IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nathaniel Brinkley, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1182 C.D. 2016

: Argued: June 5, 2017

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (US Airways, Inc., New :

Hampshire Insurance Company :

and AIG Claims, Inc.), :

:

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: December 13, 2017

Nathaniel Brinkley (Claimant) petitions for review of the June 24, 2016 

order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) insofar as it affirmed 

the decision of a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) granting US Airways Inc.’s 

(Employer) petition to terminate compensation benefits.1 We affirm.

On October 22, 2009, Employer issued an amended Temporary Notice 

of Compensation Payable (NCP) acknowledging that Claimant suffered a work-

 

1 The WCJ’s order also denied and dismissed Claimant’s review and penalty petitions and 

dismissed Claimant’s claim and reinstatement petitions as moot. These portions of the WCJ’s 

order are not at issue in the instant appeal.
2

related fracture of his right ankle on October 11, 2009, during the course of his 

employment with Employer as a lead fleet service agent. Claimant returned to work 

on March 2, 2010, and Employer, thereafter, suspended Claimant’s benefits. 

Claimant continued to work until July 5, 2011, when he was diagnosed with

fractured second and fifth right metatarsals

2 and placed in a controlled ankle 

movement (CAM) walker boot. Claimant could not return to his duties with 

Employer while wearing the CAM boot and has not returned to work since that time.

On January 9, 2012, Claimant filed a claim petition asserting that he 

sustained injuries to his right ankle, right foot, fractures of his second and fifth right 

metatarsals, fracture of the right forefoot, a fracture of a joint of the fifth metatarsal, 

defect in the superior medial talar dome, plantar fasciitis, gait dysfunction, and 

aggravation of pre-existing conditions and other medical conditions, as well as wage 

loss from July 6, 2011. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a-4a. On January 9, 2012, 

Claimant filed a review and reinstatement petition seeking to amend the description 

of the acknowledged work injury and alleging a worsening of condition, causing 

decreased earning power and entitling him to reinstatement of benefits effective July 

6, 2011. Employer filed responsive answers denying the material allegations in both 

petitions.

On March 8, 2012, a WCJ held a hearing on Claimant’s petitions. 

Claimant testified regarding his job duties before and after his work injury. Claimant 

stated that he began experiencing pain in his right foot, similar to when it was first 

injured, in March 2011. He testified that in May 2011, the pain in his foot became 

unbearable and his supervisor instructed him to see the on-site nurse. Claimant 

stated that soon after his doctor prescribed the CAM walker boot. He testified that 

 

2 Metatarsals are bones in the mid-foot. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 955 (25th ed. 1990).
3

the prescribing doctor wrote a note advising Employer that Claimant would need to 

return to limited duty in a sedentary position. Claimant stated that Employer told 

him that he would not be allowed on the premises in the CAM walker boot. Claimant 

testified that since then he had been seeing his doctor and attending physical therapy 

sessions regularly and felt that he was improving, though he still experienced pain 

from his work injury. R.R. at 309a-24a.

On October 15, 2012, Employer filed a termination petition alleging 

that Claimant was fully recovered as of April 4, 2012. All of the petitions were 

consolidated for purposes of litigation.

Claimant presented the deposition testimony of his treating physician, 

Geoffrey Temple, D.O., who first examined Claimant on August 5, 2011. R.R. at 

86a. As of May 10, 2012, Dr. Temple believed that, although Claimant was

improving, he had not fully recovered from his work injuries. Id. at 108a. Dr. 

Temple opined that Claimant could return to regular employment, but not his preinjury job. Id. at 119a.

Claimant testified by deposition on June 4, 2013, stating that as of April 

12, 2012, he had not fully recovered from his injuries. R.R. at 232a. Claimant 

further testified that, as of the date of the deposition, he still had pain in his right 

foot. Id. Claimant stated that prolonged standing and walking, particularly up and 

down steps, was difficult and painful for him. Id. at 235a. Claimant added that he 

had not recovered from a right-sided limp that was related to his pain. Id. at 258a.

Employer presented the deposition testimony of Paul Horenstein, M.D., 

who conducted an independent medical examination (IME) of Claimant on April 4, 

2012, and reviewed Claimant’s medical records. Dr. Horenstein stated that Claimant 

exhibited a mild limp, however, he could find no reason for it. R.R. at 364a. Dr. 
4

Horenstein testified that Claimant had suffered fractures of the second and fifth 

metatarsals of his right foot, which x-rays and a CAT scan confirmed were fully 

healed. Id. at 365a. In Dr. Horenstein’s written report, he opined that Claimant 

never suffered an ankle fracture. Id. at 444a. In his subsequent testimony, Dr. 

Horenstein explained that he found no sign of an ankle fracture, and it was his 

opinion that if Claimant had suffered an ankle fracture, it was now healed. Id. at 

365a. Dr. Horenstein testified that Claimant had no ongoing issues with his right 

foot or ankle as of the date of his IME. Id. at 366a.

The parties submitted a stipulation that disposed of some issues but not 

all issues raised in the various petitions. R.R. at 208a-12a. Specifically, Employer 

agreed to accept fractures to the second and fifth metatarsals as the work-related 

injury. The stipulation did not address the petition for termination, Claimant’s 

assertion that his work injury was incorrectly described in the NCP, or Claimant’s 

request for counsel fees and costs. On April 18, 2013, the WCJ approved the 

stipulation. On May 6, 2013, Claimant filed a penalty petition alleging that 

Employer failed to pay compensation per the stipulation. Afterward, Claimant and 

Employer submitted their respective briefs, proposed findings of fact, and proposed 

conclusions of law.3

In December 2013, after the WCJ’s staff advised Employer’s counsel 

that Employer’s brief had not been received, Employer’s counsel sent 

correspondence to the WCJ. At an unrelated meeting on August 21, 2014, 

Employer’s counsel advised Claimant’s attorney that he received a voicemail from 

 

3 The parties note that the briefs were submitted prior to the September 2013

implementation of the Workers’ Compensation Automation and Integration System (WCAIS). 

WCAIS allows users to file documents, and search and view those documents. 

http://www.dli.pa.gov/Businesses/Compensation/WC/claims/wcais/Pages/PA-WC-Automationand-Integration-System.aspx (last visited October 6, 2017).
5

the WCJ requesting a copy of Employer’s brief in Microsoft Word format. The WCJ 

never requested a copy of Claimant’s brief in Microsoft Word format. Employer’s 

counsel complied with the request by email but did not copy the email to Claimant’s 

counsel. Claimant’s counsel asked Employer’s counsel for a copy of the email, but 

when Employer’s counsel forwarded it to Claimant’s counsel the attachment could 

not be opened. R.R. at 47a-49a. Claimant’s counsel never received a copy of 

Employer’s email to the WCJ.

On August 27, 2014, Claimant filed a motion for recusal, alleging that 

the WCJ violated the code of ethics for WCJs set forth in Section 1404 of the 

Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).4 Claimant asserted that the WCJ engaged in ex 

parte communications, improperly delayed issuing a decision, and at all times 

demonstrated an unfair bias in favor of Employer.

The WCJ held a brief hearing to consider Claimant’s recusal motion on 

September 19, 2014. R.R. at 341a. On October 6, 2014, the WCJ issued an order 

denying Claimant’s motion. The WCJ found that the contact with Employer’s 

counsel was clerical in nature and not ex parte, as it was not a communication “as to 

the merits of the case.” R.R. at 61a. The WCJ explained that Claimant was not 

asked for a copy of his brief because the WCJ was already in possession of 

Claimant’s brief. Id. The WCJ further noted that the delay in resolution of the matter 

was only compounded by Claimant having filed a motion for recusal. Id. at 62a. 

The Board dismissed Claimant’s subsequent interlocutory appeal.

 

4 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §2504. Section 1404(a)(1)-(2) requires 

the WCJ to avoid impropriety and the appearance thereof in all activities and to perform duties 

impartially and diligently, and Section 1404(a)(3) requires the WCJ to avoid ex parte 

communications in a contested, on-the-record matter before the Department of Labor and Industry. 

77 P.S. §2504(a)(1)-(3).
6

On September 4, 2015, the WCJ issued a decision granting Employer’s 

petition to terminate; dismissing Claimant’s penalty and review petitions; dismissing 

the claim and reinstatement petitions as moot; and incorporating the denial of the 

motion for recusal. R.R. at 488a. The WCJ concluded that Claimant failed to prove 

that the description of his injuries should be amended to include any additional 

diagnoses or conditions and Employer proved Claimant was fully recovered from 

the stipulated-to injuries to his second and fifth right metatarsals. R.R. at 486a-87a. 

The Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision and this appeal followed.

On appeal to this Court,5 Claimant asserts that the Board erred in

affirming the WCJ’s decision granting Employer’s motion to terminate because 

Employer’s medical expert failed to accept as fact Claimant’s accepted work injury. 

Additionally, Claimant argues that the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s denial of

his motion for recusal.

Claimant argues that Dr. Horenstein failed to acknowledge the workrelated injury and it was therefore impossible for him to form an opinion as to 

whether Claimant had fully recovered from that injury. Claimant argues that as a 

result, Dr. Horenstein’s testimony was inadequate as a matter of law and the WCJ 

erred by finding that Employer met its burden of proof on the termination petition.

“To succeed in a termination petition, the employer bears the burden of 

proving that the claimant’s disability has ceased or that any current disability is

unrelated to the claimant’s work injury. An employer may satisfy this burden by 

presenting unequivocal and competent medical evidence of the claimant's full 

 

5 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether necessary findings were supported 

by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights 

were violated. Minicozzi v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Indus. Metal Plating, Inc.), 

873 A.2d 25, 28 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
7

recovery from his work-related injuries.” Gillyard v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board), 865 A.2d 991, 995 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2005) (citations omitted). It is well settled that a medical opinion that does 

not recognize the work-relatedness of an injury previously determined to be workrelated is insufficient to support a termination of benefits. Westmoreland County v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Fuller), 942 A.2d 213, 218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2008); Gillyard, 865 A.2d at 996. 

However, during Dr. Horenstein’s deposition, Claimant’s counsel 

requested clarification from Employer’s counsel that Employer “has agreed to accept 

the fifth metatarsal fracture and the second metatarsal fracture as work related.” R.R.

at 351a. Per the express language of the stipulation, the scope and extent of 

Claimant’s injuries were still subject to dispute. R.R. at 210a. Dr. Horenstein agreed 

that Claimant suffered fractures of the second and fifth metatarsals, i.e., the accepted 

injuries, and he opined that Claimant had recovered from those injuries. Claimant’s 

argument that Dr. Horenstein failed to acknowledge the accepted injuries is not 

supported by the record.6 

Claimant next argues that the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s 

decision because the WCJ should have recused herself. We disagree.

A WCJ is presumed capable of recognizing in herself the symptoms of 

bias and prejudice. Suprock v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board 

(Millersville University of Pennsylvania), 657 A.2d 1337, 1340 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1995). Overcoming that presumption requires bias to be shown on the record. Id. 

 

6 Moreover, contrary to Claimant’s assertions, Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that if Claimant 

had suffered a right ankle fracture, that fracture was healed, would be competent to support a 

termination of benefits if the ankle fracture were an acknowledged work injury. See O’Neill v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (News Corp. Ltd.), 29 A.3d 50, 57 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
8

“The standard for determining whether recusal is proper is whether there is 

substantial reasonable doubt as to the judge’s ability to preside impartially.” 

Steinhouse v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (A.P. Green Services), 783 

A.2d 352, 356 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).

Claimant’s allegations of partiality are based on the voicemail the WCJ 

left with Employer’s counsel advising that Employer’s brief had not been received 

and requesting a copy in Microsoft Word format and Employer’s email of the brief 

to the WCJ that was not copied to Claimant. Claimant also alleges that the WCJ 

demonstrated unfairness to him throughout the proceedings. However, an adverse 

ruling does not, by itself, indicate partiality. Cellucci v. Laurel Homeowners 

Association, 142 A.3d 1032, 1045 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

While WCJs are bound by the Act to comport themselves with the 

utmost regard to impartiality, the “mere allegation of bias, for which there is no 

support in the record, is insufficient to rebut the presumption that a WCJ is capable 

of rendering an impartial decision.” Tindal v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board (City of Philadelphia), 799 A.2d 219, 224 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Our careful 

review of the record reveals no support for Claimant’s allegations.

Claimant relies on this Court’s decision in Kinter v. Workmen’s

Compensation Appeal Board (R.D. Werner Company, Inc.), 579 A.2d 1010 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1990), as requiring that a WCJ “avoid even the appearance of possible 

prejudice.” Claimant’s Brief at 15. Kinter, however, can easily be distinguished 

from the present matter as that case involved a conflict of interest between the referee 

and the employer’s law firm, from whom the referee had sought legal advice on 

several occasions. In contrast, the WCJ’s voicemail message to Employer and 

Employer’s responsive email fall short of establishing a relationship between the 
9

WCJ and Employer’s counsel and are otherwise insufficient to raise “substantial 

reasonable doubt as to the WCJ’s ability to preside impartially.” Steinhouse, 783 

A.2d at 356. After careful review of the record, we find no evidence to support 

Claimant’s contention that the alleged bias exists.

Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nathaniel Brinkley, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1182 C.D. 2016

: 

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (US Airways, Inc., New :

Hampshire Insurance Company :

and AIG Claims, Inc.), :

:

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of December, 2017, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board, dated June 24, 2016, is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nathaniel Brinkley, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (US Airways, Inc., New :

Hampshire Insurance Company :

and AIG Claims, Inc.), : No. 1182 C.D. 2016

Respondents : Argued: June 5, 2017

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION

BY JUDGE COSGROVE FILED: December 13, 2017

The burden on an employer in a termination matter demands 

presentation of "unequivocal and competent medical evidence of the claimant's full 

recovery from his [or her] work-related injuries." Gillyard v. Workers' 

Compensation Appeal Board (Pa. Liquor Control Bd.), 865 A.2d 991, 995 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2005). In this case, despite the Majority's view to the contrary, US 

Airways, Inc. (Employer) has failed to satisfy this burden. 

The medical expert presented by Employer (Dr. Horenstein) simply did 

not believe Nathaniel Brinkley (Claimant) had suffered the underlying injury at 

issue: "It is my opinion that [Claimant] did not sustain a right ankle fracture at any 
JMC-2

time." Dr. Horenstein April 4, 2012 report, R. 444a (emphasis added). Coupled with 

his deposition testimony, it is clear that the only thing Dr. Horenstein is 

"unequivocal" about is his belief that no ankle fracture was ever suffered by 

Claimant. As such, this testimony and report are insufficient to sustain Employer's 

burden. Since the Majority finds otherwise, I must dissent. 

The Majority bases its reasoning, in part, on this Court's decision in 

O'Neill v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (News Corp. Ltd.), 29 A.3d 50 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2011). The foundation for that decision was our holding in Shaffer v. 

Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Weis Markets), 667 A.2d 243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1995), where we stated: "Even if a medical expert admits to uncertainty, reservation 

or lack of information with respect to medical details, the testimony remains 

unequivocal so long as the expert expresses a belief that, in his or her professional 

opinion, a fact exists." Id. at 245-46. Here, the expert, Dr. Horenstein, simply did 

not provide a "professional opinion" consistent with Shaffer. Accordingly, the 

Employer's reliance on Dr. Horenstein is both misplaced and insufficient, and 

requires our reversal.

___________________________

JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge