COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Annunziata 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

WARREN THADDIOUS BUIE 

v. Record No. 0117-95-1 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JANUARY 16, 1996 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Randolph T. West, Judge 

 Edward I. Sarfan (Sarfan & Nachman, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

Robert B. Condon, Assistant Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Warren T. Buie (defendant) was convicted on an indictment 

charging burglary of "a certain office, shop, storehouse, warehouse 

or other house" in violation of Code § 18.2-91. On appeal, he 

contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

conviction. We disagree and affirm the decision of the trial 

court. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine "the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting 

to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 

(1987). "The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is 

entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set 

aside unless it appears from the evidence that [it] is plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it." Id.

 During the predawn hours of June 28, 1994, defendant was 
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observed "moving back and forth" inside an "office trailer" 

(trailer) located within the perimeter of a fenced construction 

site that was secured by locked gates. Police were summoned to the 

scene, and defendant, appearing from the side of the trailer, 

raised his arms, and stated, "All right. You guys got me. I was 

trespassing." Subsequent investigation revealed broken glass and 

open windows in the trailer, interior cabinets "rummaged through," 

and other contents in disarray. 

 The evidence disclosed that the fully enclosed trailer rested 

on blocks positioned along its underside, was served by 

electricity, air conditioned, and was appropriately designed and 

furnished for office use. The trailer was accessed by steps 

leading to one of two doors, both of which, together with its 

several windows, were locked at the conclusion of each workday. It 

is uncontroverted that the structure regularly functioned as an 

office at the time of the offense. 

 Nevertheless, defendant argues that the trailer was not 

sufficiently "permanent" and "affixed to realty" to satisfy the 

elements of Code § 18.2-91.1

 Code § 18.2-91 provides, inter alia: 

 If any person [commits] any of the acts 

mentioned in Code § 18.2-90 with intent to 

commit larceny . . . he shall be guilty of 

statutory burglary . . . . 

 

 1Other elements of the offense are not in issue on appeal. 
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 Code § 18.2-90 provides, in pertinent part: 

 If any person . . . in the nighttime enters 

without breaking or at any time breaks and 

enters . . . any office, shop, storehouse, 

warehouse, banking house, or other house . . ., 

he shall be deemed guilty of statutory burglary 

. . . . 

 In construing Code § 18.2-90, the Supreme Court determined 

that the term "'other house' . . . placed at the end of a list of 

specific references to various structures[,]" all of which "share 

the common element of being improvements affixed to the ground," 

manifests legislative intent that such structures be a part of the 

realty. Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 736, 740, 324 S.E.2d 

698, 700 (1985); Crews v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 531, 536, 352 

S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1987). Thus, "in order for a structure to be the 

subject of burglary, . . . [it] must be permanently affixed to the 

ground . . . at the time of the unlawful entry." Dalton v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 544, 548, 418 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1992).2

 In Dalton, we noted that permanency is "necessarily a factual 

determination . . . that may vary from case to case." Id. at n.1, 

418 S.E.2d at 565 n.1. Therefore, "the focus . . . is on whether 

the structure is affixed to the ground so as to become a part of 

the realty at the time of the unlawful entry and not that the 

manner in which it is affixed . . . will in fact be permanent." 

Id. (emphasis added). "Whether previously mobile property that has 

been rendered stationary is affixed and a part of the real estate, 

 

 2Although not an issue in this appeal, Dalton also instructs 

that "a structure subject to burglary must . . . have walls and a 

roof." Dalton, 14 Va. App. at 548, 418 S.E.2d at 565. 
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and thus a subject of burglary, is a factual question[,]" and the 

determination of the trial court will be reversed only if 

unsupported by credible evidence. Rooney v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. 

App. 738, 740, 432 S.E.2d 525, 526-27 (1993); Dalton, 14 Va. App. 

at 546, 418 S.E.2d at 564. 

 In Rooney, the appellant also challenged a burglary conviction 

resulting from the unlawful entry of an office trailer, arguing 

that it was not a structure contemplated by Code §§ 18.2-90 

and -91. Rooney, 16 Va. App. at 739-40, 432 S.E.2d at 526. In 

affirming the conviction, we noted that the trailer was "set up on 

a . . . lot[,] . . . rested on a cinder block foundation," and was 

regularly utilized as an "office," with attendant electric service 

and furnishings, all characteristics shared by the trailer subject 

of the instant offense. Id. at 740, 432 S.E.2d at 527. Moreover, 

the instant trailer was served by fixed steps leading from ground 

level to an elevated doorway and surrounded by a secure fence. 

 We, therefore, find ample support in the record for the 

court's conclusion that the trailer was protected by the provisions 

of Code §§ 18.2-90 and -91 and affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.