access area would not be likely to remain undetected in their attempts 

to covertly gain unauthorized access to the transport while the escorts were 

busy watching persons outside the controlled access area. 

Content 

1. Tamper Indication I 73.25(c)(2)(M])]. Describe the inspection and 

detection subsystems and procedures to detect unauthorized tampering with trans

ports and cargo containers during transit and before loading. Include schedules 

for inspections and tamper-indicating features of transport and physical protec

tion hardware. Acceptable devices and procedures for satisfying these provi

sions are contained in Regulatory Guide 5.15, "Security Seals for the Protection 

and Control of Special Nuclear Material." 

*2. Transport Access Detection [§73.25(c)(2)(iii)]. Describe the surveil

lance subsystems and procedures that will be used to detect, assess, and commu

nicate any unauthorized presence of persons or materials within the transport 

and any unauthorized attempt to penetrate the transport. Also describe those 

that ensure that no unauthorized persons or materials are on board the transport 

before SSNM loading or on the escort vehicles (for road shipments) immediately 

before the trip begins. Specify which subsystems and procedures are to be used 

under given conditions and circumstances to ensure that a surveillance or detec

tion capability exists at all times during shipment. If an alarm system Is 

used, describe Its tamper-resistant features and the location and means of 

annunciation. Relate the response to any annunciation of an alarm system or 

to any alarm transmitted by security personnel to the predetermined response 

indicated In the Safeguards Contingency Plan. 

Discuss the interrelationships and interdependencies of the transport 

access detection subsystems and procedures described here with other parts of 

the in-transit physical protection. system, including the Safeguards Contingency 

Plan. Demonstrate how it will be ensured that detection of unauthorized access 

to or'activities within the transport will allow a response timely and effective 

enough to prevent the unauthorized penetration or activity from resulting in 

SSNM theft.

5.60-20
Chapter 4 DETECTION-OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS OR MATERIALS 

INTRODUCTION BY DECEIT 

Access detection and control subsystems and procedures for protection 

against actions of stealth and force were described in Chapter 3 of the Physical 

Protection Plan (see Chapter 3 of Part I of this guide). They were designed 

to channel all materials and persons seeking Introduction into controlled access 

areas or transports through established entry control points. The subsystems 

and procedures described in this chapter are designed to permit the screening 

of all persons and materials being Introduced through such entry control points 

in order to determine whether they are duly authorized for such access. 

4.1 Access Authorizations 

[673.25(b)(3)(i) and (c)(1)(i)] 

Intent 

Access authorizations should be maintained and used with access control 

systems for controlled access areas and transports. Their purpose Is to deter

mine the persons who are authorized to be admitted to the controlled access 

area or transport and the criteria for their admittance. Access authorizations 

in the form of a written access authorization schedule enable escort personnel 

to quickly discriminate between those who are to be admitted to the controlled 

access area or transport at any given time and those who are to be excluded. 

2 Such a schedule may also provide information that can be used to verify the 

Identities of those persons seeking access or of those materials, equipment, 

or vehicles presented for introduction. 

Access authorizations would normally name the individual to be granted 

access and provide the criteria (i.e., the time, place, circumstances, etc.) 

for admittance. The authorizations would be limited to the specific times 

when and places where the individual has the need to be admitted to the con

trolled access areas or transport to perform his/her job. They may also specify 

the activities in which the individual would be authorized to engage while 

enjoying such access. The authorizations would normally be provided In written 

form and mAde available to the escort force personnel who would be responsible 

for implementing the access control system. 

In some situations, the security organization may authorize an Individual 

access to controlled access areas or the transport on a temporary basis without 

specifying the individual's name or means of personal identification. This 

may be necessary to facilitate refueling or vehicle service at stops. Such 

individuals would normally be given escorts or placed under close surveillance 

to ensure that they perform only the tasks for which they have been specifically 

authorized. 

These provisions also apply to materials being introduced into controlled 

access areas or transports. Security-significant equipment, materials, or 

vehicles that may potentially have an adverse impact on the security of the 

shipment or that may be used to conceal such equipment or materials may be 

excluded unless specifically authorized for introduction into a controlled 

access area or transport.

5.60-21
It is the licensee's responsibility to determine which individuals, mate

rials, equipment, or vehicles should be given authorizations and to instruct 

accordingly the members of the escort force having responsibility for imple menting the access control system. 

Content 

Describe the criteria to be used for determining which persons and mate

rials are to be approved for authorization for access to or introduction into 

(1) controlled access areas and (2) transports. Categorize the criteria 

according to the different situations and conditions expected to apply at 

different times during shipment. 

Indicate in which cases persons granted access will require escorts or 

close surveillance by duly authorized personnel. Describe or refer to the 

escort or surveillance procedures used to the extent they are applicable. 

State which individuals in the security organization (position titles and 

names of individuals) may approve access authorizations. Describe procedures for processing authorizations and the forms used for documenting such authoriza

tions (e.g., authorization lists, letters of authorization). 

Describe precautions taken to ensure that authorization documents will 

not be generated without the approval of the responsible individuals in secu

rity organization management and to ensure that they will be secured to prevent tampering or alteration. Describe procedures for ensuring that authorization 

lists will be constantly updated, as necessary, and that only the most current 

authorization lists will be used. 

4.2 Access Control at Entr Control Points 

[§73.25(b)(3)(ii) and (c)(1)(ii)] 

4.2.1 Identification and Verification 

Intent 

Access control subsystems and procedures must be Implemented, under these 

provisions, to ensure that only 'authorized persons and materials are allowed 

access to or introduction into controlled access areas or transports. Usually these subsystems and procedures will include establishing entry control points, identifying authorized persons or materials, verifying such identifications, and assessing verified identifications against established authorization 

schedules. 

Entry control points should normally be few in number (generally not more 

than one per controlled access area) to ensure the greatest amount of control 

with the limited personnel and other physical protection resources available. 

Their objective is to cause each individual seeking entry to the area or trans

port to be channelled through a screening process for identification, verifica

tion, and authorization assessment before being allowed to enter. It is 

desirable to ensure that the detection of any attempted introduction of unautho

rized persons or materials Into controlled access areas or transports will be 

communicated to other escort force personnel so that appropriate measures 

described in the Safeguards Contingency Plan may be initiated to deny such

5.60-22
unauthorized entries. Generally this might best be accomplished by routinely 

detaining persons attempting entry at the entry control point. Thus the 

communication of detections of unauthorized persons or materials being intro

duced can be accomplished before notifying the individual that he will not be 

admitted for lack of proper identification or authorization. This will provide 

as much warning as possible to other members of the security organization if 

the persons involved are in fact adversaries and are prepared to take violent 

measures upon failure of their deceit mode. 

One method that will usually accomplish the identification verification 

function is the use of a numbered picture badge identification procedure affect

ing all individuals who will have custody of the shipment. This procedure is 

described in §73.26(g)(1) of the reference system. All members of the licensee's 

escort force and all members of other groups of security personnel authorized 

to assume custody of the shipment at transfer points or at the final destination 

are included. Badges held by the persons who would assume custody would be 

compared with facsimiles of such badges provided in advance to the escort force 

giving up custody of the shipment to ensure that identifications are valid. 

Other means may be employed to identify personnel who would be granted tempo

rary access to an area or to the transport. Temporary badges, for example, 

may be issued to such persons whifle they are in the subject area or transport. 

These would signify their temporary status and, if.applicable, their need for 

an escort or other close supervision to limit their opportunities to perform 

unauthorized acts. 

Content 

Describe how entry control points are to be established for controlled 

access areas of the types described in Section 3.1 of the Physical Protection 

Plan (see Section 3.1 of Part I of this guide). Also describe the entry con

trol points for each qf the transports described in Section 3.3 of the plan 

(see Section 3.3 of Part I of this guide). 

For each distinct type of entry control point described above, describe 

the subsystems and procedures used to detain persons or materials for which 

introduction is being sought until their identities and authorizations can be 

confirmed. 

Discuss measures that would be taken if an attempt is detected to gain 

entry to introduce unauthorized vehicles or materi.als through authorized entry 

control points by deceit. Refer to the Safeguards Contingency Plan as 

necessary. 

Describe how identification and documents presented for the purpose of 

identification will be verified as being authentic. 

4.2.2 Assessment Against Authorizations 

Intent 

After a person's identity has been verified, such identifications must be 

assessed against a written authorization schedule. This assessment will deter

mine that the person seeking entry has been authorized to enter the controlled 

access area or transport and that the specific entry criteria described in the

5.60-23

r'!
authorization 

to ensure 

schedule have been met. The use of entry criteria is intended 

specific assigned 

that access is permitted only to allow non-escort personnel to perform 

the transport. Further, 

duties that require access to the controlled access area or 

more difficult 

the specification of certain entry criteria makes it 

the amount of 

for a potential adversary to gain access by deceit by decreasing time and the number of occasions on which adversaries could deceit fully obtain such access. 

rials Specification 

places similar 

of conditions that must be met for the introduction of mate

fully introduce 

limitations on the potential adversary's ability to success unauthorized materials into controlled access areas or transports by deceit. 

other 

Measures 

related 

must 

access 

also be taken to ensure that authorization schedules and authorization 

ensure their continued'availability 

items are maintained in a secure manner to and to prevent compromise of the authoriza tion assessment subsystems and procedures. 

Content 

Describe-subsystems 

of persons, 

and procedures used to assess verified identifications 

and entry-criteria 

vehicles, and materials against current authorization schedules 

ular times, (conditions placed upon authorized entry related to partic

rials are permitted 

places, and circumstances) before such persons, vehicles, or mate

authorization 

access or introduction. Describe details of the forms of 

the authorization 

schedules that will be used by personnel or devices involved in assessment function. Also discuss the precautions prevent taken to the successful use of counterfeit authorization items.

5.60-24
Chapter 5 PREVENTION OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF SSNM 

FROM TRANSPORTS BY DECEIT 

5.1 Authorization for Removal of SSNM from Transports 

[§73.25(c)(3)(i)] 

Intent 

Authorizations are necessary under the provisions for removal of SSNM from 

transports at intermediate stopping points and at the final destination.. The 

purpose of such authorizations is to ensure that the SSNM will not be withdrawn 

unnecessarily or Indiscriminately from the transport and placed in a more vulner

able situation as a result of actions of deceit by adversaries. Authorizations 

for removal of SSNM from a transport are, in effect, instructions to the escort 

force personnel on times and conditions suitable for removing SSNM from its 

protected location inside the transport. When persons are presenting themselves 

as potential recipients of the SSNM, it is especially important to confirm that 

their identities are the same as those described on the authorization schedule 

before exposing the SSNM to them by removal from the transport. 

SSNM will have to be authorized for removal from transports at some transfer 

points and at the final destination. Numerous scheduled removals from the trans

port are discouraged and can usually be avoided by use of appropriate equipment 

and planning. In a shipment involving road, rail, and sea segments, for example, 

removals of wieldable packages of SSNM from one transport for loading into 

another can be avoided by using a standardized shipping container of the type 

specified in the reference system [paragraph 73.26(l)(1)]. 

To ensure that SSNM is removed from transports only when necessary, authori

zation schedules for the removal of SSNM from transports must specify authorized 

times, places, and conditions for removal, plus names of persons authorized to 

remove and to receive the SSNM. They must also be consistent with the means 

used to identify the recipients and the controls and procedures for removal. 

(See Regulatory Guide 5.57, "Shipping and Receiving Control of Special Nuclear 

Material.") 

Content 

Describe the criteria for removal of SSNM from the transport. State the 

names or position titles of persons who will be authorized to implement removal 

procedures, as necessary. 

Describe the SSNM removal authorization schedules that will be maintained 

to determine when prescheduled removals are to be executed. Also describe the 

forms of documentation (e.g., hand-to-hand receipts as suggested in the refer

ence system, paragraph 73.26(b)(4)) that will be used to provide a permanent 

record of transfer of the SSNM when custody of the SSNM is transferred. Samples 

of authorization schedules and other documentation should be provided.

5.60-25
5.2 SSNM Removal Controls 

[§73.25(c)(3)(ii) and (c)(3)(iii)] 

Intent 

Removal controls are necessary to ensure that the SSNH removal authoriza tion schedules just discussed are appropriately implemented and that the secu rity of the SSNH during the removal and subsequent transfer operations is ade quately maintained. This is to ensure that the actual SSNM removal is under taken only after authorization for such removal has been confirmed and the 

verified 

identities of persons into whose hands the SSNM is to be transferred have been and assessed against the current authorization schedule. In this sense, the removal controls are a type of filtering process similar to access controls in discriminating between those who are authorized to receive SSNM and those who are not. 

Removal controls also include verifying the identity and integrity of the SSNM to be removed and ensuring that the removal and transfer of SSNM from the transport is properly documented in order to establish proof that responsibility for the shipment has been duly transferred to the appropriate party. (Hand-to hand receipts are suggested in the reference system in paragraph 73.26(b)(4). See Section 1.6, "Security Records," of Part I of this guide.) This documenta tion will ensure the traceability of the shipment if it is missing or overdue at its final destination. 

Content 

in 

1. Emergency Removal Procedures. Indicate that procedures are described K the 'Safeguards Contingency Plan for the removal of SSNM from the transport in emergency situations for each transport mode involved and that such proce dures include how the SSNM is to be protected while outside an approved trans port, what procedures are to be followed in transferring material to a substitute transport, and how the escort force would maintain control over the SSNM if a substitute transport were used. Refer to the appropriate portions of the Safe guards Contingency Plan. 

2. Prescheduled Removal Procedures. Describe procedures to be used during prescheduled removals of SSNM from transports. Include procedures for identifying persons physically removing the SSNM and those who will be receiving the mateiial (if custody of the material is being transferred). Also include procedures for verifying the identifications of such persons, verifying the identity and integrity of the SSNM that will be removed from the transports, 

most 

and assessing each of the verified identifications just described against the current authorization schedules. Describe the procedures to ensure that all the foregoing procedures will be completed satisfactorily before physical removal of SSNM from the transports. 

where 

Describe the forms for acknowledging receipt of SSNM at all points there is a transfer of custody of the material. Describe the procedure or devices for validating the receipt of the material (e.g., signature of responsible individual accepting custody, use of corporate seal).

5.60-26
Chapter 6 DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF SSNM FROM TRANSPORTS 

BY STEALTH OR FORCE 

6.1 Transport Features to Delay Removal 

[§73.25(c)(4)(i)] 

Intent 

The delay that may be encountered by a potential adversary attempting the 

unauthorized removal of SSNM from a transport by stealth or force is a signif

icant factor to be considered in the overall design of a physical protection 

system for SSNM in transit. Transport features that delay removal of the SSNM 

must be considered, whether they have been specifically designed into a special 

purpose transport vehicle or are coincidentally present in a multipurpose trans

port selected to transport SSNM but also relied on to delay unauthorized removal 

of SSNM. 

This provision has been included to ensure the use, where feasible, of 

design features in specially designed transports to increase the delay that 

would be encountered by an adversary attempting unauthorized penetration of 

the transport by stealth or force. Where specially designed transports, are 

not feasible, these provisions would permit the physical protection system to 

be given credit for the transport features that promote such delay found in 

multipurpose transports. 

Some features that delay unauthorized removal of SSNM from a transport 

may be identical to those that prevent or delay unauthorized access to the 

transport. Those features have been described previously in Section 3.3 of 

Part I of this guide. This section addresses only the aspects of those 

features that promote delay in SSNM removal from the transport. 

A number of fairly simple features may be used to cause delay in unautho

rized SSNM-removal attempts. These include fastening SSNM containers to the 

floor or other part of the transport interior, binding the containers together 

so that the resulting bulk is too heavy or too large to be moved out of the 

transport cargo compartment entry point in one action, or filling the cargo 

-compartment* of the transport with tear gas or other chemicals designed to 

obscure vision or otherwise make removal more difficult. However, it is 

important that the mechanisms used to cause such emissions be designed to 

prevent unintended accidental triggering of the devices. 

In the case of road shipments particularly, there is an additional device 

that would be included under the heading of delaying removal of SSNM, but this 

involves removal of the entire transport rather than removal of SSNM from the 

transport.. In the reference system, it is suggested as one of two options that 

the transport vehicle for road shipments 'be equipped with a device for immo

biliz.ing the transport or at least the cargo-carrying portion of the transport 

so that a potential adversary could not use the transport to depart with the 

shipment after attack [paragraph 73.26(i)(3)(i)]. This device is designed to 

delay the adversary from quickly leaving the attack scene with the SSNM before 

. LLEAs arrive on the scene. This device should be sufficiently effective to 

prevent mobility from being restored to the transport by the adversary in a

5.60-27
short period of time, thus defeating the purposeof the immobilization device. 

Use of a cargo vehicle that does not have this feature would suggest the need 

for a compensatory increase in other forms of protection such as the use of an 

additional escort vehicle (as suggested in the reference system). 

Content 

Describe the transport features that will be relied on to delay attempts at unauthorized removal of SSNM from the transport. Include details of con

struction or arrangements made to produce the delay and an estimate of the time 

and resources required to overcome the obstacle or mechanism causing the delay. Refer to the descriptions of transport features delaying access in Section 3.3 

of the Physical Protection Plan (see Section 3.3 of Part I of this guide) as 

necessary. 

Describe any transport features that will be relied onto delay removal 

of a road transport vehicle loaded with SSNH. Include details of construction 

and operation of any mechanisms designed to immobilize the vehicle and the 

actions or conditions required to trigger the applicable mechanisms (e.g., improper operation of the vehicle by unauthorized persons, remote-controlled 

radio signal activation). Include details of the extent to which the vehicle 

can be restored to normal operating condition following immobilization and the 

time, resources, and knowledge required to restore the vehicle to normal 

operating condition. Describe the fail-safe features that-ensure that the 

trigger mechanism for the immobilization device does not become accidentally activated during shipment progress. 

.6.2 Detection of SSNM Removal Attempts K [§73.25(c)(4)(11)1

Intent 

This provision is intended to provide a warning to the security organiza tion that an attempt at unauthorized removal of SSNN from the transport is in 

progress or is imminent in order to enable a response that will prevent ultimate 

theft of SSNM. 

There is a degree of redundancy between subsystems and procedures designed -to detect attempts at unauthorized access to transports and those designed to 

detect attempts at unauthorized removal of SSNM from transports. However, these 

two. categories of detection subsystems and procedures need not be identical. 

Detection subsystems and procedures not apparent to the potential adversary until penetration is complete are less easily compromised than those apparent from outside the transport. Also, whereas the physical protection system may rely on personnel to conduct surveillance of the transport to detect unautho rized penetration attempts, the detection of unauthorized removal attempts may rely on a mechanical device that cannot be compromised by those conducting the 

surveillance.. This provides some degree of protection against both acts of 

coercion against the escorts conducting surveillance, as well as acts of collu

sion bythe escort force members. Therefore, it would be desirable that there 

be some degree of independence between the detection subsystems and procedures designed to detect penetrations and removals.

5.60-28
If escort personnel responsible for monitoring access to the controlled 

access area surrounding a transport are also assigned, responsibility for respond

ing to detections of unauthorized penetrations of the transport, an adversary 

might successfully neutralize such escort personnel and gain access to the SSNM 

without the LLEAs having bien notified. Greater effectiveness may be achieved 

in the physical .protection system by arranging for separate detection subsystems 

for the controlled access areas and 'for the transport. 

Alarms could be annunciated at a remote location occupied by a portion of 

the ekcort force. Because the act of unauthorized removal is so close to the 

realization of a successful theft, annunciations of the alarm could be considered 

ample cause for contacting and alerting the LLEAs before further action is taken 

by the escort force to assess the cause of the alarm. This detection system 

should be consistent with the Safeguards Contingency Plan and Sections 7.2 and 

7.3 of the Physical Protection Plan (see Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of Part I of this 

guide) to ensure that the entire system will be able to detect, assess, and 

communicate attempts at unauthorized removal so that the response to the attempt 

can be such- as to prevent the theft of SSNM as required in the statement of 

the required capability. 

Content 

Describe the detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess, and 

communicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of SSNM from transports. 

Indicate the times when such systems would be in operation, especially with 

regard to periods during which other detection subsystems and procedures would 

be or would not be in operation to. detect attempted unauthorized penetration 

of the transport. Discuss the extent to which the detection subsystems and 

procedures designed to detect unauthorized removal of SSNM from transports and 

unauthorized penetration into transports operate independently and offer a 

degree of redundancy to the detection function in relationship to the transport. 

Discuss the effectiveness of the subsystems and procedures designed to 

detect unauthorized removal of SSNM from transports and their interrelation

ships and interdependencies with other parts of the physical protection system 

described in the Physical Protection Plan and in the Safeguards Contingency 

Plan. This discussion of interrelationships and interdependencies should 

demonstrate that unauthorized attempts at removal of SSNM from transports will 

be detected.

5.60-29
Chapter 7 TRANSMISSION OF DETECTION, ASSESSMENT, AND OTHER 

SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION 

Various requirements for communications capabilities have been described 

in other portions of this Standard Format (i.e., Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6 of 

Part I). The provisions for communications capabilities in this chapter are 

intended to support the other capabilities where communications capabilities 

are needed. 

7.1 Communications Among Escort Force Personnel 

[§73.25(d)(2)(i)] 

Intent 

Communications are routinely required among members of the escort force 

at different locations, especially in the cases of road transportation where 

escort force personnel are dispersed among several escort vehicles or where 

some may purposely be sent to a remote location to ensure a response in the 

case of attack (see Section 1.8 of Part I of this guide). In addition, commu

nications may be required among escort personnel while some or all of them are 

on foot, should this become necessary as a result of, or as a tactic In, certain 

response actions. Thus, communications among escort force members, independent 

of vehicle-mounted equipment, should normally be provided in some measure. In 

all cases, for any transportation modes contemplated in the plan, communicetions 

> subsystems and procedures should be designed to permit proper implementation 

of the escort force duties and procedures detailed in the Physical Protection 

Plan and the Safeguards Contingency Plan. Continuous two-way intraconvoy 

communications are specified in. the reference system in the case of road 

shipments [paragraph 73.26(1)(6)]. 

Communications among escort force members may be affected by atmospheric 

conditions, topographic features, and spurious or purposely generated electro

magnetic radiation that may interfere with the ability to communicate clearly. 

The licensee should select subsystems and procedures to cope with such antici

pated difficulties. Communications codes or other devices to disguise position 

or other security-significant information transmitted among escort force members 

may also.be desirable. 

Content 

Describe the communications subsystems and procedures that will be employed 

to allow communications among members of the escort force, and relate their 

performance characteristics to the way they are expected to be used at different 

times during the shipment. Include range and limitations of the equipment, 

the extent to which the equipment is portable (e.g., portability by an Indi

vidual in the field, restriction to vehicle mounting, or longevity of power 

source under continuous use), and procedures for disguising position data and 

other security information that may be of interest to the potential adversary 

(i.e., duress codes). Refer as necessary to other parts of the Physical Pro

j tection Plan or to the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

5.60-31
7.2 Communications Between the Escort Commander and the Movement Control Center 

Intent [§73.25(d)2)(ii)] 

Intent 

movement 

Two-way communications are required between the escort commander and the control center to transmit assessment information and requests for 

but 

assistance from LLEAs. Equipment for such communications may be vehicle mounted 

affect 

should provide for dead areas and other anticipated conditions that may 

particular 

communications from time to time. Segments of the route that present 

priate measures 

communications problems should be taken into consideration. Appro should be taken to ensure sufficient communications capability to support the objectives of the physical protection system. Although communica tions are not required on a continuous basis between the escort commander and the movement control center, even in the case of road shipments, a capability for such communications must be provided to allow either direct or indirect communication between the escort commander and the movement control center should an emergency arise and assistance from LLEAs be required. Alternatively, 

when 

direct communications with the LLEAs would be acceptable in some situations communications with the movement control center cannot be sustained. 

portation 

The reference system provides that two of the vehicles used in road trans be equipped with radiotelephones for communication with the movement control center and that there be some other redundant means of communication as well [paragraph 73.26(1)(6)]. For sea shipments, ship-to-shore communications are specified in the reference system [paragraph 73.26(l)(7)], whereas reference system provisions for air and rail shipments do not specify the type of commu nications system to be used. 

Content 

Describe the communications subsystems and procedures that will be used for two-way communications between the escort commander and the movement con trol center to rapidly and accurately transmit assessment information and requests for assistance by LLEA forces and to coordinate such assistance with the actions of the escort force. Include the range and limitations of the equipment, whether local relays will be required, and the means to be employed 

may 

for disguising position data and other information in the communications that be useful to the potential adversary. Regulatory Guide 5.32, "Communica tion with Transport Vehicles," provides information on radiotelephones and systems and procedures for disguising position data, which would be most use ful for road or rail shipments. 

7.3 Notification of LLEAs [§73.25(d)(2_)(ii)] 

Intent 

Both the armed escorts and the movement control center personnel under this provision must be provided with the communications equipment and appro priaterprocedures to allow them to notify the LLEAs of the need for assistance. The reference system suggests specifically a need for redundancy in these commu nications 

need 

in certain instances, as discussed in Section 1.8 of this plan. The for such redundancy underscores the basic philosophy of the licensee

5.60-32
physical protection system. The escort force is not intended to be able to 

defeat potential attackers in an aggressive mode but to protect the SSN1 ship

ment and themselves from harm, while delaying the theft of SSNM or radiological 

sabotage, until LLEAs arrive. In a system designed to interface closely with 

LLEA forces, the ability of escorts and the movement control center to commu

nicate with such forces is very important and therefore requires an appropriate 

level of redundancy. 

Although the need to maintain a capability for communications with the 

LLEAs applies to all transportation modes, this does not necessarily mean direct 

communications. Various types of relays would be possible, especially where 

redundant modes are concerned. An illustration of how this communications capa

bility can be ensured during transfer operations when the SSNM is probably in 

its most vulnerable condition is provided in the, reference system, which pro

vides that the escort force would split up into two groups made up of two escorts 

and five escorts during transfers. The two escorts would go to a remote loca

tion, and both the two remotely located escorts and the five who remain to 

protect the shipment would be able to communicate directly with the LLEAs [para

graph 73.26(f)(2)]. However, there are no further specific provisions for 

communications with the LLEAs in the reference system. 

Content 

Describe the communications subsystems and procedures for (1) the armed 

escorts and (2) movement control center personnel to notify LLEAs of the need 

for assistance. Refer, if desired, to Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of the Physical 

Protection Plan (see Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of Part I of this guide). Include 

in the description the range and limitations (e.g., dead areas for radio commu

nications) of the communications, whether local relays will be required, and 

whether the escort force will have direct control of the communications system 

or will share the communications facilities with other persons (e.g., ship's 

radio on oceangoing vessel, aircraft radio normally used by aircraft crew).

5.60-33
PART 11 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIFIC SHIPMENTS
1. GENERAL INFORMATION

Intent 

It is provided in paragraph 73.26(b) of 10 CFR Part 73 that security 

arrangements for each shipment of SSNHM be approved by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission prior to the time for the 7-day notice required for shipments 

by §73.72. The purpose of this provision is to permit the NRC to review the 

shipment physical protection arrangements for a specific shipment to ensure 

that they provide the level of protection required by §§73.20 and 73.25 in the 

full context of the conditions and situations existing shortly before the time 

of shipment. Although there is no requirement as to how soon before the ship

ment this information is. to be submitted, it is normally assumed that it would 

not be so far in advance that the licensee would have to make drastic updating 

revisions to the submittal just before the actual shipment. The availability 

of scheduling information from carriers and other sources would affect the date 

of submittal and would discourage submittal too long before the shipment date. 

Significant changes in the arrangements reported to NRC should be submitted 

immediately to NRC as amendments to the original submittal when such changes 

appear necessary. These amendments will then be approved if extensive review 

is not indicated. 

The provisions of paragraph 73.26(b)(3) of 10 CFR Part 73 define basically 

the types of information to be submitted for each shipment. However, a degree 

-of flexibility is allowed in the amount of information that would be submitted. 

The licensee may choose to provide as much information as possible in the 

Physical Protection Plan so that the submittal for each specific shipment would 

be as little burdensome as possible. Providing details in the Physical Pro

tection Plan, then simply referencing them in the submittal for each shipment 

would reduce the burden. On the other end of the spectrum, the licensee may 

choose to include in the submittal for a particular shipment a number *of 

departures from the Physical Protection Plan, perhaps made necessary by 

temporary conditions beyond his control. This provision would be most suitable 

for temporary changes effective for only one shipment. There are also provi

sions for updating the Physical Protection Plan as well. The licensee, at his 

discretion, may choose to widely distribute the details of the physical pro

tection arrangements for a particular shipment between the Physical Protection 

Plan and the submittal of Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Ship

ments with the understanding that both together describe the physical protec

tion system for any particular shipment. It is advantageous to keep the 

volume of any such submittals to a level commensurate with the time allowed 

for NRC review. The sections that follow provide a standard format for the 

different types of information that may be submitted before a particular 

shipment. The physical specifications for such submittals are the same as for 

the Physical Protection Plan, as described in the Introduction to this Standard 

Format. 

Content 

State the purpose of this submittal as supplying the NRC certain informa

2; tion on specific security arrangements for shipments of SSN in formula quan

tities sufficiently In advance of the shipment to allow NRC approval of such

5.60-37
arrangements before the time for the 7-day notice required by §73.72 of 10 CFR Part 73. Reference the Physical Protection Plan corresponding to this submittal 

by docket number and date. 

2. ITINERARY INFORMATION 

Content 

State the estimated dates and times of departure and arrival, the names of the shipper, receiver, and carrier(s); and the mode(s) of shipment. 

Describe the route to be used for the proposed shipment by referring to the appropriate section in the Physical Protection Plan, indicating any differ

ences in the itinerary compared to that described in the Physical Protection Plan. Provide the appropriate information corresponding to such differences 

as required in the Physical Protection Plan so as to completely update the itinerary information required for the proposed route. Note such changes and 

include them as an appendix to this submittal. 

3. TRANSFERS OF SHIPMENT SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY 

Content 

Note by reference to the stated itinerary the times and locations of points where there will be transfers of responsibility for- the security of the shipment (i.e., escorts either accepting or relinquishing responsibility). 

At each such point, describe the arrangements made to continuously maintain the security of the shipment during the transfer, including points at which the escorts will accept responsibility for an import shipment. Refer to the 

Physical Protection Plan as necessary. 

4. DIFFERENCES FROM THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN 

Content 

Describe any subsystems or procedures to be used for the particular ship ment described here that differ significantly from those described in the Physical Protection Plan. Present this information sequentially, according to the headings that apply to the subsystem or procedure to be supplanted. In the case of each difference from the Physical Protection Plan, indicate why the change is being made. 

5. RELATIONSHIP TO THE-PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN 

Content 

Ensure that, except as specifically noted in this submittal, all subsystems and procedures for the physical protection of the proposed shipment described here will be substantially the same as those described in the Physical Protec

tion Plan.

5.60-38
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