UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS
N O
. 09-1026(E)
E A RL B. T HOMPS ON , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. E RI C K. S H I N SEKI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls (De cided Nove mber 19, 2010)

Robert V. Chisholm, of Providence , Rhode I sland, and Landon Overby of Washington, D. C., we re on

the br ie f f

or the a pp e lla nt.
W ill A. Gunn , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , A ssi sta

nt G e ne ra l Co un se l; Brian R

. Rippel , Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Nis ha C. W ag le , all of Washington D.C., we re on the brief for the a ppellee.
Be fore KASOL D, Chief Judge , and LANCE and DA VI S, Judges

. KASOL D, Chief Judge , filed the opinion of the Court. L ANCE, Judge , filed an opinion c on c ur ri ngin t he re su lt.
KASOL D, Chief Judge : V eter an Earl B. Thompson applies throug h counsel pursua nt to the Equal Ac cess to Just ice Ac t (EAJA) , 2 8 U.S.C. § 2412(d), for a n awa rd of attorney

fee s and expenses. The Sec reta

ry argues that compe nsation under EA J A is not warr anted be cause M r. Thompson is not a prevailing party and the Secre tary ' s position was subst antially justified. For the

rea sons set forth below, the application will be denie d.

I. BACKG ROUND Mr . T ho mps on a

pp e a le d a De c e mbe r 15 , 20 08 , de c isi on of the B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls (B oard) that denied his cla im for disability compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder. B efor e the ca se was decide d, the parties filed a joint motion f or rema nd (JM R). Noting that the fac ts in Mr. Thompson's c ase a

re a nalog ous to those ref

ere nced in the Court' s order in Clemons v. Shinsek

i , 232

Vet.App. 1 ( 2009), and that "[t] he law, a s articulate d in Clemons , applies to [thi s] appeal" (JM R at 2), the pa rties re quested a

rema nd for the B oard to "c onsider and a ddress the le g al proposition outlined in Cl e m ons as i t applies to the particula r fa cts of this case " ( J MR at 3). The Clemons decision had not y et issued when the Boa rd dec ided Thompson ; thus, the Boa rd did not have the opportunity

to consider the a

pplicability of the then new case to the fac ts and law a s it ex isted when Thompson was de cided. The Court summarily g rante d the par

ties' J MR. Th o m

p s o n ( Ea r l B .) v. Shinseki , U.S. Vet. App. No. 09- 1026 (unpublished cler k' s order dated Sept. 29, 2009).

II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Preva iling Party

Status Requires an Admission or Findingof Err or I t is well e s ta

b li s h e d th a t w h e n a Co u rt r e ma n d is b a s e d o n a JMR , E A JA f e e s may be

awa rd e d o nly if

the JMR is b a se d o n a

n e xplic it o r i mpl ic it a dmi ssi on of e rr or c on ta ine d in

the JMR

or a rec og nition of err or conta ined in the Court' s order g rantingthe J MR. See Sum ner v. Princ ipi , 15 Vet.App. 256, 265 ( 2001) (e n banc) (" Be cause nowher e in his motion di d the Secr etar y
a c kn o w le d g e e r

r o r , an d b e c a

u s e , a lt e r n a ti v e ly , in r e ma

n d in g th e matt e r , th e Co u rt d id n o t r e c o g n iz e administrative er

ror, the r emand wa s not predicated upon administrative er ror. The appe llant thus is not a preva iling par

ty .") , aff' d sub nom

. Vaughn v. P r i ncipi , 336 F.3d 1351 ( Fe d. Cir. 2003); Gurley v . Nicholson , 20 Ve t.A pp . 573 , 577 (2 00 7) (d e nying EA JA fe e s in the a bs e nc e of an e xplic it

or imp lic it a dmi ssi on of e rr or by the Se c re tary ); Vahey v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 208, 211 ( 2006) (fin ding no e x plicit admission of error or implicit acknowledg ment of er ror in Court dec ision); Briddell v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 267, 272 (2002) (Court looks to the words of a JMR t o deter mine whether it was predicate d on administrative error). Notably , the J MR in this i nstance contains no expli cit admission by

the Secr etar

y of administrative e rror , and ther e is no finding of er ro r in the Court ' s o rd e r g ra

nti ngthe JMR. A c c or din g ly , E AJ A fe e s ma y be awa rd e d in thi s in sta nc e on ly if t h e J M R r e f l e c t s ani mp l i c i ta c kn o w l e d g m e n to f e r r o r b y t h e S e c r e t ar

y. B . Pa rt ie s' Ar g ume nts I n support of their posi t i o n s t hat the JMRimplicitl y contained – or

did not contain – an admission of err or by

the Secr etar

y , both parties foc us on Clemons and whether or not it established

ne w l aw o r m e re ly

re state d e sta

bli sh e d leg a l pr e c e de nt. Th e Se c re tary argue s th a t Clemons eff

ecte dG i ven t he t ext o f o ur d i scus si o n, o ur co ncurri ng co l l eague' s co m m ent ab o ut t he p art i es s o m eho w exerci si ng 1 the C o u rt' s d isc re tio n to re m a n d a m a tter is p e rp le x ing a t b e st. S ee p o st at 9

. S i m p l y rei t era t ed : T he p arti es re q ue st r emand; t he C our t , i n i t s d i s cr et i on and exe r ci s e of i t s au t hor i t y , gr ant s or deni es t he r eques t

. A r eques t f or r emand may b e b a se d o n e rr o r, b u t i t d o e s n o t ha v e to b e b a se d o n e rr o r. 3 a cha ng e in law a

nd t h er efore the JMRwas not pre dicated on a dminist rative e rror , while Mr. Th omp so n argues th a t Cle mo ns simply restate d established law a nd there fore the J MR was predic ated on a dminist rative e rror
. At the outset, we note that the parties' primary relianc e on whether Clemons cre ated ne w law or applied e stablished leg al precede nt is misplaced. We have never held t hat a remand ba sed on a J MR for purposes of

consideringa statute, a

case , or a r egulation nece ssarily en t i t les an a

ppellant to EAJA fee s simply beca use t he law was established prior to a Boar d decision. Indeed, unle ss the application of e stablished law re asonably was raised below, either by the claimant or by the re cord, th e r e w o u ld b e n o e r

r o r in th e B o ar d n o t a d dr e s s in g it. S ch a f r a t h v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 589 (1991) ( Boa

rd must consider and discuss all applicable provisions of law and r egulation where they

are ma de " po te nti a lly

a pp lic a ble thr ou g h th e a sse rt ion s and iss ue s r a ise d in

the re c or d" ); se e als o Robinson v. Peak

e , 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 ( 2008) (B oard r equire d to consider a ll issues raised either by the c la ima

nt or by e vid e nc e of re c or d)

. An d, e ve n in the a bs e nc e of e rr or be low , n oth ingpr e ve nts the par ties from jointly

ag ree ing to r equest that the Court re mand a matter for the B oard to c onsider

e sta bli sh e d la w, or fo r a ny oth e r p ro pe r p ur

po se , w ith ou t an a dmi ssi on of e rr or , o r o the rw ise pr e ve nts the Cou rt fr om g ra nti ngsu c h a

JMR. E. g. , M

ag git t v . W est , 202 F.3d 1370, 1377- 78 (F ed. Cir. 1 2000) (holding that this Court has discretion to reman d l ega l i ssues raise d for the f irst time on appea l). Neve rtheless, to the e x tent a JMRis predicated on a c ited case as the ba sis for re mand, the scope of the cited c ase c an be r eleva nt to fleshing out whe ther ther e is an y i m plied conce ssion of

err or. Gurley , 20 Vet.App at 577 (noting the scope of Harris v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 180 (1991) upon which a JMR was predicated and f urther noting t h at the ter

ms of the J MR focused only on judicial economy

). C. Cle mo ns Did Not Establish New L aw Contrary to the S ecr etar

y ' s argument, althoug h Cle mo ns was a new ly decide d case , it did not

cr ea t e n ew l aw
. I n holding that an appellant does "not file a claim to r ece ive benef its only for a particula r diag nosis, but for the aff liction [cause d by ] his condition, whateve r that is," and that the4

Boa rd er rs in not consideringalter n ative conditions within the scope of the claim filed, Clemons

me re ly re ite rate d e sta

bli sh e d p ri nc ipl e s a

nd law. I nd e e d, libe ra l r e a din g of fi lin g s b y

c la ima nts is require d by

VA re g ulation, see Robinson v . Shinseki , 557 F.3d 1355, 1 3 5 9 (F ed. Cir. 2009) (38 C.F.R. §§ 20.201 and 20.202 oblige the S ecr etar y to construe arguments "in a liberal manne r" ), and has bee n since be fore the cr eation of this Court in 1988, se e Mc Gh e e v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 414 (1994) ( noting that 38 C.F .R. § 19.123 has require d the B oard to c on s t ru e ar g uments in a liberal

manner since 1983). Moreove r, the e mphasis on the intent of a lay person- claimant to deter

m i n e the scope of a claim is not new. F or example, in EF v. Der w i nski , 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 ( 1991), althoug h the veter an' s claim was for an anxiety disorder and his argument to the Board was based on the reg ional office ' s (RO' s) denial of

schizoaffe ctive disorder

and depr ession, the C ourt held t hat "there is nothing mag ical about the statements ac tually used," and that the Secre tary ' s statutory duty to assist required a VA examination t o deter mine what, if a

ny , psy chiatric disability

exis ted. S

e e a ls o I n gr a m v. Nicholson , 2 1 Ve t

. Ap p
. 2 3 2 , 2 5 6 (2 0 0 7 ) ( "[ A] s y mp at h et i c r ea d i n g o f t h e ap p el l an t 's p l ea d i n gs cannot be based on a

standard that require s leg al sophistication be y ond that which can be expected of a la y claimant and [the Secr etar y ] m ust consider whe ther the appellant' s submissi ons, considere d in toto, have ar

ticulated a c laim.")

. Simi larly , a lay

person' s g ener al lack of

competenc e to identify

the spec ific medica l condition

a il in g h im

h a s b e e nr e c o g n iz e d

s in c e th e b e g inn in g s o f

th e Co u rt, e. g
. , E

s piritu v. Derwinski , 2 Vet

. App. 492 (1992), a s has the re quirement to g ive a sy mpathetic re ading to vetera n' s filings by "de termining all potential claims raised by the evidence, apply ing all rele vant l aws a nd regulations," Roberson v. Princ ipi , 2 51 F .3 d 1 37 8, 13 84 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 1) ; Szemraj v. Principi , 357 F.3d 1370, 13 73 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 4) (s a me ); see also Kelly v . Nicholson , 463 F.3d 1349 (F ed. Cir. 2006) (f inding Ag ency err or base d on the S ecr etar y ' s "f ailure to consider all evidenc e and material of r ecor d befor e de c idi ng a mate ri a l issu e on the me ri ts, " and no tin g that th e tw o " dia g no se s w e re no t se pa rate c la ims , me re ly tw o me ans of

e sta bli sh ingthe same e nd

– th e se rv ic e c onne c tio n c la im" ); Sc ha fra th , su pra . And, per haps most tellingly , the primary issue in Clemons was the Cou rt ' s jurisdiction;

u n d e r l yi n g t h a ti s s u e w a s a J M R i nw h i c h t h e p art i e s a c kn o w l e d g e d t h e e s t a b l i s h e d l aw , s p e c i f

i c a l l y, t h e B o ar d 's d

u t y t o "ad j u d i ca t e a l l i s s u es re as o n ab l y r a i s e d b y a l i b er al re ad i n g o f t h e ap p el l an t 'sO u r c o n c u rr ing c o llea g u e ' s a sse rtio n tha t Cl emons c l ari f i ed o ur juri sdi ct i o n is inapp o si t e. A s no t ed i n t he t ext 2 above, t he dut y of

t he Secr et ar y t o proces s cl ai ms bas ed on s y mp t om s comp l ai ned of and not s i mp l y on s el f

- procl ai med di agn osi s was t he l aw bef ore Cl emons , a n d w as s o r ec og n i ze d by t h e Se cr et ar y ( wh et h er i t w as t er med as on e cl ai m or tw o ).
C o n tra ry to o u r c o n c u rr ing c o llea g u e ' s su g g e stio n tha t so m e kin d o f " m a g ic la n g u a g e " is n e e d e d to c o n stitute

3
a n a d m issio n o f er ro r, see p o st at _, i t takes a ny language e xp l i ci t l y o r i m p l i ed l y ad m i t t i ng err o r t o est ab l i sh p revai l i ng p a rty sta tus

. E. g. , G u re ly a n d V ah ey , bo t h su

p ra . 5 subs tan ti ve ap peal ," Clemons J M R at 2 (c i t i n g So lom an v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 396, 402 (1994)) , and the Secr etar

y ' s duty to inve stigate "a ll possible in-servic e ca uses of [a] curre nt disabilit y , including those unknown to the veter an, id

. (c i t i n g Sc hr oe de r v . W est , 212 F.3d 1265, 1271 ( Fe d. Cir. 2000)). T h e Se c r e ta

r y a ls o e xp li c it ly a dmi tt e d err or in the Clemons J MR when he a g ree d that "the Boa rd fai ledto ful ly

adj ud ica te t hes e in ex tr icabl y in ter tw in ed cl aim s. " Id . at 3. Thus, eve n prior to the issuance of Clemons , th e Se c re tary wa s w e ll a

wa re of his du ty to l ibe ra lly

re a d c la ims

. 2 D. Application of L aw Al tho ug h th e Se c re tary

c ou ld h a ve a g re e d in

the JMR that a re mand wa s nec e ssa ry be c a us e the B oard erre d, or failed to adequa tely addre ss the l aw or evidenc e, he did not do so. I nasmuch a s Clemons d i d

n o tcr ea t e ne w l aw , t h e S ec re t ary i mp l i ci t l y co u l d h av e a ck n o wl ed gederro r b y s t at i n g, for ex ample, that the B oard should have addre ssed the issues raise d in Clemons , or that the issues addre ssed in Clemons rea sonably wer e ra ised below in the Thompson Boa rd decision and the ref

ore the matter should be r emande d for the B oard to a ddress them. But, the Sec reta ry did not do so. 3 Rather, there is no admission or recog nition, expli cit or i mplicit, of fa ilure by the B oard, a

nd there is no admission or recog nition, expli cit or implicit, that an issue rea sonably was ra ised below

and sh ou ld h a ve be e n d isc us se d, or that the re wa s any e rr or be low . Ind e e d, bo th p art ie s le ft wh oll y
unanswe red w hether they believed the Boa rd err ed in its decision. The JMR m ere ly states that " the Boa rd should a ddress the leg al proposition outli ned in Clemons " (J MR at 3), and the Court gra nted this mot ion without dis cussion. The JMRclea

rly was pre dicated on the parties' j o i n t desire that the B oard c onsider the impact, if any , of the Clemons decision in the first instance, somethingthat the B oard did not ea rlier have the opportunity

to do beca

use Clemons had not issued from the Court at the time of the B oard de c isi on
. Thus , ra

the r tha n c on ta ini ng an a dmi ssi on of e rr or , e xplic it or imp lic it, the JMR me re ly evince s an intent of the pa rties that, whatever eac h may have thoug ht was the scope of Clemons , theyO u r c on cu r r i n g c ol l ea g u e appa r en t l y h as a f u n dame n t al di f

f er en ce of

opi n i on a s t o w het her a JM R ca n be 4 gr ant ed ev en i n t he abs enc e of an admi s s i on or r ecogn i t i on of er r or, b ut hi s o pi ni on i s not b as ed i n t he l aw. I f i t wer e, t her e woul d be no ne ed f or an a dm i s s i on or r ecogn i t i on of er r or i n t he JM R t o es t abl i s h pr eva i l i ng par t y s t at us , wh i ch is a w e ll e sta b lishe d re q u ire m e n t. E. g. , G u re ly a n d V ah ey , bo t h su

p ra . 6 wa n t edi tco n s i d er edb y

t h e B o ar d

. T h er e i s n o t h i n g wr o n g wi t h t wo p ar t i e s a g r e e i n g t o fo re go further litigation if they

can a g ree to have a

matter settled or addre ssed below. I ndeed, the " Court 4 has alwa y s attempted to enc ourag e and f acilitate the e x peditious and eff icient res o lution of cases befo re it ." Bo gg

s v . B ro wn , 10 Ve t.A

pp . 3 20 , 3 21 (1 99 7) ; se e als o 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (Court may "r emand the matter, as a

ppropriate ") , Ma

gg itt , su pra . Our c oncurr ing colleague' s sug g estion that we should deter mine in the first instance whether a JMRwas ba sed on administrative e rror is contrar

y t o b o t h our ca selaw, e.g. , Gu re ly and Vahey , both su pra , and t he Supreme Court's de cision in Bu c k ha nn on Bo ar

d &Car e Ho me

, I nc . v . W est V ir g in ia D e p a r tm e n t o

f H e a lt h & H u m a n R esources , 5 32 U.S. 598 (2001), which r equire s that preva ili n g p ar t y

status be base d on a judicial imprimatur in the under ly ing me rits decision. As explained in Br idd

e ll, su pra , to f ind that the Court ma

y , at the EAJA stag e, make a finding on what the par ties actua lly

meant in their joint motion on t he mer its would c reate an ex post facto " judicial imprimatur" in violation of Buck hannon . 1 6 V e t.A

pp . at 27 2- 73 (a lso no tin g that it wo uld be "a highly anomalous re sult for the Court to defe r consider ation of these issues on the merits, but then take the m on

a t th e EA JA sta g e , w he n s uc h a Court de c isi on c ou ld w e ll e nd up be ingma de so late in t he pr oc e ss t

hat th e B oa

rd ha d a lr e a dy

ma de its de c isi on

on re mand " ); see also He nsley v

. Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (" A re quest for at t o rney ' s fee s should not result in a second

ma jor lit ig a tio n. " ); Vaughn , 336 F.3d at 1359 (" The Supreme Court [ in Buck hannon and Hensley ]

was c oncer

ned with l i t i gat i o n over ' entitlement to an awa rd,' as we ll as over litigation over ap p ro p ri at e h o u rs ex p en d edan d h o u rl y ra t es
. " ( ci t i n g Buck

hannon , 5 3 2 U. S

. at 6 0 9 (c i t i n g Hensley , 461 U.S. at 437)))

. Be cause the J MR in this instance was based solely on the parties' ag ree ment to remand the

case for B oard c onsideration and disc ussio n of Clemons without any admission, recog nition, or other discussion of err or as a

rea son for remand, a

nd beca use the orde r g rantingthe motion contains no fu rt he r dis c us sio n of thi s iss ue or fi nd ing of e rr or , M r. Th omp so n d oe s n ot d e mon str a te that he is a preva iling par

ty

. See Sum ner

and Vahey , b oth

su pra . Acc ording ly , Mr. Thompson is not entitl ed7

to compensation under E AJ A for attorney fee s and expenses. Id . (succ essful EAJA application require s, inter alia, that the a ppellant be a

preva iling par

ty).

III . C ON CL USI ON Havingdeter

mined that Mr. Thompson is not entitl ed to an EAJA awar d beca use he is not a prevailing party , the parties' arguments reg arding substantial justification are moot. Id

. at 210-12 (EAJA application denied without discussion of substantial justification a fter Court found appe llant was not a pr evailing party ). For the fore g oing r easons, the E AJ A application is DENI ED.

L ANCE, Judge , c on c ur

ri ng : Whi le I a g re e that the EA JA a pp lic a tio n mus t be de nie d in thi s
case , I cannot ag ree with the m ajority ' s analy sis. This opinion perpetuate s the fallac y that the Court

can rema nd case s without any

appar ent basis for e x erc ising its authority

. See Vahey v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 208, 214 ( 2006) (L ance , J ., dissenting) (ar g uing it wa s inappropriate to deny the appellant pr evailing party status without determining the basis of the re mand). Eve n if the par ties dis pu te the pr op e r i nte rp re tatio n o f t he ir a g re e me nt, Ibe lie ve it i s th e re sp on sib ili ty of the Court to deter mine the basis of the r elief state d if nece ssary to resolve an EAJ A application. The a pproac h take n b y the ma jor ity tr ans fe rs the de c isi on

to a wa rd or de ny EA JA f e e s to the Se c re tary

re g ard le ss of whether the relief specifie d is ta ntamount to a materia l victory for the a ppellant. Acc ording ly , I cannot e ndorse the ma

jority ' s approa ch. Th e esse nti a l de fi c ie nc y of the ma jor ity ' s ana ly sis is that it purp or ts to a c kn ow le dg e that a JMR c an c on ta in a

n im pli c it a dmi ssi on

of e rr or and the n r e nd e rs that a c kn ow le dg e me nt m e anin g le ss by holding that the Court cannot find an implicit admission by looking at the authority

relied upon to support the J MR. As a result, i t is not appar ent t hat t here is any possible way for the Court to find an implicit admission of error in pr actice . I n my view, if the s tated basis of a J MR is law that wa s i nef fe ct at t h e t i m e o f t h e B o ar d 's d ec i s i o n— s u ch as a c i t at i o nt o a c as e t h at p re d at es t h e B o ar d 's decision — then the JMR i s based upon a dminist rative e rror even thoug h it does not contain an expli cit admission of such.8

Rather than c onduct a log ical analy sis of the J MR, the opinion spe nds four para g raphs on an irrele vant and incorrec t analy sis of our dec ision in Clemons . The discussion is irrele vant inasmuch as the opinion fre ely

admits that its analy sis has no impact on the outcome of this case. An te at 5. The discussion is incorre ct because it eg reg iously misstates the i ssue raised in Clemons . The issue in Clemons was not whether the Secre tary has a duty to sy mpathetically rea d claims or whe ther the B oa rd ha s a du ty to d isc us s a ll i ssu e s r a ise d b y the re c or d. I f t

hose were th e actua l is su e s in Clemons , then there would have be en no nee d for a panel de cision on whether o r n o t t o g rant the J MR in that case . Rather, the issue in Cle mo ns wa s " wh e the r the Court ha s juri sd ic tio n to g ra

nt a J MR that appear s to pertain in par t to an anxiety

disorder claim that was not de cided by the B oard

an d i s n o t p ro p er l y b ef

o re t h e C o u rt

. " 2 3 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 2 (c i t i n g Clemons v. Pe ake , No. 07-0558, 2008 WL 5082161, at *1 (Ve t. App. Nov. 18, 2008)). I n Clemons , the par

ties "a g ree d in their J MR that [t hat] case involve[d] t wo sepa rate claims that are inext rica bly intertwined." 23 Vet.App. at 4. After the Court sua spont e ra i s ed the potential jurisdictional def ect, the Sec reta

ry argued that the Court la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n to g ra

nt t he JMR to t

he e xten t th a t it

a dd re sse d th e me ri ts o f a

n in e xtri c a

bly intertwined c laim that was not decide d by the Board in the decision on appea l based upon the thenrec ent dec isio n of the U.S. Court of Appe als for the Fe dera l Circuit in Boggs v. Pe ake , 520 F.3d 1330 (F ed. Cir. 2008). Clemons , 23 Vet.App

. at 4. Ultimately , the Court ag ree d that it lacked jurisdiction over a claim not decide d in the Board decision on appea l but conclude d that the par ties

we re mis take n in c ha

ra c te ri zing the matte r a s tw o in e xtri c a bly int e rt wi ne d c la ims rathe r t

ha n a sin g le claim with multipl e diag noses. Id. a t 9; se e als o Jarrell v Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 326, 331 (2006) (en ba nc) ( both the Court and the B oard la ck j u ri s diction over a claim not first prese nted and adjudicate d by

a re g ional office ). Henc e, Clemons wa s i nn o wa y a d ec i s i o nab o u tt h e S ec re t ary 's d u t i es t o t re at p l ea d i n gs sy mpathetically

. Rather, it wa s unambig uously a jurisdictional decision about identifying the scope of a c laim. Prior to Clemons — and espe cially in light of Boggs — it was possi ble, i f not likely , for the Boa rd to c onclude that it did not ha ve jurisdiction ove r an issue ra ised by the re cord if the issue perta ined to a diag nosis other than the one used by the reg ional office in de ciding the claim. Af ter Clemons it should be clear to the Boa

rd t hat i t is not j urisdictionally barr ed fr om addre ssing e rror s that perta in to an alternative diag nosis for the same set of sy mptoms. Therefor e, Clemons was9

c le arl y ne w l aw i n h old ingthat the sco pe of th e B oa rd ' s juri sd ic tio n w a s b ro a de r t ha n p re vio us ly understood, and the majority ' s opposite conclusion is indefensible. The sec ond half the opinion' s analy sis fare s no better than the first . After concludingthat Clemons was not newlaw, the major ity holds that the appellant is not a pre vailing pa rty beca use the J MR " was based solely

on the par

ties' ag ree ment to remand f or B oard c onsideration and disc ussion of Clemons wi th ou t any

adm is si on or o th er di scu ss io n o f erro r." An te at 6. Howeve r, this holding

m er el y b egs t h e qu es t i o n : I f th i s wa s n o t a re m an d b as ed u p o n ad m i n i s t ra t i v e e r r o re v e n t h o u gh Clemons was not ne w law, then what was the basis for or deringthe B oard to re consider this ca se? I t w ould se em from the majority ' s analy sis that there was no basis for r emandingthis case. It was neither a rema nd based upon e rror

nor a rema

nd to c onsider new law. Appar ently , it was a re mand

a t th e wh im o f t

he pa rt ie s. Th e ma jor ity a c kn ow le dg e s a s mu c h, bu t c on c lud e s that the pa rt ie s have su c h p ow e r b e c a us e the Court has the discr etion to remand a case in cer

tain circ umstances whe n an issue is raise d for the first time on appea l. An te at 3 (citing Ma gg itt v . W est , 202 F.3d 1370, 1377- 78 (F ed. Cir. 2008)). Iam hi g hly skeptical of the assertion that parties have the rig ht to invoke a discretionar y power of the Court in a J MR. However , even a ssuming that the pa rties may exercise the Court' s discretion to r e mand a c a se wi tho ut a

fi nd ing of

e rr or , th e ana ly sis in t

his c a se wo uld

sti ll b e fl awe d. F ir st, it is s imp ly ill og ic a l to c on c lud e — a s the ma jor ity imp lic itl y do e s — that th e B oa rd ' s f a ilure to a dd

re ss
an issue rea sonably raised by the rec ord can be an appropr iate basis for a Ma gg itt rema

nd. I f an issue

wa s r a ise d b y

the re c or d be fo re the B oa rd , the n it is not be ing ra ise d for the fi rs t time on a pp e a l to the Court. See Zuberi v. Nicholson , 1 9 V e t.A pp . 5 41 (2 00 6) (a

wa rd ingEA JA f

e e s w he re the JMR direc ted the B oard to a ddress a regulation that it had failed t o co nsider in its init ial decision). Second, and mor e importantly , the majority cre ates a defa ult r ule that a JMRwill be interpre ted as

a Ma gg itt re mand if it d oe s n ot co nta in ma g ic langua g e a dmi tti nge rr or . I f a ny thi ng , th e de fa

ult ru le sh ou ld b e tha

t a J MR bas ed u

po n la w that w a s c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d p ri or

to t he B oa rd de c isi on is a

rema nd based upon a

n implicit admis sion of err o r. Only if the JM R purports to invoke Ma gg itt would Ieven r eac h the issue of whe ther the pa rties ca n exercise a discretionar

y power of the Court in a JMR.10

Contrary to the majority ' s opinion, I do not believe the question of whethe r a JMR confers preva iling par

ty status de pends upon the Secre tary ' s willingness to admit er ror in the motion. Rather, Ibelieve that the deter

mination of whether

there was a

n implicit admis sion of err or should be base d upon an ob

je c tiv e ana ly sis of

the re lie f a g re e d u

po n in the mot ion . A s th is C ourt re c og nize d in Zub e ri , whether

an appe llant is a preva iling par ty depends upon w hether

the re lief obtained f

rom the Court re pr e se nts a

mate ri a l a lte ratio n in t he rel a tio ns hip be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s o n th e me ri ts. 19 Vet.App. at 547. I n case s where the par ties dispute preva iling par ty status in a case rema

nded by ag ree ment, it is the responsibility of the Court to examine the specific relief stated in the orde r and make a n independe nt determination. As per tains to the agr eeme nt in this case, pre vailing pa rty status is no t con ferred whe re th e rel ief ob tai ned is "'onl y th e op po rtun it y

for fur th er ad

ju di cat io n. '" Id. at 5 4 6 (q u o t i n g Ake rs v. Nicholson , 4 0 9 F. 3 d 1 3 5 6 , 1 3 5 9 (F ed

. C i r. 2 0 0 5 ))

. As qu o t edi nt h e m aj o ri t y 's opinion, t h e relief stated in the JM R was a r emand to " ' consider a nd addre ss the leg al proposition outlined in Clemons as it app li es to th e par ti cul ar fact s o f t hi s cas e.'" An te at 1 (quoting J MR at 3). This clea rl y fa l ls within t he ca teg ory of a r emand only

for f urther a djudication to consider interveninglaw, which doe s not confer preva iling par

ty status. See Zub e ri , 1 9 Vet.App. at 546 (c i t i n g Ak e rs , 4 0 9 F.3d at 1357). Ther efor e, I would deny

preva iling par

ty status based upon a

n analy sis of the relief

stated in the JM R rather

than the Secr etar

y ' s ref usal to conce de er

ror. The a uthorities cited by

the majority

are not contrar

y to my position. First, in Buck

hannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. W est Virginia De

partment of H

ealth & Human Re

sources , there was no ag ree ment betwee n the par ties. 532 U.S. 598 (2 0 0 1 ). I nstead, the me rits case supporting the EAJA petiti on was dismissed as moot when the statute a t issue was am en d ed t o eliminate the provision in c ontention. Id. a t 601. Th e Sup re me Cou rt a ff ir me d th e de nia l of

a tto rn e y fe e s and he ld that EAJA fees could not be awa rded on a "c ataly st" basis wher e the r elief obta ined was not a chieve d throug h any

kind of enfor cea

ble cour t order. Id. a t6 0 9

- 1 0

. T h e C o u rts p e c i f i c a l l y h e l d t h a tE A JA do e s n ot p ro vide cou rt s wi th " ' ro vin g a uth or ity

. . . to a llo w c ou

ns e l f e e s a s c os ts o r o the rw ise whe nev er t he cou rt s mi ght deem th em w arran ted .'" Id. at 6 1 0 (q u o t i n g Alyesk a Pipeline Serv . Co.

v
. W il d e rn es s S o c 'y , 421 U.S. 240, 260 ( 1975)). Ido not advocate the exerc ise of any ty pe of " roving authority ." I

mere ly take the position that the Court may conclude that t h e re l i ef s p ecified in the11

J M R wa s b as edu

p o n ad m i n i s t ra t i v e erro r ev en t h o u gh t h e S ec re t ary re fu s es t o i n co rp o ra t e l an gu age expli citly conce ding e rror
. Our de cision in Sumner v . Principi is also easily distinguished. 15 Vet.App. 256 (2001) (e n banc) . I n that case , the appe llant filed new evidenc e with the Boa rd afte r its decision and the Court g rante d the Secr etar

y ' s u n opposed motion to remand the c ase a fter the Boa rd Chairman indicated that he wa s inclined to g rant the a ppellant' s m o t i o n for Boar d rec onsideration to consider the new evidenc e. Id. at 257. The Court c onsidered the Supreme Court' s then-re cent de cision in Buck hannon and concluded that EAJA fee s could not be awarde d beca use t he resolution did not "mate rially alter th e le gal rel ati on sh ip of t he p art ies ." Id. at 264. Nothing in Sumner stands for the pr oposition t hat the re lationship between the parties can n o t b e materially altere d by

a JMRunless the Secr etar y expli citly conce des er

ror. I n my

view, EAJA fee s should turn on the nature of the re lief stated in the J MR rather tha

n the Secr etar

y ' s willingness to include ma g ic languag e. The majo ri t y ' s mag iclang uag e appr oach to EA J A ana ly sis gives the Secre tary the power to deny EAJA fees eve n in case s wh er e t h e r el i ef

s t at edca n n o tb e i n t er

p re t edas an y

t h i n g o t h er

t h an a co n ce s s i o n o f e rr o r. Al t h o u gh Ihave so f

ar se en no evide nce that the Secre tary has misused the powe r cr eate d in Vahey , th e re is

no re a so n to c re a te a

sit uatio n wh e re the Se c re tary c an p it c ouns e l a g a ins t c lie nt b y of fe ri nga JMR that eff ectively require s counsel to forg o EAJA fees so that the client can obta in relief that can be

un de rs too d o nly

a s b a se d u

po n a dmi nis tr a tiv e e rr or by the B oa rd

. Ac c or din g ly , I c ann ot c on c ur in the ma jor ity ' s ana ly sis

.