This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 7 MEEMS SANTA FE, LP, 8 a Texas Limited Partnership, 9 Plaintiff-Appellee, 10 v. NO. 29,820 11 TONY MARTIN BUILDERS, LTD., 12 a Texas Limited Liability Company, 13 Defendant-Appellant, 14 and 15 TONY MARTIN BUILDERS, LTD. 16 a Texas Limited Liability Company, 17 Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, 18

v. 19 DOUBLE K-M, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company, 20 and KAREN H. MAYES, 21 Third-Party Defendants-Appellees. 22

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 23 James A. Hall, District Judge 242 Felker, Ish, Ritchie & Geer, P.A. 1 Randy Felker 2 Santa Fe, NM 3 for Appellees 4 Simons & Slattery LLP 5 Thomas A. Simons IV 6 Santa Fe, NM 7 for Third-Party Appellees 8 Jewell & Thompson, P.C. 9 Nathaniel V. Thompkins 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellants 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION 13 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 14 Defendant-Appellant Tony Martin Builders, Ltd. (Defendant) appeals from the 15 district court’s order denying Defendant ’s motion to reconsider the summary 16 judgment rulings that dismiss all of De fendant’s claims. The notice proposed to 17 dismiss, and Defendant filed a timely memorandum in opposition. [Ct.App.File, 18 green clip] We are not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments, and therefore dismiss 19 for lack of a final order. 20 This case began when Meems Santa Fe, LP(Plaintiff) filed a complaint against 21 Defendant arising from the alleged breach of a construction contract. [RP Vol.I/1; 223 Vol.III/460, 688] In response, Defendant filed an amended counterclaim against 1 Plaintiff [RP Vol.I/18, 68, 71] as well as a second amended third-party complaint 2 against Third-Party Defendants Karen Mayes and Double K-M (DKM). [RP 3 Vol.I/49, 76, 83] Plaintiff Meems [RP Vol.I/23, 46] and Third-Party Defendants 4 Mayes and DKM [RP Vol.I/191, 195; Vol.II/228, 251] subsequently filed summary 5 judgment motions, premised on the central ar gument that Defendant is an unlicensed 6 contractor and as such is barred from rec overy under its counterclaim and third-party 7 complaint. [RP Vol.I/28, 32] The district court granted summary judgment in favor 8 of Plaintiff [RP Vol..II/262] and Third-Party Defendants [RP Vol.II/264] , and 9 thereby dismissed with prejudice all of Defendant’s claims against these parties. [RP 10 Vol.II/262-65] Defendant now appeals from the district court’s order denying its 11 motion to reconsider the summary judgment rulings. [RP Vol.III/684] 12 Because claims brought by Plaintiff against Defendant remain outstanding [ RP 13 Vol.I/1; Vol.II/460; Vol.III/688] , dismissal for lack of a final order is merited. See 14 generally Rule 1-054(B)(1) NMRA (indicating that “when more than one claim for 15 relief is presented in an action . . . the c ourt may enter a final judgment as to one or 16 more but fewer than all of the claims onl y upon an express determination that there 17 is no just reason for delay.”); Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison , 113 N.M. 231, 236, 18 824 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1992) (providing that, generally, an order or judgment is not 194 considered final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case 1 disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible), limited on other grounds 2 by Trujillo v. Hilton of Santa Fe , 115 N.M. 397, 398, 851 P.2d 1064, 1065 (1993). 3 Although Defendant argues finality on the basi s that “the case languishes” in the 4 district court [MIO 3] , the remedy for any inaction is a matter to be addressed below, 5 and is independent of finality on appeal. 6 We recognize that the district court’s summary judgment ruling precludes any 7 further litigation between Defend ant and Third-Party Defendants. [MIO 2; RP 8 Vol.II/264] We recognize further Rule 1-054(B)(2), which provides that a judgment 9 determining all issues as to one party is final unless the court otherwise provides. 10 While the summary judgment ruling may haveended all litigation against Third-Party 11 Defendants, it did not, however, end th e litigation against Defendant. Given 12 Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendant, application of Rule 1-054(B)(2) is not 13 merited. See, e.g., Healthsource, Inc. v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C. , 14 2005-NMCA-097, ¶¶ 14-15, 138 N.M. 70, 116 P.3d 861 (recognizing that while Rule 15 1-054(B)(2) may provide finality to one party, it does not extend finality to a second 16 party if issues remain pending against suchparty in a counterclaim by a third party). 17 Further, as provided in De fendant’s counterclaim against Plaintiff, Third-Party 18 Defendant DKM is the general partner to Plaintiff, and Third-Party Defendant Karen 195 Mayes is the manager of DKM. [RP Vol.I/18] Plaintiff’s third-party complaint 1 further provides that Third-Party Defendant DKM is the predecessor-in-interest of 2 Plaintiff. [RP Vol.II/463] Given the relationship between Plaintiff and Third-Party 3 Defendants, it would be ill advised to address the dismissal of Defendant’s claims 4 against Third-Party Defendants. See, e.g., Khalsa v. Levinson , 1998-NMCA-110, ¶¶ 5 20-21, 1998-NMCA-110, 125 N.M. 680, 964 P.2d 844 (holding that the district court 6 abused its discretion by certifying an order for immediate appeal when the issues 7 resolved by the order were intertwined withissues not yet resolved by the district 8 court). 9 Conclusion. Based on the foregoing discussion, we dismiss for lack of finality. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 14 WE CONCUR: 15

16 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 17

18 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 196 1