U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGULATORY GUIDE 

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH 

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.63 

(Task SG 1264) 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR TRANSIENT SHIPMENTS

A. INTRODUCTION 

Section 70.20b of 10 CFR Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," provides for general licensing of any person to possess transient shipments of formula 

quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).* A transient shipment is a shipment of nuclear material 

originating and terminating in foreign countries on a vessel 

or aircraft that stops at a United States port. Persons 

carrying transient shipments are required under the general license to provide physical protection, including the use of 

armed guards, for transient shipments while the shipment remains in a U.S. port. The physical protection system provided must be in accordance with or equivalent to that 

required for U.S. domestic shipments of formula quantities of SSNM under the applicable provisions of paragraphs 73.20(a) and (b) and § 73.25 of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." 

A general licensee for a transient shipment (e.g., a carrier) is not required to submit applications or security plans for prior approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Com

mission (NRC) as are licensees for domestic shipments of 

formula quantities of SSNM. However, the licensee is required to prepare such plans and to implement them 

during stops at U.S. ports. 

This guide describes measures acceptable to the NRC 

staff that can be taken by the licensee to provide the 

physical protection for scheduled and unscheduled tran

sient shipments required by 10 CFR Part 70. 

*"Formule quantity" means strategic special nuclear material In 

=r.n•rm.contained n uant5y of 5,000 grams ormore computed by the formula Inrans U-.235) + 2.5(grams U-233 + inams pluto urm). "Strategic special nuce4a material" means uranium-235 (contained In uranium enriched to 20 percent or more In the U-23S Isotope), uranium-233., or plutonium.

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES 

Regulatory Guides are Issued to descilbe and make available to the Public methods acceptable to the NRC staff of implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech niques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postu lated accidents or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory Guides are nob substitutes for regulations, and compliance with hem Is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set ut In the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the +/indings requisite to the Issuance oy continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. 

This guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from the public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these guides are encouraged at all tImes, and guides will be revised, as aPpropriate. to accommodate comments and to reflect new Informa tion or experience.

B. DISCUSSION 

1. BACKGROUND 

General licensees under § 70.20b of 10 CFR Part 70 are required to provide physical protection for transient 

shipments of formula quantities of SSNM in accordance 

with or equivalent to the physical protection requirements 

for similar types and quantities of material in domestic 

shipments. These requirements are stated in 10 CFR 

Part 73 in terms of general performance objective and 

requirements [paragraphs 73.20(a) and (b)] and perform ance capabilities [§ 73.25]. 

The general performance objective and requirements 

indicate the level of protection to be provided by the 

licensee's physical protection system relative to the design 

basis threat (defined in § 73.1). The performance capabil

ities define in a systematic way the capabilities the physical 

protection system must have in order to meet the general 

performance requirements. In addition, § 73.26 describes a "reference system" containing brief descriptions of 

systems, subsystems, and procedures the NRC believes 

would generally be part of a physical protection system 

that achieves the objective and meets the requirements of 

§ § 73.20 and 73.25 for domestic shipments. However, the 

reference system does not necessarily describe a complete 

system that would meet all the physical protection require

ments for U.S. domestic or transient shipments. Additional or alternative measures may be needed depending on the 

particular circumstances under which protection is to be 

provided. 

The level of protection to be provided would be equiva

lent to that afforded formula quantities of SSNMin domestic 

shipments but may differ in detail depending on the circum

stances peculiar to a given transient shipment. That is, the 

physical protection afforded a transient shipment would 

have to satisfy the general performance objective and

Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, 

Attention: 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Docketing and Service Branch. 

The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions: 

1. Power Reactors 6. Products 2. Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation 3. Fuels and Materials Facilities 6. Occupational Health 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General 

Copies of Issued guides may be purchased at the current Government Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spe cific divisions Is available through the Government Printing Office. Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may be 

Washington, 

obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, D.C. 20555, Attention. Publications Saies Manager.

July 1982
requirements of paragraphs 73.20(a) and (b) and the 

performance capability requirements of § 73.25 but may 

be less complex because (1) the stopover times for transient 

shipments are short, (2) there is no need to offload the 

shipment from the transport, and (3) the number of persons, 

if any, required to have access to the shipment is limited. 

2. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR MEETING 

REQUIREMENTS 

General licensees for transient shipments of formula 

quantities of strategic special nuclear material may meet the 

physical protection requirements for such shipments in one 

of two ways: 

1. The licensee may contract for physical protection 

services from a person (or organization) already authorized 

by the NRC to protect formula quantities of SSNM in 

transit, or 

2. The licensee may undertake to directly provide the 

required physical protection in accordance with the provi

sions of the general performance requirements and per

formance capabilities of § § 73.20 and 73.25. 

3. PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN 

A physical protection plan in written form is required to 

be followed in providing physical protection for the tran

sient shipment. Although this plan does not have to be 

approved by the NRC in advance of the shipment, it must 

be provided along with the written notification to the NRC 

staff required by paragraph 70.20b(d) before the shipment 

first arrives in a U.S. port. 

In the case of unscheduled transient shipments, i.e., 

those resulting from exigent circumstances or route or 

schedule changes that require stops at U.S. ports not on the 

transport's itinerary at the time the SSNM was loaded 

aboard, the licensee may not have the same opportunity for 

advance planning as in the case of scheduled shipments, 

However, the licensee is required to notify the NRC and 

begin making physical protection arrangements immediately 

after the decision is made to stop at the U.S. port. Although 

at the time SSNM is loaded aboard an aircraft or vessel 

carriers may not intend to stop at a U.S. port, the knowl

edge (1) that they are carrying SSNM in formula quantity 

and (2) that their itinerary brings them through or near 

U.S. territory (i.e., territorial waters or air space) should 

prompt them to do the necessary preplanning and make 

appropriate prearrangements to meet the NRC's physical 

protection requirements should a stop at a U.S. port 

become necessary. 

When NRC officials are notified of or discover an 

impending transient shipment of a formula quantity, they 

will make preparations to inspect the carrier's physical 

protection system for the shipment while it is in port to 

ensure its adequacy or to take emergency measures if the 

required level of protection is not provided. The authority 

to make such inspections is provided for in 10 CFR Part 70.

The regulatory position of this guide describes the 

measures that may be employed in meeting the physical 

protection requirements for transient shipments. Sections 

I through 7 apply equally to scheduled and unscheduled 

transient shipments. Section 8 discusses the special con

siderations applicable. to the physical protection require- K 

ments for unscheduled transient shipments and notes 

exceptions and alternative procedures for meeting such 

requirements. Sections 1 through 7 provide an outline 

acceptable to the NRC staff for use by the licensee in 

developing the required physical protection plan, although 

no specific format is required for such plans. 

The bracketed references following each heading in the 

regulatory position denote the portions of the regulation 

applicable to the physical protection measures discussed 

under that heading. 

4. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF 

PLANS AND NOTICES 

The NRC has determined that the details of physical 

protection plans and programs submitted to the Commis

sion should be withheld from public disclosure by the NRC 

pursuant to Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, as amended. In addition, certain elements of such 

plans and programs and of the notices given the NRC in 

accordance with paragraph 70.20b(d) of 10 CFR Part 70 

may be considered classified as Confidential National 

Security Information (CNSI) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 95 

(published in the Federal Register on March 5, 1980, 

at 45 FR 14483). Any physical protection plans or pro

grams prepared and maintained by carriers operating in the• 

United States or their agents toisatisfy the physical protec-'%.. 

tion requirements of the NRC for transient shipments and 

the notifications given by such persons to the NRC in 

accordance with paragraph 70.20b(d) are considered 

classified and should be appropriately marked and handled 

accordingly (see § 95.39). However, similar types of 

information generated by persons outside the United States 

are not considered to be national security information if 

such information is not under the control of the United 

States Government. It is expected that the persons who 

generate such information will in their self-interest protect 

it from unauthorized access and public disclosure to the 

extent practicable. Detailed guidance regarding the elements 

of plans that are considered classified can be found in 

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 95. Part 95 contains informa

tion on the proper handling and transmittal of classified 

information. 

The following elements of the information required to 

be provided the NRC in the notification of a transient 

shipment are considered classified as CNSI: 

1. Location of scheduled stops in U.S. territory. 

2. Arrival and departure times for scheduled stops. 

3. Details as to the type and quantity of special nuclear 

material contained in the shipment.

5.63-2
4. The numbers of guards who will protect the shipment. 

5. Contingency plans for the response of security forces. 

Most of this information is considered declassified when 

> it becomes operational. More details on the conditions 

under which this information may be declassified may be 

found in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 95. 

Arrangements can be made on a case-by-case basis to 

coordinate the protection of safeguards-sensitive informa

tion regarding a transient shipment by contacting the 

Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

and Safeguards, at the NRC headquarters in Washington, 

D.C. This contact can be made through the appropriate 

NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73. 

C. REGULATORY POSITION 

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 

1.1 Purpose and Scope 

The licensee physical protection plan is required to ensure that the licensee has done sufficient planning to 

physically protect transient shipments of formula quantities 

of strategic special nuclear material according to the require

ments of the applicable regulations (i.e., § 70.20b, para

graphs 73.20(a) and (b), and § 73.25 of 10 CFR Parts 70 

and 73). The plan should be available to the licensee's 

personnel for reference purposes when implementation 

> becomes necessary. 

A transient shipment is defined in paragraph 70.4(v) as a shipment of nuclear material originating and terminating in 

foreign countries, on a vessel or aircraft which stops at a U.S. port. The term "U.S. port" is intended to include all 

ports of entry that carriers would normally use in making 

such shipments but in unusual circumstances would also 

include the first landfall in U.S. jurisdiction, U.S. territories 

included, regardless of the transport mode or location. It is 

the carrier's responsibility to determine whether the amounts 

of SSNM being carried constitute a formula quantity, and if 

so, to provide the physical protection required by para

graph 70.20b(c) and the notification to NRC required by 

paragraph 70.20b(d). 

The general license issued pursuant to. § 70.20b for 

transient shipments of formula quantities of SSNM is 

effective from the time the shipment enters a U.S. port 

until the time the shipment exits that port. The planning 

and notification requirements obviously must be accom plished prior to the time the physical protection require

ments of the general license become effective. Specific 

considerations related to meeting the physical protection 

requirements for unscheduled transient shipments of 

formula quantities of SSNM are presented in Section 8.

1.2 Contingency Plans [Paragraphs 73.25(dXlXil) 

and (111)] 

Safeguards contingency plans for transient shipments are 

not required to be submitted for approval in advance of 

shipments as they are for domestic shipments of formula 

quantities of SSNM. Contingency plans for transient ship

ments should be an integral part of the physical protection 

plan provided by the licensee. A typical transient shipment 

is likely to remain in port for a limited time, from several 

hours to several days, considerably reducing the complexity 

of the contingency plans needed to satisfy the requirements 

of the regulation (compared with plans required for domestic 

road or multimode shipments that could involve several 

different local law enforcement jurisdictions and changing 

environments as the shipments move from one location to 

another along the planned routes). Contingency plans for 

domestic shipments are c&scussed in detail in Regulatory 

Guide 5.56, "Standard Format and Content of Safeguards 

Contingency Plans for Transportation." 

Contingency plans for transient shipments are expected to include the following basic features and items ofinformation: 

1. Scope - A determination and identification of the 

types of safeguards-related incidents covered and not 

covered in the contingency plan. (For example, the plan 

may be designed to respond to armed attacks by small 

groups but not to armed insurrections.) 

2. Trigger Events - Those events that will be used to 

signal the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contin

gency according to how they are perceived initially by 

licensee personnel (e.g., discovery of a damaged SSNM 

container or broken seal, receipt of a written or telephoned 

threat against the shipment, discovery of attempted sabo

tage of the shipment). 

3. Responses and Objectives - The actions that will be 

taken by licensee personnel in response to each of the 

trigger events and the objectives to be accomplished by 

each of the proposed actions. The persons within licensee 

management or the licensee security organization who will 

perform the response actions should also be specified. 

4. Law Enforcement Assistance - A listing of the avail

able local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) for the U.S. 

ports at which the shipment will stop, and the methods 

arranged to communicate with them in the event their 

assistance is needed. 

5. Other Considerations - Such items as constraints 

imposed upon security organization members (i.e., guards) 

by local and State laws, company policies and practices, 

and other factors, especially those relating to the use of 

deadly force.

5.63-3
1.3 Security Organization Training, Equipment, and 

Qualification [Paragraphs 73.25(dXIXi), (iv), and (v)] 

Normally, seven armed personnel should be provided to 

protect a transient shipment stopped at a U.S. airport, 

while at least two armed individuals should be provided to 

protect a transient shipment .on a vessel (not offloaded). 

This i consistent with the provisions d paragraphs 73.26()( 3 ) 

and (IX4). 

Personnel selected to be members of the licensee's 

security organization entrusted with the physical protection 

of a transient shipment are required to be appropriately 

trained and qualified to perform all the tasks to which they 

are assigned. This includes being qualified and appropriately 

licensed by the local jurisdiction to use the weapons assigned 

them and being sufficiently flbent in English to ensure 

rapid and clear communications with the LLEA for pur

poses of requesting assistance from and coordinating with 

the LLEA response forces. Firearms, communications 

devices, and other equipment must be in good operating 

condition. To ensure that all security organization per

sonnel and armed response personnel are properly trained 

and qualified, the licensee may arrange for the employment 

of such personnel in one of three ways: 

1. Use of LLEA personnel. Such personnel may be 

presumed to be properly qualified with the weapons 

assigned to them while on official duty and to have the 

skills necessary to perform guard duties. LLEA personnel 

may be used while functioning in their official capacity, or 

they may be privately employed while off duty, depending 

on local regulations governing such employment and the 

willingness of the LLEA to provide temporary guard 

services. 

2. Use of private guards provided by an organization 

licensed or approved by the NRC to provide physical 

protection of SSNM (such as for another NRC licensee). 

3. Use of private guards who have been trained and 

qualified by the licensee, its U.S. agent, or other organiza

tion and have been determined by the licensee to be prepared 

to perform the tasks assigned them according to the licensee's 

written physical protection plan. 

Foreign nationals who accompany a transient shipment 

into port as escorts for physical protection purposes may be 

considered to make up a portion of the guard force required 

for protection of the shipment while in the U.S. port. 

However, several considerations apply particularly in this 

case to ensure that such personnel are not unduly limited in 

the extent to which they are able to contribute effectively 

to the protection of the shipment. It should be ensured 

that language difficulties and lack of familiarity with local 

communications systems do not prevent their communicat

ing rapidly and effectively with local law enforcement 

agencies or with other members of the guard force recruited 

locally. Efforts should be made to secure weapons permits 

in advance allowing them to legally carry weapons in the 

jurisdiction in which the port is located. In most local 

jurisdictions, these individuals may not legally carry their

firearms off the plane or vessel without such permits. 

Inclusion of foreign nationals under a common command 

with other guards of local origin may hinder effective 

command and control of the guard force unless appropriate 

measures are taken to properly integrate the foreign nationals 

into the guard force.

Whether foreign nationals are utilized or not, the licensee 

should be prepared to demonstrate that persons employed 

to protect the shipment meet training and qualification 

requirements equivalent to the portions of Appendix B 

to 10 CFR Part 73 relevant to their assigned duties and that 

they can function effectively together to satisfy the general 

performance requirements and performance capabilities of 

§ § 73.20 and 73.25. Although there is no requirement 

under the general license to obtain advance approval from 

the NRC regarding the adequacy of the training and qualifi

cations of guard force members, the licensee should be 

prepared to demonstrate such adequacy through appro

priate documentation upon request by the NRC inspector 

assigned to the shipment. 

1.4 Security Management [Paragraph 73.25(dXlXi)] 

The plan should indicate the personnel (either by name 

or by position title) responsible for the physical protection 

of the transient shipment while the general license is in 

effect, including the chain of command, if applicable. 

1.5 Testing and Maintenance Program 

[Paragraph 73.20(bX3)] 

Paragraph 73.20(bX3) requires testing and maintenance 

of the physical protection system's components and proce

dures. This requirement covers all activities and devices on 

which the licensee's physical protection system depends to 

maintain shipment security. Its purpose is to ensure the 

continued availability of each component of the physical 

protection system. Since the physical protection system 

for transient shipments will normally be personnel oriented, 

the testing and maintenance activity for such systems will 

consist mainly of ensuring that procedures are understand

able and workable by the personnel involved in implement

ing them. The licensee should ensure that all equipment, 

including communications devices and weapons, is in good 

working order. If equipment and armed personnel are 

provided the carrier by another organization, the licensee 

should obtain assurances from that organization that such 

equipment is in proper operating condition at the time 

these services are provided and the personnel provided are 

trained and qualified. The licensee should also make 

certain from time to time that the arrangements made and 

the procedures provided for in the plan are current and 

remain practicable and applicable to the conditions antici

pated in future transient shipments. 

1.6 Security Records [Paragraph 73.70(g)] 

The types of records that must be kept are identified in 

paragraph-73.70(g). They include the names and addresses 

of persons authorized access to the SSNM while it is in 

port, documentation of security tours and inspections of

5.634

K
cne area containing the SSNM, and any other information 

obtained relating to the security of the shipment during the 

period of time the general license is in effect. 

1.7 Reports to NRC [§ 73.711 

Section 73.71 requires that the NRC be made aware of 

any security-related incidents that occur during the period 

of the general license. The plan may specify procedures for 

reporting security incidents to the NRC when NRC inspec

tors are not present on the scene. When NRC inspec

tors are present, this requirement is satisfied by communi

cating such incidents directly to them. 

1.8 Redundancy and Diversity [Paragraphs 73.20(bX2) 

and 73.25(dX4)] 

The physical protection system is required to be designed 

with redundant and diverse measures. Redundancy means 

providing two or more measures that perform the same 

function. This would prevent failure of the entire system 

should there be a failure of one or more key system elements. 

Diversity means providing several types of measures that 

contribute to the performance of a particular security 

function. If these measures have a common purpose but 

different performance characteristics (e.g., sensitivities, 

failure modes, strengths, weaknesses), the system may be 

able to continue functioning adequately despite particular 

adverse operational conditions or an attempt to exploit a 

particular component's performance characteristics. 

> Since the physical protection system for a transient 

shipment is generally expected to be less hardware oriented 

than that for a U.S. domestic shipment, the means of 

ensuring redundancy in the system will be less involved. 

Licensees may focus their efforts at ensuring redundancy 

and diversity in the system by primarily addressing the 

communications functions and firearms capabilities. This 

may be done in several different ways. 

Alternative communications capabilities should be 

provided so that more than one person can contact the 

LLEA to request assistance, and the communications 

equipment should be of different types in case one type 

becomes inoperable as a result of equipment failure, adverse 

broadcast conditions or jamming, or injury to one of the 

guards. Also, the means provided for alternative communi

cations should be physically separated so that it would be 

unlikely that an adversary force would be able to destroy 

both capabilities for contacting the LLEA in a single attack. 

A single guard who is isolated from other guards should be 

equipped with a personal duress alarm that annunciates at a 

location occupied by other guards. 

Guards should have shotguns and rifles available for use, 

as well as individual handguns, to ensure that they will be 

able to respond effectively to adversaries attacking from 

.either short or long range.

1.9 Notification [Paragraph 70.20b(d)]

Carriers of transient shipments planning to make sche

duled stops at U.S. ports are required to notify the NRC of 

their plans to do so prior to the arrival of the shipment. 

The notification should be sent by U.S. Mail to be received 

by the NRC at least 7 calendar days before the first sched

uled stop in the United States. The notifications should 

be addressed to the Director of the appropriate Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement 

Regional Office listed in Appendix A to Part 73. This same 

office must be notified by telephone 7 calendar days in 

advance of the first scheduled stop at a U.S. port to inform 

the NRC that a shipping notice has been sent by mail 

and whether any changes have been made in the shipment's 

U.S. itinerary relative to the information contained in the 

mailed notification. 

The licensee should take steps to ensure the confi

dentiality of the itinerary information and other informa

tion contained in the written notification since such informa

tion could be used to assist in planning a theft or diversion 

attempt. In the case of domestic licensees or others who 

generate such information under the jurisdiction of the 

United States Government, the notification may come under 

the requirements of 10 CFR Part 95, which require that it 

be handled according to specific procedures designed to 

protect it as Confidential National Security Information 

(CNSI). 

The notification is required to include the following 

information: 

1. Location of all scheduled stops in U.S. territory. 

2. Arrival and departure times for all scheduled stops in 

U.S. territory. 

3. A description of the transport vehicle (ship or air

craft) used for the transient shipment. This would include 

additional transport vehicles to be used if transshipment 

(transfer of the SSNM to another transport vehicle) is 

contemplated. The description should be given in sufficient 

detail to allow the NRC to unambiguously identify the 

transport vehicle for purposes of inspection when the 

shipment arrives in port. 

4. A description of the nuclear materials in the ship

ment (elements, isotopes, enrichments, etc..). 

5. The number and types of containers of SSNM. 

6. The name and telephone number of the carrier's 

representative in the U.S. at each location in U.S. territory 

at which a scheduled stop will be made. If the carrier does 

not have a regular U.S. representative at a given U.S. port 

facility, he may name such a representative after making 

temporary arrangements with the representative for another 

carrier, or he may indicate that no U.S. representative has 

been designated.

5.63-5
7. A physical protection plan for implementing the 

requirements of paragraph 70.20b(c). The plan is required 

to include the use of armed personnel to protect the 

shipment during stops made at U.S. ports. This plan may 

be provided in one of two ways: 

a. The plan may be included in full with other 

information required to be included in the 7-day notifica

tion, or 

b. The carrier may refer the NRC to a physical secu

rity plan already submitted to the NRC by another licensee 

or by the same licensee for a previous shipment. The licensee 

may intend to implement this plan directly or arrange for 

another organization to use the plan to protect the transient 

shipment. When a previously submitted plan is to be used, 

the carrier should ensure that the plan is specific to each 

U.S. port at which a stop is to be made or should submit 

additional information to indicate how the plan is to be 

adapted to any other port at which a stop is to be made. 

If U.S. Mail service is not directly available to the 

licensee, the licensee should use other means to ensure that 

the written notification will be received by the NRC at least 

7 days prior to the first scheduled stop of the transient 

shipment within the United States. 

The licensee is also required to place a followup call to 

the same NRC regional office to confirm that the required 

notification information has been received in accordance 

with the 7-day notification requirement. 

2. SHIPMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL 

2.1 Preplanning of Shipment Itineraries 

[Paragraph 73.25(b)(IXi)] 

It is recognized that, in the case of transient shipments, 

physical security objectives may not be the determining 

factor in the planning of the itinerary of the transport carry

ing the shipment. Also, the time may often be too short 

for carriers to make changes to accommodate such objec

tives and still meet their contractual commitments to other 

shippers. However, sufficient planning could be done in 

advance to ensure that all NRC physical protection require

ments can be met when a transient shipment is planned. 

Carrier's agents at U.S. ports should be informed of the 

NRC requirements so that they can make the necessary 

advance generic arrangements for the LLEA and private 

guard organizations to be available as needed. These 

arrangements and the plan for physical protection could be 

used by more than one carrier in case an agent represents 

numerous carriers. 

Physical protection plans should be made as uncompli

cated as possible to accommodate the necessity for using 

guard personnel who may have little familiarity with special 

procedures for protecting SSNM. This can be done by pro

hibiting offloading of the SSNM from the transport unless 

absolutely necessary, arranging to isolate the transport or 

shipment as much as possible from other transports, vehicles,

and personnel (e.g., parking an aircraft at an isolatet 

location on the airfield away from the passenger and freight 

terminals), and taking steps to facilitate the timely perform

ance of any functions (e.g., repairs) that necessitated the 

stopover (to minimize the time spent in port). 

An important part of the planning process is the arrange

ment made with the LLEA. Policies of these agencies differ 

with regard to the degree of involvement to which they are 

willing to commit themselves in the event of a transient ship

ment. The extent of potential LLEA involvement should be 

determined in advance, and the physical protection system 

designed to ensure that an adequate level of protection is 

provided. Where standing arrangements are in effect, previous 

arrangements with the LLEA should be reconfirmed just 

prior to a planned shipment's arrival to take account of any 

intervening changes in circumstances at a given port facility. 

As part of the preplanning for transient shipments, a dia

gram of the important features of particular port facilities 

may be provided in the physical protection plan to facilitate 

implementation of the plan by the carrier's personnel or 

others. 

3. DETECTION AND DELAY OF UNAUTHORIZED 

ACCESS OR MATERIALS INTRODUCTION BY 

STEALTH OR FORCE* 

3.1 Establishment of Controlled Access Areas** 

[Paragraph 73.25(bX2)] 

Paragraph 73.25(b)(2) requires that controlled access 

areas be established surrounding the SSNM or its transport 

to isolate the SSNM and decrease the number of persons, 

materials, equipment, and vehicles allowed to come in 

contact with the transport or the SSNM. 

Controlled access areas must have some means of demar

cating the restricted area's boundaries that is clear to 

both authorized and unauthorized personnel. 

There must be some way of controlling access to the 

area at all times to ensure that unauthorized persons are not 

admitted. Aircraft and seagoing vessels that enter U.S. port 

facilities need not be protected while they are in motion if 

it is determined that the SSNM on board is not accessible to 

unauthorized personnel during such motion. Thus, in most 

instances, armed response personnel will be required to 

protect the SSNM only from the moment the transport 

comes to rest within the port until it starts on its way out 

of the port (see Section 8 regarding unscheduled transient 

shipments). This greatly simplifies the physical protec

tion system for transient shipments that use U.S. ports in 

"*"Stealth" means methods used to attempt to gain unauthorized 

access, introduce unauthorized materials, or remove SSNM where 

the fact of such attempt Is concealed or an attempt is made to 

conceal it. "Force" means violent methods usedby an adversary to 

attempt to steal SSNM or sabotage a nuclear facility, or violent 

methods used by response personnel to protect against such 

adversary actions. 

**"Controlled access area" means any temporarily or permanently 

established clearly demarcated area access to which is controlled and 

that affords Isolation of the material, equipment, or persons within 

it.

5.63-6

K
comparison with the protection for domestic shipments 

(i.e., those that originate or terminate within United States 

territory). The physical protection plan should recognize, 

however, that the cargo compartment containing the SSNM, 

or the SSNM itself, should be placed under immediate sur

veillance as soon as the transport comes to rest in port to 

ensure that the SSNM remains inaccessible to unauthor

ized personnel. Airport ground crews, warehousemen, 

dockworkers, and other personnel should not be permitted 

to approach the transport or its cargo compartment unless 

surveillance is provided in accordance with § 73.25. 

The plan should describe the approximate dimensions of 

the controlled access area that would be established relative 

to the transport of SSNM and the means that would be 

used for its demarcation. 

It should also indicate how attempts to penetrate the 

controlled access area without authorization will be detected, 

assessed, and communicated to ensure a response capable of 

preventing unauthorized removal of the SSNM. Procedures 

for accomplishing these tasks should be related to the 

response functions and communications capabilities de

scribed elsewhere in the plan. The plan should also detail 

the procedures that will be used to establish a controlled 

access area. Specific suggestions regarding measures to 

establish a controlled access area may be found in the 

reference system for U.S. domestic shipments [Para

graphs 73.26(fX2), (i)(7), (jX3), (kXl), and (1X3)]. 

3.2 Transport Features To Delay Access 

> [Paragraph 73.25(cX2Xi)] 

The requirement for a transport to have features that 

delay access to the SSNM will usually be satisfied, for 

transient shipments, by such physical barriers as locked 

cargo compartments. To the extent that the transport lacks 

delay.causing features (for example, during periods when 

the cargo compartment is opened for loading or unloading 

other cargo), the physical protection system must provide 

compensating features (for example, stationing guards at 

the entrance) to ensure that the general performance 

requirements of § 73.20 are satisfied. 

3.3 Access Detection for Transports 

[Paragraphs 73.25(cX2)(ii) and (iii)] 

The requirement for a capability to detect attempted 

penetrations of the transport containing the SSNM was 

intended to provide SSNM shipments with defense in depth

an added level of protection beyond that provided for by 

the controlled access area-which becomes especially 

important when many personnel must be allowed access 

into the controlled access area for servicing vehicles, hand

ling other cargo, etc. In the case of a transient shipment, 

there would generally be very few persons authorized to 

have access to the SSNM or the cargo compartment in 

which it is contained. The same guards who administer the 

controlled access area procedures could be used to keep the 

SSNM or the transport under surveillance to detect unauthor

ized attempts to gain access provided these two require

ments did not impose conflicting duties on a guard (e.g.,

having to focus attention on two different areas at the same 

time). 

Physical protection requirements for shipments of 

formula quantities of SSNM other than transient shipments 

include requirements for the emplacement and periodic 

inspection of tamper-indicating devices on transports and 

cargo containers. For transient shipments, carriers are not 

responsible for the emplacement of seals or other devices 

but are responsible for ensuring that the seals or other 

tamper4ndicating devices put in place by the shipper con

tinue to function during the period the general license is in 

effect. Seals are not specifically required by the NRC in 

the case of transient shipments but they may be employed 

by the shipper in accordance with requirements of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for shipments 

subject to IAEA safeguards. Paragraph 73.70(g) requires 

appropriate records to be kept of seal inspections during 

the time the transient shipment is in port. 

4. DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS OR 

MATERIALS INTRODUCTON BY DECEIT* 

4.1 Access Authorizations [Paragraphs 73.25(b)(3Xi) 

and (c)(IXi)] 

Access authorizations are required to determine the time 

and conditions of access for persons who are authorized to 

be admitted to a controlled access area or for introduction 

of materials, vehicles, or equipment into such areas. Access 

authorizations are also required for entry into the transport. 

In the case of a transient shipment, there are expected to be 

few authorizations necessary. The number of individuals 

authorized access to the SSNM should be miminized. 

By limiting the number of authorized persons, the author

ization subsystem may be kept relatively unsophisticated 

yet effective. 

Access authorizations would normally be provided in 

written form, naming the individual to be granted access or 

the item to be introduced. It would also detail the criteria 

for entry (e.g., time, place, circumstances) and specify the 

reasons for which access is granted (e.g., to perform service 

on the transport, to load or unload other cargo). Written 

authorizations may be obviated by implementing an escort 

procedure. Under this procedure, all persons requiring 

temporary access would be escorted by an armed guard 

during such access to ensure that only authorized activities 

are being performed. Section 73.70 requires that written 

records be kept to document each occasion on which 

temporary access is permitted. 

The physical protection plan may detail the procedures 

to be used by guards to determine which persons or mate

rials are authorized access to (1) a controlled access area or 

(2) the transport or the SSNM. 

"Deceit" means methods used to attempt to gain unauthorized 

access introduce unauthorized materials, or remove SSNM, where 

the aitempt involves falsification to present the appearance of 

authorized access.

5.63-7
4.2 Access Control at Entry Control Points 

[Paragraphs 73.25(bX3Xii) and (eXIXii)] 

Access control procedures are required to be imple mented to ensure that only authorized individuals are admitted to controlled access areas or given access to the 

transport or the SSNM. These procedures involve three 

distinct subfunctions: (1) identification, (2) verification of 

identification, and (3) assessment against authorizations. 

Where few persons or materials are expected to be allowed 

access, as in the case of most transient shipments, these 

subfunctions can be performed quite simply without resort 

to some of the more sophisticated access control hardware 

and procedures used at fixed-site facilities or for domestic 

road shipments. 

The main problem arising in providing physical protec

tion for a transient shipment will be to allow positive 

identification of the LLEA or other guard personnel who are actively involved in the implementation of the carrier's 

physical protection plan. The carrier's agent may also have 

to be positively identified. The plan should detail the means that will be used to identify these persons before the 

carrier permits them access to the transport or the SSNM. 

The carrier should be capable of immediately communicat

ing to the LLEA information concerning persons present ing themselves as contract guards, LLEA personnel, or other members of the security organization who are dis

covered to be impostors. 

Once the composition of the security organization is 

confirmed, these persons will assume the responsibility for 

further implementation of the physical protection system according to the licensee's physical protection plan. 

The means used to positively identify the members of 

the security organization who are to meet the shipment at 

the time it arrives in a U.S. port must be designed to limit 

the opportunity for successful use of false credentials or other deceitful actions. This would apply equally to other. 

persons who may be authorized access to controlled access areas or to the SSNM. 

S. PREVENTION OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF 

SSNM FROM TRANSPORTS BY DECEIT 

5.1 Authorization for Removal of SSNM from Transports 

[Paragraph 73.25(cX3)i)] 

Authorizations for removal of SSNM from a transport 

would follow the same pattern established for access authorizations. For transient shipments, removal of SSNM 

while in U.S. ports will normally not be necessary. However, 

if unscheduled removal of the SSNM from the transport 

becomes necessary as a result of some unusual circum

stance, removal authorizations would be determined on a contingent basis. The removal would be carried out under 

the direction of the carrier (or the person designated to assume responsibility for shipment) according to procedures detailed in the contingency plan. Removal procedures should be designed to ensure that no imminent or apparent 

threat exists to the safety of the shipment before the SSNM

is removed to a more vulnerable situation outside the 

transport. Additional guidance regarding acceptable 

procedures for removal of SSNM from the transport may be 

obtained from Regulatory Guide 5.57, "Shipping and 

Receiving Control of Special Nuclear Material." 

5.2 SSNM Removal Controls [Paragraphs 73.25(cX3Xii) 

and (iii)] 

Removal controls are procedures followed in removing 

SSNM from the transport in which it has been contained. 

They are required both for routine (planned) and emer gency situations and may include such activities as verifica

tion of the identities of persons performing the removal 

operation and persons to whom custody of the SSNM is to 

be transferred. The identity of the SSNM being removed 

and integrity of the containers and any seals are also items 

-to be verified. These procedures act as a filtering process to ensure that the proper conditions exist and appropriate 

personnel have been positively identified prior to the 

removal. Response measures to ensure that deceitful 

attempts at unauthorized removal of SSNM will be detected 

and communicated to responsible persons are intertwined 

with removal controls and may be described in the main 

body of the plan or referred to a more detailed description 

in the contingency plan. 

6. DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF 

SSNM FROM TRANSPORTS BY STEALTH OR FORCE 

6.1 Transport Features to Delay Removal 

[Paragraph 73.25(cX4Xi)] 

Transport features to delay unauthorized removal of 

SSNM from the transport by stealth or force should be 

considered an integral part of the physical protection 

system. When such features are designed into the transport, 

the physical protection system may take credit for the 

amount of delay provided by them. To the extent that the 

transport has features that provide for only a slight delay 

capability, other components of the physical protection 

system must be strengthened to compensate for the lack of 

sufficient delay afforded by the transport. The balancing 

of these delay and other factors (e.g., response time, size of 

guard force) is a matter of judgment by the licensee and 

ultimately the NRC inspection staff. The general guidance 

is that these factors must be balanced in such a way that 

general performance requirements of § 73.20 can be 

satisfied. 

Some transport features that delay access may also delay removal. Features that were not previously discussed as delaying access should be included in this part of the plan along with descriptions of those aspects of previously 

described features that help to delay removal as well. These 

features may include arrangements for securing the SSNM in 

the transport vehicle (e.g., securing heavy equipment neces sary for removal of the SSNM, binding together the indi

vidual packages of SSNM so as to make a one-step removal 

cumbersome, and binding the SSNM containers to the struc

ture of the transport). These features may or may not be K,. 

present on board the transport vehicle for a transient

5.63-8
shipment. In some cases, these features may be present for 

safety or other purposes rather than for physical protection 

purposes. To the extent that the physical protection 

system depends on such features to delay unauthorized 

removal, the licensee should describe which of these features 

are utilized on board the particular transport vehicle used 

for the subject transient shipment. If such features are not 

actually employed, the licensee should take action to 

employ them or take compensatory action to ensure 

satisfaction of the general performance requirements. 

6.2 Detection of SSNM Removal Attempts 

[Paragraph 73.25(cX4Xii)] 

Detection of SSNM removal attempts for transient 

shipments could be performed in most cases by the same 

personnel assigned to detect unauthorized access to the 

controlled access area, the transport, or the SSNM. The 

licensee should be careful to ensure that these duties, when 

assigned to particular guard personnel, are not in conflict 

with other duties assigned them. 

7. TRANSMISSION OF DETECTION, ASSESSMENT, 

AND OTHER SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION 

Various requirements for communications capabilities 

are described in the regulations relating to detection and 

assessment; requests for assistance from response forces or 

the LLEA are described earlier in this guide. The communi

cations capabilities described in this part of the plan would 

support the performance of these other physical protection .. ,functions. 

7.1 Communications Among Guard Force Personnel 

[Paragraph 73.25(dX2)(i)] 

A continuous communications capability is required 

between members of the transient shipment's guard force. 

This capability is needed for routine purposes as well as for 

implementation of emergency procedures detailed in the 

contingency plan. Communications could be conducted 

using citizens band hand-held transceivers or other similar 

equipment where face-to-face unassisted voice communica

tions are not practical. On board docked oceangoing 

vessels, the ship's hardwire communications system may be 

used, especially where metal shielding would not allow the 

use of transceivers. The communications function is an 

extremely important one with regard to the overall effec

tiveness of the physical protection system, so that its 

redundancy and diversity needs to be addressed. Trans

ceivers capable of using more than one channel should be 

utilized to ensure that some form of communications with 

the LLEA is possible at all times in the event of a safe

guards incident. Dividing the guard force into two or more 

different groups to ensure their survivability in case of a 

single attack has been suggested as one procedure to ensure 

that the communications function will be performed. (See 

Section C.1.8 of this guide.)

7.2 Communications Between Guard Force Commander 

and Security Control Center 

[Paragraph 73.2S(dX2Xii)] 

In the case of transient shipments, the requirement 

expressed in paragraph 73.25(dX2Xii) translates to the 

following: a continuous communications capability should 

be maintained between the guard force assigned to protect 

the transient shipment and a remotely located security 

control center manned by personnel employed by the 

licensee to monitor the status of the shipment while it is in 

port. This security control center could be located in the 

offices of the carrier's U.S. agent orat some other temporary 

location in the area of the port. The security control center 

should maintain knowledge of the status of the shipment at 

all times during the period the general license is in effect. 

This could be accomplished through an intermediary such 

as an airport control tower or the harbor master's office 

during times the transport is in motion within the port. 

Communications between the guard force commander 

and the security control center need not be continuous, but 

the capability for immediate two-way communications by 

either the security control center or the guard force should 

exist while the shipment is in port. 

7.3 Liaison with and Notification of Local Law Enforce

ment Authorities (LLEA) [Paragraphs 73.25(dX2Xili) 

and (dX3)] 

Both the armed guards for the transient shipment and 

the security control center personnel are required to possess 

the capability for direct communications with the LLEA to 

notify them of the need for assistance if necessary. The need 

for such communications is underscored by the basic 

philosophy of the licensee physical protection system. The 

guard force for the transient shipment need not be designed 

to defeat potential attackers in an aggressive mode, but 

only to protect the shipment and guard personnel from 

attack. Its primary objective should be to delay the adver

sary from completing any act of theft of SSNM or sabotage 

until the LLEA forces arrive. The system should be designed 

to interface closely with LLEA forces whose responsibility 

it is to enforce local and State laws regarding thefts and 

other criminal acts. The capability of the guard force to 

call LLEA forces into action when such assistance is needed 

is of great significance to the success of the physical protec

tion system and deserves to be protected with- an appro

priate level of redundancy and diversity. Liaisons with 

LLEA personnel should be consummated in advance 

of the shipment or as soon as possible following arrival in 

port. 

8. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNSCHEDULED 

TRANSIENT SHIPMENTS 

8.1 Purpose and Scope 

The purpose of the physical protection system for 

unscheduled transient shipments does not differ from that 

for scheduled transient shipments. However, the scope of

5.63-9
protection may differ owing to the unpredictability of the 

circumstances that would require the transport to make an unscheduled stop at a U.S. port facility. There are essen

tially two differences. 

1. The randomness of stops made at U.S. ports would 

make them difficult for the adversary to predict so that, for 

a period of time following arrival in port, the shipment would 

have a degree of protection arising solely from the randonmess 

of the event. As the time in port grows longer, the ability 

of the adversary to assemble or regroup his forces and trans

port them to the port from another location increases also. 

This will affect the timing of implementation of the physical 

protection system for the transient shipment. 

2. Since the unpredictable factors of weather, equip

ment failures, or other unusual circumstances may result in 

the shipment arriving at a U.S. port at which the carrier 

neither has made previous arrangements for physical pro

tection nor has a U.S. agent or representative, the physical 

protection system may have to'be implemented by the 

carrier with little specific knowledge of the port. This will 

require a much greater dependence on the port's LLEA for 

cooperation in the early period following arrival in port. 

8.2 Notification Requirements [Paragraph 70.20b(eXl)] 

For unscheduled transient shipments, it may be impos

sible for the licensee to notify the NRC 7 calendar days 

prior to the arrival of the transport in a U.S. port, as is 

required for scheduled transient shipments. However, the 

carrier is required to notify the NRC of its intent to bring a transient shipment of a formula quantity of SSNM into a U.S. port by telephone, radio, or other means immediately 

upon the carrier's decision to enter a U.S. port. The notifi

cation should contain the same types of information included 

in the 7-day notification required for scheduled transient ship

ments [as described in paragraph 70.20b(d)] except that some 

information regarding the name and address of the carrier's 

U.S.-based representative and the physical protection plan 

may be unavailable. The carrier may, in fact, not have a 

U.S.-based representative or agent at the port in question 

and may have little choice of which port to use, especially 

if the stop is made beciuse of adverse weather conditions or equipment failure. In such situations, the carrier may choose 

to name a member of the crew who would assume immediate 

responsibility for the transient shipment's physical protec

tion and make other arrangements after landing. 

8.3 Implementation of Physical Protection Plans for 

Unscheduled Transient Shipments 

[Paragraph 70.20b(eX2)] 

Physical protection plans may not need to be imple

mented immediately upon arrival of a transient shipment at a U.S. port. However, the time that would be allowed to 

elapse before physical protection plans must be implemented 

would depend on a number of factors such as the amount 

of time during which the shipment is expected to remain in 

port, whether it will be necessary to transfer the SSNM to 

another transport, or whether there has been any civil 

unrest (e.g., protest demonstrations) or a recent natural

disaster that may appear to pose a threat to the safety of 

the shipment (e.g., increased risk from mob actions). 

Another factor is the extent to which there is public 

knowledge of the transient shipment entering the port and 

how much advance knowledge could have been obtained by 

potential adversaries. Generally, physical protection measures should be implemented within two hours after 

arrival at the port. NRC inspectors or headquarters personnel 

would make the final determination based on what is reason

able in the light of local conditions and other circumstances. 

In the event physical protection of an unscheduled 

transient shipment becomes necessary, the licensee will be 

required to arrange for protection by armed personnel. 

These may be armed guards provided by a commercial guard 

service or personnel provided by the LLEA. Whether LLEA 

personnel will be available will depend on the operating 

policies of the LLEA at the particular port. If the port has 

its own security force of armed personnel, it is likely that their 

services could be obtained, either temporarily until other 

arrangements can be made, or for the duration of the stop. 

8.4 Physical Protection Plans 

[Paragraphs 70.20b(dX7) and (e)(1)] 

In the event a carrier finds it necessary to bring a tran

sient shipment into a U.S. port with minimal preparation, 

carriers are required to indicate immediately after the 

decision to enter a U.S. port the means they will use to 

ensure the physical protection of the shipment. Plans for 

providing this physical protection may become available to 

NRC inspectors in a number of different ways:

1. Carriers may prepare and have on board their own 

plans in accordance with the regulations and the guidance 

contained herein. Carriers transporting SSNM of formula 

quantities with itineraries bringing them within iange of 

U.S. ports might anticipate use of these ports for emer

gency stops and plan ahead to meet such contingencies. 

2. Carriers may have on board, or on file with their 

agents at a U.S. port or ports, physical protection plans 

prepared by themselves or their U.S. agents that (a) may be 

adapted specifically to particular ports at which they may 

make emergency stops or (b) may be generically designed 

to be adapted to any port as circumstances require. The 

latter alternative will leave the carrier with the necessity for 

making final arrangements for physical protection as the 

need arises for any given port situation. 

3. Carriers who have done no advance planning for 

physical protection can still comply with the regulation by 

preparing ad hoc plans while approaching port, if time 

allows, or shortly after entering the port. They may pre

pare their own plans in response to the guidance contained 

in this guide, or they may attempt to obtain the services of 

a U.S. tiased agent who may be more familiar with the NRC 

physical protection requirements for transient shipments. 

NRC inspectors may require the licensee to take certain 

actions in order to protect the SSNM if they determine that 

the protection provided by the licensee is inadequate.

K

5.63-10
VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT

A separate value/impact analysis has not been prepared 

> for this regulatory guide. The guide was developed to 

provide guidance to persons subject to physical protection 

requirements for transient shipments contained in 10 CFR 

Parts 70 and 73. These requirements were promulgated by 

amendments to NRC regulations published in the Federal 

Register on February 13, 1981 (46 FR 12193). A value/ 

impact analysis was prepared for the amendments originally 

proposed for the physical protection of transient shipments on January 8, 1980 (45 FR 1625), a copy of which was placed in the Public Document Room at that time. This 

analysis is also appropriate to the final amendments and to 

this regulatory guide since only minor changes were made

in the proposed amendments when the final rule was 

published. 

The major conclusions of the value/impact analysis were 

that the required physical protection could be provided at 

reasonable cost and minimal impact to the parties concerned, 

that the costs of providing such protection are essentially 

independent of the technical and procedural alternatives 

considered, and that the overall level of impacts, including 

those to the NRC, other government organizations, industry, 

workers, and the public, and also the impact on inter

national relations, will be minimal because of the small 

number of potential licensees.

5.63-11
UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 

OFFICIAL BUSINESS 

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300

FIRST CLASS MAIL 

POSTAGE & FEES PAID 

US"I C 

WASH a C 

PERMIT No ilL

K

K