NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOEL ELIAS SANCHEZ,

Petitioner

- Appellant,

v. JEFFREY A. BEARD,

Respondent

- Appellee. No. 15

- 56369
D.C. No. 5:13

- cv - 01448

- MMM

- VBK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 13, 2018 ** Pasadena, California Before: GOULD and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and AMON, *** District Judg e. Joel Sanchez was convicted in California state court of second

- degree murder
for the shooting and killing of Manuel Torres

. In t his habeas petition, Sanchez challenges the exclusion of a toxicology report during his murder trial

. The

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

NOV 16 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

toxicology report showed that Torres was under the influence of methamphetamine and alcohol at the time of the shooting. Without offering any expert testimony to explain the toxicology results, Sanchez sought to introduce the report to corroborate
his claim of self

- defense that he shot a “ crazed ” and “ maniacal ” Torres out of fear for
his own life

. Sanchez unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2254, and we affirm.
Our r eview of the state court’s decision denying Sanchez’s appeal is governed by the Anti

- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Sanchez argues that the toxicology report constituted “critical” evidence that directly corrobo rated his self

- defense theory. He cl aims that the exclusion of the report violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense, and was therefore contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court p recedent. However, u nlike the excluded evidence in Chambers v. Mississi ppi , 410 U.S. 284 (1973) , which directly corroborated the defendant’s main defense that a third party in fact had killed the victim, the toxicology report in this case by itself provided
little support t o Sanchez ’s theory that he shot Torres in self

- defens e . Sanchez wanted

t he jury to infer and speculate , based solely on the toxicology results, that the amount of drugs and alcohol in Torres’s body caused Torres to act in an aggressive manner, justifying Sanchez to shoot Torres out of fear

. Yet, Sanchez offered no expert testimony and no evidence to suggest that it is common knowledge that the combined effect of methamphetamine and alcohol cause s an individual to act aggressively or3

violently. This is not the type of “critical , corroborative ” evid ence the Supreme Court
has held leads to a constitutional violation when erroneously excluded

. DePetris v. Kuykendall , 239 F.3d 1057 , 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers , 410 U.S. at 302
and Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14, 18

– 19 (19 67 ))

. Even assuming the toxicology report constituted relevant defense evidence,
Sanchez still fails to overcome AEDPA deference

. The Supreme Court has never held that evidence excluded on relevancy grounds violates a defendant’s constitutional rights. Holmes v. South Carolina , 547 U.S. 319, 326

– 27 (2006) (“While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose . . . , we have stated that the Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is repe titive, only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation s omitted; alterations incorporated ). Thus, the state appellate court’s decision to affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling “cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.” Moses v. Payne , 555
F.3d 7 42 , 759 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wrig ht v. Van Patten , 552 U.S. 120, 124

– 26 (2008))

. AFFIRMED.