United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Stephen A. Gale-Ebanks, Plaintiff,

v.

Chesapeake Crewing, LLC, 

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 20-22685-Civ-Scola

Order Remanding Case to State Court

Defendant Chesapeake Crewing, LLC, removed this case from state court, 

contending Plaintiff Stephen A. Gale-Ebanks’s claims “are governed by the Suits 

in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30901.” (Def.’s Not. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1, 2.) At the same 

time, Chesapeake Crewing filed a motion to dismiss, in which it maintains “[t]his 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over [Gale-Ebanks’s] claims because the 

exclusive remedy under the Suits in Admiralty Act is an action against the 

United States” (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 8, 2) and the suit is time barred (id. at 18).

“The Suits in Admiralty Act does not itself provide any substantive rights: 

instead, it ‘merely provides a jurisdictional hook upon which to hang a 

traditional admiralty claim’ against the United States.” Martin v. Miller, 65 F.3d 

434, 438 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Trautman v. Buck Steber, Inc., 693 F.2d 440, 

444 (5th Cir.1982)). There is no dispute, here, that this action is not a suit 

against the United States. And neither party suggests the United States should 

be substituted as the proper party. Further, Chesapeake Crewing maintains 

Gale-Ebanks’s claim cannot be maintained under the Suits in Admiralty Act, in 

any event, because the statute of limitations has expired. As Chesapeake 

Crewing itself points out, “[t]his is a jurisdictional limitation.” (Def.’s Mot. at 18 

(quoting Szyka v. U.S. Sec’y of Def., 525 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1975)).) The Suits in 

Admiralty Act, therefore, cannot, by its plain terms, provide a basis for federal 

jurisdiction here. As the party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction, Chesapeake 

Crewing bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction: it has not carried this

burden because it claims the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case under the 

terms of the very statute that it claims confers jurisdiction. 

Chesapeake Crewing’s protestations, in its response to the Court’s order to 

show cause regarding jurisdiction, are unavailing. Although it is true, as 

Chesapeake Crewing explains, that “a Jones Act claim cannot defeat an 

otherwise proper removal based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction,” 

(Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 9, 4), here, as set forth above, Chesapeake Crewing has 

failed to carry its burden of establishing an actual federal question. The Court 

Case 1:20-cv-22685-RNS Document 11 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/14/2020 Page 1 of 2
also does not find, as Chesapeake Crewing maintains, Gale-Ebanks artfully 

pleaded around the application of the Suits in Admiralty Act. Here, Chesapeake 

Crewing “attempts to justify removal on the basis of facts not alleged in the 

complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 397 (1987). In other words, 

Chesapeake Crewing supplies facts, appearing nowhere in the complaint, which

it contends show it was acting as an agent of the United States when GaleEbanks sustained his injuries.1 But “the ‘artful pleading’ doctrine cannot be 

invoked in such circumstances.” Id. Chesapeake Crewing cannot manufacture 

federal jurisdiction by injecting a federal question based on a potential defense to 

Gale-Ebanks’s claim. Id. at 399 (1987) (“Congress has long since decided that 

federal defenses do not provide a basis for removal.”) 

Finding subject-matter jurisdiction lacking, the Court remands this case 

back to state court. The Clerk is directed to close this case and take all 

necessary steps to ensure the prompt remand of this matter and the transfer of 

this file back to Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for MiamiDade County. The Court denies all pending motions as moot, as not properly 

before this Court.

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on July 14, 2020.

________________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

1 This is in stark contrast to the case presented in Van Hook v. Raytheon Tech. 

Services Co., LLC, 604CV1490ORL22JGG, 2005 WL 8159921, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 

Feb. 11, 2005), upon which Chesapeake Crewing relies. In that case, the 

complaint itself contained facts indicating the defendant there was an agent of 

the United States. Further, in Van Hook, there is no indication the defendant 

there simultaneously argued the court lacked federal-question subject-matter 

jurisdiction while at the same time seeking to remove the case from state court

on the basis of federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.

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