UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JOAN E. FARR, a/k/a Joan Heffington, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent - Appellee. No. 18-9002 (CIR No. 002746-15)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, McKAY and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Joan E. Farr appeals pro se from a Tax Court decision that sus tained the Commissioner’s assessment of excis e taxes. Exercising jurisdic tion under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a), we affirm.
B ACKGROUND In 2015, the Commissioner issued Farr a notice of tax deficien cy for engaging in excess benefit transactions with her § 501(c)(3) o rganization, Association for Honest

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 1, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Attorneys (AHA). 1 “The term ‘excess benefit tran saction’ means any transaction in which an economic benefit is pr ovided by an applicable tax-exem pt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person if t he value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the val ue of the consideration (includ ing the performance of services) received for providing such benefit.” 26 U.S.C. § 49 58(c)(1)(A). As for the specific excess bene fit transactions, the Commissio ner determined that during 2010, 2011, and 2012, Far r used AHA’s checking account t o make personal purchases from various grocery , retail, automotive, and home-im provement stores, as well as to make tuition payments for her son and to cover the c osts of exhuming her father’s remains for DNA analysi s. Based on transactions total ing $39,495.34 over the three-year period, the Commissi oner assessed a first-tier excis e tax of $9,873.83 and a second-tier excise tax of $78,990.68. Farr then disputed the assessme nts in Tax Court, arguing that the AHA funds she withdrew were used to further A HA’s business purpose, to compen sate her for services rendered to AHA, and to repay loan s she made to AHA. The Tax C ourt upheld the assessments, prompting Fa rr’s appeal to this court.
D ISCUSSION Excess benefit transactions are taxed in two tiers—first, at a rate of twenty-five percent, and second, at a rate o f two-hundred percent if the fi rst tier is not paid within the taxable period. See id. § 4958(a)(1), (b). These taxes a pply to “disqualified person[ s],”

1 According to Farr, AHA “tries t o discourage litigation, improv e the legal system and seek ‘justice for al l.’” Aplt. Opening Br. at 1.3 meaning “any person who was, at any time during the 5-year peri od ending on the date of such transaction, in a position to exercise substantial influen ce over the affairs of the organization.” Id. § 4958(f)(1)(A). The Tax Court sustained the Co mmissioner’s assessment of first - and second-tier excise taxes because Farr failed to submit any credible evidenc e showing that the economic benefits she derived fr om using AHA’s funds were trace able to any consideration she provided AHA. Indeed, “an economic benefit s hall not be treated as consideration for the performan ce of services unless such organ ization clearly indicated its intent to so treat such benefit.” Id. § 4958(c)(1)(A). 2 We review the Tax Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its fa ctual findings for clear error. Lewis v. Comm’r , 523 F.3d 1272, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008). On appeal, Farr advan ces no cogent argument with record suppor t showing that the Tax Court erred in determini ng that she engaged in excess b enefit transactions with AHA. Rather, she accuses the Tax Court and the Commissioner of , among other things, “engag[ing] in unethical acts and . . . conspiracy/collusion, f raud and intentional fraud, and tort of outrage.” Aplt. O pening Br. at 10. Although we li berally construe a pro se

2 In the Tax Court, Farr did not dispute that AHA was a tax-exem pt organization, that she was a di squalified person, or that she h ad not corrected the first-tier tax deficiency in or der to avoid the second-tier tax . Any attempt to do so now is waived. See Tele-Commc’ns., Inc. v. Comm’r , 104 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n issue mu st be presented to, considered and decided by the trial court before it can be rai sed on appeal.” (brackets and i nternal quotation marks omitted)); Mitchell v. Comm’r , 775 F.3d 1243, 1248 n.3 ( 10th Cir. 2015) (noting that arguments forfeited before the Tax Court and unaccompanied on a ppeal by assertions of plain error are waived).4 litigant’s filings, we neverthele ss require a pro se litigant t o provide “succinct, clear and accurate” arguments, together “with citations to the authoritie s and parts of the record on which [she] relies.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 (10th Cir. 2005). This, Farr h as not done. It is not our role to “serv[e] as the litigant’s attorney in constructing argument s and searching the record.” Id. at 840. Thus, her bald assertions of fraud/conspiracy are insufficient to invoke appel late review. See id. (holding that a pro se litigan t forfeits appellate review by ad vancing arguments that are scurrilous instead of substantive). To the extent Farr has complied with her briefing obligations by complaining that the Tax Court did not appoint c ounsel for her and would not let her plead the Fifth Amendment, we note that there is no “right to counsel in a Tax Court proceeding,”
Shamrock v. Comm’r , 860 F.3d 433, 434 (7 th Cir. 2017) (emphasis omitted), and the privilege against self-incrimination “cannot [be] invoke[d] in a Tax Court case to satisfy [the taxpayer’s] burden of proving that the government miscalcu lated h[er] tax deficiency,” Kosinski v. Comm’r , 541 F.3d 671, 678 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Anaya v.
Comm’r , 983 F.2d 186, 188 ( 10th Cir. 1993) (“[t]he taxpayer carries t he burden of proving [that] the Commissione r’s assessment is incorrect”).5 C ONCLUSION We affirm the decision of the T ax Court, and we grant Farr’s m otion for leave to proceed in form a pauperis.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge