U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

REGULATORY GUIDE 

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 

SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR 

ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

A. INTRODUCTION 

Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical 

Protection of Plants and Materials," requires that road 

movements of special nuclear material (SNM) in quanti

ties identified in paragraph 73.1(bX2) be protected by 

one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least 

two armed guards accompanying the shipment in a sepa

rate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed 

truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to di

version by design features that permit immobilization of 

the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical 

penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards 

are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobiliza

tion is not required. Paragraph 73.30(d) requires that the 

qualification, of individuals to act as guards used pur

suant to paragraph 73.31(c) be documented. This guide 

describes features acceptable to the NRC staff for a vehi

cle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear 

material by road and for the qualification of the armed 

guards. 

B. DISCUSSION 

There are two approaches that can be taken to satis

fy paragraph 73.31(cX2), i.e., specially designed truck or 

trailer. One method would be the use of a specially de

signed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to 

resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthor

ized personnel using a wide variety of tools and weap

ons. The penetration time would be commensurate with 

the time needed for law enforcement agencies to re

spond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would 

be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of 

a diversion attempt. 

The other method would be through the use of ar

mored car service. In this case, resistance to unauthorized

entry is provided, in part, by the armed personnel within 

the vehicle who are in turn protected by the inherent 

design of the armored vehicle. 

Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel 

used in armored car service are provided in this guide. 

This revision reflects comments received from the public 

and other factors. 

1. Armor 

Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a 

very small number of manufacturers. The specific design 

of the armor supplied by each company is considered 

proprietary information. The armor can generally be de

scribed with respect to its resistance to projectile pene

tration. All manufacturers provide armor that will re

sist initial penetration by bullets from readily available 

small arms. The armor is usually affixed to the vehicle in 

such a way as to provide protection to the occupants 

against attack from any external direction. 

2. Cab-Cargo Interface 

The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several 

options. In most cases, the separating wall between cab 

and cargo compartment is armored to provide protection 

in case either compartment is compromised. A window 

of bullet resistant material that allows the crew in one 

compartment to have a clear view of the access doos of 

the other compartment is also provided. Some models 

have a door that. allows passage from the cab to the 

cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle. Other 

models are equipped with gunports that permit firing 

from cab to cargo compartment. 

3. Guards and Drivers 

Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of tWo 

or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo 

compartments. For long-distance trips the crew.is often

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commlseeien. U.S. Ntuclaw 

Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C. N00. Attention: Docketing *nd 

methods ccpble to the NC staff of implementing specific prtsService Section. 

Commission's regulations. to delineate techniques used by the staff in evalu- T uides are iuued in the flowing ten broad divisions: 

ating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to appli. 

cants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, end complilance 1. Power Reactors & Products 

with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in 2. Research aedrTetReactors 7. Tran••otatlon 

the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to 3. Fuels and Materiale Facilitle 8. Ocsupat"oe "eo 

the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust Review 

Comments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General 

at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate. to accommnodate com

ments and to reflect new information or experience. This guide was revised as a Copies of published guides may be obtained by written request Indicaling the 

result of substantive comments received from the public and additional staff divisions desired to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comeloeion. WasnIngton. D.C. 

review. 2f6. Attention: Director. Office of Sandaerds Developement.

Revision 1 

April 1975
increased to allow rest periods for drivers and guards. 

SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent long

distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain 

the full-protective capacity of the armored service during 

these trips, it is important that adequate crews for 

continuous manning of both compartments during 

normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility in 

achieving this end would be provided if both guards and 

drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either 

function (guard or driver). 

4. Door Locks 

All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment 

locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cases, 

access to the cargo compartment requires positive action 

by personnel in both compartments when the cargo 

compartment is occupied by a guard. 

5. Alarm System 

Many of the armored cars presently in service are 

equipped with audible alarms or flashing lights similar to 

those used by police and emergency vehicles. The aware

ness of attack that such alarms elicit in the general pub

lic can facilitate response to attack or recovery of di

verted material. 

6. Securing the Cargo 

Armored cars have no standard provision for tying 

down cargo. This is understandable in view of the types 

of cargo normally handled by these carriers. For SNM 

cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected, 

some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be 

required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel 

safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expense 

would be required to equip existing vehicles with tie

down fittings. 

"17. Gas Protection 

Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow

through (front-to-back) air system for heating and cool

ing the vehicle interior. Typically, these systems draw 

outside air from the front (cab area) of the vehicle and 

expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of the 

vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided by 

the air system offers some resistance to the introduction 

of gaseous substances. The air intake is under occupant 

control and can be closed. S6me vehicles are normally 

equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks, filters, 

and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM would en

hance the ability of vehicle crew members to resist gas 

attacks. 

8. Antenna Protection 

Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with 

communication systems of some kind. Each vehicle is 

equipped by the purchaser of the vehicle although the 

manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access 

areas for the communication system components. In 

some instances, the purchaser may provide the corn

*Lines indicate substantive changes from previous issue.

munication equipment to the manufacturer who will in

stall the equipment at the time the vehicle is con

structed. Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in 

use. Each system is dependent on the use of radio signals 

received and transmitted from a vehicle-mounted 

antenna that could logically become the first target of 

an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pre

clude the vehicle occupants from either notifying ex

ternal agents of the attack or from seeking aid or as

sistance. To provide for sufficient delay during an attack 

for a vehicle crew to transmit emergency messages, 

antenna protection is desirable. Such protection could 

be provided in the form of concealment, multiplicity, or 

hardening. The actual antenna could be concealed or 

designed to appear as some other object while con

ventionally appearing dummy antennas would be 

conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas 

using internal switching could offer a delay sufficient to 

enable emergency messages to be transmitted. Hardened, 

attack-resistant antennas could be designed and used to 

provide a delay time. Combinations of these or other 

similar methods could enhance the viability of trans

mission. 

C. REGULATORY POSITION 

The characterisitcs listed below are acceptable to 

the NRC staff for a road vehicle operated by armed 

guards in order to comply with NRC regulations pertain

ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and 

local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local 

transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments 

and compliance with these requirements is expected. 

1. Armor 

The vehicle should provide protection for the 

driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impact. The ex

ternal surface of the vehicle (side panels, floor, top, fire

wall area, and viewing areas) should be constructed of 

materials that are resistant to at least the muzzle im

pact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. Fuel tanks should 

be provided with similar protection against projectile im

pact. Fuel tanks also should be equipped with a lock

type cap and a screen in the tank nozzle to prevent the 

insertion of an explosive device into the tank. 

2. Cab-Cargo Interface 

The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments 

should be armored. Additional features to be considered 

in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface 

depend on the method selected for the protection of the 

shipment. At least one of the methods listed below 

should be used. These methods are similar in that each 

provides the capability for the crew to use firearms to 

prevent entry into the cargo compartment without leav

ing the vehicle. 

a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed 

in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous 

wall of armor with a bullet-resistant window would be 

considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.

5.31-2
b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab 

should be available so that a guard can go directly from 

the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the 

vehicle. 

c. Gunports should be available which will permit 

firing from the cab into the cargo compartment.. Addi

tionally, the gunports should permit firing of the weap

on at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the 

cargo compartment can be prevefited. 

3. Guards and Drivers 

All personnel of an armored vehicle should be quali

fied to perform all normal operational tasks involved 

with a shipment. Both guards and drivers should be 

qualified to perform either function, and interchange of 

function should be allowed if required for the safety and 

security of the cargo and crew. 

Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR 

173.393(jX4), which deals with radiation levels in occu

pied vehicles, should be maintained in addition to other 

applicable State and local requirements. All guards and 

drivers should be qualified in accordance with NRC 

Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Quali

fying of Guards and Watchmen," or an equivalent pro

gram. 

4. Door Locks 

The cargo compartment doors should normally be 

in a locked mode and should be secured by a locking 

mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in 

both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if 

the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo com

partment is not occupied, the cargo compartment door 

lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be 

further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo com

partment door lock should require positive action by 

personnel at the cargo compartment door and in the cab 

compartment. The cab compartment doors should 

normally be locked and should require key insertion for 

operation from the outside. 

S. Alarm System 

The vehicle should be equipped with an audible 

and/or visual alarm which is activated from within the 

vehicle and which has the same range of detection as 

that normally required by emergency vehicles. De

activation of the alarm system circuitry should require 

access to the armored compartments of the vehicle.

6. Securing the Cargo 

The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the 

cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment 

for such securing devices as are required to provide re

straint against substantial movement of or damage to the 

cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops. 

The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR Part 

177. 

7. Gas Protection 

The vehicle compartments should be equipped with 

gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the 

crew to resist an attack by incapacitating gas for a suf

ficient time to allow transmittal of a distress message 

and, if possible, the arrival of aid. 

8. Antenna Protection 

Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be 

provided in order to afford sufficient time for the com

munication system to transmit an emergency message. 

9. Immobilization 

Although there is no requirement for immobili

zation of vehicles that use armed guards, this is a desira

ble feature. The vehicle could have a provision for im

mobilization upon an authorized command originating 

from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the im

mobilization system should resist unauthorized de

activation for -as long as feasible. Caution should be 

taken to ensure that activation devices that cause im

mobilization are adequately shielded to prevent them 

from being energized from spurious electromagnetic 

signals. 

D. IMPLEMENTATION 

The purpose of this section is to provide informa

tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's 

plans for utilizing this regulatory guide. 

This guide reflects current regulatory practice. 

Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant 

or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method 

for complying with specified portions of the Com

mission's regulations, this guide will be used by the staff 

in evaluating the materials and plant protection portion 

of license applications, licensee security plans, or other 

documents pertaining to materials and plant protection 

submitted to the NRC on or after the issuance date of 

this guide.

5.31-3
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