IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-1043

Filed 16 January 2024

McDowell County, Nos. 17 CRS 51009-10

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

ROBERT TODD GUFFEY, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 18 February 2022 by Judge 

Forrest D. Bridges in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of 

Appeals 19 September 2023. 

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Asher 

P. Spiller, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Aaron 

Thomas Johnson, for defendant-appellant.

MURPHY, Judge.

When a defendant is charged with a continuing criminal enterprise, each act 

alleged to have constituted the enterprise is an essential element of the offense. As 

an indictment must allege all the essential elements of an offense, an indictment 

charging a defendant with a continuing criminal enterprise is invalid unless it 

specifies the acts alleged to have constituted the enterprise itself. Here, where the 

indictment charging Defendant with aiding and abetting a continuing criminal 

enterprise did not specify the acts alleged to have constituted the enterprise, the 

indictment was fatally defective.
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

2

However, the jury’s verdict with respect to Defendant’s separate charge of 

conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine was not fatally ambiguous under our 

longstanding precedent pertaining to disjunctive conspiracy instructions, and no 

error occurred with respect to that charge.

BACKGROUND

Defendant is an admitted participant in a drug trafficking enterprise 

appealing his 17 February 2022 convictions of conspiracy to traffic in 

methamphetamine and aiding and abetting a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”). 

The enterprise in question distributed meth, crack cocaine, opiate pills, and 

marijuana and moved quantities whose total dollar value was in the hundreds of 

thousands. However, by the State’s own characterization, Defendant was neither an 

organizer nor employee of the principal operation, instead being a routine purchaser 

of drugs for resale with whom some more immediate members of the operation were

familiar.

Defendant was indicted on 21 August 2017, and the indictments with which 

Defendant was charged provided as follows:

The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or 

about the date(s) of offense shown and in the county named 

above [] [D]efendant named above unlawfully, willfully and 

feloniously did conspire with Jamie Leonard Tate to 

commit the felony of trafficking by possession and 

transportation of 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams 

of methamphetamine.

. . . .
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

3

The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or 

about the date(s) of offense shown and in the county named 

above [] [D]efendant named above unlawfully, willfully, 

and feloniously did aid and abet Jamie Leonard Tate and 

Dwayne Bullock in unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously 

engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise by violating 

[N.C.G.S. §] 90-95(h)(3b) by trafficking in 

methamphetamine. The violation was part of a continuing 

series of violations of Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General 

Statutes, which Jamie Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock 

undertook in concert with more than five other persons, 

including Jackie Pearson, Marqueseo Pearson, Gregory 

Rutherford, Randy Scott, Aretha Fullwood, Aretha Giles,

and Karita Bullock, with respect to whom Jamie Leonard 

Tate and Dwayne Bullock occupied a position of organizer, 

a supervisory position, and a management position, and 

from which Jamie Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock 

obtained substantial income and resources.

Defendant was tried beginning on 14 February 2022. During trial, Defendant 

made “[a] general motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence[,]” arguing, in 

particular, that the evidence did not establish sufficient involvement in the criminal 

enterprise for purposes of the CCE charge and that the evidence also did not establish 

Defendant trafficked the amount of methamphetamine specified in the charge. The 

trial court denied the motion. When the jury returned its verdict, the verdict sheets 

indicated Defendant was “guilty of conspiracy to traffic[] in methamphetamine by 

possession or transportation of 28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams[,]” as well 

as “guilty of aiding and abetting a continuing criminal enterprise[.]”

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Defendant argues both that the trial court lacked subject matter 
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

4

jurisdiction over the charge of aiding and abetting a CCE because the indictment was 

fatally defective and that it erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of aiding 

and abetting a CCE because a defendant may not be guilty of that offense under a 

theory of aiding and abetting. He also argues both verdicts were fatally ambiguous 

because the jury was instructed disjunctively on two separate theories of trafficking 

to support both charges.

As we agree that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 

charge of aiding and abetting a CCE, we vacate that charge; therefore, we need not 

address whether, as a general matter, a defendant may be guilty of aiding and 

abetting a CCE or whether that verdict was fatally ambiguous. However, we hold 

that the jury’s verdict with respect to conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine was 

not fatally ambiguous and find no error with respect to that charge.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We first address Defendant’s argument that the charge of aiding and abetting 

a CCE in the indictment was fatally defective. Specifically, Defendant argues the 

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense because the indictment 

did not specify each of the offenses comprising the CCE. “Whether a trial court has 

subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v. 

Herman, 221 N.C. App. 204, 209 (2012) (citation omitted).

North Carolina defines the offense of continuing criminal enterprise in 

N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1:
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

5

(a) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal 

enterprise shall be punished as a Class C felon and in 

addition shall be subject to the forfeiture prescribed in 

subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Any person who is convicted under subsection (a) of 

engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise shall forfeit 

to the State of North Carolina:

(1) The profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and

(2) Any of his interest in, claim against, or property or 

contractual rights of any kind affording a source of 

influence over, such enterprise.

(c) For purposes of this section, a person is engaged in a 

continuing criminal enterprise if:

(1) He violates any provision of this Article, the 

punishment of which is a felony; and

(2) Such violation is a part of a continuing series of 

violations of this Article;

a. Which are undertaken by such person in concert 

with five or more other persons with respect to whom 

such person occupies a position of organizer, a 

supervisory position, or any other position of 

management; and

b. From which such person obtains substantial 

income or resources.

N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1 (2022). 

In interpreting a federal statute with nearly identical wording, see 21 U.S.C. § 

848, the United States Supreme Court held in Richardson v. United States that each 

individual offense comprising a CCE constitutes an essential element of the offense:

When interpreting a statute, we look first to the language. 

United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 490 (1997). In this 

case, that language may seem to permit either 

interpretation, that of the Government or of the petitioner, 

for the statute does not explicitly tell us whether the 

individual violation is an element or a means. But the 

language is not totally neutral. The words “violates” and 

“violations” are words that have a legal ring. A “violation” 
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

6

is not simply an act or conduct; it is an act or conduct that 

is contrary to law. Black’s Law Dictionary 1570 (6th 

ed.1990). That circumstance is significant because the 

criminal law ordinarily entrusts a jury with determining 

whether alleged conduct “violates” the law, see infra, at 

822, and, as noted above, a federal criminal jury must act 

unanimously when doing so. Indeed, even though the 

words “violates” and “violations” appear more than 1,000 

times in the United States Code, the Government has not 

pointed us to, nor have we found, any legal source reading 

any instance of either word as the Government would have 

us read them in this case. To hold that each “violation” 

here amounts to a separate element is consistent with a 

tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is 

whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates 

the law. To hold the contrary is not.

The CCE statute’s breadth also argues against treating 

each individual violation as a means, for that breadth 

aggravates the dangers of unfairness that doing so would 

risk. Cf. Schad v. Arizona, [501 U.S. 624, 645 (1991)]

(plurality opinion). The statute’s word “violations” covers 

many different kinds of behavior of varying degrees of 

seriousness. The two chapters of the Federal Criminal 

Code setting forth drug crimes contain approximately 90 

numbered sections, many of which proscribe various acts 

that may be alleged as “violations” for purposes of the 

series requirement in the statute. Compare, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 842(a)(4) and (c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III) (providing civil 

penalties for removing drug labels) and 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) 

(Supp.III) (simple possession of a controlled substance) 

with 21 U.S.C. § 858 (endangering human life while 

manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of the 

drug laws) and § 841(b)(1)(A) (possession with intent to 

distribute large quantities of drugs). At the same time, the 

Government in a CCE case may well seek to prove that a 

defendant, charged as a drug kingpin, has been involved in 

numerous underlying violations. The first of these 

considerations increases the likelihood that treating 

violations simply as alternative means, by permitting a 

jury to avoid discussion of the specific factual details of 
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

7

each violation, will cover up wide disagreement among the 

jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not, do. 

The second consideration significantly aggravates the risk 

(present at least to a small degree whenever multiple 

means are at issue) that jurors, unless required to focus 

upon specific factual detail, will fail to do so, simply 

concluding from testimony, say, of bad reputation, that 

where there is smoke there must be fire.

Finally, this Court has indicated that the Constitution 

itself limits a State’s power to define crimes in ways that 

would permit juries to convict while disagreeing about 

means, at least where that definition risks serious 

unfairness and lacks support in history or tradition. Schad 

v. Arizona, 501 U.S., at 632-633 (plurality opinion); id.[] at 

651 (SCALIA, J., concurring) (“We would not permit . . . an 

indictment charging that the defendant assaulted either X 

on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday . . .”). We have no reason to 

believe that Congress intended to come close to, or to test, 

those constitutional limits when it wrote this statute. See 

Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 783-784[] . . . (1985) 

(citing H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, pt. 1, pp. 83-84, (1970)) (in 

making CCE a separate crime, rather than a sentencing 

provision, Congress sought increased procedural 

protections for defendants); cf. Gomez v. United States, 490 

U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (“It is our settled policy to avoid an 

interpretation of a federal statute that engenders 

constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative 

interpretation poses no constitutional question”); 

Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348 (1936) 

(Brandeis, J., concurring).

Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818-20 (1999).

The United States Supreme Court’s expression of constitutional concern with 

respect to CCE in Richardson, while avoided for prudential reasons in the opinion 

proper, was well-founded. Id. at 820; cf. Matter of Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642 (1977) 

(“If a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one of which will raise a 
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

8

serious question as to its constitutionality and the other will avoid such question, it 

is well settled that the courts should construe the statute so as to avoid the 

constitutional question.”). While the State has some latitude to “define different 

courses of conduct, or states of mind, as [] alternative means of committing a single 

offense,” its ability to do so is not boundless under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. at 632. “The axiomatic requirement of 

due process that a statute may not forbid conduct in terms so vague that people of 

common intelligence would be relegated to differing guesses about its meaning carries 

the practical consequence that a defendant charged under a valid statute will be in a 

position to understand with some specificity the legal basis of the charge against 

him.” Id. at 632-33 (citations omitted) (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 

453 (1939)). For this reason, “no person may be punished criminally save upon proof 

of some specific illegal conduct.” Id. at 633 (emphasis added).

Here, the specificity concerns raised by the United States Supreme Court in 

Richardson are fully present in the indictment. The indictment does not allege that 

the enterprise engaged in any specific conduct, only defining the CCE as “a continuing 

series of violations of Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes” and generally 

naming the participants and their positions in the trafficking scheme’s hierarchy. A 

juror would have no way of knowing how many criminal acts were committed within

the organization or how Defendant’s acts advanced them; while the indictment 

specifies that Defendant aided and abetted the CCE “by trafficking in 
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

9

methamphetamine[,]” it says nothing of why the enterprise with which Defendant 

dealt constituted a CCE. Moreover, if such an indictment were sufficient as to the 

establishment of a CCE, a future indictment could permissibly invite little to no 

agreement from individual jurors as to in which acts a defendant actually 

participated. 

While Richardson is not a directly binding authority as to the interpretation of 

North Carolina’s statute, the command of the Due Process Clause is; and we, like the 

United States Supreme Court, will not construe a statute so as to jeopardize that 

statute’s constitutionality. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 820; Matter of Arthur, 291 N.C. 

at 642. We therefore hold that each underlying act alleged under N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1 

constitutes an essential element of the offense. Moreover, as “an indictment . . . must 

allege all the essential elements of the offense[,]” State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 887 

(2018) (marks and citations omitted), we further hold that a valid indictment under 

N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1 requires the state to specifically enumerate the acts alleged. 

Defendant’s charge of aiding and abetting a CCE was therefore fatally 

defective, and we vacate the judgment on that charge. Having so held, Defendant’s 

other arguments with respect to that charge are moot. Roberts v. Madison Cty. 

Realtors Ass’n, Inc., 344 N.C. 394, 398-99 (1996) (marks and citations omitted) (“A 

case is moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, 

cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”)

B. Motion to Dismiss
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

10

We turn next to whether Defendant’s conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine 

verdict was fatally ambiguous. Specifically, Defendant argues the verdict was 

“fatally ambiguous because it is not possible to determine from the indictments, 

evidence, jury instructions, and verdict sheets whether the jury unanimously found 

trafficking by possession versus trafficking by transportation . . . .”

“A verdict should be certain and import a definite meaning free from 

ambiguity, with an uncertain or ambiguous verdict being insufficient to support the 

entry of a judgment.” Chisum v. Campagna, 376 N.C. 680, 710 (marks and citations 

omitted), reh’g denied, 377 N.C. 217 (2021). Jury verdicts are “fatally ambiguous in 

the event that the verdict sheet or the underlying instructions were vague, making it 

unclear precisely what the jury intended by its verdict.” Id. As ambiguity in a jury 

verdict creates an issue of jury unanimity, we review this argument de novo. See 

State v. Surrett, 217 N.C. App. 89, 93 (2011) (“We review the existence of a unanimous 

jury verdict de novo on appeal . . . .”).

Here, as Defendant’s argument depends on the failure to distinguish between 

trafficking by possession and trafficking by transportation, a determinative question 

is whether these offenses, if presented to the jury in the disjunctive, would actually 

render the jury’s verdict fatally ambiguous. Under our binding conspiracy precedent, 

the answer is no. “[O]ur case law has long embraced a distinction between 

unconstitutionally vague instructions that render unclear the offense for which the 

defendant is being convicted and instructions which instead permissibly state that 
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

11

more than one specific act can establish an element of a criminal offense.” State v. 

Walters, 368 N.C. 749, 753 (2016). On the one hand, “a disjunctive instruction[] [that] 

allows the jury to find a defendant guilty if he commits either of two underlying 

acts, either of which is in itself a separate offense, is fatally ambiguous because it is 

impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously found that the defendant 

committed one particular offense. In such cases, the focus is on the conduct of the 

defendant.” Id. (marks omitted) (emphasis in original). On the other hand, “if the 

trial court merely instructs the jury disjunctively as to various alternative acts which 

will establish an element of the offense, the requirement of unanimity is satisfied. In 

this type of case, the focus is on the intent or purpose of the defendant instead of his 

conduct.” Id. (marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Where a conspiracy charge disjunctively lists multiple offenses, we have held 

that each underlying offense does not create a separate conspiracy, but is instead an 

alternative act by which a Defendant may be found guilty of the singular conspiracy 

alleged. In State v. Overton, the defendant’s verdict sheet charged a conspiracy to 

“manufacture, possess with intent to sell and deliver or sell and deliver[] . . . heroin[,]” 

and the jury’s verdict mirrored that use of the disjunctive. State v. Overton, 60 N.C. 

App. 1, 34 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 581 (1983). Although we 

“acknowledge[d] that the verdict sheet was not artfully drawn,” we nonetheless held 

that “[t]he parameters of the conspiracy could include either a conspiracy to 

manufacture or to possess with intent to sell or deliver or to sell and deliver heroin.” 
STATE V. GUFFEY

Opinion of the Court

12

Id. We reasoned that the defendant “could not have been prejudiced by the inexact 

nature of this verdict form because the punishments for conspiracy to do any one of 

these three offenses are the same, and the trial court’s judgment contained a sentence 

well within the statutory limits. Id. Moreover, in State v. Davis, we applied a similar 

principle to hold that a defendant “charged only with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine”

was not subject to the risk of a non-unanimous verdict because “fact that the different 

methods of trafficking constitute separate offenses is immaterial.” State v. Davis, 188 

N.C. App. 735, 741 (2008) (citing State v. McLamb, 313 N.C. 572, 578-79 (1985)).

We are bound by this precedent and therefore hold the jury’s verdict was not 

fatally ambiguous.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s verdict with respect to conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine 

was not fatally ambiguous. However, as Defendant’s judgment for aiding and 

abetting a CCE did not enumerate the acts alleged to have constituted the CCE as 

necessary elements of the offense, we vacate that judgment.

VACATED IN PART; NO ERROR IN PART.

Judge FLOOD concurs.

Judge STROUD concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion.
No. COA22-1043 – State v. Guffey

STROUD, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

While I concur with the majority’s decision regarding the issue of a fatal 

ambiguity in the verdict, I write separately to dissent as to the indictment issue. 

Because the indictment was not fatally defective, the trial court had subject matter 

jurisdiction, and I would find no error as to the indictment of continuing criminal 

enterprise (“CCE”). 

I. Indictment

It is well-established that 

[t]o be sufficient, an indictment must include, inter 

alia, a plain and concise factual statement asserting facts 

supporting every element of a criminal offense and the 

defendant’s commission thereof. If the indictment fails to 

state an essential element of the offense, any resulting 

conviction must be vacated. The law disfavors application 

of rigid and technical rules to indictments; so long as an 

indictment adequately expresses the charge against the 

defendant, it will not be quashed. 

State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 886-87, 821 S.E.2d 787, 790-91 (2018) (citations, 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Our Supreme Court has clearly stated “the 

purpose of an indictment is to put the defendant on notice of the crime being charged 

and to protect the defendant from double jeopardy.” State v. Newborn, 384 N.C. 656, 

659, 887 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2023) (citation omitted). “[T]he traditional test is whether 

the indictment alleges facts supporting the essential elements of the offense to be 

charged.” Id. 
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 2 -

North Carolina General Statute Section 90-95.1 establishes the criminal 

charge of CCE, stating:

(a) Any person who engages in a . . . [CCE] shall be 

punished as a Class C felon and in addition shall be subject 

to the forfeiture prescribed in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Any person who is convicted under subsection (a) of 

engaging in a . . . [CCE] shall forfeit to the State of North 

Carolina:

(1) The profits obtained by him in such 

enterprise; and 

(2) Any of his interest in, claim against, or 

property or contractual rights of any kind 

affording a source of influence over, such 

enterprise.

(c) For purposes of this section, a person is engaged in 

a .. . . [CCE] if: 

(1) He violates any provision of this Article, the 

punishment of which is a felony; and

(2) Such violation is a part of a continuing series 

of violations of this Article;

a. Which are undertaken by such person 

in concert with five or more other 

persons with respect to whom such 

person occupies a position of organizer, 

a supervisory position, or any other 

position of management; and

b. From which such person obtains 

substantial income or resources. 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1 (2021). 

The indictment charging Defendant with CCE stated:
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 3 -

The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or 

about the date(s) of offense shown and in the county named 

above [Defendant] named above unlawfully, willfully, and 

feloniously did aid and abet Jamie Leonard Tate and 

Dwayne Bullock in unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously 

engaging in a . . . [CCE] by violating G.S. 90-95(h)(3b) by 

trafficking in methamphetamine. The violation was part of 

a continuing series of violations of Article 5 of Chapter 90 

of the General Statutes, which Jamie Leonard Tate and 

Dwayne Bullock undertook in concert with more than five 

other persons, including Jackie Pearson, Marqueseo 

Pearson, Gregory Rutherford, Randy Scott, Aretha 

Fullwood, Aretha Giles, and Karita Bullock, with respect 

to whom Jamie Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock 

occupied a position of organizer, a supervisory position, and 

a management position, and from which Jamie Leonard 

Tate and Dwayne Bullock obtained substantial income and 

resources. 

The majority relies on a United States Supreme Court case, Richardson v. 

United States, 526 U.S. 813, 143 L.E.2d 985 (1999), to determine “each underlying 

act alleged under N.C.G.S. § 90-95.1 constitutes an essential element of the offense.” 

However, as the majority noted, this decision is not binding on this Court as to North 

Carolina’s CCE statute since Richardson was interpreting a federal statute, not 

North Carolina’s statute. See generally id. I believe, under current North Carolina 

case law, North Carolina’s law is more in line with the dissenting opinion in 

Richardson than the majority opinion. The dissenting justices would have held that 

an indictment alleging CCE need not allege each underlying act that is the basis for 

this type of charge. As the dissent in Richardson notes, requiring the government to 

specifically allege the underlying acts that constitute a CCE charge “is a substantial 
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 4 -

departure from what Congress intended.” Richardson, 526 U.S. at 826, 143 L.E.2d 

at 998 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 

Here, the indictment specifically alleged Defendant aided and abetted Jamie 

Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock by “engaging in a . . . [CCE] by violating G.S. 90-

95(h)(3b) by trafficking in methamphetamine[,]” which is a felony offense under 

North Carolina law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3b) (2021). The indictment 

specifically alleged this felony offense was part of a “continuing series of violations of 

Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes” and states Defendant undertook the 

violations “in concert with more than five other persons[,]” naming each person, and 

alleging Jamie Leonard Tate and Dwayne Bullock “occupied a position of organizer, 

a supervisory position, and a management position, and from which Jamie Leonard 

Tate and Dwayne Bullock obtained substantial income and resources.”

The indictment tracks the statutory language of North Carolina General 

Statute Section 90-95.1 by naming the underlying felony offense as required by 

subsection 90-95.1(c)(1); expressly stating the person was part of a “continuing series 

of violations” as required by subsection 90-95.1(c)(2); the violations were in concert 

with five other people and the person occupied a “position of organizer, a supervisory 

position, and a management position” as required by subsection 90-95.1(c)(2)(a); and 

the person “obtained substantial income and resources” as required by subsection 90-

95.1(c)(2)(b). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1.
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 5 -

Since, as the dissent in Richardson also notes, the underlying violations that 

constitute the CCE charge could involve “hundreds or thousands of sales[,]” and the 

indictment is sufficient under North Carolina law to put Defendant on notice and 

tracks the statutory language, I would hold there was no error with respect to the 

indictment of the CCE charge. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 826, 143 L.E.2d at 998 

(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see Newborn, 384 N.C. at 659, 887 S.E.2d at 871 (“[T]he 

purpose of an indictment is to put the defendant on notice of the crime being charged 

and to protect the defendant from double jeopardy.” (citation omitted)); see also State 

v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953) (“The general rule in this state 

and elsewhere is that an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient, if the offense 

is charged in the words of the statute, either literally or substantially, or in equivalent 

words.” (citation omitted)). 

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant also argues “[t]he trial court erred by denying [Defendant’s] motion 

to dismiss the CCE charge where a defendant cannot be guilty of that offense based 

on a theory of aiding and abetting[.]” While the majority did not discuss this 

argument since it concludes the indictment was fatally defective, I will briefly discuss 

the issue since I would conclude there was no error as to the indictment. 

The State’s evidence tended to show that Jamie Tate and Dwayne Bullock were 

leaders of a criminal enterprise specifically related to drug trafficking. As the 

majority notes, the criminal enterprise trafficked various drugs and collected 
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 6 -

hundreds of thousands of dollars from the trafficking enterprise. Defendant’s role in 

this enterprise was limited to purchasing drugs from Jamie Tate and Dwayne 

Bullock, or their associates, and re-selling the drugs. There is no indication that 

Defendant was under the direction or control of Jamie Tate or Dwayne Bullock, or 

was otherwise involved in the enterprise aside from purchasing drugs to re-sell. 

At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss for 

insufficiency of the evidence, which the court did not rule on. Defendant did not 

testify on his own behalf or present any evidence, and renewed his motion to dismiss 

at the close of all evidence. The trial court ultimately denied the motions to dismiss.

Defendant’s argument is essentially that he could not be convicted of aiding 

and abetting a criminal enterprise since he was not involved in any leadership role, 

and his purchase of drugs from the enterprise was a small part of the enterprise’s 

overall operation. Defendant discusses federal caselaw regarding the federal 

equivalent to North Carolina’s CCE statute, stating:

The Second Circuit has held that a defendant cannot be 

guilty of the offense based on this theory of vicarious 

liability, while the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, 

concluded that a defendant can be liable as an aider and 

abettor under some circumstances. Both circuits 

concluded, however, that such aiding-and-abetting liability 

should not exist where, as here, the defendant is an 

employee or agent of the CCE.

Defendant cites to United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) 

and United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2nd Cir. 1987). 
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 7 -

While I would not conclude a defendant can never be charged as an aider and 

abettor to a CCE, I would conclude, under these facts, the trial court erred by not 

dismissing the CCE charge. The State correctly notes that “aider and abettor liability 

in North Carolina is a principle of common law.” See State v. Goode, 350 N.C. 247, 

260, 512 S.E.2d 414, 422 (1999) (laying out the common law elements of aider and 

abettor liability). The plain language of North Carolina General Statute Section 90-

95.1 abrogates aider and abettor liability for those who are not in a management or 

leadership position in a criminal enterprise. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1; see also 

State v. James, 371 N.C. 77, 87, 813 S.E.2d 195, 203 (2018) (“The intent of the General 

Assembly may be found first from the plain language of the statute[.] If the language 

of a statute is clear, the court must implement the statute according to the plain 

meaning of its terms so long as it is reasonable to do so.” (emphasis added) (citation 

omitted)).

North Carolina General Statute Section 90-95.1(c) states:

(c) For purposes of this section, a person is engaged in 

a . . . [CCE] if: 

(1) He violates any provision of this Article, the 

punishment of which is a felony; and

(2) Such violation is a part of a continuing series 

of violations of this Article;

a. Which are undertaken by such person 

in concert with five or more other 

persons with respect to whom such 

person occupies a position of organizer, 
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 8 -

a supervisory position, or any other 

position of management; and

b. From which such person obtains 

substantial income or resources. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Subsection (c)(2)(a) states a person who “occupies a position of organizer, a 

supervisory position, or any other position of management” can be liable for a CCE 

charge. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1(c)(2)(a). Thus, the plain meaning of the words 

“organizer,” “supervisor,” and “management” will control the meaning of the statute. 

See James, 371 N.C. at 87, 813 S.E.2d at 203. “Organizer” means “one that 

organizes[,]” which means “to cause to develop an organic structure[,] to form into a 

coherent unity or functioning whole[,] to set up an administrative structure for[,] to 

persuade to associate in an organization[,] to arrange by systematic planning and 

united effort[.]” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 874 (11th ed. 2003). 

“Supervisor” means “one that supervises; an administrative officer in charge of 

business, government, or school unit or operation[.]” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 

Dictionary 1255 (11th ed. 2003). “Management” means “the act or art of managing: 

the conducting or supervising of something[,] judicious use of means to accomplish an 

end[,] the collective body of those who manage or direct an enterprise[.]” MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary 754 (11th ed. 2003). 

Taken together, the clear legislative intent of North Carolina General Statute 

Section 90-95.1 is that it should apply to those who are drug kingpins, not those who 
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 9 -

are not involved in the overall enterprise leadership structure. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

90-95.1. Holding to the contrary would impose criminal liability under a theory of 

CCE for any person who purchases drugs from a criminal enterprise, which the 

General Assembly did not intend. See id. Here, it is undisputed Defendant was 

involved in the purchase and distribution of large quantities of illegal drugs, and he 

was charged and convicted of those crimes. Those convictions are not affected by this 

appeal. But the evidence was clear that Defendant’s role in this enterprise was 

limited to purchasing drugs from Jamie Tate and Dwayne Bullock, or their associates, 

and re-selling the drugs. The State even conceded at trial that Defendant “wasn’t a 

kingpin. So you can treat him differently than you would the kingpin.” In the State’s 

brief to this Court, it again conceded that “Tate and Bullock soon formed [a] closeknit organization of ‘seven or eight’ associates and family members who ran the drugtrafficking enterprise[,]” listing “[t]he individuals under Tate and Bullock’s 

supervision[,]” without listing Defendant. The State does not characterize Defendant 

as an employee of the organization, while it specifically referred to the seven listed 

individuals as employees of the organization. 

While it is clear and undisputed that Defendant sold drugs obtained by the 

criminal enterprise, it is also clear Defendant was not one of the organizers, 

supervisors, or managers listed in North Carolina General Statute Section 90-95.1. 

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95.1(c)(2)(a). Since North Carolina General Statute Section 

90-95.1 demonstrates a clear legislative intent to punish those acting as drug 
STATE V. GUFFEY

STROUD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

- 10 -

kingpins, I would conclude the trial court erred in not dismissing the CCE charge at 

the close of all evidence. 

For the reasons outlined above, I concur in part and dissent in part.