a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives

June 2005 MILITARY 

TRANSFORMATION

Actions Needed by 

DOD to More Clearly 

Identify New Triad 

Spending and Develop 

a Long-term 

Investment Approach

GAO-05-540
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-540.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact 

Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-540, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

June 2005

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 

Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 

Identify New Triad Spending and Develop 

a Long-term Investment Approach 

Although DOD broadened its definition of strategic capabilities during the 

2001 Nuclear Posture Review and established a New Triad, it has not 

developed a way to use the FYDP to identify the total amount it plans to 

spend to sustain and enhance New Triad capabilities during the next few 

years. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD 

and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and to make 

informed decisions in light of competing priorities. While DOD has identified 

some New Triad spending included in the FYDP, it has not identified all 

associated spending. GAO’s notional analysis of New Triad-related programs 

in the FYDP through 2009 shows that overall spending could be significantly 

greater than DOD’s limited analyses have identified to date. According to 

DOD officials, DOD has not fully identified spending in the FYDP because of 

the diversity and broad scope of the concept. A mechanism for aggregating 

FYDP data, known as a “virtual major force program,” could help DOD 

address these obstacles and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress 

with better visibility into overall DOD spending plans for the New Triad. 

DOD also faces long-term affordability challenges in funding the New Triad. 

However, it has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term 

investment approach to identify the projected resource requirements and 

funding timelines to acquire and sustain New Triad capabilities beyond the 

period of time covered by FYDP. Long-term capital investment planning is an 

important tool to help organizations establish priorities and develop future 

budgets. DOD is likely to face significant affordability challenges in the long 

term in deciding the mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to 

implement the vision of the New Triad, as existing nuclear weapons 

platforms begin to reach the end of their lives within the next 15 years and 

missile defense capabilities are expanding. While DOD has identified some 

near-term investments, its investment plans are incomplete and it lacks a 

comprehensive strategy for developing a long-term plan. 

Transformation of U.S. Strategic Capabilities 

In its December 2001 Nuclear 

Posture Review, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) created a New 

Triad by significantly changing its 

definition and conceptual 

framework for its strategic 

capabilities to include not only the 

nuclear capabilities of the old Triad 

that consisted of intercontinental 

ballistic missiles, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, and 

strategic bombers, but also the 

capabilities of offensive 

conventional strike forces, active 

and passive defenses, and a 

revitalized defense infrastructure 

(see figure). 

GAO was asked to determine the 

extent to which DOD has 

(1) identified the projected 

spending for the New Triad in its 

Future Years Defense Program 

(FYDP) and (2) developed a 

long-term investment approach to 

identify and manage future 

spending for the New Triad. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD take 

actions designed to provide greater 

visibility of the projected spending 

and future investments for DOD’s 

efforts to create the New Triad and 

acquire future capabilities. 

Although GAO requested them, 

DOD did not provide comments by 

the time the final report went to 

print. 
Page i GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in 

the FYDP 11

DOD Lacks an Overarching and Integrated Long-term Investment 

Approach for Acquiring and Sustaining New Triad Capabilities 20

Conclusions 25

Recommendations for Executive Action 27

Agency Comments 28

Appendixes

Appendix I: U.S. Strategic Command Missions 29

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 31

Appendix III: GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected 

Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense 

Program 34

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41

Tables Table 1: New Triad Weapons Systems and Capabilities 7

Table 2: GAO Notional Analysis of Projected Spending for New 

Triad Program Elements in the FYDP for Fiscal Years 

2004-2009 16

Table 3: U.S. Strategic Command Missions 29

Table 4: GAO’s Categorization of New Triad-Related FYDP Program 

Elements 36

Table 5: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Major Force 

Program Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009 37

Figures Figure 1: The New Triad 5

Figure 2: Comparison of New Triad-Related Program Elements 

Identified in DOD and GAO Analyses 15

Figure 3: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Primary 

Appropriation Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 

2009 39

Figure 4: Projected Spending for the New Triad by DOD 

Organizations, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009 40
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Contents

Page ii GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
Page 1 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

June 30, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Terry Everett

Chairman

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes

Ranking Member

Strategic Forces Subcommittee

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,1

 the Department of Defense 

(DOD) presented a conceptual framework for transforming U.S. strategic 

capabilities.2

 The review proposed that the United States move away from 

depending heavily on nuclear weapons and instead bring together the 

capabilities of nuclear and conventional offensive strike forces, active and 

passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure, to create a New 

Triad to achieve the desired strategic effects. Enhanced command and 

control, planning, and intelligence capabilities would also support the New 

Triad. The review stated that the synergism achieved through the 

integration of nuclear and conventional offensive strike and defensive 

capabilities would provide the President and Secretary of Defense with a 

broad array of military options to better address the spectrum of potential 

opponents and contingencies that may arise in the coming decades.

1

 In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 

(Pub. L. No. 106-398), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Energy, to “conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the 

United States for the next 5 to 10 years”. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was the second 

post-Cold War review of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The first one was conducted in 1994.

2

 Strategic capabilities are those required to conduct strategic missions, which are 

operations directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the 

purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s capacity and will to 

make war. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are designed to have a 

long-range rather than an immediate effect on the enemy and its military forces. There may 

be times, however, when strategic capabilities need to produce timely effects.
Page 2 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review also concluded that new defense 

initiatives and investments would be required to transform U.S. strategic 

capabilities and realize the full potential of the New Triad. The Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP), a DOD centralized report consisting of 

thousands of program elements3

 that provides information on DOD’s 

current and planned out year budget requests, is one of DOD’s principal 

tools to manage the spending for its transformation of strategic 

capabilities. The FYDP provides visibility over DOD’s projected spending 

and helps inform DOD and Congress about resource data relating to 

identifying priorities and trade-offs.

DOD is transforming its strategic capabilities at a time when it is also faced 

with fiscal challenges brought about by ongoing military operations and 

other major initiatives to transform the way it prepares to fight and win 

wars. In our February 2005 report entitled 21st Century Challenges: 

Reexamining the Base of Government, we concluded that the magnitude 

of funding and potential for current investments and operations to turn into 

long-term financial commitments are prompting real questions about the 

affordability and sustainability of the rate of growth in defense spending.4

We also observed that the role, size, and structure of forces and capabilities 

comprising the strategic triad are key issues that may need to be assessed 

in view of the new security and fiscal environment.

At your request, we reviewed the progress made by DOD in determining 

and allocating resources needed to implement the New Triad today and in 

the future. Specifically, you asked us to determine the extent to which DOD 

has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its FYDP and 

(2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage 

future investments needed to achieve the synergistic capabilities 

envisioned for the New Triad.

3

 Program elements are the primary data elements in the FYDP that generally represent 

organizational entities and their related resources. They represent descriptions of the 

various missions of DOD and are the building blocks of the FYDP, and they may be 

aggregated in different ways, including to show total resources assigned to a specific 

program, and to identify selected functional groupings of resources.

4

 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). This report presents illustrative 

questions for policymakers to consider across major areas of the budget and federal 

operations as they carry out their responsibilities.
Page 3 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

To obtain information on DOD’s efforts to identify projected spending and 

develop future investment strategies for the New Triad, we reviewed 

documents and interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps 

headquarters, and the U.S. Strategic Command. We also conducted a 

notional analysis to identify projected spending for the New Triad by 

analyzing resource data for program elements related to the New Triad 

included in the FYDP prepared to support the President’s fiscal year 2005 

budget submission to Congress. The results of our notional analysis are not 

meant to provide a definite accounting of the projected New Triad spending 

included in the FYDP but rather to illustrate an approach that could be 

used to align the concepts and capabilities of the New Triad with program 

elements in the FYDP.5

 We did not analyze resource data from the FYDP 

prepared to support the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget submission 

because the data were not yet available during our review. In conducting 

our analysis, we determined that the automated FYDP data were 

sufficiently reliable for meeting our objectives. Additionally, we compared 

DOD’s investment planning actions for the New Triad against the best 

practices identified for leading capital decision making to determine the 

extent that DOD has followed these practices. We conducted our review 

from December 2003 through April 2005 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. See appendix II for a more 

complete description of our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief Although DOD established its New Triad in 2001, it has not developed a 

way to fully identify projected spending for New Triad programs in its 

FYDP. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming strategic 

capabilities in the current fiscal environment, decision makers need to 

have the best and most complete data available about the resources being 

allocated to the New Triad. Although DOD has identified some spending 

related to the New Triad in the FYDP, our notional analysis of such 

spending included in the FYDP through 2009 indicates that overall 

spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD’s limited 

analyses have identified. DOD has not fully identified New Triad spending 

5

 In conducting our analysis we relied on DOD’s definitions of New Triad capabilities to 

determine the relevant program elements in the FYDP that were aligned with those 

capabilities. However, we made certain assumptions about how to make these linkages, 

such as the extent to which capabilities provided by program elements were dedicated to 

New Triad missions.
Page 4 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

because the diversity and scope of the New Triad and ambiguity of the 

concept make it difficult for DOD officials to reach agreement on a 

complete list of programs, according to DOD officials. Additionally, the 

current FYDP structure does not readily identify and aggregate New Triad 

spending. A mechanism to aggregate FYDP spending, known as a “virtual 

major force program,” has been used by DOD to identify space funding and 

could be beneficial in tracking New Triad funding, according to some DOD 

officials including the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. Without 

some mechanism to aggregate funding associated with the New Triad, DOD 

will be limited in its ability to guide and integrate New Triad spending.

Despite the long lead time generally needed to develop and acquire new 

systems and the need to consider long-term affordability issues, DOD has 

not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment 

approach for acquiring new capabilities and replacing some or all of its 

aging systems that provide New Triad capabilities. Best practices show that 

long-term capital planning is needed to help organizations define direction, 

establish priorities, and plan future budgets. While DOD has identified 

some near-term investments, its investment plans are incomplete because 

some key capabilities for the New Triad have not been fully assessed in 

context of the New Triad and long-term replacement of key platforms have 

not been assessed in the context of the new security environment and 

DOD-wide affordability challenges. Although DOD recognizes the need for 

a long-term investment approach, it has not begun to develop one because 

its concepts for nonnuclear strike and missile defense are not fully mature. 

However, delaying the preparation of a long-term investment approach 

puts DOD at risk of not developing an affordable strategy. Additionally, 

DOD and Congress will not have sufficient information to effectively 

determine future investment costs, the priorities, and trade-offs needed to 

sustain New Triad implementation. While we agree that some concepts are 

continuing to evolve, and that new systems are still under development, we 

do not believe that these circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to 

plan for the future of the New Triad. As new information becomes 

available, we would expect to see adjustments in DOD’s plans–that is the 

nature of long-term planning.

We are making recommendations designed to provide greater visibility of 

the projected spending and future investments for DOD’s efforts to create 

the New Triad and acquire future capabilities. On April 28, 2005, we 

provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. As of the 

time this report went to final printing, DOD had not provided comments 

as requested.
Page 5 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Background In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded the range 

of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad, which consisted 

of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also conventional and 

nonkinetic offensive strike and defensive capabilities. The review also 

called for revitalizing the U.S. research and development and industrial 

infrastructure that would develop, build, and maintain offensive forces and 

defensive systems and be capable of responding in a timely manner to 

augment U.S. military capabilities when necessary. According to DOD, the 

three legs of the New Triad–offensive strike, active and passive defenses, 

and responsive infrastructure–are intended to be supported by timely and 

accurate intelligence, adaptive planning, and enhanced command and 

control capabilities. Figure 1 shows the three legs of the New Triad and its 

supporting elements.

Figure 1: The New Triad

Note: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

SLBMs

ICBMs

Offensive strike

Source: 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.

Active and 

passive defenses

Strategic 

bombers

Command and control, 

intelligence, and

planning 

Old

Triad

Responsive 

infrastructure
Page 6 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

DOD concluded in the 2001 review that while nuclear weapons will 

continue to play a critical role in defending the United States, the 

combination of capabilities included in the New Triad would increase the 

military options available to the President and Secretary of Defense and 

allow for the development of responsive, adaptive, and interoperable joint 

forces that could be employed in a wider range of contingencies. DOD’s 

review indicated that the additional capabilities provided by the New Triad 

would partially mitigate the effects of any reductions in the number of 

operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads that are planned 

through 2012.6

 Table 1 shows the weapons systems and capabilities that 

make up the New Triad.

6

 The Nuclear Posture Review states that the United States plans to reduce its operationally 

deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a range between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads by 2012. 

This warhead range and the year the goal is to be reached are also set forth in the May 2002 

Moscow Treaty between the United States and Russia. An operationally deployed strategic 

nuclear warhead is one that is fully ready for use and is either mated on or allocated to an 

operational delivery system, such as a ballistic missile or strategic bomber.
Page 7 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Table 1: New Triad Weapons Systems and Capabilities

Source: Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, 2002, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense.

In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD indicates that new initiatives and 

investments would be required to achieve a mix of new or improved 

capabilities that compose the offensive, defensive, and responsive 

infrastructure legs and supporting command and control, intelligence, and 

adaptive planning elements of the New Triad. In particular, the review 

found that major investment initiatives would be needed in the areas of 

advanced nonnuclear strike, missile defenses, command and control, and 

intelligence. DOD also plans to improve existing New Triad-related 

capabilities by modernizing existing weapon systems and enhancing the 

tools used to build and execute strike plans to provide more flexibility in 

adapting or developing military options during crises. An Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

told us that DOD intends to partially address near-term affordability issues 

for the New Triad by enhancing capability characteristics of current 

weapon systems, such as range, and leveraging capabilities already in 

development. In March 2003, DOD published a Nuclear Posture Review 

Implementation Plan that is intended to identify initiatives for developing

Leg Element Weapon system or capability

Offensive strategic strike Nuclear strike • Intercontinental ballistic missiles

• Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

• Strategic bombers

• Nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (held in reserve)

Nonnuclear strike • Advanced conventional weapon systems

• Offensive information operations

• Special operations forces

Defenses Active defense • Ballistic missile defenses

• Air defenses

Passive defense Measures that:

• Reduce vulnerability through mobility, dispersal, redundancy, 

deception, concealment, and hardening

• Warn of imminent attack

• Support consequence management activities

Responsive infrastructure Research and development and 

industrial infrastructure

• Research facilities

• Manufacturing capacity

• Skilled personnel

Elements that support the New 

Triad:

• Adaptive planning

• Enhanced command and control

• Timely and accurate intelligence
Page 8 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

the New Triad and institutionalizing the Nuclear Posture Review.7 DOD 

plans to implement the New Triad concept and many of the capabilities 

identified by the Nuclear Posture Review by 2012. However, DOD states 

that further investments are likely to be needed beyond that time frame as 

existing nuclear platforms age, such as the Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile system,8

 and follow-on nuclear weapon systems are 

proposed.

The Nuclear Posture Review also states that DOD should conduct periodic 

assessments to determine its progress in developing and integrating 

capabilities for the New Triad. Specifically, these strategic capability 

assessments are to review the (1) progress to date in reducing the number 

of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, (2) state of the 

security environment, and (3) progress made in the development of the 

New Triad. An assessment team, which included representatives from DOD 

and the Department of Energy, completed its first Nuclear Posture Review 

strategic capability assessment and associated report in April 2005. An 

Office of the Secretary of Defense official told us that DOD plans to update 

its first assessment in the fall of 2005 to support the department’s conduct 

of the Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD intends to conduct subsequent 

assessments about every 2 years through 2012.

Many DOD organizations, including the Joint Staff, military services, 

combatant commands, and defense agencies, and the Department of 

Energy, have responsibilities for implementing various aspects of the New 

Triad. These responsibilities are broadly defined in relevant New Triad 

implementation and guidance documents. Within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, two organizations have key responsibilities for 

overseeing and managing the New Triad implementation efforts:

• The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible 

for developing the policy and guidance to implement the 2001 Nuclear 

Posture Review and for establishing an organizational framework for 

coordinating New Triad initiatives within DOD.

7

 The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan is intended to provide general 

guidance for developing several key New Triad capabilities, including advanced nonnuclear 

strike and ballistic missile defenses, and for modernizing and extending the service lives of 

existing strategic nuclear platforms.

8

 DOD plans to extend the service life of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile 

system until 2020.
Page 9 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

• The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics is responsible for providing oversight for the 

development and deployment of New Triad capabilities.

The U.S. Strategic Command also has a significant role in implementing the 

New Triad and supporting its missions. In addition to its responsibilities for 

strategic nuclear deterrence and military space operations missions, the 

command was assigned several new missions related to the New Triad in 

January 2003. These missions are: global strike; integrated missile defense; 

DOD information operations; and command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In January 2005, 

the Secretary of Defense also assigned the command responsibility for the 

mission of combating weapons of mass destruction. Appendix I provides 

additional information about the U.S. Strategic Command’s missions.

Additionally, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense is responsible for assembling and distributing the 

FYDP, which DOD uses to formulate the estimated projected resources and 

proposed appropriations to support DOD programs, projects, and 

activities, including those related to the New Triad. The office is also 

responsible for coordinating with DOD components any proposed changes 

to the FYDP’s structure, such as updates to existing program element titles 

and definitions. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) has responsibility for the annual budget justification 

material that is presented to Congress. These offices work collaboratively 

to ensure that the data presented in the budget justification material and 

the FYDP are equivalent at the appropriation account level.

The FYDP is a report that resides in an automated database, which is 

updated and published at least 3 times a year to coincide with DOD’s 

internal budget development activities and annual budget submission to 

Congress. It provides projections of DOD’s near and midterm funding 

needs and reflects the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal year. 

The FYDP includes data on estimates for the fiscal year reflected in the 

current budget request and at least 4 subsequent years.9

 Both detailed data 

and a summary report are generally provided to Congress with DOD’s 

annual budget submission.

9

 The FYDP submitted with DOD’s fiscal year 2005 budget includes data through fiscal 

year 2009.
Page 10 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

The FYDP is used as a source of data both for analysis and as an input to 

alternative ways of displaying and portraying actual and programmed 

resources. It contains data related to the forces, manpower, and 

total obligation authority for each program element. The FYDP is organized 

into 11 major force program categories, comprising combat forces and 

support programs, which are used as a basis for internal DOD program 

review. The major force program categories include strategic forces, 

general-purpose forces, research and development, and special operations 

forces. The FYDP is further arranged according to the appropriation 

structure utilized by Congress to review budget requests and enact 

appropriations, which includes major appropriation categories for 

procurement; operation and maintenance; military personnel; research, 

development, test, and evaluation; and military construction. Therefore, 

the FYDP’s structure serves the purpose of crosswalking DOD’s internal 

review structure with the congressional review structure.

In 2003, DOD began implementing the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System (JCIDS) process to identify improvements to existing 

capabilities and guide development of new capabilities from a joint 

perspective that recognizes the need for trade-off analysis. The new 

process is designed to provide an approach to defense planning that looks 

at the broad range of capabilities to address contingencies that the 

United States may confront in the future. When fully implemented, JCIDS is 

intended to provide an enhanced methodology utilizing joint concepts that 

will identify and describe existing or future shortcomings in capabilities 

and identify integrated solutions that meet those capability needs. The 

system is also expected to provide better linkage to the acquisition process 

and improve prioritization of validated joint warfighting capability 

proposals. Specifically, it is intended to provide a broader review of 

proposals than did the previous planning process by involving additional 

participants, including the combatant commands, early in the process. The 

analyses conducted during the process are to result in a set of potential 

solutions, including additional resources or changes to doctrine and 

training designed to correct capability shortcomings. These solutions are 

then incorporated into roadmaps that show the resource strategies to 

develop and acquire the needed capabilities.
Page 11 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

DOD Has Not Fully 

Identified Projected 

New Triad Spending in 

the FYDP

DOD has not fully identified the projected spending for New Triad in the 

FYDP to date. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming strategic 

capabilities, decision makers need to have the best and most complete data 

available about the resources being allocated to the New Triad in making 

decisions on the affordability, sustainability, and trade-offs among the 

efforts to develop and acquire capabilities. The FYDP is one of the principal 

tools available to help inform DOD and Congress about resource data 

relating to these efforts. While DOD has identified some New Triad 

spending in its analyses and in relevant New Triad documents, our notional 

analysis of New Triad-related program elements indicates that overall 

projected spending for the New Triad through fiscal year 2009 could be 

much greater when other program elements that provide New Triad 

capabilities are considered. Additionally, the current FYDP data structure 

does not expressly identify and aggregate New Triad program elements that 

would allow identification of New Triad spending, and the program 

elements included in the FYDP’s existing major force program category for 

strategic forces do not fully capture the broader range of strategic 

capabilities that were envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review. DOD does 

not plan to develop a complete and approved inventory of New Triadrelated program elements in its FYDP because DOD officials believe that it 

is difficult to reach agreement on the program elements to be included in 

such an inventory. However, an inventory of New Triad-related program 

elements that provides a more complete and clear identification of the 

projected spending currently planned for the New Triad could help DOD 

and Congress make decisions on the affordability and spending needed for 

programs to develop and acquire New Triad capabilities.
Page 12 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

DOD Has Not Fully Aligned 

Projected Spending with 

New Triad Capabilities

While DOD has identified some program elements related to the New Triad 

in documents and internal reviews, it still has not fully identified 

projected spending associated with the New Triad. DOD documents related 

to the New Triad, including the Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear 

Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the Secretary of Defense’s 

fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, 

broadly describe the capabilities of the New Triad and indicate the range 

and types of activities and weapon systems that provide these capabilities. 

DOD has also identified and directed resources for some New Triad 

programs. For example, as the Nuclear Posture Review was being 

completed in late 2001, DOD issued guidance for preparing its fiscal year 

2003 budget that identified 12 initiatives that were considered key to 

developing the New Triad, such as programs to provide capabilities to 

defeat hard and deeply buried targets.10

In anticipation of a potential requirement to identify New Triad program 

elements in the FYDP, DOD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 

conducted an analysis in 2003 that identified a list of 188 FYDP program 

elements, which accounted for about $186.7 billion in then-year dollars of 

projected spending for fiscal years 2004 through 2009.11 The office 

identified another $17.4 billion for programs and activities that are not 

readily identifiable in the FYDP,12 bringing the total to about $204.1 billion. 

However, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation officials told us that 

the analysis included only those program elements that supported the 

initiatives identified in DOD’s programming guidance or otherwise clearly 

provide New Triad capabilities. The officials said that the list of programs 

identified in this analysis was never agreed upon and approved within DOD 

and there are no current plans to update the analysis.

10 Hard and deeply buried targets are structures ranging from hardened surface bunker 

complexes to deep, underground tunnel facilities, which are used to conceal and protect 

critical leadership, military, and industrial personnel; weapons; equipment; and activities 

that constitute serious threats to U.S. security. These structures are typically large, complex, 

and well concealed, incorporating strong physical security, modern air defenses, protective 

siting, multifaceted communications, and other important features that make many of them 

survivable against existing conventional methods of attack.

11 All projected spending associated with the New Triad is expressed as total obligation 

authority in then-year dollars and is current as of the budget submitted to Congress for fiscal 

year 2005.

12 These programs and activities include special access programs, weapons systems, and 

other activities that are not identifiable with discrete program elements.
Page 13 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that the team conducting 

the first strategic capability assessment for the New Triad performed a 

subsequent survey of current program elements in the FYDP to determine 

the capabilities these program elements would provide for the New Triad 

by 2012. An Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation official said that the 

survey included all of the program elements on their list. However, the 

official did not know whether the survey identified any additional program 

elements.

In addition to DOD’s projected spending in the FYDP for the New Triad, the 

Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration 

identified $41.7 billion for nuclear weapons activities for fiscal years 2004 

through 2009 in its Future Years Nuclear Security Program prepared for the 

fiscal year 2005 President’s budget submission. This agency is responsible 

for maintaining the infrastructure to support nuclear weapons capabilities, 

including the refurbishment and service-life extension of currently 

deployed nuclear warheads.

New Triad Spending Could 

be Much Greater Than DOD 

Has Currently Identified

DOD’s analyses of FYDP program elements did not include many of the 

program elements that make up several capabilities identified for the New 

Triad in the Nuclear Posture Review, such as special operations and 

intelligence, or those that provide capabilities that are needed to perform 

New Triad missions but also have wider military applications. If these 

additional program elements are considered, the overall projected 

spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD has currently 

identified in New Triad-related documents and in either of the analyses 

conducted by its Office of Program Evaluation and Analysis or strategic 

capability assessment team.

We conducted a notional analysis to identify any additional spending for 

New Triad-related program elements included in the FYDP. Our notional 

analysis considered a broader range of FYDP program elements than either 

of the analyses conducted by DOD’s Office of Program Evaluation and 

Analysis or strategic capability assessment team and included many 

elements that provide capabilities for conducting New Triad missions, but 

also have wider military applications, such as communications, 

intelligence, and special operations program elements. Using available 

DOD definitions of New Triad capabilities, we reviewed each of the 

FYDP’s 4,725 program elements to determine to what extent the elements 

provided capabilities needed for New Triad missions. We further 

distinguished the program elements we identified as being fully dedicated 
Page 14 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

to the missions of the New Triad or not fully dedicated to the New Triad 

because the capabilities provided by these latter program elements 

could be used in a wider range of military applications than just for the 

New Triad.

Compared to the 188 program elements and $204.1 billion in then-year 

spending for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 identified by the Office of 

Program Analysis and Evaluation, our notional analysis identified a total 

of 737 program elements in the FYDP that are aligned with New Triad 

capabilities, with a total associated spending of $360.1 billion over the 

same period, or about $156.0 billion more than the DOD analysis.13

Of the 737 program elements that we identified, 385 program elements 

provide capabilities that would be fully dedicated to New Triad missions, 

such as program elements for weapons of mass destruction defense 

technologies and for the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense 

Organization. The other 352 program elements we identified provide 

capabilities, such as special operations, that would be used in conducting 

New Triad missions but could also be used for other military missions. 

Figure 2 shows the number of New Triad program elements identified by 

the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and the number of 

additional program elements identified in GAO’s analysis.

13 Of the 737 program elements we identified, 271 did not have any resources assigned to 

them for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 at the time the President’s 2005 budget was released. 

However, these program elements remain active in the FYDP, and therefore may have 

spending associated with them in the future.
Page 15 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Figure 2: Comparison of New Triad-Related Program Elements Identified in DOD and 

GAO Analyses

a

In its analysis, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation determined that the capabilities 

provided by about 7 of the 188 program elements it had identified, or 4 percent, were not fully 

dedicated to the New Triad. However, using the criteria we developed for our analysis, we determined 

that all 188 program elements were fully dedicated.

Of the $360.1 billion we identified in projected spending for the New Triad, 

$231.8 billion was for programs that are fully dedicated to the New Triad 

and $128.3 billion for programs that are not fully dedicated.14 As table 2 

shows, we broke out the spending into the New Triad’s four capability 

areas–offensive strike; active and passive defenses; responsive 

infrastructure; and command and control, intelligence, and planning–and 

created a fifth area for program elements that supported more than one 

capability area. Our notional analysis shows that projected spending for 

offensive strike and enhanced command and control, intelligence, and 

planning capability areas almost doubles when program elements that are 

not fully dedicated to the New Triad are included. The offensive strike 

capability area represents the largest amount of the projected spending, 

$156.0 billion in then-year dollars, and the command and control, 

intelligence, and planning capability area is next with $108.0 billion in 

projected spending. Together, these two capability areas account 

14 For not fully dedicated program elements, we included all projected spending for the 

elements in our analysis and we did not attempt to assign any specific portion of the 

spending to the New Triad.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

188 program elements

197 program elements

352 program elements

Fully 

dedicated Program elements 

identified by the Office 

of Program Analysis 

and Evaluationa

Not fully

dedicated

Additional program 

elements identified 

by GAO
Page 16 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

for 73 percent, or about $264.0 billion, of the $360.1 billion total projected 

spending identified in our analysis. Most of the $86.3 billion of projected 

spending for the active and passive defenses capability area is in the fully 

dedicated category. Appendix III provides additional information on the 

results of our analysis.

Table 2: GAO Notional Analysis of Projected Spending for New Triad Program 

Elements in the FYDP for Fiscal Years 2004-2009

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding.

a

Spending amounts do not include $41.7 billion from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 in the Department 

of Energy’s Future Years Nuclear Security Program for nuclear weapons activities.

b

Projected spending associated with program elements that support more than one New Triad 

capability area.

Officials with Program Analysis and Evaluation, Policy, and Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 

U.S. Strategic Command stated that the methodology we used for our 

notional analysis was reasonable. Officials from the Office of Program 

Analysis and Evaluation and from U.S. Strategic Command told us that the 

program elements we identified were consistent with the capabilities 

defined for the New Triad. Officials from the Office of Program Analysis 

and Evaluation also said that our analysis used a more systematic approach 

in identifying New Triad-related program elements included in the FYDP 

Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars

New Triad 

capability areas

Projected spending

for program

elements fully

dedicated to the

New Triad

Projected spending

for program

elements not fully

dedicated to the

New Triad

Total projected

spending for New

Triad program

elements

Offensive strike $82.4 $73.6 $156.0

Active and passive 

defenses

85.2 1.1 86.3

Responsive 

infrastructurea

1.3 0.1 1.4

Command and 

control, intelligence, 

and planning

56.6 51.4 108.0

Multiple capability 

areasb

6.3 2.1 8.5

Total $231.8 $128.3 $360.1
Page 17 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

than was followed in DOD’s analyses. The officials added that when they 

were compiling their own analysis of New Triad-related program elements, 

many of the documents that GAO used to identify relevant programs had 

not yet been published. Therefore, while DOD did not include many 

program elements that are not fully dedicated to the New Triad in their 

analyses, the officials told us that it was not unreasonable to include those 

program elements in our analysis. As our notional analysis shows, 

including these program elements not only provides greater transparency 

of the projected spending for the New Triad in the FYDP but also identifies 

many additional program elements that provide capabilities necessary for 

carrying out New Triad missions.

New Triad Spending Is Not 

Readily Identified in the 

FYDP’s Structure

While the FYDP is a report that provides DOD and Congress with a tool for 

looking at future funding needs, the current FYDP structure does not 

readily identify and aggregate New Triad-related program elements to 

provide information on current and planned resource allocations–including 

spending changes, priorities, and trends–for the New Triad. In conducting 

our analysis of FYDP program elements, we observed that DOD has not 

created any data fields in the FYDP’s structure that would expressly 

identify program elements as being relevant to the New Triad. According to 

DOD Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, there is no plan to modify 

the data fields in the FYDP structure to allow the ready identification of 

New Triad program elements and associated spending because they have 

not received direction to do so. Additionally, these officials told us that if 

DOD were to modify the FYDP structure to allow such identification, it 

would need to develop an approved list of existing New Triad program 

elements to allow capture of these elements in the data fields.

Additionally, as we have reported in the past, the FYDP’s 11 major force 

program categories have remained virtually unchanged since the 1960s.15

Our notional FYDP analysis indicates that the FYDP’s definition of the

15 GAO, Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency of DOD’s 

Projected Resource Needs, GAO-04-514 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004). This report also 

discusses a number of other limitations in the FYDP. For example, the FYDP’s current 

usefulness is limited in providing Congress visibility over the implementation of the 

capabilities-based defense strategy and associated risk management framework, important 

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review initiatives. We made recommendations aimed at 

enhancing the effectiveness of the FYDP, including: (1) aligning the program elements in the 

FYDP to defense capabilities needed to meet the defense strategy and the dimensions of the 

risk management framework and (2) reporting funding levels in its summary FYDP report 

to Congress.
Page 18 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

existing major force program for strategic forces16–one of the key major 

force program categories associated with the New Triad–does not fully 

capture the projected New Triad spending for the broader range of 

strategic capabilities that are envisioned for the New Triad in the Nuclear 

Posture Review. We determined that only $55.6 billion, or about 15 percent 

of the $360.1 billion of projected spending that we identified in our notional 

analysis of FYDP program elements, is associated with the FYDP’s strategic 

forces major force program category, which largely captures projected 

spending on offensive nuclear capabilities. The remaining $304.6 billion is 

dispersed among the other 10 major force programs. For example, program 

elements for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, which is an 

autonomous, stealthy, long-range, conventional, air-to-ground, precision 

cruise missile designed to destroy high-value, well-defended fixed or 

moveable targets, and the Patriot missile defense system, which 

contributes to the defense leg of the New Triad, are included in the FYDP’s 

general-purpose forces major force program. Similarly, intelligence-related 

program elements for hard and deeply buried targets and to support 

U.S. Strategic Command are part of the FYDP’s command, control, 

communications, and intelligence major force program.

In the past, DOD created new aggregations of program elements and 

changed the FYDP’s structure as decision makers needed information not 

already captured in the FDYP. For example, a recent aggregation allows 

data that relate to every dollar, person, and piece of equipment in the FYDP 

to be identified as being in either a force or infrastructure category. DOD 

has also made it possible to identify program elements in the FYDP that are 

related to activities to capture the resources associated with specific areas 

of interest, such as space activities. In 2001, DOD established a “virtual 

major force program” for space to increase the visibility of resources 

allocated for space activities. This is a programming mechanism that 

aggregates most space-unique funding by military department and function

16 The FYDP defines strategic forces as those organizations and associated weapon systems 

whose force missions encompass intercontinental or transoceanic intertheater 

responsibilities. Program elements in the strategic forces major force program include 

strategic offensive forces, such as those related to intercontinental and submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles, and strategic defensive forces, such as ballistic missile early-warning 

systems.
Page 19 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

crosscutting DOD’s 11 existing major force program categories.17 The 

Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, who has key responsibilities 

for implementing the New Triad, told us that creating a virtual major force 

program for the New Triad could help align New Triad capabilities with the 

projected spending in the FYDP, identify responsible organizations, reduce 

ambiguity of the New Triad concept, and provide better visibility and focus 

for DOD efforts to develop and acquire New Triad capabilities. The 

Commander suggested that it could be necessary to create more than one 

virtual major force program, possibly one for each of the New Triad legs, 

because of the diversity and scope of New Triad capabilities. Some Office 

of the Secretary of Defense officials also told us that creating a virtual 

major force program could provide Congress with more visibility of DOD’s 

efforts underway to develop the capabilities needed for the New Triad. 

Until such time as a tool such as a virtual major force program becomes 

available that can capture and categorize the projected spending for the 

New Triad in the FYDP, we believe that DOD will be limited in its ability to 

guide and direct all its efforts to develop, acquire, and integrate New Triad 

capabilities and Congress will not have full visibility of the resources being 

allocated.

DOD Lacks a Plan to Fully 

Identify New Triad Spending

DOD has not established a requirement to develop a complete and 

approved list of the program elements included in the FYDP that are 

associated with New Triad spending. Office of the Secretary of Defense 

officials told us that DOD has not established such a requirement because 

the diversity and scope of the New Triad make it difficult for DOD officials 

to reach agreement on a complete list of programs. They also told us that 

because the New Triad is an ambiguous concept, the program elements 

included in such a list would change as the New Triad evolves and becomes 

better defined.

However, without a complete and approved DOD list of New Triad program 

elements included in the FYDP, there is some uncertainty about the total 

17 We have issued several reports addressing DOD’s progress in creating its virtual major 

force program for space. See: GAO, Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and 

Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions 

Need to Be More Robust, GAO-05-155 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005); Defense Space 

Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further Management Actions Needed, 

GAO-03-379 (Washington, D.C.: April 2003); and Military Space Operations: Planning, 

Funding, and Acquisition Challenges Facing Efforts to Strengthen Space Control, 

GAO-02-738 (Washington, D.C.: September 2002).
Page 20 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

range of programs and projected spending that are being pursued to 

achieve New Triad capabilities. It also will be difficult for Congress to 

assess DOD’s progress in achieving the goals identified in the Nuclear 

Posture Review without having complete information on the resources 

being spent or needed in the future to meet those goals. Additionally, the 

broad scope of the New Triad concept and large number of organizations 

with New Triad-related spending responsibilities makes it even more 

important to have complete information available on the projected 

spending being provided for each of the New Triad capability areas and for 

each of the many organizations developing and acquiring New Triad 

capabilities. For example, our notional analysis identified as many 

as 23 defense organizations, including the military services, offices within 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, several combatant 

commands, and defense agencies, with FYDP spending related to the New 

Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that having an 

approved program list would promote a common understanding of the New 

Triad and benefit future department program reviews. Additionally, an 

Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation official told us that an approved 

program list would aid DOD in making resource decisions for the New 

Triad. In preparing DOD’s fiscal year 2006 budget, the official told us that an 

approved list of programs would have made it easier to evaluate the effects 

of programming changes proposed by the military services on capabilities 

being acquired for the New Triad.

DOD Lacks an 

Overarching and 

Integrated Long-term 

Investment Approach 

for Acquiring and 

Sustaining New Triad 

Capabilities

While several New Triad documents and DOD’s recent strategic capability 

assessment identify investment needs through 2012, DOD’s near-term 

investment direction is incomplete. Additionally, DOD has not yet 

developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach to 

identify and plan investments needed to acquire and sustain capabilities for 

the New Triad. A long-term investment approach is an important tool in an 

organization’s decision-making process to define direction, establish 

priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions 

needed to achieve goals. Although DOD recognizes the need for a long-term 

investment approach, it does not plan to develop one until nonnuclear 

strike and missile defense concepts are mature. DOD has not identified a 

specific date for when this will occur. The new JCIDS process could 

complement any long-term investment approach developed for the New 

Triad by providing additional analysis and discussions to support New 

Triad investment and the development of a plan.
Page 21 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Long-term Investment 

Approach Is a Useful Tool to 

Establish Priorities

In our past reporting on leading capital decision-making practices,18 we 

have determined that leading organizations have decision-making 

processes in place to help them assess where they should invest their 

resources for the greatest benefit over the long term. These processes help 

an organization determine whether its investments are the most cost 

effective, support its goals, and consider alternatives before making a final 

selection. A long-term investment approach is an important tool in an 

organization’s decision-making process to define direction, establish 

priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions 

needed to achieve goals. Our analysis of several investment plans showed 

that such an approach includes information on future investment 

requirements, projected resources, investment priorities and trade-offs, 

milestones, and funding timelines, and is intended to be a dynamic 

document, which would be updated to adapt to changing circumstances.

In the past, DOD has developed and maintained long-term investment 

planning documents for major defense capabilities–such as the Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027 and the “Bomber Roadmap”–to 

provide senior decision makers options in the development of broad 

strategies that will define future DOD force structure and help with the 

resource allocation process.19 In 2003, DOD also published an Information 

Operations Roadmap, which supports collaboration of broad information 

operations efforts and endorses the need for the department to better track 

information operations investments.

DOD’s Near-term 

Investment Direction for the 

New Triad Is Incomplete

As noted earlier, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that 

New Triad documents–including the Nuclear Posture Review, Nuclear 

Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the first strategic capability 

assessment–identify some of the near-term investments needed to provide 

18 GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making, 

GAO/AIMD-99-32 (Washington, D.C.: December 1998).

19 DOD, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(Washington, D.C.: December 2002). Also see GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic 

Planning Can Enhance DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342

(Washington, D.C.: March 2004). For information on the “Bomber Roadmap”, see 

GAO, Operation Desert Storm: Limits on the Role and Performance of B-52 Bombers in 

Conventional Conflicts, GAO/NSIAD-93-138 (Washington, D.C.: May 1993) and Strategic 

Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time-Consuming, and 

Costly, GAO/NSIAD-93-45 (Washington, D.C.: February 1993).
Page 22 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

capabilities for the New Triad. However, this investment direction is 

incomplete and does not address long-term affordability challenges that 

DOD may be faced with in sustaining and developing new capabilities to 

implement the New Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told 

us that the strategic capability assessment provides a near-term investment 

approach by identifying priorities for focusing resources to keep 

investment efforts on track to reach New Triad implementation goals for 

2012. According to the officials, the team conducting the strategic 

capability assessment developed a list of capabilities that were needed in 

key areas, such as strategic strike and missile defense, from the Nuclear 

Posture Review’s vision of the New Triad. The team then reviewed current 

operation activities, acquisition programs of record, and a potential range 

of new technologies to determine any capability shortcomings. Based on 

this review, the assessment team was able to determine whether initiatives 

to develop New Triad capabilities in the key areas were (1) met or on track 

to be satisfied by 2012; (2) on track, but would not be met by 2012; or 

(3) not on track to be met by 2012 unless additional funding was provided. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that by determining the 

status of meeting capabilities in each of the key areas, DOD would be able 

to better prioritize future investment decisions for the New Triad.

However, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy officials 

acknowledge that the first strategic capability assessment provides only a 

limited, near-term investment approach for the New Triad. These officials 

told us that the assessment did not review and assess some key capabilities 

of the New Triad, such as cruise missile defense, information operations, 

and passive defense, and may not have fully surveyed existing capabilities 

in the areas that were included in the assessment. Further, it does not 

address the potential for further investments to replace one or more 

existing nuclear platforms that will approach the end of their useful lives. 

These officials told us that they expect future strategic capability 

assessments to include New Triad key areas not reviewed in the first 

assessment. Additionally, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told 

us that while the assessment’s recommendations are not binding on DOD 

programming and budgeting decisions, the assessment was used during the 

department’s last program review in developing the fiscal year 2006 defense 

budget.

DOD, in its 2003 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, called for 

the creation of an overarching strategic planning document for the New 

Triad that would establish the strategies and plans for developing new 

strategic capabilities to meet national security goals stated in the Nuclear 
Page 23 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Posture Review. The plan also was to provide broad guidance for 

integrating the elements of the New Triad as new capabilities came on line 

and for the development of future forces, supporting systems, planning and 

the creation of a responsive infrastructure. However, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense Policy officials told us that while a draft plan was 

prepared, they decided not to circulate the draft for comments because 

they believed the results of the first strategic capability assessment would 

result in too many changes to the plan. Instead, the officials told us that the 

strategic capability assessment process would develop the strategy, plans, 

and guidance that were to be provided by the plan.

DOD Does Not Plan to 

Develop a New Triad 

Long-term Investment 

Approach Until Concepts 

Mature

In its Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, DOD states a need 

for a long-term investment strategy for the New Triad, and according to the 

plan, intends to conduct a study to evaluate options for preparing an 

integrated, long-term investment strategy for strike capabilities, defensive 

capabilities, and infrastructure when nonnuclear strike and missile defense 

concepts are mature. Policy and Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that there are 

several concepts related to New Triad capabilities being developed, 

including the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept and concept 

and operational plans for global strike and integrated ballistic missile 

defense. The officials told us that once nonnuclear strike and missile 

defense concepts are developed, specific programs could be better 

identified to implement these concepts, including new programs to develop 

capabilities that do not currently exist. These officials told us that they 

recognize the importance of a long-term investment approach for the New 

Triad to provide a basis for decisions on resources for future capabilities 

initiatives. However, they do not believe the development of the nonnuclear 

strike and missile defense concepts are far enough along to begin the study 

leading to development of a long-term investment strategy. These officials 

did not provide us with an estimate for when these concepts would be 

considered sufficiently mature to begin the study.

While we agree that some concepts are continuing to evolve, and that new 

systems are still under development, we do not believe that these 

circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to plan for the future of the 

New Triad. For example, although DOD is still developing concepts for 

missile defense, it is planning to spend billions of dollars over the next 

several years to develop a range of missile defense capabilities. As new 

information becomes available, we would expect to see adjustments in
Page 24 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

DOD’s plans–that is the nature of long-term planning. Further, without the 

context of a long-term investment approach for acquiring new capabilities 

and replacing some or all of its aging systems that provide New Triad 

capabilities, DOD will continue to invest billions of dollars on capabilities 

that will affect the long-term composition of the New Triad. DOD is likely 

to face significant affordability challenges in the long term as some existing 

nuclear weapons platforms begin reaching the end of their expected 

service lives within the next 15 years and as missile defense capabilities are 

expanding. Given the length of time to develop and acquire capabilities for 

the New Triad and the need to consider long-term affordability issues, DOD 

is also at risk of not considering the best approaches to developing and 

sustaining capabilities needed to provide the broad range of military 

options for the President and Secretary of Defense that are envisioned for 

the New Triad. DOD is further at risk of not effectively integrating the wide 

range of diverse New Triad capabilities as they are developed and being 

able to effectively determine future investment costs and the priorities 

and trade-offs needed to sustain New Triad implementation. In our 

February 2005 report addressing the challenges that the nation faces by its 

growing fiscal imbalance in the 21st century, we stated that DOD’s current 

approach to planning and budgeting often results in a mismatch between 

programs and budgets and that DOD does not always fully consider 

long-term resource implications and the opportunity cost of selecting one 

alternative over another.20

JCIDS Process Could 

Complement Any Long-term 

Investment Approach

The new JCIDS process could play a role in any long-term investment 

approach that is eventually prepared for the New Triad by providing a 

forum for additional analyses and assessments to support New Triad 

investment decisions and ensure that those decisions are in concert with 

DOD’s overall investment priorities. The JCIDS process is intended to 

provide a means to ensure that new capabilities are conceived and 

developed in a joint warfighting context. The process intends to (1) focus 

on achieving joint operational capabilities rather than on individual 

weapon systems and (2) provide a systematic means to identify capability 

gaps, propose solutions, and establish roadmaps for future investments to 

acquire needed capabilities. Capability assessments, developed through the 

process, are designed to have a long-term focus, consider a wide range of 

potential materiel and nonmateriel solutions across the military services, 

20 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
Page 25 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

analyze trade-offs among different solutions, and identify areas where 

existing capabilities are redundant or excessive. The process offers 

proposed solutions that are intended to be integrated and prioritized and 

would eventually be incorporated into resource roadmaps that show the 

investment strategies to develop and acquire the needed capabilities.

JCIDS also intends to involve the combatant commanders early in the 

decision-making process to provide a strong warfighter perspective in 

identifying capabilities and resource priorities. The U.S. Strategic 

Command has created mission capabilities teams within its Capability and 

Resource Integration Directorate that closely align its missions with the 

JCIDS process to strengthen its ability to more effectively advocate for the 

capabilities needed to perform its missions. The Commander of the U.S. 

Strategic Command told us that his intent is for these teams to play an 

active role in identifying and developing New Triad capabilities.

New Triad capabilities span most of the functional areas established in the 

JCIDS process, including command and control and force application. 

Officials in the Joint Staff’s Office of Requirements Assessment told us that 

the JCIDS process does not currently identify and track joint warfighting 

capabilities as capabilities for the New Triad and Office of the Secretary of 

Defense officials told us that there are no efforts at this time to crosswalk 

the JCIDS’ joint warfighting capabilities with the New Triad. However, Joint 

Staff officials said that organizations with New Triad responsibilities, such 

as the U.S. Strategic Command, do participate in the working groups and 

other activities throughout the JCIDS process to ensure that their equities 

are addressed. The JCIDS process could provide benefits to defense 

planning, but because the process is still very early in its development it is 

unclear whether or how DOD plans to use JCIDS to address its New Triad 

investments.

Conclusions It is important for DOD and congressional decision makers to have the 

most complete accounting possible of the projected spending planned for 

the New Triad over the next several years as they deliberate the budget. 

Until DOD reaches agreement on the program elements that comprise New 

Triad spending in its FYDP, and creates a way to aggregate spending, 

neither defense officials nor Congress will have visibility over all of the 

projected spending planned in the near-term for the New Triad. 

Importantly, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, who has been 

assigned significant responsibilities for coordinating and integrating New 

Triad capabilities from a warfighter perspective, will not have the resource 
Page 26 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

visibility needed to effectively carry out this new role. This information is 

needed to accurately assess the affordability of the various activities and 

weapon systems that make up the New Triad, and to make timely and 

informed decisions on the funding required to develop, acquire, and 

integrate the wide range of diverse New Triad capabilities.

Moreover, without an overarching and integrated long-term investment 

approach for the New Triad, information on affordability challenges, future 

funding priorities, and requirements beyond the current FYDP is not fully 

known. While DOD believes it is still too early to develop a long-term 

investment approach, further delaying the start of this effort puts the 

department at risk of not developing and acquiring capabilities for the New 

Triad when needed. As a result, the President and Secretary of Defense can 

not be assured that DOD has the broad range of military options envisioned 

in the New Triad. Although New Triad concepts are continuing to evolve 

and mature, laying the foundation now for a long-term investment 

approach would provide DOD with an additional planning tool for future 

development of the New Triad concept–a tool that could be continuously 

improved and updated as better information becomes available and as 

changing security and fiscal circumstances warranted. The need for such 

an approach becomes increasingly important as existing nuclear platforms 

begin approaching the end of their useful lives and decisions to replace one 

or more of the platforms are required. Additionally, without such an 

approach, decision makers lack information on projected costs, spending 

priorities and trade-offs, resource requirements, and funding timelines in 

making decisions on the spending commitments needed to sustain New 

Triad implementation. Further, without a long-term investment approach, 

the large number of New Triad stakeholders, such as the military services, 

defense agencies, and combatant commands, will lack the direction and 

focus they need to effectively prepare future funding plans to develop, 

acquire, and integrate the capabilities. Lastly, while the new JCIDS process 

is intended to provide a better approach to identifying solutions to 

capability shortcomings and strengthen the role of combatant commanders 

in making decisions on capability investments, it is yet unclear how the 

process will be used to specifically support investment decisions for the 

New Triad.
Page 27 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To strengthen DOD’s implementation of the New Triad and provide greater 

transparency of resources that are being applied to developing, acquiring, 

and sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense take the following four actions:

• Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in 

consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to 

(1) develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program 

elements in the FYDP, which support activities for developing, 

acquiring, and sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to 

establish a virtual major force program for the New Triad by creating 

new data fields that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New 

Triad-related program elements to provide increased visibility of the 

resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report each year the 

funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the 

department’s summary FYDP report to Congress. The Secretary of 

Defense should direct that these three actions be completed at or about 

the time when the President’s budget for fiscal year 2007 is submitted to 

Congress.

• Direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to develop an overarching and integrated 

long-term investment approach for the New Triad that provides decision 

makers with information about future joint requirements, projected 

resources, spending priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding 

timelines. As part of developing and implementing this approach, DOD 

should leverage the analyses, assessments, and other information 

prepared under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System process. The Secretary of Defense should direct that 

development of a long-term investment approach be completed in time 

for it to be considered in the department’s preparation of its submission 

for the President’s budget for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and be updated, 

as needed, to adapt to changing circumstances.
Page 28 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Agency Comments On April 28, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and 

comment. As of the time this report went to final printing, DOD had not 

provided comments as requested. However, DOD did provide technical 

changes, which have been incorporated in this report as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-4402. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who 

made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Janet A. St. Laurent

Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management
Page 29 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Appendix I

U.S. Strategic Command Missions ApApenednxidexiIs

U.S. Strategic Command has a significant role in implementing the New 

Triad, advocating for the development of New Triad capabilities, and 

supporting its missions. It derives these responsibilities from missions 

assigned by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Table 3 describes 

U.S. Strategic Command’s current missions.

Table 3: U.S. Strategic Command Missions

Mission Description Basis of authority

Strategic deterrence • Plan, target, and employ during wartime 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 

bombers.

Assumed the mission in June 1992 from the 

disestablished Strategic Air Command and 

Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff

Military space operations • Develop desired characteristics and 

capabilities; 

• Plan, advocate, and conduct military space 

operations; and

• Serve as the single point of contact for 

military space operational matters.

Change 1 of the Unified Command Plan,a

effective July 2002

Global strike • Provide integrated global strike planning 

and command and control support to 

deliver rapid, extended-range, precision 

kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., elements of 

space and information operations) effects 

in support of theater and national 

objectives.

Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, 

effective January 2003

Integrated missile defense • Advocate desired global missile defense 

and missile-warning characteristics and 

capabilities for active and passive ballistic 

missile defenses for all combatant 

commands; and

• Provide centralized planning, coordination, 

and integration of global ballistic missile 

defenses, missile warning systems, and 

battle management, command control, 

communications, and intelligence system 

and architecture. 

Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, 

effective January 2003

DOD information operations • Integrate and coordinate DOD information 

operations (including computer network 

attack, computer network defense, 

electronic warfare, operations security, 

military psychological operations, and 

military deception) across geographic 

areas of responsibility.

Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, 

effective January 2003
Appendix I

U.S. Strategic Command Missions

Page 30 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Source: Unified Command Plan 

Note: Change 1 and Change 2 incorporated), April 20, 2002, and Memorandum from the Secretary of 

Defense, January 6, 2005, designating responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction to 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

a

The Unified Command Plan is a classified document approved by the President, published by the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and addressed to the commanders of combatant commands. It 

establishes the combatant commands, identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary 

missions, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and gives 

guidance on the exercise of combatant command.

Command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance

• Plan, integrate, and coordinate 

intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance in support of strategic and 

global operations, as directed; and 

• Task and coordinate command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance 

capabilities in support of strategic force 

employment, including global strike, 

missile defense, and associated planning.

Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, 

effective January 2003

Combating weapons of mass destruction • Plan, integrate, and synchronize DOD 

efforts with the efforts of other agencies;

• Integrate other U.S. Strategic Command 

capabilities (e.g., global strike) and provide 

operational support to other combatant 

commands and organizations conducting 

combating weapons of mass destruction 

missions;

• Synchronize DOD operations for 

combating weapons of mass destruction 

with the intelligence community;

• Advocate desired capabilities for 

combating weapons of mass destruction;

• Sponsor relevant joint doctrine; and

• Provide military representation to U.S. 

national and international agencies.

Memorandum from the Secretary of 

Defense, effective January 2005

(Continued From Previous Page)

Mission Description Basis of authority
Page 31 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Appendix II

Scope and Methodology ApendxiI

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

fully identified projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years 

Defense Program (FDYP), we reviewed key DOD documentation to 

identify and define the New Triad’s capabilities and determine whether 

DOD had identified specific, related programs in the FYDP.

Specifically, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents on the New 

Triad, including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture 

Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense’s fiscal year 2002 

Annual Defense Report, the Defense Science Board’s February 2004 report, 

Future Strategic Strike Forces, briefings by DOD officials, and relevant 

programming guidance. We also obtained the results of an analysis 

performed by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation that identified 

New Triad spending in the FYDP, and discussed the purpose, scope, 

methodology, and limitations of the analysis with officials from this office. 

In addition, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, including officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, the Office of Strategic and Space 

Programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of 

the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, and 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S. Air 

Force headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, and the Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to gain an 

understanding of their role in implementing the New Triad. We met with 

officials of the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, to discuss the 

command’s missions that are relevant to the New Triad.

As part of our effort to determine the extent to which DOD has identified 

the projected spending for the New Triad in its FYDP, we performed our 

own notional analysis of the FYDP to identify resources associated with the 

New Triad. In doing so, we examined the FYDP’s structure and related 

documentation to determine whether the FYDP was designed to capture 

information that would identify specific program elements as being related 

to the New Triad. We met with relevant DOD officials to discuss our 

approach, and reviewed the analysis performed by the Office of Program 

Analysis and Evaluation. We also reviewed prior GAO work to gain a better 

understanding of whether the FYDP has been modified to allow for new 

program element aggregations. In performing our analysis, we assessed the 

reliability of the FYDP data by (1) performing electronic testing of required 

data elements, (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the 

system that produced them, (3) interviewing a knowledgeable DOD official 
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

about the data, and (4) reviewing data reliability tests on these data 

previously performed by GAO. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Additional details about 

how we performed our notional analysis are presented in appendix III.

To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a long-term 

investment approach to identify and manage future investments needed to 

achieve the synergistic capabilities envisioned for the New Triad, we 

interviewed officials and reviewed key documentation to determine 

whether DOD has taken steps to develop and follow such an approach. 

Specifically, to identify best practices for a long-term investment approach, 

we reviewed relevant GAO reports, and identified and reviewed investment 

approaches of other organizations. We then compared DOD’s approach for 

the New Triad against these elements that we had identified in other 

organizations to determine the extent to which DOD had these elements in 

place. In addition, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents, 

including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture Review 

Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense’s fiscal year 2002 Annual 

Defense Report, the Defense Science Board’s February 2004 report, Future 

Strategic Strike Forces, briefings provided by DOD officials, and relevant 

programming guidance to identify investments and investment priorities in 

building New Triad capabilities. We also met with officials from the Joint 

Staff’s Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments to 

discuss the development and implementation of the department’s new Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System, and to determine 

whether the New Triad’s plans for achieving desired capabilities were 

aligned to this new system.

Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, including officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, the Office of Strategic and Space 

Programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of 

the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, and 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S. Air 

Force headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, and the Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to gain their 

perspectives. In addition, we visited the headquarters of the 
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and met with command 

officials to discuss investments needed to acquire capabilities and 

implement the command’s missions.

Our review was conducted between December 2003 and April 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 34 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Appendix III

GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and 

Projected Spending on the New Triad in the 

Future Years Defense Program ApendxiI

To determine how much the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend 

on the New Triad, we performed a notional analysis of the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP) to identify programs and projected spending 

associated with New Triad capabilities. This analysis identifies 737 

program elements that are either “fully dedicated” or “not fully dedicated” 

to the New Triad. “Fully dedicated” program elements provide capabilities 

that primarily execute or support New Triad missions, whereas “not fully 

dedicated” program elements provide capabilities that have wider military 

application than just the New Triad.

Our notional analysis is based on certain assumptions, which we 

considered to be relevant and reasonable, about how to align New Triad 

capabilities to FYDP program elements. For example, we assume that:

• All program elements in the FYDP that are not defined as “historical” are 

currently active and valid for analysis, even though there may not be any 

spending currently associated with the program elements over the fiscal 

years 2004 through 2009 time frame.

• Certain FYDP field values, or combinations of values, can be used to 

identify groups of program elements as being related to the New Triad. 

For example, certain combinations of Force and Infrastructure Codes 

and Defense Mission Codes can be used to identify particular New Triad 

capabilities.

To ensure that our assumptions were reasonable, we discussed our overall 

approach with budget experts at GAO and the Congressional Budget Office 

and with DOD officials. Generally, these officials agreed with our approach 

to identify the projected spending associated with the New Triad included 

in the FYDP. However, DOD officials cautioned that identifying program 

elements that are not fully dedicated to the New Triad can be difficult 

because of the subjectivity required in deciding on the extent to which a 

program element provides capabilities for the New Triad. Therefore, our 

notional analysis suggests a methodology that can be used to conduct a 

comprehensive accounting of the spending plans for the New Triad, and is 

not meant to provide a definitive accounting of projected New Triad 

spending. We recognize that the assumptions we made are subjective, and 

that other analyses to identify projected spending on New Triad capabilities 

in the FYDP may use different assumptions and obtain somewhat different 

results.
Appendix III

GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and 

Projected Spending on the New Triad in the 

Future Years Defense Program

Page 35 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Our Methodology for 

Identifying FYDP 

Program Elements 

Related to the 

New Triad

To identify DOD’s definitions of the four New Triad capabilities—offensive 

strike; active and passive defenses; responsive infrastructure; and 

command and control, intelligence, and planning—we used relevant DOD 

documentation, such as the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear 

Posture Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense’s fiscal 

year 2002 Annual Defense Report, and the Defense Science Board’s 

February 2004 report, Future Strategic Strike Forces. We compared these 

capability definitions with information about each of the 4,725 FYDP 

program elements1

 we reviewed. When we determined that a program 

element was related to one or more of the New Triad’s capabilities, we 

categorized it according to the particular capability that it supported.

We then determined whether the program elements that we identified were 

either fully dedicated or not fully dedicated to the New Triad. In making 

this determination, we assumed that all of the program elements identified 

in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation analysis were fully 

dedicated to the New Triad. Table 4 summarizes the criteria we used to 

identify and categorize program elements that are linked to the New Triad.

1

 FYDP resources fall into three broad categories—total obligation authority, manpower, or 

forces—that are identifiable by resource identification codes. In our review of the FYDP’s 

structure, we identified 4,725 unique, active program elements associated with total 

obligation authority resource identification codes.
Appendix III

GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and 

Projected Spending on the New Triad in the 

Future Years Defense Program

Page 36 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Table 4: GAO’s Categorization of New Triad-Related FYDP Program Elements

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation.

We then used the FYDP data to identify the projected spending associated 

with these program elements for fiscal years 2004 through 2009, and 

expressed our results in then-year dollars. The data for the projected 

spending are current as of the President’s budget submission to Congress 

for fiscal year 2005.

Description Fully dedicated program elements Not fully dedicated program elements 

Offensive strike

Kinetic (e.g., advanced conventional and 

nuclear) and nonkinetic (e.g., information 

operations) systems that provide the ability 

to rapidly plan and deliver limited-duration 

and extended-range attacks to achieve 

precision effects against highly valued 

adversary assets. Includes special 

operations capabilities.

• All relevant program elements identified in 

the Office of Program Analysis and 

Evaluation analysis.

• Additional program elements, identified by 

GAO, that provide or support conventional, 

nuclear, and information operations strike 

capabilities.

GAO-identified program elements that 

mainly support special operations, 

cryptology, and certain counterintelligence 

capabilities.

Active and passive defenses

Programs designed to defend the U.S. 

homeland, allies, and forces abroad. Active 

defenses include (1) ballistic and cruise 

missile defense capabilities and (2) air 

defenses. Passive defenses include 

measures that reduce vulnerability through 

mobility, dispersal, redundancy, deception, 

concealment, and hardening; warn of 

imminent attack; and support consequence 

management activities. 

• All relevant program elements identified in 

the Office of Program Analysis and 

Evaluation analysis.

• Additional program elements, identified by 

GAO, that provide or support missile 

defenses, defense of U.S. airspace, and 

passive defenses, particularly 

consequence management activities. 

GAO-identified program elements that 

mainly provide headquarters support and 

certain counterdrug activities. 

Responsive infrastructure

Programs that address the ability of the U.S. 

technology base to deal with or hedge 

against uncertainties in the nature and 

timing of potential strategic threats, the 

capability of the technology and industrial 

base to respond in a timely manner, and the 

adequacy and responsiveness of science 

and technology programs related to possible 

future strategic capabilities. 

• All relevant program elements identified in 

the Office of Program Analysis and 

Evaluation analysis.

• Additional program elements, identified by 

GAO, that support the upkeep of important 

test ranges and facilities.

GAO-identified program elements that 

support activities at key facilities that 

support or execute New Triad-related 

missions.

Command and control, intelligence, and planning

Programs that (1) provide or support 

nuclear, national, and global military 

command and control systems, including 

key communications infrastructure and 

platforms; (2) provide “exquisite” intelligence 

of an adversary’s capabilities; and 

(3) support adaptive planning.

• All relevant program elements identified in 

the Office of Program Analysis and 

Evaluation analysis.

• Additional program elements, identified by 

GAO, that historically provided nuclear 

command and control capabilities.

GAO-identified program elements 

supporting a broad range of command and 

control, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance capabilities at the national 

level, including space-, air- and groundbased surveillance and reconnaissance 

platforms.
Appendix III

GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and 

Projected Spending on the New Triad in the 

Future Years Defense Program

Page 37 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Projected New Triad 

Spending by FYDP 

Major Force Program

The FYDP’s strategic forces major force program, one of 11 major force 

programs in the FYDP, includes $55.6 billion in then-year dollars for the 

New Triad for fiscal years 2004 through 2009, or 15 percent of the 

$360.1 billion of total spending that we identified. The offensive forces and 

weapons systems in this program are primarily nuclear-focused. As 

indicated in table 5, the remaining $304.6 billion, or 85 percent of the 

projected spending that we identified, is dispersed among 7 of the 

remaining 10 major force programs in the FYDP. The command, control, 

communications, and intelligence program accounted for the largest share 

of New Triad-related spending—$133.5 billion, or 37 percent of the 

projected spending that we identified. We did not identify any projected 

spending on the New Triad in major force programs for central supply and 

maintenance; training, medical, and other general personnel activities; and 

support of other nations.

Table 5: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Major Force Program Category, 

Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009 

Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars

Major force program 

category/Illustrative program 

elements

Total projected spending for

New Triad program elements Percent

Strategic Forces

• B-52 Squadrons

• Minuteman Squadrons

• Service Support to U.S. 

Strategic Command

$55.6 15

General Purpose Forces

• Tomahawk Cruise Missile

• Tomahawk and Tomahawk 

Mission Planning Center

• Domestic Preparedness 

Against Weapons of Mass 

Destruction 

29.7 8

Command, Control, 

Communications, and 

Intelligence

• E-4B National Airborne 

Operations Center

• U.S. Army Space Activities

• Defense Reconnaissance 

Support Activities 

133.5 37
Appendix III

GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and 

Projected Spending on the New Triad in the 

Future Years Defense Program

Page 38 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Total projected spending does not add to $360.1 billion and total percent does not add to 100 

due to rounding.

Mobility Forces

• Special Operations Forces

3.5 1

Guard and Reserve Forces

• B-52 Squadrons, Air Force 

Reserve

• F-16 Air Defense Squadrons, 

Air National Guard

4.8 1

Research and Development

• Army Missile Defense Systems 

Integration

• Space-based Radar

• Next Generation Bomber 

98.2 27

Central Supply and Maintenance n/a n/a

Training, Medical, and Other 

General Personnel Activities 

n/a n/a

Administration and Associated 

Activities

• Management Headquarters, 

Missile Defense Agency 

 0.9 <1

Support of Other Nations n/a n/a

Special Operations Forces

• Psychological Operations 

Activities, Active Army

• Joint Special Operations Forces 

Intelligence Activities

33.8 9

Total $360.1 100

(Continued From Previous Page)

Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars

Major force program 

category/Illustrative program 

elements

Total projected spending for

New Triad program elements Percent
Appendix III

GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and 

Projected Spending on the New Triad in the 

Future Years Defense Program

Page 39 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Projected New Triad 

Spending by Primary 

Appropriation 

Category

We analyzed the $360.1 billion of projected spending associated with the 

New Triad based on primary appropriation category, as illustrated in 

figure 3. We determined that the largest amount of projected spending is for 

research, development, test, and evaluation funding, which accounts for 

$141.8 billion or 39 percent of the $360.1 billion in projected spending that 

we identified. We identified $111.0 billion in projected spending for 

operation and maintenance appropriations, or 31 percent of the total 

spending that we identified.

Figure 3: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Primary Appropriation Category, 

Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009

Note: Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars.

18%

31%

11%

1%

39% Research, development, test, and 

evaluation $141.8 billion 

Military construction $2.6 billion

Military personnel $41.2 billion 

Operation and maintenance 

$111.0 billion 

Procurement $63.5 billion 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Appendix III

GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and 

Projected Spending on the New Triad in the 

Future Years Defense Program

Page 40 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Projected New Triad 

Spending by DOD 

Organizations

Defensewide programs, including programs managed by the Missile 

Defense Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and intelligencerelated defense agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, account 

for 50 percent of the $360.1 billion of projected spending that we identified 

as being associated with the New Triad. Spending for Missile Defense 

Agency-related program elements totals $53.1 billion during fiscal years 

2004 through 2009 and is greater than the spending we identified for either 

the departments of the Army or Navy. As shown in figure 4, among the 

military departments the Air Force accounts for the largest share of New 

Triad spending—$112.9 billion, or 31 percent of the $360.1 billion that we 

identified for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. Spending by the Air Force, 

Army, and Navy includes service support for defense agencies and 

combatant commands, such as the U.S. Strategic Command.

Figure 4: Projected Spending for the New Triad by DOD Organizations, Fiscal Years 

2004 through 2009

Note: Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars.

a

Includes Marine Corps.

Defensewide $179.9 billion

Navy $39.4 billiona

Air Force $112.9 billion

50%

11%

31%

8%

Army $27.9 billion

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Page 41 GAO-05-540 Military Transformation

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402

Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, 

Mark J. Wielgoszynski, David G. Hubbell, Kevin L. O’Neill, 

Julie M. Tremper, and Renee S. McElveen made key contributions to 

this report.

(350475)
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