J-S65020-14

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RAYON DAMION SCARLETT

Appellant No. 3556 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 25, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000339-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2014

Appellant, Rayon Damion Scarlett, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on June 25, 2013, as made final by the denial of 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion on November 19, 2013. On this direct 

appeal, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed both a petition to 

withdraw as counsel and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).1 We conclude that Appellant’s counsel has complied 

with the procedural requirements necessary to affect withdrawal. Moreover, 

after independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the instant 

____________________________________________

1 See also Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).
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appeal is wholly frivolous. We, therefore, grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

The trial court ably summarized the facts underlying Appellant’s 

convictions for kidnapping and related offenses. As the trial court explained:

In October 2007, the Montgomery County Detectives 

Narcotics Enforcement Team conducted a search of 806 

Smith Street in Norristown, Montgomery County, 

Pennsylvania. This search resulted in the seizure of 

approximately [15] pounds of marijuana, firearms, 

ammunition, and drug packaging material. [Appellant] and 

his friends[,] Ronald Wilson and Khanniel Headley[ 

(hereinafter “Wilson” and “Headley”),] were arrested and 

charged with possession with intent to deliver and related 

offenses.

On October 30, 2007, following his arrest, [] Headley gave 

a statement to Detective Michael Fedak. In this statement, 

Headley told [Detective Fedak] . . . that he was not a 

resident of 806 Smith Street. Headley further told the 

detective that, although the marijuana seized was not his, 

he knew there was “about a pound of marijuana” there and 

that he went to the house “[b]ecause I get marijuana there 

to smoke.” Although Headley declined to tell Detective 

[Fedak] specifically who had provided him with marijuana at 

the residence, Headley did tell the detective that [Appellant] 

– a resident of 806 Smith Street – was the only person 

upstairs at the home when an individual named “Tune” 

came to the home and went upstairs for marijuana.

At [Appellant’s] trial, Headley testified that, in March 2008, 

he was living in a third floor bedroom in a house owned by 

[Appellant’s own] grandmother at 400 East Marshall Street 

in Norristown. At approximately midnight on March 28, 

2008, Headley was alone in his bedroom getting ready for 

bed. Headley had taken off his clothes and shoes and was 

wearing only a tee shirt and boxer shorts when there was a 

knock at his bedroom door. Headley opened the door and 

saw [Appellant’s] brothers[,] Ricardo “Ricky” Scarlett and 

[A.S. (hereinafter “Ricardo” and “A.S.”),] standing in the 
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hallway. Ricardo was pointing an SKS-type assault rifle at 

Headley. [A.S.] – who was approximately [12] years old at 

the time – was carrying a knife.

Ricardo and [A.S.] came into the bedroom and Ricardo 

ordered Headley to sit down on the floor, telling him that 

“The Boss want [sic] to talk to you.” Headley testified that 

he knew Ricardo meant that [Appellant] wanted to talk to 

him, since [Appellant] was referred to as “The Boss.” 

With Headley sitting on the floor, Ricardo took out his cell 

phone and – continuing to point the gun at Headley – made

a call during which he said: “The fish is ready” or “The fish 

is fried.” Headley testified that he and the Scarlett brothers 

are from Jamaica and that, in Jamaican slang, “fish” is a 

slang term for a snitch or [an] informant.

[Appellant] and [] Wilson . . . then arrived at Headley’s 

bedroom. Headley testified that [Appellant] ordered Wilson 

to tie [Headley] up, and that Wilson did so, binding 

Headley’s arms behind his back with an electrical extension 

cord.

Headley testified that [Appellant], Wilson, and Ricardo [] 

then began rummaging through his belongings. Headley 

testified that he did not see [Appellant] actually steal 

anything, but someone – he thought Ricardo – took his 

earring out of his ear, and that his watch, his chain, and 

[the] money from his wallet were stolen.

Headley testified that [Appellant] then sat beside him on the 

floor with a Bible and “started talking to me about betrayal 

and stuff like that,” accusing Headley of being a snitch and 

of telling the police that [Appellant] was “selling marijuana 

out of Smith Street.” Headley testified that [Appellant] was 

“flashing around” what [Appellant] said was a copy of the 

statement Headley had given to Detective Fedak and that 

[Appellant] said he had obtained the statement from his 

lawyer.

Headley testified that [Appellant, Wilson, and Ricardo] spent 

the remainder of the night threatening [Headley] and 

discussing what they should do with him. Headley testified 

that they discussed shooting him, putting a pillow over his 
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head so no one would hear the shot. Headley told 

[Appellant] that his grandmother was on the floor below 

and that she would hear what was happening and call the 

police. Headley testified that [Appellant] then suggested 

they take [Headley] to New York “and get rid of [Headley] 

somewhere,” and Ricardo said that they should go to Home 

Depot to “get some stuff and cut him up.”

Headley testified that, during his ordeal: [Appellant] “told 

his brother to pee on [Headley]”; that the men stepped on 

him; and that Ricardo put the barrel of the SKS in 

[Headley’s] mouth and told him to suck on it. Headley 

testified that [Appellant] ordered him to drink liquid from a 

Gatorade bottle. When Headley refused, Ricardo put the 

barrel of the SKS to his head and ordered him to drink. 

Headley complied and soon was “throwing up all over” 

himself.

Headley testified that [Appellant] ultimately left at 

approximately [4:00] a.m., saying he wanted to get some 

sleep and telling the others that he would call them to “tell 

them what to do with [Headley].” After [Appellant] left, 

Ricardo said to Headley: “You’re a good guy, but 

[Appellant] is my brother so we got to do what he said.” 

[Wilson and A.S.] eventually left to go to a store for 

cigarettes, taking Headley’s car keys with them. Ricardo 

remained sitting on the bed with the SKS pointed at 

Headley. Ricardo eventually fell asleep and Headley used 

the opportunity to escape[; Headley then ran] two blocks to 

the nearest police station.

Headley arrived at the Norristown Police Department at 

approximately 5:30 a.m. Corporal David Brook testified 

that, when he arrived, Headley was barefoot and dressed 

only in this underwear, with his hands still bound behind his 

back with electrical cord. After listening to Headley’s 

account of what happened, all available police units 

proceeded to 400 East Marshall Street, where they 

encountered Ricardo and [A.S.; the police were able to 

take] . . . Ricardo into custody [that night]. In the backyard 

of the residence, the police discovered an SKS assault rifle 

partly hidden under a doormat. The weapon was clean and 

dry, despite it having rained earlier that evening, and [the 
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weapon] contained ten live rounds of ammunition in its 

magazine. The SKS was entered into evidence without 

defense objection as Commonwealth Exhibit 2. At 

[Appellant’s] trial, Headley identified the SKS as the weapon 

that was employed by Ricardo [] during his ordeal.

During a search of the interior of 400 East Marshall Street, 

the police discovered that Headley’s bedroom was in 

disarray, and that there was a Gatorade bottle and what 

appeared to be vomit on the floor. During a subsequent 

search of 806 Smith Street, the police discovered a copy of 

Headley’s October 2007 statement to Detective Fedak. The 

statement was found in a bedroom where the police also 

discovered items indicating that the bedroom was occupied 

by [Appellant].

An arrest warrant was issued for [Appellant], but he was 

nowhere to be found. Ultimately, [Appellant] was arrested 

in Florida in December 2011, following a routine traffic stop, 

and was returned to Montgomery County[, Pennsylvania] 

for trial on charges of kidnapping and related offenses.

On January 14, 2013, the jury returned its verdict, finding 

[Appellant guilty of]: [] kidnapping [Headley] with the 

intent to facilitate the commission of robbery (Count I); [] 

kidnapping [Headley] with the intent to terrorize (Count II); 

[] conspiracy to commit robbery with the intent to terrorize 

(Count III); and [] terroristic threats (Count IX).[2] 

[Appellant] was found not guilty of robbing [Headley] 

(Count V).

[Appellant] appeared for sentencing on June 25, 2013. 

Following [the] hearing, the [trial] court sentenced 

[Appellant] on Count I (kidnapping with intent to facilitate 

the commission of robbery), to not less than four [] nor 

more than eight [] years [in prison]. On Count II 

(kidnapping with intent to terrorize), [the trial court] 

imposed no further penalty beyond entry of the verdict of 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2901(a)(2), 2901(a)(3), 903(a)(1), 2706, and 

3701(a)(1)(i), respectively.
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guilty, given [the trial court’s determination] that the two 

kidnapping offenses merged for sentencing purposes. On 

Count III (conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping 

with intent to terrorize), [Appellant] was sentenced to not 

less than two [] nor more than four [] years [in prison], to 

be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 

I. On Count XI (terroristic threats), [Appellant] received a 

sentence of three [] years [of] probation to be served 

consecutively to [Count III].

The [trial] court thus imposed an aggregate sentence of not 

less than six [] nor more than [12 years’] imprisonment, 

followed by [three years’] probation.

On July 5, 2013, [Appellant] filed, pro se, a timely postsentence motion. On July 24, 2013, Assistant Public 

Defender Timothy Peter Wile, Esquire, filed on [Appellant’s] 

behalf – with leave of court – an amended post-sentence 

motion. [The trial court] denied [Appellant’s] post-sentence 

motion and amended post-sentence motion by order 

[entered] November [19], 2013.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/14, at 1-6 (internal citations, footnotes, and 

emphasis omitted).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant’s courtappointed counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw and accompanied 

this petition with an Anders brief. Within the Anders brief, Appellant raises 

the following claims:3

[1.] [The trial court] abused [its] discretion when [it] 

admitted into evidence an SKS carbine [rifle], Headley’s 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court ordered Appellant to file and serve a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b). Appellant complied with the order and, within 

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant listed all of the claims that he 

raises on appeal.
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statement, a computer printout from an internet search 

engine, [] evidence of [Appellant’s] alleged prior bad acts[, 

and the] . . . habeas corpus testimony of Detective 

[Michael] Crescitelli.

[2.] [The trial court] committed reversible error when [it] 

denied [Appellant’s] motion for judgment of acquittal on the 

robbery and kidnapping counts at the close of the 

Commonwealth’s evidence.

[3.] [The trial court] abused [its] discretion when [it] denied 

[Appellant’s] motion for a new trial on the basis that the 

guilty verdicts were against the weight of the evidence.

[4.] [The trial court] abused [its] discretion by sentencing 

[Appellant] to an aggregate term of six [] to [12] years of 

total confinement to be followed by three [] years of special 

probation.

Appellant’s Brief at i-ii (internal capitalization and bolding omitted).

Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, this Court must first 

determine whether counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural 

requirements for withdrawing as counsel. Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 

A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

To withdraw under Anders, court-appointed counsel must satisfy 

certain technical requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for 

leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of 

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.” 

Miller, 715 A.2d at 1207. Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in 

which counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and 

facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in 

the record that counsel believes arguably supports the 
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appeal; (3) set[s] forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal 

is frivolous; and (4) state[s] counsel’s reasons for 

concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should 

articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, 

and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to his client 

and advise the client “of [the client’s] right to retain new counsel, proceed 

pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.” 

Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2007).

If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the 

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the 

appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5, quoting

McClendon, 434 A.2d at 1187. It is only when both the procedural and 

substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to 

withdraw.

In the case at bar, counsel has met all of the above procedural 

obligations. We must, therefore, review the entire record and analyze 

whether this appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. 

We have reviewed Appellant’s brief, the relevant law, the certified 

record, and the well-written opinion of the able trial judge, the Honorable 

William J. Furber, Jr., President Judge. We conclude that the claims raised 

in Appellant’s Anders brief are either waived or frivolous and that the trial 
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court’s opinion, filed on May 27, 2014, meticulously and accurately explains 

why Appellant’s claims on appeal are either waived or frivolous. Therefore, 

we adopt the trial court’s opinion as our own. In any future filings with this 

or any other court addressing this ruling, the filing party shall attach a copy 

of the trial court’s opinion with the name of A.S. redacted and replaced with 

initials so as to protect the juvenile’s identity.

Further, after an independent review of the entire record, we see 

nothing that might arguably support this appeal. The appeal is therefore 

wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw appearance.4

Petition to withdraw appearance granted. Judgment of sentence 

affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

4 We note that Appellant responded to counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

raised a number of additional claims on appeal. However, the additional 

claims Appellant seeks to raise are ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 

which are not reviewable on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 

A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002) (“as a general rule, a [defendant] should wait to 

raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review”); 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 620 (Pa. 2013) (“absent 

[certain, specified] circumstances [(that are inapplicable to the case at bar)] 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA review; 

trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon post-verdict 

motions; and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal”). We 

further note that, within Appellant’s response, Appellant has also restated all 

of the claims that counsel raised in the Anders brief and that the trial court 

analyzed in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Appellant’s Response, 9/5/14, at 

6-12.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/25/2014