Opinion filed July 12, 2012

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-12-00070-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF A.W.C. AND G.A.C., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 106th District Court

Dawson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 11-03-18547

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order terminating the parental rights of the 

mother and father of A.W.C. and G.A.C.1The children’s mother (Connie) and father (Antonio) 

have each filed a notice of appeal. We affirm.

Issues

Connie presents three points of error for review, and Antonio presents eight issues for

review. All of the points of error and issues involve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support termination of Connie’s and Antonio’s parental rights. In her points of error, Connie 

contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s 

findings (1) that she constructively abandoned the children while they were in the temporary 

conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department); (2) that 

 

1

In some parts of the record, the children are referred to as A.W.C., Jr. and G.A.S.C.
2

she failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions 

necessary for her to obtain the return of her children; and (3) that, because the Department made 

reasonable efforts to return the children to her, termination based on her alleged mental illness or 

deficiency was not supported by the evidence. In his issues, Antonio contends that the evidence 

was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings (1) that he 

constructively abandoned the children while they were in the temporary conservatorship of the 

Department (Issues 1 and 2); (2) that he failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that 

specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of his children (Issues 3 

and 4); (3) that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the children (Issues 5 

and 6); and (4) that, because the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to 

him, termination based on his alleged mental illness or deficiency was not supported by the 

evidence (Issues 7 and 8).

Legal and Factual Sufficiency

Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2011). To determine if the evidence is legally 

sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the finding and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or 

conviction that its finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To 

determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and 

determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 

(Tex. 2002).

To terminate parental rights under Section 161.001, it must be shown by clear and 

convincing evidence that a parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(1)(A)–

(T) and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Section 161.001. In this case, the trial 

court found that the parents committed two of the acts listed in Section 161.001(1). Specifically, 

the trial court found that Connie and Antonio had:

[1] constructively abandoned the children who have been in the permanent 

or temporary managing conservatorship of the [Department] for not less than six 

months and: (1) the [Department] has made reasonable efforts to return the 

children to the [parent]; (2) the [parent] has not regularly visited or maintained 

significant contact with the children; and (3) the [parent] has demonstrated an 

inability to provide the children with a safe environment; [and]
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[2] failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically 

established the actions necessary for the [parent] to obtain the return of the 

children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship 

of the [Department] for not less than nine months as a result of the children’s 

removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the 

children.

See Section 161.001(1)(N), (O). The trial court also found that termination of Connie’s and 

Antonio’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See Section 161.001(2).

A trial court may order termination of parental rights under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.003 (West 2008) when it is shown, and the trial court finds, that:

(1) the parent has a mental or emotional illness or a mental deficiency that 

renders the parent unable to provide for the physical, emotional, and mental needs 

of the child;

(2) the illness or deficiency, in all reasonable probability, proved by clear 

and convincing evidence, will continue to render the parent unable to provide for 

the child’s needs until the 18th birthday of the child;

(3) the department has been the temporary or sole managing conservator 

of the child of the parent for at least six months preceding the date of the hearing 

on the termination held in accordance with Subsection (c);

(4) the department has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the 

parent; and

(5) the termination is in the best interest of the child.

See Section 161.003(a)(1)–(5). In this case, the trial court made the findings required for 

termination under Section 161.003.

The record shows that, on February 26, 2011, the Department received a report that 

Connie and Antonio were neglecting A.W.C. and G.A.C. At that time, A.W.C. was nineteen

months old, and G.A.C. was five months old. The Department received information that 

Antonio had called friends in Lamesa because he and Connie were being evicted from their 

residence in New Mexico; that Antonio had requested his friends to come to New Mexico and 

then bring him, Connie, and the children to Lamesa; that, when Antonio and Connie and the 

children were picked up in New Mexico and later arrived in Lamesa, the children “were dirty 

and smelled” and Antonio and Connie “had body odor as well”; that Antonio and Connie did not 
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have any formula for G.A.C.; that Antonio and Connie were giving both children regular milk to 

drink; and that the bottles the children were drinking from “were crusty and filthy.”

Kimberly Masters, an employee of the Department, was the conservatorship caseworker 

assigned to this case. Masters testified that, after the Department received the neglect report, an 

investigator for the Department made contact with Antonio, Connie, and the children. The 

record showed that this contact occurred on March 1, 2011. At that time, the children were very 

dirty, and Antonio and Connie were also dirty. The investigator discovered that Antonio and 

Connie were giving both children two percent milk. On the same day, the Department removed 

the children from the care of Antonio and Connie. The Department placed A.W.C. and G.A.C. 

in foster care with Lino and Holly Garcia. The children were still in the Garcias’ care at the time 

of trial. The Department’s initial goal in the case was to reunify the children with Antonio and 

Connie, but later, the Department’s goal became adoption by the Garcias.

Masters testified that A.W.C. and G.A.C. were not current on their immunizations when 

they were removed from Antonio and Connie. Masters also testified about the condition of the 

children at the time of removal. She said that G.A.C. was developmentally delayed, was not 

eating properly, and had intestinal problems. Masters said that A.W.C. was also developmentally 

delayed. She said that A.W.C. had problems with his speech. Masters explained that A.W.C. 

did not say any words and that his mode of communication consisted of “mainly grunts.” She 

also said that A.W.C. was very small and did not have hand/eye coordination.

Holly Garcia testified that she was married to Lino Garcia. Holly testified that A.W.C. 

and G.A.C. came to live with Lino and her on March 1, 2011, and had continually lived with 

them since that time. The Garcias had one other foster child, a three-month-old girl. Holly 

testified that she was a stay-at-home mom.

Holly testified that A.W.C. and G.A.C. were both sick when they came to live with her. 

The Garcias took the children to doctor’s appointments, where the Garcias learned that both

children had sinus infections and double ear infections. Holly also testified that both children 

were “small” when they were placed in her care. She learned at the children’s doctor’s 

appointments that both children were in the fifth percentile. While in the care of the Garcias, the 

children were brought current on their immunizations.

Holly said that A.W.C. was developmentally delayed in his speech when he came to live 

with her. She said that he had a very limited vocabulary. After being placed in the Garcias’
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care, A.W.C. attended speech therapy once a week and occupational therapy twice a week.

Holly said that A.W.C. was almost finished with speech therapy and that he “talk[ed] all the time 

now.” She also said that A.W.C. was progressing well in occupational therapy and would be 

attending “a little more occupational therapy just to learn some more motor skills.” A.W.C. did 

not eat very much when he came to live with the Garcias. At that time, A.W.C. was still on a 

bottle, and it took about a month to get him to consistently eat solid food. Holly was informed 

that G.A.C. had been on whole milk before she was removed from Antonio’s and Connie’s care. 

Holly said that G.A.C. “had a lot of stomach issues” at first and that it took “a little while to get 

her stomach regulated.”

Holly testified that both children “like[d] to eat [and were] healthy” and that the children 

were “growing and thriving.” Holly said that, at the time of trial, A.W.C. was “almost past the 

12th percentile” and G.A.C. was “already in the 72nd percentile.” Holly testified that, at the 

time of trial, A.W.C. and G.A.C. were happy, healthy, and stable kids. Holly said that she and 

her husband loved A.W.C. and G.A.C. and wanted to adopt them.

The record shows that the Department removed another child from Antonio’s and 

Connie’s care in 2008. Antonio and Connie voluntarily terminated their rights to this child.

Antonio and Connie both received monthly disability checks. Antonio received monthly 

checks in the amount of $681 and $175. Connie received a monthly check in the amount of

$175. Antonio had never been employed, and Connie had not been employed during the 

pendency of this case. Neither Antonio nor Connie had a driver’s license or drove a car.

Antonio and Connie had a house in Lamesa when they lived in New Mexico. The record 

is not clear as to whether they owned the house. Antonio and Connie lived in this house at the 

time of trial. When Antonio and Connie arrived in Lamesa from New Mexico, their house in 

Lamesa was unlivable. It had no electricity or running water. Antonio and Connie lived in a 

motel for a lengthy period of time. Masters testified that, when she first saw Antonio and 

Connie’s house, it was “run down.” Masters explained that “[she] could see through the floor, 

through the ceiling, windows were broken, [and] walls needed to be repaired.” Hollie Price 

testified that she was the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) and guardian ad litem for 

A.W.C. and G.A.C. Price visited Antonio and Connie’s home shortly after the children were 

removed from their care. At that time, Antonio and Connie did not live in the house. Price 

described the condition of the house at that time as “dirty, [and] almost unlivable.” Price also 
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said that the house had holes in the floors and broken windows and that the house did not have

electricity or running water.

Masters said that, later in the case, members of a church remodeled Antonio and Connie’s 

house. Masters saw the house two or three weeks before trial. She said that, although the 

physical condition of the house was “fine” at that time, “[the home] had gone back downhill.” 

She said that the house was dirty again and that wind was blowing through windows in the 

house.

Chris Powell testified that he was the senior pastor at First Baptist Church in Lamesa. He 

said that, in July 2011, volunteers from his church rewired, replumbed, painted, and cleaned 

Antonio and Connie’s house in Lamesa. The volunteers also made cosmetic repairs to the house. 

They patched but did not replace broken windows in the house. Powell said that the church 

provided Antonio and Connie with a washer and dryer, a stove, a refrigerator, a bed, a couch, and 

some other items. Powell testified that the house was not in a livable condition before the 

volunteers worked on it. He said that it would have concerned him for children to be in the 

house in its former condition.

After the children were removed from Antonio and Connie, court-ordered service plans

were put into place. Antonio and Connie were required to comply with the terms of their

respective service plans, which established the actions necessary for them to obtain the return of 

A.W.C. and G.A.C. See Section 161.001(O). As required by the plans, Antonio and Connie 

both completed psychological evaluations with William E. Hoke, Ph.D. The Department 

introduced copies of Dr. Hoke’s reports of the evaluations into evidence as State’s Exhibit No. 1.

Dr. Hoke determined that Antonio, who was forty-nine years old, had a full-scale IQ of 51.

Dr. Hoke diagnosed Antonio with moderate mental retardation. Based on his examination of 

Antonio, Dr. Hoke concluded in his report as follows:

Overall, these results are consistent with severe and chronic mental 

retardation which will have a major impact upon his ability to be an appropriate

father. [Antonio] certainly is unable to care for himself and will require structure 

and supervision throughout the remainder of his life. It is likely that his wife,

[Connie] spends much of her time in taking care of many of his needs. He will 

not be able to live independently and will certainly be unable to provide an

appropriate or safe home for his children. Although he seems to love them and is 

somewhat attached to them, his limitations will place the children at risk for harm.

 
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Recommendations include [Antonio] continuing with the Plan of Service 

as prescribed by CPS. This should include parenting classes, a clean and 

appropriate living arrangement, and any other services deemed appropriate. If he 

is able to receive the assistance he requires, his long-term prognosis may be 

slightly improved. In general, however, his cognitive limitations appear to be 

severe and are unlikely to improve in the future. As a result, his ability to 

adequately care for his children appears to be quite limited and it is very likely 

that they would be in danger were they to be placed with him as a primary 

paternal figure.

 

Dr. Hoke determined that Connie, who was twenty-nine years old, had a full-scale IQ of 

70. Based on his examination of Connie, Dr. Hoke concluded in his report as follows:

Overall, these results suggest significant limitations in many areas in her 

life. It appears that she will struggle to provide an appropriate home for herself 

and will also struggle to provide an appropriate and stable home for her children. 

Unfortunately, her level of insight into her deficits appears to be very limited and 

it is likely that she will have a difficult time understanding why anyone might 

have concerns about her . . . ability to be an appropriate parent.

Recommendations include [Connie] continuing with the Plan of Service as 

prescribed by CPS. This should include individual counseling, couples 

counseling, parenting classes, homemaker skills training, family counseling, 

budgeting classes, and all other services as indicated. If she is able to receive the 

assistance she requires, her long-term prognosis may be slightly improved. 

Again, given what appear to be a number of significant limitations, it is likely that 

[Connie] will struggle in the future to be able to provide an appropriate home for 

her children, yet may be fairly unaware of her deficits and limitations.

The service plans also required Antonio and Connie to participate in an MHMR 

assessment and to follow through with all recommendations provided by MHMR. Masters 

testified that the MHMR services entailed a mental health evaluation and services, financial 

budgeting classes, parenting classes, and any other necessary life skills classes. The Department 

included the MHMR services on the service plans so that Antonio and Connie would have an 

opportunity to learn how to take care of themselves and to manage their money. Additionally, 

MHMR would help Antonio and Connie obtain necessary medications and any other available 

disability payments. Masters said that the MHMR services were made available to Antonio and 

Connie in Lamesa.

Masters testified that the Department scheduled appointments for Antonio and Connie to 

receive MHMR services on three separate occasions but that Antonio and Connie did not show
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up for any of the appointments. A prior caseworker in the case set up the first appointment, and 

Masters set up the second and third appointments. Masters testified that Anita Carillon, a 

Department employee, attempted to take Antonio and Connie to the last scheduled appointment 

but that she could not find them. Masters said that Antonio and Connie told her that they went to 

an MHMR appointment but that they did not need services and so “MHMR turned them away.” 

Masters contacted MHMR and confirmed that Antonio and Connie missed all the scheduled 

appointments.

A temporary order provided that Antonio and Connie would have supervised visitation 

with the children a minimum of two hours every other week at the Department’s office closest to 

the children’s foster care placement. The visitations were scheduled to take place in the 

Department’s office in Odessa. Because neither Antonio nor Connie had a driver’s license or a 

car, the Department provided round-trip transportation to them for their visits with A.W.C. and 

G.A.C. Masters said that, although the Department made transportation available to Antonio and 

Connie, they only visited A.W.C. and G.A.C. on nine of twenty-four scheduled visits. Masters 

testified that, before a scheduled visitation, Carillon would go to Antonio and Connie’s house 

and, if they were not home, would then go to places where they often went, such as convenience 

stores and restaurants, to look for them. On most occasions, Carillon could not find Antonio and 

Connie. Masters said that, the week before trial, Antonio and Connie visited the children for the 

first time in four months.

Connie testified that she had been getting disability checks since she was five years old. 

Connie said that she was put in special education classes while in school. However, she said 

that, “knowing how smart [she was],” she had no idea why she was placed in special education 

classes. Connie also said that she had gone to school through the tenth grade.

Connie testified that she and Antonio went to MHMR. She said that they “made the 

appointments on [their] own.” Connie said that she talked to a psychiatrist and a caseworker by 

videoconference at MHMR. She testified that, at MHMR, “he” wanted to give her shots because 

she was anemic. Connie said that she did not “want to take no shots.” Connie said that, at 

MHMR, she was told that the only way she could take classes was to take medication. Connie 

said that, a long time ago, a doctor diagnosed her with schizophrenia. Connie testified that she 

used to take medication for her schizophrenia but that “God ha[d] taken away [her] mental 

illness.” She said that she had promised God that she would not take any more medications and 
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that she could not break her promise to God. She said that “[she had not] taken medication in a 

long time.” However, Connie said that she was currently taking medication for mood swings 

relating to her going through menopause.

With respect to missing visitation periods with the children, Connie said that she and 

Antonio did not hear Carillon knock on the door if Carillon came to their house to take them to 

the visits. Connie said that Carillon tried to make her look bad and “made [them] miss out on 

seeing the babies.” Connie also said that A.W.C. and G.A.C. were not sick when they were 

removed from her care. Connie testified that she was capable of taking care of the children 

because Antonio taught her how to take care of them.

Connie also testified about the condition of her and Antonio’s house. She said that, at the 

beginning of the case, the house had no electricity. However, she said that a church had put 

wiring in the house.

Antonio testified that he and his family came back to Lamesa because their landlord in 

New Mexico had “kick[ed] [them] out.” Antonio testified that their house in Lamesa needed to 

be fixed up “a little bit” when he and Connie moved back to Lamesa from New Mexico. He said 

that the church helped fix up their house in Lamesa.

Antonio said that A.W.C. and G.A.C. were not sick when they were removed from his 

care. He does not believe that Carillon came to their house to pick up Connie and him for visits 

with the children every time that she said she did. Antonio said that he and Connie went to 

MHMR and that, while there, he did a videoconference with a psychiatrist. He said that a lady at 

MHMR told him that “you don’t need to come here no more.”

Norma Rosales testified that she had known Antonio all her life. She said that Antonio 

babysat her children in 1993. Rosales testified that Antonio was able to take care of her kids.

The evidence, which is summarized above, showed that Antonio’s and Connie’s service 

plans required them to participate in an MHMR assessment and to follow through with all 

recommendations provided by MHMR. Masters testified that the Department made three 

separate appointments for Antonio and Connie to receive MHMR services but that Antonio and 

Connie did not attend any of the appointments. Masters confirmed with MHMR that Antonio 

and Connie missed all their appointments. Antonio and Connie testified that they went to 

MHMR. The trial court’s function, as the trier of fact, was to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses, assign the weight to be given their testimony, and resolve any conflicts or 
10

inconsistencies in the testimony. In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 742 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2004, pet. denied). The trial court was entitled to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of 

any witness. In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d 376, 382–83 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.). The 

trial court was free to believe Masters’s testimony and to disbelieve Connie’s and Antonio’s 

testimony. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court could reasonably have formed 

a firm belief or conviction that Connie and Antonio both failed to comply with the court-ordered 

service plans. Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination 

under Section 161.001(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code.

Connie’s second point of error and Antonio’s third and fourth issues are overruled. 

Because only one ground is needed to support a termination order, we need not address Connie’s 

first and third points of error and Antonio’s first, second, seventh, and eighth issues challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings under Sections 161.001(1)(N) 

and 161.003 of the Texas Family Code.

In his fifth and sixth issues, Antonio challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of A.W.C. 

and G.A.C. The focus is on the children’s best interest, not that of the parents. Dupree v. Tex.

Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas, no writ). With 

respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be proved. In re C.J.O., 325 

S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). But, courts may use the nonexhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 

(Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional 

and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to 

the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, 

(5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, 

(6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability 

of the home of proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that 

the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or

omissions of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds 

for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. A trier of fact may measure a parent’s future conduct 
11

by his or her past conduct and determine that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental 

rights. In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

The record shows that A.W.C. and G.A.C. were removed from Connie’s and Antonio’s 

care on March 1, 2011. Since that date, the children had been living with the Garcias. The 

children had thrived while in the Garcias’ care. The Garcias had provided a stable environment 

for the children and had met the children’s needs. A.W.C. and G.A.C. had a good relationship 

with the Garcias, and the Garcias wanted to adopt them. On the other hand, Connie and Antonio 

had not exhibited adequate parenting abilities in the past. The evidence demonstrated that they 

could not provide A.W.C. and G.A.C. a safe and stable home environment or meet their physical 

and emotional needs. Further, the evidence showed that Connie and Antonio likely would not be 

able to sustain a safe and stable environment or to meet the children’s needs in the future. 

Considering Connie’s and Antonio’s past conduct, the trial court could have reasonably 

concluded that Connie and Antonio would not be able to provide the children with a safe and 

stable environment or to meet their needs in the future.

Based on the evidence, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or 

conviction that termination of Connie’s and Antonio’s parental rights would be in the best 

interest of A.W.C. and G.A.C. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s best interest 

finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence is legally and factually 

sufficient to support the finding that termination of Connie’s and Antonio’s parental rights is in 

the best interest of A.W.C. and G.A.C. Antonio’s fifth and sixth issues are overruled.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Connie’s and Antonio’s parental rights to 

A.W.C. and G.A.C.

TERRY McCALL

JUSTICE

July 12, 2012

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Kalenak, J.