Revision 1" 

May 1980

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGULATORY GUIDE 

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 

REGULATORY GUIDE 57 

(Task SG 909-4) 

ENTRY/EXIT CONTROL FOR PROTECTED AREAS, 

VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS

A. INTRODUCTION 

Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," of 

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, specifies perform

ance requirements for the physical protection of special 

nuclear materials and associated facilities. Section 73.20, 

"General Performance Requirements," describes the general 

performance objective and requirements that must be met 

through the establishment of a physical protection system. Performance capabilities necessary to meet the requirements 

of § 73.20 are described in § 73.45,"Performance Capabilities 

for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems." While detec

tion and control requirements are specified throughout the 

capability statements, specific entry/exit control techniques 

are required under three capabilities. Paragraph 73.45(b) 

specifies preventing "unauthorized access of persons, 

vehicles and materials into material access areas and vital 

areas." A physical protection system must achieve this by 

using entry controls, among other things. Paragraph 73.45(e) 

•Ipermits "removal of only authorized and confirmed forms 

and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from mate

rial access areas." The system must achieve this capability by providing detection subsystems and procedures to detect, 

assess, and communicate attempts at unauthorized removal. 

Paragraph 73.45(f) provides for ensuring only authorized 

access to the protected area and requires, in part, the use of 

entry controls to meet the capability. Finally, § 73.46,"Fixed 

Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, 

Components, and Procedures," outlines typical specific safe

guards measures that will often be included in an overall 

system that meets the requirements of Sections 73.20 and 

73.45. 

A significant element of the physical protection system 

is the control of the entry and exit of personnel, vehicles, 

and material. This control includes personnel identification 

The substantial number of changes In this revision has made It Impractical to Indicate the changes with lines In the margin.

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES 

Regulatory Guide s are Issued to describe and make available to the public methods acceptable to* the NRC staff of Implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech niques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postu 'led accidents or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulator uldes, are nof substitutes for regulations, and compliance wIth Am Is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set __,Jut in the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. 

Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new Information or experience. This guide was revised as a result of substantive com ments received from the public and additional staff review.

and entry/exit control systems and procedures for searching 

individuals, vehicles, and materials. Entry and exit control 

procedures are used to provide assurance that only authorized 

individuals are allowed access to protected areas (PAs), vital 

areas (VAs), and material access areas (MAAs). Entry search 

procedures, in conjunction with other protection elements, are used to provide assurance that firearms, explosives, and 

incendiary devices are not introduced into the subject areas. 

Exit search procedures from material access areas are used 

to provide assurance that strategic special nuclear material 

(SSNM) is not being covertly removed. 

This guide describes measures the NRC staff considers 

acceptable for implementing entry/exit control requirements 

at facilities subject to the above regulatory requirements. 

B. DISCUSSION 

The objective of controlling access to protected areas, 

vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that only 

authorized persons with legitimate need be allowed access 

to such areas. The objective of searching vehicles, personnel, 

or packages prior to entry into protected or material access 

areas is to prevent the introduction of firearms, explosives, 

or incendiary devices that could be used to commit radio

logical sabotage or aid in the theft of SSNM. The objective 

of searching all personnel and material exiting material 

access areas is to provide a means of detecting attempted 

theft or diversion of concealed SSNM. 

Entry control involves the following functions: 

I. Identification and authorization check, 

2. Entry to control point, 

3. Weapons search, 

4. Explosive/incendiary device search, 

5. Badge exchange, if used, and 

6. Admittance to area or denial and notification to 

security force of a problem.

Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. 

The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions: 

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2. Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation 3. Fuels and Materials Facilities a. Occupational Health 

4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General 

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Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Publications Sales Manager.

I I[
The identity of an individual can be verified by determin

ing something about an individual, such as facial features; 

by determining something possessed by an individual, such 

as a coded badge; or by determining something known to 

an individual, such as a numerical code. By using combina

tions of the above three identity verification processes, 

more reliable identity verification can be obtained. Such 

identification procedures can be accomplished by attendant 

security personnel or by the use of identification equipment 

such as video comparator systems. 

Searching of incoming personnel or material can be 

accomplished by a hands-on "pat-down" search, by-the use 

of devices that detect unauthorized materials, by the use of 

a "strip" search, or by a combination of all three. Entry 

searches that use equipment to perform the search function, 

such as metal or explosives detectors, are preferred as they 

minimize the imposition of a hands-on or strip search. 

Exit searches, which are conducted to ensure that 

concealed SSNM is not removed from material access areas, 

should use both special nuclear material (SNM) detection 

equipment and metal detection equipment to provide 

greater confidence that either shielded or unshielded 

material could be detected. All materials leaving the material 

access area should undergo such a search. 

Direct responsibility for controlling the entry and exit of 

personnel, vehicles, and materials normally resides with 

members of the security organization. They should be 

adequately trained in operation of entry/exit control and 

search equipment and procedures in accordance with 

Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Personnel," to 

10 CFR Part 73. 

Extensive discussions and descriptions of various alterna

tive equipment and procedures for use in controlling entry 

and exit and for conducting searches of personnel, vehicles, 

and materials can be found in NUREG-0509, "Bibliography 

of Technical Guidance for the Physical Protection Upgrade 

Rule Requirements for Fixed Sites."'1 

For the purpose of this guide the following definitions 

are provided: 

i. Guard means a uniformed individual armed with a 

firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special 

nuclear material against theft and the protection of a plant 

against radiological sabotage. 

2. Watchman means an individual, not necessarily 

uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection 

for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the 

course of performing other duties. 

1NUREG-0509 is available for public inspection or copying for a 

fee at the NRC's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased directly from the NRe 

by writing to the Publications Sales Manager, Distribution Services 

Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 

20555 or the National Technical Information Service, Springfield. Virginia 22161.

3. Escort means a member of the security organization 

or other designated individual responsible for accompanying 

those personnel not allowed unescorted access within a 

protected area. An escort is not required to possess technica; 

knowledge of processes or equipment as is required by the". 

two-man concept. 

C. REGULATORY POSITION 

1. PROTECTED AREAS 

a. Entry. Identification and Authorization 

At each entry/exit control point (EECP) into a protected 

area, a means of establishing the identity and access autho

rization of incoming individuals should be provided. Accept

able means of identity verification are facial recognition 

and positive comparison to an authorized picture badge. 

Such identity verification can be performed by attendant 

security personnel or by the use of remotely viewed closed 

circuit television (CCTV) systems that display an acceptable 

image of the individual's face and compare it to an image of 

a picture badge or a stored image of that individual's face. 

The identification/verification procedure and confirmation 

of entry authorization should be performed prior to any 

search function. To facilitate both identification and search 

functions, entry and exit traffic should be separated by 

physical barriers, and employee and visitor traffic should be 

processed separately. 

b. Personnel Search 

A search of entering personnel for firearms, exploK.. 

sives, or incendiary devices should be conducted by use of 

both a firearms detector and an explosives detector. All 

incoming individuals not possessing a Department of 

Energy (DOE) material access authorization should undergo 

such a search. DOE couriers engaged in the transport of 

SSNM are exempt from such searches. 

A sample of all individuals possessing DOE material 

access authorizations should be searched. The sample rate 

should be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected 

randomly from all entering personnel who possess the 

necessary authorizations. 

In the event that search equipment indicates the presence 

of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the following 

actions should be taken: 

1. The security personnel should request that the 

individual empty his or her pockets and again be tested by 

the search equipment. If the individual complies and after 

the equipment no longer indicates the presence of firearms 

or explosives and the contents of the pockets have been 

verified as not including firearms, explosives, or incendiary 

devices, the individual may be allowed to pass into the 

protected area. 

2. If, however, the equipment continues to indica! 

the presence of firearms or explosives, a physical searck.., 

should be made by one unarmed security person, while at

5.7-2
least one guard observes the search. An acceptable alterna

tive to a hands-on search is a "'strip search," which could be 

completed in the privacy of a separate searchroom and 

which should include the individual disrobing (except for 

underclothing) and submitting his or her clothing for 

inspection. 

3. If an individual refuses to comply with either a 

hands-on or strip search or if a firearm, explosive, or 

incendiary device is found, entry should be denied. 

4. If material of a suspicious and unknown nature is found, 

entry should be delayed until responsible security personnel 

are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature. 

When the initial search uses hand-held detectors or is a 

hands-on search, firearms should be searched for first, as it 

is presumed that a concealed firearm is a more immediate 

danger to the searcher than concealed explosives or incen

diary devices. 

Entry into the protected area should be granted to 

individuals only after they have satisfactorily met the 

identification, authorization, and search requirements of 10 

CFR Part 73. The opening to the last barrier to the PA 

should be controlled by an individual isolated within a 

bullet-resisting structure. Acceptable means to accomplish 

this are to provide a builet-resisting booth meeting UL 

Level IV standards at the last barrier of the EECP for the 

individual who controls the opening to the PA or to have 

this opening controlled by the central alarm station (CAS) 

or secondary alarm station (SAS) operator or both. 

c. Package or Material Identification and Search 

At PA EECPs, all hand-carried packages should be searched 

by direct observation, by the use of firearms detectors or 

explosives detectors, or by the use of X-ray equipment for 

concealed firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other 

items that could be used for theft or sabotage purposes. 

Packages carried by individuals who possess a DOE material 

access authorization may be excepted unless that person is 

one of the sample selected randomly to'undergo an entry 

search, in which case any hand-carried packages should also 

be searched. 

Hand-carried packages or materials that cannot be readily 

opened or otherwise cannot be effectively searched by 

direct observation should be submitted to suitable detec

tion equipment, which may include X-ray devices. If the 

nature of the packaging interferes with effective operation 

of firearm or explosives detection equipment, X-ray should 

be used. Any item or material determined to be of a ques

tionable nature by search personnel should not be allowed 

into the protected area until responsible security personnel 

are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature. 

d. Vehicle and Cargo Entry and Search 

All vehicles except DOE vehicles engaged in the transport 

of SNM and emergency vehicles responding to emergency 

conditions are required to be searched for unauthorized

personnel, firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior 

to entry into the protected area. The search should include 

the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo 

area. (Refer to NUREG/CR-0485, "Vehicle Access and 

Search Training Manual," 2 for details. A level I search 

should be conducted as a minimum.) The use of vehicle 

sally ports (secure access passageways) is an acceptable way 

to facilitate identification, control, and search functions. 

All material or packages to be delivered into the PA 

are required to be identified and verified as an authorized 

delivery prior to entry. A sample of all such delivered 

packages or materials should be searched for firearms, 

explosives, or incendiary devices, the sample rate to be a 

minimum of 10%, with samples selected randomly from all 

such deliveries. Where size, weight, packaging, or other 

characteristics prohibit an effective search by direct observa

tion, detection equipment, or X-ray, entry may be granted 

so long as: 

1. The material is escorted to its destination by a 

member of the security organization, 

2. The material is not initially offloaded or unpack

aged adjacent to a vital or material access area, and 

3. Offloading and unpackaging is observed by at least 

two authorized individuals, one of whom is a member 

of the security organization, for the purpose of ensuring 

that only authorized material has been delivered and that 

there are no concealed firearms, explosives, or incendiary 

devices. 

e. Entry and Search Aids 

The use of pedestrian and vehicle sally ports can provide 

an effective means of isolating, identifying, and searching 

individuals in a controlled area prior to allowing entry into 

the PA. By interlocking the first and second openings in the 

sally port so they cannot be opened simultaneously and by 

providing observation of entry, a positive means of prevent

ing "piggybacking" is available. 

Firearms detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal 

variety, should be capable of detecting with at least an 85% 

effective detection rate one of the following located any

where on an individual: (1) Colt .25 automatic, (2) Titan 

.25 automatic, (3) General Precision Model 20-.22 caliber, 

(4) CDM .22 short, or (5) the calibration source specified in 

NILECJ-STD-0601.00, "Walk-Through Metal Detectors for 

Use in Weapons Detection." 3 The false alarm rate should 

2

NUREGXCR-0495 is available for public inspection or copying 

for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., 

Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased for $4.75 directly from 

NRC by sending check or money order, payable to Superintendent 

of Documents, to the Director, Division of Technical Information 

and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, D.C. 205SS. GPO Deposit Account holders may charge their order by calling (301) 492-9530. Copies are also available for 

purchase through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. 

3

National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 

Standard 0601.00, Stock Number GPO-2700-002S6,Is for sale for 

65 cents per copy by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

5.7-3

II{
not exceed 10% when the detector sensitivity is adjusted to 

this detection level. The devices should be adjusted to 

discriminate between typical firearm and non-firearm 

masses of metal. One example of a testing method for 

demonstrating compliance with the detection rate is given 

in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods 

may be used if the methods are fully documented and 

approved by the NRC. 

Explosives detectors, whether of the hand-held or 

portal variety, should be capable of detecting with at least a 90% effective detection rate dynamite, TNT, and similar 

nitrogen-containing compounds in a minimum amount of 

200 grams. One example of a testing method for demon

strating compliance with the detection rate is given in the 

Appendix. Other testing methods may be used if the 

methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC. 

The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% when the detector 

sensitivity is adjusted to this detection level. If the search 

for explosives is to be performed directly by security 

personnel, it should be performed only after a search for 

firearms has been made. 

A search dog may be capable of providing a satisfac

tory detection capability for firearms and explosives. If 

dogs are used, they should be individually tested to ensure 

their continued capability and reliability. As an animal may 

present unpredictable problems and weaknesses, a set of 

trained and tested backup individuals or other detection 

devices or equipment should be immediately available to 

serve as a substitute in the event of a dog's illness or other 

sign of abnormal behavior. A dog should be used only if it can be shown to detect firearms or explosives with equal or greater confidence than existing alternatives. A dog may be 

particularly useful in the search of vehicles or oversize 

packages. As the duration of a dog's effectiveness for 

performing search functions may be limited, it should be 

used only as a secondary aid. 

Annunciation of metal and explosives detection equip

ment should be both aural and visual. 

The EECP should be provided with one or more duress 

alarms that annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. Such 

alarms should be placed in a concealed location that can generally be reached by attendant security personnel and 

activated in an unobtrusive manner. An acceptable alterna

tive to duress alarms that annunciate in the alarm stations is 

the use of duress alarms that are ,Worn or carried by atten

dant security personnel and that can be activated unobtru

sively. Such duress alarms should be worn or carried at all 

times when security personnel attend an EECP. 

2. MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS 

a. Entry Identification and Authorization 

Individuals desiring entry to material access areas should 

be verified as being on appropriate authorization schedules 

and should be identified by comparison of facial features to an authorized picture badge. An acceptable method of

verifying authorization is the use of a code intrinsic to the 

picture badge indicating that entry to MAAs is authorized. 

At no time should a lone individual be allowed entry to an MAA or a vault. As a minimum, entry to an unoccupied 

MAA requires at least two individuals to meet the intent of 

the two-man concept. 

b. Package or Material Identification and Search 

All packages and materials entering a material access 

area should be searched for firearms, explosives, and 

incendiary devices. Search procedures and equipment, as discussed previously, for use at protected area EECPs should 

be used. In the event that security search personnel are suspicious of the nature of any searched packages or material, entry should be delayed until the nature or 

identity of the package or material can be determined. 

c. Entry and Search Aids 

Entry and search aids discussed in the section on pro

tected areas are also applicable to EECPs at MAA boundaries. 

In addition, unmanned EECP doors should be alarmed and 

annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. 

d. Exit Search for SSNM 

Prior to exit from an MAA, all individuals, vehicles, 

packages, and other materials are required to be searched 

for concealed SSNM. This search should be conducted using 

both metal detection and SNM detection equipment. The 

metal detection system used to search for concealed shielded 

SSNM should be capable of detecting with at least a 90% 

effective detection rate a minimum of 100 grams of nonfer

rous metal (shielding) concealed anywhere on an individual. 

One example of a testing method for demonstratinig com

pliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix to 

this guide. Other testing methods may be used if the 

methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC. 

The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% for that level of 

detection. SNM detection equipment should be capable of 

detecting plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched to 

90% in the uranium-235 isotope in accordance with the 

testing and operational requirements of Regulatory Guide 

5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitor." 

Individuals should undergo two separate searches prior 

to exiting an MAA. An acceptable method of conduc

ting these searches is to require individuals to pass through 

two separate sets of metal and SNM detection equipment, 

each set monitored by a different member of the security 

organization. For individuals exiting an area that contains 

only encapsulated or alloyed SSNM, the second search may 

be made of a sampling of all individuals exiting the area, the 

sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with individuals 

selected randomly to undergo the search. 

If an SNM or metal detector is triggered by an individual 

attempting to exit an MAA EECP, the individual should be 

asked to remove all items from his or her pockets and again

3.74

/'
pass through the detection equipment. If the detector still 

triggers, a hands-on or strip search should be conducted. In 

the event search personnel are unsure of the nature of an 

object or material uncovered during a search, the material or 

object should be confiscated and the individual's exit 

delayed until a determination can be made that the object 

or material is not SSNM or does not contain SSNM. 

Vehicles, materials, or packages, including trash, uncon

taminated wastes, tools, and other equipment should 

be searched with SNM and metal detection equipment where 

appropriate. This search should be conducted by a team of 

at least two authorized and designated individuals who are 

not normally allowed access to the material access area in 

question. An acceptable means of accomplishing such 

searches for items too large to be accommodated in pedes

trian EECPs is to provide a holding area within the MAA 

that can be isolated from other MAA activities when search 

personnel are conducting authorized searches. 

e. Accounting for Individuals In MAAs 

Procedures should be employed at MAA EECPs to 

account for the number and identity of individuals within 

the MAA. Manual or automated accounting procedures are 

equally acceptable so long as the procedures can determine 

at any given time that no lone individual Is within the 

MAA. An attempted violation of the two-man concept 

should be detectable at the EECP, CAS, and SAS (e.g., 

if one of two individuals alone within an MAA attempts to 

exit without the other). 

I. Vaults 

.Entry to vaults should be controlled so that individ

ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules 

are accomplished prior to opening the vault door. The use 

of split-screen CCTV or CCTV and badge reader are accept

able means of establishing identification and authorization.

Entry control should ensure use of the two-man concept 

during entry and access to vaults and should ensure that the 

vault is monitored by CCTV in both alarm stations and at 

least one other continuously manned onsite location. 

3. VITAL AREAS 

Entry to vital areas should be controlled so that individ

ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules 

are accomplished prior to entry into the area. Use of the 

two-man concept for entry control is recommended. The 

use of attendant security personnel, authorized escorts, or 

remotely viewed CCTV systems that compare a facial image 

to an authorized picture badge are all acceptable means of 

providing such control. 

4. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 

Emergency procedures should be developed to deal 

with the possibility of failure of entry/exit detection and 

assessment equipment or emergency evacuation. 

a. Failure of Detection Equipment 

Provisions should be made to use alternative EECPs 

or backup detection equipment or security personnel and 

provide for rapid repair of malfunctioning detection equip

ment. Failure of detection equipment should not be allowed 

to compromise the effectiveness of required search proce

dures. 

b. Evacuation Procedures 

To the extent possible, and without compromising 

safety practices or considerations, procedures should be 

established to protect against the possibility of an emergency 

evacuation being used to remove SSNM from the facility or 

to gain unauthorized access to the facility. Such procedures 

should be part of the facility's contingency plan.

5.7-5

III
VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT

A separate value/impact analysis has not been prepared for the revision to this regulatory guide. The changes were made to make the guide consistent with the upgrade physical protection amendments to the regulations published 

in final form in the Federal Register of November 28, 1979 

(44 FR 68184). A value/impact analysis prepared for the

proposed amendments was made available in the Commis

sion's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Wash

ington, D.C., at the time the proposed amendments were published. This analysis is appropriate for the final amend

ments as well as for the regulatory guide revisions appropri

ate to those amendments.

5.7-6
APPENDIX

1. BACKGROUND 

The purpose of this appendix Is to provide an example 

of a testing method for determining the detection capabil

ity of firearms, explosives, and nonferrous metal detectors. 

This example should not be interpreted as a regulatory 

requirement. Other testing -methods for demonstrating 

compliance with the detection rates may be used if fully 

documented and approved by the NRC. The purpose 

of testing a detector is to ensure that the installed instru

ment is operating according to one of the three performance 

criteria stated below. 

I. Firearms Detectors - Regulatory Position C. L.e of this 

guide' states, in part, that firearms detectors should be 

capable of detecting firearms with at least an 85% 

effective detection rate. 

2. Explosives Detectors - Regulatory Position C. I.e of 

this guide states, in part, that explosives detectors 

should be capable of detecting explosives with at least 

a 90% effective detection rate. 

3. Nonferrous Metal Detect6rs - Regulatory PositionC.2.d 

of this guide states, in part, that the metal detection 

system should be capable of detecting nonferrous 

metals with at least a 90% effective detection rate. 

2. TESTING THE DETECTORS 

There are at least two types of testing that should 

be conducted on the detectors: detection rate testing and 

operational testing. Detection rate testing should be con

ducted quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is 

designed to determine whether the detector is operating in 

compliance with the appropriate performance criterion. 

Operational testing should be conducted daily or, preferably, 

at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is designed 

to ensure that the detector is operating and that the detec

tion rate has not decreased to below the performance 

criterion. Additionally, manufacturer's design specifi

cation testing could be conducted quarterly. If the detector 

does not meet the minimum performance levels for the 

detection rate testing and the operational testing given in 

the following two sections, then corrective actions should 

be taken. All tests, test results, and corrective actions 

should be documented. The documentation will establish 

the performance history for each detector, and the test 

results should be available for inspection and analysis. 

2.1 Detection Rate Testing 

Detection rate testing should be conducted on each 

detector quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is 

designed to determine whether the detector is operating in 

compliance with the appropriate performance criterion.

The performance criterion for firearms detectors is at least 

an 85% effective detection rate. The performance criterion 

for explosives and nonferrous metal detectors is at least a 

90% effective detection rate. One example of a method for 

detection rate testing Is outlined on the following pages. 

The testing methods for showing at least 85% and at least 

90% effective detection rates are similar, the only difference 

being that more successful tests are required to demonstrate 

the higher detection rate. The security personnel should 

test each detector by having one of the members of the 

security organization walk through the detector carrying 

the appropriate test material. 

2.1.1 Firearm.s Detectors 

For firearms detectors, test each detector 30 times. 

1. If 29 or 30 of the 30 tests result in successful detec

tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate 

a detection rate of at least 85%, with 95% confidence in 

this statement. 

2. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections 

of the test material, the detector should be checked for an 

obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi

tional tests should be conducted. If all 10 tests result in 

successful detections, the detection rate testing can be 

ended for this detector for this quarter, since 38 successful 

detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the 

performance criterion. However, Uf only 9 out of the 

10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted. 

All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to 

demonstrate compliance, since. the cumulative number of 

successful detections must be at least 47 out of 50 tests 

in order to demonstrate at least an 85% detection rate, with 

95% confidence. 

3. If 27 of the 30 tests result in successful detections 

of the test material, the detector should be checked for an 

obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 addi

tional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 tests). If all 

20 tests result in successful detections, then the detec

tion rate testing can be ended for this detector for this 

quarter. 

4. If 26 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful 

detections of the test material, compliance with the perform

ance criterion is not demonstrated. 

Table 1, given below, shows in summary form the 

minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and 

50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on 

the detection rate is at least 85%. See the appendices to 

Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Sys

tems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving 

these confidence limits.

5.7-7

1_1
Table 1 

SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE DETECTION 

RATE OF 85%

Total No. Minimum No. of 

of ,ests Successful Detections

29 

38 

47

Statement: 

The detection rate 

is at least _%, with 

95% confidence 

85.1 

85.1 

85.2

If the minimum number of successful detections given in 

Table I is not met, compliance with the performance 

criterion has not been demonstrated. The detector needs to 

be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required 

level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, 

adjusted, or replaced), the testing procedure should be 

conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance 

with the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests. 

A table similar to Table 2 of this Appendix can be used for 

recording the test results. 

Table 2 

DETECTION RATE TESTING RESULTS 

Firearms Detector at (location) 

Quarter 198 

Date:

2. If 29 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of 

the test material, the detector should be checked for an 

obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi

tional tests should be conducted. If all 10 tests result in 

successful detections, the detection rate testing can be 

ended for this detector for this quarter, since 39 successful 

detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the 

performance criterion. However, if only 9 out of the 

10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted. 

All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to 

demonstrate compliance, since the cumulative number of 

successful detections must be at least 48 out of 50 tests 

in order to demonstrate at least a 90% detection rate, with 

95% confidence. 

"3. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of 

the test material, the detector should be checked for an 

obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 

additional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 

tests). If all 20 tests result in successful detections, the 

detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this 

quarter. 

4. If 27 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful 

detections of the test material, compliance with the per

formance criterion is not demonstrated. 

Table 3, given below, shows in summary form the 

minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and 

50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on 

the detection rate is approximately 90% (at least 88%). See 

the appendices of Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter 

Intrusion Alarm Systems," particularly Appendix B, for the 

details of deriving these confidence limits.

"Time:

Total 40

No. of Successful Detections 

- (if 29 or 30, testing complete)

SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE DETECTION 

RATE OF ABOUT 90% 

Statement: 

The detection rate 

Total No. Minimum No. of is at least J%, with 

of Tests Successful Detections 95% confidence

- (if 38, testing complete)

10

Total 50 - (if 47, testing complete)

2.1.2 Explosives Detectors andNonferrour Metl Detectors 

For explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors, 

test each detector 30 times. 

I. If 30 out of the 30 tests result in successful detec

tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate a 

detection rate of at least 90%, with 95% confidence in this 

statement.

If the minimum number of successful detections given in 

Table 3 is not met, compliance with the performance 

criterion has not been demonstrated. The detector needs to 

be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required 

level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, 

adjusted, or replaced), then the testing procedure should be 

conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance with 

the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests. A 

table similar to Table 4 can be used for recording the test 

results.

5.7-8

30 

40 

50

No. of Tests 

30

10

Table 3

30 

40 

so

30 

39 

48

90.5 

88.7 

87.9
Table 4 

DETECTION RATE TESTING RESULTS 

Explosives (or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (ocation) 

Quarter _, 198_ 

Date: 

Time:

No. of Tests 

30

No. of Successful Detections 

S(if 30, testing complete)

10

Total 40 - (if 39, testing complete)

10

Total 50 __ (if 48, testing complete)

2.2 Operational Testing 

Operational testing should be conducted daily or, pref

erably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is 

designed to ensure that the detector is operating and that

the detection rate has not decreased to below the perform

ance criterion. One example of a method for operational 

testing is outlined on the following pages. The testing meth

od for operational testing is the same for firearms detectors, 

explosives detectors, and nonferrous metal detectors. The 

security personnel should test each detector by having one 

of the members of the security organization walk through 

the detector carrying the appropriate test material. 

The operational testing on each detector should result in 

100% detections of the test material. The test results should 

be documented on a success/failure basis. If the detector fails 

to detect the test material on an operational test, corrective 

actions should be taken and documented. For example, if 

the test of the detector results in no alarm (no detection), 

the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such 

as an incorrect setting and retested 4 more times during the 

same shift if possible. If all 4 of these tests result in alarms, 

the detector should be tested 5 more times during the same 

shift on the next day. If all these 5 tests result in alarms, 

the daily or once-per-shift testing schedule can be resumed, 

since the performance criterion (85% detection rate for 

firearms detectors or 90% detection rate for explosives 

detectors and nonferrous metal detectors) has been con

firmed. If there were any failures to detect among the 9 

additional tests, the detector should not be used until after 

it has been thoroughly checked, repaired If necessary, and 

retested according to the detection rate testing method to 

demonstrate that it is now detecting the test material at the 

rate specified by the appropriate performance criterion. A 

table similar to Table 5 can be used for recording the test 

results. 

5.7-9

II
Table S 

OPERATIONAL TESTING RESULTS 

(Success -I, Failure = 0) 

Firearms (or Explosives or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (location) 

Week beginning , 198, (in Quarter , 198_) 

Date Tune Result 4 Retests S Retests 

Monday - Shift I I oro . . ,,., - Shift 2 . . .. - - - - Shift 3 ' - ' 

Tuesday - Shift I 

- Shift 2 

- Shift 3 

Wednesday - Shift I 

- Shift 2 

- Shift 3 

Thursday - Shift I 

- Shift 2 

- Shift 3 

Friday - Shift I 

- Shift 2 

- Shift 3 

Saturday - Shift I 

- Shift 2 

- Shift 3 

Sunday - Shift I 

- Shift 2 

- Shift 3

5.7-10
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