[Cite as O’Connor v. O'Connor, 184 Ohio App.3d 538, 2009-Ohio-5436.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PUTNAM COUNTY 

 

O'CONNOR, 

n.k.a. RACHESKY, 

 APPELLEE, CASE NO. 12-09-04 

 v. 

 

O'CONNOR, O P I N I O N 

 APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Putnam County Common Pleas Court 

Domestic Relations Division 

Trial Court No. 94-DVA-211 

Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: October 13, 2009 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Michael A. Borer, for appellee. 

Garth W. Brown, for appellant. 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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SHAW, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Michael Ryan O’Connor appeals from the May 

12, 2009 judgment entry of the Court of Common Pleas of Putnam County, Ohio, 

modifying a previous child-support order. Michael alleges that the court erred in 

calculating the revised child-support order because it did not impute the income 

that plaintiff-appellee, Denise K. O’Connor, n.k.a. Rachesky, earned prior to 

leaving her job in November 2008. 

{¶2} Michael and Denise had their first child, Chelsea, born February 23, 

1992. The couple subsequently married on April 4, 1992. Their second child, 

Michael, was born January 12, 1994. On August 29, 1994, Denise filed a 

complaint for divorce. The court granted the divorce on December 16, 1994, and 

ordered Michael to pay $476.67 a month for child support and to provide health 

insurance for their two children. 

{¶3} The amount for child support remained the same until January 8, 

2009, when the Putnam County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) 

recommended the amount be increased.1

 On the child-support worksheet, CSEA 

assigned Denise an income of $14,248 based on annual earnings at minimum 

wage. The recommendation did not provide the reasons for assigning Denise this 

income amount. Indeed, the recommendation provided little information about the 

 

1

 The record does not contain any filings between the resolution of the matters involved with the divorce in 

October 1996 and the notice of CSEA review completed in January 2009. 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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circumstances and facts warranting the increase and the method for calculating the 

revised support. Nevertheless, CSEA proposed that the current support order 

should be increased to $758.68 per month when health insurance is being provided 

by Michael or $782.50 per month plus an additional $139.17 per month for cash 

medical support when insurance is not being provided. CSEA submitted these 

recommendations to the Putnam County Court of Common Pleas for review to 

determine whether the proposed revisions for support were appropriate. 

{¶4} On May 12, 2009, the court conducted a hearing to review the 

revised child-support order. Present in court were the director and the attorney for 

the CSEA, Denise, who was not represented by legal counsel, and Michael’s 

attorney. The only evidence offered at the hearing was Denise’s testimony. While 

on the stand, Denise stated that prior to leaving her job in November 2008, she 

worked at Procter and Gamble for 111⁄2 years. She provided earnings statements 

for 4 of those 11 years that stated that Denise earned an annual salary of 

approximately $50,000. She did not provide any financial information about her 

income for the other 71⁄2 years of employment. In addition, Denise also testified to 

the personal reasons leading to her decision to voluntarily leave her job. 

{¶5} Based on Denise’s testimony, the trial court summarily adopted 

CSEA’s recommendations finding its proposals to be “appropriate” and 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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“reasonable under the circumstances” and thereby ordered Michael to begin 

paying the revised amount of child support. 

{¶6} Michael now appeals, asserting one assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The trial court abused its discretion by not imputing the appellee’s 

previous income when calculating child support since the appellee 

voluntarily left her job in November of 2008. 

{¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Michael alleges that the trial court 

erred in adopting CSEA’s recommendation because it imputed Denise’s annual 

income at the minimum-wage level instead of imputing income based on the 

actual salary she earned from her previous employment. Specifically, Michael 

alleges that the trial court provided no explanation for a decision that ignored the 

evidence of actual income and instead imputed a minimum-wage income, which is 

supported by nothing in the record. 

{¶8} An appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination of the 

amount of income to be imputed in a child-support order under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Rock v. Cabral (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 616 N.E.2d 218, 

syllabus. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, 

arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 

219, 450 N.E.2d 1140. 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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{¶9} The calculation of child support is governed by R.C. Chapter 3119. 

Pursuant to R.C. 3119.02, a court or child-support-enforcement agency must 

calculate the amount of a child-support obligation according to the schedules and 

worksheets provided in R.C. 3119.02 to 3119.24. The applicable worksheet for 

this case is found in R.C. 3119.022 entitled “Child Support Computation 

Worksheet for Sole Residential Parent or Shared Parenting Order” because Denise 

is the sole residential custodian of the parties’ children. 

{¶10} In the instant case, CSEA completed and calculated the appropriate 

worksheet. The first section of the worksheet requires information regarding the 

income of both parents. This section directs the agency to assess the “[a]nnual 

income from employment or, when determined appropriate by the court or agency, 

average annual gross income from employment over a reasonable period of years.” 

R.C. 3119.022. Since Michael is employed, CSEA entered his gross annual 

income, a figure that the parties agree is accurate. However, CSEA merely 

entered $14,248 as Denise’s income, a figure that is the subject of this appeal. 

Upon completing the remainder of the worksheet, CSEA attached it to a notice to 

the trial court of CSEA’s review. Neither the worksheet nor CSEA’s notice of 

review provided any further information to indicate how or why CSEA arrived at 

this amount for Denise’s income. 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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{¶11} At the subsequent court hearing on May 12, 2009, regarding the 

CSEA order, Michael objected to the amount of $14,248 assigned as Denise’s 

imputed income, when the only evidence in the case reflected a three-year income 

for Denise of over $50,000. Although not explicitly stated, we can glean from the 

record that CSEA and the trial court determined Denise to be voluntarily 

unemployed. This is significant because before a trial court may impute income to 

a parent, it must first determine that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 

underemployed. Moore v. Moore (2008), 175 Ohio App.3d 1, 884 N.E.2d 1113, ¶ 

63, citing Rock v. Cabral (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 616 N.E.2d 218, syllabus. 

While the trial court does not specifically address this finding in its judgment 

entry, it can be inferred from Denise’s testimony that both the trial court and 

CSEA found Denise voluntarily unemployed. 

{¶12} Denise testified that she voluntarily left her job in November 2008, 

citing several personal reasons. One of the reasons given for her departure was 

recent surgery performed on her knees to correct a previous injury. Although 

Denise claimed that her occupation aggravated this injury because she had to 

remain standing during her 121⁄2 hour shift, the doctor who performed the surgery 

permitted her to return to her job after the operation.2

 Denise testified that her 

 

2

 At the hearing, Denise also stated that her job interfered with the care of her youngest son, from her 

second marriage, who required extra attention because he suffered from multiple severe allergies. 

According to Denise, this was a major reason for her leaving her job, in addition to the nature of the 

occupation aggravating her knee injury. 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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doctor ordered her not to work for only a short period after her surgery to allow for 

recovery. Additionally, when questioned whether her employer asked her to 

leave, Denise responded “absolutely not.” Based on this testimony, it is apparent 

that the trial court and CSEA found Denise voluntarily unemployed. 

{¶13} Upon making this determination, CSEA and the trial court were 

required to impute Denise’s potential income on the child-support-order worksheet 

in compliance with R.C. 3119.01(C)(11)(a), which states: 

“Potential income” means * * * the following for a parent who the 

court pursuant to a court order, or a child support enforcement 

agency pursuant to an administrative child support order, determines 

is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed: 

(a) Imputed income that the court or agency determines the parent 

would have earned if fully employed as determined from the 

following criteria: 

(i) The parent’s prior employment experience; 

(ii) The parent’s education; 

(iii) The parent’s physical and mental abilities, if any; 

(iv) The availability of employment in the geographic area in which 

the parent resides; 

(v) The prevailing wage and salary levels in the geographic area in 

which the parent resides; 

(vi) The parent’s special skills and training; 

(vii) Whether there is evidence that the parent has the ability to earn 

the imputed income; 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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(viii) The age and special needs of the child for whom child support 

is being calculated under this section; 

(ix) The parent’s increased earning capacity because of experience; 

(x) Any other relevant factor. 

{¶14} Denise’s imputed income of $14,248 was apparently based on 

annual earnings at minimum wage. At the hearing, Denise questioned why 

minimum-wage income was imputed to her, since she was unemployed. In 

response, the court explained to her that the reason this amount was imputed was 

because she had previously been employed and despite being unemployed, was 

still able to work. However, prior to this cursory explanation, Denise offered only 

limited evidence of her prior employment income. She testified that before 

leaving her job with Procter and Gamble in November 2008, she had been 

employed there for 111⁄2 years. However, she presented specific evidence of her 

annual income earned only during 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. 

{¶15} During these years, Denise worked as a technician. In this capacity, 

she operated and maintained heavy machinery used to dispense and bottle liquid 

laundry detergent. She testified that her annual salary was “plus or minus $50,000 

a year,” depending on the amount of mandatory overtime she accrued. Thus, 

according to her testimony, she earned $54,475 in 2005; $5,000 in 2006; $50,312 

in 2007, and she estimated that she earned the same amount in 2008 as she had in 

2007. 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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{¶16} Denise further explained the discrepancy in her 2006 income. 

During that year she gave birth to her youngest child, whom she conceived with 

her current husband, Alan Wayne Rachesky. Denise’s employer granted an 

unpaid leave of absence to employees who decided to stay home with their 

newborns until they reached one year old. Thus, she only earned a minimal 

amount for the limited time she worked in 2006. However, upon her return, 

Denise continued to make her previous salary of approximately $50,000 a year. 

Moreover, she testified that had she continued to be employed as a technician her 

salary would have remained the same. 

{¶17} Previously, this court has stated that the trial court (and CSEA) are 

required to consider the statutory factors mentioned above when imputing income 

under R.C. 3119.01. Long v. Long, 162 Ohio App.3d 422, 2005-Ohio-4052, 833 

N.E.2d 809, ¶ 15-16. The purpose for using these factors is to closely approximate 

a parent’s potential earning capacity when the parent is voluntarily unemployed. 

{¶18} Denise’s testimony demonstrates ample evidence of her prior 

employment experience, one of the statutory factors. However, the only evidence 

we have of her prior employment income is her position as a line technician 

earning around $50,000 annually for the three years discussed previously. In 

addition, her testimony also revealed evidence that she has the present ability to 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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earn more than the imputed income of minimum wage, another statutory 

consideration. 

{¶19} In sum, there is no other evidence in the record as to her earning 

levels during the remaining 71⁄2 years of employment. As a result, the only 

evidence offered at the hearing supported imputing to Denise an income at or 

around the level of her earnings of $50,000 per year prior to leaving her job in 

November 2008. Moreover, on this evidence, there is nothing in the record to 

indicate why CSEA and the trial court found it appropriate to impute Denise’s 

annual earnings at $14,248 in light of the factors expressly provided in R.C. 

3119.01. 

{¶20} In the absence of any explanation in the record for imputing 

Denise’s income at the minimum-wage level of $14,248 rather than imputing her 

income consistently with the statutory factors listed in R.C. 3119.01—and 

consistently with the only evidence in the record showing an income of over 

$50,000—we have no choice but to find the trial court’s approval of CSEA’s order 

imputing an income of $14,248 to Denise to be an abuse of discretion. 

{¶21} For all these reasons, the assignment of error is sustained. 

Accordingly, the decision of the Putnam County Court of Common Pleas is 

reversed and this cause is remanded for further consideration consistent with this 

opinion. 
Case No. 12-09-04 

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Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

 PRESTON, P.J., and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.